THE EUROPEAN UNION IN
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE
NEGOTIATIONS:
EU actorness, internal dynamics and leadership
strategies
Sophie van Bochove S2089769
Table of Content
List of abbreviations ... 2
1 Introduction ... 3
1.1 Problem statement and contextualisation ... 3
1.2 Research question and relevance ... 3
1.3 Research method ... 4
2 The EU and Climate change policies ... 6
2.1 The history ... 6
2.2 Key climate change policies in the EU ... 8
3 The EU as an actor in international climate negotiations ... 10
3.1 EU actorness ... 10
3.2 EU actorness criteria ... 11
3.3 Institutional set up of the EU ... 13
4 EU leadership ... 16
4.1 Leadership strategies and styles... 16
4.2 Position ... 17 5 Case studies ... 18 5.1 Kyoto Conference (1997) ... 18 5.2 Montreal Conference (2005) ... 20 5.3 Copenhagen Conference (2009) ... 22 5.4 Paris Conference (2015) ... 24 5.5 Madrid/Chile Conference (2019) ... 26
6 Discussion and conclusion ... 29
6.1 EU actorness ... 29
7 Bibliography ... 36
List of abbreviations
BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India and China
COP Conference of the Parties
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
EAP Environment Action Programme
EC European Commission
ECCP European Climate Action Programme
EEA European Environment Agency
EEAS European External Action Service
ENB Earth Negotiations Bulletin
EP European Parliament
ETS Emission Trading Scheme
EU European Union
GHG Greenhous gas
HR/VP High Representative/Vice President
NDC National Determined Contribution
NEPI New Environmental Policy Instrument
MEA Mixed Environmental Agreement
QMV Qualified Majority Voting
SEA Single European Act
TEU Treaty on the European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union TROIKA Three consecutive Council Presidencies
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UN United Nations
1 Introduction
1.1 Problem statement and contextualisation
“COP25, the UN climate talks in Madrid, ends in a sad splutter”. This was the headline of the Economist on 15 December, 2019, after the 25th annual Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This headline symbolises the ending of the climate summit, without much progression. Despite the Conference motto of “Tiempo de actuar” (time to act), no new objectives were set and no progress was made (Streck, 2020). This COP symbolises the trend in the international climate negotiations scene; a lot of talk and limited multilateral action (Winkler and Beaumont, 2010). Relatively recently this was different, in 2015 the Paris agreement marked an “unprecedented political recognition of the risks of climate change” (The Economist, 2015). Most of the progress was credited to the European Union (EU), as being one of the main supporters for climate action (Parker, Karlsson and Hjerpe, 2017; Oberthür and Groen, 2018). The EU has created many climate policies to reduce greenhouse gas emission (GHG) (e.g. the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS)) and promotes multilateral action through UNFCCC (European Commission, n.d.). The EU is one of the leaders in the international climate scene (Damro, Hardie and Mackenzie, 2008) without being a traditional actor in international relations. The EU is not a state and supersedes the status of an international organisation, it is sui generis (Weiss, Seyle and Coolidge, 2013). It remains disputed how the EU has evolved into an important player and why its’ role and effectiveness varies between Conferences.
1.2 Research question and relevance
Taking into account the context of international climate negotiations and the position of the EU in this setting, the following question is formulated: What factors explain the changing
(leadership) role of the European Union in international climate negotiations? In order to
answer this question it needs to be clear which factors could affect the role of the EU. Furthermore, the role the EU plays in international climate negotiations needs to be clarified.
EU actorness is often mentioned when discussing the EU in international relations. EU actorness refers to the ability of the EU to act in an international setting, which is based on several criteria. These criteria refer to the recognition of the EU as an actor, the authority to
this thesis. However, other factors such as institutional changes within the EU can be contributing too (Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2014). The strategy formation of the EU in international negotiations is most likely determined internally, these internal decisions can be influenced by dynamics between the institutions and Member States and the different policy proposals concerning climate action. Multilateral dynamics might also be important for the determination of the role of the EU in international climate negotiations (Bäckstrand and Elgström, 2013).
Most literature focusses on either EU actorness or on leadership strategies of the EU in international climate Conferences. By combining both subjects a gap in this field of research is explored. The insights gained in this research can contribute to the general understanding of how the EU comes to its strategies in international climate negotiations. The transparency of the EU can be strengthened, which is one of the goals in the strategic agenda for 2019 to 2024 of the European Council (European Council, 2019a). Furthermore, examining different climate Conferences with different outcomes might contribute to future strategy formation of the EU. 1.3 Research method
To gain a better understanding of the EU’s actions in the field of environmental policy, I will first look into environmental policy documents of the EU, for which I used primary and secondary sources on EU legislation. Next I will investigate the concept of EU actorness, which will be tested in the case studies. I will also explore the internal set-up and dynamics of the EU, which possibly influences the ability of the EU to act. Furthermore, I research the strategy formation of the EU in international climate negotiations.
After gaining a better understanding of the EU within international climate negotiations, I will execute a cross-case analysis on five case studies, to see how the role of the EU changed and what influenced that change. The cases are selected, either because of important changes within the EU or because they delivered milestone treaties. Firstly I will look into the Kyoto Conference (1997), which established the Kyoto protocol and just followed the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. Secondly, I look into the Montreal Conference (2005), which is the first COP to discuss post-Kyoto action and also followed recent enlargements within the EU (van Schaik and Schunz, 2012). The third case is the Copenhagen Conference (2009), which is often seen as a failure of EU leadership and almost made the entire multilateral negotiation system collapse (Killian and Elgström, 2010). The fourth case is the Paris Conference (2015), which
was the first time that the impacts of climate change were fully recognised multilaterally (Oberthür and Groen, 2018). Lastly, I use the Madrid/Chile Conference (2019), which resulted in a disappointment without any real progress made, furthermore the new European Commission (EC) just came into office before the COP (Newell and Taylor, 2020; Streck, 2020). The cases studies are a literature review from the reports by the Earth Negotiations
Bulletin (ENB), an authoritative insider reporting service for international environmental
negotiations, which analyses and summarises the COPs and describes the negotiating dynamics. I look at policy documents in which the EU’s strategy and objectives are stated and I look at the statements that were made by the EU at these Conferences. Finally, I use the outcome documents to see if they align with the EU’s initial goals.
This thesis is structured as follows: in chapter two the history of the EU in environmental negotiations and the internal policies that the EU has on climate action are presented. Chapter three explores the concept of EU actorness and in chapter four the different leadership strategies are discussed. In chapter five the results of the case studies will be presented and in chapter six these results will be discussed, after which an answer to the research question will be presented.
2 The EU and Climate change policies 2.1 The history
The development of environmental policies started in the 1970s and has evolved on all kinds of issues (Knill and Lieferink, 2007). Environmental policies range from air pollution control to waste policy to the control of chemicals. It has become a core area of European politics, while in the initial Treaty of Rome (1957) nothing hinted towards environmental issues (Knill and Lieferink, 2007). According to Lenschow (2015) the emergence of environmental policy in the EU can be divided into three phases, each with a distinctive type of policy and legal structure.
2.1.1 Phase 1: 1972 - 1987
The first phase started with the Paris Summit (1972) of the European Economic Community, a declaration was signed regarding environmental and consumer policy. Consequently, the EC created the Directorate General for environment in 1973 (Knill and Lieferink, 2007). Initially environmental policy was designed as trade policy, it was a ‘flanking policy’ to the Common Market, mostly focussing on reducing non-tariff barriers, with legal justification in Article 30 (TEU). Ecological motives were sometimes justified. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) had ruled Article 2 (TEU) as a justification for environmental action. This made controlling cross border (air) pollution with the aim to improve the living conditions in Europe justifiable (Knill and Lieferink, 2007). Nevertheless, most environmental policies were linked to economic objectives, due to the lack of treaty basis. Still, a substantial amount of European environmental laws were made, with political aims that moved beyond trade foundations (Lenschow, 2015).
2.1.2 Phase 2: 1987 – 1992
In 1987 the Treaty was expanded through the Single European Act (SEA) which explicitly declared environmental policy a task of the Community (Knill and Liefferink, 2007). It was deemed necessary in order to complete the Common Market, that EU regelation was established on not only economic issues, which explains adding legal ramifications for environmental policy in Article 175 (TEU) (Knill and Liefferink, 2007). An ‘environment’ chapter was added to the Treaty and rules regarding economic integration also provided ramifications for environmental policy formation (Knill and Liefferink, 2007). The Community had the authority to decide on necessary environmental measures to ensure the attainment of environmental
policy objectives. However, unanimity of the Council for decision-making was still necessary (Knill and Liefferink, 2007).
The SEA gave the European Community a formal role in environmental policy and guided action with treaty-based rules (Jordan, 1999 as cited in Knill and Liefferink, 2007). Environmental policy was no longer a ‘flanking policy’ to economic objectives. There was environmental policy in new areas, e.g. access to environmental information (Knill and Liefferink, 2007). Furthermore, decision-making concerning environmental policy linked to economic objectives became majority decision-making and the European Parliament (EP) gained in influence. This resulted in an increase in Community based action regarding environmental pollution (Lenschow, 2015).
2.1.3 Phase 3: 1992 – Present
The last phase is characterised on the one hand by further consolidation of EU environmental policy in the treaty framework and on the other hand by the stagnation of the political dynamics surrounding environmental policy progress (Knill and Liefferink, 2007). However, recently there has been an increase in public attention surrounding climate action again (Streck, von Unger and Greiner, 2020). This phase started with the Treaties of Maastricht that provided expanded authority in environmental protection (Lenschow, 2015). Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty set out the task to ‘promote environmentally sustainable growth’ (Article 2, TEU, 1992). The decision-making procedures regarding environmental policy measures changed to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) (Article 175, TEU). The position of the EP was strengthened in the Amsterdam Treaty, by introducing the co-decision procedure between the EP and the Council (Knill and Liefferink, 2007). In 1994 the European Environment Agency (EEA) was created which symbolises the institutionalisation of EU environmental policy (Knill and Liefferink, 2007; Mathis, 2016).
The Lisbon Treaties further streamlined decision-making regarding environmental policy and increased the EU’s competences in climate change and energy (Lenschow, 2015). All environmental issues now fall under the ordinary legislative procedure, meaning that both the Council and the EP have co-decision powers. Furthermore, the TROIKA (current, former and
Service (EEAS) serve as external representation during international negotiations (de Botselier, 2017). Nevertheless, in reality the council presidency still represents the EU (Delreux, 2014).
2.2 Key climate change policies in the EU 2.2.1 Emission Trading Scheme
The ETS is the first EU policy aimed at reducing GHG emissions. It was first outlined in the 1990s as an answer to the reduction targets of the Kyoto Protocol (Ellerman, 2010). After ratification of the Kyoto Protocol the ETS came into force in 2005. Directive 2003/87/EC (2003) sets out guidelines for the ETS, which puts a cap on the GHG emissions in the EU. Emitters have the possibility to trade in emission allowances that are granted by the EC to certain companies and installations. Only industrial activities and electricity generation that emit carbon dioxide are included in the ETS, which is around 45% of the total GHG emissions (2003/87/EC, 2003; Ellerman, 2010). Since 2012 the aviation sector is also included, however, this has been a challenging step since flights also go to countries outside of the reach of the ETS. Therefore, it only includes flights to and from the European Economic Area (EEA) (2008/101/EC, 2008). The EU wants to use the ETS as a global standard and tries to inspire other countries and regions to implement a similar strategy to reduce GHG emission (Ellerman, 2010).
2.2.2 2020 Climate and Energy Package
The 2020 Climate and Energy Package was negotiated in March 2007 (adopted in December 2008) when the European Council made an ‘independent commitment’ (Oberthür and Kelly, 2008) and decided to integrate energy and climate policy. The 2020 Climate and Energy Package entails the objective to reduce GHG emission of the EU in 2020 by 20 percent, compared to 1990 levels. Furthermore, it aims to increase the share of renewable energy sources by 20 percent on average in the EU (2009/28/EC, 2009) and to improve the energy efficiency by 20 percent wit nationally binding targets (2012/27/EU, 2009). The EC proposed a number of legislative acts such as revising the ETS and introducing national emission reduction targets to focus on areas outside of the ETS (Oberthür and Kelly, 2008).
2.2.3 2030 Climate and Energy Framework
In 2014 the European Council negotiated and agreed upon a common strategy for both energy and climate policy towards 2030. Similar to the 2020 package it includes targets with a specific
aim to reduce GHG emissions by 40%, to increase the share of renewable energy sources to 32% and to increase the energy efficiency up to 32,5% (European Commission, 2014). Furthermore, the importance of national reduction targets was also stressed by the EC (Fischer, 2014). Financial transfers were promised to Eastern and Southern European Member States to convince them to support this plan (Fischer, 2014).
2.2.4 EU green deal
The EU green deal was proposed by the new EC in December 2019, and includes a growth strategy with the goal of climate neutrality in the EU in 2050 (European Commission, 2019a). Furthermore, it entails action plans for important sectors that must contribute in order to achieve the goal of climate neutrality (Harvey and Rankin, 2020). The EC plans to revise all kinds of European policies ranging from transportation to agricultural policies in order to achieve climate neutrality.
3 The EU as an actor in international climate negotiations 3.1 EU actorness
Gunnar Sjöstedt (1977) defined EU actorness as: “the capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system” (p. 16). EU actorness is connected to the ability and autonomy to act in a system without having to consult anyone. Two identifying traits of the EU are presupposed. Firstly, it is assumed that there are common values among Member States. Secondly, a legitimate decision process is required (Richard and van Hamme, 2013). The work of Sjöstedt is pioneering; he recognised that the EU possessed certain aspects that were necessary to be an actor such as the capacity and the autonomy to act on behalf of its Member States while it lacked state-like characteristics (Niemann and Bretherton, 2013). Jupile and Caporaso (1998) defined criteria to assess EU actorness. Firstly, recognition; to be an actor in international relations one needs to be recognised as such by other actors (Jupile and Caporaso, 1998). Secondly, the authority to act; the EU needs to have the legal competences to act in an international setting. This can be conferred to the EU by its Member States (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Chalmers et al., 2014) or the EU has informal competences in an area, through expertise on certain subjects (Niemann and Bretherton, 2013). Thirdly, the autonomy
to act; this concerns the ability of self-government by the EU. Furthermore, it refers to the room
to manoeuvre vis-à-vis its Member States within negotiations (Jupile and Caporaso, 1998). Lastly, cohesion; this refers to what extent the EU institutions and Member States can reach a common goal. This criterion is part of the internal dynamics of the EU, which can be linked to the role and position of the EU in international climate negotiations (Delreux, 2014; Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2014; Niemann and Bretherton, 2013). Delreux (2014) identifies two ways in which the EU can be cohesive in external representation. Either by using ‘one voice’, when the EU has one message, or by using ‘one mouth’ that expresses the EU position (Delreux, 2014). The framework by Jupile and Caporaso (1998) has been criticized for being too complex or too internally focussed while forgetting about the international context (e.g. Niemann and Bretherton, 2013).
Bretherton and Vogler (2006) conceptualise actorness by reference to opportunity, presence and capability. These concepts are inherently inter-related and continuously developing through the process of interaction in both the internal and external context (Pavese and Torney, 2012). Opportunity concerns the context and the dynamic processes that determine the actions by the EU in an international setting (Niemann and Bretherton, 2013). This concerns the global power
structure, the European level, but also the public opinion of Member States’ citizens (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). The second concept, presence, builds upon the notion that the EU is able to act in an external context. The external ability to act has been developed unconsciously by internal policies that influence the external context (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). The last element, capability, concerns the components that internally affect the EU’s capability to act (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). Both the external perception of the EU and the willingness to act are linked. It concerns the capacity to formulate and implement policy, which can be divided into three categories; consistency, coherence and the presence of policy instruments (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). This last element comes closest to the cohesion criterion as defined by Jupile and Caporaso (1998).
For this research I use the definition by Jupile and Caporaso (1998) with the criteria:
recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion. These four elements make up the different
layers that are part of EU actorness. I try to resolve limits of internal focus by going beyond the concept of EU actorness and also taking into account the geopolitical context in determining the role of the EU in international climate negotiations. Furthermore, I will add to the fourth element, cohesion, some aspects of the concept coherence by Bretherton and Vogler (2006) to get a broader understanding of EU actorness.
3.2 EU actorness criteria 3.2.1 Recognition
In past negotiations, especially in the 1970s and 1980s the EU, lacking legal personality in international law, could not obtain a full partner status, although it did actively participate as an observer (Bäckstrand and Elgstrom, 2013). The EU did not have internal legislation on environmental issues and could not make decisions on behalf of its Member States, which made it difficult to be recognised as an official party (Groenleer and van Schaik, 2007). Nevertheless, since the entry into force of the UNFCCC in 1995, the EU is recognised as full-fledged partner to these negotiations. It has internal competences to legislate in the area of the environment since the SEA and the EU’s participation is fully accepted by everyone (Groen and van Schaik, 2007; Delreux, 2014). The EU has the same formal rights as every other party in most international environmental negotiations.
3.2.2 Authority to act
The second criterion, the authority to act is based on the legal competences of the EU concerning external environmental action, as set out in primary EU law. Since the SEA external environmental relations has been explicitly declared as legal competence (Knill and Liefferink, 2007; Article 191, TFEU). Indirectly the EU’s external competences have grown too, beyond treaty basis. Case law by the CJEU has created the ‘doctrine of parallelism between internal and external competences’ (Delreux, 2014, p1019). This doctrine entails that when the EU adopts (environmental) law internally on a certain subject, it is also allowed to pursue interests and negotiate externally. However, the competences that the EU has regarding external environmental negotiations are shared (Oberthür and Kelly, 2008; Article 4(2), TFEU). In the negotiations it is hard to draw the line between EU competences and Member States competences. Every round of environmental negotiations the cards are shuffled and new competences are conferred to the EU or back to the Member States (Delreux, 2006). Member States often have the competence to negotiate in international settings, which results in mixed agreements. This means that both the EU and its Member States are party to environmental agreements (Delreux, 2006; Delreux, 2014), consequently, close coordination is required (Oberthür and Kelly, 2008).
3.2.3 Autonomy to act
The third criterion, the autonomy to act, concerns the discretionary room that EU negotiators have in environmental negotiations (Jupile and Caporaso, 1998). The agreements that the EU negotiates and signs need to be ratified by the Council; where the Member States are represented. EU negotiators can only make agreements to the extent that Member States will accept (Delreux, 2014). Furthermore, the EP has to ratify the agreements through the ordinary legislative procedure, since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 (Article 192(1), TFEU). The autonomy to act is also effected by the presence of individual Member States that are at liberty to negotiate at the Conferences (Article 191(4), TFEU). The EU tries to resolve this by holding internal co-ordination meetings before and during the negotiations to align visions (Delreux, 2014). The autonomy of the EU differs between different negotiations, this variation can be explained by how compelling the external environment is (Delreux, 2011). When the external environment is compelling, the relative bargaining power of the EU is low and stakes are high, the autonomy of EU negotiators to act is often higher (Delreux, 2014).
3.2.4 Cohesion
EU external climate policy has a strong intergovernmental nature, in which Member States can play an important role (Pavese and Torney, 2012). The internal cohesion, or lack thereof, can reflect on the EU’s presentation in a multilateral area. Delreux (2014) adds that the divergence of representation within different climate Conferences can be divided into two categories. Firstly, there is the unity of representation in which there is ‘one mouth’ expressing the European opinion. Secondly, there is the unity of position, where there can be a ‘single voice’ or ‘multiple voices’. The fact that different delegations negotiate at an environmental Conference does not necessarily mean that there is not a common position in the EU (Delreux, 2014). Nevertheless, when several actors express the EU position in these negotiations does mean that this position can become inconsistent. The position that the EU takes within environmental negotiations is often the result of long a process, which starts from earlier global negotiation sessions (Delreux, 2014), but can also be based on existing legislation on a particular environmental subject (Oberthür, 2011). The topic of internal cohesion, or cohesiveness, is complicated and fluctuates over time, because of changing legislation or because of enlargements within the EU. In order to understand the internal dynamics, it is important to understand the institutional set-up of the EU and the decision-making structures.
3.3 Institutional set up of the EU
The EU consists of the EC, the Council (of Ministers), the EP and the European Council. Furthermore, the CJEU preserves the legislation and treaties under the EU (Article 17(1), TEU). Moreover, there are advisory bodies that are consulted in the legislative procedures (Article 13(4), TEU; Article 192(1), TFEU). The area of external and internal environmental law and policy is a shared competence between the EU and its Member States (Pavese and Torney, 2012; Article 4(2), TFEU). Decisions on climate laws and policies are usually made under the ordinary legislative procedure, in which the EP and the Council are co-legislators and the EC comes up with a proposal (Article 192(1), TFEU). The Council can make decisions based on a majority vote, however, some essential climate issues are not adopted through the ordinary legislative procedure. Issues such as carbon taxation are decided through the special legislative procedure, meaning that the EP is not a full co-legislator and is only consulted (Article 192(2), TFEU). Furthermore, the Council adopts decisions by unanimity which makes progress harder
makes the dynamics surrounding the external position of the EU in climate policy hard to track and reaching a common position difficult (Delreux, 2014).
3.3.1 Internal dynamics
In the past there have been differences between Member States with regard to climate policy. For example in the ‘Burden Sharing Agreement’ the EU broke down its common Kyoto protocol objective, of 8% reduction in GHG emissions by 2012, and divided it under the Member States. This meant that some had higher targets than others. This division reflected the higher GHG reduction potential for some and the willingness of some Member States to reduce their GHG emissions (Groenleer and van Schaik, 2007). Moreover, the dynamics between the Member States have become more complex since the EU’s enlargements. More countries’ positions need to be taken into account when coming up with a common position. According to Ekengren and Engelbrekt (2006) on the one hand the EU’s capacity to act has increased because of enlargements, since the new Member States add new areas of interest and legacies of external relations. On the other hand the cohesiveness of the EU has been weakened. Definitely the most recent enlargements with Eastern European Member States, can be quite challenging for forming a common position on climate issues. The Eastern European Member States are often more conservative on issues of climate change, for example Poland which has little to no attention for climate change (Marcinkiewicz and Tosun, 2015), while the EU aims to be ambitious in its position (Bäckstrand and Elgström, 2013).
Nevertheless, not all positions have to be aligned internally to be able to present a cohesive EU position (Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, 2014; Oberthür and Rabitz, 2014). This can be explained by the fact that not all Member States are active in the negotiations. Theoretically all 27 Member States would have to agree to achieve cohesion, however, in reality this rarely happens. In many occasions only a small number of Member States have a clear opinion on issues, while others are inactive or indifferent (Delreux, 2014).
3.3.2 Reaching a common position
The position of the EU for international negotiations, almost never starts from scratch since internal legislation is often used as the ‘red line’ for agreement (Pavese and Torney, 2012). Furthermore, in the 1990s the EU already established a flexible system of EU coordination and representation through working groups in the Council (Oberthür and Kelly, 2008). The working
group prepares the negotiations and comes to conclusions (Pavese and Torney, 2012). These outcomes from the working groups go to the COREPERs of the countries whom deliberate on the conclusions and present a final position to the Council. The strategy of the Commission and the different Member States is based on the position of the Council (Oberthür and Kelly, 2008). Climate action has become a very political issue, consequently the European Council sometimes also takes decision regarding the European position (Pavese and Torney, 2012). The politicisation of climate action is due to the growing evidence that climate change is real, civil society is calling for action and climate change has been gradually moving to the top of the agenda for many EU countries (Newell and Taylor, 2020).
3.3.3 External representation
In the treaties it is not specified how the EU should negotiate under mixed agreements. Often the EC is legally assigned to negotiate on behalf of the EU, yet to create bargaining power, the Member States often let the rotating Presidency represent them. This representation does not have treaty basis (Delreux, 2014). Furthermore, the lack of treaty stipulation concerning shared competences gives rise to tension between the EC and the Council on who should represent the EU in negotiations. Since the Lisbon Treaty there have been more tensions (Delreux, 2014). The EEAS should fungate as the external representation of the EU, the HR of the EEAS is also part of the Commission (Article 21, TEU). It seems logical that the HR would represent the EU, however, the Member States still wanted the representation by the TROIKA. The EC claimed that the failure of the Copenhagen Conference could have been prevented if the EU could present a coherent front through the Commission. The tensions temporarily impeded European action in international environmental negotiations, nevertheless this was soon resolved and EU negotiators are able to act on behalf of the EU (Delreux, 2014).
4 EU leadership
4.1 Leadership strategies and styles
Before the 1990s the European Community was seen as a laggard in protecting the ozone layer, while the US was a frontrunner, because the national interests and positions diverged among the Member States. Furthermore, some Member States wanted to protect the chemical industries, while the US had already banned ozone depleting substances in its own jurisdiction (Kilian and Elgström, 2010). However, in the 1990s this position changed dramatically and since the Dublin Declaration (1992) the EU has aimed to be a leader in the field of international environmental politics (Council, 1990; Oberthür and Kelly, 2008). The EU perceives itself as a leader and frontrunner and attributes itself the leadership skills that are needed to be influential (Oberthür and Kelly, 2008). The EU uses different types of strategies in these negotiations. These leadership strategies depend on the actorness criteria and the internal dynamics between the EU institutions and the Member States (Delreux, 2014). When the EU is internally divided, it is harder to be a strong united leader. Furthermore, the leadership role that EU can play depends on the geopolitical context in which the negotiations take place (Groen, Niemann and Oberthür, 2012; Bäckstrand and Elgström, 2013)
In the 1990s, when the EU was first perceived as a leader in the field of international environmental negotiations (Groenleer and van Schaik, 2007), it mostly relied on directional
leadership that is primarily based on soft power resources (Kilian and Elgström, 2010; Oberthür
and Kelly, 2008). Directional leadership is mostly based on internal action and ‘leading by example’ (Grubb and Gupta, 2000; Oberthür and Kelly, 2008). Secondly, it relies on the promotion of the leaders vision. It can be seen as norm-driven leadership (Bäckstrand and Elgström, 2013). In the past the EU has had the aim of distributing its own climate policies to the international scene, with for example the ETS. Another example is the communication of the 2020 Climate and Energy Package, in which the EU set out its aim to reduce its Greenhouse Gas emissions by 20 per cent by the year 2020 (European Commission, 2007; Parker et al. 2012).
In Copenhagen (2009) the directional leadership strategy did not lead to a leadership role, due to several circumstances. Leading by example was hard for the EU because of internal disagreement within the EU about the measures that should be taken, the actorness criterion of internal cohesion was not sufficiently met. As a consequence the norm-driven arguments were
towards a more realistic and structural type of leadership (Bäckstrand and Elgström, 2013). This means that it uses the material and financial resources that it has, to persuade other actors to align their visions with the EU (Barnett and Duval, 2005). It scaled down its ambitions and tried to be a bridge-builder between other major emitting countries. According to Bäckstrand and Elgström (2013) the EU was a ‘leadiator’ in these negotiations. Meaning that it is a leader and a mediator between the different geopolitical powers. It is forging coalitions with developing countries, building bridges between different views while still having norm-driven interests which makes it a ‘leadiator’ (Bäckstrand and Elgström, 2013). Instrumental leadership was exercised in the Paris Conference (2015). Beforehand the EU had built a high ambition coalition with other countries (Parker et al., 2017), furthermore, it still had high norms. However, in the past years the EU seems to be moving back to directional leadership, with high ambitions and norms for internal policies and no efforts towards building coalitions (Streck, 2020). The different leadership strategies that the EU has, have a major effect on the role that it can play in the Conferences.
4.2 Position
The level of ambition of the EU also influences its role, furthermore, it determines whether the EU can use directional leadership. In multilateral negotiations very ambitious or reformist stances are highly unpopular and less likely to succeed (Meunier, 2000). While when the EU has conservative objectives before starting negotiations it is more likely to be a leader in the negotiations and is often able to align other actors with its vision (Bäckstrand and Elgström, 2013).
This can be exemplified by the Copenhagen COP (2009) and the following Cancun COP (2010). In Copenhagen (2009) the EU had a relative ambitious goal for the negotiations, albeit being unilaterally divided. By having ambitious goals it side-lined itself from the negotiations because other influential actors were not willing to follow and had lower ambitions (Groen et al., 2012). This ambitious position highly influenced the ability of the EU to be a leader in the negotiations. A year later in the Cancun Conference (2010) the ambitions of the EU were lower. This enabled the EU to negotiate with other actors and build coalitions in which there was more room to manoeuvre - autonomy to act. The fact that the position of the EU was less ambitious
5 Case studies
In this chapter the results from the literature review for the cross-case analysis are presented. The role and position of the EU in five climate Conferences is discussed. The role that the EU has will be identified, furthermore the four EU actorness criteria; recognition, authority and autonomy to act and cohesion will be assessed for each Conference to see a possible connection between the two. Other factors such as the geopolitical context and the internal dynamics will also be outlined to gain a comprehensive understanding of the circumstances surrounding the different COPs.
5.1 Kyoto Conference (1997)
The Kyoto Conference was held from 1 to 11 December, 1997 in Kyoto, Japan (ENB, 1997). According to a report by the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (1997) it had over 10,000 participants which ranged from government representatives and intergovernmental organisations to NGOs and press. At the end of the COP, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted (ENB, 1997). The preceding first two UNFCCC COPs laid the foundations for the Kyoto Protocol. COP 1 took place in Berlin, Germany, and produced the Berlin Mandate. A group was formed that started a process aimed at appropriate action beyond the year 2000 (ENB, 1997). The final session of the group showed the willingness of the US to participate and called for developing countries (e.g. G77 and China) to participate meaningfully (ENB, 1997). COP 2 took place in Geneva, Switzerland, and ended with a declaration that supported the creation of legally binding objectives in the following COP. In the end the Kyoto Conference resulted in an agreement in which the devel-oped countries, under Annex I, committed to emission reduction targets (ENB, 1997; Groenleer and van Schaik, 2007).
5.1.1 EU actorness
The first actorness criterion, recognition, was established. This means that by signing and rati-fying the Kyoto Protocol the EU becomes an official party to it, along with its Member States (Groenleer and van Schaik, 2007). Furthermore, during the negotiations the EU was recognised as an actor. However, the US perceived institutional clumsiness of the EU, since in their per-ception some Member States refused to give the negotiators from the TROIKA the space they needed to acutely negotiate on behalf of the European Member States (ENB, 1997).
The authority to act on behalf of Member States in the Kyoto Conference has been established, however, the EU lacked legal competences in fiscal and energy policies (Groenleer and van
States, which made its position in the negotiations weaker. Furthermore, the autonomy to act of the EU was restricted. Initially the TROIKA would speak on behalf of the Member States (ENB, 1997; Delreux, 2006). However, the UK and some cohesion countries did not fully agree with the common EU position and were also negotiating by themselves. This slowed down the pace that the TROIKA could adapt to changes and showed internal tension (ENB, 1997). Besides ambiguity on who should negotiate on behalf of the EU there were also some incon-sistencies in positions of Member States before Kyoto. For example the ‘bubble concept’ of the EU - this concept referred to the burden sharing of the different European Member States in reducing the GHG emission - was questioned by the UK and several countries who had rela-tively recently joined the EU (e.g. Spain, Portugal, Ireland etc.) (Damro and Mendez, 2003). In the end these tensions were resolved and a common position was formed by the EC. Neverthe-less, the internal cohesion was low.
5.1.2 Leadership strategy and position
The EU strategy was embedded in the ‘Commission Communication on climate change: EU strategy towards Kyoto Conference’ (European Commission, 1997 as cited by Damro and Men-dez, 2003). The EU wanted the Annex I countries to commit to strict numerical emission re-duction targets, while remaining flexible to avoid the failure of the summit (Damro and Men-dez, 2003). Furthermore, the EU presented the ‘bubble concept’, which created an united front as the EU during the Conference (ENB, 1997). Moreover, the EU adhered to the precautionary
principle, meaning that (scientific) uncertainty about climate change consequences should not
hinder action at the international level (Huber, 1997). The EU aimed to be a leader in Kyoto and wanted all participants of the Kyoto summit to share the responsibility of reducing emis-sions (European Commission, 1997 as cited by Damro and Mendez, 2003). Moreover, it pro-posed a fixed date for when the reduction objectives should be met. During the Conference voluntary reduction targets were proposed, the EU supported those but was very wary for the loopholes attached to them (ENB, 1997). That is also why it was opposing the New Environ-mental Policy Instrument (NEPI) as proposed by the US which was an emission trading system between countries. The EU was afraid that the US would simply buy-off their emissions, with-out achieving real GHG reduction (ENB, 1997; Damro and Mendez, 2003).
scheme in which countries could buy emission allowances from other countries (ENB, 1997). The fact that the US was involved in the negotiations and had a clear goal for itself, without willing to give leeway, created the situation in which the EU was not able to achieve all its goals and had to compromise. The strong position of the US with the emission trading scheme was central in the negotiations (Damro and Mendez, 2003). The economic position of the US was also strong and it would benefit greatly from an emission trading scheme, which explains its stance (Banks, 2000).
5.2 Montreal Conference (2005)
The Montreal Conference was COP 11 and the first COP after the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. Both the UNFCCC COP and the first Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Kyoto Protocol took place from the 28th of November till the 10th of December (ENB, 2005). The MOP mainly discussed the adaptation of the operational details of the Kyoto Protocol, which concerned the Marrakesh Accords that were vital for a proper implementation of the Kyoto Protocol (Wittneben et al., 2006). Furthermore, the functioning of the Protocol and the guide-lines for financial mechanisms were negotiated (ENB, 2005). The COP negotiations were dif-ferent from the MOP negotiations, since the MOP only included like-minded countries and negotiating was easier (Wittneben et al., 2006). The COP also included the US, which had refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol since the US Senate rejected it. The end result of the Con-ference was a dialogue concerning the future post-2012, without any new commitments made (ENB, 2005). However, this dialogue was seen as the best possible outcome (Wittneben et al., 2006).
5.2.1 EU Actorness
The EU was already recognised as a full-fledged actor since the 1990’s, even though it had no official legal personality until the Lisbon Treaty, entered into force in 2009 (Delreux, 2014). During the Montreal COP the EU negotiated as an official partner and other actors mostly ne-gotiated with the official representation of the EU; the UK Council presidency (ENB, 2005). The competences for environmental action were shared between the EU and its Member States (Oberthür and Kelly, 2008). However, the EU had just established the ETS as a response to the Kyoto Protocol, in which rules and commitments are embedded for its Member States (2003/87/EC, 200; See chapter 2). The fact that the EU had internal legislation ultimately lead to the authority to act in that area (Delreux, 2014).
the EU negotiators more autonomy to act. The communication by the EC which set out the policy strategy for climate change post-2012 (European commission, 2005) also meant that the Member States were aligned on the issue. Internal cohesion was clearly achieved (Delreux, 2014). Furthermore, the recent enlargement did not have a significant effect on the position. The UK as the Council Presidency, was mostly speaking on behalf of the EU (ENB, 2005). This means that the EU was speaking with both ‘one voice’ and ‘one mouth’, thus being cohe-sive in its external representation.
5.2.2 Leadership strategy and position
Among other things the EU wanted to keep using flexible and market-based instruments that aim at reducing emissions in the EU and around the world, e.g. the ETS (European Commission, 2005). Moreover, the EU wanted to lead in multilateral efforts that address climate change and convince other big emitters, both developed and developing countries, to address climate change (European Commission, 2005). The UK, on behalf of the EU, put out an opening state-ment that called for everyone to address post-2012 climate action in ‘open-minded’, creative and innovative ways (ENB, 2005). This clearly shows that the EU tried to convince others to also address climate action. The EU tried to a have leadership role during the Conference, by being ambitious and setting an example itself with the ETS that came into force after the im-plementation of the Kyoto Protocol. It shows directional leadership by setting the example and pushing for the process to continue (Killian and Elgström, 2010). Furthermore, the EU kept stressing the importance of post-2012 action (Wittneben et al., 2006). This shows the EU’s ambition to keep on cooperating on a multilateral basis.
5.2.3 Geopolitical context
The US had not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, since the new republican President Bush was op-posing (multilateral) climate action (Müller, 2006). In the beginning of the COP the US was refusing to talk about future action (ENB, 2005). This made the negotiations during the summit very challenging because it seemed impossible to include the US in talks about post-2012 ac-tions (Müller, 2006). Furthermore, post-2012 negotiaac-tions were not yet on the agenda. The EU had tried to put it on the agenda at COP 8 in New Delhi, India in 2002, however, it had faced opposition from developing countries. This was less of an issue at Montreal Conference, since the MOP under the Kyoto Protocol only included like-minded countries (Wittneben et al.,
5.3 Copenhagen Conference (2009)
The Copenhagen COP took place from 7 to 19 December, 2009. Besides the COP several other meetings concerning climate change took place, such as the MOP 5 and some working groups concerning the Kyoto Protocol (ENB, 2009). The expectations of the Summit were high, there was the intention to ‘seal the deal’ for future action (ENB, 2009). The idea was to find an agreement that would be the successor to the Kyoto Protocol and set-out post-2012 multilateral climate change action (Parker et al., 2012). The end result of the Copenhagen COP were the ‘Copenhagen Accords’ which encompasses a political agreement to further discuss mitigation of climate change (FCCC, 2009). To many this was seen as an ‘historic failure’ since it was merely a political agreement without a binding character, while others described it as a ‘big step forward’ (Winkler and Beaumont, 2011), because of the political will that was shown by the global leaders (ENB, 2009).
5.3.1 EU Actorness
Although the EU was recognised as an official actor, it did not achieve its goal of being per-ceived as leader in Copenhagen. The EU was perper-ceived as a leader by only 40% of the delegates of the COP, while in previous Conferences this number was around 60% (Parker et al., 2012). Nevertheless, the actorness criterion of recognition was met. Furthermore, the EU has the
au-thority to act on behalf of its Member States and since the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force
in December 2009 just before the COP, it also has official legal personality in the field of cli-mate change mitigation (Delreux, 2014; Article 191, TFEU). Nevertheless, it remains a shared competence (Article 4, TFEU) which means that the end-result of the COP is a mixed agree-ment, which falls under the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 192(1), TFEU). Both the Council and the EP need to agree in order to ratify an agreement, this limits the autonomy to
act of EU-negotiators (Delreux, 2014).
In Copenhagen the EU was visibly internally divided. Some Member States were questioning the reduction targets that the EC had set (Niemann and Groen, 2013). Furthermore, there was no consensus within the EU on the issue of unused Assigned Amount Units. Before the COP the Member States could not reach an agreement and it became clear in Copenhagen that there was disagreement between the European Member States. Thirdly, disagreement existed about the financial contributions that would have to be made by the Member States for the measures, in the wake of the economic crisis this was an unpopular subject and agreement was not reached (Niemann and Groen, 2013). Especially the ‘new’ Eastern European Member States, who
re-2013). The enlargement of the EU made reaching a common position more difficult. The
au-tonomy to act was restricted (Killian and Elgström, 2010; Niemann and Groen, 2013).
Further-more, the external representation was ambiguous. The treaties do not specify how the EU should negotiate in mixed agreements (Delreux, 2014). In Copenhagen the Swedish government mostly spoke on behalf of the other Member States, since they were part of the TROIKA (ENB, 2009). However, at the final stage of the negotiations heads of states from Germany, France and the UK negotiated a less ambitious deal (Niemann and Groen, 2013). This shows that the EU was not able to speak with one voice or one mouth at the Copenhagen COP and there was a lack of cohesion (Delreux, 2014).
5.3.2 Leadership strategy and position
The EU’s hopes were high for the Copenhagen Conference. It wanted to move towards a prehensive agreement for climate action and limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius com-pared to pre-industrial levels (European Commission, 2009; Parket et al., 2012). In December 2008, a year before the COP, it had passed the 2020 Climate and Energy Package. The EU set clear targets to reduce emissions by 20% compared to 1990 levels, increase in energy efficiency by 20% and have 20% of renewable energy sources (European Commission, 2007; Oberthür and Kelly, 2008; Parket et al., 2012’; see chapter 2). This shows the ambition of the EU con-cerning climate change and its unilateral directional leadership (Grubb and Gupta, 2000). Fur-thermore, the EU offered inducements to developing countries to align their visions with them (Parker et al., 2012). However, the strategy that the EU had set out did not consider the geopo-litical context, which explains its limited influence (Parker et al., 2012; van Schaik and Schunz, 2012).
5.3.3 Geopolitical context
The geopolitical context was very complex during the Copenhagen COP. First of all the eco-nomic crisis of 2008 was still affecting the countries and made negotiations about financing climate mitigation very difficult (Winkler and Beaumont, 2011). Secondly, the global dynamics had changed by the time of COP15, the EU was no longer perceived as the sole climate leader, but other countries such as the US and China emerged as leaders again (Parker et al., 2012). Almost all actors were looking at the US for leadership since Obama took office, who had promised US leadership in combatting climate change (White house, 2009). However, just
be-committing themselves to an agreement. Furthermore, there was a dramatic shift in traditional political groupings, partly because of the economic crisis. This meant that new actors came at the table, such as the BASIC countries. The EU strategy did not account for these changes in the global dynamics which made it hard to be a leader (Killian and Elgström, 2010). At some point the EU was even side-lined from the negotiations because of its highly diverging ambi-tions from other actors (Killian and Elgström, 2010).
5.4 Paris Conference (2015)
The Paris COP took place from the 29th of November to the 13th of December, 2015 (ENB, 2015). It was the 21st UNFCCC COP and the 11th Kyoto MOP, furthermore subsidiary bodies concerning scientific and technical advice and implementation met in Paris (ENB, 2015). The Summit attracted around 36,000 participants and expectations were high (ENB, 2015). Eventu-ally the COP resulted in the Paris Agreement and the associated decision, which marks the start of a new era of multilateral climate governance (ENB, 2015; Dimitrov, 2016; Oberthür and Groen, 2018). The Paris Agreement entrenches the desire to keep temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial times, with an objective to keep it below 1.5 degrees Celsius. Moreover, it introduces the (intended) Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and a 5 year international review cycle to keep the parties on track (Parker et al., 2017). This is different from the Kyoto Protocol which set targets from top-down, while in the Paris Agree-ment countries can determine their targets bottom-up. This way of committing was more ap-pealing to many countries (Oberthür and Groen, 2018). A transparency framework also came into force which made the communication of the NDCs legally binding (ENB, 2015; Paris Agreement, 2015). Nevertheless, the targets set out in the NDCs are not legally binding an allow for national differentiation.
5.4.1 EU Actorness
The EU was recognised as an actor by the other participants, albeit may it be less as a leader than it desired. It was perceived as a leader by 41% of the participants, while the US was seen as a leader by 59% of the participants (Parker, Karlsson and Hjerpe, 2017). The Lisbon Treaty was now fully operational and established the commitment of the EU towards protecting the environment (Article 191, TFEU). The precautionary principle and ‘effective multilateralism’ made sure that the EU had to be active in Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)(de Botselier, 2017). Consequently, the EU’s authority to act was strengthened. The Lisbon Treaty further embedded the ordinary legislative procedure for environmental related issues (de
Botselier, 2017) , which made it easier to pass MEAs within the Council (Article 192, TFEU) and made the room to manoeuvre - autonomy to act- bigger.
Before the COP an agreement on a climate and energy package was reached within the Coun-cil (EU CounCoun-cil, 2015) which ensured the internal cohesion. Concerning external representa-tion by the EU, the EC together with the Council Presidency were acting on behalf of the EU. Furthermore, countries such as France and Germany were also complementing the actions of the Commission (de Botselier, 2017). Although multiple mouths spoke, they all expressed a similar message, thereby reinforcing the EU’s united position. The goals of the EU were clearly established beforehand and the 2030 EU Climate and Energy Framework provided grounds for a clear and coherent EU during the Paris summit (Parker et al., 2017; Oberthür and Groen, 2018; See chapter 2).
5.4.2 Leadership strategy and position
After Copenhagen and its ‘historic failure’, the EU tried to reinvent itself in the field of multi-lateral climate action, that is why it launched the process to the eventual Paris Agreement (Par-ker et al., 2017). The EU had a strategy of being a ‘leadiator’, by facilitating coalition and bridge building (Oberthür and Groen, 2018; Parker et al., 2017). Before the COP the EU had already reached out to numerous countries to form a coalition that could apply some sort of pressure on other heavily emitting countries. The High Ambition Coalition had convened a couple of times before the COP (Parker et al., 2017). It supported the proposal by the EU to have a long-term reduction goal with 5 year review cycles and transparency and accountability rules to keep the parties on track of their goals. At the start of the COP this coalition had around 80 members (ENB, 2015; Parker et al., 2017). The fact that the EU was successful in building a coalition, was probably due to the fact that the EU was somewhat of a ‘middle power’, with on the one hand major emitters who had very low standards and on the other hand heavily influenced de-veloping countries with more ambitious policy goals (Oberthür and Groen, 2018). By choosing this position, the EU ensured that its preferences were heard and became part of the eventual deal (Parker et al., 2017).
5.4.3 Geopolitical context
Global interests of protecting the climate had risen at the Climate COP (Oberthür and Groen, 2018). The stakes were high and no one wanted to be the one to blame for failure, as had
hap-Groen, 2018). Although, the US was afraid to commit itself to legally binding mitigation targets because the US Senate would reject the agreement, Obama wanted to build a lasting climate legacy (Clemençon, 2016). China at the other hand wanted strict targets but loose mechanisms to control the targets (Dimitrov, 2016). Nevertheless, both actors wanted to reach some sort of agreement to avoid failure (Oberthür and Groen, 2018). Because of the coalition that the EU had built, it could put pressure on these countries.
5.5 Madrid/Chile Conference (2019)
The Madrid/Chile Conference took place from the 2to 13December, 2019 (ENB, 2019). Ini-tially Brazil would be the host country of the Conference, but it withdrew itself from hosting when new president Bolsonaro took office in 2018, whom is anti-climate action. Chile offered to host the Conference instead, but at the end of October 2019 it had to cancel because of unrest in the country. Spain stepped in and offered to host the Conference in cooperation with Chile, which resulted in the Madrid/Chile Conference (Streck, et al., 2020). Expectations were high for the Conference which aimed to finish the Paris Rulebook, specifically Article 6, to ensure the implementation of the Paris Agreement by the countries. Moreover, agreement had to be reached on the review of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage associated with Climate change impacts and finance (WIM) (ENB, 2019). The result of the Conference, was according to many ‘disappointing’. UN Secretary General, António Gutteres, even said that “the international community lost an important opportunity….to tackle the climate crisis” (ENB, 2019, p.25). The end results were decisions made under ‘Chile-Madrid Time for Action’ (Streck et al., 2020), which includes decisions on the final review of the WIM, the gender equal-ity issue and some financial decisions. Furthermore, it suggests countries to increase their am-bition regarding the Paris Agreement (FCCC, 2019).
5.5.1 EU Actorness
The EU has been recognised as a full-fledged actor under the UNFCCC (Delreux, 2014) and the authority to act was further strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty (Article 191, TFEU; de Botselier, 2017). Before the COP the European Council established a document with the objec-tives for the upcoming COP which provides the EU negotiators clear guidelines (European Council, 2019b) and strengthened autonomy to act. The guidelines by the European Council also show that the EU reached internal cohesion, since all heads of states are represented in the European Council and have agreed. Lastly, the external representation was provided by both the Council Presidency (Finland) and members of the EC. This can be shown by the official
Presidency, while the opening statement was made by Frans Timmermans, the VP of the Com-mission (European ComCom-mission, 2019b, 2019c). Even though different mouths spoke during the Conference, the message of these negotiators was more or less the same which means that they spoke with a ‘single voice’, and as argued by Delreux (2014) this shows cohesion within the EU.
5.5.2 Leadership strategy and position
The EU’s objectives for the Climate Summit in Madrid are clearly outlined by the European Council document (European Council, 2019b). First of all the 2030 Climate and Energy Frame-work is coupled to the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, the European Council hears the call for more action from civil society and wants to do more, that is why it also wants to encourage other major emitters to be more ambitious (European Council, 2019b). The EU also presented its European Green deal during the Conference, which showed its ambition to become the first climate neutral continent by the year 2050 (European Commission, 2019a; See chapter 2). The Green Deal is a strategy document which links a growth strategy for the economy with climate neutrality. By proposing the Green Deal the EU shows that it wants to commit itself to real climate actions in all sectors (European Commission, 2019a). The EU tried to lead by example. Moreover, the EU joined the ‘Climate Ambition Alliance’ which was initiated by the Chili presidency to bring together countries that wanted to commit to upscaling the action and targets (Streck, 2020). This is different than the alliance that was built in Paris, since the EU did not initiate it itself. The EU’s position was very ambitious for the COP 25, however, it is also the only major emitter committing to new objectives concerning climate change mitigation (Newell and Taylor, 2020). EU leadership was necessary, since the US had withdrawn from the Paris Agreement (ENB, 2019), nevertheless, the end result of the Conference did not meet the objec-tives of the European Council (2019b).
5.5.3 Geopolitical context
The world had changed drastically at COP 25 compared to COP 21, the geopolitical and eco-nomic context is mostly dominated by right-wing populism and marketization of responses to climate change (Newell and Taylor, 2020). The room to negotiate on multilateral action for climate change was rather narrow and many countries (e.g. US, Brazil, India etc,) were oppos-ing climate action, because they doubt the scientific basis of climate change (Newell and
Tay-in Paris the US was a proponent of multilateral commitment, it now opposes any commitments. Furthermore, although civil society and science are demanding a proper response to climate change, this response is obstructed by the structure of the UNFCCC. This structure of multilat-eralism is very complicated and the differences between countries are too big to overcome (ENB, 2019). The difficulty lays in the fact that a vast majority must agree in order to pass anything. In Madrid this struggle was especially visible and the highly diverging objectives and beliefs of different countries could not lead to an ambitious agreement, or any real agreement at all.
6 Discussion and conclusion
The aim of this thesis was to explore what factors could explain the changing (leadership) role of the EU in international climate negotiations. The EU actorness criteria, recognition, authority and autonomy to act and cohesion (Jupile and Caporaso, 1998), were used as a conceptual framework. EU actorness concerns the ability to act of the EU in an international setting (Sjöstedt, 1977). However, other factors can also contribute to the role of the EU (Niemann and Bretherton, 2013). That is why internal dynamics, leadership strategies, internal legislation of
the EU and the geopolitical context were also taken into account, to gain a comprehensive
picture. In this thesis I choose to focus on these specific aspects, since researchers often research either EU actorness or leadership strategies. By combining both I tried to make a more comprehensive research design. Nevertheless, it should be noted that other factors might also contribute to the role formation of the EU at a COP. However, for the purpose of this thesis, these were not taken into account.
6.1 EU actorness
Since 1995 the EU is recognised as an official party to the UNFCCC (Groenleer and van Schaik, 2007). In Kyoto (1997) it had the formal authority to act, yet, it lacked the legal competences to make fiscal and energy policies (Groenleer and van Schaik, 2007). Furthermore, the
autonomy to act was restricted because other Member States besides the TROIKA spoke.
Lastly, there was a lack of cohesion on what measures should be taken and the EU was not seen as an united front (ENB, 1997). The actorness criteria were only partly met in Kyoto, which could explain the limited influence that the EU had (Damro and Mendez, 2003). In Montreal (2005) the EU had further developed its legal competences, it now had the authority to act on the basis of legislation on energy and fiscal policy with the ETS. Furthermore, the cohesion between Member States was ensured beforehand. The EU was able to hold an influential role and initiate post-2012 action (Witneben et al., 2006). The fact that all actorness criteria were met could have contributed to this.
At the Copenhagen Conference (2009) almost all actorness criteria were met, except for internal
cohesion (Killian and Elgström, 2010). The EU was internally divided on measures that should
2014). At both the Paris Conference (2015) and the Madrid/Chile Conference (2019) virtually all actorness criteria were met. The Lisbon Treaty further embedded EU competences on climate change policies, which added to the authority and autonomy to act. Furthermore, the position of the EU was internally aligned (Parker et al., 2017). At the Paris and Madrid Conferences the EU spoke with several mouths, however the message was more or less the same, which means that they effectively spoke with a ‘single voice’ (Delreux, 2014). Nevertheless, the two Conferences had different end-results. The Paris Conference established a ‘ground-breaking’ agreement (Oberthür and Groen, 2018), while the Madrid/Chile Conference led to disappointment (ENB, 2019).
This divergence in success of the Conferences raises the question whether EU actorness preconditions the role that the EU plays or if other factors are more important. It is often presumed that cohesion of the EU is important to be influential in multilateral negotiations (e.g. Delreux, 2014). However, as evidenced in this thesis, it seems that other factors also effect the role of the EU. In Paris there was the objective to achieve an agreement that would set-out post-Kyoto action (ENB, 2015), while in Madrid/Chile the objective was to complete the Paris rulebook (ENB, 2019). The mindset for both Conferences was different beforehand which could explain the different roles of the EU. This was also the case at Kyoto (1997) and Montreal (2005). Although in this case the ambitions for Kyoto were higher and in Montreal lower. Nevertheless, it becomes clear that other factors are at play when determining the role of the EU. EU actorness might be important for role formation of the EU, however, it evidently does not determine the role that the EU plays since virtually the same level of actorness in different Conferences, led to different outcomes. That is why different strategies of role formation can be important too.
6.2 Leadership strategies and positions of the EU
In Kyoto (1997) the EU used directional and norm-driven leadership, since it was ambitious and the EU aimed to steer away from a mechanism with loopholes (NEPI). The EU wanted to present an united front with the ‘bubble concept’ (ENB, 1997), which can be seen as risk prevention leadership (Damro and Mendez, 2003). The EU wanted to prevent any risks by proposing emission reduction targets, while scientific evidence on climate change was limited (Huber, 1997). Eventually, the EU’s role was not that of a leader. This can be explained by the ambitious goals of the EU for Kyoto, which is often highly unpopular in multilateral
to ‘lead by example’, it had just implemented the ETS and its strategy continued to be ambitious and pushed for the process to continue (Killian and Elgström, 2010). The EU used directional leadership and was able to lead in these negotiations. The divergence in roles between Kyoto and Montreal could be explained by EU actorness, which was only partly met in Kyoto and further established in Montreal. Furthermore, in Montreal the EU had the ETS which added to the credibility of the EU’s directional leadership strategy.
At the Copenhagen Conference (2009) the EU continued to ‘lead by example’, with its 2020 Climate and Energy Package (Oberthür and Kelly, 2008). The 2020 Climate and Energy Package showed that the EU acted on its ambitions. Furthermore, the EU offered inducements to developing countries to get them on board (Parker et al., 2012). This can be seen as structural leadership (Bäckstrand and Elgström, 2013). Nevertheless, the EU did not lead in the negotiations, at some point it was even side-lined (Killian and Elgström, 2010). An explanation for this can be found in the ambitious goals of the EU, which were far removed from other countries. Furthermore, the geopolitical context was very unfavourable for agreement. At the Paris Conference (2015) the EU changed its strategy to instrumental leadership and directional leadership. The EU tried to build coalitions with other countries and formed an ambitious grouping at the COP (Parker et al., 2017; Oberthür and Groen, 2018). Furthermore, the EU introduced the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework to ‘lead by example’. The combination of directional and instrumental leadership together with an ambitious position, was a success. In Madrid (2019) the EU tried to lead by example again, however, it was not successful with its ambitious position and introduction of the EU green Deal. This can be due to the lack of other leadership strategies that were used, besides directional leadership, such as instrumental leadership, or the fact that the ambitions of the EU were far away from the other actors. Furthermore, other factors could also be at play, such as an unfavourable geopolitical context.
The EU’s strategy and position is important for the role that it can play at a COP. Although at earlier COPs directional leadership was quite successful, this changed after Copenhagen and the EU needed to use instrumental leadership as well to be influential. This can be shown by the relative failure in Madrid, where only directional leadership was used as a strategy combined with ambitious goals. Bäckstrand and Elgström (2013) argue that ambitious goals are
