Sebastian Kind -‐ 6116167
Supervisor: Prof. J.H. Zeitlin
Second Reader: Dr. E.M. Heemskerk MSc in Political Science – International Relations
Project – New Forms of Governance: From the EU to the World? GSSS, University of Amsterdam
The Dutch Meat Industry: Towards or
Away from Experimentalist Based
Regulation?
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank everybody that contributed to this thesis.
First and foremost, I would like thank Prof. J.H. Zeitlin for the sharing of his profound experimental knowledge and the providing of the subject for this thesis.
Second, I want to thank dr. E.M. Heemskerk for the time he is willing to spend to evaluate this thesis as my second reader.
Third, this thesis could absolutely not have been written without holding such valuable interview data as provided by my interviewees during the last couple of months. Thank you so much for your time.
List of Abbreviations
BRC British Retail Consortium
BSE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy CCM Continuous Control Monitoring Codex Codex Alimentarius
COKZ Centraal Orgaan Kwaliteitsaangelegenheden Zuivel COV Centrale Organisatie voor de Vleesindustrie
CCP Critical Control Point
DG SANCO Directorate General Health and Consumer Protection EFSA European Food Safety Authority
EU European Union
EZ Ministerie van Economische Zaken FVO Food and Veterinary Office
HACCP Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point IFS International Food Standard
IKB Integrale Ketenbeheersing
ICOV Infobox Crimineel en Onverklaarbaar Vermogen IOD Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst
KDS Kwaliteitskeuring Dierlijke Sector
KNS Koninklijke Nederlandse Slagersorganisatie
LNV Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit OM Openbaar Ministerie
NVWA Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit OFFC Official Food and Feed Controls Regulation OvV Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid
QLL Quality System Livestock Logistics RvA Raad voor Accreditatie
SKV Stichting Kwaliteitsgarantie Vleeskalversector VKI Voedselketeninformatie
VWS Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport WRR Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid
Index
Acknowledgdements 2
List of Abbreviations 3
Chapter 1. Introduction
6
Chapter 2. Research Methods
8
2.1 Methodology 8
2.2 Data Collection 8
Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework
11
3.1.1 Hierarchical Governance 11
3.1.2 Experimentalist Governance 12
3.1.3 Destabilization Regimes and the Shadow of Hierarchy 13
3.2.1 Risk-based regulation 15 3.2.3 System-based regulation 15 3.3.1 Party Regulation 17 3.3.2 Cooperation Between the Public and the Private Sector 17
Chapter 4. Participating Actors
19
4.1 Supervisory Actors 19 4.1.1 International Norm Developers 19 4.1.2 Food and Veterinary Office 194.1.3 Government Departments 20 4.1.4 Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit 20 4.1.5 Raad voor Accreditatie 21 4.2 Advisory Actor: European Food Safety Authority 21 4.3 Sectoral Actors 22
Chapter 5. Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
24
System
5.1 How HACCP is Intended 24
5.2 Hygiene Codes 25
5.3 Analysis 26
5.3.1 Party Regulation and Cooperation Between the Public 26 and the Private Sector
5.3.2 Risk and System-Based Regulation 27 5.3.3 Experimentalist Features 28
Chapter 6. Ante Mortem Inspections
31
6.1 How Ante Mortem Inspections are Intended 31 6.2 How Ante Mortem Inspections Work in Practice 316.2.1 The Absence of Official Veterinarians and Risk-Based Regulation 31
6.3 Further Analysis 35 6.3.1 Party Regulation and Cooperation Between the Public and the 35 Private Sector
Chapter 7. Post Mortem Inspections
38
7.1 How Post Mortem Inspections are Intended 38 7.2 How Post Mortem Inspections Work in Practice 39 7.2.1 Critical Control Points: Interpretation 39 7.2.2 Failed Public Enforcement: Large Slaughterhouses 39
7.2.3 Sight Inspections and KDS Tasks 42
7.3 Analysis 44
7.3.1 Party Regulation and Cooperation Between the Public and the 44
Private Sector
7.3.2 Risk and System-Based Regulation 46
7.3.3 Hierarchical and Experimentalist Features 49
Chapter 8. Certification and Chain Quality Systems
51
8.1 Private Certificates and Paper Realities 518.2 Analysis 55
8.2.1 Party Regulation 55 8.2.2 Risk and System-Based Regulation 55 8.2.3 Hierarchical and Experimentalist Features 56
Chapter 9. Private and Public Information Exchange
58
9.1 The Lack of Information Flows 589.2 Analysis 61
9.2.1 Cooperation Between the Public and the Private 61 9.2.2 Hierarchical and Experimentalist Features 61
Chapter 10. Government Departments
64
10.1 Ministerial Interference 64 10.2 Analysis: Hierarchical and Experimentalist Features 66Chapter 11. European Uniformization
68
11.1 Policy Fine Tuning 68Chapter 12. Conclusion
71
References 75
List of Interviewees 79
Chapter 1. Introduction
The Dutch government has a tendency to reduce supervision in the sense of a decreased regulatory and supervisory burden together with the increased responsibility for other actors in the governance field while switching to the complete opposite in the sense of tightened enforcement and stricter supervision in case incidents occur (WRR, 2013: 12). This trend that is known as the
regulatory paradox can amongst others be related to the Dutch (red) meat industry that as a result of fraud with horse meat in 2013 is continuously being confronted with plans for stricter supervision such as presented by the
Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid (OvV) that was asked to investigate the risks in the Dutch meat industry on behalf of the State Secretary of Economische Zaken (EZ), the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Next to increased legislative demands by the Dutch public, such pressure comes from different angles just as well. Private self-‐regulation and third-‐party requirements on one side and both public domestic and European legislative demands on the other afflict the European food and feed industry from respectively below and above that as a result of such often contradictory
overregulation seems to get stuck like custard between two layers of millefeuille pastry. The pressure of a bite by either teeth from above or below will make it escape from the sides and spill onto the floor. To prevent the Dutch meat industry from being squeezed it is therefore important for both layers to be somewhat adjusted to one another (Van der Meulen and Freriks, 2006: 175).
This thesis will discuss the possibilites for the Dutch meat industry to keep its head above the water and particularly pays attention to the extent in which experimentalist governance as a theory that facilitates the learning from different implementation strategies could play a significant role. The question that will be answerd in this thesis states: “To what extent does experimentalist governance emerge in the Dutch meat industry?”. This can be considered a
relevant question since already existing structures both in and around the Dutch meat industry show experimentalist characteristics while it is not necessarily clear whether these are being used to their utmost potential.
This thesis is structured as follows. Right after the introduction, the second chapter will discuss the research methods being used followed by the third chapter in which a fully fledged theoretical framework is presented. This thesis should give the reader an indication about the ratio between hierarchy on the one side of the spectrum and experimentalist governance on the other with regard to several major elements in the Dutch meat industry. Both theories form the absolute basis of that theoretical framework. The fourth chapter will
descriptively discuss all the actors in the field ranging from supervisory to advisory and sectoral actors while the actual analysis starts in chapter five in which the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) system is discussed which enables companies to determine their unique critical control points within their organizations. Chapter six discusses the ante mortem inspection prior to slaughter while the seventh chapter is fully dedicated to the post mortem inspection after slaughter. Private certification and the tendency of certificates becoming paper realities is what the eighth chapter is about whereas chapter nine covers the subject of private and public information exchange. More towards the end, chapter ten is used to discuss the interfering role of the Dutch ministries as regards the Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit (NVWA) while number eleven as in fact being the final regular chapter deals with European uniformization. Finally, the conclusion can be found under chapter twelve.
Chapter 2. Research Methods
In this chapter, the research methods that are used for developing this thesis are being explained by focussing on methodology first and data collection thereafter.
2.1 Methodology
This thesis is based on qualitative research with the case study as accompanying research design in the sense of the Dutch meat industry. By using interviews, academic literature, research reports, policy documents, and various relevant websites as sources for analysis, most findings in this thesis are cross-‐checked by means of triangulation (Bryman, 2008: 700). Particularly through interviewing, small theories, insights, and linkages are generated which reflects an inductive approach (Bryman, 2008: 366). Nevertheless, even through the interviews but certainly in general, academic main theories are in the end being tested which implicates the use of a deductive approach (Bryman, 2008: 693).
The epistemological position that is used can be considered interpretivist since particularly the interviews have served to understand the social world through the analysis of the interpretations by its participants (Bryman, 2008: 366). The ontological position that has been chosen and matches this can be described as constructionist in the sense that social phenomena within the Dutch meat industry are being shaped by the interactions between social actors (Ibid.). The type of case study that is used is more or less a critical least likely case in the sense that if the Dutch meat industry would be moving towards a fully
fledged experimentalist regime, such governance form could well be applied to other sectors given the industry shows no or only little signs of for example information sharing and effective peer review at this very moment while the structures for this to accomplish are often present.
2.2 Data Collection
The documentation analysis in this research paper is built around the critical research report by the OvV called ‘Risico’s in de Vleesketen’ which has recently
been published in March 2014. Further, legal documents and reports coming from both the European and domestic level as well as from public and private sources are used as frist-‐hand information. A firts-‐rate collection of academic literature by prominent scholars in the field has been selected for amongst others the construction of a solid theoretical framework. Finally, several websites have been consulted for in particular the acquiring of detailed additional information.
In total, seven interviews have been conducted ranging from a public
interviewee at the European level to public and private people at the level of the Member State and below. Although by far not comprehensive, this somewhat gives a reflection of the actors in the field that in some way are connected to the Dutch meat indusrty. On a European level, the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) has been contacted. Domestically, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the
Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit, the Cenrale Organisatie voor de Vleessector (COV), the Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, the Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR), and socio-‐legal scholar Tetty Havinga from the Radboud University have been approached. For the specific positions of the interviewees regarded please take a look at the end of this thesis.
The interviews were conducted in a semi-‐structured form in the sense that the questions were not necessarily posed in the way they were outlined. Despite such flexibility, all questions were asked in a similar wording and were tried to put at the service of letting the interviewee explain certain events in such a manner that it could be linked to the theories that are used in this thesis without necessarily explaining them in full (Bryman, 2008: 438). All interviewees were selected as a result of purposive sampling since the brief consultation of
Professor J.H. Zeitlin made more or less clear what kind of people on which positions could assist in answering the research question (Bryman, 2008: 458). Snowball sampling would have absolutely been an option since most
interviewees recommended (direct) relations to talk to. However, a combination of time constraints, theoretical saturation, and declined or unanswered requests has prevented this from happening. Important to mention is that the NVWA Division Veterinary and Import refused to talk since they were prepairing an official reaction to the critical report by the OvV as mentioned above. Indeed, the
Dutch meat industry is a topical issue which amongst others resulted in the recent Dutch government response to the report concerned on the tenth of June 2014 (EZ and VWS, 2014).
Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework
In this chapter, the theoretical foundation that this thesis is based on has been rolled out. First and foremost, hierarchical and experimentalist governance as being two mainly conflicting theories are described and positioned on both ends of a spectrum on the basis of which a significant part of further analysis will be classified. Also, destabilization regimes which can be described as certain
solution mechanisms for impasses that arise as a result of unsuccessful attempts to experimentalist rule making will extensively be discussed. Further, both risk and system-‐based regulation are being explained since such approaches to regulation can be found in various types of legislation and, as will become apparent further on, are differently being interpreted across the board. Finally, different types of party regulation and cooperation between the public and the private sector are presented for the purpose of gaining a more legal
understanding on the basis of which further analysis could be categorized. Although not being discussed in this theoretical framework, non-‐binding
recommendations about Dutch supervision in general as drafted by the WRR will also be used for the categorization and comparison of further analysis
throughout.
3.1.1 Hierarchical Governance
According to Craig and de Búrca, hierarchical policies are top-‐down, often from the centre and by central actors opposed comprehensive policies that do not provide recipient actors with a lot of room for their own interpretation (ie discretion). Moreover, these kind of policies often have a binding character, implying that recipient actors have no choice but to mandatory implementing them which obviously makes such rules suitable to be legally enforced in a mandatory way. All in all, hierarchical governance can be described in terms of a command-‐and-‐control type of regulation (Craig and de Búrca, 2011: 160).
Hierarchical policy processes can amongst others be observed within the European Union. The Commission, having an agenda-‐setting privilege, often initiates policy proposals that are subsequently forwarded to the Parliament and
the Council that, as being legislative powers, are able and allowed to transform proposals into binding and uniform regulations (ie laws) (Harcourt and Radaelli, 1999: 109) (Egeberg, 2003: 130). Craig and de Búrca refer to the ‘Classic
Community Method’ as a form of hierarchical governance within the EU which is more or less in line with the aforementioned policy process, added thereto that the resulting binding and uniform rule is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (Craig and de Búrca, 2011: 160).
3.1.2 Experimentalist Governance
According to Sabel and Zeitlin, experimentalist governance will always appear as a reaction to ‘strategic uncertainty’. In a situation of strategic uncertainty,
(central) actors continuously encounter problems that are impossible to solve with their at that moment most preferred strategies. Consequently, in order to be able to achieve their goals, they are willing to engage in deliberative
alternatives that involve cooperation with other actors which would have
normally been something out of their comfort zone (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012: 17). Next to strategic uncertainty, a ‘polyarchic distribution of power’ is another important condition for experimentalist governance. Under a polyarchic
distribution of power, Sabel and Zeitlin understand the impossibility of the actors involved to impose their most preferred solutions on the other members in the network without taking their points of view into account (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012: 12).
Experimentalist governance itself is described as a “recursive process of provisional goal-‐setting and revision based on learning from the comparison of alternative approaches to advancing them in different contexts” (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012: 3). Hereby, ‘recursiveness’ refers to the latest step of the process calling for (the infinite) repitition of all previous stages (Website Van Osch, 2010). Hereby, the outcomes of one round serve as the input for the next. Therefore, iteration of the same process yields different results (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012: 3)
The experimentalist governance cycle contains four consecutive steps. First, broad framework goals and measures need to be established on a provisional
basis by a combination of relevant central and local actors in consultation with the civil society (Ibid.). The ‘civil society’ can be conceived of as non-‐state actors with a political mission, such as non-‐governmental organisations (NGOs), that reject the idea of states as authoritive units of analysis (Anheier et al., 2001: 15) (Lipschutz, 1992: 398).
Secondly, local actors are given a huge amount of discretion to reach the goals as agreed upon in their own way (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012: 3). As a condition for the autonomy obtained, thirdly, the local actors are obliged to regularly report their performance in this regard. Moreover, they are obligated to engage in a peer review process which allows for the results of their different means of implementation to be compared. Local actors should implement the best
practices of their peers if it turns out that they are unable to achieve the desired progress on the basis of the agreed indicators themselves (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2012: 4).
In the fourth place and finally, the goals, measures, and the decision making procedures are to be periodically revised by a widening circle of actors on the basis of the results obtained from peer review. Ultimately, the entire cycle is repeated (Ibid.).
3.1.3 Destabilization Regimes and the Shadow of Hierarchy
According to Sabel and Zeitlin and as already mentioned, destabilization regimes can be described as certain solution mechanisms for impasses that arise as a result of unsuccessful attempts to aforementioned experimentalist rule making and revision. Obviously, such regimes are only to put into effect if the situation as emerged is no longer sustainable and if they provide “plausible and superior alternatives” (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010: 13). Although destablization regimes can be considered some sort of sanctioning, they do specifically not concern
pecuniary penalties but are simply meant to achieve actors moving in a way that they initially had not in mind (Ibid.).
Sabel and Zeitlin explain three different types of destabilization regimes. A first type describes the public justification requirement that requires the submitting of a joint document with the arguments of the diagreeing actors to
the address of the central actor such as the Commission for evaluation. The idea behind this is that actors tend to avoid this practice in most cases and continue non-‐hierarchical deliberation out of fear of losing credibility in herefrom arising public debate (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010: 13) (Vos, 2010: 160).
‘The right to challenge and the duty to explain’, as a second mechanism, concerns the right of a central actor to take over certain responsibilities of the lower level units provided that its actions are supported by all members of the network regarded (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010: 14).
A third type, as an indirect effect, is the penalty default that makes any refrain of participation so unattractive that actors decide to engage in a second worst scenario of deliberation. Such penalties could involve threatening to proceed with the (highly undesirable) hierarchical drafting of policies or anything else that is perceived as very unwelcome (Ibid.). Just as with the first type, the effective instilling of fear makes the direct intervention of the central actor often unnecessary which means that one can speak of non-‐hierarchical mechanisms in that sense.
This leads us to the conviction of some that argue that the governance discretion of non-‐state actors always occurs under the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ which assumes the limitation of hierarchy to accomplish its desired outcomes at all times. Therefore, non-‐state actors that do have the capacities to achieve those goals are attributed semi-‐constitutional authority by the public central actor that will support their agreements in exchange for the creation of a honest bargaining culture or environment. Should this fail and culminate in disagreement between the parties, the public actor has the final say by imposing an arrangement top-‐ down (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010: 14-‐5). Eberlein is correct that the shadow of hierarchy idea is not necessarily about the public taking over its lower level units regulatory tasks. It might as well be defined as a threat that in most cases will never become reality since such intervention, if only because of the absence of public capacity, is always to be perceived less attractive as opposed to
deliberation to resume (Eberlein, 2010: 75-‐6).
All in all, destabilization regimes and the shadow of hierarchy concept can indirectly be considered public hierarchical intervention mechanisms at all times but at the same time do not lead to actual direct and overshadowing hierarchical
interventions in most cases. One should thus not confuse the two and be careful to categorize such mechanisms as hierarchical by definition.
3.2.1 Risk-Based Regulation
By adopting a risk-‐based approach, the effectiveness of public supervision should increase as a result of targeted monitoring at places that in case of non-‐ compliance with the agreed regulations poses the greatest risk. Moreover, there where the likelihood of breach is high, monitoring mechanisms should be placed in position (Havinga and Van Waarden, 2013: 50). Obviously, risk-‐based
regulation implies the discontinuation of attention for violations that are not being categorized under high risk (Havinga and Van Waarden, 2013: 51). Risk-‐ based supervision goes hand in hand with selective monitoring based on risk analysis and risk profiles that require the collection of fertile information. The interpretation and operationalisation of ‘risk’ as a generally considered
contested definition plays a central role in case of such daintiness. After all, the interpretation of this definition determines the classification of the ‘high risk’ category with respect to its ‘low risk’ counterpart (WRR, 2013: 47-‐8).
3.2.3 System-Based Regulation
System-‐based meta regulation is aimed at the supervision of production processes instead of the product (in the making) itself. Therefore, it is in line with the shift from a prescriptive to the aforementioned risk-‐based approach (Havinga and Van Waarden, 2013: 49, 55). Meta regulation corresponds to government demands for goal oriented supervision as already presented in the Kaderstellende Visie Op Toezicht 2005: Minder last, meer effect (Helderman and Honingh, 2009: 28). System-‐based regulation can be described as the
supervision in which the structure, scope, and the operation of systems and organizational processes of organizations are established by the execution of audits. Meta regulation can be further specified as a form of vertical supervision by public organizations utilizing the internal assurance systems of the sectors or organizations themselves (Helderman and Honingh, 2009: 7).
Successful control over the systems by the organizations under supervision without the use of direct vertical public intervention to be required can be considered the ideal situation (Helderman and Honingh, 2009: 9). Therefore, the challenge for the public supervisor is to make the organizations feel responsible for compliance with the standards attached to the systems concerned. Meta regulation would obviously benefit from objectiviable standards that could be unambiguously operationalized (Helderman and Honingh, 2009: 10).
Nevertheless, reality checks by public organizations will always remain required, even in case of proven mastery (Helderman and Honingh, 2009: 11). In search of new risks and adequate standards for them, thematic supervision provides a solution that should not involve strong penalties in the beginning (Helderman and Honingh, 2009: 99).
The capacities to self-‐regulation and the quality of assurance systems can be considered the main requirements for system-‐based regulation whereby the former determines the latter. Self-‐regulation includes the capacity and
responsibility to act (Helderman and Honingh, 2009: 99-‐101). The suitability of meta regulation for specific sectors totally depends on the extent of
interdependency within the relationships and interests involved. The larger the self-‐interest to control the risk, the greater the chance of self-‐regulation and the proper implementation of assurance systems (Helderman and Honingh, 2009: 11-‐2).
Trust is an inevitable issue in supervisory relationships. ‘Just culture’, as used in aviation, could be considered an ideal interpretation that includes the subject of sanctioning. It assumes the expectation of actors to be properly
treated by one another. Transparency will be rewarded by attenuating sanctions or reduced external supervision assuming serious negligence or intentional violations do not occur. Only in this way an environment is created in which one could draw lessons from mistakes to avoid them from happening in the future. ‘Just culture’ is most likely to emerge when the distance between the risk taker and the actual potential effect of the risk is short (Helderman and Honingh, 2009: 96-‐7). Contrary to ‘just culture’, complex and less transparent markets, and the ability to externalize negative risk effects reduce the incentive to self-‐regulation (Helderman and Honingh, 2009: 12).
3.3.1 Party Regulation
Food standards can be formulated and enforced by a variety of actors. Quality regulating actors can be divided into four separate main categories (Havinga and Van Waarden, 2013: 18). First party regulation involves self regulation by the organization concerned including the drafting of internal standards which are internally to be enforced and monitored. Second party regulation encompasses the imposition of standards to the organization by its trading or business partner either originating from the supplier, the recipient, or both. To proceed with third party regulation, this is described as the imposition and monitoring of standards by a third party such as an industry association, a private certification body, or even the media. Finally, fourth party regulation is a non-‐private form of
regulation and enforcement that is strictly executed by public organizations, both on the international and domestic level. Obviously, the four categories mentioned are ideal types that will often appear in various combinations in practice (Ibid.).
3.3.2 Cooperation Between the Public and the Private Sector
Cooperation between public and private supervision in the food sector exists in many forms. The nine main types that are to be distinguished can be found in order of increasing commitment and public involvement underneath (Havinga and Van Waarden, 2013: 59, 60).
The first type describes the non-‐binding consultation and coordination between the public and private sector for the purpose of advising one another. A great example can be found in the Regulier Overleg Warenwet that, as a public initiative, discusses the proposed policies and regulations with a variety of public and private actors including industry associations, consumer organizations, the ministries of Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (VWS) and Economische Zaken, the NVWA, and the relevant industrial and product boards (Havinga and Van Waarden, 2013: 60). The second type corresponds to this first type except that information sharing procedures have adopted a more binding character that, for example, can result in a shared database (Ibid.).
The third type presents a regulation initiative by the public whilst making use of existing private standards for its execution. Such initiatives may come from the legislator, the public supervisor, or even the court (Havinga and Van Waarden, 2013: 61). The fourth type, on the other hand, describes the private sector taking the initiative regarding any standards or types of monitoring whilst acquiring support by public authorities and regulations. Private self-‐monitoring systems are often associated with this fourth type which are ideally to bring about reduced public supervision provided the compliance of the companies concerned with the standards of such systems (Havinga and Van Waarden, 2013: 62). The fifth type describes public recognition, support, and the eventual
reorganization of originally private organizations. In general, the public supervisor fulfills the role of additional supervisor that supervises the way private organizations fulfill their supervisory tasks (Havinga and Van Waarden, 2013: 64-‐5).
The sixth type includes the privatisation of public tasks which ought to be fully covered by public funding. The initiative lying with the public sector, public organizations partially outsource their tasks to private organizations (Havinga and Van Waarden, 2013: 65). Related to this is the seventh type encompassing the same privatisation of public tasks but in the absence of any public funding. A variant on this is the privatisation of an originally perceived public task that is not any longer covered by public funding but forces its users to pay for it directly instead. Notwithstanding extensive privatisation, the final responsibility is often for the account of the public (Havinga and Van Waarden, 2013: 65-‐6).
The eighth and penultimate type involves covenants between public organizations and companies or sectors in the sense of more or less private contractual commitments. Hereby, mutual obligations are defined on a
confidential basis preceded by either private or public initiative. Mutual trust between the parties is often based on experience, past performance, and
reputation of the other (Havinga and Van Waarden, 2013: 66). Finally, the ninth type covers the supervision of private parties on public activities. Both advisory and supervisory boards fall under this heading (Havinga and Van Waarden, 2013: 67).
Chapter 4. Participating Actors
In this chapter, actors that are somewise connected to the Dutch meat industry are being described, including supervisory actors, advisory actors, and sectoral ones. Although descriptive, their discussion now allows for a more dedicated focus on analysis further on.
4.1 Supervisory Actors
4.1.1 International Norm Developers
Requirements for food safety in chain quality systems are developed by international private actors such as British Retail Consortium (BRC) and
International Food Standard (IFS). Several certification schemes are developed to cover all actors in the meat sector whereby the HACCP risk inventory is of the utmost importance. Certifying agencies that adopt such schemes and offer them to companies need to determine whether their potential clients comply with the requirements by making use of audits (OvV, 2014: 24).
4.1.2 Food and Veterinary Office
One of the conclusions from the Medina Ortega report about Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), better known as the mad cow disease, was the need for better coordination between inspection and law-‐making in the European Union (EU). Consequently, the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) was established within the Commission’s Directorate General Health and Consumer Protection (DG SANCO) as a service to ensure the correct implementation and enforcement of EU legislation within the Member States as well as in third countries. The FVO’s activities involve extensive market surveillance in the countries concerned on the basis of a set of rules as laid down in the Official Food and Feed Controls Regulation (OFFC) which bridges the gap between the Commission and so called competent authorities on the national level such as the NVWA in the case of the Netherlands (Weimer and Vos, 2013: 10-‐11).
In fact, the task of the FVO is simply to establish a dialogue with authorities on both the national and local level and even involve some relevant business actors. On the one hand, the presence of the FVO should bring about a pressure to comply with EU legislation. On the other hand, it should give the actors involved a direct possibility to present their (deviating) outlooks to the FVO whereas the competent authority is even required to draft an action plan on the basis of their country specific recommendations as provided by the European body based on their mission findings (Weimer and Vos, 2013: 5).
4.1.3 Government Departments
The Dutch ministries of Economische Zaken and Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport have a joint responsibility regarding food safety policies. Whereas EZ is responsible for the NVWA and focuses on every single chain in the meat sector, VWS functions mere as an appointing authority to the supervisor and is more aimed towards the end of the chain there where the actual products are able to reach the consumer. Furthermore, VWS is responsible for non-‐European third country meat import (OvV, 2014: 25).
4.1.4 Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit
The NVWA, as an inspectorate, monitors the compliance of both European and domestic legislation regarding food safety through the use of audits and system inspections. Next to enforcement, the public authority is responsible for both risk assessment and communication, and cattle and meat inspections. The authority charges the (private) industry for its executed tasks such as various kinds of inspection and licensing since food safety is considered a shared responsibility (OvV, 2014: 26-‐7).
Within the NVWA, inspection and supervision, enforcement, and investigation are united as one service although investigation is positioned independently under Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst (IOD) that maintains close ties with the Openbaar Ministerie (OM) (ie public Prosecution). Trained
only allowed to act on the basis of administrative law but can proceed with criminal prosection if required (OvV, 2014: 26, 29).
Other possible and rather strong sanctions include administrative fines, which are allowed since July 2013, periodic penalty payments, and even
withdrawal of permits. Obviously, softer enforcement measures such as verbal and written warnings are also among the possibilities and it all depends on the type of violation which sanction is imposed. Anyway, the motto of the NVWA states ‘Soft when possible, hard if required’ (OvV, 2014: 26) (Interview Wienk, 2014).
4.1.5 Raad voor Accreditatie
The Raad voor Accreditatie (RvA) monitors the level of independence and quality of certifying agencies without addressing the actual content of the norms or standards concerned (OvV, 2014: 29). The RvA falls under the responsibility of EZ and cooperates with other accrediting bodies within the European Union to ensure that the to them applicable European guidelines are more or less equally being implemented (Interview Bokhorst, 2014). This platform is called the European co-‐operation for Accreditation (OvV, 2014: 29).
4.2 Advisory Actor: European Food Safety Authority
The Medina Ortega Report, which appeared as a result of the outbreak of BSE in 1996 as already mentioned, found the Community’s approach to ad-hoc
comitology to be complex, non-‐transparent, and un-‐democratic (Vos, 2010: 153). Comitology relates to the procedures by which the Commission makes decisions about the implementation of EU legislation in collaboration with committees of national experts which simply originated from the idea that “one cannot regulate what one does not understand” (Dogan, 1997: 31) (Shapiro, 2004: 342-‐3).
In response to the Community’s mismanagement during the BSE crisis, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was founded under the General Food Law (GFL). Contrary to the course of events prior to the BSE crisis, the “high level of protection of both health and consumers’ interests” could be considered the
focal point of the GFL, rendering any internal market operations of secondary importance. In other words, “food shall not be placed on the market if it is unsafe” (Vos, 2010: 154-‐5).
Referring to the GFL, one could speak of a clear distrubtion of tasks between EFSA and the Commission. Whereas EFSA has been assigned the task of risk assessment, the Commission is designated to risk management (Vos, 2010: 155). The role of risk assessment covers the independent provision of scientific
opinions regarding food safety by EFSA to the addresses of the Commission, the Parliament and the Member States in such a transparent manner that allows for the accessibility of all actors concerned (Vos, 2010: 158). With its own scientific staff, EFSA, as an independent agency, could undoubtedly be considered
proactive since a significant part of their tasks are executed in the absence of any command of the Commission, the Parliament, or the Member States (Vos, 2010: 156-‐7).
The Commission usually follows the by EFSA acquired insights. This chemistry between the two seems necessary given the obligation of the
Commision to consult EFSA on all issues concerning public health. This course of action is naturally stimulated from the Commission’s lack of expertise. Moreover, the Commission tends to consult EFSA concerning priority setting during the first stage instead of directly approaching the Member States through comitology (Vos, 2010: 157-‐8). Next to an Executive Director, a Secreteriat, and a
Management Board, EFSA consists of an Advisory Forum, a Scientific Committee, and several Scientific Panels (Vos, 2010: 158).
4.3 Sectoral Actors
Although European legislation describes in detail how meat safety should be ensured by the NVWA, Council Regulations 178/2002 (ie the GFL) and 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs define that all actors in the meat chain are primarily responsible for the production of a safe meat product. The chain starts at the livestock farmers that could limit the use of medicines that pose a threat to human health. They can participate in specific quality systems such as Integrale Ketenbeheersing (IKB) Varken, IKB Rund, or Q Rund that aims to make the
