The EU's Military Operations in the Central African Republic
MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for the Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam
By Elizabeth van der Hoorn
Main supervisor: Dr. L.A. Bialasiewicz Second supervisor: Dr. M.E. Spiering
Table of Contents
Introduction ... 4
Chapter I: Studying CSDP Operations ... 6
1.1. Europe as a strategic actor? ... 6
1.2. Conclusion ... 11
Chapter II: International Relations Theory ... 12
2.1. The Quest for External Power ... 14
2.2. Normative Power Europe ... 17
2.3. The Search for Ever Closer Union ... 18
2.4. Domestic Politics ... 20
2.5. Conclusion ... 21
Chapter III: The ‘Comprehensive Approach’ ... 23
3.1. The History of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ ... 23
3.2. The ‘Comprehensive Approach’ in EU rhetoric ... 27
3.3. Implementing the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ ... 33
3.4. Problems with the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ ... 35
3.5. Conclusion ... 37
Chapter IV: EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North-Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR) ... 38
4.1. Operation Background ... 38
4.2. Putting EUFOR Chad/CAR on the CSDP agenda... 38
4.3. Operation mandate and objectives ... 40
4.4. Preparing EUFOR Chad/CAR ... 41
4.5. Implementing EUFOR Chad/CAR ... 41
4.6. The drivers behind EUFOR Chad/CAR ... 43
4.7. Conclusion ... 44
Chapter V: The Central African Republic (CAR) ... 45
5.1. Background ... 45
5.2. Political background to the conflict ... 48
5.3. Humanitarian background to the conflict ... 50
5.4. The French response ... 52
5.5. The regional response ... 54
5.5. The international response ... 56
5.6. Conclusion ... 57
Chapter VI: EU Military Operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR CAR) ... 59
6.1. Operation background ... 59
6.2. Putting EUFOR CAR on the CSDP agenda ... 60
6.3. Operation mandate and objectives ... 60
6.4. Preparing EUFOR CAR ... 61
6.5. Implementing EUFOR CAR ... 61
6.6. The drivers behind EUFOR CAR ... 62
6.7. Conclusion ... 66 Conclusion ... 68 Bibliography ... 75 Articles ... 75 Books ... 80 Newspaper articles ... 82
Official documents and reports ... 85
Websites ... 88
Introduction
Over time various theorists across a range of disciplines have addressed the EU’s foreign policy and more specifically the principles underlying the EU’s military operations. In academic circles, the three most dominant theoretical strands that have addressed the EU’s raison d’état of external action are those of realism, constructivism and neo-liberalism.1 In popular political discourse and the mass media, however, the EU
has often been criticized for being – and simplistically reduced to - ‘an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm’.2 Yet since 2003 the EU has performed twenty-nine
civil and military operations in Africa, Europe and Asia.
This thesis will focus upon one specific EU operation, the EUFOR CAR, which was recently deployed in the Central African Republic. In particular, it will ask what this operation can tell us about the current contours of the EU’s external action and the ways in which it represents itself and its intentions. I will locate my analysis within the wider academic debate on the EU’s crisis management operations that have increasingly become a matter of European concern since the beginning of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In doing so, I will attempt to answer how this operation fits in line with prior CSDP operations. Simultaneously, however, I will show how it could mark a change in the EU’s strategic directions. I will thus aim to unravel what kind of policy is underlying the EU’s CSDP currently. This thesis will therefore try to address the following, more specific, research question: How is the EU’s engagement in the conflict in the Central African Republic represented and justified?
This thesis will be organized in six chapters. The first chapter provides an analytical overview of some of the theories considering the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It builds and elaborates on the theoretical framework as
1 Norheim-Martinsen, P.M. (2013) The European Union and Military Force: governance and strategy.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Pohl, B. (2012), "But We Have To Do Something”: the Drivers
behind EU Crisis Management Operations. Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Social and behavioural
Sciences, Leiden University, pp.2.
2 Whitney, C. (1991). WAR IN THE GULF: EUROPE; Gulf Fighting Shatters Europeans' Fragile Unity. The
New York Times. [online] Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/25/world/war-in-the-gulf-europe-gulf-fighting-shatters-europeans-fragile-unity.html [Accessed 15 Jun. 2014].
4
developed by Benjamin Pohl in his PhD dissertation ‘"But We Have To Do Something": the drivers behind EU crisis management operations' of September 2012. The second chapter will shortly elaborate on the geopolitical and historical prologue to the establishment of the EU’s CSDP. Further, it offers a short chronological overview of the EU’s CSDP operations that have been deployed thus far since its establishment in 2003. Chapter three covers the EU’s recently adopted ‘comprehensive approach’.
Chapter four covers the EU’s military operation EUFOR Chad/CAR that was deployed in Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008 and 2009.3 Chapter five
presents some necessary historical and political background information on the situation in 2014 in the CAR. It will give details on the regional- and international forces that are currently present in the EUFOR CAR arena. Chapter six will provide an overview of the current EUFOR CAR operation’s background. This section will follow EUFOR CAR through the stages of agenda setting, operational planning and into the implementation phase - as closely as possible.4 It will combine insights from the theory
of security governance, the official EU rhetoric on the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ and the CSDP’s operational performance in order to engage with the research question and provide a concluding assessment.
3 In EU rhetoric the operation mostly goes by its French acronym EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Nonetheless I will
use the English acronym EUFOR Chad/CAR hereinafter.
4 In EU rhetoric the operation mostly goes by its French acronym EUFOR RCA. Nonetheless I will use the
English acronym EUFOR CAR hereinafter.
5
Chapter I: Studying CSDP Operations 1.1. Europe as a strategic actor?
Historically, the use of military power has been envisaged as a strong indicator of state sovereignty, while at the same time it is frequently used by states to provide support for the construction of a national identity.5 For that reason, the EU Member States’ security
and defence policies have always been seen as a key symbolic embodiment of national competences and for long seen as a field of action that should be retained by Member States. As such institutionalized EU cooperation on military operations used to be uncommon.6
Principally because security and defence is such a sensitive subject to the EU Member States, it is fascinating to analyse the construction of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Formally the CSDP is an intergovernmental policy instrument for engaging in civilian- and military crisis management operations outside the EU.7
Interesting is that the EU’s CSDP is intergovernmental in its set-up. Therefore it means that it is formally under control of the governments of the Member States. Simultaneously this led to numerous discussions concerning which (civilian or military) role the EU should perform in the international community. Darrell Driver for example said that the CSDP has always been subject to fundamentally differing ‘political motives’ from the UK and France from its inception onwards. In his opinion the UK wanted to build on the EU’s civilian crisis management capabilities, whereas France wanted to focus more on expanding the EU’s military capacities.8
In spite of those differences, a thorough analysis of the concept of a European common defence policy goes all the way ‘back to 1948 when the UK, France and the
5 Castells, M. (1997). The power of identity. 1st ed. Malden, Mass: Blackwell, pp. 30, 36, 55 Pohl, B. (2012
Op.cit. pp.1.
6 Norheim-Martinsen, P.M. (2013). Op.cit. pp.1-2. Pohl, B. (2012), Ibid. pp.1. 7 Pohl, B. (2012), Ibid. pp.3.
8 Driver, D. (2010). Op.cit. pp. 138.
6
Benelux signed the Treaty of Brussels’ and agreed on the establishment of the Western European Union (Hereinafter referred to as: WEU). Along with the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Hereinafter: NATO) in 1949 the WEU remained the most important medium for European defence cooperation until the 1990s.9
The 1990s marked a change in European security policies because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Moreover the Bosnian war (1992-1995) and the Kosovo war (1998-1999) significantly affected the decision to arrange a common European security policy. In 1991 the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union’s second pillar on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Hereinafter: CFSP).10
Subsequently the WEU introduced the Petersburg Tasks in June 1992. They formulated which military action could be used when there was a need for crisis management. The Petersburg Tasks included ‘humanitarian tasks’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘peace-making’.11
The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), was first announced during the British-French summit in St. Malo, France, in 1998. It was announced that the EU and the WEU in essence would be merged and by adopting the Petersburg Tasks the EU committed itself to developing its military capabilities.12 Thus in essence in St. Malo a
9 European External Action Service, (n.d.). About CSDP - Overview. [online] Available at:
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/index_en.htm [Accessed 29 Apr. 2014]. NATO, (1949). NATO -
The North Atlantic Treaty. [online] Available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm [Accessed 24 Jun. 2014].
10 European External Action Service, (n.d.). About CSDP - The Treaty of Amsterdam. [online] Available at:
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/amsterdam/index_en.htm [Accessed 24 Jun. 2014]. Howorth, J. (2007). Security and defence policy in the European Union. 1st ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.52-56. Smith, K. (2000). The end of civilian rower EU: A welcome demise or cause for concern? The
international spectator, 35(2), pp.11.
11 Balkan Military History, (2012). Balkan Wars 1990's. [online] Available at:
http://www.balkanhistory.com/balkan_wars_1990's.htm [Accessed 24 Jun. 2014]. European External Action Service, (n.d.). About CSDP - The Petersburg Tasks. [online] Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/petersberg/index_en.htm [Accessed 24 Jun. 2014].
12 Driver, D. (2010). Op.cit. pp. 138. Pohl, B. (2012), Op.cit. pp.46. Smith, K. (2000). Op.cit. pp. 15, 18.
7
new institutional policy in the field of defence was constructed: the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).13
The Petersburg Tasks were initially adopted by the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam. Furthermore the Treaty of Amsterdam established the position of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. Subsequently Javier Solana (from Spain) was appointed at the Cologne European Council in 1999 and held the position of the EU’s High Representative from 1999 to 2009.14
An important accomplishment by the High Representative, Javier Solana at the time, was the release of the European Security Strategy in December 2003. The document named ‘A Secure Europe in a better world’ was created by the High Representative Javier Solana after requests from the Member States to draft a European strategy document. The 2003 ESS was followed up by the 2008 ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy’.15
Essentially the Treaty of Lisbon put an end to the EU’s pillar structure. Nonetheless the Treaty expanded the Petersburg Tasks in the long run with the responsibilities of: ‘conflict prevention’, ‘joint disarmament operations’, ‘military advice and assistance’ and ‘post-conflict stabilisation’ when it entered into force in December 2009. Furthermore Article 18 of the Treaty of Lisbon (hereinafter, Article 18 TEU) formally appointed the High Representative with the ‘double-hatted’ responsibility for the CFSP and the vice-presidency of the European Commission. Currently the position of
13 Originally the policy was named the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) but was renamed
into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) through the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. I will use the CSDP acronym, because this is the most up-to-date reference in relation to the EU operations that will be discussed in my research.
14 European External Action Service, (n.d.). About CSDP - Overview. [online] Available at:
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/index_en.htm [Accessed 29 Apr. 2014]. Smith, K. (2000). Op.cit. pp. 11.
15 European External Action Service, (n.d.). About CSDP - Overview. [online] Available at:
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/index_en.htm [Accessed 29 Apr. 2014]. The EU High Representative, (2003). A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD: EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY. Brussels: European External Action Service. The EU High Representative, (2008). Report on the
Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World -. Brussels:
European External Action Service.
8
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in combination with the post of Vice-President of the European Commission is held by Baroness Catherine Ashton (from the UK). She holds this position since 1 December 2009.16
In addition Article 27 of the Treaty of Lisbon (hereinafter, Article 27 TEU) ensured the establishment of the European External Action Service (Hereinafter: EEAS) and mandated it with the assistance of the HR/VP.17 Both the HR/VP and the EEAS have
created an indispensable link in aligning the various EU institutions responsible for European foreign policy and as such: ensuring policy coherence and comprehensiveness.
Within the CSDP framework the EU has performed twenty-nine civil and military operations in Africa, Europe and Asia since 2003. On the European continent the EU has operated military in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003) and in Bosnia Herzegovina (2004).18 Furthermore five civilian operations operated between 2003 and
2013.19 EULEX Kosovo (2008) is an ongoing civilian operation that is active since 2008.
In Asia the EU engaged in five civilian operations whereof one is completed and four are ongoing.20 The EU has performed seven military operations on the African
16 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. [18], 2010 O.J. C 83/01, at
[http://www.dutpp.hr/userdocsimages/Consolidated%20versions%20of%20treaties.pdf]. European External Action Service, (n.d.). About CSDP - Overview. [online] Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/index_en.htm [Accessed 29 Apr. 2014]. European External Action Service, (n.d.). About CSDP - The Treaty of Amsterdam. [online] Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/amsterdam/index_en.htm [Accessed 24 Jun. 2014].
17 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. [27], 2010 O.J. C 83/01, at
[http://www.dutpp.hr/userdocsimages/Consolidated%20versions%20of%20treaties.pdf].
18 CONCORDIA was a military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (2003).
EUFOR ALTHEA is an ongoing military operation in Bosnia Herzegovina (since 2004).
19 EUPM Bosnia Herzegovina (performed in 2003-2012), EUPOL PROXIMA Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM) (performed in 2004-2005), EUJUST THEMIS Georgia (performed in 2004-2005), EUJUST LEX (performed in 2005-2013) and EUPAT Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (performed and completed in 2006).
20 AMM Monitoring Operation Aceh/Indonesia (performed in 2005-2006). EUBAM RAFAH Palestinian
Territories (since 2005), EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories (since 2006), EUPOL Afghanistan (since 2007), EUMM Georgia (since 2008).
9
continent, whereof three are completed and four are ongoing.21 Eight civilian operations
have been executed, whereof three are completed and five are ongoing.22 Additionally
the EU has supported a civil- and military operation in Sudan and Darfur in 2005-2006.23 In doing so the EU has become an active player in the field of global security and
defence.24 This further calls into question the EU’s foreign policy and the image of the
EU as an international actor.
Figure 1. Completed CSDP missions and operations.25
21 ARTEMIS RD (Completed in 2003), EUFOR RD Congo (Completed in 2006), EUFOR Tchad/RCA
(Performed in 2008-2009), EU NAVFOR Atalanta (Since 2008), EUTM Somalia (Since 2010), EUTM Mali (Since 2013) and EUFOR RCA Central African Republic (Since 2014).
22 EUPOL Kinshasa (Performed in 2005-2007), EU SSR Guineau Bissau (Performed in 2008-2010),
EUAVSEC South-Sudan (Performed in 2012-2014), EUSEC RD Congo (Since 2005), EUPOL RD Congo (Since 2007), EUCAP SAHEL Niger (Since 2012), EUCAP NESTOR Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Seychelles (Since 2012) and EUBAM Libya (Since 2013).
23 AMIS II was a supporting civil- and military operation in Sudan and Darfur (2005-2006). 24 Pohl, B. (2012), Op.cit. pp.2.
25 European External Action Service, (2014). Completed missions and operations. [image] Available at:
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/completed/index_en.htm [Accessed 20 Jun. 2014].
10
1.2. Conclusion
In order to learn how the EU portrays itself as an international actor it is insightful to look at the deployment of the numerous CSDP-operations. The following chapter (Chapter II) will also address the motivations underlying the creation of the CSDP as well as the drivers causing the deployment of the CSDP operations.
Figure 2. Ongoing CSDP missions and operations.26
26 European External Action Service, (2014). Ongoing missions and operations. [image] Available at:
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm [Accessed 20 Jun. 2014].
11
Chapter II: International Relations Theory
Over time various theorists have addressed the EU’s foreign policy as well as the image of the EU as an international actor. More specifically scholars have also looked into the EU’s principles underlying military engagements. From a narrow interpretation the three most dominant strands are those of realism, constructivism and liberalism. Broadening the scope leads to the introduction of ‘new’ European integration theories as well as to the introduction of concepts like ‘Normative Power Europe’ and ‘global security governance’.27
Benjamin Pohl is one of those academics who has addressed the EU’s foreign policy and, more specifically, looked into the drivers behind EU crisis management operations. His work has been particularly useful to this thesis as it engages a very similar set of research questions and I have therefore cited him extensively. In the following chapter I will look deeper into his analysis on the drivers behind CSDP operations. At the same time, I will aim to build upon and extend his account by addressing the representation of the EU as an international actor in crisis management operations. The central question of the following chapter is thus: How are the EU’s CSDP operations being represented?
In his book Benjamin Pohl tried to analyse four proximate drivers that, in his view, could have motivated the operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Chad/CAR. In his analysis he suggested that the following four drivers could explain the EU’s engagement in CSDP operations: (1) the EU’s search for relative external power, in particular in relation to the US, (2) the EU’s effort to boost its external image of being a ‘Normative Power’, (3) the EU’s internal efforts to promote European integration and lastly (4) the extent to which EU Member States domestic affairs are affecting internal EU decision-making. In his view the first two drivers (1&2) represent the external dimension to the EU’s decision-making, whereas the last two (3&4) represent the internal policy dynamics.28 Additionally it should be mentioned
27 Norheim-Martinsen, P.M. (2013) Op.cit. Pohl, B. (2012), Op.cit. pp.2. 28 Pohl, B. (2012), Op.cit. pp.4-5, 22, 26, 29, 36.
12
that Pohl related the first and third driver to the concepts of state power and political survival. The second and fourth drivers are more affected by ‘ideational purposes’.29
Pohl chose to analyse the drivers behind the CSDP operations conducted because ‘ultimately, what the EU does is more important than the mechanisms by which it does it, and a disproportionate focus on the latter can serve simply as a distraction’. Furthermore according to him there are hardly any practical theories on the EU’s strategic behaviour as an international actor. ‘Therefore particularly the CSDP operations conducted will more effectively reflect the EU’s ambitions than merely assessing the EU’s political rhetoric’.30 In doing so he chose to use a framework of these
drivers to analyse the conduct of CSDP operations rather than using more traditional theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism. In his words because:
By introducing propositions related to, but not identical with or comprehensively representing theoretical paradigms, this study aims to make use of their analytical insights while eschewing the descent into a debate merely about labels.31
His main argument for using the propositions is that no single theory can explain the EU’s behaviour in its foreign policy on its own.32 In his opinion, on the one hand,
constructivism falls short because it is in essence a social theory and it does not come with the systematic, analytical skills needed to analyse political behaviour. On the other hand, according to Pohl, realism and liberalism tend to spread themselves too thin among the various possible explanations of political behaviour. Therefore where, according to him, both fall short he introduces his analytical framework of the four
29 Pohl, B. (2012) Ibid. pp.16.
30 Menon, A. (2009) ‘Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten.’ International Affairs, 85(2), pp.228. Pohl, B.
(2012), Ibid. pp.3-4.
31 Pohl, B. (2012), Ibid. pp.39-41. Walt, S. (1998). International relations: one world, many theories.
Foreign policy, pp.38.
32 Pohl, B. (2012), Ibid. pp.12.
13
drivers and possible propositions to overcome these pitfalls.33 With this he underscores
Stephen Walt’s position:
Therefore we are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy. Competition between theories helps reveal their strengths and weaknesses and spurs subsequent refinements, while revealing flaws in conventional wisdom.34
Yet in my opinion Pohl claims to avoid the debate about theoretical labels, but he seems to have gotten stuck somewhere between the traditional International Relations theories and the newer constructivist theories. Because his four drivers form an analytical framework that hovers over the IR and constructivist theories his analysis comes across as somewhat inconsistent and overlapping.
Furthermore he chose to analyse to what extent the drivers explain the EU’s behaviour ‘individually or in various combinations’.35 Therefore he ends up with a
conclusion that to a certain extent combines all drivers, and so does not provide any ‘new’ ground breaking conclusions. Nonetheless, I have found that his analysis and proposed drivers do provide a useful starting point for further analytical discussion on the topic of the EU as an international operating actor in the field of military operations. Therefore I will shortly elaborate on his four propositions regarding the drivers behind CSDP operations in the following section.
2.1. The Quest for External Power
Pohl thus formulated the following four propositions regarding the drivers behind CSDP operations. Pohl called the first driver ‘the Quest for External Power’ and it claims that EU governments act in military operations in order to achieve relative external power by pooling their military capabilities. This proposition is in essence derived from realist theories because from the realist’s point of view the CSDP operations mainly function to
33 Pohl, B. (2012), Ibid. pp.41-42. 34 Walt, S.M. (1998), Ibid. pp. 30 35 Pohl, B. (2012), Op.cit.pp.10.
14
counter-balance the EU’s relative power versus the US’ global power.36 Particularly the
works of Robert Art, Seth Jones and Barry Posen provide valid insights in the dynamics of the balance of great powers.37
Realism posits that a state is primarily concerned with its external environment and its own power position therein (…) given the basis assumption that every state wants to survive but needs to rely on self-help, its relative power position is pivotal.38
Robert Art, to make an example on the realist’ tradition, formulated five conditions when a realist power would be willing to engage: ‘the nation invaded is small, it is militarily weak, the intervention is welcomed by the bulk of the populace, the costs in casualties are relatively low, and the probability of success is high’. In addition, Catherine Gegout subsequently made a distinction between ‘minimal’ and ‘maximal realists’. She argued that the labelling refers to the extent to which a great power will prove to be willing to intervene in a humanitarian intervention. In Gegout’s perception the EU particularly proved to be much of a maximal realist in the case of the EU’s first military operations.39
36 Pohl, B. (2012), Ibid. pp. 22. For other realists’ works on CSDP see; Brooks, S. and Wohlforth, W. (2005).
Hard times for soft balancing. International Security, 30(1), pp.72-108. Diez, T. (2005). Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering Normative Power Europe'. Millennium-Journal of International
Studies, 33(3), pp.613-636. Hyde-Price, A. (2013). Neither Realism nor Liberalism: New Directions in
Theorizing EU Security Policy. Contemporary Security Policy, 34(2), pp.397-408. Jones, S. (2007). The rise
of European security cooperation. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Menon, A. (2011).
Power, institutions and the CSDP: the promise of institutionalist theory. JCMS: Journal of Common Market
Studies, 49(1), pp.83-100. Pape, R. (2005). Soft balancing against the United States. International Security,
30(1), pp.7-45. Peters, D. (2010). Constrained balancing. 1st ed. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Posen, B. (2004). ESDP and the Structure of World Power. The International
Spectator, 39(1), pp.5-17. Rynning, S. (2011). Strategic culture and the common security and defense
policy-A classical realist assessment and critique. Contemporary Security Policy, 32(3), pp.535-550. Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international politics. 1st ed. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
37 Art, R. (2004). Europe Hedges Its Security Bets. In: T. Paul, J. Wirtz and M. Fortmann, ed., Balance of
Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 1st ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Art, R. (2006).
Striking the Balance. International Security, 30(3), pp. 177-185. Jones, S. (2007). The rise of European
security cooperation. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Posen, B. (2004). ESDP and the
Structure of World Power. The International Spectator, 39(1), pp.5-17.
38 Pohl, B. (2012), Ibid. pp. 19.
39 Art, R. (2004). Europe Hedges Its Security Bets. In: T. Paul, J. Wirtz and M. Fortmann, ed., Balance of
Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, 1st ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Bono, G.
(2011). The EU's military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic: An operation to save
15
Thus Pohl’s first driver is connected with the most dominant realist accounts. The ‘Quest for External Power’ driver proposes that EU officials (actively) govern their behaviour and follow certain ideas concerning global power-politics. In the case of the EU this is specifically juxtaposed to the US’ strategic behaviour. For this driver to be justified Pohl further argued that France will most likely take the lead in the case of operationalizing EU military operations. Because this driver suggests some international political balancing, the EU and the US will subsequently often disagree on the purposes and practices of military operations.40
Nonetheless this driver can be criticized because it focuses substantially on the EU’s strategic waging of power versus the US. Therefore this proposition logically leads to the assumption that in general EU member states will be unwilling to cooperate with the US. However this immediately leads to complications because (not all) EU Member States are very reluctant to operating in joint engagements with the US. In this case one can obviously think of the ‘Coalition of the willing’ that were contributing to the Iraq war in 2003.41
Simultaneously this driver seems to disregard the importance of the internal dynamics to the EU’s foreign behaviour, one could think for example of member states’ political preferences. Therefore it is located directly opposite to the fourth driver considering ‘domestic politics’. I will further look into the apparent contrast between these two drivers in section 2.4.
lives? Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 5(1), pp.24. Gegout, C. (2005). Causes and consequences of the EU’s military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo: a realist explanation. European
foreign affairs review, 10(3), pp.427-443.
40 Pohl, B. (2012), Op.cit. pp. 20-22.
41 Full list of coalition countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and Uzbekistan. Additions: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Kuwait, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Palau, Portugal, Rwanda, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Uganda. Derived from; Schifferes, S. (2014). US says 'coalition of willing' grows. BBC News. [online] Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2870487.stm [Accessed 1 Jul. 2014].
16
2.2. Normative Power Europe
Pohl’s second driver is called ‘Normative Power Europe’ and stresses that EU governments act in CSDP operations to pursuit and promote global liberal values, rather than to serve other more self-interested objectives. This proposition stems from the concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ because it implies that the EU follows a certain ideational dimension in its external policy. Furthermore the liberal that Pohl mentions are in line with Ian Manners’ normative principles that he suggested the EU promotes. These principles are ‘sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance’.42
Manners’ initial 2002 conceptualization of ‘Normative Power Europe’ has often been discussed because of its lack of generalizability, external validity and subsequent explanatory power.43 For example Richard Youngs reasoned in 2004 in response that
any normativity to the EU’s foreign policy was solely a product of the EU’s strategic interest in creating a European identity.44
In order to add some explanatory power to the concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’, Helene Sjursen provided some analytical criteria to assess the EU’s normative
42 Manners, I. (2008), “The normative ethics of the European Union”, International Affairs, 81(1), 46. 43 For other account on the EU as a normative power see; Aggestam, L. (2004). A European foreign policy?.
1st ed. Stockholm: Stockholm University, Department of Political Science. Bicchi, F. (2006). ‘Our size fits all’: Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean. Journal of European public policy, 13(2), pp.286-303. Bickerton, C., Irondelle, B. and Menon, A. (2011). Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 49(1), pp.1-21. Bull, H. (1982). Civilian power Europe: a contradiction in terms?. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 21(2), pp.149-170. Duchêne, F. (1972). Europe's role in World Peace. In: R. Mayne, ed., Europe Tomorrow:
Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, 1st ed. London: Fontana. Forsberg, T. (2011). Normative Power Europe,
Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type*. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 49(6), pp.1183-1204. Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?. JCMS: journal of
common market studies, 40(2), pp.235-258. Manners, I. (2006). Normative power Europe reconsidered:
beyond the crossroads 1. Journal of European public policy, 13(2), pp.182-199. Pace, M. (2007). The Construction of EU Normative Power*. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(5), pp.1041-1064. Teló, M. (2006). Europe, a civilian power?. 1st ed. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Whitman, R. (2011). Normative power Europe. 1st ed. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
44 Youngs, R. (2004). ‘Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External Identity’, Journal of
Common Market Studies, 42(2), pp. 415-35.
17
dimension. As one of the criteria she introduced the extent to which the EU tries to strengthen the dimension of cosmopolitan law. She suggested that: ‘a core distinguishing feature of a ‘normative’ power might be that it seeks to overcome power politics through a strengthening not only of international but cosmopolitan law’.45
Pohl’s ‘Normative Power’ driver proposes that it is empirically evident that the EU is a liberal and normative actor. The driver assumes the promotion of certain liberal values and that there is a certain (ideational) policy underlying the CSDP operations. Empirically EU governments should prove potentially willing to take political risks in defending those liberal values if this proposition is true. According to Pohl this proposition implies that the US will probably support these CSDP operations due to its historically deeply rooted liberal values.46
This driver can be criticized because the normative approach to the EU’s external action is in its explanatory power very narrow and ‘’reductionist’.47 ‘Normative Power
Europe’ reduces the EU’s strategic behaviour to these nine principles that evidently lead to the characterisation of the EU as a ‘soft power’. In spite of the fact that over the years the EU has gained military capabilities and it is working on its intelligence.
I mostly argue that the ‘Normative Power’ debate is clearly not up to speed with the most topical developments in the EU’s strategic behaviour, more specifically: the adoption of the ‘comprehensive approach’. I will further look into the developments considering the ‘comprehensive approach’ in chapter III.
2.3. The Search for Ever Closer Union
Pohl’s third driver is called ‘the Search for ‘Ever Closer Union’, supposedly referring to the European Community’s (EC) motto that was dropped from the Constitutional Treaty
45 Sjursen, H. (2006), “The EU as a normative power: how can this be?” Journal of European Public Policy,
13:2, 235-236.
46 Pohl, B. (2012), Op.cit. pp. 26.
47 Hyde-Price, A. (2006). ‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique. Journal of European public policy,
13(2), pp.217-219.
18
in the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2003.48 This driver is related to European
integration theories because it argues that the EU engages in military operations to promote further European integration.49 Desmond Dinan for example reasons that
European integration revolves around the political and economic necessity to integrate due to increasing interdependency and competition in the global environment.50 Thus;
The primary objective of an EU foreign policy, in other words, is to garner legitimacy for the Union rather than to shape the EU’s environment in whichever way.51
According to Pohl the ‘Search for Ever Closer Union’ driver implies that the EU actively aims to increase its visibility in the international arena and legitimize its military presence in the field. This proposition can be recognized through so-called ‘flag-raising exercises’, that is: the decision to engage in conflicts through the CSDP framework rather than other (possibly more effective) institutional alternatives like NATO or the UN. Furthermore it is characterised by a focus on the joint aspects of the unified operation rather than on the expected consequences or possible effects for the host countries. This proposition further scrutinizes the CSDP as a means of European identity creation rather than as an instrument of national self-interest.52
48 Dinan, D. (2004) “Governance and Institutions: The Convention and the Intergovernmental
Conference”, JCMS, 42, 39. Dinan, D. (2005), “Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration”, 3rd edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, pp.2.
49 Pohl, B. (2012), Op.cit. pp. 27-28. For other works on European integration and the CSDP see; Gross, E.
(2007). Germany and European security and defense cooperation: The Europeanization of national crisis management policies? Security Dialogue, 38(4), pp.501-520. Moumoutzis, K. (2011). Still fashionable yet useless? Addressing problems with research on the Europeanization of foreign policy. JCMS: Journal of
Common Market Studies, 49(3), pp.607-629. Selden, Z. (2010). Power is Always in Fashion: State-Centric
Realism and the European Security and Defence Policy. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 48(2), pp.397-416. Smith, M. (2004). Europe's foreign and security policy. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
50 Dinan, D. (2010), “Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration”, 4th edition, Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, pp.1-3.
51 Pohl, B. (2012), Ibid. pp. 29.
52 Anderson, S. (2008). Crafting EU security policy: in pursuit of a European identity. Lynne Rienner
Publishers. Anderson, S. and Seitz, T. (2006). European Security and Defense Policy Demystified
Nation-Building and Identity in the European Union. Armed forces & society, 33(1), pp.24-42. Mitzen, J. (2006). Anchoring Europe's civilizing identity: habits, capabilities and ontological security 1. Journal of European
19
This driver can be (normatively) criticized because it is tremendously self-interested and it raises questions on the EU’s strategy and security motivations in its external behaviour. This driver mostly stands in contrast to the second driver of ‘Normative Power Europe’ because it implies that ‘other economic, geo-strategic or security objectives’ affected the decision to operate in CSDP operations, rather than the (“altruistic”) promotion of liberal values.53
2.4. Domestic Politics
Pohl’s fourth and final driver is called ‘Domestic Politics’ and underlines that EU governments act in CSDP operations to gain domestic political support. This driver stems from liberalism because it proposes that EU governments primarily act in accordance to their domestic societal preferences and electoral behaviour.54
This driver is juxtaposed to the first driver ‘the Quest for External Power’ because it introduces the internal dynamics to EU decision making and stresses the importance of the EU member states’ domestic preferences. According to Jan Zielonka, for example, EU governments prefer the use of the CSDP over NATO and the UN because they can exercise their own interests better.55
Public Policy, 13(2), pp.270-285. Pohl, B. (2012), Ibid. pp. 29. Tonra, B. (2003). Constructing the CFSP: the
utility of a cognitive approach. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(4), pp.731-756.
53 Bono, G. (2011). Op.cit. pp.25.
54 Pohl, B. (2012), Op.cit. pp. 31. For more theory on domestic politics in CSDP see; Berenskoetter, F.
(2013) ‘Jumping off the Bandwagon’, Contemporary Security Policy, 34:2, pp.385. Doyle, M. (2008). Liberalism and foreign policy. Foreign Policy: theories, actors, cases, pp.50-70. Duffield, J. (1999). Political culture and state behavior: why Germany confounds neorealism. International Organization, 53(04), pp.765-803. Giegerich, B. (2006). European security and strategic culture. 1st ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Katzenstein, PP. (1996). The culture of national security. 1st ed. New York: Columbia University Press. Krotz, U. and Maher, R. (2011). International relations theory and the rise of European foreign and security policy. World politics, 63(03), pp.548-579. Meyer, C. (2006). The quest for a European strategic
culture. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking preferences seriously: A
liberal theory of international politics. International organization, 51(04), pp.513-553.Tonra, B. (2003) ‘Constructing the CFSP: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41(4), pp. 738.
55 Zielonka, J. (2007). Europe as empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
20
This driver can be criticized because it could lead to inadequacy in answering to the needs of the host countries and to a lack of ‘effective solutions’. In opposition to the second proximate driver (that of the EU governments’ pursuit of liberal values) the focus on domestic politics could also lead to governments’ reluctance to engage in certain hazardous, unpopular CSDP operations.56
2.5. Conclusion
In conclusion I agree with Benjamin Pohl to a certain extent. It is true that liberalist and realist theories focus very strongly on ‘why’ the EU decides to engage in the CSDP operations. They aim to address what drivers underlie the EU’s strategic behaviour. Nonetheless in doing so realists and liberalism theorists sometimes seem to neglect to link the historical to the institutional context of the EU’s behaviour. Therefore they do not address how certain strategic behaviour has gained ground.
Constructivist theories (including the debate on Normative Power and the European integration theories), on the other hand, tend to focus more on ‘how’ the EU decision process has taken place and how this has led up to a certain image of the EU as an international actor. They seem to look for meaning in European Union integration activities or overstress finding appropriate labels for the EU, like ‘normative power’, ‘civilian power’ or ‘pouvoir normatif’.57 Although they spend a lot of time studying the
evolving character of the EU, they seem to lack explanatory power to examine the EU’s decision-making. They seem to overstress the means and mechanisms through which the EU operates, rather than the actual political and bureaucratic outcomes. Therefore they fall short in assessing important dynamics to the EU’s decision-making process.58
Thus I argue that disregarding the one or the other implies that an important aspect will be neglected or even ignored. Taking a firm theoretical stance means that
56 Pohl, B. (2012), Ibid. pp. 36.
57 Aggestam, (2004). Op.cit. Manners, (2002, 2006, 2008). Op.cit. Pace, (2007). Op.cit. Sjursen, (2006).
Op.cit.
58 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (2001). Taking stock: the constructivist research program in
international relations and comparative politics. Annual review of political science, 4(1), pp.393. Norheim-Martinsen, P.M. (2013) Op.cit. pp. xi-xii.; Pohl, B. (2012), Op.cit. pp. 41-42.
21
both the traditional International Relations theories as well as more constructivist theories seem to fall short in explaining what the CSDP and the EU as an international actor actually is or does.
Considering the former I fully agree with P.M. Norheim-Martinsen that it is fair to say that the political reality as well as the academic debate show that the CSDP has developed in a vacuum. In its scope the CSDP goes beyond traditional intergovernmentalism but it does not yet reach supranationalism. In his analysis Pohl falls short in his claim on the paradigmatic character of the constructivist and IR theories that he discusses. Particularly the work of Norheim-Martinsen, among others, opened up the debate to the new concept of European security governance and should unquestionably be taken into further account.59
I argue that in explaining the EU’s behaviour in its foreign policy (CDSP) and as an international actor the academic field needs a more ‘Comprehensive Approach’. Funnily enough the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton provided an answer to this question. In the following chapter I will explain what the comprehensive approach is about and how it exactly relates to the CSDP operations.
59 Norheim-Martinsen, P.M. (2013) Ibid. pp. xi.
22
Chapter III: The ‘Comprehensive Approach’
In recent years the EU has developed a “new” comprehensive method to its external action that should not be overseen in considering the EU as a strategic actor. The development of the comprehensive approach has been part of internal debates but was not codified as official policy until December 2013. Luckily the emergence of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ in EU rhetoric has not remained unnoticed within academic scholarship.60 In particular the works of Margriet Drent and Nicoletta Pirozzi, among
numerous others, have provided important support in developing understandings of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’. My argument is that the EU’s ‘Comprehensive Approach’ could signify a change in the EU’s strategic direction. The central question to this chapter is thus: how does the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ relate to EU’s crisis management operations?
3.1. The History of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’
The rise of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ is often related to a new ‘holistic and multidimensional’ conceptualization of ‘human security’ that emerged to the end of the Cold War.61 The end of the Cold War in the 1990s marked a shift in attention from the
possibility of intrastate nuclear war to a stronger focus on ‘human security’ as the
60 Drent, M. (2011). The EU’s ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to Security: A Culture of Co-ordination? Studia
diplomatica, pp.3-18. Driver, D. (2010). The European Union and the Comprehensive Civil-Military Approach in Euro-Atlantic Security: Matching Reality to Rhetoric. 1st ed. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical
Information Center; Ehrhart, H. and Pettreto, K. (2012). The EU and Somalia: counter-piracy and the question of a comprehensive approach. Study for the Greens/European Free Alliance, Hamburg; Gross, E. (2008). EU and the ‘Comprehensive Approach’. 1st ed. Copenhagen: DIIS. Hynek, N. (2011). EU crisis management after the Lisbon Treaty: civil-military coordination and the future of the EU OHQ. European
security, 20(1), pp.81-102. Johannsen, J. (2011). The EU's comprehensive approach to crisis management.
1st ed. Baden-Baden: Nomos; Mattelaer, A. (2012). Reviewing the EU’s Crisis Management Procedures.
Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 6; Norheim-Martinsen, P.M. (2011). EU strategic
culture: When the means becomes the end. Contemporary Security Policy, 32(3), pp.517-534; Pirozzi, N. (2013). The EU’s ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to Crisis Management. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Brussels. Reinhardt, M. (2010). Civil-military relations in the European
Union and" Innere Fuehrung"; Schroeder, U. (2011). The Organization of European Security Governance. 1st ed. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis.
61 Gross, E. (2008). Op.cit. pp.9; Pirozzi, N. (2013). Op. cit. pp. 5.
23
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) called the new concept in the Human Development Report of 1994.62 The new ‘human security’ concept offered:
the opportunity to include non-military root causes of instability onto the agenda, a common framework for cooperative problem-solving among diverse actors (governments, NGOs, international organisations, trans-national agencies and coalitions) and to integrate separate but related policy areas: development, human rights, conflict resolutions, etc.63
This shift in the global security debate eventually culminated within the European Union in both the inauguration of various EU foreign policy bodies as well as in the formulation of the 2003 European Security Strategy (Hereinafter: ESS). In May 2003 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU tasked the High Representative for the CFSP, at the time Javier Solana, with the development of the ESS, because the CFSP lacked strategic direction and clarity. Due to its global aspirations the document was formally baptised ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’. The ESS document inextricably linked (human) security to development and expressed a growing amount of global threats (terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime).64
The subsequent milestone in the development of the EU’s ‘Comprehensive Approach’ was the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. Pirozzi argued that the Treaty of Lisbon marks a significant change in the scope of the EU’s ‘Comprehensive Approach’. In her words: ’[t]he challenge launched by the Lisbon Treaty is to break out of the “CSDP box” and interpret the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ in the dimension of the EU’s external relations, with the concurring contribution of different policies and
62 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), (1994). HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994. New
York: Oxford University Press, pp. 22. Smith, K. (2000). Op.cit. pp. 11.
63 Pirozzi, N. (2013). Op. cit. pp. 5.
64 Biscop, S. (2004). The European security strategy: implementing a distinctive approach to security.
Centre d'etudes de Defense, pp. 1; Council of the European Union, (2003). A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER
WORLD: The EU High Representative, (2003). A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD: EUROPEAN
SECURITY STRATEGY. Brussels: European External Action Service, pp. 2-5. Gross, E. (2008). Op.cit. pp. 9;
Krahmann, E. (2003). Conceptualizing security governance. Cooperation and conflict, 38(1), pp.5-26; Pirozzi, N. (2013). Ibid. pp. 5.
24
actions’.65 Article 18 formally mandated The High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Hereinafter referred to as: HR/VP) with the responsibility for the CFSP and ensured the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS).66
Since the entry into force in 2009 of the Lisbon Treaty the EU has been aiming for more coherency and simultaneously for a more comprehensive mandate in the EU’s foreign policy. Further, Pirozzi argued, the post-Lisbon period has been marked by a shift away from NATO’s original Civil-Military cooperation (CIMIC) – concept into the “new” EU Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) – concept. This becomes apparent after scrutinizing the Council of the European Union’s March 2002 forwarding note on ‘Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Concept for EU-Led Crisis Management Operations’ versus the November 2003 note on ‘Civil Military Co-ordination (CMCO)’ from the Council of the European Union Secretariat/Commission services to Delegations.67
Analysing the concept of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ means moving back to 2011. According to Pirozzi:
it is fair to say that the two 2011 strategies for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel are a specific legacy of the Lisbon Treaty’s appeal to “consistency” in the EU’s external action (Article 18 TEU) and can be considered as a first attempt to put the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ into practice by joining different instruments and through the cooperation among the institutions involved.68
65 Pirozzi, N. (2013). Ibid. pp. 7.
66 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. [18], 2010 O.J. C 83/01, at
[http://www.dutpp.hr/userdocsimages/Consolidated%20versions%20of%20treaties.pdf]. Hereinafter; Article 18 TEU.
67 Council of the European Union, (2003a). CIMIC concept for EU-led crisis management operations
(7106/02), 18 March. Brussels: Council of the European Union. Council of the European Union, (2003b). Civil-military co-ordination (CMCO) (14457/03), 7 November. Brussels: Council of the European Union.
68 Pirozzi, N. (2013). Op.cit. pp. 13. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. [21], 2010
O.J. C 83/01, at [http://www.dutpp.hr/userdocsimages/Consolidated%20versions%20of%20treaties.pdf]. Hereinafter;
Article 21 TEU.
25
Logically, the operations that followed the two 2011 strategies can be analysed along the same line of argumentation. Therefore, the subsequent missions that have been deployed since 2011 are: the military training mission EUFOR Libya (closed on 10 November 2011: EUFOR Libya was not launched as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs did not allow it69), the supporting/assisting civilian mission
EUCAP SAHEL in Niger (since 2012 till August 2014), the civilian mission EUCAP NESTOR in the Horn of Africa (since 2012 till July 2014), the civilian mission EUAVSEC Sudan (completed on 17 January 2014), the military operation EUTM Mali (since 2013, extended to May 2016), the civilian border mission EUBAM Libya (since 2013 till mid-2015), civilian mission EUCAP Sahel Mali (since 2014) and of course: military operation EUFOR CAR Central African Republic (since 2014).70 I will further deal with the case
study of EUFOR CAR and the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ in the EU’s external action in chapter three.
In short, the 2013 EU’s ‘Comprehensive Approach’ is thus a method for horizontal institutional integration and for vertical policy integration in the EU’s external action.71 This ranges from diplomacy, defence, finance and trade to
development. In a more narrow definition it is joining civilian and military instruments in EU crisis management operations. According to Gottwald these instruments are for example: ‘the stability instrument, humanitarian aid, the community mechanism for civilian protection, programmes for reconstruction and development, as well as economic support measures’.72
The following table provides a minor systematic overview of how the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ emerged from merely an instrument in crisis management operations within the CSDP into a leading principle for the EU’s external relations.
69 ISIS Europe (2014). Mission Chart | CSDP MAP ». [online] Available at:
http://www.csdpmapp.eu/mission-chart [Accessed 7 Jun. 2014].
70 ISIS Europe (2014). Mission Chart | CSDP MAP ». [online] Available at:
http://www.csdpmapp.eu/mission-chart [Accessed 7 Jun. 2014].
71 Drent, M. (2011). Op.cit. pp. 4.
72 Gottwald, M. (2012). Humanizing security? The EU's responsibility to protect in the Libyan crisis. FIIA
Working Paper, 75, pp. 16.
26
Table 1. The emergence of the comprehensive approach
From CIMIC… March 2002 ‘Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Concept for EU-Led Crisis Management Operations’.73
… and CMCO November 2003 ‘Civil Military Co-ordination (CMCO)’ from the Council of the European Union Secretariat/Commission services to Delegations.74
To Planning…. Since 2011 ‘Brussels’ (specifically the EEAS) is responsible for the planning phase of crisis response and management in cooperation with Community instruments.75
… and all stages of the cycle of conflict or other external crises
Since 2013 the HR/VP and the Commission’s mandate to external conflict and crises ranges from: ‘early warning and preparedness, conflict prevention, crisis response and management to early recovery, stabilisation and peace-building’.76
3.2. The ‘Comprehensive Approach’ in EU rhetoric
The ‘Comprehensive Approach’ made its first formal appearance in a joint communication from the Commission to the European parliament and the Council in December 2013. The document called ‘The EU’s ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to external conflict and crises’ was written by High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), Catherine Ashton.77 The same day an
73 Pirozzi, N. (2013). Op.cit. pp. 6. 74 Pirozzi, N. (2013). Ibid. pp. 6. 75 Pirozzi, N. (2013). Ibid. pp. 7.
76 High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, (2013). Op.cit. pp. 2. 77 High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, (2013). JOINT
COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL: The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises. Brussels: European Commission.
27
accompanying press release from the European commission was released, titled: ‘EU enhances its ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to external conflicts and crises’.78
Both the 2013 joint communication and the press release state that the HR/VP and the Commission adopted a number of measures to ensure coherent and effective external policy. In the official wording: ‘[t]he ‘Comprehensive Approach’ is about the strategically coherent use of EU tools and instruments’.79 To that end they pledged the
following eight actions: (1) to develop a shared analysis and understanding of potential crisis situations, (2) to define a common strategic vision when a crisis situation occurs, (3) to focus on prevention by means of diplomacy, (4) to mobilise the different strengths and capacities of the EU (‘even while carrying out short-term engagements’), (5) to commit to the long term, (6) to link policies in internal and external action, (7) to make better use of EU delegations and lastly (8) to work in partnerships.80
As the communication goes on it stresses that the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ is a ‘shared responsibility of EU-level actors and Member States (…) [because] [t]he EU is stronger, more coherent, more visible and more effective in its external relations when all EU institutions and the Member States work together on the basis of a common strategic analysis and vision’.81
The following argument for the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ is the growing amount of global challenges. The 2013 communication largely draws on the global challenges communicated earlier in the 2003 ESS and the subsequent 2008 ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy’. The 2003 ESS stated the following key threats: (1) Terrorism, (2) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (3) Regional Conflicts, (4) State Failure and (5) Organised Crime.82 The 2008 Report
78 European Commission, (2013). EU enhances its comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises.
Brussels: European Commission.
79 European Commission, (2013). Ibid. pp. 1. 80 European Commission, (2013). Ibid. pp. 1.
81 High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, (2013). Op.cit. pp. 3. 82 The EU High Representative, (2003). A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD: EUROPEAN SECURITY
STRATEGY. Brussels: European External Action Service, pp. 2-5.
28
added ‘Organised Crime’, ‘Cyber- and Energy Security’ and ‘Climate change’ to the list of global challenges.83 According to the most recent 2013 communication global
challenges are: ‘climate change and degradation of natural resources, population pressures and migratory flows, illicit trafficking, energy security, natural disasters, cyber security, maritime security, regional conflicts, radicalisation and terrorism, et cetera’.84
The last part of the introduction firmly reemphasises the link between (human) security and development. Therefore the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ “recruits” all EU actors in Brussels, Member States as well as the EU institutions and services that deal with humanitarian aid, development assistance and the CSDP missions.85 Thus the
‘Comprehensive Approach’ ‘demands a high amount of EU-internal coordination, also with the relevant Commission departments, such as Development Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response’.86 European Commissioner responsible for
Development and Cooperation is Andris Piebalgs.87 European Commissioner for
International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response is Georgieva Kristalina.88
Furthermore the following observations on both documents are in place. Firstly, the communication by HR/VP Catherine Ashton affirms that the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ is historically and institutionally linked to the principles set out in the Lisbon
83 The EU High Representative, (2008). Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy:
Providing Security in a Changing World -. Brussels: European External Action Service, pp. 3-6.
84 High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, (2013). Op.cit. pp. 3. 85 High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, (2013). Ibid. pp. 4. 86 Drent, M. (2011). Op.cit. pp. 9-10.
87 Ec.europa.eu, (2014). Biography of Andris Piebalgs. [online] Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/piebalgs/about/bio/index_en.htm [Accessed 10 Jun. 2014].
88 Ec.europa.eu, (2014). Kristalina Georgieva - Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva - European Commission -
Biography. [online] Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/georgieva/about_me/biography/index_en.htm [Accessed 10 Jun. 2014].
29
Treaty.89 The Treaty called for consistency (and comprehensiveness) by means of the
establishment of the post of the HR/VP and the establishment of the assisting European External Action Service (EEAS).90 The EU affirms that it has ‘increased potential’ to
‘draw on the full range of its instruments and resources’ and exercise the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ due to these new institutional bodies.91
Secondly, it affirms that the concept of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ is not new. It argues that it is drawn from crisis management operations in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and the Great Lakes.92 It does nevertheless by no means refer to the earlier
‘Comprehensive Approach’ of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) (that originated in NATO) nor does it mention the pre-Lisbon Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) concept.93 Therefore the EU, logically but maybe somewhat inconsistently, seems to
prefer referring to previous operational results rather than drawing on earlier rhetoric. In Pohl’s words this is a key symbolic embodiment of the so-called ‘flag-raising exercise’. These ‘flag-raising exercises’ tend to foster European integration by focusing on joint operational successes. Moreover their aim is to legitimize other military presences by increasing international visibility.94
Thirdly, the communication affirms that the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ is a collective initiative and the HR/VP and the Commission pledge a joint external policy and action to this matter. Proceeding on that foot: the document communicates that the HR/VP and the Commission have a ‘common understanding’ of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ in all the stages of crisis-management. In EU rhetoric this ranges from ’early
89 High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, (2013). Op.cit. pp. 2.
European Commission, (2013). EU enhances its comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises, pp. 2.
90 Article 18 TEU. Article 27.3 TEU.
91 High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, (2013). Op.cit. pp. 2. 92 High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, (2013). Op.cit. pp. 2. 93 Council of the European Union, (2003a). CIMIC concept for EU-led crisis management operations
(7106/02), 18 March. Brussels: Council of the European Union. Council of the European Union, (2003b). Civil-military co-ordination (CMCO) (14457/03), 7 November. Brussels: Council of the European Union.
94 Pohl, B. (2012), Op.cit. pp. 29-30.
30
warning and preparedness, conflict prevention, crisis response and management to early recovery, stabilization and peace-building in order to help countries getting back on track towards sustainable long-term development’.95 This joint undertaking is
particularly interesting because overcoming the institutional divide between the HR/VP, chairing the EEAS, and the European Commission was considered one of the strongest obstacles that clogged effective implementation of the EU’s external action. The joint EEAS/EC communication ‘was originally expected to be released in September 2012’, subsequently ‘delayed to the first semester of 2013’ and eventually released in December 2013.96 Pirozzi further explained it as follows:
The adoption of this Joint Communication [was] blocked by the traditional inter-institutional competition over spheres of influence and approaches to crisis management. On the one hand, the European Commission insists on the need to respect the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty in terms of division of competences and budgetary responsibilities vis-à-vis the European External Action Service (EEAS). This is accompanied by fears of politicization of humanitarian aid and development cooperation by respective communities of actors. On the other hand, Member States are suspicious about a possible distortion of the scope of the CSDP.97
The fourth argument the communication makes is that global peace and security is in the EU’s interest. It draws back on the 2003 ESS and the EU Internal Security Strategy. The ESS framed it as follows: ‘Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world (…) [Furthermore a] European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight’.98 In this manner therefore the rhetoric logically
connects the EU’s conflict prevention and the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to strategic
95 High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, (2013). Op.cit. pp. 2.
European Commission, (2013). EU enhances its comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises, pp.1.
96 Pirozzi, N. (2013). Op.cit. pp. 7. 97 Pirozzi, N. (2013). Ibid. pp. 7.
98 The EU High Representative, (2003). A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD: EUROPEAN SECURITY
STRATEGY. Brussels: European External Action Service, pp. 1, 11.
31
