Keeping people in place: the policy objective of livelihoods strategies

Master Thesis Political Economy

Keeping people in place: the policy objective of livelihoods strategies.

Research Question: How will increasing migrants livelihoods encourage them to remain or move further?

Emma Vos 10115269

Darshan Vigneswaran

Who Belongs Where? Controlling Movement and Settlement June 23rd ₂₀₁₇

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INDEX

1.

Introduction ... 6

2.

Literature Review ... 9

2.1 Livelihoods Strategy ... 9 2.2 Voluntary Repatriation ... 11

2.3 The Jordan Model ... 15

2.4 Migration-Development Theories ... 18

2.5 Migrant Networks and Migration Systems ... 22

3.

Theoretical Framework... 24

3.1 Concepts and Relations ... 24

3.2 Theoretical expectations ... 26

4.

Sample and case selection ... 28

4.1 Case selection ... 28

4.2 The Iranian-Dutch Case ... 32

5.

Methodology ... 37

5.1 Operationalization ... 37

5.2 Method ... 37

5.3 Data Collection ... 39

5.4 Limitations of the Research ... 42

6.

Analysis ... 43

6.1 Introduction of key findings ... 43

6.2 Resources and Mobility ... 45

6.3 The Factor Family ... 50

6.4 First and second generation distinctions ... 52

6.5 The Intergenerational Relation ... 56

6.5 Migration Transition Theory ... 57

7.

Conclusion and Discussion ... 60

8.

References ... 62

9.

Appendixes ... 67

Appendix 1: Topic list ... 67

Appendix 2: Transcribed summarized interviews ... 67

Appendix A ... 68 Appendix B ... 70 Appendix C ... 73 Appendix D ... 75 Appendix E ... 78 Appendix F ... 81

4 Appendix G ... 84 Appendix H ... 87 Appendix I ... 90 Appendix J ... 93 Appendix K ... 96 Appendix L ... 98 Appendix M ... 101 Appendix N ... 103 Appendix O ... 105 Appendix P ... 107

6 1. Introduction

57.7 million people, of whom 19,5 million refugees were displaced worldwide according to The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) at the end of 2014. 6.4 million of these refugees were in protracted situations which entails being in exile for five years or more (UNHCR, 2015). As the number of long-term displaced persons increased, the international community advocated a change of policy focus. With no prospect of declining conflicts globally the sustainability of short-term humanitarian assistance is questioned. In 2014 the UNHCR presented the ‘Global Strategy for Livelihoods’. This new strategy aims to enhance the access to livelihoods for refugees in order to live active and productive lives during their displacement. The main objective of this strategy is to go beyond the means of humanitarian aid and to engage with refugees on a more developmental base. Through these livelihoods programs people will become more self-reliant and resilient which will have positive benefits for both people of concern and host states. Another anticipated benefit that arises from this policy shift towards developmental strategy is that; when people eventually repatriate they will have more human and financial capital to engage in the build-up of their ‘home’ countries (Betts and Collier, 2017). This last benefit is where the line between reality and policy becomes vague.

Generally there are three identified durable solutions for refugees; voluntary repatriation, local integration in the host state or resettlement to a third country (UNHCR,2013). It is widely agreed upon by the international community, both state and non-state actors, that repatriation is the most durable solution (Omata, 2013, Jansen & Löving, 2007; Black & Koser, 1999; Word Bank Group, 2015). However, the use of this notion as a starting point for refugee policy-making has been contested in the past years (Omata, 2016; De Haas, 2015; Easton-Calabria, 2015). Due to the rise of displacement and on-going crises there is an increasing gap between the capacity of the international community and the aspirations and wishes of refugees themselves (World Bank Group, 2015). The gap represents the struggle of finding a ‘durable solution’. On the one hand, we have the international policy-making community who believe repatriation is generally the most durable solution. On the other, we see that in reality finding a most durable solution is a very personal process influenced by numerous external factors. While, the international community struggles to contribute to finding a durable solution they deem best, the vision of refugees grows more divergent. That the international community sees repatriation as the best solution is related to the objectives they have as receiving countries. This objective is related to the tendency of keeping people in their place, close to ‘home’.

7 The renewed vision on long term solutions for migratory flows towards Europe has become a developmental issue instead of a short term humanitarian fix. European countries and institutions are adjusting their strategies towards more inclusive and developmental approaches to the refugee ‘crisis’. The underlying and general understanding for such policies is that this strategy is set-up to diminish the migratory flows towards Europe and to make sure the situation in the region improves. Europe must therefore be willing to invest greatly in such projects. Investing in these projects is a way to reduce the threat of the problem at a distance and to deal with the issue before it has a chance to disrupt the European welfare system (Betts & Collier, 2017). It is important to note the saliency of this aspect in the way these developmental projects to fix the refugee system are structured. The help and money from the EU will not be directed out of pure altruism. The reason this is such a salient issue is because many see migration as something that threatens the way of life in Europe and therefore must be controlled. The renewed strategy of Western based institutions can therefore not be seen without this idea of trying to keep people in their place. The Jordan Model is an example of such strategies. This model proposed by Betts and Collier (2015) sparked the argument that is central to this research. The question that arises from this is whether the implementation of Livelihoods strategies will lead to this objective. Will this developmental solution keep people in place? Is it reasonable for European countries to suspect that investing in these kind of projects will stop the migratory flow? This leads to the following research question: How will increasing migrants livelihoods encourage them to remain or move further?

There is limited willingness from the European countries to take people in. They will do their share in the region so that the outcome of migratory movement towards them can be controlled. The policy objective is very focussed on the outcome of migration and does not discuss the root causes of migration. The question central to this thesis is therefore not so much about the outcome of mobility decisions but more about how these decision come into being.

How will implementing policy to

increase one’s livelihood during displacement affect the mobility of migrants? The theoretical

implication of this train of thought is that the migrants will have an increase of resources at

their disposal which generally means an increase of mobility. Looking at this argument

repatriation does not seem very likely. However, the trajectory of migration is not as simple

as that and cannot be explained by just economic or developmental drivers.

The above mentioned framework, that serves as the base for refugee policy-making by the international community, seems to not fully take into account the micro-level complexity of refugees’

decision-8 making processes regarding their personal most durable solution. The average period in exile is twenty years or more (World Bank Group, 2015). While in exile, the values and aspirations of refugees are in flux. Being displaced is not an event, it is a process in which people seek to improve their situation. The strategies are aimed at improving one’s situation through increasing self-reliance but fail to illustrate how this improvement of livelihoods might alter the decision-making process of people of concern.

To turn these grand theories and global strategies into a feasible research this thesis will engage in a case study. The selected population for this case study are Iranian-Dutch citizen who fled Iran between 1980 and 2000. This thesis will try to extrapolate how the Iranian-Dutch case reflects the migration mechanism, as described above. How will their mobility decisions be altered by an increase of livelihoods or might there be external explanations? In the second chapter an extensive literature review will discuss the livelihoods strategy set up by UNHCR and other institutions. The second part of this chapter will provide a review of the Jordan Model which has been the critical starting point of this research. The subsequent paragraph will reflect on the implications of this model in respect to the existing discourse of migration literature. The third chapter will discuss the theoretical framework in which this thesis is written and elaborate on the theoretical expectations that the literature review has provided. The fourth chapter will contain the case selection. How and why was the Iranian-Dutch population selected as the case study of this research. In the subsequent paragraph the demographics of the Iranian-Dutch population will be discussed. The fifth chapter contains the methodology. This chapter will discuss the operationalization, method, data collection, limitations of the research and theoretical and societal relevance. The sixth chapter will contain the analysis of the retrieved data. In this chapter the research question will be answered and the hypothesis will be challenged. Finally a conclusion and discussion will follow.

9 2. Literature Review

2.1 Livelihoods Strategy

The Global Strategy for Livelihoods

As the assumed ‘refugee crisis’ grew larger the need for a different policy approach increased (Betts & Collier, 2017). The sole purpose of humanitarian aid is to provide people of concern with the basic means to survive. However, as the duration of displacement grows this humanitarian aid will not provide people of concern with a sufficient durable solution (UNHCR, 2014). Thus, several organizations such as The International Labour Organization (ILO), The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and The World Bank have decided to change focus towards the development of autonomy, self-reliance and resilience with those who are displaced. In the Global Strategy for Livelihoods 2014-2018 the UNHCR elaborates on the strategy. Livelihoods can be seen as any activity that contributes to the opportunity of people to secure basic needs such as water, food and shelter. According to the UNHCR engaging in livelihoods activities entails:

“(…) acquiring the knowledge, skills, social network, raw materials, and other resources to meet individual or collective needs on a sustainable basis with dignity. Livelihoods activities are usually carried out repeatedly within an income stream such as agriculture, pastoralism, fishing, employment within a market sector, or as an entrepreneur. Ideally, people work within one or multiple streams providing goods and services to a market economy based on cash exchange or barter. (UNHCR, 2014)”

The main objectives of the livelihoods strategy are to get people back to work and to let them become more self-reliant again with a sense of dignity. An important outflow of this self-reliance is the idea that increased self-reliance will also induce a certain form of resilience. When people obtain a degree of self-reliance that will contribute to their capacity to claim their civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights (UNHCR, 2014). Through all phases of displacement it is crucial for people to continue building self-reliance. This degree of self-reliance will eventually play a key role in the finding of a durable solution whether that might be returning to the country of origin, local integration or resettlement to a third country. UNHCR’s livelihoods programming is mainly focused on refugees but also addresses some cases such as; returnees, stateless persons and internally displaced persons.

The livelihood strategy aims to incorporate people of concern into local host state economies and markets. The legal employment of migrants is something governments usually do not prefer to

10 envision. Although providing people with a job is seen as the ultimate form of integration, it is often obstructed by governments (Werker, 2007). The opportunities of migrants in settlements are highly dependent on host state policies, such as restrictions on movement and work as well as the location of most settlement which are physically and economically isolated from the local market (Feldmann, 2007). These restrictions stifle the potential and productivity of the migrants but also obstruct the opportunities migrants might provide for the host state. The restrictions on integration are often imposed out of fear for the already underdeveloped labour market of the host state. The largest neighbouring refugee havens are mostly developing countries that already cope with negative economic prospects and unemployment. As the general thought is that migrants will come in to overrule the volatile labour market, migrants are often banned from the formal economy. However, there seems to be consensus in both policy and academic literature that the inflow of migrants can have mutual beneficial outcomes for both migrant and host country, if directed in the right manner. (UNHCR, 2016; ILO, 2015; De Haas, 2015; Korkmaz, 2017; World Bank, 2016).

A win-win-win situation

Trough close cooperation between host states and institutions such as; the World Bank, UNHCR, ILO, UNDP and others the aim is to redirect the humanitarian focus of the issue towards a more economic, developmental and market based inclusive approach. This is attractive for host states for it will give a large foreign direct investment (FDI) injections making the economy more attractive for both international companies and private parties. Through liberalization of the economy and the labour market the host states will strengthen their ties and position on the international markets (Betts & Collier, 2016). This idea of creating a more inclusive and liberalized system will require strong cooperation between host states and external institutions. It will be a challenge to achieve this mutual understanding and to overcome the negative conceptions on refugee integration. Apart from this change of focus from local governments there is also a direct need of this shift in the policies as projected by institutions as UNHCR (Betts & Collier, 2017). The livelihoods strategy goes beyond the first humanitarian actions. In order to enable people to become more autonomous UNHCR states that this also implies a shift in their own humanitarian culture towards a more developmental strategy. The change of focus should be redirected from short-term relief interventions towards more long-term self-reliant developmental strategies (UNHCR, 2014). Other financial institutions such as the World Bank are needed to step in. This way the host state might actually benefit from the inflow of refugees. The refugees will have a better life while being displaced and will be able to become more

11 autonomous. Meanwhile the host state will receive subsidies and other external financial injections boosting the local national economy. These are the first two wins, the third win is attributed to the next step the refugees will take. The third win implies that refugees need to be able to build up a livelihood and continue their development in exile not only for their wellbeing but also for the wellbeing of the country of origin. The idea is that generally people will want to return to their home country and that they will be the ones that have the heavy task of rebuilding it. By giving them the means to increase their lives in exile they will have more social and financial capital to bring back to their country once they return (Betts and Collier, 2017). This option of return is generally referred to as repatriation.

2.2 Voluntary Repatriation

Generally there are three identified widespread durable solutions for migrants; voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement to a third country. Generally refugee policy-makers, such as the UNHCR, highlight repatriation as the most preferable solution for refugees (Jansen & Löving, 2007; Black & Koser, 1999; Omata, 2016) This tendency towards repatriation is linked to an assumed inherent and inseparable desire of refugees to return to their ‘home’. The notion of ‘home’ is viewed by policy-makers as one geographical place, the country of origin. Repatriation is therefore considered as the natural and most favourable option for refugees. However, this is not in line with active refugee emplacement reality (Omata, 2016).

Remigration instead of Repatriation

The concept of repatriation relates to the idea of ‘returning to one’s fatherland’ which is connoted with some form of nostalgia, a longing to go back. In reality however, this urge to go back to the country of citizenship is not necessarily true. In 2015 UNHCR reported that half of the worlds’ refugee population was residing in protracted refugee situations. These protracted situations occur when people of concern remain exiled for five years or longer. The average duration of exile is nearly twenty years or longer (World Bank, 2015). When people are displaced for a long period of time they do not stand still. During their displacement people will always try to find ways to increase their quality of life and to see if there are options to create a form of ‘home’ (Omata, 2016; Feldmann, 2007; Castles, 2014, Werker, 2007; De Haas, 2015; Betts, 2014). Lubkemann (2008) argues that in the case of long-term exile people tend to change their aspirations, identities, values and socio-economic expectations.

12 Migration, being in transit and displacement are transformative experiences. People change under these circumstance and so does their view on going back to the country of origin. Thus, repatriation might not be desirable or even, a realistic option (Stefansson, 2004). The use of the term repatriation by the majority of influential refugee policy-makers and institutions does not fit the reality of protracted situations. Omata (2016) advocates the use of remigration as the correct term. Repatriation implies that people are going back ‘home’ and ignores the fact that refugees might not consider the country of origin as their home. What would ‘home’ mean to someone who left their country of origin as a one year old child after 20 years of displacement? The fact that someone has citizenship in a certain state does not imply that returning would feel like ‘home’. This relates closely to the idea of an underlying sedentary bias. Maliky (1995) refers to the analytical bias in common notions of culture and how migration would entail a loss of this culture and identity. The sedentary bias creates an expectation that people want to remain in their place of origin (Bakewell, 2007). This has created a discourse that operates on the assumption that the normal and desirable state for people is to be non-mobile and stay in their country of origin (Bakewell, 2007). This contributes to the notion that staying in place is a favourable objective.

The Envisioned Outcome

In the Livelihoods programming strategy 2014-2018 by the UNHCR there is no direct evidence of which durable solution they deem most sustainable. There is also no indication of what these livelihoods strategies will bring about in relation to the three durable solutions. A collaborative report of ILO, UNHCR and UNDP on the situation in Jordan as a result of the Syrian war published in 2015 gives an indication on the relation between livelihood programming and the mobility of refugees:

“With no immediate end to the conflict in Syria on the horizon, with humanitarian assistance diminishing, and with livelihood options for refugees limited, thousands are choosing the dangerous path of migration to Europe. Others are even returning to insecure areas of Syria. Jordan and its partners are at a critical juncture in their response to the Syria crisis. The challenge is to sustain levels of funding needed to cover the basic needs of vulnerable refugees and, at the same time, to broaden the options for Syrian refugees - women, men, boys and girls of all ages – to pursue a dignified and productive future in the region (ILO, 2015).”

This quote reflects the overall livelihoods strategy as it describes how the duration of exile continues, how humanitarian aid will no longer be sufficient and how the livelihoods strategy will mitigate the

13 situation of the people of concern. However, it does not address how this increase of livelihoods will affect the mobility of refugees. Livelihoods strategies are designed to achieve more resilience during displacement and to help find the most durable solution eventually. If voluntary repatriation is seen as the most durable solution does this imply that livelihoods strategies are aimed at achieving this as an end goal? In the livelihoods literature this seems to be a blind spot.

The mobility of people is very personal and very dependent on numerous factors that cannot be controlled or described by one general theory or policy. This refers to the heterogeneity of migrants and migratory movement. However, it seems that the international community of refugee policy-makers use repatriation as a base end goal when structuring their policies. Omata (2013) argues that the complexity of refugees’ return decision-making processes in protracted exile have a close relation to the possibility of one of the other durable solutions. Among the available options to them they choose the most viable one that provides them with the highest degree of security and the option that enhances the pursuit of their desires and priorities. Studying Liberian refugees in Ghana Omata (2013) assembled empirical evidence that illustrates that repatriation is no self-evident post-conflict outcome for all types of refugees. Being in transit is a complex condition that is determined by a number of familial, social, economic and political factors. Omata argues that in the case of the Liberian refugees, who had no chance of resettlement to a third country, it still was not a case of return or stay. There was no clear dichotomy to be made as numerous people chose to engage in split-family strategies moving back and forth to secure their best potential. The way refugees act to secure their best potential is discussed in the next paragraph.

Purposive Actors

Turton (2003) states that refugees are ‘purposive actors’ that have gained new values and vision during exile. By forcing repatriation on them their renewed potential and ability to decide their own future is diminished:

“What I am arguing here, then, is that we should be focusing on forced migrants as ‘purposive actors’ - as ordinary people. And this for both a practical and a moral reason. The practical reason is that this is how migratory processes actually work: through acts of individual, household and group decision making - decisions about whether to move, when to move and where to move. In the field of refugee studies I think there has been a relative dearth of work focusing on this sort of decision-making. Research and teaching in refugee studies has tended to focus on public policy and private need - that

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is, on policy issues on the one hand and on the needs - physical and psychological - of forced migrants on the other. But not on their active decision making (Turton, 2003).”

This concept of purposive actors and the manner in which Turton stresses the importance of a more bottom-up analysis relates closely to the conceptual framework of this thesis. In refugee studies the focus on policy-making has overshadowed reality. The idea that repatriation is the best solution has influenced policy-making over the years. By implementing policy on the base of unjust assumptions, such as repatriation as most durable solution, there might be an increased risk of externalities. The implementation of the livelihoods strategies might result in a different outcome than the policy-makers envisioned. This relevant to the question posed in this thesis because it focusses on how mobility decision come into being. Policy makers generally focus more on the outcome of these mobility decisions and where people move. This research will focus on the way people shape these decision and ideas regarding their own mobility. Trying to understand the movement from the root instead of the analysing the outcome. This way movement can be better understood and it might make it more clear to anticipate on externalities.

To summarize; the question in this research, how will increasing migrants livelihoods encourage them to remain or move further? is not so much about the outcome of mobility decisions but more about how these decision come into being. Therefore, the point in looking at the root causes of movement in relation to the livelihoods strategy is that it shows that there might be alternative outcomes. Livelihoods strategies will increase the capabilities and alter the values and aspirations of refugees while in exile but will still see repatriation as the most durable solution. As these purposive actors increase their capabilities their vision of their mobility and chances might presumably alter. By increasing capabilities people tend to expand their wishes and prospects to the best solution possible. The next paragraph will discuss the theory of Betts and Collier, The Jordan Model, and the way the livelihoods policy they implement is focused on keeping people in place.

15 2.3 The Jordan Model

“Immigration is going to stay toxic for a long time. But refugees is a very fixable problem. It is a well-defined problem and there is a well-well-defined solution which does not involve a lot of migration (Collier, 2017).”

The comment stated above was made by Paul Collier in an interview with CNN on the 30th _{of March} 2017. In 2015 Alexander Betts and Paul Collier presented their solution to the Syrian refugee ‘crisis’. The main objective of the study is to stop the migratory flows to Europe. According to Betts and Collier several grand events like Brexit and the election of Trump as the president of the United states are disruptive consequences of this ‘refugee crisis’. According to Betts and Collier (2017) there is a limit to what the Western welfare system can take and they believe this limit has been reached. Therefore, they propose a new strategy to transform the current, broken, refugee system. The approach promotes the harbouring of refugees in neighbouring countries but advocates for financial support from Europe. The comparative advantage of Europe is that they have the money and the firms to bring prosperity to these havens. What is needed, is to provide the refugees with jobs for them to become more autonomous. The pilot Betts and Collier (2017) started in Jordan is based on this idea and focusses on the development of refugees while in exile in a way that is beneficial for both host state and refugee. This objective greatly resembles the Global Strategy for Livelihoods as presented by UNHCR.

Just a 15 minute drive from the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan lays a Special Economic Zone (SEZ); the King Hussein Bin Talal Development Area (KHBTDA) with the capacity to employ over 100,000 people (Betts and Collier, 2015). However, currently there are 10,000 people working in the zone which means that everyone in the Zaatari camp (70.000) could be employed in the SEZ instantly.

“The pilot for the Jordan Model is basically stating that; with the right investment and trade concessions provided by the European Union you can allow Syrians to work alongside Jordanian nationals in a way that benefits the Syrian refugees, benefits the Jordanian economy and empowers people and businesses to eventually go home and rebuilt (Betts, 2017).”

What is needed today is more than the humanitarian policies the UNHCR mandate can provide. Firstly there is a direct need of economic development and autonomy of refugees and secondly a need to guide states to collective action. The refugee system is broken and needs to be updated with new sustainable projects such as; the Jordan Model. According to Collier (2017) the World Bank should be

16 leading the economics of this problem in order to secure a fresh look at existing policies and institutional mandates. In this theory they make a clear distinction between migrants in general and refugees in particular. They state that refugees are not voluntary migrants, they are the people that wanted to stay in their countries, had to flee them and that it is their preference to go back home when the conflict is over (Betts & Collier, 2017). Meanwhile the majority of refugees have sought safety in also poor neighbouring countries. These countries according to Betts and Collier are countries of emigration.

The pilot of the model of Betts and Collier has been initiated in 2016. Therefore, not much can be said at this point about the success of the model. It does provide an interesting angle for the argument made in this thesis. The Jordan Model is focussed on getting refugees to work through increasing the collective action between host states and external players such as the European Union. Europe needs to be involved in trying to keep people in place by providing the financial aid and knowledge to do so. The assumed outcome is economic prosperity for host states and refugees and the prospect of returning to the country of origin with more human and financial capital to start the rebuilt (Betts and Collier, 2016). Betts and Collier plea for a fresh look at existing policies and mandates but seem to cling onto the idea that repatriation is the most durable solution and that it is best if people stay in their place, close to home. They advocate a strategy of development without concerning the migratory movement this might bring about. This blind spot seems to be persistent is the majority of modern day refugee policies.

The Jordan Model is a policy that is set up to keep people from migrating to Europe. By increasing livelihoods there people will, according to the theory, be less motivated to undertake the dangerous journey to Europe. The theory is focussed on the outcome of migratory movement: people coming to Europe. This should be stopped and the idea is that if people will be able to build up a certain standard of livelihoods they will have less reason to seek their luck elsewhere. They do not have to migrate further because they get access to a decent autonomous life close to home. By staying close to home the option of going back home is more realistic. However, there seems to be a blind spot in this reasoning. The outcome of the migratory movement must be stopped but it is not made clear how an increase of livelihoods will make sure this is going to happen. Will an increase of livelihoods change migrants decisions regarding if they want to move on or not? Betts and Collier generally argue that; if people have the option to become more autonomous and increase their livelihood in the neighbouring countries, they will not want to move onwards in Western direction.

17 They suggest that by turning this humanitarian problem into a development project people will have less reason to move.

The relation between migration and development is an highly debated topic that has had positive and negative connotations over the past decades (De Haas, 2008). De Haas (2008) argues that there is a gap between macro and micro, empirical and theoretical academic work that has failed to provide a generalized understanding of the migration-development interactions. There is a general lack of theoretical rootedness, combined with a very general descriptive nature of empirical data which has led to a scattered understanding. The implementation of livelihoods strategies, like proposed in the Jordan Model, seems to be an example of policy-making based on this misunderstood relation. Because the root causes of movement are theoretically misunderstood the objectified outcome of the policy seems unsure. A weakness of migration development research is the tendency to study causes and impacts of migration separately from one another. This is unfortunate because it does not acknowledge how developmental factors influence migration decisions and how these decisions are also likely to shape the developmental outcomes. So, the debate is focussed on separating developmental causes and effects of migration from more general processes of socio-economic change. Migration should be studied in a wider societal context where it is seen as a transformative process of development and it is recognized as a self-perpetuating mechanism. The Jordan Model is focussed on the impact of migration to Europe. This outcome focussed reasoning neglects the importance of causes of movement. The next chapter will give a brief overview of the current academic discussion of several of these divergent theories of the migration-development discourse. It will elaborate on the conceptual framework that is central to this research for the analysis of migration-development interactions in a broader socio-economic perspective. With these theories the probability of using development to keep people in place is questioned.

18 2.4 Migration-Development Theories

De Haas (2008) argues that there is a general lack of awareness of prior theoretical and empirical work which has resulted in fragmentation of the progress made in migration studies. There is a gap between the vast amount of descriptive empirical work on migration and the rooted theoretical perspective of development. Due to this gap it is hard to reciprocally connect developmental causes and migratory impacts. This problem seems to be reflected in modern day policy objectives.

As the number of displaced people rose the past decade the issue of migration has become more politically salient (World Bank, 2016). It is often thought and reproduced that today we see a tremendous increase of migratory flows especially in the South-North direction. However, this is one of many myths that have dominated the public and sometimes even scholarly debate on migration (De Haas, 2005). De Haas (2005) made an overview of the most obstinate ideas that influence the debate. One important misconception, that is very relevant to this thesis, is the cause of migration. The idea that poverty and misery are the root causes of migration is obsolete. According to Skeldon (1997) it is rarely the poorest that choose to migrate. Although migration evidently emanates from the desire to improve one's livelihood, those who are poorest are simply not able to move. Migration involves considerable costs and risks, and, besides knowledge and social networks, also requires the necessary aspirations. This explains the paradox that socioeconomic development in the form of rising incomes, educational levels, and access to information tends to be associated initially with increasing migration. To a large extent, this can also explain why leading emigration countries (e.g. Mexico, Morocco, Turkey, the Philippines) typically do not belong to the group of least developed countries (De Haas, 2005).

This specific finding is so relevant for this thesis because it partially delves into the question; What are the drivers of migration? How do internal and external factors determine the next step that migrants might take or consider to take? As mentioned above UNHCR distinguishes three durable solutions that migrants can turn to; voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement to a third country. These three options have been viewed very differently over the course of time as being either the success or failure of migratory movement. This is of relevance for it gives an understanding as to how the general idea arose that increasing livelihoods in the region will stop people from coming to Europe. Studying the underlying behavioural mechanisms of migration has resulted in three main discourses of theory which will be discussed in the following section.

19 Neo Classical Migration Theory

In Neo Classical Migration theory the focus lies with the ability of an individual to maximize his or her utility by seeking places where they can increase their returns for human capital investments through productivity (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Massey et al., 1998; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987). This neoclassical approach considers migration successful when people succeed at the new place of settlement and do not have to return to their country of origin. If they can stay, that means that they have achieved their goal of increasing their livelihood elsewhere opposed to their prior situation. In line of this argument this theory also implies that it would not be rational for migrants to maintain close social and economic ties with the country and people of origin. The costs of staying abroad would become higher as the person of interest remains at a minimum level of integration. Recent academic literature has found contradictory evidence to this theory. Portes (2003) has found no reason to assume that origin and destination society are part of a zero-sum game in which the migrant has to choose between one or the other to be successful socially and economically. Local integration and maintenance of ties with the origin country is often seen in practice and is not seen as an indicator of failure or success.

The New Economics of Labour Migration Theory

The New Economics of Labour migration theory (NELM) interprets migration as a livelihood strategy employed by households and families instead of individuals to spread income risks and to overcome sending country (credit, insurance) market constraints. This coinsurance model is a radical departure from neoclassical models which conceptualize migration as income or utility-maximizing behaviour by individuals: If the prime motive for migrating is to improve the situation at the origin, migrants will only return once they have succeeded. Staying and integrating locally is seen as failure (Stark & Bloom, 1985). In this theory the spread of labour forces is seen as a way to increase the overall wealth of the family. Remittances and return with human and financial capital are key.

The Migration Transition Theory

Both theories have contributed to the idea of general push-pull models which explain migratory movement. However, this process of mobility is characterized by the heterogeneity of migrants (De Haas, 2014). There does not seem to be a one size fits all general model to interpret the movement of people;

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“The relation between integration processes and return migration is likely to depend on initial motivations to migrate, livelihood opportunities in origin and destination societies as well as educational, cultural and other specific features of immigrant groups. So, it is likely that there is no one-size-fits-all theory, and depending on the specific context, both theories might provide powerful explanations of observed patterns (De Haas, 2014).”

The Migration Transition theory addresses migration in relation to development and argues that this relation is not linear (Zelinsky, 1971; De Haas,2014). Generic push and pull models cannot explain the mechanism. By arguing that poverty and income gaps are not the main drivers of migration this theory goes beyond the maximizing of utility by individuals and general push-pull models. Zelinsky (1971) argues that processes of economic development historically concur with an increase of rural to urban migration trends followed by a subsequent increase in emigration. Through increased urban migration processes a vast growth of modernization is set in motion what results in an overall increase of wealth throughout society. This trend shows that as societies become wealthier emigration decreases and immigration increases. This model is known as ‘The Migration Hump’ (see graph 1.1.) and shows how countries gradually transform from net emigration to net immigration.

Firgure 1: ‘The Migration Hump’

When societies increase their overall wealth, more people can imagine a vital future in their own country and emigration is likely to decrease. This is primarily achieved when high levels of education, occupational specialisation and bureaucracy are established like in the most developed parts of the world such as Western Europe (De Haas, 2016). The mobility of such states remains high. The most high skilled people tend to migrate more an over larger distances to meet their specific desires but the general rate of emigration goes down. Thus, increased migration capabilities do not

21 directly lead to more migration. Whether people migrate or not depends on their general life aspirations and their perception to how these aspirations can be met ‘here’ or ‘there’. These perceptions of geographical opportunities are a highly complex interaction of broader socio-economic factors and altering expectations. The crux, as De Haas calls it, is that when development occurs in poor states the aspirations of people rise along with their migratory capabilities. This combination causes; ‘the phenomenon of development driven emigration booms (De Haas, 2016)’. From this angle, it is said that development processes typically expand people’s access to material resources, social networks, education, media and knowledge. At the same time, improvements in infrastructure and transportation, which usually accompany development, make travel less costly and risky, enabling migration over increasing distances. This is related to migrant network theory which will be disused in the next paragraph. De Haas (2016) empirically proves that this phenomenon is seen now in the migration patterns of Africa. This theory reveals a relation between development and migration that has long been misunderstood.

Bakewell (2007) too addresses this relation between development and migration in the light of the African case. According to him opening up migratory movement between Africa and the West will be a far more effective way of fighting poverty than starting another development project there. As discussed earlier, Bakewell (2007) argues that migration has always been a strategy used by people to improve their situation. If development is the end goal of a project migration should be seen an important shackle in achieving this. According to Bakewell (2007) migrants who send home remittances should be seen as the agents of development. People move because they see more chances elsewhere. That the general policy-making body does not acknowledge this is a big gap in the potential of their projects (Bakewell, 2007). As people develop and expand their resources this will alter their abilities to keep developing.

In relation to the livelihoods strategy implemented in the Jordan Model this theory of migration transition sheds a different light on the relation between development and migrants’ mobility decisions. Through the livelihoods strategy a form of development is set in motion which will enhance the capabilities and options of refugees, which might alter their perception of their next step. The more resources people have the more their options to other solutions open up. In line with this argument the idea of implementing livelihoods strategies to enhance repatriation and stop migratory movement to Europe seems questionable. De Haas (2008) pleas for a more pluralist and refined approach to this relationship. The causes and consequences of migration are strongly interrelated and

22 must be seen as part of the general processes of socio-economic transformations. Migration must simultaneously be considered as both a dependent and independent variable. This is why the transitional migration theory as described above has a more heuristic power than traditional structuralist push and pull theories. The next paragraph will elaborate on the understanding of migration as a self-perpetuating mechanism of networks and migration systems. This idea is central to the argument made in this thesis.

2.5 Migrant Networks and Migration Systems

Economic forces are generally seen as the main drivers and root causes of migration. People will move to places where the standards of living are better and they will use migration as a tool to achieve this. However, this truism alone cannot explain the actual patterns of migration (De Haas, 2008). The one’s that migrate first have great impact on the subsequent migration patterns. These pioneers determine and facilitate the flow of information through their network. They hereby reduce risks and other collective costs making subsequent migration more likely. This is described in the literature as the Migrant Network theory. These migrant networks make life to and at the destination more easily accessible creating a migrant community that attracts subsequent migration (Massey et al, 1993). Massey et al (1993) define these networks as: ‘sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and nonmigrants in origin and destination areas through bonds of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin.’ Massey (1989) argues that the self-perpetuating character of migration patterns is established through these networks. There is a critical level of network connections in the origin area that creates the social structure to sustain the process. This strong facilitating role of family and friend networks make migration patterns hard to follow and most importantly hard to control.

These networks are a form of social capital that is hard to control and restrict from a governmental top-down perspective (Massey, 1989). Social capital is a crucial migration resource which enables and inspires people to migrate (De Haas, 2008). However, it is important to note that this attractiveness of these migration networks do not go on forever. The same goes for the general push and pull models that are described above. There needs to be recognition of external, structural factors as well as internal processes that counteract the general migration patterns. This leads back to the more pluralist approach to the migration-development relationship. The Migration Systems theory acknowledges this reciprocal assumption that migration alters the entire developmental space in which migration processes operate. Migrant Network theory can explain how migration becomes a self-perpetuating mechanism through networks. Migrations System theory adds to this notion that

23 migration flows tend to be geographically patterned and that they take the shape of clustered flows. These clustered flows cannot be explained by purely economic developmental drivers such as inequality or unemployment (De Haas, 2008). These theories help us understand how migration evolves over time and how it is reciprocally linked to a broader process of development that goes beyond economic objectives.

Migration transition theory, Migrant Network theory and Migrations Systems theories all focus on the factors that shape and cause migration as a self-perpetuating mechanism. This creates a theoretical understanding of how migration changes its nature, being the independent and dependent variable, and the relation this has to development. This is perspective is central to this research and it is therefore viewed as superior to other push and pull theories. The sedentary notion that migration and development are substitutes rather than complements is thereby disintegrated. The Jordan Model introduced by Betts and Collier seems to linger on traditional non reciprocal relations between development an migration which might lead to unjustified outcomes of the self-perpetuating mechanism. The next chapter will elaborate on the discussed concepts and relations by concretely defining them in a theoretical framework. The subsequent paragraph will contain the theoretical expectations that have arisen from this literature review with regards to the research question.

24 3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Concepts and Relations

In the previous chapters numerous concepts, relations and theories have been put forward in order to shape the argument central to this thesis. This chapter will concretely define the used concepts and create a theoretical framework. This theoretical framework will provide a provisional descriptive answer to the research question; How will increasing migrants livelihoods encourage them to remain or move further? This descriptive answer will then lead to the empirical question posed in this thesis that will be answered in the analysis with data retrieved from field work.

Migration

Migration is seen in this research as a self-perpetuating mechanism. De Haas (2008) states: ‘migration is not an independent variable explaining change, but is an endogenous variable, an integral part of change itself in the same degree as it may enable further change. This is why it is more correct to refer to the reciprocal relationship between migration and broader development processes instead of the— one-way—impact of migration on development.’ The migration transition theory argues for a more heuristic understanding of this mechanism and tries to go beyond one on one descriptive explanations of the migration-development relation.

Mobility

A central concept to the research question is human mobility. In the migration literature mobility is defined as the options people have to migrate and the way they make use of these options. This relates to the development value of migration (De Haas, 2015). Generally there is a one sided view of migration and development which emphasizes on remittances and the negative economic impact on the receiving countries end. In this thesis mobility will be viewed as an intrinsic developmental value. It is closely related to the capabilities approach as proposed by Sen (1999). This approach relates to the ability of humans to lead lives they value and to be able to enhance the substantive choices they have to increase this value (De Haas, 2015). Within this capabilities perspective human mobility is seen as an integral part of human development for intrinsic and instrumental reasons (De Haas, 2009). People can only move if they have the means to do so. Therefore, human mobility in this research is seen as the capability people have to decide where to live. Migration or movement is the functioning tool to achieve this. Furthermore, this mobility is seen as an integral part of development for it can

25 achieve instrumental values on other dimensions such as health, education and earning capacity (De Haas, 2015).

Livelihoods

“A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources), and activities required for a means of living (Carney 1998). A livelihood encompasses not only the households’ income generating activities, but also the social institutions, intrahousehold relations, and mechanisms of access to resources through the life cycle (Ellis1998) (De Haas, 2008).”

Carney (1998) argues that there are five type of capitals that people can use to determine their livelihoods; natural, social, human, physical, and financial. The way these capitals are combined shape the strategy that a household or individual uses to secure or increase their livelihoods. The combination of choice is determined by the access one has to these capitals, the perception of opportunities and the aspirations one has. This explains the heterogeneous character of livelihoods strategies and the way they are shaped. De Haas (2008) states that: ‘Research attempting to isolate migration and migrants from their wider social and economic context, and other livelihood activities, is therefore not able to assess the relation between migration and broader transformation or development processes.’ The relation between livelihoods and human mobility is that they both create and influence peoples capabilities. The increase of one’s livelihood will provide an individual with more capabilities to envision life elsewhere and to make substantive choices to reach this. Mobility can be a mean to realize these choices. The main objectives of the livelihoods strategy, as implemented by UNHCR, is to get people back to work and to let them become more self-reliant again with a sense of dignity. People will become more autonomous which will influence their choices and their capabilities.

Resources

The increase of livelihoods will also lead to an increase of resources. Resources in this thesis are defined as the pragmatic tools such as money, access to infrastructure and other networks to ensure mobility. The goal of increasing livelihoods is to alleviate poverty and to create a sustainable living. This will increase overall wealth and resources which will provide people with alternative options for their future. In migration literature the relationship between resources and mobility is generally seen as positive. An increase of resources creates a higher mobility (De Haas, 2004). People have more means to move. Whether they choose to do so is dependent on the way they see their options ‘here’

26 and ‘there’. This is not only driven by economic factors but also by things like social capital which has been described in the Migrant Network theory.

3.2 Theoretical expectations

The relationship between these concepts is that in this thesis migration is seen as the dependent and independent variable in relation to development. Livelihoods and migrant networks are seen as sources that enhance human mobility. By increasing resources people will have more options to move and to enhance their capabilities. Therefore, the implementation of livelihoods strategies in order to keep people in their place seems not plausible. The provisional descriptive answer to the research question: How will increasing migrants livelihoods encourage them to remain or move further? Is that there is a chance people will move on as their options increase. The foreseen outcome of implementing livelihoods strategies in protracted refugee situations in order to make sure people will not migrate further does not appear from the theoretical framework. However, as seen in the previous chapters and this theoretical framework there is reason to question this argument. This leads to the following hypothesis: The increase of refugee’s livelihoods will increase further migration.

The underlying idea of The Jordan Model is that in situ the increase of livelihoods will be a good strategy to keep people from moving on. Flowing out of the previous chapters on migration theory the theoretical expectation of this research is that an increase of livelihoods will not slow down the migratory movement towards Europe. Theoretically, livelihoods strategies will increase peoples resources, capabilities and aspirations which will lead to more mobility. The expectation of this thesis will therefore be that implementing livelihoods strategies in the region to stop onwards migration to Europe will not result in the envisioned outcome.

In the Jordan Model the most opportune outcome of the policy would be if people in the region will increase their livelihoods and build-up some form of capital which they can use to repatriate and rebuild their home country. The expectation is that livelihoods strategies might provide a good alternative to regular humanitarian aid in the current regional refugee situation. But it is not clear what the effect will be on the long-haul with regards to further movement. Therefore it is questioned in this thesis if the envisioned outcome, stopping migratory movement towards Europe, will be realized by the implementation of livelihoods strategies. It is however important to note that an increase of resources and an increase of mobility does not directly lead to massive movement. There are numerous other factors that determine migratory movement which call for a pluralistic

27 approach to the subject. As described above migration is a self-perpetuating mechanism which is largely determined by internal and external factors of the migrants network.

The next chapter will introduce the Iranian-Dutch population that has been used as a case study to test the hypothesis. For the feasibility of the research the broad research question: How will increasing migrants livelihoods encourage them to remain or move further? Was modified into an empirical question that suited the population selected: How will an increase of the Iranian-Dutch population’s livelihoods affect their mobility decisions? The next chapter will first elaborate on feasibility of the research and the case selection process.

28 4. Sample and case selection

4.1 Case selection

The selection of a case-study for this thesis was influenced and eventually determined by several factors that will be described in this chapter. Feasibility of the research played a key role in the selection of the case-study. The issue that emanated from the literature review and current scholarly debates on migratory movement resulted in the question central to this thesis: How will increasing migrants livelihoods encourage them to remain or move further? In order to relate this broad research question to the reach of this thesis it was necessary to change the scope of the debate to a feasible case-study. This lead to the following empirical research question: How will an increase of the Iranian-Dutch population’s livelihoods affect their mobility decisions? The next paragraph will explain how the Iranian-Dutch case falls outside the population of study and how this will be solved by extrapolating on that base.

Extrapolating

The Jordan Model theory argued by Betts and Collier, as a solution to the broken refugee system, was the starting point of the argument in this thesis. This describes the Syrian refugee population in Jordan and the situation in the Zaatari refugee camp. The Syrian case as described in the literature review above is a very interesting case and shows the saliency of the issue today. However, it is not yet possible nor scientifically relevant to conduct extensive research on the mobility decisions of Syrian refugees as the conflict is still at large. They have just fled the country in a time span of the last 5 years. What their next step will be is unsure, even to them. The ideal case for this research would have been a most similar population that is forced to a protracted situation and that has experienced the implementation of the livelihoods strategies over the past few years. The implementation of these livelihoods strategies however is a relatively new solution in the field of refugee affairs. The outcome of the use of livelihoods strategies in refugee context was therefore hard to find in one specific and feasible case. Due to the time-span of the thesis and the feasibility, the fieldwork had to be organized in the Netherlands. Because of these limitations it was necessary to choose a case that fell outside of the original population of study. By extrapolating the data of the fieldwork onto the population of the Jordan Model this can help build the narrative of how and why people move. The question in this research is not so much about the outcome of mobility decisions but more about how these decision come into being. Extrapolating the process of mobility decisions in a Dutch refugee population can give an indication on the way these decision come into being with other populations. The goal is to

29 project and expand the findings of the Dutch case to the still unknown area of the Jordan Model case. It will present a narrative that might prove useful in the analysis of other populations.

Populations in the Netherlands

Due to feasibility of the research the scope of the case selection had to be brought down to populations that are present in the Netherlands. To map out the characteristics of different populations data by the Dutch Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP, The social and cultural strategy bureau) was used. In 2011 the Dutch Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP) conducted a research report on the integration patterns of the four largest refugee populations then known to the Netherlands; Afghanistan (38.000), Iraq (52.000), Iran (31.000) and Somalia (27.000). The data was retrieved in 2009 under the name Survey Integratie Nieuwe Groepen (SING’09, Survey integration new groups) covering 1000 participants between the age 15 and 64. The main theme of the research was to map out how several broader socio-economic factors have influenced the degree of integration. The results of the research differed per population due to age differences, duration of exile and educational levels. Most attention was drawn to the high unemployment rate and the effect this has on the integration process (Dourleijn & Dagevos, 2011). Another aspect of the research focussed on the idea refugees had about their position in the Netherlands and their abilities and aspirations to go back to their country of origin, to stay or to resettle to a third country. The majority of all four populations do not see a future in their country of origin and do not wish to go back. The urge for repatriation is highest amongst Somali refugees; 38% compared to around 20% in the other three populations (Dourleijn & Dagevos, 2011). Amongst all 4 groups participants under the age of 24 are more reluctant to return to their country of origin than older participants. The reasons participants addressed in relation to returning yes or no showed similarities across groups. The first consideration is the political situation in the country of origin. The second consideration is that they have grown attached to the Netherlands mostly due to raising children, health care, education and work. However, there remains a group that aims for resettlement to a third country. 31% of Iranian participants say they have aspirations to migrate further. The wish for resettlement is, in all four groups, greater under the 15-24 age group and under the highly educated. This report was used as a primary filter in the case selection process. Although here are other refugee populations in the Netherlands this report provided interesting information on the four groups which made the first cut in the selection process. The scope of the selection process at this point was brought back to Afghans, Iranians, Somali and Iraqi people in the Netherlands.

30 Feasibility of the Research

The selection of the case eventually was mostly made on pragmatic grounds. Due to several contacts in the Iranian population the access to this population was greater than the other three. In relation to the limited time frame in which this research had to be conducted it seemed most viable to build up on the existing relation with the Iranian population rather than to try and connect with other populations. There were some implications that this practical choice brought to the research.

The first implication was the time spent in the Netherlands and the year of flight. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of migratory movement over the years of the four largest refugee populations in the Netherlands. The Iranian population was the first to migrate in large numbers followed by the Somalian population according to the SING 09 data.

Figure 2: SING ’09: *410-Left home country, cross tabulation.

That the Iranian population was the first to migrate makes the case distant from the original Jordan Model population that Betts and Collier propose. Because they have spent a relatively long time in the Netherlands they substantially deviate from the population that has sought refuge in the regional havens, those who are the objective of the implementation of livelihoods strategies.

A second characteristic of the Iranian population that was an obstacle in the case selection process is the fact that Iranians are generally very highly educated. This is a problem because they will generally have little problems regarding their livelihoods. Most refugees who fled Iran did so because

Question 410* LAND VAN HERKOMST VERLATEN – LEFT HOME COUNRTY

Country of origin respondents 1930-1950 1951-1970 1971-1990 1991-2000 2000-onwards Total Afghanistan 0 0 48 795 151 994 Iraq 1 7 79 701 162 950 Iran 1 16 225 597 90 929 Somalia 0 1 126 645 168 940

31 of their political activities. They are generally highly educated people who had the means to choose to move. They had the resources to ensure their mobility. This is very different from the population described in the Jordan Model. These people live in protracted situations with no clear view of any short term improvements. The livelihoods strategies should provide them with increased options which might influence their mobility. The Iranian-Dutch population is very deviant on these two aspects and this does ask for nuance in the extrapolation of the narrative onto other populations.

Figure 2: SING ’09: Level of Education: Iranian Population

However, there is one aspect that both populations share. They both do not wish to be displaced. They generally both do not wish to be where they are in the years after their flight. Those who have sought refuge in a refugee camp in Jordan generally wish to go back to their home country in the first years of their flight. Most Iranians who arrived in the Netherlands never wanted to end up here and the majority had the wish to return to Iran in the first years after their arrival. Most Iranians, at first, thought of their stay in the Netherlands as temporary and had the idea of swiftly moving back to Iran once the situation calmed down. The most common route for Iranian refugees was to flee to Turkey and to move onwards from there. The reason they did not stay in Turkey, the region, like Syrian

32 refugees stay in Jordan, was that in Turkey most political refugees were still not safe. It was vital for the majority to keep moving and leave Turkey as soon as possible. The two most common ways of migrating onwards were through the use of a smuggler or in the early years after the revolution by resettlement programs initiated by the UN in Istanbul. The choice of the next step was therefore often determined by the smuggler or by the UN. The Netherlands, for the majority of Iranian refugees, was not a known option and they ended up there by coincidence. It is not denied that there is a difference between the situation of a refugee camp in Jordan or an asylum centre in the Netherlands but they must both be seen as protracted situations that are the result of forced displacement. The fact that both populations do not want to be in this situation and will do what is in their power to change or optimize their situation makes them somewhat similar. The dynamic of both groups is that they have a wish to return to their old ‘normal’ life or something, somewhere that resembles their old life.

This last characteristic of the Iranian-Dutch population makes the case useful to extrapolate on the initial population. Although it fall outside the population of study it can help build a narrative. By deducing information from the Iranian-Dutch case this research will reflect on general theoretical implications of migratory movement. The following chapter will elaborate on the demographics, culture and general behaviour of Iranians in the Netherlands to sketch a profile of the population.

4.2 The Iranian-Dutch Case

This profile of Dutch-Iranians will provide a compact overview of the position of Iranians in the Netherlands in regard of their heritage, culture and history. The Iranian population falls back on strong national ties to the country and the Persian culture. The Persian culture and language goes back 2500 years and is a very important fundament of today’s pride (Hessels, 2002). Iranians often refer to themselves as being Persian instead of being Iranian. This pride of the rich Persian tradition shaped the strong sense of national pride and resistance against foreign, and other oppressors. Because of numerous foreign invasions from both the Western and Middle Eastern world the society today is a mixture of traditional and modern values (Hessels, 2002).

The revolution of 1979 changed the horizon of the country completely when the Islamic legislation, the Sharia, was introduced. It set the stage for continuing bad blood between the West and the Muslim world and altered the dynamics of the Middle-East completely (Sudhavna, 2017). The revolution can be seen as one in a series of events in reaction to exploitation and domination of Iran