When sexual orientation intersects with nationality : public opinion's influence over policies towards LGBT asylum seekers

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MASTER THESIS POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE

POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

AND ASYLUM

WHEN

SEXUAL

ORIENTATION

INTERSECTS WITH NATIONALITY:

PUBLIC

OPINION'S

INFLUENCE

OVER POLICIES TOWARDS LGBT

ASYLUM SEEKERS

Supervisor: Dr. Jeroen Doomernik Second Reader: Dr. Anja van Heelsum Name: Moni Krausz

Student Number: 11259752 Date: June, 2018

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Introduction

In the summer of 2017 thousands demonstrated in Tel-Aviv, Israel, against the state's imposed discriminatory restrictions on same-sex couples who wish to adopt children (Bluemental 2017).1 Before and after the demonstration a cross sectorial support was reported in social networks and traditional media in favor of marriage and adoption equalities with even prominent Jewish orthodox figures expressing inclusive opinions towards both issues. Though no legislation or policy reforms followed, the Ministry of Welfare announced on removing its objection and gave its blessing for future legislation that will create equality in adoption (Yerktzi 2017).2

Few streets away from there, in the first days of 2018, a more controversial demonstration took place. Activists for asylum seekers' welfare took to the streets to protest the future implementation of a new deportation policy. They were confronted by deportation supporters. Statements like "Israel wants deportation" and "Not a refugee nor a miserable, he is just an intruder and infiltrator" were chanted (Bluemental 2018).3 The policy was eventually cancelled. It was replaced by one that would have regulated the residency of half of the asylum seeking population and the relocation of the others in collaboration with the UNHCR that was shelved few hours later (Landau 2018).

The disparity between the expressed attitudes in both events is also exemplified by various surveys. In the latest round of the ESS (European Social Survey), the majority of respondents expressed positive attitudes towards LGBT people and negative ones towards asylum seekers. Almost 60% reported that they believe that gays and lesbians should be free to live their lives. In addition, a bit less than 50% said that they would not be ashamed to have a gay or lesbian close family member as well as agreed that gays and lesbians should be able to adopt children. In contrast, only 21% of the respondents agreed that the government should judge asylum applications in a generous way and just 27% believed that asylum applications are made due to real fear of persecution in origin countries. In addition, solely 34% of 1

An article about a demonstration for equal adoption policies for LGBTQ couples. The article reviews the demonstration and the state's stance towards the issue.

2_{An article about the Ministry of Welfare's position change with respect to adoption by same-sex couples.}

3_{Hundreds demonstrated against the (now canceled) deportation of asylum seekers form Eritrea and Sudan. The demonstrators}

were confronted by local activists who supported the deportation policy. The article sounds the opinions of few activists from each side and reviews the (now canceled) deportation plan.

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the participants supported family reunification for asylum seekers (ESS 2016). Similar results were observed also in the previous round of the survey (ESS 2014).4

Other surveys portray as well a disparity between attitudes towards LGBT people and asylum seekers. For instance, in one survey a majority of the Israeli public supported marriage equality (Hiddush 2017), whereas another survey shows that asylum seekers are believed to damage the character of the Israeli society (Herman et al. 2017, p. 151).5 Aside from that, as part of my activist past in the country I encountered many LGBT Israeli-Jews who support and advocate discriminatory policies against non-Jews, including the asylum seeking population.6 This has often been translated, with a spark of irony, into voting for political parties which avoid or refuse to promote pro-LGBT legislation and policies.

Surprising as it may be, these findings also appear in other countries. I collected data from the 7th and 8th rounds of the ESS about seven EU countries. In every state, from the more racist and homophobic one to the least, the majority of the respondents were more positive towards LGBT people than towards asylum seekers (ESS 2014, ESS 2016).7 For example, the Netherlands 8th round results show that 95% of the respondents believed that gays and lesbians should be free to live their lives. In addition, a bit more than 96% answered that they would not be ashamed to have a gay or lesbian close family member, and approximately 76% of the respondents agreed that gays and lesbians should be able to adopt children. On the other hand, only 17% of the respondents agreed that the government should judge asylum applications in a generous way and almost 38% believed that asylum applications are made due to real fear of persecution in origin countries. In addition, approximately 40% supported family reunification for asylum seekers (ESS 2016).8

Even though it seems unrelated, these findings stand in contradiction with behavioral researches about attitudes towards LGBT people. According to this scholarship, support in LGBT people is mainly identified with young, educated, 4_{See: appendix number one tables 1.B and 1.C and graphs 1.A and 1.B}

5_{The Israel Democracy Institute is a non-profit independent research organization. Every year the institution publishes a report}

about the local public opinion towards various subjects.

6_{For example, see: an interview with MP Amir Ochana in Haaretz. MP Ochana is the chairman of the Lickud's gay chamber.}

The Lickud is an Israeli conservative party and its leader is the current prime minister. In his interview MP Ochana expresses his national-conservative political opinion. https://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/.premium-MAGAZINE-1.2516112

7_{See: appendix number 2 tables 2.A.2 – 2.G.2 and graphs 2.A.1 – 2.G.2} 8_{See: appendix number 2 tables 2.A.2 and 2.A.3 and graphs 2.A.1 and 2.A.2}

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secular and liberal population. Therefore, positive public opinion towards LGBT people should have predicted similar levels of positive opinion towards other minority groups, among them asylum seekers.9 Moreover, although factors like pro-LGBT legislation and the number of asylum applicants in each country might explain the support and opposition levels towards LGBT people and asylum seekers separately, they do not elucidate why a disparity between opinions towards both groups exists in all of the examined states. An explanation for this pattern could be provided through the focus on the public opinion towards the intersection of both groups, LGBT asylum seekers.

In theory, if a positive public opinion towards LGBT people in a state is a result of solely liberal values or a belief in universal rights, than opinion towards LGBT asylum seekers in that country should reach similar levels. If a disparity between opinions exists, than it means that other factors besides liberal and universal values influence attitudes towards LGBT people. Reflecting on the Intersectionality theory, I believe that the levels of positive public opinion towards LGBT asylum seekers will be lower than the ones towards 'native' LGBT people. Intersectionality theory determines that individuals experience their environments and are being treated by others on the basis of their multifaceted identity. As Crenshaw demonstrates through her research about the US, women of color experience different forms of marginalization due to their gender and ethnicity than Caucasian women (Crenshaw 1991).

Unlike 'native' LGBT people, LGBT asylum seekers have a dimension in their identity that differ them from their hosting state's citizenry. LGBT asylum seekers by definition are exogenous to their hosting national community (Zolberg 2012, p. 1216). Therefore, I would like to investigate how both dimensions, the sexual identity and the national one, play a role in the formation of opinion towards this population. Insofar, little is known about the public opinion towards this group, I have yet to find any research or database tackling this subject.

On the other hand, there is a considerable amount of documentation, whether issued by states or researchers, about policies towards LGBT asylum seekers. Together with the measured separate opinions towards LGBT people and asylum 9_{For instance, see: Smith, Son & Kim 2014.}

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seekers separately, this leads me to posit my research in the field of relations between public opinion and public policies. My aspiration is to unravel how the opinions towards both separate groups shape the policies towards LGBT asylum seekers and to deduce from it why one group is more favorable in some countries than the other. Therefore, my research question shall be: How does the public opinion towards asylum seekers on the one hand and LGBT people on the other, influence public policy towards LGBT asylum seekers?

I will examine my question through a comparison between two states, Israel and the Netherlands. Reflecting on Pettinicchio's study and the ESS results, I chose to conduct a comparative research in order to expose whether the results transcend nationalities (Pettinicchio 2012, p. 552). Therefore, Israel and the Netherlands were chosen due to three reasons. First, both states differ in their citizenship conception. Whereas citizenship in Israel is mostly identified with the Jewish ethnicity (Duman 2015), the Netherlands is more ethnically diverse due to past and present immigration (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2018). Second, both countries do not follow similar external policies with respect to the interface with asylum seekers. The Israeli authorities operate according to the guidelines of the Geneva Convention, while the Netherlands is bound to EU policies (Government of the Netherlands n.d). Last, both countries share similar institutional characters in the form of proportional electoral system and unitary governmental system. Since I do not aim to examine the influence institutional systems have, this choice was made in order to reduce the influence that these variables have (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 47 - 58).

I will develop my research throughout five chapters; the first will be the theoretical background. It will include an interdisciplinary review of the literature regarding the influence public opinion has on public policy, immigration policies and policies towards LGBT people. Since a notable corpus of literature was written about public opinion influence over public policy, this structure will allow me to approach my research from a deeper perspective than the one that would have been achieved by solely relying on immigration and LGBT scholarship. In chapter two, I will give an overview of the policies towards asylum seekers and LGBT applicants and data about both groups in Israel and the Netherlands. In conjunction with the first chapter,

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through these sections I will draw the framework and guidelines according to which I will conduct my research.

The third chapter will be devoted to the methodology that I will apply in this research. I will conduct qualitative semi-structured interviews that will be grounded on the theoretical background and on information from both states. The interviews will be held with 14 stakeholders among them associations' managers, lawyers, journalists, parliament members and one immigration official. The collected information will be presented at the fourth chapter in two sections, one for each state. Each section will be indexed on the basis of the content analysis method. When possible, results from the interviews will be also supported by quantitative data from the media.

In the fifth chapter I will discuss the research results in light of the theoretical background. I will examine whether and how my assumptions will be answered in both countries and which meanings could be derived for the spheres of public opinion and policies towards LGBT asylum seekers. Thereafter, I will extrapolate the results to discuss the phenomenon from which I approached this research. I will examine how the results could explain attitudes towards LGBT people on the basis of their national identity and the disparity between opinion towards LGBT people and asylum seekers.

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Theoretical background

In recent decades, a growing corpus in the literature about the LGBT community has been devoted to migration and asylum seekers. Various scholars and grassroots have been unraveling that western states asylum systems are not compatible with the needs of LGBT applicants.10 Others have been pointing at the embracement of the western notion of sexual identity by the immigration authorities at multiple levels in the asylum procedures as an element that precludes applicants from receiving a refugee status.11

Insofar, I have found no study, conducted in light of immigration and public policy theories or LGBT studies, dealing with the relation between public opinion and policies towards LGBT asylum seekers. Since no particular literature exists, I will base this study on related yet more general scholarship. Hence, I will draw my theoretical framework from the following spheres; public policy, immigration, and LGBT studies. I will begin by sketching the more general domain of public opinion influence over public policy. Thereafter, I will dive into the domains of public opinion influence over immigration, pro- and anti-LGBT policies. I will make this move while relying on definitions and structures that will be presented in the public policy section. Following, I shall explain in view of the Intersectionality Methodology how the presented domains regarding the examination of the public opinion towards asylum seekers and LGBT people intertwine in creating policies towards LGBT asylum seekers.

Public Opinion and the Influence on Public Policy

Contemporary research on public opinion evolved following the appearance of surveys in the first decades of the 20th century. Prior to that, a conception of a public that holds opinions existed, yet surveys broadened the opportunities for studying the phenomenon as well as creating the sense that masses of people, and not only elites, have opinions about politics and policies (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 13, Weakliem 2005, p. 227). Most studies have been conducted about western countries, first and foremost about the US. Erikson found a positive correlation in the US during the 30's 10_{For example, see: Spijkerboer & Jansen 2011.}

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between the public's average opinion and the federal state's policies towards some issues. Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson discovered that political leaders respond directly to public opinion. Scholars like Manza and Cook investigated how public opinion impacts different types of policies across various states (Weakliem 2005, p. 241–242).

Others, like Soroka and Welzien, examined the confluence between the public's opinion and policy making. They showed how, on the one hand, the public adjusts its' opinions due to policy change and, on the other, how policymakers respond to the public's preferences over time (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 4). Aside from that, some scholars claim that legislators now days have greater incentives and tendencies to match the policies to the public's aspirations in order to secure their electoral future (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 1-2). In contrast with these findings, some researches challenge the proven congruence between opinion and policy. Brooks for instance found that in Canada, France, the US and Germany the policies favored by the majority of the public were adopted in fewer than half of the examined cases (Weakliem 2005, p. 241).

In addition, works that support the positive opinion-policy correlation neglect the effects of other factors on policy shaping, like in the case of Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson who ignored the existence of civil society organizations (Weakliem 2005, p. 242). Nevertheless, these studies' results demonstrate that the public opinion's influence over policies is not single-valued or unified across all domains, states and times. Instead, and as I will show in this section, the degree to which public opinion influences policy shaping is dependent by its multifaceted definitions, the presence of various conditions, and is displayed by various tools.

Starting by the definitions, scholars explain the term public opinion in various variations. Osborne and Rose for example state that the public opinion is the aggregate of the views held by the entire adult population (Weakliem 2005, p. 227). Blumer in contrast, anoints the term with political consciousness by defining it as "The views and positions on the issue that come to the individuals who have to act" (Weakliem 2005, p. 242). Griffin and Newman with their research about the US identify the public opinion as the voters' opinion. Since voters choose their political representatives, the latter tend to be more attentive to them upon non-voters in order

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to be elected or reelected. Resonating Blumer's definition, voters tend to be more informed than non-voters and therefore to communicate their demands (Griffin & Newman 2005, p. 1207-1208).

Soroka and Welzien provide a somewhat different definition. Theoretically, individuals enjoy equal liberties within a polity; however they do not have the same actual means to enjoy these liberties. Therefore, not all sections of the public have the access to relevant information or the ability to express their political stance. Thus, the researchers conceptualize the public's opinion as the set of preferences that groups in the citizenry have with regards to a specific policy field (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 23). In their definition the public is demarcated by belonging to the citizenry and by being politically involved as well as informed with regards to policy issues (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 19, 146).

The second term, influence, can also be defined as the representation of the public opinion by policymakers. Achen claims from a liberal perspective, that representation is equal to legislators expressing their opinions towards issues and designing relevant policies on behalf of their constituency as a single unit (Achen 1978, p. 477–478). Soroka and Welzien explain that governments in representative democracies design policies that reflect, to a certain level, the public's preferences (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. vii). The degree of representation can be described on the basis of congruence between the policymakers' activities and the opinions of those who they represent. It is expressed by elections and policy formation or the combination of the two (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 10, 35-36).

The last term in this triangle of definitions is the public policy. Here, the definition includes various components such as votes at the House of Representatives, advancement of specific laws, rulings made by the Supreme Court, public spending or national budget formation and more. Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson for instance describe public policy in their study about the US as an index that includes congressional votes, laws and Supreme Court decisions (Weakliem 2005, p. 242). Monroe also focuses on the US federal policy; however he examines changes in legislation and regulation made by the congress and their direction (Monroe 1998, p. 10-11).

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In their research, Soroka and Welzien focus on policy through the perspective of public spending in the US, the UK and Canada (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 4). They were drawn to concentrate on changes that were made in theses states' national budgets because of two reasons. The first is that the public shapes its opinions while relying on actual or ideal situations with the help of frames and tools that have already been generated (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 26). The second is that the vast majority of the public forms its demands for policy changes with regards to the parts of the policy that are apparent. Therefore, the public's influence will occur mostly toward that visible phase in the whole set of policies, which in these countries is the formation of the national budget (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 79).

According to the literature, the influence that public opinion has on policies varies due to several conditions. These conditions include the responsiveness of policymakers to the public, the responsiveness of the public to policy, the issues level of salience, a state's electoral and governmental systems' structure, and the presence of cue-givers and agents of mobilization. Starting with policymakers' responsiveness, this is an elementary demand for liberal democracy in general and for the public's influence about policy shaping more specifically. Policymakers' responsiveness, which is based on efficiency or centrality, reflects norms of fairness and neutrality. It symbolizes a competition between policymakers on equal terms in order to receive the electorate vote of confidence, i.e. the popular sovereignty (Achen 1978, p. 488–490).

The competition itself is important; policymakers have fewer incentives to respond to the public's opinions if their popular sovereignty is not challenged. Competition can be portrayed in various forms, whether during general elections or following them. In spite of that, representation or responsiveness can also occur without electoral competition. Representatives might execute policies that are favored by the public just because they are part of it and share the same ideology (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 46, 171).

A supplementary condition for the responsiveness of policymakers is the existence of a responsive public, i.e. a public that monitors policymakers' activity and expresses its opinions about it (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 15). Politicians tend to be more attentive towards individuals who are politically involved upon an apathetic public, especially if the firsts form a critical mass that can impact the politicians'

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career (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 19, 147-148). Public's responsiveness to policymakers' behavior can be performed across domains and within them, throughout different periods, and by different groups (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 170).

When masses become responsive towards an issue, its salience level increases and in turn the congruence between the public's opinion and the policy regarding this domain will grow (Monroe 1998, p. 7, 22). A salient issue, the third condition, is a politically important issue; one that is being inspected closely by the mass public's eye and is in the core of debates between groups and between politicians (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 43). A salient issue impacts on both the public and policymakers. The public will monitor policymakers on the basis of their stances and deeds towards a salient issue whereas policymakers will pay more attention to opinions regarding this issue in order not to become irrelevant (Monroe 1998, p. 21–22, Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 44-45). Moreover, when issues are not salient, policymakers tend to pay less attention to responsiveness among parts of the public and take into consideration other influencing factors like political elites' opinion and agents of mobilization activity (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 43-44).

The fourth presented condition is the structure of the electoral and governmental systems (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 4). Both systems are powerful mediators between opinion and policy; they influence representation by policymakers and responsiveness of the public to policies. With regards to electoral systems, proportional method, i.e. multi-party parliaments and coalition governments, and majoritarian method, i.e. bi-polar party parliaments and single party governments, differ in their influence across election and post-election periods. During elections, proportional systems tend to provide better representation of the public than majoritarian systems due to political bargaining and coalition negotiations. However, during post-election periods majoritarian systems tend to better representing the public since a one ruling government, that was elected by the majority of the citizenry, does not need to negotiate about policies with other parties and has greater incentives to satisfy its voters (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 47-49).

With regards to the governmental systems, two parameters affect the responsiveness of both policymakers and the public. The first is the vertical division of power, i.e. whether the governmental structure is federalist or unitary. In a

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federalist structure it is sometimes unclear to understand whether the federal or the national levels of governance are responsible for policy shaping. Therefore, the public has difficulties in finding the decision makers towards whom it should show its responsiveness. As a result, public responsiveness is expected to be relatively low with regards to issues that are treated by multiple levels of governance. In a unitary structure on the contrary, it is quite clear that the national government is responsible for the state's policies and thus it will be easier for the public to be responsive. Yet, sometimes even in a unitary structure the policies' origin is unclear due to segmentation of authority between different ministries and offices (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 49-52).

The second parameter is the horizontal division of power, i.e. whether the executive authority is a cabinet chosen from the parliament or a single ruler (for instance a president) chosen by the public. Members of parliament are expected to be restrained by a chosen cabinet, whether it is a proportional or majoritarian electoral system. Chosen cabinets have the ability to force their will over the parliament. For instance, prime ministers sometimes have the ability to disperse the parliament and decide upon elections. On the other hand, cabinets depend on the parliament support and in a proportional electoral system they are restricted by coalition discipline. Conversely, in a presidential system the political power is divided differently between the executive and the legislative authorities. Due to that, policymakers' responsiveness is expected to be higher in the latter system upon the first. Whereas cabinets can promote a policy that is agreed by all coalition parties in a proportional electoral system or by the majority of a single ruling party, rulers chosen directly by the public can react faster and sharper to changes in the public opinion (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 53-58).

The last condition is the presence of cue-givers and agents of mobilization. Most people lack the opportunity to enrich their knowledge about policy issues and as a result rely on experts and opinion leaders when they form their attitudes. These experts and opinion leaders are described as cue-givers and agents of mobilization. They include political groups, researchers, journalists, prominent public authorities' members, and even family members or friends (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 34-35). Cue-givers and agents of mobilization can generate a multiple impact by first steering

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their followers' opinions and in turn these followers spread the political message to members of their social networks (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 148-149).

Aside from that, public opinion and its influence on policy are displayed through various means. Policymakers can track the public's attitudes via internal and external surveys, communication networks, elections, media reports, other policymakers, and cue-givers messages, to name a few. Surveys, whether conducted for a policymaker or an external cause, can tell by two ways about their repliers' stances towards an issue; first by questions that directly refer to the issue and second by MIP (most important problem) questions in which respondents rank the problems at stake (Monroe 1998, p. 20, Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 100-102). Yet, it is important to bear in mind that surveys results may differ due to wording issues and relative policy opportunities that are offered by the survey designers (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 27-28).

Additionally, publics' responsiveness is also expressed through communication networks, i.e. close and intimate groups of supporters that transmit information from their environment (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 40-41). Elections are another form of public's responsiveness through which the representatives that deliver the favorite policies gain support (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 35-36). On top of that, public opinion is expressed through media reports and cue-givers. The media has a dual importance; it keeps both the policymakers and the public updated about the other's deeds and notions. The media can be used by cue-givers to spread their message to the general public and policymakers but also to transmit the public opinion to the latter (Weakliem 2005, p. 243).

To conclude this section, public opinion influences public policies to a different extent due to some variables. These variables include the way researchers define public, influence and policies. In addition, they comprise the levels of policymakers and public's responsiveness, the degree of salience the issue at stake raises, the electoral and governmental systems' structure, and the presence and activity of cue-givers and agents of mobilization. In addition, public opinion, responsiveness and the relations between them can be monitored through surveys, the media, social networks and elections. Nonetheless, the presented scholarship disregards the impact that supranational and transnational ties have on the degree to which public opinion

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influences policies shaping. These will be presented in the next two sections about opinion influence on immigration as well as pro- and anti-LGBT policies.

The Influence of Public Opinion on Immigration Policies

The literature about public opinion's influence on policy has not been employed extensively in migration studies. Among the scholarship that will be introduced only Morales, Pilet and Ruedin relate specifically to the subject. The authors reason about the disconnection between both strings of literature in the public policy studies' unit of measurement. Whilst public policy theories rely on recorded measures like budgetary movements, immigration policies belong to a regulatory area that is difficult to monitor (Morales, Pilet & Ruedin 2015, p. 1498). Bearing this in mind, in this section about public opinion's influence on immigration policies, I will employ the domain's specific scholarship in light of the structure and terminology that were drawn in the previous part.

Immigration has become a highly salient issue among the public and the policymakers across various industrialized countries (Gilligan 2015, p. 1374, Lahav &

Guiraudon 2006, p. 213). The debate about it is fueled by various factors like political beliefs and ideologies, racial prejudice, socio-tropic motivations and more (Lahav 2004, p. 1165). Information collected from diverse surveys and researches about industrialized states reveals that immigration is often conceptualized by the public as a 'big problem' or one of the most important problems in a country (Lahav 2004, p. 1167).

The public, in general, supports more restrictive policies from many reasons including communitarian and economic ones (Beck & Camarota 2002, Ford & Somerville 2015, Gilligan 2015, p. 1373, Lahav 2004, p. 1167, 1171–1172). In congruence with the general opinion –public policy literature, the issue's high level of salience has been generating policy responses, as demonstrated from studies about the UK and other European countries (Ford & Somerville 2015, p. 1400, Morales, Pilet & Ruedin 2015, p. 1496). Additionally, the issue's salience and the public opinion with regards to it are expressed by the reported means of measurement including the media, general elections, and surveys, to name a few (Ford & Somerville 2015, p. 1397, Gilligan 2015, p. 1381-1382, Morales, Pilet & Ruedin 2015, p. 1499).

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Some scholars argue that regardless of the issue's level of salience, the public's responsiveness to policymakers and vice versa almost do not exist with regards to immigration policies (Lahav & Guiraudon 2006, p. 213). These scholars point to an opinion-policy gap that is nourished by representatives who are attentive to interests' groups, a non-mobilized public, and legislation and norms that are made by domestic and supranational institutions or derived from the international human rights regime (Ford & Somerville 2015, p. 1392, Lahav 2004, p. 1152–1154). Freeman, for example, argues that the public is mostly ignorant and not responsive with regards to immigration policies since, unlike interest groups, it mobilizes and crystalizes an opinion in a slow phase. As a result, to his opinion immigration policies represent only interest groups and the liberal elites (Ford & Somerville 2015, p. 1392, Lahav &

Guiraudon 2006, p. 212). In addition, Freeman claims that among all western countries only in the UK policymakers are responsive to the public's demands for immigration restrictions (Ford & Somerville 2015, p. 1392).

Camarota and Beck in contrast, show that in the US immigration is a salient issue, yet there is a disparity between the worried public and the apathetic un-responsive political elite. They explain this gap by the public's lack of mobilization and the elite's lack of ability to understand the blue-collar sector's fear of competition with immigrants over positions (Beck & Camarota 2002, p. 1-7). Another prism is suggested by Joppke and others, who hold that the public's representation in immigration policies is constrained by legal restrictions. These restrictions are made by domestic institutions like the judicial authority and even the legislative authority itself, as well as by supranational organizations like the EU (Ford & Somerville 2015, p. 1392, Gilligan 2015, p. 1375, Lahav 2004, p. 1153–1154, Morales, Pilet & Ruedin 2015, p. 1496).

Nevertheless, these fatalistic and generalizing arguments about public and policymakers' absence of responsiveness can be contested by empirical data, different case studies and contemporary researches. Lahav for instance, shows that both the public and policymakers are responsive to immigration issues and to each other on these issues. Empirical data unravels that publics across the EU are responsive to immigration issues, and immigration policies were made to respond to their demands (Lahav 2004, p. 1152-1155, 1159). Moreover, Lahav proves with empirical data and

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the growing discussion about 'new politics' and 'new security' that the public's opinion influences policymakers' opinions and behavior regarding these matters (Lahav 2004, p. 1154).

Another evidence for the public and policymakers responsiveness is provided by Ford and Somerville. In their research about the UK, Ford and Somerville found that the public monitors immigration policies and express its opinion in this matter through voting patterns (Ford & Somerville 2015, p. 1395-1396, Gilligan 2015: 1381-1382). As a result, policymakers tend to respond to public demands and pile restrictions on immigration when they are not faced by constraining factors (Ford & Somerville 2015, p. 1394).

Similar patterns of responsiveness are also reported in Zincone and Caponion's work (Zincone & Caponio 2006) Among his examples, Zincone describes the legalization of practices that were promoted by a coalition of cross-political civil society organizations in favor of undocumented immigrants in the health and child educations' fields in Italy during the 90's (Zincone & Caponion 2006, p. 279). Nonetheless, the claim that the public and policymakers are always responsive on this domain and to each other is as much fatalistic statement as the opposite one. Morales and others showed with their study that a policy gap occurs in some European countries while not in others (Morales, Pilet & Ruedin 2015, p. 1509).

The dissimilarity between these strings of scholarship summons a further discussion about the distinctions that have to be made when approaching this topic. An examination of the factors that might affect or constrain the public opinion's influence on immigration policy has to be conducted in view of the general sphere. First, I will demarcate the unit of measurement, i.e. the examined public. One option is to embrace Griffin and Newman's definition of the public as those among the citizenry who vote (Griffin and Newman 2005, p. 1207-1208). Another option is to adopt Osborne and Rose or Soroka and Welzien definitions of the public as masses of citizens who hold an opinion regarding an issue. (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 23, Weakliem 2005, p. 227). This is exemplified by the researches made by Morales, Ford, Camarota and others (Beck & Camarota 2002, Ford & Somerville 2015, Morales, Pilet & Ruedin 2015). On top of that, the latter definition can be extended to

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encapsulate social groups or membership in a supranational entity as demonstrated by Lahav in her study about the EU citizenry's opinion (Lahav 2004).

Another distinction should be made with regards to the specific group that is targeted by the immigration policies. Immigration encapsulates several groups including asylum seekers, family reunion, students, EU nationals, economic migrants and more. Responsiveness levels of both the public and policymakers might vary across these groups, as exemplified by Ford and Somerville's study about the UK. They show that the public has diverse opinions towards different groups of migrants and in turn demands to restrict their numbers in accordance. In their attempt to respond to the public's demand, legislators limit the admission of some groups. Yet and ironically, due to domestic and international constrains the groups that were targeted by policymakers were the least detestable ones from the entire immigrant population (Ford & Somerville 2015, p. 1400, Gilligan 2015, p. 1376). Ford and Somerville's research, especially when compared to Freeman's claim about the UK, shows that a detailed examination of policies towards different migrant groups produces different and multifaceted results with regards to opinion-policy relations in both the immigration domain and the general theory (Ford & Somerville 2015, p. 1392, Gilliigan 2015, p. 1384-1385).

Their findings lead me to discuss the factors that shape the structure of public opinion's influence on immigration policies. As in the literature about public opinion's influence on public policy, also in the immigration domain issues' salience, electoral and governmental systems, and agents of mobilization and cue-givers can affect both responsiveness and representation. With regards to issues' salience and as in the public policy literature, it is demonstrated that policymakers tend to be more responsive to the public once the issue at stake gains massive attention. This is exemplified in Ford and Somerville's study about the tightening of the UK's immigration regime after 2004 due to the public's demands (Ford & Somerville 2015).

With respect to the electoral and governmental system, Lahav found that a parliamentary system is dynamic, flexible and attentive to the public on issues of immigration (Lahav & Guiraudon 2006, p. 209). However, in this kind of systems policymakers might be restrained by other coalition members (Ford & Somerville 2015, p. 1401). Aside from that, also other forms of governance can influence

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responsiveness and representation with regards to immigration, like in the case of the Swiss immigration referendum (Lahav & Guiraudon 2006, p. 209).

Public opinion's influence on immigration policy is also affected by cue-givers and agents of mobilization, especially if these belong to the extreme right or to powerful interest groups (Lahav 2004, p. 1155, Lahav & Guiraudon 2006, p. 207-210). Morales and others, for instance, found that extreme right movements, together with media coverage, succeeded in raising the public's responsiveness to the issue in accordance with their own ideology (Morales, Pilet & Ruedin 2015, p. 1508-1509). Lahav also marks that the extreme right's electoral power shapes public's responsiveness (Lahav & Guiraudon 2006, p. 209–210). However, when it comes to policymakers' responsiveness, Morales and others found that anti-immigration parties' presence in parliaments and cabinets does not change the levels of public opinion's representation by policies (Morales, Pilet & Ruedin 2015, p. 1507-1508).

On top of these factors and unlike the public policy scholarship, the immigration literature encapsulates debates over the impacts that supranational institutions and the international human rights regime have on the public opinion's influence. Some states are bound to directives, treaties and conventions that balance the responsiveness of legislators to the public's demands. Such is the case of the UK in which EU directives, treaties and the human right regime restricted lawmakers from generating a radical change in immigration policies towards asylum seekers and EU nationals. Thus, it led lawmakers to show responsiveness to the public's demands by imposing restrictions on other groups of immigrants (Ford & Somerville 2015, p. 1393, 1400-1401). Yet, the levels of influence that supranational entities or the human right regime have on the structure of influence are not set in stone. For example, EU states still differ in their immigration and naturalization policies even though they follow the same treaties (Lahav 2004, p. 1175, Morales, Pilet & Ruedin 2015, p. 1505).

To seal this section, public opinion influences immigration policies through similar structures that were presented in the public policy section. In viewing this domain, one has to define the examined public and the policies or population towards which these policies are directed. Second, attention should be paid to immigration related issues' levels of salience, the electoral and governmental systems' structure, the

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presence of cue-givers and agents of mobilization and the impact of supranational organizations and the international human rights regime.

The Influence of Public Opinion on Policies towards LGBT People

In contrast with the immigration domain, a meager body of scholarship has been devoted to the influence of the public opinion on policies towards LGBT people (Lax & Phillips 2009, p. 367-369). On top of that and similarly to the immigration scholarship, among these researches I found only two that refer to the general theories, terminology and discussions about public opinion's influence on public policy. Discussions about policies towards LGBT people became globally salient in recent decades. Researches and surveys show that across some parts of the world there has been a tremendous growth in positive opinions towards LGBT people (Brewer 2014, p. 279, Hooghe & Meeusen 2013, p. 259, Kreitzer, Hamilton & Tolbert 2014, p. 795-796). In these countries the LGBT community has been conceptualized as a legitimate part of the citizenry and society (Johnson 2015)

Researchers have been engaged extensively with unraveling the factors that predict varied opinions towards LGBT people. These include levels of religiosity and secularization, economic and political stability, access to education, personal familiarity with LGBT people and more. Most studies have been conducted about states that have certain pro-LGBT legislation or that underwent a process of legalizing same-sex marriage. These encompass mostly European and South, Central and North American countries (Adamcyzk & Pitt 2009, Hooghe & Meeusen 2013, p. 259–260, Kreitzer, Hamilton & Tolbert 2014, p. 796–797).

The scholarship about public opinion's influence on policies towards LGBT people echoes the more general researches about public policies (Monroe 1998). Lawmakers usually follow the demands made by their constituency with regards to anti- or pro-LGBT policies when these become salient. When these issues are not salient, policymakers might not care about them or even ignore the public's opinion (Lax & Phillips 2009, p. 368). Nonetheless, LGBT issues tend to be highly salient, and even to a greater extent than the average level, since they shed under the umbrella of 'morality' discussions. Mooney (2001) defined 'morality' discussions as ones that

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encompass society's core and fundamental values (Kreitzer, Hamilton & Tolbert 2014, p. 796, Lax & Phillips 2009, p. 370).

As an exceedingly salient domain, both the public and policymakers show a high degree of responsiveness towards any change or demands for change with regards to it. This is exemplified by the high turnout level in the Irish referendum about same-sex marriage (The Irish Times 2015). Another example is seen from the US where judges in the state of Iowa who ruled in favor of same-sex marriages were not reelected by the public due to their positive opinion towards the issue (Kreitzer, Hamilton & Tolbert 2014, p. 795). In addition, public responsiveness towards LGBT issues might increase the responsiveness levels towards other political domains. This was demonstrated by a greater political participation of groups that opposed same-sex marriages in the Bush campaign for presidency (Brewer 2014, p. 280).

With regards to the other side of the coin, the scholarship shows a mixed pattern of policymakers' responsiveness. Some studies show that positive public opinion paves the way for recognition in same-sex relationships (Brewer 2014, p. 279). Lewis and Oh, for example, found through bivariate and multivariate analysis that states in the US in the pre-marriage equality era had anti- or pro-LGBT policies that matched their local public's opinion. They also reveal that pro-LGBT public opinion decreases the possibility of discriminatory legislation. Moreover, they discovered that in the US policymakers' responsiveness to public opinion on LGBT issues had been fortified in such way that it became the best predicting factor for policies' implementation (Lewis & Oh 2008, p 48-51).

Similar partial results were also reported by Hooghe and Meeusen in their study about same-sex marriage and public opinion in some European countries. From their examination in Norway, Sweden and Denmark an increase in a positive public opinion towards LGBT people preceded the legislation of same-sex marriages. A resembling pattern was also demonstrated in the Netherlands and Belgium (Hooghe & Meeusen 2013, p. 264–265). Yet, public responsiveness towards a certain stance does not guarantee that policymakers will respond in the same direction (Pettinicchio 2012, p. 554). In their same study Hooghe and Meeusen discovered that in Spain and Portugal marriage equality was legalized in contrast with the average public attitude (Hooghe & Meeusen 2013, p. 264–265).

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The same was also reported in other states out of Europe. In Canada for example only 46% of the public supported same-sex marriages before it was legalized (Pettinicchio 2012, p. 542). In the US, public opinion had a limited influence about the repeal of Sodomy laws (Lewis & Oh 2008, p. 43-44). In Latin American states, like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, pro-LGBT legislation was promoted and implemented against the public's will and in contrast with society's morality values. As a result it led on the one hand to growth in positive opinion towards LGBT people in Argentina and on the other severe physical violence and fear of backlash in Brazil and Mexico (Encarnación, 2011)

One way to explain the disparity between the two types of results is routed in the definitions of pro-LGBT policies and their congruence with the public's opinion. Lax and Phillips studied the correspondence between the public opinion towards LGBT people and eight policies affiliated with them in the US (Lax & Phillips 2009, p. 367). The couple shows that even though all policies were debated by the public, each one alone stimulated different levels of salience (Lax & Phillips 2009, p. 370). Moreover, they discovered that each issue received support to a different extent in a way that is not necessarily overlapping with its level of salience; for example, more people supported anti-discriminatory work laws or equal access to housing than in marriage equality (Lax & Phillips 2009, p.372). Likewise, Pettinicchio demonstrates that the public opinion towards LGBT individuals does not always conjure with the support in certain policies, more specifically marriage equality. Therefore, the lack of a specific policy does not always hint to the multifaceted public opinion towards LGBT people (Pettinicchio 2012, p. 550-551).

Another argument that can explain the varied responsiveness levels was made by Mooney Lee and with respect to the US. In their view, public opinion influences 'morality' policies to a greater advance when the issues at stake are controversial. In contrast, over issues with strong public consensus policymakers will mostly follow the political elite's ideology in order to maintain general agreement. However, if an agent like a federal or judiciary authority forces a change in policy over a system in consensus, a gap will be created between the new policy and the majority's opinion. In that case, lawmakers will often favor the ideology or positions of cue-givers and

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agents of mobilization who supported the policy change upon the average and common public opinion (Lewis & Oh 2008, p. 44).

Further explanation for different level of influence of the public opinion can be provided by the activities of domestic and transnational agents of mobilization (Hooghe & Meeusen 2013, p. 260). Lax and Phillips for instance found that in the US religious conservatives have had a major influence on adoption of policies towards LGBT people (Lax & Phillips 2009, p. 378). Hooghe and Meeusen identified these conservatives as mostly Evangelical leaders and priests (Hooghe & Meeusen 2013, p. 260). Pettinicchio demonstrates that these agents do not have to be solely affiliated to the debate over LGBT rights. He shows that labor unions sometimes promote pro-LGBT policies, especially ones that target discrimination at work (Pettinicchio 2012, p. 537)

Agents of mobilization have been prominently successful in influencing lawmakers' responsiveness with their activity in Latin American countries. This was especially notable in Argentina as part of the campaign for marriage equality. Friedman unraveled that Argentinian pro-LGBT agents of mobilization succeeded in persuading policymakers to promote same-sex legislation mainly due to collaboration with Spanish activists and officials (Friedman 2012). However, these various domestic and transnational agents' activities cannot dismantle the public from its power to demand policymakers' responsiveness (Hooghe & Meeusen 2013, p. 265). In the US for instance, there have been more pro-LGBT agents of mobilization than in the Netherlands, however the latter had for years more developed pro-LGBT policy than the first (Pettinicchio 2012, p. 539-541).

To conclude, in this section I presented how, according to the scholarship, public opinion influences pro- and anti-LGBT policies. Issues regarding LGBT rights tend to be highly salient since they are part of a broader 'morality' discussion. The issue's salience and the public responsiveness do not necessarily lead to representation by policymakers. Sometimes policymakers respond to the public opinion and sometimes they favor elites or agents of mobilization's stances, as demonstrated by Moony and Lee or by the success of Argentinian and Spanish organizations to promote same-sex marriages in Argentina. Additionally and as in the immigration

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domain, a distinction of the specific policies at stake should be made in order to better understand the structure of opinion influence on pro- and anti-LGBT policies. The Influence of Public Opinion on Policies towards LGBT Asylum Seekers

In the previous sections of this chapter I elaborated the theoretical background upon which I will establish my study. I started by drawing the broader frame of public opinion's influence on public policy. Thereafter, I proceeded towards a deeper discussion about immigration and LGBT people focused policies while using the structures presented in the first section. On the basis of these foundations and in view of the Intersectionality methodology, I will now develop my theoretical framework to examine how the public opinion towards asylum seekers and LGBT people influences policies towards LGBT asylum seekers.

Intersectionality is a methodology that connects the Foucauldian and the constructivist discourses and contemporary politics. Intersectional analysis determines that individuals experience their interactions with society on the basis of their multifaceted identity (Crenshaw 1991). This identity encapsulates various forms of associations, whether with the self or with different social groups. For instance, individuals might define their identity as constructed from their sexuality, gender, nationality, and ethnicity elements, among others. In the same breath, these individuals will experience an intertwined form of marginalization that will be based on the relative rank of their social identification in the hierarchy of sociocultural power and privilege within the relevant society (Crenshaw 1991, Parent, DeBlare & Moradi 2013).

In accordance with the Intersectionality methodology, I will investigate the influence that public opinion has on policies towards LGBT asylum seekers in light of two dimensions in their social demarcation. The first will be their different national identity, which is mostly exogenous to their hosting citizenry (zolberg 2012, p. 1206), while the second will be their sexual and gender identity. Therefore, I will deploy my theoretical framework on the basis of the preceding sections and in correspondence with the population's two elements. At first glance, this topic should be salient since it involves the intersection of two groups that are highly notable by both public and policymakers (Hooghe & Meeusen 2013, Gilligan 2015, Kreitzer, Hamilton & Tolbert

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2014, Lahav & Guiraudon 2006). However, as exemplified by Lax and Phillips, not all LGBT-related topics raise the same level of saliency (Lax & Phillips 2009).

Therefore, my first assumption shall be that the issue of LGBT asylum seekers will not be automatically salient in every country. Here it should be noted that I will adopt the scholarship's unit of examination which is the state, and more specifically Israel and the Netherlands (Lax & Phillips 2009). Second, I posit that public's responsiveness towards LGBT asylum seekers and policies regarding them will be dependent on the issue's level of salience, i.e. none to meagre responsiveness will be displayed by the public if the issue will reach low level of salience and vice versa (Monroe 1998, Soroka & Wlezien 2010). Reflecting the scholarship's varied definitions for 'the public' I will test this assumption on two sub-groups, the 'general public' and the 'native' LGBT community (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 23, Weakliem 2005, p. 227). Third, Policymakers' responsiveness towards LGBT asylum seekers will be based on the public's opinion in case of high saliency and on agents of mobilization in case of a low saliency (Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 43 - 44).

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LGBT Asylum Seekers and Asylum Policies – Two Case Studies

As part of the study of the public opinion's influence over policy towards LGBT asylum seekers I will focus on two countries, Israel and the Netherlands. The decision to demarcate this research to the state's level derives from the discussion about nationality and sexuality from which I approach this project. The choice to examine the research question in Israel and the Netherlands flows from three reasons.

First, Israel and the Netherlands have a different conception towards citizenship. While the Israeli society is ethnically homogenous and the state does not have naturalization policies towards non-Jews (Duman 2015, Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018),12 the Netherlands is a home for various ethnic groups and holds different naturalization policies towards these groups (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2018, Immigration and Naturalisation Service n.d).13 This fact will be highly relevant to the extrapolation of the research results about sexual identity and nationalism.

Second, both states have different external policies with respect to the interface with asylum seekers. The Israeli authorities operate according to the guidelines of the Geneva Convention (1951) that has yet to be ratified in the country (Dunam 2015). The Netherlands on the other hand embraced both the Geneva Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, the Dutch government follows number of EU Directives and Regulations with regards to treatment of asylum seekers (Government of the Netherlands n.d). By investigating two states which are not obliged to similar external policies I will spread more light on the actual influence that public opinion has over policies towards LGBT asylum seekers.

Third, both countries share similar institutional characters in the form of proportional electoral system and unitary governmental system. Soroka and Wlezien showed that these institutional systems impact on public opinion and policy relations 12_{According to the Israeli central bureau of statistics' report, as of March 2018 almost 75% of the state's citizenry were Jews and}

approximately 21% were Arabs. These statistics do not refer to the number of Palestinians who reside in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

13_{According to the Dutch central bureau of statistics' report, during 2017 more than 230,000 people immigrated to the}

Netherlands. In addition, there are more than 1.8 million people who count as second generation migration and at least 22.6% of the population has first or second migrant background.

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(Soroka & Wlezien 2010, p. 47-58). Since I do not aim to examine the influence institutional systems have, this choice was made in order to reduce their influence. In the following chapter I will present both states' policies towards LGBT asylum seekers. This will be as part of a broader display of the asylum policies in each country. In addition, the Netherlands will also be examined in light of relevant EU policies that the country is bound to. Attention will be devoted to the characteristics of the LGBT asylum seekers and the entire asylum population in each state.

Israel

Israel was among the first states to sign the Geneva Refuge Convention. Nevertheless, it has yet to ratify the convention and regulate any asylum system. According to Duman (Duman 2015, p. 1237), this is part of a broader approach that conceptualizes immigration as a process that only Jews and Jewish descendants are eligible to undergo. Immigration is legalized by the Law of Return (1951) which defines it as 'Aliaa' and the Jewish newcomers are defined as Olim.14 This is part of the process' spiritual symbolization as a return to the ancient fatherland (Duman 2015, p. 1237).15

In the past, the country received less than few hundreds of asylum applications. An exceptional case was the grant of asylum for thousands of Christian Lebanese who collaborated with the state's military during the occupation of Southern Lebanon. In 2002 a new policy was introduced that divided the responsibilities between the state and the UNHCR with regards to asylum seekers. In the core of that policy lays the recognition that Israel will provide only a temporal shelter for applicants and refugees (Dunam 2015, p. 1238).

The situation changed during the previous decade with the arrival of the first masses of asylum seekers from Sudan and Eritrea through the country's southern border with Egypt. Since then, public and policymakers' discussion about asylum 14_Ascendants

15_{Israel has, in addition, a set of policies towards temporary workers that are employed in the agricultural, construction and}

nursing care sectors. These workers' rights are heavily restricted by the state and they are not allowed to reside in the country once their temporal work permit is expired. For further explanation about temporary workers' rights and duties, see: The Law of Foreign Workers https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/Law01/P178_002.htm (in Hebrew).

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seekers has been identified with people from these two countries. As of March 2018 and according to the national Population and Immigration Authority, there are a bit more than 36,000 asylum seekers in Israel, of which Sudanese and Eritrean people are largely majoritarian, accounting for a bit more than 91% (Population and Immigration Authority 2018, p. 2-4).16 Most of the asylum seekers live in Tel-Aviv's southern slums; others live in satellite cities surrounding Tel-Aviv and in big cities like Jerusalem and Haifa. Asylum seekers from Eritrea and Sudan have been receiving a 'temporary group protection' and they are obliged to request a renewable visa every one to three months (Kalir 2015, p. 586).

Asylum seekers are often called by the authorities as 'infiltrators', a term that was inherited from the security discourse about Palestinians who illegally crossed the border to Israel in the middle of the previous century (Cohn 2016, p. 15, Dunam 2015, p. 1239). In contrast, The UNHCR defines them as asylum seekers who deserve a 'refugee like' status (UNHCR 2017, p. 3). Once 'infiltrators' apply for asylum, their status is changed to asylum seekers. Insofar, many have not filed asylum applications due to various reasons. First, some are not informed about the procedure. Second, some choose not to submit applications since both statuses do not entitle any legal or social aid or services. Moreover, there is distrust in the Israeli systems which, on its side, piles up many obstacles for initiating and conducting an asylum process. The Israeli authorities do not allocate enough manpower or positions for this issue and also halted in the past the option to apply for asylum.17 Furthermore, the authorities tend to deliberately fail asylum processes and have not been recognizing most of the requests (Cohn 2016, p. 18, Kalir 2015, p. 587, UNHCR 2017, p. 1-3).

Whether defined as asylum seekers or infiltrators, applicants do not receive any basic economic or social right. Asylum seekers cannot obtain work permits, health insurance, social services or any provision of shelter. They can get a medical treatment at NGOs or by approaching the emergency units in severe cases. Although they do not hold work permits, a ruling made by the Supreme Court allows them to officially be part of the labor force. Yet, the Interior Affairs Ministry and local

16_{A quarterly report issued by the Population and Immigration Authority about the number of foreigners in the country.} 17_{For example, see:}_{https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/1.4037056}_{or a video documenting the conditions outside one of the}

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municipalities sterilized this ruling by imposing fines and sanctions on asylum seekers' employers a

nd by demanding from the latest to set aside shares from their income to a special deposit. Insofar, the existence of sanctions coupled with lack of social rights led to the employment of some asylum seekers in human trafficking conditions (Dunam 2015, p. 1245, Kalir 2015, p. 586).

At the peak, asylum seekers numbers accounted for more than 60,000 people. In the last decade, the state enacted some measures to block unauthorized entrance and to reduce the number of asylum seekers. One measure was the construction of a border wall with Egypt that was completed in 2013, and contributed to a decrease in the entrants' numbers (Cohn 2016: 16-17). During 2017, for example, none entered 'illegally' from the southern border (Population and Immigration Authority 2018: 3). Prior to that, asylum seekers that were caught at the border would have been detained by the military and eventually sent back to Egypt or transferred to Tel-Aviv. Another stately measure was the construction of the 'Saharonim' detention center. Once completed, asylum seekers would have first been taken there to pass a screening procedure and then detained or released with a one-way bus ticket to Tel-Aviv (Kalir 2015, p. 586).

Another measure that was introduced was the legislation of an amendment to the Prevention of Infiltration Law (1952). Three rounds of overruling by the Supreme Court had happened before the government formulated a version that matched previous Israeli legislation and judgmental verdicts. The updated amendment permitted the detention of 'infiltrators' for a period of three months in 'Saharonim' camp and the deportation of those who were denied a refugee status. On top of that, an open detention center, 'Holot', was constructed in the heart of the desert to accommodate those who cannot be deported for a period of one year. Tenants were allowed to exit the center but were demanded to register themselves once a day when they returned at night. It should be noted the both camps could not host more than few thousand people (Cohn 2016, p. 19-21). During March 2018 and as part of the initial