CULTURAL DIPLOMACY:
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOFT POWER
AND PROPAGANDA
Case Study of Cultural Diplomacy during the Dutch-Russian
year of 2013: How to Measure the Effectiveniss.
Thomas Bakker 6071945
Masterthesis Eastern-European Studies University of Amsterdam (UvA)
Table of Contents
Table of Contents... 2
Preface... 2
Chapter One... 5
Introduction Chapter One... 6
1.1 The meaning of cultural diplomacy...6
1.2 Cultural diplomacy as a propaganda tool...11
1.3 Cultural diplomacy as a soft power tool...15
1.4 What makes cultural diplomacy effective and how to evaluate the effectiveness?17 Conclusion Chapter One... 23
Chapter Two... 25
Introduction Chapter Two... 25
2.1 History of Dutch-Russian diplomatic relations...26
2.1.1 Pre-1917... 26
2.1.2 Soviet Union period (1917-1991)...27
2.1.3 Post-Soviet period (1991-present)...30
2.2 History of cultural diplomacy in the Soviet Union and Russia...35
2.3 The Sochi Olympic Games 2014 as an example of Russian cultural diplomacy....39
2.4 The history of the Netherlands and cultural diplomacy...40
2.5 Nuclear Summit 2014 as an example of Dutch cultural diplomacy...43
2.6 Dutch-Russian cultural relations... 45
Conclusion Chapter Two... 49
Chapter Three... 50
Introduction Chapter Three... 50
3.1 The Dutch-Russian year 2013... 51
3.2 Pillars of activities: Economy and politics...53
3.3 The importance of culture in diplomatic relations...55
3.4 Cultural event ‘The Sovjet Mythe’ (Drents Museum, Assen)...58
3.5 Cultural event ‘Constellation of Russia’ (Russotrudnichestvo, Amsterdam)...62
3.6 Cultural event ‘Russian fair’ (Rusland op z’n Best, Best)...66
3.7 Cultural exhibition ‘Peter de Grote, een bevlogen tsaar’ (Hermitage, Amsterdam) ... 69
3.8 Good practise of cultural diplomacy?...71
Conclusion Chapter Three... 77
Conclusion... 78
Preface
I became acquainted with Russia in 2010 as part of a study-trip to Saint Petersburg and Moscow. During this trip, I did not really get to know Russian culture because of the limited amount of time. This would change when in that same year, I travelled to Russia by myself to work in a children’s camp in the Russian woods near Nizhniy Novgorod. Also, in 2013, I went to Russia for three months to do an internship at the Dutch Institute in Saint Petersburg. During these three months I got to know Russian culture better because I rented a room at an apartment of an Russian old lady. With her I had many conversations as well as with other Russian natives about Dutch and Russian norms and values. I tried to open myself for Russian traditions and became aware, from my own experiences, of the cultural differences between the Netherlands and Russia. For example, what struck me was how at first, Russians appear to be very detached. I experienced that they seem to be somehow suspicious towards you. However, after they get to know you, I was amazed by their hospitality, where they invited me to their homes to cook a traditional meal, like blinies and borsch. Furthermore, I noticed that Russians in general are very religious, hold on tied to traditions and that marriage is very important. During my stay in Saint Petersburg, I saw many weddings and what struck me was the young age of these couples. Things that are strange to me are normal for Russians. Of course, there are also things that Russians find strange about Dutch people. For instance, when I spoke to Russians and I told them I was not married at my age of 25, they were kind of surprised.
Every nation has its own culture, with its own norms and values. With all these different cultures around the world, I think it is important to create an atmosphere of understanding and respect toeach other’s culture. To achieve this, cultural diplomacy can be used to explain a nation’s culture. Cultural diplomacy is a vehicle to reduce cultural differences and to increase mutual understanding of each other’s culture. The fact that Russians have different norms and values then Dutch people should not lead to incomprehension towards each other’s culture. When you try to give insights on Russian culture to a foreign audience, they could learn about Russian culture in order to influence their perception on Russia and to create understanding for the norms and values: the objective of cultural diplomacy. This is what happened during the time I lived with the Russian old lady: she tried to give me insights in the Russian culture
and because of her explanation I started to understand on what norms and values the Russian culture is based.
This thesis will have its focus on the bilateral Dutch-Russian year in 2013 as a form of cultural diplomacy. During this year, both sides would present their culture in order to promote and explain it. Cultural events are in this case used to achieve its goals in cultural diplomacy. Events like the ‘Constellation of Russia’ and ‘De Sovjet Mythe’ had the objective to improve Dutch-Russian relations by informing its audience about a Russian culture. The question that arises is how cultural diplomacy could be practised most effectively. This thesis will research whether particular cultural
events that were organized during this bilateral year were a form of effectively practising cultural diplomacy. This thesis argues that there are two ways on how
cultural diplomacy could be used: as soft power or as propaganda. The argument of the thesis is that cultural diplomacy is best practised through soft power, while I argue that propaganda on the other hand is not the right approach for this.
This thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter 1 uses theoretical literature to explain the meaning of cultural diplomacy. Scholars of international relations distinguish between using cultural diplomacy as a tool of soft power and as a tool of propaganda. The difference between both approaches is clear as soft power has the objective to reach mutual understanding, while propaganda has the intention to impose a message without reaching mutual understanding. With the help of theoretical scholarship, this chapter also explains what makes cultural diplomacy effective. Is cultural diplomacy more feasible with a soft power approach or with a propaganda approach?
Chapter 2 focuses on Dutch-Russian relations in particular. It gives a historical overview of the relations between the Netherlands and Russia on the political, economic and cultural level, followed by a discussion of how both countries have been practicing cultural diplomacy. Furthermore, this chapter will provide the reader with examples of Dutch cultural diplomacy and Russian cultural diplomacy. The purpose of these examples is to make clear in what circumstances cultural diplomacy could be used and for which purposes.
Chapter 3 continues with the core of this thesis: the Dutch-Russian year as a case of cultural diplomacy. In this section, I analyse four cultural events and evaluate whether they are a practise of soft power or propaganda, and therefore, if
they are an effective way of practising cultural diplomacy. To find an answer to this question, I immersed myself in the origins of these cultural events. The answer to this question is based on how scholars view the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy. This thesis is important because cultural diplomacy is a relatively new concept. This thesis has its contribution because it explains the term to an audience and it takes a new approach to cultural diplomacy. It explains that cultural diplomacy has two distinct approaches: the soft power approach and the propaganda approach.
Chapter One
Introduction Chapter One
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the meaning of cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is the main subject because the research provided in this thesis has the intention to present the Dutch-Russian year of 2013 as a case of cultural diplomacy. This section explains in what circumstances cultural diplomacy is used and what tools are available to practise cultural diplomacy.
Cultural diplomacy can be practised in two different ways: as a tool for soft power and as a form of propaganda. This section explains the difference between soft power and propaganda and how these notions can be applied to cultural diplomacy. To make my point on this distinction clear, I present the reader with examples of using cultural diplomacy as soft power and as propaganda.
Furthermore in this chapter, I discuss the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy. This chapter presents a debate on how scholars view the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy. What are the most effective players to practise cultural diplomacy and what do they see as preconditions of successfully practising cultural diplomacy. It is important to discuss what effective cultural diplomacy means because later on in this thesis I evaluate whether particular cultural events during the Dutch-Russian year were a good practise of cultural diplomacy.
1.1 The meaning of cultural diplomacy
Simon Mark (2009) argues that there is a certain problem among scholars to give a real definition to the term cultural diplomacy. He points out that many definitions of the term exist.1 Moreover, he argues that there is no agreement among scholars on its objectives, the agents, and activities, which is visible in the different approaches of countries in cultural diplomacy. Mark (2009) emphasizes the difference in the use of cultural diplomacy for countries: first, with the purpose to advance a country’s national interests, and second, to achieve mutual understanding between international cultures.2 I discuss both terminologies in order to make a distinction between propaganda and soft power. The use of cultural diplomacy to advance its national interest explain this as a form of propaganda and achieving mutual understanding between international cultures is defined as soft power.
This thesis defines cultural diplomacy on the definition given by the American scholar Milton Cummings (2003): ‘the exchange of ideas, information, art, values and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding’.3 What this means is that national governments try to present a, mostly, positive image of their culture, norms and values and are trying to promote these abroad to the population of a targeted country. Kazuo Ogoura (2008) explains this practise: he argues that Japan from the 1950s onwards invested in its cultural diplomacy in order to change the image of Japan into a ‘peace-loving nation’, as the image of Japan decreased because of World War Two.4 In order to successfully practise cultural diplomacy, it is important for national governments not only to promote their culture and values, but also to develop respect and to understand the way of thinking of a targeted country. Through obtaining knowledge and understanding of each other’s culture, the ultimate goal of cultural diplomacy is to achieve and improve relations between nations.5 Especially when relations are tense, culture might be helpful as a
1 S. Mark, ‘A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy’, Netherlands Institute of International Relations
‘Clingendael’, 2009, p. 4.
2 (Mark 2009, 5)
3 M. Cummings, Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: a Survey. Washington D.C.: Center for Arts and Culture, 2003, p.1.
4 K. Ogoura, ‘Japan’s Postwar Cultural Diplomacy’, FU Berlin CAS, Center for Area Studies, Working paper 1/2008, p. 2.
5 R. Appel, A. Irony, S. Schmerz, A. Ziv, ‘Cultural Dilplomacy: An Important but Neglected Tool in Promoting Israel’s Public Image’, The Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, May 2008, pp. 7-8.
fresh tool to establish new links, away from official diplomatic relations.6 A political dispute between two nations ensures that ambassadors are not able to play any role, while cultural institutions have the ability to keep the doors open between two countries in times of political tension. Because of the non-political power of culture, it can therefore be used in many situations, even in times of political dispute.7
Cultural diplomacy is a component of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy could be interpreted as the umbrella for everything an international actor does to present and explain itself to the world, where cultural diplomacy is one of the elements.8 Public diplomacy is directed to citizens of other countries to influence them in order to achieve a positive image of one’s country.9 The main difference between public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy is that public diplomacy is the promotion of the whole society and cultural diplomacy focuses on a nation’s culture.10 Furthermore, public diplomacy has a one-way approach where an international actor tries to influence a countries population with no expectation to get something in return, while cultural diplomacy has a two-way approach, where international actors are focused on reaching mutual understanding.11
When making use of cultural diplomacy, the main purpose of a national government is not only to foster mutual understanding of another country, but through the promotion of culture it also sought to attract foreigners to its own nation. The practise of cultural diplomacy is not a government-to-government communication; it is directed at the population of a target country.12 Cultural diplomacy can create a framework of trust and relationships with other peoples and demonstrate the nation’s values, it could reach influential people of society that could not be reached at the governmental level, and cultural diplomacy creates a neutral platform for contact
6 K. Bound, R. Briggs, J. Holden and S. Jones, ‘Culture is a central component of international relations. It’s time to unlock its full potential’, Demos, London, 2007, p. 52.
7 (Bound 2007, 55)
8 C. Schneider, ‘Cultural Diplomacy: Hard to Define, but You’d Know If You Saw It’, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Fall/Winter 2006, Vol. 13 Issue 1, p. 191.
9 G.D. Malone, Organizing the Nation’s Public Diplomacy, Boston: University Press of America 1988, p. 1. 10 C. Lord, Losing Hearts and Minds?: Public Diplomacy and Strategic Influence in the Age of Terror, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006, p.15.
11 M. Ryniejska-Kieldanowicz, ‘Cultural Diplomacy as a Form of International Communication’, Institute for
International Studies, University of Wroclaw, p. 7.
12 J. Hecht, ‘What Are We Searching For? Culture, Diplomacy, Agents, and the State’, in J. Gienow-Hecht and M. Donfried ed., Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, New York and Oxford: Berghahn 2010, p. 13.
between people.13 The think thank organization ‘Demos’ (2007) argues that cultural diplomacy could also be helpful to certain countries in particular; countries that have a negative reputation worldwide.14 Cultural diplomacy then can have the ability to restore this problem through presenting different perspectives, views and opinions, as it is a form of explanation and exposition. Cultural diplomacy could also do something about existing national stereotypes. An example is the reputation of the United States because of the government policies: as a consequence of its invasion in Iraq in 2003, the 1956 Suez Canal crisis and the American presence in the Vietnam War.15 The attractiveness of the United States in the case was decreased as a consequence of these incidents and by means of cultural diplomacy; the U.S. could try to change this reputation.16
To practise cultural diplomacy, the actors engaged can use different tools in order to show their culture to foreign audiences. First, a country could make use of art. Art is a broad term and can be divided into ‘performing’ and ‘fine’ arts. Theatre, film, ballet and music are a form of performing arts, while paintings, photographs and architecture are classified as fine arts.17 The use of films as a performing art is an important element of practising cultural diplomacy. Films could deliver a message; especially films that appeal to emotions and could have an effect on people. For instance, Soviet citizens during the Cold War watched American films in which people had a car in their possession and witnessed people that did not have food-shortages. For Soviet citizens in the 1950s, this was a new phenomenon.18 Films could contain a form of cultural diplomacy as the American films promoted the use of cars and display stores with plenty of food. As another performing art, music is a contributor to cultural diplomacy. Especially during the Cold War, the United States sent several acts to countries to perform.19 For instance, American rock and roll musicians in the time of the Cold War obtained the message of freedom, which had an
13 Report U.S. Department of State, ‘Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy’, Report of the
Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, September 2005, pp. 3-6.
14 (Bound 2007, 23) 15 (Bound 2007, 26) 16 (Nye 2004, 38)
17 J. Lenczowski, ‘Cultural Diplomacy, Political Influence and Integrated Strategy’, Institute of World Politics, 2008, p. 13.
18 C. Lord, Losing Hearts and Minds?: Public Diplomacy and Strategic Influence in the Age of Terror, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006, p. 52.
appeal in communist countries in Eastern Europe. This kind of music emphasised on the attractiveness of American freedom and values.20 Photography is another tool of cultural diplomacy, which could show images of every day life of a country. For example, the United States Information Agency (USIA) initiated a photographic exhibition called ‘The Family Man’ in the 1950s. This exhibition functioned as a platform to show the diversity of American culture and its norms and values.21 The exhibition was sent to 39 countries, mostly in Eastern Europe, and functioned as a way to show to the population of the communist countries what freedom means according to American values.22 Liam Kennedy (2003) explains photography as a cultural diplomacy tool. The U.S. government launched a photographic exhibition called ‘After September 11: images from Ground Zero’. Joel Meyerowitz made the photos for the exhibition, which contained images of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001 and its aftermath. The exhibition was seen in more then 60 countries and had to objective to tell America’s story to international audiences.23 The exhibition not only served as a reminder of the horrible event that happened in New York, but also as a way of saying that the United States has the strength to recover from this tragedy. This is a message the American government want to spread around the world.24 In order to transmit a story of recovery, the photographs showed heroic figures; such as the fire fighters and policemen who did everything they could to help innocent victims. Furthermore, the culture of an international actor could be presented through exhibitions. Exhibitions were used during the Cold War period by the United States and the Soviet Union in order to show their culture and the progress that they made. Such an exhibition was organized in Moscow in 1959, where American consumer goods were shown in order to present to the Soviet population the high standard of living in the United States. Furthermore, sport is also a tool in the field of cultural diplomacy. Take for example the soccer World Cup in South Africa in 2010; it was for the South African government a good opportunity to present South Africa as a country of tolerance, equality, solidarity and freedom.25 Especially looking 20 (Mark 2009, 2)
21 N. Cull, ‘Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616 (March 2008), pp. 39-40
22 Kennedy, L., ‘Remembering 11 September: Photograpgy as Cultural Diplomacy’, International Affairs, 79, 2003, p. 323.
23 (Kennedy 2003, 316) 24 (Kennedy 2003, 318)
25 S. Mxolisi Ndlovu, ‘Sports as cultural diplomacy: 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa’s Foreign Policy’,
at the history of South Africa with the apartheid-regime, the World Cup did contribute in changing the image of South Africa. According to Nelson Mandela, former president of South Africa (1994-1999), sport has the power to change the world and to unite people all over the world; Sport is an instrument for peace.26 Sport has a universal language and it brings cultures from all over the world together.27 Vincent Mabillard and Daniel Jadi (2011) emphasize on how sports can be a tool for cultural diplomacy. They take the example of the U.S. table tennis team that travelled to China in 1971 to participate in matches. Although the U.S. government did not recognize China as a country during this Cold War period, Mao Zedong invited the American president Richard Nixon as a consequence of the presence of the U.S. table tennis team in China. This shows what sport can accomplish in international relations, even when two countries are in political dispute.28 Also, the establishment of institutions abroad is a way of practising cultural diplomacy. China for instance, established 353 Confusius Institutes worldwide.29 Su-Yan Pan (2013) explains that the state-sponsored institutions have to objective to promote Chinese cultural traditions, way of life and Chinese foreign policy abroad.30 Furthermore, the institutions aim to teach the Chinese language to foreign audiences.31
1.2 Cultural diplomacy as a propaganda tool
Cultural diplomacy as a tool for nations, states and rulers to present a positive image abroad can be traced from ancient times onwards. In the 16th century for instance, an Italian traveller Matteo Ricci travelled to China to present western knowledge to the Chinese population. Furthermore, French ruler Napoleon Bonaparte exported French culture and education in the 18th century to the rest of Europe.32 The concept of cultural diplomacy has always been the same. The objectives and motivations to practise cultural diplomacy, however, have not. Jan Melissen (2005) argues that the distinction between cultural diplomacy as a propaganda tool and cultural diplomacy 26 ‘Nelson Mandela: Sport has the power to Change the World’, last modified on November 2, 2014:
http://internationalpoliticalforum.com/nelson-mandela-sport-has-the-power-to-change-the-world/
27 V. Mabillard, D., Jadi, ‘Sports as Cultural Diplomacy: How Sport can make a difference in International Relations’, ICD Outlook, Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, October 2011, p.2.
28 (Mabillard 2011, 11)
29 S. Pan, ‘Confusius Institute Project: China’s Cultural Diplomacy and soft power projection’, Asian
Education and Development Studies, 2013.
30 (Pan 2013, 29) 31 (Pan 2013, 2)
as a soft power tool is that propaganda is based on short-term political goals, by influence and manipulation to impose your norms and values without mutual understanding, while cultural diplomacy as a soft power tool is used for long-term strategic goals, with the aim of mutual understanding in order to ‘get through to foreign audiences’.33 Kevin Mulcahy (1999) explains that when a government tries to explain and defend its political objectives abroad, it represents informational diplomacy. This informational diplomacy has a clear political content and therefore he classifies this as propaganda.34 Yasar Yakis, Former Minster of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, acknowledges that cultural diplomacy should be an exercise of ‘give and take’, and not a one-way traffic, which he classifies as propaganda. He argues that this one-way approach has the objective to prove that one culture is superior to the other.35 In this case, there is no effort being made to understand the culture of other countries and their population: it is a way of advancing the national interests.36 As Mark (2009) points out, it is a way to counter existing stereotypes to influence the target audience.37
During the Second World War and the Cold War, the United States used cultural diplomacy as a propaganda tool. The U.S. government started to focus on cultural diplomacy programs because of the threat of the Soviet Union, according to Cynthia Schneider (2006).38 The post-war period was marked by the ideological campaign of the U.S. against the Soviet Union, which used every tool that was available to practise cultural diplomacy in order to make sure communism eventually would extinct. Through this diplomacy, the U.S. government had the objective to promote democracy and anti-authoritarianism as a counterpart to communism. Propaganda in this context could be described as the ‘attempt to influence behaviour by shaping the
33 J. Melissem, ‘The New Public Dilpomacy: between Theory and Practise’, in Jan Melissen (ed), The New
Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2005), p. 14.
34 K. Mulcahy, ‘Cultural Diplomacy and the Exchange Programs: 1938-1979’, The Journal of Arts Management,
La wand Society, 29:1, 1999, p. 8.
35 Statement Yasar Yakis, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, on the signigicance of Cultural Diplomacy, available at http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/index. php?Statement-about-Cultural-Diplomacy
36 (Mark 2009, 3) 37 (Mark 2009, 21)
38 C. Schneider, ‘Cultural Diplomacy : Why It Matters, What It Can – and Cannot-Do?’, Annual Meeting of the
attitudes of masses of people’.39 The mission of this form of cultural diplomacy was to make sure that the population of these communist countries would move away from communism and would appeal to democracy.40
The U.S. cultural diplomacy program could be divided into four categories: first, cultural exchange programs, which sent artists, filmmakers, writers and artworks to foreign countries. Secondly, the opening of American Libraries and Centres in foreign countries that offered American literature, films, exhibits and speakers. Thirdly, radio broadcasting and fourthly, student, professional and citizen exchanges.41 The players in the U.S. cultural diplomacy initiatives were the U.S. State Department and the United States Information Agency (USIA), which was created by the U.S. president Truman to continue the propaganda offensive against the Soviet Union. The main objective of this organization was to inform, understand and influence foreign audiences and to create a dialogue with foreign countries.42 The USIA has the task to explain U.S. policies to foreign audiences and to give these audiences information about the United States.43 Another important player in the U.S. cultural diplomacy was the CIA. The Arts Public Forum argues that the CIA was an effective player in the cultural diplomacy efforts of the U.S. government because it was a spying agency, which remained unnoticed in its practise to promote American culture abroad. The high level of propaganda here is apparent because the CIA did everything in its power to succeed in the objective of influencing the targeted population with cultural elements such as journals, books and concerts: a one-way communication effort.44
The first step taken to propagate American culture to the Soviet Union was the implementation of the Fulbright Act in 1946, which provided a program for educational exchange for American students to study abroad.45 This Act was established to increase mutual understanding between U.S. citizens and foreign 39 W. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961, London: MacMillan Press 1998, p. 1.
40 H. Finn, ‘The case for Cultural Diplomacy: Engaging Foreign Audiences’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November-December 2003), p. 15.
41 Arts Public Forum, ‘Cultural Diplomacy and The National Interest: In Search of a 21st-Century Perspective’,
Arts Industry Policy Forum, 2008, p. 5.
42 (Hixson 1998, 24)
Y. Richmond, U.S.-Soviet Cultural Exchanges, 1958-1986, Who Wins?, Boulder and London: Westview Press 1987, p. 35.
43 (Hixson 1998, 23)
people.46 Furthermore, the adoption of the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948 had a similar purpose: it had the purpose to organize cultural exchange activities on world scale in order to promote a better understanding of the United States among the peoples of the world.47 This Act was meant to combat false propaganda and misinformation about the United States and to make sure foreign audiences would get knowledge and understanding of America’s policies.48 Both the Fulbright Act and the Smith-Mundt Act explain the importance of the increase of mutual understanding. However, as Liam Kennedy (2003) explains, there was no effort to reach mutual understanding during the Cold War. With the creation of the USIA, the tune of American cultural diplomacy became highly propagandistic, as it was primarily created to tell America’s story to the rest of the world without reaching mutual understanding.49 Also, Mulcahy (1999) agrees with Kennedy that both the Fulbright Act and the Smith-Mundt Act were part of the propaganda effort of the United States in response to the Soviet Union.50
Radio was the most popular propaganda toll during the Cold War. The Voice of America (VOA) was used during the Cold War to bring over the message of the United States to the population of Eastern Europe. Through this communication, the American government hoped that the population of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union would turn their back on the communist regime.51 In order to reach and appeal the population, VOA broadcasted in many languages, including Russian.52 Radio could be seen as an element of cultural diplomacy because the broadcasting was filled with news and music to highlight American culture. Moreover, the assumption that radio was used for propaganda purposes is clear, as the news entailed anti-communist reports, which focused on the low standards of living of Soviet civilians and on the weakness of the Soviet system. The VOA glorified the benefits of political freedom,
45 K. Mulcahy, ‘Cultural Diplomacy and the Exchange Programs: 1938-1978’, The Journal of Arts Management,
Law, and Society, Vol. 29, Issue 1, 1999, p. 17.
46 ‘An Informant History of the Fulbright Program’, last modified April 29, 2014, http://eca.state.gov/fulbright/about-fulbright/history/early-years
47 (Mulcahy 1999, 17)
48 ‘Smith-Mundt Act’. Last modified April 29, 2014, http://mountainrunner.us/smith-mundt/#.U2aMPc2WsxF 49 L. Kennedy, ‘Remembering 11 September: Photograpgy as Cultural Diplomacy’, International Affairs, 79, 2003, p. 316.
50 (Mulcahy 1999, 17) 51 (Hixson 1998, 34) 52 (Nye 2004, 102)
capitalist economy and democracy in the United States. The VOA presented an image of the United States as liberator as they wanted to free nations who fell under the spell of the Soviet hegemony.53 William Benton (1945) emphasized on the need for people in foreign countries to hear about America. He explains that people from all over the world were eager to listen to ‘the Voice of America’, as he argues that foreign people still needed a lot of information about the United States.54 Although Benton would say otherwise, I argue that the Voice of America was a form of propaganda.55 The Voice of America was formed out of national political interests and not to achieve mutual understanding between international cultures. As Kevin Mulcahy (1999) argues, such informational diplomacy is classified as propaganda.56The radio broadcast had the purpose to tell America’s story to the rest of the world and to influence the people’s minds abroad to adopt American values and norms, while there was no effort of the Voice of America to understand other cultures.
1.3 Cultural diplomacy as a soft power tool
A different approach to cultural diplomacy is with soft power, a term which Joseph Nye invented. According to Nye (1990), power in general means ‘the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do’.57 He makes a distinction between hard and soft power. He argues that hard power is the economic and military ability of a country to get what it wants. Through hard power, a country could be able to change the position of the target country by inducements or threats.58 In this case, you force countries to change with military force and through economic sanctions. On the other hand, there is soft power. Through soft power, a country could achieve results without making any threats or inducements.
Soft power is ‘the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction and co-option rather than coercion or payments’.59 In cultural diplomacy, 53 (Hixson 1998, 49-61)
54 W. Benton, ‘The Voice of America Abroad’, Journal of Educational Sociology, Vol. 19, No. 4, A Free Press for a Free World ( Dec, 1945), p. 211.
55 (Benton 1945, 215)
56 K. Mulcahy, ‘Cultural Diplomacy and the Exchange Programs: 1938-1979’, The Journal of Arts Management,
La wand Society, 29:1, 1999, p. 8.
57 J. Nye, ‘The Changing Nature of World Power’, Political Science Quaterly, Vol. 105, No.2, 1990, p. 177. 58 J. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs 2004, p. 5.
59 J. Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, Annals of the American Academy of Politica land Social Science, Vol. 616, Public Diplomacy in a Changing World (March 2008), p. 94.
the notion ‘attraction’ is an important concept because a country wants to influence a population to have a positive image on one’s culture. Nye (2004) argues that when a country is able to get others to admire your ideals through seduction, you don’t have to invest a lot to force people to like you.60 He explains that seduction and attraction are more effective then coercion, because coercion is an arrogant manner that forces people to do something you want, which leads to repulsion.61 Through soft power, you can get the desired results through cultural attraction. Nye argues that this cultural attraction does not mean that people immediately will like a country. For instance, a good wine from France does not mean you immediately like the country France.62 However, Nye (2004) argues that such cultural attractions do contribute to the appeal of people to the particular country. Kevin Mulcahy (1999) argues that the soft power approach of cultural diplomacy is based on cultural exchanges, which seek to achieve a better understanding among international cultures.63 He argues that the cultural exchanges must be separated from propaganda, because the objectives of these exchanges are not political and it has not the task to manipulate opinions of foreign audiences.64
Cultural diplomacy as a soft power tool was used in the 19th century by national governments in order to repair the nation’s prestige. Central in 19th century cultural diplomacy was the promotion of national cultures and languages abroad.65 For example, the French government created the Alliance Francaise in 1883 in order to promote French language and literature abroad. This form of soft power is an important component of a nation’s foreign policy. During the Cold War, it was necessary for both the Soviet Union and the United States to use propaganda tools in order to show their superiority. However, Walter Hixson (1998) argues that it is more effective for governments to reach mutual understanding. In cultural diplomacy, the role of credibility is important.66 Using propaganda alone lacks credibility: if information tends to be propaganda, the cultural diplomacy might be
60 J. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs 2004, p. 2. 61 (Nye 2004, 7)
62 (Nye 2004, 12) 63 (Mulcahy 1999, 8) 64 (Mulcahy 1999, 23)
65 K. Osgood & B. Etheridge, The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History, Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010, p. 4.
counterproductive as public may despise it.67 In order to change the minds of people, the ultimate goal of cultural diplomacy, a soft approach is necessary. Effective cultural diplomacy is a two-way street (dialogue), which means that it must include talking as well as listening. There needs to be an understanding on the minds of others and what values are shared. Falk Hartig (2012) argues that the two-way approach of cultural diplomacy is necessary: it is a symbolic gesture, and it is a mechanism to avoid stereotypes of other nations and to create relations. The one-way approach (monologue) is helpful to inform international audiences, but it is not capable of changing views.68 Lucian Jora (2013) agrees with Hartig on the soft power element of cultural diplomacy. He argues that national governments need to look beyond the one-way approach and emphasize more on the soft power element of cultural diplomacy: to go into engagement and participation.69 In this sense, cultural diplomacy is in search for a feeling of collaboration between two nations.
1.4 What makes cultural diplomacy effective and how to evaluate the effectiveness?
Scholars who deal with public diplomacy are in search for what cultural diplomacy could mean in international relations and discuss what it is that makes cultural diplomacy effective. To practise cultural diplomacy in an effective manner, a nation has the choice to use the propaganda or the soft power approach: to achieve the goals of its national interests or to achieve mutual understanding between international cultures. Based on the statements of scholars on how they evaluate effective cultural diplomacy, I could define what practises of cultural diplomacy are propaganda and soft power. I argue that the effective manner to practise cultural diplomacy is with soft power rather than a propaganda approach.
First, Cynthia Schneider (2003) argues that for a cultural initiative to be effective, it should communicate the nation’s values, which means the diversity, opportunity, individual expression and freedom of speech and thought. However, she emphasizes that initiatives might work in one particular country, but will not have the same effect 67 (Hixson 1998, 100)
68 F. Hartig, ‘Cultural Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics: the case of Confusius Institutes in Australia’, Communication, Politics and Culture, Vol. 45, 2012, p. 259.
69 L. Jora, ‘New Practises and Trends in Cultural Diplomacy’, Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, Romanian Academy, 2013, p. 51.
in another: the host country should understand the environment and it should be adequate for its audience. It is important to take the interests of the host country into consideration and to show respect for their traditions and history.70 Also, the cultural initiative should improve the dialogue between the diplomats of the country that practise the cultural initiative and their host country. Furthermore, she argues that the cultural initiative should be part of a long-term relationship and the strengthening of ties. Schneider argues that for a successful and effective practise of cultural diplomacy, it should obtain communication between two nations with exchange and mutual respect. Furthermore, she highlights the importance of creating a sense of community or common identity between participants and their hosts.71 Schneider mentions the cultural initiatives that have become integrated into the life of the host country have to most effective impact.72
John Lenczowski (2007) argues that cultural diplomacy works if there is a promotion of cross-cultural communication and mutual understanding. Cultural exhibitions and performances create relations with influential people in foreign countries, next to the normal diplomatic relations. These cultural diplomatic tools have the power to improve the relations with the target country. He argues that this happens through exhibitions, when the cultural representatives talk to the public in a language anyone understands: music and art, which serves as cultural communication. The successfulness of cultural diplomacy lies according to him in the absence of political, commercial or economic goals and highlighting the importance of respect of foreign cultures. He argues that this will create good will and trust among audiences, which is only feasible over a long period of time. Therefore, long-term strategic goals are a requirement.73 The U.S. Department of State (2005) also states that effective cultural diplomacy needs a long-term commitment to influence the minds of people all over the world.74
70 C. Schneider, ‘Diplomacy that works: best practices of cultural diplomacy’, Georgetown University, ph.D., 2003, p. 3.
71 (Schneider 2003, 4) 72 (Schneider 2003, 5)
73 J. Lenczowski, ‘Cultural Diplomacy, Political Influence and Integrated Strategy’, The Institute of World
Politics, Washington, 2007, pp. 19-20.
74 Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, ‘Cultural Diplomacy: the Linchpin of Public Diplomacy’, U.S. State Department, September 2005, p. 16.
At a conference on cultural diplomacy at the Ditchley Foundation in the United Kingdom on March 8-10 in 2012, participants discussed whether cultural diplomacy works and what makes it effective and what makes it not effective. The Ditchley Foundation has the aim at improving policy approaches and problem solving on issues important in international relations. On multiple conferences a year, the participants, mostly diplomats, come together to discuss these issues.75 On this particular conference on cultural diplomacy, diplomats from all over the world were participating and agreed that the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy must lay in the creation of genuine partnerships. Furthermore, the participants stressed that listening is as important as talking, in order to understand the local needs. When a country tries too hard to promote its country and culture, the less the audience in the target country would appreciate this. The participants also argued the ways of cultural diplomacy which are not seen as effective in cultural diplomacy; propaganda. Propaganda, they argued, is something that is not helpful in conducting cultural diplomacy, as they agreed on the fact that the international audience nowadays needs to have the feeling that the truth is being told; when cultural performers could express critical notes on the situation in their home country, it would lead to a more positive image of that country. The participants of the conference would argue that the target country would see this as the expression of honesty and tolerance. The conference also discussed which players in the field of cultural diplomacy are seen as the most effective. They discussed the motives of these players and what advantages and disadvantages they bring with them. First, there is the state, which they discuss as partly effective actors, as long as they do not fully control the cultural program. Their motives to practise cultural diplomacy are based on politics and national interest. Second, there are the cultural and educational institutions. These institutions are semi-independent from the government, while the government has supervision over these institutions. These cultural institutions are discussed to be the most effective players. The reason that these institutions are seen as the most effective players in the field of cultural diplomacy is that they have the genuine belief in the value of arts and education, according to the diplomats at the conference. Third, there are the nongovernmental organizations, which have the advantage to be completely independent from the government. The advantage here is that these organizations can act according to their own wishes without taking the wishes of the government into account. Fourth, there 75 The Ditchley Foundation, on the Ditchley Foundation homepage: www.ditchley.co.uk
are the individual artists. They are seen as mixed effective, as they are completely on their own without government interference. However, the question is whether these individuals could have a decent cultural diplomacy program without funds that they could rely on. Last, there are businesses. They are also seen as partly effective; although they are independent from the government and have the advantage of money; their motives rely mostly of making profit.76 The participants argued on the role of governments in the practise of cultural diplomacy. As opposed to the position of Gienow-Hecht, explained below, the diplomats argue that the role of the government is vital in cultural diplomacy. They argue that in some areas the state is the only player that is able to create an environment where cultural diplomacy is possible. The diplomats refer to money, and also to the role they play to realize that individuals and institutions and practise cultural diplomacy, for example arranging visa.77
Natalia Grincheva (2013) argues that cultural institutions like museums are always an effective way of practising cultural diplomacy, because they have the objective to built cultural bridges. She mentions that museums have the power to influence the cultural values of its audience. In such a museum, cultural diplomacy can work best through participatory learning. Grincheva mentions that understanding and appreciate another culture is best realized through learning, which means that the educational element of a museum is seen as an effective way of practising cultural diplomacy.78 Members of the think thank organization ‘Demos’ (2007) stress the importance that museums, and also galleries and libraries, are institutions to articulate and communicate its own and other’s identity. Museums are institutions, which showcase the national culture as well as foreign cultures. For presenting foreign cultures, museums often make use of material from cultural institutions abroad in which they have agreements on cultural exchange. The authors argue that museums are unofficial ambassadors of a nation because they serve the public interest.79
76 Summary of the Conference at the Ditchley Foundation: ‘Cultural Diplomacy: Does it work?’, March 8-10, 2012.
77 Ibidem
78 N. Grincheva, ‘Cultural Diplomacy 2.0: Challenges and Opportunities in Museum International Practises’,
Museum and Society, 11(1), 2013, p. 43.
Jessica Gienow-Hecht (2010) does not fully agree with the diplomats of the Ditchley-conference that the government should be involved in the practise of cultural diplomacy. She discusses which players are the best actors to effectively practise cultural diplomacy. She emphasises the need of a neutral bridge for a two-way cultural dialogue and exchange.80 This neutral bridge means no relation with a national government. Although she realizes that full neutrality is impossible, she advices a clear distance from governments as this would appeal to audiences. She states that national governments often tell their own story abroad, without really listening what other countries have to say and that national governments are not able to maintain bilateral relations based on understanding because they are often involved in their own national agendas. Gienow-Hecht (2010) argues on the other hand that civil society organizations have been able to do the job that national government could not: the creation of relationships between civil societies in different nations. For a reason for the success of the civil society organizations, she mentions that they had the freedom the carry out their missions. For the long-term success and effectiveness of cultural diplomacy, Gienow-Hecht (2010) points out that cooperation between civil society organizations and national governments is vital.81 She mentions two preconditions that will contribute to the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy and a cultural program to be successful. First, there must be a distance between the initiator of a cultural diplomacy program and the political and economic agenda. If cultural programs relate to national governments, the less people in the target country will appreciate this as she argues that people often relate messages coming from national governments as propaganda. Nye (2004) also acknowledges the fact that the world nowadays is more sceptical about governmental messages.82 People would not be sure whether a national government tries to build dialogue and understanding, or whether is tries to pursue its own economic and political interests. In the case a cultural program is related to a civil society organization, it will receive more legitimacy by target audiences as it is an independent organization and does not take into account the economic or political agenda of the national government.83 Secondly, Gienow-Hecht (2010) argues that the more exchange and dialogue there is between two 80 J. Gienow-Hecht and M. Donfried, ‘The Model of Cultural Diplomacy: Power, Distance, and the Promise of civil Society’, in J. Gienow-Hecht and M. Donfried ed., Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, New York and Oxford: Berghahn 2010, p. 22.
81 (Gienow-Hecht 2010, 23) 82 (Nye 2004, 143) 83 (Gienow-Hecht 2010, 22)
nations that will go into both directions, the more chance there is for a successful and effective cultural diplomacy. When there is only a one-way communication, for example a Dutch cultural program that is presented in Russia, but no Russian cultural event is organized in the Netherlands, there is no chance that a dialogue and exchange would be built up.
Milton Cummings (2009) argues that the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy must be based on the two-way approach rather then a one-way approach. With a one-way approach, Cummings argues that a country wants to pursue its national interest by promoting the national language, promoting its culture, explaining its policy and mostly ‘telling their story’ to international audiences. However, he acknowledges that this is not the effective way to practise cultural diplomacy, as there is no room for understanding other cultures. Therefore, he stresses the importance to adopt a two-way approach in cultural diplomacy, where the practiser of cultural diplomacy learns to listen to other peoples and cultures.84 The same applies for Nye (2004), where he argues that practisers of cultural diplomacy need to be more open and more sensitive to the perception of foreign publics.85 The part of listening to foreign audiences is vital. When this is the case, cultural diplomacy could be effective.86
In sum, the authors discussed above agree that cultural diplomacy is effective when there are elements of exchange and mutuality available rather then one-way communications. This indicates that cultural diplomacy, as a soft power tool is more effective than as a propaganda tool. The measurement, however, is one of the problems cultural diplomacy faces to evaluate whether cultural diplomacy initiatives could be regarded as successful or not. Having discussed what it is that makes cultural diplomacy effective does not mean whether certain cultural diplomacy projects indeed work. The most important objective for cultural diplomacy is to create a long-term relationship between cultures all over the world and, but the result cannot be achieved in a short period of time. The results can only be achieved over a long period of time, which makes it difficult to measure whether certain cultural projects have their effect. For the objective of cultural diplomacy to influence the people’s hearts and minds, the 84 M. Cummings, ‘Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: a sruvey’, Cultural Diplomacy
Research Series: Centre for Arts and Culture, June 26, 2009, p. 3.
85 (Nye 2004, 125) 86
results cannot be proved.87 Joseph Nye acknowledges the problems of cultural diplomacy and its measurement. He argues that it is rare for cultural diplomacy to obtain any tangible results that could be measured. Mary Einbinder (2013) writes that the cultural diplomacy initiatives that are hard to measure should be evaluated on analyses on the behaviour of audiences, interviews, internal survey, qualitative data analysis and empirical research.88 Furthermore, the writers Appel, Irony, Schmerz and Ziv (2008) also acknowledge the difficulty of measuring cultural diplomacy programs. They argue that results, which should derive from cultural diplomacy programs, are not noticeable right away, as it will take many years before possible results may be visible.89 Cynthia Schneider (2006) argues that cultural diplomacy cannot be measured. She states that cultural diplomacy makes a qualitative, not quantitative, difference in relations between nations and peoples.90 Although the results of cultural diplomacy are not tangible and could not be measured right away, Amir Ofek, diplomat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel in an interview in the article ‘Cultural Diplomacy: An Important but Neglected Tool in Promoting Israel’s
Public Image’, is convinced of the fact that the cultural programs have an effect right
away among the visitors and participants. He gives the example that a journalist from Spain witnessed an impressive performance of an Israelian artist. After he saw this performance when he wrote about the Israel-Palestina conflict, the performance he saw would influence his opinion about the conflict in favor of Israel. Simon Mark (2009) argues that there have been methods to measure the success of cultural diplomacy and cultural diplomacy projects: how many people turned up at concerts/festivals/exhibitions, media coverage, and reviews of people who attended these projects.91 However, he acknowledges the lack of proof there is that cultural projects might have on audiences. It will always be difficult for all cultural diplomacy efforts worldwide to decide whether the view of attendees have been changed, based on how many people attended the cultural events. The question he raises is whether such a cultural diplomacy event could contribute in changing behavior from attendees: did the view that people have on a particular country change after visiting a 87 R. Appel, A. Irony, S. Schmerz, A. Ziv, ‘Cultural Dilplomacy: An Important but Neglected Tool in Promoting Israel’s Public Image’, The Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, May 2008, p. 19.
88 M. Einbinder, ‘Cultural Diplomacy Harmonizing International Relations through Music’, (PhD, diss., New York University, May 2013), p. 29.
89 (Appel 2008, 19) 90 (Schneider 2006, 196) 91 (Mark 2009, 3)
cultural diplomacy event of that country. The question remains a difficult one the answer. As Nye (2004) argues, opinions of people can change, which has the consequence that reviews are not reliable.92
Conclusion Chapter One
The aim of this chapter was to make the meaning of cultural diplomacy clear. Cultural diplomacy is a way of promoting a nations culture to a target audience with the purpose to create a certain image of its country. In order to use cultural diplomacy, the applicant can use two manners. This chapter highlighted the distinction between using cultural diplomacy as propaganda and as a soft power tool. The distinction is that propaganda has a one-way approach and is used by countries to prioritize its national interests without the goal of mutual understanding. Soft power on the other hand means that two countries are engaged in dialogue through cultural institutions and in practising cultural diplomacy; it aims at mutual respect and cultural exchanges.
Furthermore, I did research on the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy based on what scholars write about the subject. Scholars seemed to agree on the fact that effective cultural diplomacy must focus on mutual understanding and respect. There must be a long-term relation between cultural institutions with a lot of exchanges in order to make sure that ties will be strengthened. These exchanges must go into both directions rather then only one direction. Also, when a country puts a lot of focus on presenting its culture only in a positive way, the less the target audience would appreciate this. Based on the research on the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy, it becomes clear that the effectiveness relates more to use cultural diplomacy as soft power then it is to use cultural diplomacy as propaganda: the aim to achieve mutual understanding is seen as more valuable then it is to solely advance the national interests.
For this, the actors involved play an important role. National governments are not the optimal practisers of cultural diplomacy: they are accused of telling their own story abroad without listening to the target audience. Their objectives are not based on mutual understanding but rather on advancing the national interests, which makes it propaganda. The most reliable actors of cultural diplomacy are cultural institutions,
because they have no political or economic goal and are focused on reaching mutual understanding among international cultures.
Chapter Two
Introduction Chapter Two
Before going into detail on the Dutch-Russian year in particular, this chapter provides a historical background on the relation between the Netherlands and Russia on the political, economic and cultural level. The celebration year of Dutch-Russian relations in 2013 was initiated because of 400 years of friendship, so the task of this chapter is to explain how the relations started and how they evolved over the centuries.
First, this chapter divides Dutch-Russian relations into the pre-1917 period, the Soviet Union period, and the post-Soviet period. The relations started at the end of the sixteenth century and have experienced lots of ups and downs over the centuries. Although politics and economics have always been central pillars in the relations between the Netherlands and Russia, culture has been a relatively new concept. The cultural relations had their start in the Soviet-period. However, I will explain the hesitation from the Dutch government to agree on a cultural agreement with the Soviet Union.
Although it took a long time to agree upon a cultural agreement between the Netherlands and the Soviet Union, this chapter presents an overview of the history of cultural diplomacy practised in both the Soviet Union/Russia and in the Netherlands. This section explains what type of cultural diplomacy initiatives took place. Also, this chapter provides the reader with an example of cultural diplomacy practised by both countries, which will be presented based on a case study.
2.1 History of Dutch-Russian diplomatic relations
2.1.1 Pre-1917
Before 1917, the relations between the Netherlands and Russia were mostly based on trade and innovation. At the end of the 16th century, on Russian initiative, the first formal contacts were made between Dutch and Russian officials.93 However, both parties had different objectives in mind at the start of this relation. Although Russia wished to receive Dutch military support for its war against the Poles and the Swedes, the Dutch were only interested in trade. Research showed that Dutch merchants and craftsmen established themselves in the Russian port of Archangel around 1590, which was the centre for Russian foreign trade.94 Years later, in 1697, the Russian tsar Peter the Great visited several European countries, including the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands. It was the first time for a Russian tsar to make a trip abroad, which was called the ‘Grand Embassy’ of Peter the Great.95 The reason for his visit to the Dutch Republic was because it was one of the most modern European powers of that time.96 The Dutch were a maritime and trade power in the 17th century that was often referred to as the Golden Age, a period in history in which the Dutch Republic had a leading international role in science, trade, military and art. As tsar Peter the Great desired to modernise Russia, he found in the Dutch Republic a good example of how a modern state should look like.97 During his visit, he learned about Western life and about the shipbuilding industry as Peter the Great was particularly interested into strengthening his own fleet.98 Another phrase of Dutch-Russian
93 J. Driessen, Russen en Nederlanders: Uit de geschiedenis van de betrekkingen tussen Nederland en Rusland
1600-1917, Den Haag: SDU 1989, p. 42.
94 R. Detrez, Rusland, een geschiedenis, Antwerpen/Amsterdam: Houtekriet 2008, p. 101. ‘Historische inleiding: de Hollandse Archangelvaart’, last modified August 23, 2014,
http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/archangel/app/inleiding
E. Munter, B. Naarden and T. Witte, Voorzichtig en met mate; De betrekkingen van Nederland met de Sovjet Unie
(1942-1991), Amsterdam: Stadsdrukkerij Amsterdam 1992, p. 6.
95 (Driessen 1989, 76)
96 ‘Nederlands-Russische betrekkingen’, last modified August 23, 2014, http://www.isgeschiedenis.nl/gahetna-op-isgeschiedenis/nederlands-russische-betrekkingen/
97 (Kraft 2013, 92)
98 ‘Peter the Great in Holland’, last modified August 23, 2014, http://www.hermitage.nl/en/st-petersburg_en_rusland/nederland_rusland_en_st-petersburg/peter_de_grote_in_holland.htm
relations can be found in the 19th century, when Russian soldiers liberated Dutch cities from Napoleon. Napoleon Bonaparte occupied the Batavian Republic (successor of the Dutch Republic) from 1806-1810. Napoleon gave this region to his brother Louis Napoleon to rule over the Netherlands and renamed this region the Kingdom of Holland, which in that period would serve as a puppet state of the French Empire. However, in 1810, the Kingdom of Holland became fully annexed by France because Louis Bonaparte did not fulfil the wishes of his brother to strictly rule this region. According to Napoleon Bonaparte, his brother pursued Dutch interests more than his own. In 1813, the Russian Empire liberated the Dutch Republic from Napoleon.99 In the Battle of Arnhem, the Cossacks from Russia defeated the Napoleon army. With the liberation, the Dutch Republic was transformed into a kingdom, named the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the beginning of a monarchy.
2.1.2 Soviet Union period (1917-1991)
The dissolution of the Russian Empire as a consequence of the October revolution of 1917 and the start of a new Soviet government meant that trade-relations that have been built up over the centuries between the Netherlands and Russia vanished.100 The Dutch government refused to establish diplomatic relations with a communist government who they saw as a reign of terror.101 Ben Knapen (1985) argues that the Dutch queen Wilhelmina was one of the proponents not to continue with diplomatic relations, as she saw the Bolsheviks as the murderers of the tsar families.102 The Soviet government would from now on control the Soviet economy and therefore also the trade. The government would further control foreign companies in the Soviet Union, which meant that Dutch merchants were no longer able to continue their trade. They were forced to leave the Soviet Union because the Soviet government confiscated all possessions of Dutch merchants. The official diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and the Soviet Union ended on November 8, 1918.103 However, for the economic relations, the Dutch government was committed to
99 ‘Time-line Nederlands-Russische betrekkingen’, last modified August 23, 2014, http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4492/Nederland/integration/nmc/frameset/timeline/timeline.dhtml 100 ‘400 jaar Nederlands-Russische betrekkingen’, last modified August 23, 2014, http://www.vertreknl.nl/uploads/VNL-Rusland-special2-WEB.pdf
101 F. Baruch et al., Aan de grenzen voorbij; Over de betrekkingen tussen Nederland en de USSR (1917-1987), Amsterdam: Uitgeverij De Schalm 1987, p. 113.
102 B. Knapen, De lange weg naar Moskou; De Nederlandse relatie tot de Sovjet-Unie, 1917-1942, Amsterdam, Brussel: Elsevier 1985, p. 125.
103 E. Schoobaar, ‘De erkenningspolitiek van Nederland’, last modified August 23, 2014, http://evaschoobaar.nl/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/De-erkenningspolitiek-van-Nederland.pdf
recover its trade with the Soviet Union. This was due to Dutch entrepreneurs who pressured the Dutch government on the importance of trade with the Soviet Union.104 Business in the Netherlands required the Dutch government to restore the economic relations with the Soviet Union, because they were afraid of falling behind Germany and Great Britain, which already restored their economic ties with the Soviet Union.105 The wishes of Dutch entrepreneurs were honoured, when in 1934 negotiations were held which spoke of new trade rules. Most European countries however, performed a different policy towards the Soviet Union than the Netherlands. While other European countries recognized the Soviet Union in 1924 and were willing to conclude new trade agreements with the new Soviet government, it took a while for the Dutch government to recognize the Soviet Union and to think about establishing new relations. Eva Schoobaar (2008) argues that the Dutch government withhold from recognition because there was an aversion towards communism. For countries like France and Germany, economic interests were more important then the possible Soviet threat of communism.106 Furthermore, the Dutch government refused to recognize the Soviet Union because the Soviet government forced the end of the trade with the Netherlands by taking away the possessions from Dutch merchants.107 It would be a matter a pride and dignity for the Dutch not to recognize the Soviet Union. However, the attitude of the Dutch government towards the Soviet Union would change during the Second World War.
With the invasion of Nazi-Germany into the Soviet Union in 1941, Great Britain recognized the Soviet Union as ally and the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill called upon western countries to support the Soviet Union as well. This automatically meant that the Netherlands should support the Soviet Union too, because the Dutch were the allies of Great Britain. Furthermore, the Dutch were the only one among the allied governments that did not recognized the Soviet Union and the only one that did not have diplomatic relations with the Soviets.108 Dutch politician Albarda argued that the Netherlands should get rid of its stubbornness as the only country not to recognize
104 (Baruch 1987, 114) 105 (Baruch 1987, 115) 106 (Munter 1992, 18)
107 E. Schoobaar, ‘De erkenningspolitiek van Nederland’, last modified August 23, 2014, http://evaschoobaar.nl/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/De-erkenningspolitiek-van-Nederland.pdf 108 (Knapen 1985, 35)
the Soviet Union. Albarda realized that the Dutch would make it very difficult for itself in international politics if they would not recognize.109 Especially when a peace settlement would emerge after the war in the case the allied forces would win, the position of the Netherlands as the only country that did not recognize the Soviet Union would give a wrong impression.110 Thomas von der Dunk (2003) argues that the Netherlands has a tradition of always being afraid of being on his own. After being provocative and being different then the rest, the Dutch government would always eventually seek convergence with the rest.111 The conviction to recognize the Soviet Union came in 1942, mainly because of self-interests. The Dutch colony, the Dutch Indies, was being attacked by Japan and became occupied. In order to free the Dutch Indies from the Japanese, the help from the Soviet Union was needed. The Dutch government changed their course and decided to recognize the Soviet Union and to make new efforts for diplomatic relations. On July the 10th, 1942, both countries signed an agreement on the recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations, although suspicion towards the Soviets continued to be the case.112 Tony van der Togt (2013) argues that distrust was a deciding factor for the development of rough relations between the Netherlands and the Soviet Union from 1942 onwards.113 During World War Two, Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs E.N. van Kleffens was suspicious because he feared that the Soviet Union would expand their sphere of influence into Western Europe.114 After the war, van Kleffens was worried about the Soviet military presence on the Balkan and in Germany and the chance of forcing the communist ideology upon the population in these regions. But he gave the Soviet Union the benefit of the doubt, because the Soviet Union was needed for the economic recovery of Germany after World War Two.115
The emergence of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War Two ensured political tensions between western powers, including the
109 (Knapen 1985, 232) 110 (Baruch 1987, 123)
111 T. Von der Dunk, Rusland & Europa; Over de betekenis van oude culturele scheidslijnen, Instituut Clingendael, Den Haag: Uitgeverij Van Gennep 2003, p. 34.
112 E. Munter, B., Naarden, and T. Witt,, Voorzichtig en met mate; De betrekkingen van Nederland met de
Sovjet Unie (1942-1991), Amsterdam: Stadsdrukkerij Amsterdam 1992, p. 19.
113 (Kraft 2013, 66) 114 (Munter 1992, 22) 115 (Kraft 2013, 68)
