Towards a Militarized Protest Policing
Style in the Netherlands?
Kirsten Zweers - s1779974
Supervised by Anouk van Leeuwen en Jelle van Buuren
Thesis in fulfillment of the Master of Science in Crisis and Security Management at the Faculty Campus The Hague at Leiden University, June 2017
Abstract
Police militarization is becoming increasingly apparent in many different sectors of society in the United States and in the European Union. While there is a substantive body of knowledge on the militarization of law enforcement activities, such as protest policing, in the United States, research on this topic for Member States of the European Union is scarce. It is however important to research police militarization of protest policing styles of Member States of the European Union, because the extent to which police conduct is militarised has a considerable impact on whether a demonstration turns violent or not. This thesis therefore aims to answer to what extent a shift is noticeable towards militarization noticeable in the protest policing style of the Netherlands since 2002? To do so, this thesis studies the theoretical development of police militarization through a qualitative analysis, and tests whether the theoretical findings translate to practice through a Protest Event Analysis. It does so by combining a model on police militarization and a model on strategic incapacitation, and by examining police militarization in three dimensions of militarization: the military
dimension, the organizational dimension, and the operational dimension. The results of the qualitative and Protest Event Analysis show that in general, police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style, apart from a peak in 2010, is low. After stating possible suggestions for this result, this thesis concludes that a spillover effect from militarised sectors such as the protection of individuals and objects and border security, to non-militarised sectors such as protest policing, has not yet occurred because a significant event, such as the 9/11 attacks in the United States, has not happened in the Netherlands.
Foreword
This thesis is written as a final assignment of the Master Crisis and Security Management of Leiden University. This thesis analyses the extent of police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis is the first research that touches upon police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style. The results and the assessments of this thesis therefore provide for important ideas for future research.
The idea for this current topic came after I read the paper Blurring the Dividing Line by Lutterbeck (2015) during the course of Internationalisation of Crisis and Security
Management. During the course of the Master, I remained intrigued as to find out in which ways and to what extent police militarization occurs in the Netherlands. I am therefore grateful to complete this Master with a thesis on the topic which has captured and held both my attention and my curiosity.
Herewith I would like to thank Anouk van Leeuwen and Jelle van Buuren for their help and guidance during the process of writing this thesis. Their knowledge and support helped me to fully explore and analyse the topic of police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style to the best of my ability.
The Hague, 8th of June, 2017
Index
1. Introduction 5 1.1 Reader’s Guide 8 2. Theoretical Framework 9 2.1 Police Militarization 9 2.2 Protest Policing 112.3 Militarization of the Dutch Protest Policing Style? 14
2.4 Providing Context 15
2.4.1 The influence of Mass-Behaviour 15
2.4.2 The Dutch Protest Culture 17
2.4.3 A New Policing Structure 18
3. Methodological Framework 20
3.1 Case-Selection 20
3.2 Part One: A Qualitative Analysis 20
3.3. Part Two: a PEA Analysis 22
3.4 Time-Frame: from May 2002 until December 2016 23
3.5 Measurements 24
3.6 Threshold 26
3.7 Limitations 27
4. Militarization of the Dutch Protest Policing Style in Theory 28
4.1 Extent of Martial Weaponry and the Use of Advanced Military Technology 28
4.1.1 Military Material and Equipment 28
4.1.2 The Use of Military Technology 29
4.2 The Expansion of Specialised Police Forces 31
4.2.1 The ME 31
4.2.2 The Mounted Police, Dog Brigades and BRATRA-units 32
4.2.3 Arrest Teams of the Marechaussee 32
4.3 Operational Patterns Modeled After the Military 33
4.3.1 The Influence of New Communication Technologies 33
4.3.2. Physical Violence and Police Aggressiveness 35
4.3.3 Operational Tactics and the Controlling of Space 37
5. Militarization of the Dutch Protest Policing Style in Practice 39
5.1 Detailed oversight of the years 2002-2016 on police conduct during protests 39
5.2 Results 47
5.2.1 The Military Dimension 47
5.2.2 The Organizational Dimension 48
5.2.3 The Operational Dimension 49
5.4 The Period Since 2010 51
6. Discussion 53
6.1 Newspaper Coverage of Police Conduct during Protest Events 53
6.1.1 Summary 54
6.2 Militarization In Other Sectors 54
6.2.1 The Protection of Objects and Individuals 54
6.2.2 Border Protection 56
6.2.3 Summary 57
7. Conclusion 58
8. References 60
9. Annex 72
1. Introduction
“The human rights organization Amnesty International has expressed concerns about police action during the ‘Black Piet’- protest in Rotterdam in a letter to the mayor of
Rotterdam, Aboutaleb, and the police. Most of the 198 arrests - all arrested persons have currently been released - were unlawful according to the organization. Amnesty International points out that above all an investigation needs to be conducted in order to investigate the violence that the police used against one of the protesters. The video footage of the arrest of the anti-Zwarte-Piet-activist Jerry Afriyie allegedly shows that the police used disproportionate violence during the arrest” (Volkskrant, 2016, Own
Translation ) 1
The above quote summarizes how Dutch policing units managed the street demonstrations staged against the Dutch character of ‘Black Piet’ (Zwarte Piet), a traditional figure that is considered discriminating by participants of the street demonstrations. It makes us question whether this example indicates a trend towards an increased characterization of the protest policing style of the Netherlands by means such as mass arrests, surveillance, and the use of violence. Such a process, known as militarization, is defined by Peter Kraska (2007) as the “process of arming, organizing, planning, training for, threatening, and sometimes
implementing violent conflict”, by using military power, hardware, operations, organization, and technology as its primary problem-solving tools (p. 3). More specifically, police
militarization of protest policing is the process whereby “civilian police increasingly draw 2
from, and pattern themselves around, the tenets of militarization . . .”, and police units increasingly consider the use of force as the most effective or appropriate means to manage protests (p. 3). The question that therefore arises is: to what extent is a shift towards
militarization noticeable in the protest policing style of the Netherlands since 2002?
This thesis seeks to provide an answer to that question. Kraska (2007) points out the effect of the 9/11 attacks on the policing culture in the United States (US), as powers
1 The author is responsible for the translation of quotes of Dutch sources such as newspaper articles and
documents.
2 The concept of militarization can also be used as theoretical lenses to make sense of a wide range of issues and
assigned to the US government in the name of protecting the country from terrorists have also been used in other sectors, such as protest policing (p. 10 & 11). As such a striking event has not occurred in the Netherlands, this thesis takes the murder of Pim Fortuyn in May 2002 as the starting point for its analysis, because it has had a most similar effect in the Netherlands . 3
This thesis therefore analyses the extent to which the protest policing style of the Netherlands is militarized in the period from 2002 until 2016. It is important to point out that by taking May 2002 as the starting point for its analysis, this thesis solely focusses upon the effect of terrorist attacks on police militarization, although the dynamics of police militarization is also shaped by other factors.
In order to answer the question at hand, the analysis of this thesis is divided into two parts: the first part of the analysis constitutes a qualitative analysis of existing theoretical information on militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in the Netherlands. The second part of the analysis of this thesis asks whether the theoretical findings of the extent to which police militarization occurs in the Dutch protest policing style are also translated into
practice. In order to do so, this thesis studies Dutch national newspaper articles on protests
since 2002 which include descriptions of police conduct. Newspaper articles are chosen as the primary source of information for the second part of the analysis of this thesis, foremost, because newspaper articles not only provide for factual information, but also provide
contextual information that is necessary for the study of the extent to which police conduct during protests is militarized in the Netherlands (Fillieule & Jiminez, 2003, p. 260).
It is of scientific importance to research the extent to which the protest policing style is militarized in the Netherlands because of two reasons. Scholarly attention has been paid to police militarization of protest policing in the US (McPhail, Schweingruber & McCarthy, 1998; Maguire, 2016; Narr et al., 2006). In addition, striking documentaries such as “Do Not Resist” (2016) by Atkinson show the growing militarization within the US police forces (VRPO, 2017). Research on this topic in the European Union (EU) is however scarce (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998; van Leeuwen et al., 2016; Gillham & Noakes, 2005; Gillham, 2011). Indeed, van Leeuwen, McCarthy, van Stekelenburg, Klandermans (2016) have conducted research on the protest policing style of EU Member States and have investigated the
3 This thesis does not assume that before May 2002 there was no sign of militarization in the protest policing
style of the Netherlands. The period since May 2002 is foremost chosen for the analysis of this thesis because of the significant effect of the assassination of Pim Fortuyn on the Dutch protest policing style.
diffusion of the strategy of ‘strategic incapacitation’ from transnational protests to national protests. Van Leeuwen et al. have found that in the EU the diffusion of strategic
incapacitation at protests, marked by selective and one-sided communication, mass arrests, the use of force, extensive surveillance, and the control of space from transnational protests to national protests is limited (p. 146).
It is however important to point out that van Leeuwen et al.’s (2016) research has investigated specific protests in time between 2009 and 2013, rather than investigating police militarization as a process within an established time period. In addition, as is pointed out by Della Porta, Peterson and Reiter (2006), there is great variation and fluidity in the protest policing strategies of the EU Member States (p. 87). As van Leeuwen et al.’s research
touches upon protest policing events in several EU Member States, it is important to focus on a specific EU Member State in order to gain full understanding of its protest policing style and the extent to which its protest policing style is militarized. As a result, this thesis tests the validation of the study conducted by van Leeuwen et al., firstly, by studying police
militarization in the field of protest policing in a period of time, being from 2002 until 2016, and, secondly, by studying the protest policing style of the Netherlands in particular.
It is also of societal importance to investigate this topic because greater insight in police militarization of protest policing in the Netherlands can help reduce conflicts at protest events. When police units increasingly consider military power, technology and hardware as the most appropriate and effective means to manage protests (Kraska, 2007, p. 3), this will have implications for the interactions that police officers have with citizens, and more
specifically, protesters. In fact, as van Leeuwen et al. (2016) point out that “research revealed that the police conduct has a considerable impact on whether a demonstration turns violent or not” (p. 124). Thus, when the Dutch protest policing style indeed is making a shift towards militarization, police handling of protest events could in fact lead to more conflicts at protests since police officers are more likely to use aggressive approaches and protesters can react to such approaches more violently (p. 124). Therefore, the conclusions of this thesis are of importance to Dutch policing units which aim to limit such conflicts during protest events.
1.1 Reader’s Guide
This thesis proceeds as follows. The second section, the Theoretical Framework, is divided into four parts. In Police Militarization, the concepts of militarism and militarization are defined, as well as existing literature on police militarization both in the EU and in the US. The second part outlines existing knowledge on protest policing, with a focus on the three different protest policing styles: escalated force, negotiated management, and, most
importantly, strategic incapacitation. The third part of this section explains gaps in literature on police militarization and protest policing and establishes the foundation for the analysis of this thesis. Lastly, the Theoretical Framework establishes background information on factors which influence protest policing in the Netherlands and which provide for a context of the analysis.
In the third section of this thesis the Methodological Framework is outlined. The case-selection of the Netherlands is explained, as well as the decision for the time-frame 2002-2016. The methodology for the qualitative analysis and the Protest Event Analysis will be stated. Moreover, this section explains the thesis’ combination of two different models, one on police militarization and one on strategic incapacitation, which are essential for the analysis of this thesis. Lastly, this section states the limitations of this methodological framework.
The fourth section of this thesis, Militarization of the Dutch Protest Policing Style in Theory, focusses on a qualitative analysis in order to research the extent of militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in theory. In addition, it poses expectations for the fourth section, Militarization of the Dutch Protest Policing Style in Practice, which implements a Protest Event Analysis in order to research the extent of militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in practice. The fifth section therefore establishes whether the expectations of the correlation between police militarization in theory correlates with police militarization in practice.
The sixth section of this thesis, the Discussion, touches upon possible suggestions for the results of the qualitative analysis and the Protest Event Analysis. It does so by focussing upon the methodological limitations of this thesis: the use of newspaper articles and the use of terrorism as the context for the analyses. The last section of this thesis is the Conclusion,
which provides for a summary of the theoretical framework, the methodological framework and the results. In addition, the Conclusion states the limitations of this thesis and poses ideas for further research in the area of protest policing.
2. Theoretical Framework
This section firstly conceptualizes the concept of police militarization, after which it outlines existing literature on protest policing and outlines the societal and scientific importance of investigating the extent to which the protest policing style of the Netherlands is militarized. In addition, this section provides context for the analysis of this thesis by outlining the protest culture, the movement of mass-behaviour, and the development of the structure of the
policing system of the Netherlands.
2.1 Police Militarization
Different actors are responsible for maintaining safety and stability in the Netherlands. These actors protect vital interests such as territorial safety, economic safety, social and political stability, physical safety and ecological safety in order to prevent the Dutch national security from being compromised (NCTV, 2012, p. 3). Firstly, the Dutch military traditionally has been responsible for the protection of its own territory and that of its alliance’s partners, for the improvement of the international legal order and stability, for the support of civil authorities in law enforcement duties, and for disaster relief and humanitarian aid, both nationally and internationally (Ministerie van Defensie, 2013, p. 57). Secondly, the Dutch national police has been responsible for preventing and challenging crime, for maintaining public order, for detecting illegal acts, assisting in emergency situations, performing policing duties for the Ministry of Justice, and by enforcing the law (NCTV, 2012, p. 4).
A development is however noticeable in which this clear dichotomy between the military and the police is blurring and powers and tasks of the two are slowly converging (Lutterbeck, 2015; Kraska, 2007; Dunlap, 1999). As Kraska (2007) points out: “we have been witnesses to a little noticed but nonetheless momentous historical change - the traditional distinctions between military/police, war/law enforcement, and internal/external security are rapidly blurring” (p. 1). One such way by which this distinction is blurred is by the
police-ization of the military (Dunlap, 1999; Kraska, 2007). Firstly, police-ization of the military is illustrated by the increased involvement of the military in for example counterdrug activities, as military personnel is used to perform drug prevention practices (Dunlap, 1999, p. 221; Kraska, 2007, p. 2). Secondly, the ‘Golden Age of Terrorism’ will continue to
reinforce the need to use military force for law enforcement activities because this unprecedented security challenge overwhelms police resources (Dunlap, 1999, p. 220; Kraska, 2007, p. 2; Bergen, 2015). Lastly, military forces are increasingly deployed for routine patrol operations, house-to-house searches and for arresting law-breakers in order to combat crime (Kraska, 2007, p. 10). Dunlap (1999) for example points out that in the case of the US “ military forces have been used to enforce civil law against domestic violence, mostly to suppress riots and similar civil disorders; in particular, troops were used on several occasions to counter labor unrest” (p. 219).
A second way in which the convergence of the powers and tasks of the police and the military is noticeable is through the process of militarization. Militarization, according to Kraska (2007), is a development in different sectors of society as domestic security efforts such as the war on drugs, crime and terrorism “increasingly draw from, and pattern
themselves around, the tenets of militarism and the military model” (p. 3). Such tenets include the use of military technology, hardware, operations, and organizational structure (p. 3). Militarization, then, is the implementation of the ideology of ‘militarism’, which is “a set of beliefs, values, and assumptions that stress the use of force and the threat of violence as the most appropriate and efficacious means to solve problems” (p.3). Militarization therefore is a concept that helps us to understand how the influence of military power and military
technologies influence different day-to-day aspects of society. In fact, as Kraska argues, “militarism and militarization can operate as powerful theoretical lenses to make sense of many issues and trends in society . . .” (p. 4 & 5).
Militarization in the sector of law enforcement, known as police militarization, constitutes the process whereby police units consider the use of force as the most effective and appropriate means to manage national security threats such as organized crime, the war on drugs and the war on terrorism (Kraska, 2007, p. 3). Arguably, the most pronounced example of the manifestation of police militarization is that of the US (Kraska, 2001; Maguire and King, 2004; Mcculloch, 2004; Zimmerman, 2005). Police units in the US have incorporated tenets of militarization in several ways. Firstly, there is a growth in the
formation of special police units that are modelled after military special groups (Kraska, 2007, p. 2). For example, Police-Paramilitary Units (PPU’s) in the US have found to “derive their appearance, tactics, operations, weaponry, and culture to a significant extent from military special operations units” (Kraska, 2007, p. 6) in for example training in hostage
rescue. In fact, 89% of the police departments in the US in the late 1990’s adopted PPU’s - almost double the size compared to the mid 1980’s (Kraska, 2007, p. 6). Secondly, both special units and normal civilian police which have incorporated certain tenets of militarization are not only more employed in drug raids, terrorist situations, sniper, and hostage situations, but also in for example routine patrol work (Kraska, 2007, p. 7).
Whereas literature on police militarization is extensive for the US, literature which extends research on police militarization to the case of Europe is less well developed
(Lutterbeck, 2015; McCulloch, 2004). The most apparent case of police militarization in the EU is in ‘border policing’ practices (Lutterbeck, 2015, p. 234). Militarization of border policing in the EU is pronounced because of the Schengen treaty which was signed in 1985 and which largely abolished internal border checks. For instance, at Germany’s and Austria’s borders police units patrol with military-type thermal cameras which were previously used by the US in the Vietnam War. Thus, as put in the words of Lutterbeck (2007):
One implication of these heightened ‘border anxieties’ in EU or Schengen countries has been that police forces responsible for border enforcement have been resorting to a growing amount of military-style technology and hardware
to secure the outer frontiers of the Schengen area development often decried by human rights organisations as unacceptable ‘border militarisation’ (p. 234). Secondly, police militarization in the EU is visible in the modus operandi style of Member States’ police units as they increasingly turn to military style technologies and structures in order to maintain public order (p. 235 t/m 238). For example, In Germany institutional rearrangements and legislative changes have not only facilitated cooperation between its foreign intelligence agency and its civil police, but even have transferred surveillance powers to its civil police in order to manage public order (p. 239.) In addition, in the United Kingdom (UK) police units have adopted military-style command and control structures in the area of public order (p. 241).
2.2 Protest Policing
Police militarization is thus apparent in many different sectors of society in the US and in the EU, even in routine law enforcement practices such as maintaining the public order (Kraska,
2007; Lutterbeck, 2015). What does existing literature say then about police militarization in the area of protest policing? Protest policing, according to Della Porta and Fillieule (2006) is “the police handling of protest events” (p. 217). Such police handling roughly has taken on three different styles in the history of protest policing: escalated force, negotiated
management, and strategic incapacitation (Gillham, 2011, p. 83).
The first protest policing style, which prevailed through most of the twentieth century, is that of escalated force, defined by Gillham et. al (2011) as “a repertoire of tactics revolved around the use of arrests, beatings, tear gas, bullets, and other weapons meant to quell protests by inflicting pain and suffering” (p. 82). During the twentieth century, protests were considered to disturb the public order as protesters were seen as unpredictable (van Leeuwen et al., 2016, p. 126). As a result, policing revolved around the use of repressive and aggressive means in order to manage such ‘unpredictable’ protests and their participants. Secondly, negotiated management, described as a “decidedly softer approach”, followed after the normalization of protests in the 1960’s and 1970’s (van Leeuwen et al., 2016, p. 126). Protests such as for example on gay rights and abortion stimulated an approach by which police units negotiated agreements with protesters prior to protest events in order to prevent conflicts (McPhail et al., 1998, p. 51). Lastly, strategic incapacitation is used to manage protest events through the use of force, selective communication, mass arrests, the control of space and the extensive use of surveillance (van Leeuwen et al., 2016, p. 127). Its use
increased after police units failed to effectively manage transnational protests through negotiated management (Della Porta, Reiter and Peterson, 2006; Gillham, 2011; van Leeuwen et al., 2016).
According to Gillham (2011) that the goal to accomplish effective protest management with strategic incapacitation is achieved in three ways:
1) the use of surveillance and information sharing as a way to assess and monitor risks, 2) the use of preemptive arrests and less-lethal weapons to selectively disrupt or incapacitate protesters that engage in disruptive protest tactics or might do so, and 3) the extensive use of fancing and barrier to isolate and contain disruptive protesters whether actual or potential (p.
3).
Consequently, there are 8 different dimensions that characterize the strategic incapacitation approach: mass arrests, the use of force, extensive surveillance, the control of space, selective
and one-sided communication, selective protection of demonstrator’s constitutional rights, selective tolerance for community disruption, and the widespread sharing of information on
protest organizations (Gillham, 2011; van Leeuwen et al., 2016).
The strategic incapacitation approach clearly incorporates tenets of militarization. In fact, according to Kraska (2007) there are 4 dimensions in which militarization can occur: the
cultural dimension, the organizational dimension, the operational dimension, and the material dimension (p. 4). Kraska defines the cultural dimension as “martial language, style
(appearance), beliefs, and values” (p. 4). Similarly, van Leeuwen et al. (2016) point out that in the protest policing style of strategic incapacitation communication is only established with cooperating participants of protest events and is selective and one-sided (p. 127). In addition, Kraska explains the organizational dimension as the “martial arrangements such as
‘command and control’ centers . . . or elite squads of officers patterned after military special operations patrolling high-crime areas” (p. 3). The strategic incapacitation approach thus shows militarized characteristics in its organizational dimension in for example the use of force against protesters as special police units are used such as mounted police or riot police (van Leeuwen et al., 2016, p. 127).
Thirdly, Kraska (2007) outlines the material dimension of militarization as the use of “martial weaponry, equipment, and advanced technology” (p. 3). In the approach of strategic incapacitation militarization of the material dimension is thus apparent as martial weaponry and equipment is used for the control of space, the use of force and conducting mass arrests. Lastly, Kraska points out that the operational dimension of militarization shows “patterns of activity modeled after the military such as in the areas of intelligence, supervision, handling high-risk situations, or war-making/restauration” (p. 3). As van Leeuwen et al. (2016) argue, the extensive use of surveillance such as the infiltration of protest organizations, and
real-time filming and photographing, are functions that distinguish strategic incapacitation from escalated force and negotiated management protest policing styles (p. 127). Thus, also in the operational dimension of the strategic incapacitation approach some tenets of
militarization have been incorporated.
In the case of the US, several scholars have addressed the militarization of its protest policing style because of its history of police violence during such demonstrations (Maguire, 2014; Geron, 2014). Most noticeably, protests following events such as for example the Ferguson shooting, during which a white officer shot and killed an 18-year old
African-American man, and the Occupy-Movement, have resulted in the view that “the way area police departments responded to the protests . . . [was] heavy-handed and overly militarized” (Maguire, 2014, p. 67). In fact, scholars have recognized a pattern of
unconstitutional and abusive practices in the policing of protests in the US whereby policing units increasingly rely upon the use of force due to a change of technology and a change of the public’s priorities (Geron, 2014, p. 149).
2.3 Militarization of the Dutch Protest Policing Style?
As the process of militarization can be seen in different sectors of society in the EU and we have witnessed the militarization of the protest policing style in the US, to what extent has the protest policing style in the EU militarized, and even more specifically, in the
Netherlands? Van Leeuwen et al. (2016) conclude in their research on the diffusion of the protest policing style of strategic incapacitation from transnational protests to national protests, that whereas the protest policing style in the US is repressive and strategic
incapacitation is indeed increasingly used as a protest management style, this development is less apparent in the EU (p. 146). As the strategic incapacitation approach shows congruence with tenets of militarization, this could indicate that the process of militarization in protest policing is also less apparent in the EU than in the US.
This thesis validates the study conducted by van Leeuwen et al. (2016) in two different ways. It is important to point out that van Leeuwen has studied the diffusion of strategic incapacitation in 8 different EU member states (Belgium, Czech Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), between 2009 and 2013. This thesis validates the study conducted by van Leeuwen et al. therefore firstly, by solely focussing upon one member state: the Netherlands. As is pointed out by Della Porta, Peterson and Reiter (2006), there is great variation and fluidity in the protest policing strategies of the European Member States (p. 87). This thesis argues that a thorough research solely focused on the Netherlands could indeed reveal a process of militarization of its protest policing style.
Most importantly however, is that this thesis investigates whether van Leeuwen et al.’s (2016) findings endure when a different methodology is applied: instead of using samples of random protest events between 2009 and 2013, this thesis investigates the process
of militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in the period between 2002 and 2016. This thesis thus assumes that the process of militarization in the protest policing style can in fact become apparent when investigating protest events in a time period, rather than
investigating police behaviour at protest events at specific points in time. Therefore, this thesis asks to what extent a shift towards militarization is noticeable in the protest policing style of the Netherlands since 2002?
2.4 Providing Context
In order to gain a thorough understanding of the question at hand, it is important to provide some background information on factors which shape and influence the context of the Dutch protest policing style.
2.4.1 The influence of Mass-Behaviour
As is pointed out by Postmes, Bezouw, Tauber, and van de Sande (2013), the nature and intensity of mass-behaviour in relation to protests has shifted considerably in history although protest, demonstrations, and riots have been ‘of all times’ (p. 5). In order to understand the influence of mass-behaviour on the increase and peak of militarization up until 2010, it is firstly important to gain some understanding of mass-behaviour itself. Postmes et al. establish several variables which influence mass-behaviour: the economic situation, the political situation, physiological predictors (drugs, alcohol, and temperature), the influence of the surroundings (segregation), structural opposition (leading to the formation of a group-identity and shared moral emotions), and psychological variables (social identity, moral involvement, and expected effectiveness) (p. 7 & 8).
On the background, the political situation only has its effect on mass-behaviour in protests when contradictions between two groups become centralised in the political agenda. Similarly, the economic situation can lead to tensions between different groups in society when the differences between groups such as adolescents, elderly or immigrants is
highlighted (Postmes et al., 2013, p. 9). As a result, political and economic predictors relate only indirectly with civil unrest, and normally only lead to unrest when contradictions
between those with power and those without power, or when contradictions between two groups with similar powers, such as women and men, or protestants or catholics, leads to severe polarisation (p. 76). On the foreground, physiological predictors, alcohol, drugs and temperature do have their effect on individual aggression and assault, although their precise effect on mass-behaviour is unknown (p. 77). In addition, there is a clear relation between unrest and location: segregation of economic or ethnic minorities can lead to unrest when such minorities are being stigmatised and which can lead to individual criminality and isolation (p. 80). Lastly, with regards to the interpersonal sphere, psychological predictors such as collective moral involvement, expected effectivity of a protest, and the awareness of a shared identity have significant impact on mass-behaviour (p. 81-83).
Up until 2010, there are a few significant indicators that explain the development of mass-behaviour in the Netherlands in the case of protest events. For example, the economic crisis, which started in 2007, has led to oppositions between different population groups and between the population and the government, also in the Netherlands (Postmes et al., 2013, p. 91). Important to point out is, that according to Postmes et al. (2013) the recession not only influenced mass-behaviour with regards to protests, but did also affected protest policing of the Dutch police force as they are “more inclined to act repressive” during demonstrations against governmental failures ( p. 91). Similarly, the political variability is substantial in the Netherlands since the elections of 2002: twenty to twenty-five percent of the Dutch
population votes for anti-establishment parties, such as the one of Pim Fortuyn (p. 93). In addition, the stigmatising of population groups such as immigrants in the Netherlands has been an ever increasing problem (p. 94). This is exemplified by the increase of population of the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), which has been increasingly able to mobilise voters with fear and hate towards islamic immigrants (p. 95). As argued by Postmes et al. “unrest goes hand in hand with the need for powerful leadership and a zero-tolerance policy” (p. 94). Therefore, in a context where the opposition between the Dutch population and immigrants increases repressive performance may occur in the policing of protests on such topics. Lastly, with regards to demographic, psychological and physiological predictors, Postmes et al. conclude that “we have assessed that there are no specific risks for the Netherlands following these predictors” (p. 98).
Moreover, as is argued by Postmes et. al (2013) “the risk for unrest increases when participants of protests have an explicit common goal. Such protests do not occur so often in
the Netherlands at the moment. The greatest risk for the Netherlands however remains spontaneous disturbances . . . Although in such situations a brief contrast between ‘we’ (the protesters) and ‘they’ (police and the ME) can exist, such contrast does not have a long lasting effect” (p. 102). Therefore, although political predictors, economic predictors,
physiological predictors and psychological predictors in the Netherlands indicate the increase of
spontaneous, bottom-up protests, characterised by a short-term discrepancy between protesters and the police, there have not been specific risks that show a mass movement of protest.
2.4.2 The Dutch Protest Culture
It is of essential importance to look at the historical context of protests in the Netherlands. As is argued by Postmes et al., (2013) “the willingness to demonstrate is the highest in countries which have a long tradition of protest and which have a police force with a burdened past” (p. 58). It is for this reason that protests in the south of the EU are usually more violent than in countries such as the Netherlands. As is pointed out by Postmes et al. “on the executive side [repressive] policy in the Netherlands is usually employed in an intelligent, conscientious and effective manner - the police in general is reticent to use violence and aims to solve incidents as much as possible through conversations” (p. 94). In addition, a crucial aspect of the Dutch method of working is the direct communication between police officers, civilians, and
victims, in combination with directed repression (p. 97). As a result, the Dutch police usually enjoys high legitimacy from the Dutch population (p. 94). It is for this reason, amongst others, that the Dutch population is less willingly to demonstrate than in countries such as for example the US.
The same is true for trust in the Dutch government as it usually enjoys high legitimacy (p. 93). Indeed, as mentioned above, anti-establishment parties have received votes and there has been a slight decrease in the trust of the Dutch government. In general however, the trust of the Dutch population is amongst the highest in European countries (CBS, 2016, p. 11). In addition, the Netherlands has been, even during the economic crisis, one of the richest countries in the EU (CBS, 2016, p. 69). Based on this historical context, the chance that a
sharp contradiction between Dutch civilians and the government, or amongst Dutch civilians on economic or political issues sparks violent protests is minimal compared to countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece.
Only with regards to minorities the Netherlands has had radical tensions as an
undeniable factor of risk for the escalation of protest events (Postmes et al., 2013, p. 110). In the period between 1960 and 1990 there was resistance of the Dutch population against immigrant workers (Adang et al., 2010). In addition, since 2002 there is substantial attention for fear and hate against Islam and immigrants, which is proven by the electoral success of the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) (Postmes et al., 2013, p. 111). Moreover, according to Postmes et al. (2013), the greatest sources of popular unrest during protest events in the Netherlands are protest events in which radical groups (extreme-left or anarchistic individuals) participate (p. 51). In the Netherlands, protests of squatter movements and anti-globalists are such a source of commotion and violence (p. 51). Research has examined that the expression of radical goals might influence police repression at protest events (Earl et al, 2003). In fact, as Earl et al. (2003) point out, the presence of social movement
organizations with radical goals influence police influence, as organizations which directly target the government and its various actor “present a more clear threat to power than other miscellaneous or single issue protests representing a variety of claims” (Ratliff, 2011, p. 30).
It is important to point out however that such contradictions between left-right and immigrants-natives indeed have existed in the Netherlands, and remain to exist now, they do not necessarily lead to confrontations at the neighbourhood level (Postmes et al., 2013, p. 95). As a result, there is not necessarily a positive relationship between such tensions and the increase of protests. Therefore, the risk for structural unrest because of segregation, social exclusion or discrimination appears to be minimal.
2.4.3 A New Policing Structure
Apart from the historical and the economic, political, and social context of protests in the Netherlands it is important to mention the recent re-organization of the police structure. The change to a centralised police structure, which was established in 2013, may not directly affect the nature of protests, but does influence the management of protests. Before 2012,
each regional corps in the Netherlands - being 25 in total - had its own police units, with 167 units in total (Politie, 2012, p. 12 & p. 13). This system of independent regional police departments was however heavily criticised for its ineffectiveness and inefficiency in solving safety, crime, and security challenges. Consequently, the Policing Law of 2012 established a system in which all police units became combined as ten regional districts in the under one nationale police authority (Politie, 2012, p. 14). With the new system of a centralised national
police, the Dutch government aims to increase efficiency, reduce overhead within the police and aimed to achieve greater trust of the Dutch population (Politie, 2012, p. 2).
It is important to point out that
researches have issued
Figure 2: Effect of Centralization on Policing Strategies (Das et. al, 2007, p. 530).
concerns about a possible increase in the extent of repression, combined with the
centralisation of police forces (Cachet & Marks, 2009; Das, Huberts & van Steden, 2007). Cachet & Marks (2009) for example argue that the nature of Dutch policing has changed dramatically
during the past decade as “Dutch policing and justice apparatus has traditionally been associated with pragmatism, tolerance and a systematic distaste for ‘anything which smacks of militarism” whereas nowadays “the Netherlands seems to drift toward the opposite side of the previously progressive ideal” in a more repressive climate” (p. 110). The relation with the development whereby Dutch police forces increasingly concentrate their efforts on more repressive tactics and the centralisation of police forces thus lies in the observation that “Crime, terrorism and general public fears have caught front-line police officers in a “crossfire” between liberal ideals and burning security issues [which] has resulted in
tendencies of centralization, penalization and responsibilization” (Das et al., 2007, p. 529). Das et al. (2007) have illustrated this relationship in Figure 2 above (p. 530). It is important to point out, that a greater centralised policing system does not lead to greater use of repressive means per se, but in combination with responsibilization and penalization it can indeed be highly influential on militarised tendencies (p. 530).
3. Methodological Framework
In order to gain a thorough understanding of the extent to which a shift towards militarization of protest policing is noticeable in the Netherlands, this section outlines the qualitative
analysis and the protest-event analysis (PEA) that is applied in this thesis and the operationalization of this methodological framework.
3.1 Case-Selection
This thesis researches the extent to which the protest policing style of the Netherlands is making a shift towards militarization. Van Leeuwen et al. (2016) have focussed in their article To What Extent Has Transnational Protest Policing Diffused to National European
Protest Events? on protest events in eight different European countries: Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (p. 122). Although van Leeuwen et al
.
conclude that the diffusion of the protest policing style strategic incapacitation to national protests is limited, the author also argues that:our sample of demonstrations is not necessarily representative for the eight countries under study. This is because the CCC project, which gathered the dataset, only included demonstrations that were large, (foreseen to be) non-violent, staged by a diverse range of
social movements, and known at least two weeks in advance (p. 147).
In addition, as Della Porta et. al (2006) point out, there is great variation and fluidity in the protest policing strategies of the European Member States (p. 87). This thesis thus studies the protest policing style of the Netherlands not only because a focus upon one European country of the selection of van Leeuwen et al’s research could reveal a variation, but also because a focus on smaller and more local protests could indeed indicate a process of militarization of the protest policing style in the Netherlands.
3.2 Part One: A Qualitative Analysis
The first section of the analysis of this thesis focusses on qualitative sources in order to assess whether in theory a process of militarization of the Dutch protest policing style exists. It is
important to point out, that this thesis uses the framework developed by Kraska (2007) who identified four dimensions of police militarization, which can be seen in the table below.
Table 1: Kraska’s (2007) Model on Police Militarization. Cultural Dimension Operational
Dimension Organizational Dimension Material Dimension ● martial language ● style (appearance) ● beliefs ● values ● patterns of activity modeled after the military (intel, supervision, handling high risk situations, war making/resta uration) ● martial arrangements (command and control structures, elite squads) ● martial weaponry ● equipment ● advanced technology e
It is important to point out that whilst militarization can occur in each dimension, it is not necessary for indicators to be found in all dimensions in order for police militarization to occur (Kraska, 2007, p. 3). In fact, as Kraska argues, “police militarization, in all countries across any time in history, must be conceived of as the degree or extent of militarization. Any assertion that the police are or are not militarized is simply misguided” (p. 3). Since this paper focuses on police conduct during protest events, this thesis therefore solely focuses upon the operational, the organizational and the material dimension. As a result, the cultural dimension of police militarization will not be taken into account.
When conducting a qualitative research on police militarization in theory, this thesis therefore focuses on the development of the material available to police forces, to the
development of military-like specialised police units, and to operational powers and functions assigned to police agencies. Such information will be retrieved from sources such as
3.3. Part Two: a PEA Analysis
Following the qualitative analysis, a Protest Event Analysis (PEA) will determine whether the findings of the extent of police militarization in theory also translate to practice. PEA is a form of content analysis which solely uses press articles in order to explain the process of social movements (Fillieule & Jiminez, 2003). PEA, as a content analysis, is a method to “systematically assess the amount of and features of protests across various geographical areas (from the local level up to the supranational level) and over time (from short periods of time up to several decades) (Hutter, 2014, p. 1 & Fillieule & Jiminez, 2003, p. 261). As a result, PEA focusses on social movements as a process, rather than regarding that social movements exist in isolations from other movements (Fillieule & Jiminez, 2003, p. 258).
Especially over the last decades, PEA has become a key method of social movement research (Hutter, 2014, p. 1). Although PEA originally was used for social movement research purposes solely, the method has refined and adapted to study other research fields. As this thesis aims to systematically assess the militaristic features of Dutch protests over a period of time and to develop an analysis on the process of militarization of the protest policing style in the Netherlands, PEA thus provides for a helpful methodological framework in order to answer this thesis’ research question. In order to conduct the PEA analysis, this thesis uses a dataset of
Dutch newspaper articles, news bulletins, news blogs and forums, gathered by LexisNexis. As this thesis aims to investigate the extent to which a shift is noticeable towards the
militarization of the protest policing style in the Netherlands with PEA, it solely uses Dutch national newspapers articles which are retrieved from this dataset.
It is not in the scope of this thesis to analyse all daily newspaper articles since 2002. Therefore, newspaper articles on protest events of both newspapers are analyzed for each first and third monday of the month from May 2002 until February 2016. In addition, newspaper articles are selected through a selection of keywords, noticeably protest (protest),
demonstratie (demonstration), activisten (activists), betoging (demonstratie), and
politieoptreden (police conduct). An analysis of these newspaper articles will then give a
militarized.
3.4 Time-Frame: from May 2002 until December 2016
It is important to point out that this thesis uses May 2002 as the starting point for its analysis because of the assassination of Pim Fortuyn on the 6th of May, 2002. According to Kraska (2007) the process of militarization has accelerated since the 9/11 attacks, as the war on terrorism has pushed “the US military’s mission of creeping into functions traditionally viewed as the purview of the police” (p. 10) in order to keep the public secure from the acts of terrorism. Similarly, Lutterbeck (2015) points out that events such as the London
bombings and the 9/11 attacks have changed the “traditional rules of engagement” for police officers and have replaced them by more militarized means such as ‘shoot-to-kill’ policies (p. 235 & 236). The 9/11 attacks thus have resulted in an increase of “the US military’s mission of creeping into functions traditionally viewed as the purview of the police” (p. 10). In fact, the author points out that whereas the US government has claimed a number of new policing powers in the name of protecting the country from terrorists, similar powers have also been used in other sectors (p. 10&11), such as in the policing of protests.
As in the Netherlands attacks such as the London bombings or the 9/11 attacks have not occurred, this thesis assumes that the assassination of Pim Fortuyn in May 2002 has had the most similar effect on the process of militarization on the protest policing style of the Netherlands. It therefore analyses newspaper articles on police conduct at protest events in the period from 2002 until 2016. De Wijk (2012), previous director of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), has pointed out that the assassination led to societal and political polarisation and indicated a “new era” (p. 6) of terror in the Netherlands. In fact, after the assassination of Fortuyn a new system of ‘supervise and secure’ was implemented in the Netherlands which aimed to prevent (terrorist) attacks on persons, objects and services through an extended cooperation between regional police units, the Dutch royal military police (KMAR), and the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Agency (AIVD) (p. 6 & 7), whilst using methods such as protective intelligence (p. 12). The effect of the murder of Pim Fortuyn therefore foremost had its effect on militarization of personal security. In fact, as is argued by Cachet & Marks (2009) “The performance crisis around 2000, the terrorist attacks
in New York, London and Madrid and the murders of politician Pim Fortuyn and writer Theo van Gogh fuelled a strong demand for more effective as well as more repressive police work” (p. 110). This thesis therefore assumes that the assassination of Pim Fortuyn has had an accelerated effect on the process of militarization since repressive measures sparked by the murder may have diffused to the Dutch protest policing style.
3.5 Measurements
In order to measure the extent to which the protest policing style in the Netherlands has been militarized since 2002 in newspaper articles on protest events, this thesis combines the two different models provided by Kraska (2007) and Gillham (2011). As mentioned above, this thesis uses Kraska’s dimensional model (2007) on police militarization. In addition, Gillham (2011) has developed a model on strategic incapacitation as a protest policing style, which consists of eight different dimensions (Table 2).
Table 2: Gillham’s (2011) model on Strategic Incapacitation.
First Amendment Rights ● protesters who follow
pre-determined guidelines will be protected
Tolerance for Community Disruption ● selective determination of location, time and behaviour that are tolerated
Communication ● selective one-way communication
● issue commands
● often refusal to communicate
Extent and Manner of Arrests ● are selectively applied ● to arrest transgressive actors
Extent and Manner of Using Force ● use of less-lethal weapons such as tear-gas, pepperspray
● cause injury ● elite squads
Use of Surveillance ● infiltration or informants
● before and during protest events ● information used to disrupt protest
Information Sharing ● extensive reliance on the share of information
● selective engagement of media
Controlling Space ● elaborate fencing system ● arrests
In order to create a model of the militarization of the protest policing style, all 8 dimensions of Gillham’s strategic incapacitation model are combined with Kraska’s 4 dimensions of militarization, leading to the following model (Table 3):
Table 3: Combination of Kraska’s (2007) and Gillham’s (2011) model:
Militarization of the Strategic Incapacitation Protest Policing Style
Material Dimension
- martial weaponry, technology, advanced equipment
● extent and manner of using force
Organizational Dimension
- martial arrangements
● extent and manner of using force Operational Dimension
- patterns of activity modeled after the military
● controlling space ● use of surveillance ● sharing of information ● extent and manner of arrests
As mentioned above, this thesis focuses on police conduct during protest events and therefore does not take into account the cultural dimension of Kraska’s framework. Similarly, the indicators of communication, first amendment rights, and tolerance for community disruption of Gilham’s model will not be taken into account since they belong to the cultural dimension of police militarization of protest policing. Since both models are not specific to the case study of the Netherlands, it is important to outline the specific regulations with regards to the material, the organizational, and the operational specifics of Dutch police units. When such specifics are added the following, and final, model on the militarization of the Dutch protest 4
policing style can be found below (Table 4):
4 The specifics of the material, operational, and organizational dimension follow from the qualitative analysis
Table 4: Combination of Kraska’s (2007) and Gillham’s (2011) model + indicators.
Militarization of the Strategic Incapacitation Protest Policing Style
Material Dimension
- martial weaponry, technology, advanced equipment
● extent and manner of using force - wapenstok (baton)
- helmen (helmets) - schilden (shields)
- dienstpistool (service gun) - pepperspray
- semi-automatisch pistool
(semi-automatic gun)
- kogelwerend vest (bulletproof vest) - traangas (tear-gas)
- machine geweer (machine gun) - helikopter (helicopter)
- waterkanon (water cannon) - speedboat (speedboat) Organizational Dimension
- martial arrangements
● extent and manner of using force - politie te paard (mounted police) - hondenbrigade (dog brigade) - ME (Mobile Unit)
- (Marechaussee (Military Police)) Operational Dimension
- patterns of activity modeled after the military ● controlling space - charges (charges) ● use of surveillance - surveillance (surveillance) ● sharing of information - filmen (police filming)
● extent and manner of arrests - massa-arrestaties (mass arrests) - gewonden (injuries)
- agressie (aggression)
3.6 Threshold
In addition, it is important to point out that this thesis assumes that at least two of the
indicators from the table above should be mentioned in a newspaper article in order for police conduct at a protest event to be labelled as militarized.
3.7 Limitations
The use of newspaper articles for a qualitative analysis and a PEA analysis has some limitations. Firstly, with regards to the qualitative analysis of this thesis, use of secondary sources. Secondly, with regards to the PEA analysis, it is important to point out that
newspaper articles are subject to biases, as there is an “inevitability of bias in basic cognitive and perceptual mechanisms” (Zelizer, 2002, p. 3). Lastly, the data allows to capture only a small proportion of the ensemble of newspaper articles on police conduct at protest events as the collection and analysis of such articles is very time consuming (Fillieule & jiminez, 2003, p. 276). The conclusions that are retrieved from the data in this thesis therefore do not
provide for a full overview of the extent to which the protest policing style in the Netherlands is militarized, but rather give an indication of such a development.
4. Militarization of the Dutch Protest Policing Style in Theory
This section analyses the extent of theoretical militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in the organizational, operational and material dimension. It does so by focussing on militarization as a process between 2002 and 2016. It does so by outlining the developments in this time period for all three dimensions through a qualitative analysis of government papers, newspaper articles, journal and magazine articles, and books. .
4.1 Extent of Martial Weaponry and the Use of Advanced Military Technology
In order to understand the theoretical development of militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in the material dimension, it is important to look at changes in the use of martial weaponry and the adoption of military technology which are used in order to manage protest events.
4.1.1 Military Material and Equipment
Nowadays, police officers has several kinds of material to its availability. The standard armour of a regular police officer is a short baton, a Walther P5, handcuffs, and pepper spray. In addition, a police officers can use a long baton when the situation demands it. The use of handcuffs is a standard precautionary tool which is used extensively, except when there are no signs of flight risk such as with elderly people. Pepper spray is also a commonly used tool since it is more effective in neutralising aggressive suspects but results in less injuries than for example physical violence (De Nationale Ombudsman, 2013, pp. 58-67). A baton on the other hand, is not used regularly as it results in injuries and is used foremost as a means to deter suspects (De Nationale Ombudsman, 2013, pp. 58-67). For example, when a line is formed in order to keep for example protesters at a distant, police officers have to use the baton aggressively in order to achieve some effect, and therefore prefer to use pepper spray in order to achieve a greater effect but to limit physical injuries. Lastly, in some cases, police units can make use of water cannons which are deployed at high risk situations (de Nationale Ombudsman, 2013, pp. 58-67).
Specialised units on the other hand have more equipment to their availability. The ME for instance, can use a Walther P5, pepper spray, CS-tear gas grenades, a MZP grenade launcher, a semi-automatic fire gun of Heckler and Koch, and a MP5A handgun (De
Nationale Ombudsman, 2013, pp. 58-67). The last three mentioned in this last are only used in extraordinary high-risk situations. In addition the unit has protective clothing such as helmets, a shield, torso-, shin-, hip- and arm protectors and ME officers can make use of a short and a long baton and a gasmask. Because of the specialised tasks which such units have to perform, their material is therefore more extensive than that of standard police officers. Although specialised units have such equipment to their availability, scales of unrest
determine when such equipment may be used. During most ‘resting scenario’s’ of public law enforcement the police, together with emergency services, will be prepared in such a way that deployment of the ME is not necessary (De Nationale Ombudsman, 2013, pp. 58-67). In some cases however, the ME is deployed with uniforms similar to ordinary police officers, whereby both cannot be easily distinguished. In a stadium of a disruption and public order, a ‘scenario of unrest’, the ME wears its standard uniform, without violent attributes such as automatic rifles and tear-gas. Only in a serious ‘scenario of escalation’ the ME appears fully clothed with such materials (De Nationale Ombudsman, 2013, pp. 58-67 & Staatscourant, 2007, pp. 1-8).
There are only a few significant developments in the adoption of martial weaponry by police departments in the policing of protests. As mentioned above, the debate about police violence has recently become more intensive. Although the adoption of new equipment has been more difficult because of the intensified debate, there are two developments in the adoption of new weaponry: the long baton and a taser (Meulen et al., 2013). However, they are only being tested and they have not yet been integrated in standard police uniforms.
4.1.2 The Use of Military Technology
The Dutch police is changing its organization, its operational tactics, and to some extent its equipment in order to maintain effective management of protest events (Baltink, 2006, p. 530). In order for police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in the material dimension to occur, available military technology has to be adopted by police forces. As
pointed out in 2006 however by Baltink, in practice the standardisation of the use of military technology by police forces in law enforcement activities such as protest policing is not easily feasible, although chances for such standardisation indeed occur (Baltink, 2006, p. 530). Even the Ministry of Internal and Royal Affairs (BZK) has pointed out in its policy document
Vision on Safety and Technology, that relatively little attention had been paid to the
technological possibilities for increasing safety up until that period (Baltink, 2006, p. 530). It is therefore interesting to look whether standardisation of military technology has occurred since the policy document. The “bluetrace crowd control” system is a system which allows police forces to map the movements of individuals through bluetooth phones
(Akkerman, 2012, p. 10). The system is developed by TNO, a company that focusses on the cooperation between emergency services, the national police, and defence by focussing on the sharing of technology. In addition to the “bluetrace crowd control” systems, surveillance systems such as LOTUS (developed by TNO) and Gatekeeper (developed by Thales
Netherlands) have been developed and are now distributed on the global market (Akkerman, 2012, p. 11-13). The standardisation of military-like surveillance technologies by police departments in protest policing is therefore the most prominent development in the standardisation of military technology.
A more recent development in the process of adopting military technology by police forces is the use of the drone for surveillance possibilities. As is stated by Koster (2013), “the use of drones for domestic affairs has developed itself rapidly, for example in the extension of surveillance-possibilities of law- and police services” (p. 37). Although the use of drones for domestic affairs is progressing fast in the US, in the Netherlands the use of drones has not been regulated yet. Indeed, the possibilities of the usage of drones has been acknowledged by for example the Minister of Internal Affairs who “has noticed that the usage of ‘flying
cameras’ for law enforcement of the public order can be necessary to maintain an overview of the movement of masses in public spaces” (Custers et al., 2015, p. 115). However, although the debate concerning the usage of drones is progressing, up until now the Dutch government has not dispensed permits or exemptions for the usage of drones by police forces.
The material available to law enforcement for the policing of protests therefore has changed only together with the introduction of specialised police units with the 2002 and 2007 regulations. Similarly, there has not been a sufficient legal base for the adoption of military
technology by police forces in the policing of protests. This thesis expects that the minimal development in the adoption of new (military) weaponry and technology is not sufficient enough to influence the material dimension of militarization of the Dutch protest policing style. As a result, this thesis expects that in practice, the lack of standardisation of new martial weaponry and technology results in a low militarization of the material dimension of the Dutch protest policing style.
4.2 The Expansion of Specialised Police Forces
Police Paramilitary Units (PPU’s) are police units which “derive their appearance, tactics, operations, weaponry, and culture to a significant extent from military special operations units” (Kraska, 2007, p. 6). An expansion of such units is an integral element to the
development of the operational dimension of the militarization of a protest policing style. In the period between 2002 and 2016, several of such units stand out in the Netherlands: the ME, the mounted police, the dog brigade, BRATRA units, and arrest teams from the Dutch military police: the Marechaussee.
4.2.1 The ME
The ME is an organization for the execution of specific activities within the police task (Staatscourant, 2007, p. 4). With its 1994 regulation, the ME was set to support the Dutch police force in extraordinary cases during which the capacity of the police force alone was not sufficient for coping with law enforcement disturbances (Staatscourant, 2007, p. 4). In 2002 this situation changed when in a police document on the Frame of Reference of Conflict- and Crisis Management which altered the availability, interchangeability, uniformity and quality of the ME with regards to law enforcement support (Staatscourant, 2007, p. 4). The most outstanding change in the functions of the ME was however established with the 2007 regulation which facilitated an increased deployment of the ME by the Dutch police force (Staatscourant, 2007. p. 4). The main difference between the 2002 police document and the 2007 regulation is that whereas the former facilitated an optional cooperation between the ME and Dutch police departments, the latter regulated the deployability and functions of the ME uniformly for all police departments (Kroon &
Hoeksema, 2014, p. 7). Following the 2007 ME regulation the core tasks of the unit widened from operating primarily at emergency public order situations to everyday law enforcement tasks such as event accompaniment and crowd control.
4.2.2 The Mounted Police, Dog Brigades and BRATRA-units
Besides the widening and deepening of law enforcement tasks of the ME, the 2007 regulation established the functions of recon units, mounted police, dog brigades and BRATRA units (Staatscourant, 2007, p. 4). Although such units existed already before this regulation, the theoretical functions and deployment of the units where theoretically established for law enforcement. Firstly, according to Art. 4, recon or scout units’ principal task is to “scout the situation inconspicuously prior to large scale law enforcement activities” in order to provide law enforcement executives with necessary intel (Staatscourant, 2007, p. 5). Similarly, the mounted police and dog brigade units, respectively established by Art. 5 and Art. 6, are specialised in the use of horses and dogs for violent incidents or in support of the ME during big events. Both units are imposing units and are therefore primarily used in order to control a crowd through for example charges. Lastly, the 2007 regulation established fire and teargas (BRATRA) units (Art. 9) which primary tasks is to clear blocked or barricaded infrastructure and to protect ME personnel through the use of teargas (Staatscourant, 2007, p. 5 & 6).
4.2.3 Arrest Teams of the Marechaussee
In addition to an expansion of PPU’s, Dutch law enforcement agencies also increasingly deploy actual military units in order to enforce law during protest events. In particular, arrest teams of the Marechaussee have become increasingly integrated in every-day law
enforcement tasks such as protest policing. Traditionally, arrest teams were foremost
occupied with the security of threatened individuals, the managing of hostage situations, and the arresting of highly dangerous suspects (Timmer, 2005, p. 518). Recently the tasks of arrest teams have however become more complex, more dangered, and more extensive (Timmer, 2005, p. 518). In fact, whereas previously the criterium for the involvement of arrest teams was ‘imminent firearm violence’, this criterium has now expanded to ‘life
