2019
PUSHING THE RIGHT BUTTONS:
THE ALT-RIGHT, TRUMP, AND
FRAMING STRATEGY
MASTER THESIS
Alexander Royall Leiden University
Student number: s1411209
Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs Msc. Crisis and Security Management Supervisor: Dr. J. Vüllers
Second reader: Dr. G.M. van Buuren January 13, 2019
1 this page is intentionally left blank
2 I would like to thank both Dr. Vüllers and Dr. van Buuren for their guidance, valuable insights, and shown
confidence concerning the topic at the beginning and during the project.
My gratitude towards Tim is enormous for showing enthusiasm and going through all of my work and thereby helping me to realise a coherent and grammatically correct thesis.
Thanks to Duaa, Yvonne, Floris, and Jordi for their insights and support.
Last but not least, I want to thank Juliette. Without her I would have fallen in the black hole of Excel and Word and I could not have the figures that I am now so proud of.
3 TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ... 5
1.1 FROM THE FRINGES TO THE MAINSTREAM ... 5
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION ... 8 1.3 ACADEMIC RELEVANCE ... 9 1.4 SOCIETAL RELEVANCE ... 9 1.5 READERS GUIDE ... 10 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ... 12 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 16
3.1 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES ... 16
3.2 THEORY OF FRAMING ... 19
3.3 PROSPECT THEORY ... 21
3.4 THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS ... 26
4. METHODOLOGY ... 30
4.1 CASE ... 30
4.1.1. CASE | DESIGN ... 30
4.1.2. CASE | SELECTION ... 31
4.2 DATA COLLECTION ... 31
4.2.1. DATA COLLECTION | UNIVERSE ... 32
4.2.2. DATA COLLECTION | SOURCES ... 34
4.3 RESEARCH METHOD ... 35
4
4.3.2. RESEARCH METHOD | TIME PERIOD ... 36
4.3.3. RESEARCH METHOD | OPERATIONALISATION ... 37
4.4 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY ... 43
5. ANALYSIS ... 44
5.1 Radix Journal ... 44
5.1.1. 2014 December ... 44
5.1.2. 2015 May 14 – June 14 & June 15 - July 14 ... 46
5.1.3. 2016 October 8 – November 8 & November 9 – December 8 ... 49
5.2 The Daily Stormer ... 52
5.2.1. 2014 December ... 52
5.2.2 2015 May 14 – June 14 & June 15 - July 14 ... 54
5.2.3. 2016 October 8 – November 8 & November 9 - December 8 ... 57
5.3 INTERPRETATION ... 60
6. CONCLUSION ... 65
6.1 ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION ... 65
6.2 LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH ... 66
5
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 FROM THE FRINGES TO THE MAINSTREAM
“So as you know, I am a woman of colour. I am the daughter of immigrants. I am a Muslim. I am a feminist. I am a leftist liberal. What I want to ask you is; am I your enemy?” - Journalist and activist Deeyah Khan.
“You are not subjectively my enemy, but what you are promoting will lead to the disappearance of my people and my culture.” Jared Taylor – white nationalist affiliated with the Alt-Right. (Khan, 2017)
In many ways, it can be argued that the first decade of the 21st century functioned as an incubation period for the far-right movements that we can see today in the United States of America (US). The September 11 attacks in 2003 (9/11) caused high levels of paranoia for everything that was foreign (Franko Aas, 2007; Neiwert, 2017). Self-organised militias started to assemble at the Mexican border, the belief in conspiracy theories intensified, and Iraq was invaded under false pretensions. Nevertheless, Democratic candidate Barack Obama was elected as the new president in 2008. While the liberal and progressive world was in awe of Obama’s political potential as the first African American president in history, for the far-right community this development felt like yet another threat (Neiwert, 2017). Not long thereafter a, eventually unsuccessful, counter-movement was established in the form of the Tea Party. In the meantime, society was continuously changing as a result of technological developments. In the early 2010s, social media was one of the main instigators of large protest movements such as the Arab Spring, Occupy, and online Hacker movements (Nagle, 2017). Although most of these protests did not end as intended, they did show the strength and potential of online mobilisation. Whereas movements traditionally have been limited by the available resources in spreading their message, the internet allows groups to spread their message more easily and far and wide (Schafer, 2002). In addition to that notion, the internet offers numerous advantages for far-right extremist movements as it offers a safe area from, and alternative for, the government and popular media outlets, as well as allowing extremist groups to offer social support (ibid).
6 Against this background, the ‘Alt-Right’, short for alternative right, emerged to become an active far-right movement made up of individuals ready to start agitating people online with high doses of irony and directness, the so-called troll army. A debate developed in 2014 concerning the internal politics of the gaming world and it became the first time that the movement took on its activist form (Neiwert, 2017). Feminist activist Brianna Wu became the foremost recipient of the trolls’ hostile threats and hateful comments on the internet (Neiwert, 2017: 213-215). Neiwert explains that the Gamergate controversy showed the first character traits of the Alt-Right, as he observed an “internet presence beset by digital trolls, unbridled conspiracism, angry-white-male-identity victimization culture, and, ultimately, open racism, anti-Semitism, ethnic hatred, misogyny, and sexual and gender paranoia” (ibid: 215). The increasing dissatisfaction and anger of the far-right following the developments in the early 21st century, combined with the opportunity presented by the internet, gave great potential for a movement such as the Alt-Right to grow significantly. Soon many internet platforms were established in affiliation with the movement, or already existing platforms announced their support of the Alt-Right. More information on all the different platforms and individuals will be discussed in the subchapter on data collection (4.2.1.). For most of its relatively short history, the movement has existed almost entirely online (Wendling, 2018). And although the movement seems to have no real organisational structure (ibid), a closer look at the different actors and platforms does present some influential figures and platforms. These figures and platforms seem to share unifying factors in the broad, somewhat incoherent, ideology of the Alt-Right. The crucial element of the ideology focuses on what is dubbed as the white nationalist ideology which is the idea that white identity is under threat of becoming marginalised or even extinguished as a result of contemporary Western societal ideals such as equality (since the French revolution) and diversity, also referred to as ‘white genocide’ by the group itself (Wendling, 2018; Neiwert, 2017; Heikkilä, 2017; Nagle, 2017). Depending on where you stand within the spectrum of this ideology, the culprit in this narrative is often a Jewish conspiracy. As it is the case in most movements and ideologies, there are individuals who are more or less extreme. Individuals who call themselves part of the Alt-Right movement sometimes have different opinions about issues than other self-claimed Alt-Righters and the levels of extremity in those opinions are equally disparate. The platforms and figures that advocate a more moderate version are dubbed as the Alt-Lite. This study will focus on the more extreme platforms and figures of the Alt-Right (as will be explained in methodology chapter 4).
7 The idea of white genocide has inspired some individuals to perpetrate domestic terrorist attacks. The most well-known attack was committed by Dylann Roof when he murdered nine people in a black-community church in Charleston in 2015. As he explained in his manifesto written prior to the attack, Roof was inspired by the content of the Council of Conservative Citizens (who’s website posted Jared Taylor’s articles on black on white crime) and the Daily Stormer (see 4.2.1. for more information on this platform) (Neiwert, 2017). Domestic terrorist attacks by right-wing extremists in the US have increased since 2007 and notably reached high numbers between 2012 and 2016 with an average of eleven attacks a year (CSIS, 2018). These numbers increased dramatically in 2017 with 31 attacks in one single year (ibid). Most of the targets were Muslim or Jewish institutions or figures (ibid). Protests organised by Alt-Right platforms also led to violence and one infamously ended with a fatality. The ‘Unite The Right’ rally in Charlottesville in 2017 was aimed against the possible removal of a statue Robert Edward Lee (an American commander who fought for the Confederate states in the Civil War) following a new societal standard set to erase memories of a controversial past, a trend that was viewed as one of the many examples of ongoing white genocide by Alt-Right supporters. The protest turned violent when counter-protesters of the political left gathered in Charlottesville. James Field drove his car into a crowd of counter-protesters killing Heather Heyer. In December 2018, Fields was found guilty of first-degree murder (Reuters, 2018). A more recent example is the terrorist attack committed by Robert Bowers who murdered eleven people in a synagogue in Pittsburgh (Volkskrant, 2018).
As Jared Taylor mentions in the extract above, it is clear that he views the ‘other’, the group Deeyah Khan affiliates herself with, as causing the disappearance of white male identity. It is fair to say that this type of rhetoric has the potential to mobilise individuals with similar concerns and identity. This similar fear of loss was also represented in Roof’s manifesto that he wrote prior to his rampage (Neiwert, 2017). Bower also voiced concerns that the US would eventually be bereft of its white male population, as he posted on a forum prior to his attack that “HIAS [Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society] likes to bring invaders in that kill our people… I can’t sit by and watch my people get slaughtered” (CNN, 2018). This frame of loss is characterised by the emphasis on the idea that action is necessary in order to prevent loss. However, as it will be argued in this study, framing for mobilisation is not necessarily restricted to this frame of loss.
8 Meanwhile, a successful businessman and television personality took the decision to run for the presidency. Donald Trump announced his candidacy for the Republican primaries on June 14th in 2014. Barkun (2017: 437) noticed that “as his campaign developed, it became clear that he was capable of articulating and representing a whole repertoire of fringe themes”. Fringe in this case being defined as “ideas, beliefs, and organizations that have been ignored, rejected, marginalized, or that have voluntarily separated themselves from the dominant society” (ibid: 437). The extreme right, for the very first time, backed a major party candidate (ibid). Trump’s election campaigns therefore channelled the Alt-Right into the broader political conversation (Heikkilä, 2017). As mentioned earlier, the number of far-right domestic terrorist attacks spiked in 2017. Neiwert (2017: 46) argues that these attacks were influenced “by the Trump campaign… it seemingly gave permission, in its stubborn refusal to bow to ‘political correctness’, for people to act and speak in an openly bigoted way and spiteful fashion… it was as though the campaign lifted the lid off the national id, and the violent, vicious tendencies that had been held in check for years came crawling right out”. Trump’s campaign themes were focused on anti-immigration (mainly of Hispanics and Muslims) and anti-establishment (both the Democratic and Republican parties were targeted) and he preferred to make use of social media for communication with the outside world instead of through traditional media. Trump’s main political promise of building a wall across the border with Mexico was an idea that was first coined by Ann Coulter, a writer and columnist who has a long history of citing far-right extremists and white nationalists in her work (Neiwert, 2017). Richard Spencer, Peter Brimelow, and Jared Taylor are some of those white nationalists and far-right extremists. These men are all affiliated with the Alt-Right movement and Richard Spencer could even be designated as one of the leaders of the movement (see 4.2.1.). In conclusion, the positions that Trump took and the rhetoric he used were seen as indicators for the idea that Trump adhered to the same core ideological drive, that is to prevent the marginalisation of white men. Barkun (2017: 441) thus concludes correctly that “Trump has brought the fringe into the mainstream”.
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION
Although there seems to be a consensus on the idea that a frame of loss predominates in the communication of a movement in order to mobilise further support, this study questions that theory. An attempt will be made to construct a new theory which takes into account the effect a political opportunity might have on a movement’s frame strategy. Therefore, the question that this study will attempt to answer is:
9 What is the effect of political opportunities on a movement’s framing strategy?
In order to answer the research question, a content analysis of two online Alt-Right platforms, i.e. ‘Radix Journal’ and ‘The Daily Stormer’, will be carried out. The political opportunity that is studied is the political ascendancy of Donald Trump. This will be tested to see whether there is relationship between the independent variable (Trump) and the dependent variable (frame). In addition to a frame of loss, this study will also take into consideration the possibility of a frame of gain.
1.3 ACADEMIC RELEVANCE
One of the pressing questions that social movement theorists attempt to answer is why individuals make the decision to join movements or why individuals radicalise in their ideology and potentially become extreme and choose to engage in violent behaviour. As the next two chapters will illustrate, this discussion is far from being solved and debates continue to present new and/or improved theories. This study will add to that discussion by proposing a possible relationship between two different fields within social movement theory, namely the theories of political opportunity and the theories of framing. In addition, this study also provides some more in-depth insight on the communication methodology of two online platforms affiliated with the Alt-Right, i.e. Radix Journal and The Daily Stormer. The findings of this research might spur further research, more specifically building on the proposed theory in this study. However, it might also build further on some other observations that have been made based on the content analysis performed in this study. More information on this will be provided in ‘interpretation’ subchapter (5.3.) and in the subchapter on ‘limitations and further research’ (6.2.)
1.4 SOCIETAL RELEVANCE
Improving our understanding of how movements frame their messages will help to manage this phenomenon. Although the Alt-Right movement does not explicitly mobilise people to use violence for their cause, practice shows that such a radical ideology can motivate people to act violently. The statistics provided in the above subchapter indicate a trend that is possibly influenced by the mainstreaming of former fringe ideologies such as the one promoted by the Alt-Right. This phenomenon of anti-immigration and aggressiveness towards minorities is not
10 limited to the US, but can identified across the globe. In Europe, the existence and electoral successes of political parties portraying populist views that are aligned with right-wing extremist views indicate that a similar ideology is also gaining ground in Europe (Europol, 2018). The EU Security Commissioner, Julian King, warned for a ‘growing menace’ of violent right-wing extremism (Euractiv, 2017). Meanwhile, Brazil has recently sworn in their new far-right president Jair Bolsonaro who has been shown to share similar characteristics and political opinions as Trump (New York Times, 2018; Wall Street Journal, 2018; Financial Times, 2018).
1.5 READERS GUIDE
This study is structured in six chapters. All of these chapters have subchapters to enable the creation of a clear and structured overview for the reader. This is the first chapter and functions as an introduction to the remainder of this study. The first subchapter outlined the background against which the Alt-Right came into being and provided an explanation of the movement and the relationship it has with Trump. This phenomenon led to the construction of a research question that was presented in the subsequent subchapter. The subchapters 1.3. and 1.4. argued for the academic and societal relevance of answering this research question. The next chapter is the literature review. This chapter will provide the reader with an overview of the literature that has attempted to answer how social movements mobilise support.
Chapter three is the theoretical framework and is divided in subchapters that are aimed at explaining theories on political opportunity structures (3.1.), framing (3.2.), and prospect theory (3.3.). As indicated by the title of this chapter, these three theories will function as the framework to this study’s proposed theory. Subchapter 3.4. will present an interpretation of the aforementioned theories to construct a new theory. The hypothesis that resulted from this theory is presented at the end of this subchapter.
The next chapter will present the methodology of this study in order to test the hypothesis. The first two chapters explain what design is used and why the Alt-Right was selected the case of this study. The following two subchapters will provide insight into the data selection process. The ‘universe’ provides the reader with a more complete picture of all the actors involved in the Alt-Right movement (4.2.1.) and the sources will briefly consider the technical characteristics of the two chosen sources for this study (4.2.2.). This will be followed by an explanation on the research method, i.e. the content analysis (4.3.1.) and the selected time period from which the data will be extracted (4.3.2.). Subchapter 4.3.3. will operationalise the
11 theory and the concepts so that the analysis can be performed in a transparent and systematic matter. The last subchapter, before the analysis is presented, discusses the potential validity and reliability issues.
The analysis is presented in chapter five. It will provide an insight into the content analysis that was performed through the use of quotes and the discussion of the more ambiguous articles that had to be coded. The results of the analysis of Radix Journal (5.1.) and The Daily Stormer (5.2.) will be presented with the main purpose of presenting rather than interpreting. This task is completed in the subchapter ‘interpretation’ (5.3.) in which the results will be interpreted aided by the presentation of graphs.
The final chapter is the conclusion (5) in which the findings of this study will be used to answer the research question. The final subchapter will outline the possible limitations of this study and will discuss some ideas for further research based on this study.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In order to clarify where my research stands within the wider academic research on contentious politics, an overview will be presented of the most important work within this field. This will help to focus the position of this research within the literature, but it will also provide insight into how the proposed theory and thereof resulting hypothesis in this research came into being. Much of the literature will be concerned with the question of how social movements mobilise support. Tarrow (1998: 2) defines politically contentious behaviour as instances where “ordinary people, often in league with more influential citizens, join forces in confrontations with elites, authorities, and opponents”. He adds that not all events of political contentiousness can be termed as social movements, as he limits the social movement definition to only the “sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames, and which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents” (ibid).1 The problems of mobilising ordinary people to engage in political contentious behaviour will be discussed together with the dominant theories of how these problems could be solved. This will lead to a conclusion regarding the literature and an attempt at creating a refined theory that combines the most convincing theoretical arguments into one stronger one.
When ordinary people join forces and decide to act in favour of a shared goal or against a shared enemy, it is often wondered how this movement came to life. To show that this has been a topic of great interest throughout history, Tarrow (ibid: 10-13) refers to the work of famous theorists such as Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and Antonio Gramsci. Each of them focused on three different elements which would evolve to become the three main theories on contentious collective action in the 20th century. Before Marx’s theory of collective action was commonly accepted, the prevailing explanations for such action was based on the ideas that individuals
1 Although on face-value this might seem as an easy and straightforward definition of a social movement, it is,
however, often not as easy as one might hope to identify the underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames. This opaqueness will especially shine through in the more modern and new movements which are predominantly active on the internet. Nevertheless, as the section on the Alt-Right will also help to illustrate, the point will be made that the far-right movement that organised the Charlottesville rally and is affiliated with Donald Trump, is indeed a social movement. Therefore the literature that is discussed here legitimately provides this thesis with relevant insights on mobilisation for the Alt-Right.
13 were largely incapable of structured and direct action in favour of their own interests and collective action was explained as impulsive or manipulated behaviour (Tilly, 1978: 14). Pinard (2011) refers to the work of Gustave LeBon, who had a grim view of the capacity of people as he perceived crowds to be irrational and incapable of thinking properly.
Marx2 and his likeminded contemporaries saw collective action as the logical and destined outcome of the structural development of society. At the same time, hardly any attention was given to the resources that are needed for successful mobilisation. Therefore, Marx’s main problem in his theory was that he failed to convincingly explain why people would not mobilise and revolt, even if the structural conditions should logically motivate them to do so. As Tarrow puts it, “Marx had neither a clear-cut concept of leadership, nor one of working-class culture, and he seriously underspecified the political conditions in which to provide opportunities for revolutionary mobilization” (Tarrow, 1998: 12).
Lenin focused more on this question of leadership and proposed an elite, or vanguard, of revolutionaries that would guide the workers to revolution. It came down to a top-down management and organisation of revolutionary behaviour in favour of the workers and in order to solve the collective action problem that Marx faced. Both Marx and Lenin viewed the workers as being controlled by the state, creating a level of unconsciousness with regard to the workers’ own well-being and need for revolution. Therefore they both look at the situation from a top-down perspective, underestimating the social and political context.
As an Italian, Antonio Gramsci observed that this top-down organisation of revolution was not working in the West. For this reason, Gramsci focused more on the possibility of changing the consciousness of the worker in order to mobilise for revolution, rather than forcing it from a top-down organisational elite. Gramsci envisioned a slow process in which consensus would be built around the party and among the workers, and the capacity thereof would be strengthened. In hindsight, it can be argued that a long-term dialogue leads to the loss of the revolutionary character of the party.
According to Tarrow (ibid: 14), these three theoretical attempts parallel the theorising on collective action in the social movement research of the 20th century. At first, the grievances and collective behaviour theorists saw movements as more spontaneous forms of expression where any social subject could be mobilised due to urges to recompose society, seek a new
2 The paragraphs on the work of Marx, Lenin, and Gramsci are all summarised from Tarrow’s book and the
14 collective identity, channel their individual deprivation, or to demonstrate societal dysfunctions (ibid). Although these theorists were influenced by the work of, for example, Gustave LeBon, they rejected biases such as the assumption of irrationality and incapability (Pinard, 2011). This focus on the deprivations or grievances of participants as the main explanation for the occurrence of politically contentious collective action was represented by relative deprivation theorists. As Turner and Killian (1987: 242) put it, “the common element in the norms of most, and probably all, movements is the conviction that existing conditions are unjust”. The idea of relative deprivation was elaborated by, amongst others, Ted Robert Gurr. Although Gurr’s models did contain other factors than deprivation, Gurr’s idea that relative deprivation was the “basic precondition for civil strife of any kind” (Gurr, 1968: 1104, as quoted in Pinard, 2011: 9) made it vulnerable for criticism as other factors were deemed to be more important than Gurr’s models proposed.
In the 1960s, microeconomics became the leading element in social sciences and Mancur Olson’s work on rational choice theory in 1965 instigated new thought in social movement theory (ibid; McClurg Mueller, 1992). Olson (1965) observed that, if only the elite of a group would profit from change, the others would not have an incentive strong enough to mobilise, causing the so-called free-rider problem. By recognising this problem, Olson was confronted with essentially the same obstacle that frustrated Marx, Lenin, and Gramsci: how do you get individuals to participate in collective action, even if it appears to be against their own interests? The answer that Olson provided, shaped future theorising on social movements. In order to overcome the free-riding problem, Olson (ibid) argued that an individual must be offered selective incentives strong enough so that the decision for mobilisation is perceived as a rational choice due to the benefit that the individual expects to gains. The leaders of a social movement must therefore convince the people that participation is worth their effort and risk (Tarrow, 1998: 15).
Resource Mobilisation theory (RM) elaborated further on this idea and emphasised the importance of potential resources, such as personal resources, professionalization, and external financial support (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). RM theory is an important contribution to the extent that it highlights the role of the social movement organisation (SMO). This facet corresponds with Lenin’s focus on collective action, as he underlined the importance of a vanguard in achieving mobilisation. Although social movement activity has increasingly moved to the internet and therefore the role of SMOs seems to be undergoing changes, Earl (2015) remains convinced that SMOs are still important actors in explaining social movement activity.
15 Earl (ibid) argues that SMOs remain especially influential in situations such as the organisation of offline events, the sustainment of the longevity of the more longer-term and enduring struggles in order to achieve change, and the creation of more stable networks that promise guaranteed participation. Essentially, RM proposed an answer to the question of how movements could mobilise and took potential resources (personal resources, professionalization, external financial support) as the explanatory variable (Tarrow, 1998).
Although this theory has held a rather dominant position within social movement theory in the decades since the 1970s, it lacks strength in explaining why ordinary people would act contentiously, especially in the cases where movements with low resources mobilised successfully. For that reason, theorising about possible explanations continued and the concept of political opportunity structures was developed.
16
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES
Some social movement theorists argue that the political opportunity structures determine whether a social movement will be effective or not. The theory of political opportunity structures will be explained in this subchapter.
Eisinger’s (1973) attempt to explain why there were differences across cities in the US in experiencing riots was one of the first studies that referred to the idea of political opportunity structures. Eisinger argued that protests generally do not occur in the case of closed structural conditions, but rather “protest is a sign that the opportunity structure is flexible and vulnerable to the political assaults of excluded groups” (ibid: 28). Therefore, when movements experience an increase in freedom and opportunities to make a change, protest is more likely.
Tarrow (1998) argues that the opportunities or constraints provided by political characteristics determine whether collective action takes place or not. Tarrow defines political opportunities as “consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national – dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics,” (ibid: 19) and political constraints are defined as “factors – like repression, but also like authorities’ capacity to present a solid front to insurgents – that discourage contention” (ibid: 20).
The word “structure” is not included in this definition, as Tarrow admits that there is “no simple formula for predicting when contentious politics will emerge” (ibid). Rather than a model, Tarrow argues that it is more like a “set of clues for when contentious politics will emerge” (ibid). Tarrow’s set of clues focuses mainly on the idea of political opportunity. The word “political” refers to the idea that the government is the other actor (Tilly, 1978). This actor can loosen or tighten its grip on civil society, making it easier or more complicated to mobilise. The theory of political opportunity is illustrated by Tarrow (1998: 73-76) with the example of the fall of the Soviet Union (USSR). In this case, Mikhael Gorbachev decided that reforms were necessary in order for the USSR to stay alive. Although the reforms were modest changes, it had set things in motion as new organisations were established and it forced political figures to choose sides. As more and more external events and influential allies seemed to appear in favour of change, the elite cracked and weakened along with the state, and it created the space for the revolution and fall of the long-standing Soviet regime.
17 This example is used by Tarrow (ibid: 77) to explain the importance of perceived external resources, as he argues that an improvement of opportunity is only relevant if this difference is actually perceived by the potential challengers. Not every potential challenger perceives the changed opportunity in this way, which explains the distinction between the early risers and the weaker players, of which the early risers experience deeper grievances and have greater resources than the latter (ibid). Opportunity, or access, increases when elections occur, although this is especially the case in non-democratic states rather than in democratic states as elections are a normal phenomenon in the latter (ibid: 78). However, any instability in political alignments can act as a window of opportunity for potential challengers. This is also shown by the case of the USSR where the political elite quibbled among themselves (ibid: 79). Furthermore, the case of the USSR also showed that having influential allies also determines opportunity and successful mobilisation, an argument that is supported by empirical evidence (Gamson, 1990; Jenkins & Perrow, 1977; Tarrow, 1989a: all mentioned in Tarrow, 1998: 79).
Political opportunity’s key contribution is that “activists’ prospects for advancing particular claims, mobilizing supporters, and affecting influence are context-dependent” (Meyer, 2004: 126). As Meyer mentions, this puts a large burden on analysts as any possible context-related phenomenon could affect the movement in a plethora of ways.
According to Tarrow (ibid: 81-83), generally more stable conditions, state strength and prevailing state strategies can help explain the occurrence of collective action. Centralised states are generally more powerful, especially if they have an inclusive strategy and allow challengers to participate at an institutional level. However, when an opportunity arises in a centralised state with exclusive strategies, it is easier to organise a movement in the face of a common enemy which is the state. Tarrow sees “wars, elections, party realignments, and shifts in public opinion” (ibid: 83) as potential causes for changes in state strength.
Gamson and Meyer (1992: 277) distinguish between fixed aspects of opportunity that are deeply embedded in political institutions and culture on the one hand, and the more volatile, shifting opportunities that “emphasise the interaction between movement strategy and the opening and closing of those oft cited windows of opportunity”. However, Gamson and Meyer (ibid: 278) argue that looking at the fixed aspects of opportunity “are not very helpful in understanding dynamic processes of mobilisation and demobilisation”. Therefore, observing the more changeable and impermanent opportunities should provide more illumination.
18 These are all rather convincing conditions and to some extent also potential causes for collective action. However, they are predominantly a potential condition for collective action. A political opportunity itself should instead be understood as the creation of favourable circumstances that indicate a higher probability of a political contentious action to occur. It is precisely as it is named, an opportunity. It therefore still fails to comprehensively explain why an individual would or would not join a social movement in taking potential advantage of that opportunity. Gamson and Meyer (1992: 276) explain that “opportunities open the way for political, but movements also make opportunities”. This proposes that there might be a degree of interaction between movements and political opportunities. With this in mind, framing theory might offer a better solution to this conundrum.
19 3.2 THEORY OF FRAMING
In the end, collective action can only occur if there are people that are convinced to take part in it. Individuals will not simply engage in contentious political action because they have the opportunity to do so. In order to mobilise individuals, they need to have certain convictions concerning the matter in question. SMOs have to bid for the support of individuals. In their research on protest movements, Schussman and Soule (2005) demonstrated that it is important that individuals are asked to participate and that individual circumstances, such as time and responsibility, do matter. This contribution is important for our understanding to the extent that it shows, similar to RM, that the relationship between the organisation and the individual is indicative for explaining mobilisation. It does, however, not explain why the individual would answer in the affirmative to a request for protest. If it is simply necessary for an organisation to ask an individual to participate, we would be underestimating the importance of the content of such a request. The translation of objective grievances into felt grievances does not always occur automatically. An important tool to accomplish subjective grievances is the use of framing. Academics have agreed that movements actively engage in framing grievances into a specific claim (Snow and Benford, 1988; William Gamson, 1992). Therefore, in addition to political opportunity, successful mobilisation would also depend on the “collective action frames that justify, dignify, and animate collective action” (Tarrow, 1998: 21).
The concept of framing was introduced by Goffman (1974), or more specifically the concepts of frameworks, as he made the distinction between natural and social frameworks. This distinction is centred around the idea that events or phenomena are either natural or a guided doing. Snow and Benford (1988) built on Goffman’s work in an attempt to explain what factors determine the resonance of a frame for the mobilisation of a social movement. Framing is explained as a struggle to portray the world ‘out there’ by focusing selectively on certain events or stories and to ignore others. It has been argued that the concept of framing had mostly conceptual utility, but that it was neglecting the provision of “specific tasks that need to be conducted in order to achieve consensus and to produce action” (ibid: 199). In order to be sure that the framing is effective in reaching its goal, which is instigating collective action, it is necessary to know what the best practice is. Three core framing tasks were introduced by Snow and Benford: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing (ibid). Diagnostic framing concerns the diagnosis, the answer to what is wrong and what needs to be changed. Prognostic framing provides a solution to the diagnosed problem. Motivational framing is meant to stimulate action, the crucial step from disengagement to engagement. In
20 similar fashion, Entman (1993) argues that a frame has four functions, as it defines the problem(s), diagnoses the causes, makes moral judgments, and suggests remedies. Through these functions, framing can “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” (ibid: 52). If we take the four dimensions coined by Entman, it should allow us to properly analyse the different frames that are being used by movements.
However, it is still unclear what the best practice of framing is when it comes to the motivational dimension. Chong and Druckman (2007) have established that it is not just simple repetition of a frame that determines its resonance, but it is rather the strength of the frame that can change an individual’s opinion. The strength of a frame should therefore not be underestimated as an indicator for mobilisation. Having said that, what determines the strength of a frame remains a question unanswered, and Chong and Druckman claim that “the source of a strong frame is a problem that has puzzled political scientists and psychologists alike who study mass communication” (ibid: 652, based on O’Keefe, 2002).
One theory that provides a possible answer to the question, is prospect theory. In the next section, this theory will be discussed and critique on that theory will be refuted. The idea of a frame of gain will also be discussed with an empirical example that illustrates the possible relevance of such a frame. Thereupon, the theory is proposed that both political opportunities and the use of framing are important for achieving mobilisation and that the type of political opportunity determines which frame is the strongest.
21 3.3 PROSPECT THEORY
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) main argument is that individuals tend to take more risks when they, from their reference point (the status quo), face a potential loss compared to when they face a potential gain. This theory was developed in the 1970s at a time where expected-utility theory was being increasingly disputed. Whereas the expected utility theory argues that individuals will act when they expect a gain, prospect theory argues that a potential loss weighs heavier in the decision-making process. According to Kahneman and Tversky (ibid), this process is divided into two different phases, the editing phase and the evaluation phase. The individual first identifies what is at stake, i.e. what is the reference point and what are the possible outcomes, and what do they mean with respect to the this reference point (ibid). In the evaluation phase, the individual combines these possible outcomes with their estimated probabilities (ibid). Kahneman and Tversky do not include the idea of framing as the subjectivity and unpredictability of framing would be too ambiguous (Levy, 1996). The focus is merely on the individuals rather than any outside, exogenous influence through, for example, the act of framing. However, this process of identifying the reference point and the possible outcomes takes place in a “dynamic environment that shapes the perception of alternatives” (Masters, 2004: 704). If the individual’s estimate of the reference point and the possible outcomes determine whether this individual will take part in contentious politics, the organisation or leadership of a movement would have a clear focus point in order to increase mobilisation of individuals. An individual’s view of their own reference point and potential outcomes can be steered into a certain direction through the use of framing.
This is a view that is supported by Jeffrey Berejikian, who argues that “if a losses frame is a first necessary condition for revolt, then the initial task for a revolutionary organization is to adopt – or construct – a worldview that effectively communicates to individual peasants the understanding that existing social-structural arrangements are worse than in some “normal” past” (1992: 653). In his article, Berejikian delves into Skocpol’s (1979) structural theory and Popkin’s (1979) rational choice theory, and highlights the flaws in these theories. These are the same observed flaws as the ones that have been mentioned in the previous section. Berejikian (1992: 649) illustrates the free-rider problem through empirical examples provided by Ronald Waterbury on historical instances where the structural conditions for a revolt were sufficient, but where peasants still chose not to act. Berejikian uses prospect theory to explain the different reaction by peasants in two different cases. He points out that the decisive aspect is not necessarily the expected outcome, but it is more about how the outcome relates to the reference
22 point. An important aspect of framing is conveying the message that the status quo, the reference point, is one of continuous loss. As Kahneman and Tversky mention themselves about framing, “the framing effects arise when the same objective alternatives are evaluated in relation to different points of reference” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982: 165: as quoted in Berejikian, 1992: 652). What this theory means in practice, is that the organisation of a movement would motivate the most individuals and it will be most likely to attain successful collective action if it frames the status quo as a state of deteriorating loss and that this continuation will persist in the face of inaction. The reason for this is that the individual would have to choose between two losses, “not to revolt entails an expected value of increased loss attendant to participation but also some smaller prospects of improvement” (ibid: 653). It is simply a choice between accepting loss, or mitigating loss and having the potential prospect of improvement (back to the actual status quo or even better conditions).
Tarrow (1998: 86-87) has argued that this theory is lacking on three aspects. First of all, he mentions that there are “fairly obvious cases” (ibid: 86) in which individuals joined movements without any promise of gains in status or position or an immediate threat. As an example he mentions the American civil rights movement where individuals of the north in the United States (US) joined the movement in the south, increasing their risk significantly. Secondly, he argues that “gains” and “losses” cannot be objectively defined and observed. His third critique, and according to him his strongest objection, is that prospect theory cannot explain transnational movements as distant issues are perfect examples of a lack of personal loss or gain. His first and third critique are essentially the same, as he questions the explanatory power of prospect theory for movements where, at face value, the direct personal loss and gain is lacking. This critique will be rebuffed using the research on transnational foreign fighters by David Malet.
With regard to the fairly obvious cases that Tarrow refers to, the research of David Malet (2013) can be presented as a counter-argument to that statement. Malet attempted to answer the question of why foreign fighters join insurgencies abroad. A reason why this research is insightful is that, in the specific case of foreign fighters, there seems to be a lack of clear direct losses or gains for the individual foreign fighter. Malet conducted a content analysis to identify the recruitment messages in the propaganda that was meant to mobilise foreign fighters in past insurgencies such as the Texas Revolution (1835-36), the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), The Israeli War of Independence (1947-49), and the Afghanistan War (1978-92). Based on this empirical examination, he claimed that recruiters frame a conflict as if the common transnational identity is under existential threat and that action is required for the survival of
23 this identity (ibid). Borum and Fein (2017) agreed with Malet’s observation and have noted that there is a remarkable degree of historical consistency over time and across conflicts in how the message was framed, how the recruits were mobilised, and what their experiences were like in the field. The two most striking and consistent findings of Borum and Fein are that social ties and networks are used to generate new recruits and that the framing of a conflict is done by linking it to a broader global threat, i.e. invoking a so-called ‘defensive mobilisation’ (ibid: 225). So, although on face value it might not seem as if the individual has something to lose or gain, Malet and Borum and Fein’s research illustrates that framing, combined with political opportunities, can still convince individuals that something of importance to them is at stake.
With regard to a lack of objective definitions of what gains and what losses would be in a situation, Tarrow touches upon two important aspects. First of all, this makes it even more important in relation to the practice of framing, as there is apparently some leeway in establishing what a loss and what a gain would be in a specific situation. This would make it extra sensitive for framing purposes, and therefore an obvious tool for a movement’s organisation for affecting levels of mobilisation. Additionally, Berejikian argues that framing would have to occur within certain limits and has to take into account the existing structural context. As Berejikian explains, “there is point at which a value system must ultimately access aspects of empirical reality for its legitimization. If it does not, the contradictions between ideological assertions about the world and an individual’s subjective assessment of his or her social context prevents its adoption” (1992: 654). This thesis takes this notion a step further. The theoretical argument is that the best practice of framing is determined by the type of political opportunity that has occurred. A political opportunity provides a movement with great potential and incentives to mobilise if the political opportunity is relevant, or can be made relevant, for the movement’s core goal. Therefore, the moment such a political opportunity develops, it is simultaneously the moment where a frame would shape its strongest motivational dimensions. More than that, the empirical reality of that political opportunity will either push the narrative towards a frame of loss or a frame of gain. The suggestion of a frame of gain is discussed in the ensuing part.
Hirschman (1982) argues rather optimistically that there are also benefits in participating in collective actions, as striving for a goal can be just as satisfying as achieving something, and perhaps even the most satisfying. According to Hirschman, free-riding would also imply that an individual would miss out on an opportunity to gain in “public pleasures”, (ibid: 85) which are rewards such as “community, beauty, knowledge, and salvation” (ibid). In this sense, taking
24 action, for example politically contentious action, would normally be seen as a cost, but with Hirschman’s argument in mind, the process could also be typified as a potential gain in some respects. Or as Hirschman puts it, “the pleasure segment penetrates the cost segment and suffuses it with its own experience” (ibid: 88). On a personal level, most people will probably understand what Hirschman is trying to say, as such similar experiences are common to most. Hirschman uses an easier (to understand) and more concrete example to illustrate his idea by referring to the pleasure that we gain whilst preparing a meal. Whereas it could be argued that the preparation of a meal is simply a cost you have to endure for attaining a gain, that is the consumption of the food to still the hunger, most people sometimes, if not often, actually also enjoy the act of cooking. Furthermore, when we take this idea to the level of movements and contentious politics, individuals who joined movements often mention the benefits of being part of a group or a community and all the advantages that come with such membership.3 One might also think that this argument would no longer hold true when contentious action takes on extremely risky forms, such as when it concerns life and death. The case of transnational fighters and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) movement serves as an interesting counter-argument to that expectation.
After ISIS declared their ‘caliphate’ on 29 June 2014, the group saw an unprecedented growth of Western foreign fighters and non-combatants joining their organisation (Schmid & Tinnes, 2015; Berger, 2015: 19). Foreign fighters have been a major determinant for the success of ISIS since then (Schmid & Tinnes, 2015). Which shows that ISIS has been successful in mobilising external support. So what makes these individuals decide to abandon their safe home country and to travel to Syria or Iraq, a decision that carries an extremely high risk of death. According to prospect theory, these individuals could be convinced to act as a result of ISIS putting more emphasis in framing attempts around the idea that the transnational identity is in a state of constant loss. Novenario (2016) examined the difference between the propaganda that al Qaeda and ISIS produced in their published magazines and concluded that both groups have distinctly different narratives. Al Qaeda’s main goal is to defend the Ummah against the West and therefore its main purpose is to attack the far enemy that is the West. The Ummah is an Arabic
3 For example, see Deeyah Khan’s documentary about the Alt-Right “White Right: Meeting the Enemy”, in which
individuals – also with retrospective insight - often give similar motivational reasons for having joined a radical right movement. Many references are given to the social pleasure they got out of being accepted by a movement and by feeling that they had a purpose in life.
25 word meaning “community”, a term used for referring to the Islamic transnational community. ISIS, however, is more focused on building the caliphate and bringing Muslims under its rule by intimidating populations and outbidding other jihadist organisations. A structured and interpretative analysis of Dabiq, ISIS’s international recruitment magazine, has led Nelson (2017: 40-41) to the conclusion that ISIS’s most important recruitment message is related to asserting its legitimacy as the long awaited religious authority establishing Sharia law to its true extent in society. Nelson further notes, similarly to Novenario, that “jihadist terrorist and insurgent group recruitment has traditionally employed defensive narratives. However, the results show that ISIS may be adopting an “offensive jihad”, as opposed to a defensive one. This observation is contrary to the observations made by Malet and Borum and Fein of earlier insurgencies, as they ascertained that insurgency groups would generally fall back on framing a defensive narrative.
26 3.4 THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
As mentioned in the previous section, Tarrow admitted that his theory on political opportunity was more a set of clues rather than a predictive model. The theory presented in this section follows the same lines of thinking. It is argued that the combination of political opportunity and accurate framing in the motivational dimension provides the strongest, to use Tarrow’s language, set of clues for when mobilisation for contentious politics will be most effective. The appearance of political opportunity is an important and perhaps crucial precondition for a movement to act. It provides a movement with the opportunity to mobilise itself effectively in the face of, what is to a particular movement, a relevant grievance. However, political opportunities are limited causes for collective actions, rather than explaining why individuals participate in collective actions, it identifies an important condition for mobilisation to occur. In order to actually persuade and mobilise individuals, the SMO has to frame accordingly to the empirical reality that is provided by the political opportunity.
Therefore, the essence of the framing should either be a focus on a frame of loss or a frame of gain. In the case of a frame of loss, the emphasis is set on a reference point in which the experienced outcome of inaction is perceived as a continuous loss. In other words, inaction would lead to deteriorating conditions for the individual, as this individual is unequivocally part of the identity that this movement represents. In the case of a frame of gain, the focus would be on the more positive experiences and prospects. For example, as we saw with the case of ISIS and the theory of Hirschman, there are also plenty of gains to achieve through participating in politically contentious action. Instead of putting the emphasis on the notion that the status quo brings about nothing but more loss, and that action is necessary to contain, or potentially turn, that loss, a frame of gain would stress the potential advancement of the movement and its identity.
Furthermore, as mentioned in the above, the frame must be reasonably close to empirical reality in order to remain legitimate and convincing for individuals. Following Berejikian (1992: 654) in this, and staying ahead of Tarrow’s critique, this would prevent any distorted comparisons of the individual’s own experienced situation with the narrative provided by the movement. The occurrence of a political opportunity would function as a stronghold for the movement in that regard, and therefore it can be expected that references to this political opportunity would occur rather frequently. The nature of the political opportunity would thus provide the instructions for the framing practices. In this sense, the concept of political opportunity refers to opportunities through elections, instability in political alignments, the presence of influential allies in the
27 political sphere, but also noteworthy events, such as disastrous or catastrophic events. These political opportunities must have been taken place in empirical reality. Interpretation of such a change is important as it can make or break the event into being a relevant political opportunity. However, a political opportunity has some inherent characteristics which make it more prone to being a positive opportunity that bears potential gains, or a negative opportunity that bears potential loss. These characteristics determine whether a frame of loss or a frame of gain is used.
Arceneaux’s (2012: 281) work on the strength of frames of losses and gains supports this theory as he argues that, “because humans appear to have built-in preferences to avoid losses, arguments that claim to avert losses have the potential to be more persuasive than those that claim to realize gains”. In a similar fashion, Arceneaux then points out that the frame of loss is not always the most effective choice of framing, as he claims that “the contextual information surrounding the message (either internal or external to the message) must successfully activate biased information processing” (ibid). Drawing on the work of neurobiology and political psychology (including prospect theory), Arceneaux found that anxiety plays an important role in the decision making process as it causes people to rely more on cognitive biases that prioritise loss aversion. This suggests that “when individuals are in an anxious state, they will be more likely to accept the recommendations of arguments that are framed in a bias-congruent fashion [e.g. a loss frame] and less likely to accept the recommendations of arguments that are framed in a fashion that is incongruent with the activated cognitive bias [e.g. a gain frame]” (ibid: 273). A loss of frame would therefore be more effective in cases where the political opportunity instigates fear among individuals. For example, seen through the lens the Alt-Right ideology, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the nomination of Obama as president of the US are examples of fear-instigating events and thus political opportunities in which a frame of loss would resonate the strongest. On the other hand, Donald Trump as the (potential) new president of the US would be a political development raising support and enthusiasm from the perspective of such an ideological lens. Therefore, the expectation would be to see a switch to a more positive frame of gain compared to the more negative frame of loss.
This dynamic between a political opportunity and framing is also illustrated quite well in the case of ISIS. As an extremist Salafi-Jihadi organisation, ISIS is in competition with al Qaeda. Although they agree with each other on ideology in most aspects, the frame that is being used to mobilise support differs significantly. This could be explained by looking at the political opportunity that drove ISIS to change their narrative. The surge in foreign fighters came to life
28 after the declaration of the caliphate in 2014. The opportunity therefore arose, though it was self-created and the claim was widely rejected, for ISIS to build their own state. For an extremist Salafi-Jihadi organisation, achieving this ultimate goal had an inherently positive characteristic. It therefore makes sense that ISIS relied on a positive frame of gain rather than a frame of loss. For al-Qaeda the situation is very different. This organisation’s raison d’être is the liberation of Islamic lands from Western occupation or from rulers who do not adhere to their ideology of Salafi Islam. Although they might have the ambition in the long run to set up an Islamic caliphate, they have not achieved such a thing. Therefore, al-Qaeda remains focused on the initial task, which is the liberation of the lands. In order to persuade individuals to join or support the organisation in this objective, it is necessary to show that the lands are indeed under attack or control by antagonists. This requires a frame of loss that emphasises that the status quo is unacceptable and will only get worse if nothing is done to change it.
What this case also shows is that the SMO in this theory is attributed with quite some importance, as it is argued that the organisation, or leadership, plays a significant role in setting the frame. With regard to the question of leadership and its combination with movements that are, in a large part, active on the internet, it is important to accept that the identification of the organisation of such a movement is not as straightforward as it used to be the case for SMs in the 1960s and the 1970s. As mentioned in the introduction of the literature review, the more modern and new movements, which are predominantly active on the internet, are more complex and therefore it is more difficult to extract and identify the underlying social networks and thus also its leadership. However, as this study will illustrate with the case of the Alt-Right movement, leaders can generally be identified as there are usually a number of spokespersons on behalf of the group and one or more platforms on the internet that explicitly name themselves as the representatives of the movement.
Based on this proposed theory, we can expect a number of things when we observe political contentious action. Firstly, in most cases successful mobilisation will occur after the appearance of a political opportunity. Secondly, framing would also focus on the conditions affecting an identity with which the individual could relate. These conditions would then be linked to a frame of loss or a frame of gain. Thirdly, it can be expected that the framing efforts of a movement or organisation relate to the empirical reality of the political opportunity, and that this reality determines whether a frame of loss or a frame of gain is potentially the strongest and therefore predominant.
29 In this research, the Alt-Right movement will be analysed in order to test this theory and to therefore gain more understanding of how movements mobilise support for politically contentious behaviour. The Alt-Right as a movement in the US has been chosen as it grew out of a clear unprecedented political opportunity, i.e. the nomination of Donald Trump as president of the US following on from Barack Obama who had completed his two terms as the 44th president of the US from January 2009 until January 2017. The next section will explain in more detail why this was a political opportunity for a movement such as the Alt-Right. Based on the proposed theory, the following hypothesis can be formulated:
H: The type of frame that is used by the Alt-Right movement switches from a frame of loss to a
frame of gain as a consequence of the developing political opportunity that is represented by the political ascendancy of Donald Trump in the US.
30
4. METHODOLOGY
4.1 CASE
The subsequent two subchapters will provide the reader with information about the decisions that were made with regard to the number of cases, whether the study is qualitative or quantitative, and why the Alt-Right was chosen for this study and what characteristics of the movement make this case an interesting phenomenon.
4.1.1. CASE | DESIGN
The question that this study attempts to answer is whether any political opportunity, one that is relevant to a movement, influences the type of frame that would be the overarching communication methodology of that movement. In order to get an answer to this question, this study is based on a single case analysis of the Alt-Right. However, as section 4.2.1. will illustrate, the Alt-Right is not represented by merely one single platform, or at least it seems to be a matter of controversy within the broader movement and its self-acclaimed members. Therefore, the actual analysis includes two different platforms. Nevertheless, it will be argued later on in this study that these two platforms, together with a good deal of other platforms, both embody the Alt-Right movement. The decision to include two rather than one platform was made to increase the validity of this study as having two notable Alt-Right platforms will provide a more valid and complete picture of the actual movement. Eventually this study considers these two cases to be part of one single case: the Alt-Right. A single case study generally indicates that the researcher is applying a qualitative lens to attain more in-depth information on the specific case that is being observed. Applying such a design in this study will result in a thorough analysis of the frames used by the Alt-Right movement in the chosen time-periods. Therefore, the expectation is that it will be the best design for extracting and identifying the possible present frames of loss and gain in the form as they will be defined later on.
31 4.1.2. CASE | SELECTION
The choice for the Alt-Right as the case for analysis was made for several different reasons. Firstly, it is argued that the ascendance of Donald Trump in US politics has been a decisive and elevating political opportunity for the Alt-Right movement. Furthermore, the ideology of the Alt-Right seems to have shifted from the fringes of society to the mainstream. Studying a movement that went through such a shift can lead to fruitful insights within the domain of politically contentious movements. The reason why such a movement is worthy of examination is because the shift from the fringe to the mainstream implies that the movement has been effective in its attempts for mobilisation. Therefore, in order to develop a better understanding of the relevance of framing and political opportunities within contentious politics and social movement mobilisation, the Alt-Right emerges as an appropriate and possibly insightful case to study. In addition, the underlying explanations of that shift are worth discovering as the societal impact of an ideology that moves from the fringes more towards the mainstream can affect the existing political and societal conditions, and facilitate polarisation.
4.2 DATA COLLECTION
This study analysed two different Alt-Right internet platforms, i.e. the Daily Stormer and Radix Journal. The characteristics of the content will be briefly described in section 4.2.2., but first an overview of the complete range of sources, the ‘universe’, is given to provide the reader with a more complete picture of all the actors involved in the Alt-Right movement. Website analysis is difficult as it is hard to establish the resonance of the different internet platforms. As the introduction made clear, the Alt-Right is a loosely-organised, internet-based movement. The decision was therefore made to restrict the search for potential sources to platforms on the internet. Case studies on the Alt-Right are scarce and agreement on who and what platform truly represents the movement is not agreed upon. Therefore there are few sources to refer to as validation for the choices that were made for this study. One of the main footholds in making these decisions has been David Neiwert’s (2017) book on the Alt-Right. Neiwert outlines the context in which the Alt-Right came into being (for a summary, see the section 1.1. that introduces and defines the Alt-Right) and in particular chapters 10 and 11 give a coherent overview of the Alt-Right movement and the affiliated individuals and websites.
32 4.2.1. DATA COLLECTION | UNIVERSE
The roots of the Alt-Right can be found in the 4Chan website, created by Christopher Poole. Through internet memes and trolls, the forums became a meeting place for individuals who would later call themselves members of the Alt-Right. The “manosphere” and its discussion boards, such as “men’s rights activists”, were the main sections on the website where Alt-Righters gathered and discussed their misogynist ideas and anti-Semite conspiracies (ibid: 232-233). The harassment that accompanied the Gamergate discussion (see introduction) led to more restrictions on the 4Chan website. As a response, 8Chan was created and the discussions moved to this platform. These platforms are not chosen for analysis as they are leaderless platforms and therefore the expectation of a coherent frame is not realistic. The hypothesis in this study is based on the idea that the movement’s organisation functions as a top-down frame-setter in order to mobilise further support for the movement. Therefore 4Chan and 8Chan are not perceived as the best options for an in-depth analysis. Nevertheless, further research on this topic could examine such message boards to see whether the frame of the SMO finds any resonance in the more autonomous forums.
With regard to potential influencing individuals, Neiwert (ibid: 236-250) highlights the names of Richard Spencer, Brad Griffin, Matthew Heimbach, Stephen Bannon, Milo Yiannopoulos, and Andrew Anglin. Spencer is one of the individuals who is putting himself forward in claiming to be one of the leaders of the Alt-Right movement and he also proclaims to have invented the name of the movement (although the first mention of the Alt-Right name was uttered by Paul Gottfried, his former mentor). He is probably the most recognisable leader of the Alt-Right movement (Wendling, 2018). After having founded and led the websites Alternative Right and National Policy Institute (NPI), Spencer gave up these platforms and started giving his sole attention to spreading his white nationalist ideology on the website Radix Journal. As Spencer emerged as one of the influential figures and major advocates of the movement, this platform will be part of the analysis. This is accounted for by his frequent media-appearances and the fact that he seems to be communicating an extreme view that excludes him from the so-called Alt-Lite. Nonetheless, he attempts to reach a broader audience – compared to the more openly degrading racist platforms that will be discussed later - with his ‘academic racist’ style, meaning that he bases his opinions and arguments on (controversial) scientific research, pays attention to what he wears (suit and tie), adopts a more eloquent style of speaking and writing, and stays calm in tense and controversial debates.
