Out of 'El Monte' : counterinsurgency, space and civilian lives in Colombia's ETCS

Out of ‘El Monte’

Counterinsurgency, Space and Civilian Lives in Colombia’s ETCR

Aislinn Irvine

15

_{July 2019}

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MSc Thesis: International Development Studies Graduate School of Social Sciences University of Amsterdam

Abstract

Since signing a peace agreement with the Colombian government in 2016, the Fuerzas

Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the country’s largest and oldest guerrilla

movement, have been engaged in a process of reincorporation within Colombia’s

peripherally located Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación (ETCR). This process of reincorporation was modelled off the international Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) peacebuilding framework. What distinguishes the FARC’s

“reincorporation” from the usual process of “reintegration” is its collective nature. While there is a body of literature on Colombia’s conflictual past and DDR processes more broadly, very little research has focused on the ETCR. Thus, we know little about how the particular spatiality of the ETCR, namely their isolated and segregated nature, conditions the ex-combatants’ process of reincorporation. This research aims to fill this knowledge gap. Based primarily on ethnographic fieldwork (semi-structured interviews, participant observations) with the ex-combatant communities residing within the ETCR and the communities

neighbouring them, I examine the spatiality of reincorporation. The research found that while the ETCR serve to aid the reincorporation of the ex-combatant community by

facilitating their disarmament and granting ex-combatants the opportunity to socialise with local civilians; they also inhibit their reincorporation by isolating ex-combatants from

Colombian society and often failing to serve as a viable base for their future economic autonomy. Ultimately, the ex-combatant community residing within the ETCR is in a state of vulnerability, determined by future uncertainty and governmental breaches. The research findings call into question the current state of the Colombian peace process, as well as our understanding of DDR processes more broadly. On a theoretical level, my research

contributes to a better understanding of the employment of space within counterinsurgency strategies.

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor Frank Müller for all his guidance throughout the research process and for pushing me to opt for the more challenging research topic and supporting me through that decision. I would also like to thank my local supervisor Jairo Baquero Melo for all his assistance throughout my time in Colombia. Without his help, gaining access to the ETCR would have been a far greater challenge.

Secondly, I would like to thank my parents, Róisín and Russell, for their continual support throughout my academic career, without which my year in Amsterdam and this research project would not have been possible. I would like to say a special thanks to my mum for going above and beyond what most parents would do and taking the time to apply her unsurpassable grammar skills to proof-reading my thesis.

Lastly, I would like to thank the FARC for introducing me to their way of life and welcoming me with open arms into their home.

Table of Contents

3.3.1COIN AND SPACE 22

3.3.2COIN&DDR 25

4. METHODOLOGY 28

4.1RESEARCH LOCATION 28

4.2UNIT OF ANALYSIS 30

4.3METHODS 31

4.3.1SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 32 4.3.2PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 33

4.3.3DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 33

4.3.4SAMPLING 33

4.4METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 34

4.4.1QUALITY CRITERIA ASSESSMENT 34

4.4.2LIMITATIONS 36

4.4.3ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 39

5. DE-MILITARISATION 43`

5.1INTRODUCTION 43

5.2SECURITY 43

5.3MILITARY TO POLITICAL ORGANISATION 49

5.4RECIDIVISM 56

5.5CONCLUSION 61

6. TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN LIVES 63

6.1INTRODUCTION 63

6.2STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL 63

6.3PARENTHOOD 67 6.4EDUCATION 69 6.5ECONOMIC AUTONOMY 71 6.6SOCIAL INTEGRATION 79 6.7CONCLUSION 86 7. CONCLUSION 88 7.1DISCUSSION 88 7.2CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 91

7.3RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 94

8. BIBLIOGRAPHY 95

ANNEX I: INTERVIEW FRAMEWORK 100

ANNEX II: TRANSPARENCY DOCUMENT 104

List of Figures

FIGURE 1KILCULLEN'S THREE PILLARS OF COIN ... 27

FIGURE 2A MAP OF THE ETCR(SOURCE:AGENCIA PARA LA REINCORPORACIÓN Y NORMALIZACIÓN,(N.D.))... 28

FIGURE 3AGUA BONITA,MONTAÑITA,CAQUETÁ ... 29

FIGURE 4MARIANA PAEZ,MESETAS,META ... 30

FIGURE 5CONCEPTUAL SCHEME (SOURCE:AUTHOR’S ELABORATION) ... 41

FIGURE 6THE BEGINNING OF THE LONG PATH LEADING TO AGUA BONITA ... 45

FIGURE 7THE SPATIAL ORGANISATION OF AGUA BONITA ... 48

FIGURE 8INDIVIDUAL LIVING IN AGUA BONITA ... 52

FIGURE 9EX-COMBATANTS AND CIVILIANS ARE GATHERED FOR A WOMEN’S CONVENTION IN AGUA BONITA ... 54

FIGURE 10A MURAL OF WELL-KNOWN FARC COMMANDANTS IN AGUA BONITA ... 57

FIGURE 11THE LIBRARY IN AGUA BONITA HOUSES RELICS OF THE FARC EX-COMBATANTS’ PAST ... 60

FIGURE 12MARIANA PAEZ ... 62

FIGURE 13LIVING CONDITIONS IN MARIANA PAEZ ... 66

FIGURE 14THE CHILDREN OF FARC EX-COMBATANTS ON THEIR WAY TO SCHOOL IN THE ETCR,AGUA BONITA ... 70

FIGURE 15ONIONS GROWING IN ONE OF THE PRODUCTIVE PROJECTS IN MARIANA PAEZ ... 73

FIGURE 16THE VISITORS’ RESTAURANT IN AGUA BONITA ... 74

FIGURE 17THE BAKERY (FOREGROUND RIGHT) IN MARIANA PAEZ ... 77

FIGURE 18THE BAKERY,AGUA BONITA ... 79

FIGURE 19EX-COMBATANTS WORKING ALONGSIDE CIVILIANS IN AGUA BONITA’S AGROECOLOGY WORKSHOP ... 83

FIGURE 20PEACE AND RECONCILIATION,AGUA BONITA ... 85

FIGURE 21AGUA BONITA –‘THE FIRST SOCIALIST TOWN IN COLOMBIA’ ... 86

List of Abbreviations

AB Agua Bonita (Caquetá)

ACR Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración

Colombian Reintegration Agency

ARN Agencia de Reincorporación y Normalización

Colombian Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation

AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia

United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia

CJ Compensatory Justice

COIN Counterinsurgency

DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

ELN Ejército de Liberación Nacional

National Liberation Army

ETCR Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación

Territorial Areas for Training and Reincorporation

FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia

Fuerzas Alternativas Revolucionarias del Común

The Alternative Revolutionary Forces of the Commons

JEP Justicia Especial Para la Paz

Special Justice for Peace

MP Mariana Paez (Meta)

ZVTN Zonas Veredales Transitorias De Normalización

1. Introduction

1.1 Context

Colombia’s history is fraught with conflict. The Colombian civil war, which lasted 52 years (Isacson, 2018) stands as the longest armed conflict in the Western Hemisphere (Theidon, 2007: 68). This war has been waged by numerous armed groups, including the military, paramilitary groups such as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), left-wing guerrilla groups such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the Fuerzas Armadas

Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), and multinational actors such as the USA, all fighting

over the country’s lucrative resources (Ibid.). It has resulted in the death of an estimated 260,000 people (Isacson, 2018), the majority of whom were unarmed civilians (Theidon, 2007: 68).

Founded in 1966 (Ibid.), the FARC constituted the oldest and largest guerrilla movement in Colombia (LeGrand et al., 2017: 260). The FARC was established as a Marxist rural self-defence group in response to La Violencia, a period of violent confrontations from 1948-1953 between the Conservative and Liberal political parties (Theidon, 2007: 68). The goal of the FARC was the defence of a peasant path to development (LeGrand et al., 2017: 265). It argued on behalf of the rights of the rural poor and in favour of much needed land reform within a socio-economic system of unequal land distribution wherein small

producers were seen to be discriminated against and marginalised in favour of the interests of urban elites (Ibid.). In the 1980s, right-wing paramilitary groups sought to establish their authority in rural Colombia where the FARC had a strong presence, resulting in territorial conflict between the armed actors (Ibid.). As a result, rural Colombia has been subject to massive displacement since about 1996 as armed groups, such as leftist guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries, have moved into these lands, dispossessing and displacing the local populations (Escobar, 2003). The conflict has led to the largest internal refugee crisis in the world, with over 2 million internally displaced people in Colombia (Ibid.: 157).

Colombia has a tradition of successful peace processes and demobilisations that did not bring the conflict to an end (Carranza-Franco, 2019: 8). Over the course of the 20th

demobilisations and processes of ex-combatant reintegration (Ibid.). These demobilisations often follow the international Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) peacebuilding framework where ‘Demobilisation’ refers to ‘the process in which armed organisations […] decrease in size or are dismantled as one component of a broad transformation from a state of war to a state of peace’ (Theidon, 2007: 71).

Various attempts were made to negotiate an agreement with the FARC through which they might demobilise, including those by Colombia’s conservative ex-President, Álvaro Uribe, between 2004 and 2007 (Carranza-Franco, 2019: 73). Juan Manuel Santos had been Uribe’s Minister for Defence and one of his main allies throughout his presidency (Ibid.). Once Santos was elected president of Colombia in 2010, he entered into secret exploratory dialogues with the FARC (Ibid.: 10). However, unlike Uribe who looked upon the FARC as a mere terrorist threat, Santos recognised the existence of an armed conflict and thus treated the FARC as a political actor, rather than a terrorist organisation (Ibid.: 73). These private conversations developed into official public negotiations between state officials and the FARC in Havana with the Cuban and Norwegian governments acting as international guarantors (Ibid.: 11). The negotiations lasted five years (Ibid.: 10) until, finally, on 24 November 2016, the Colombian conflict came to an end with the signing of the peace accord by the Colombian government and the FARC (LeGrand et al., 2017: 259-260).

The final peace agreement was not reached without various obstacles on the way, including the plebiscite’s rejection of the initial peace agreement by a very small margin (50.2%) (Ibid.). The FARC also rejected the traditional DDR route on the basis that the FARC handing in their weapons was not a symbol of their surrender or their plans to dismantle, but rather to transform into a new political structure that would allow them to continue their struggle in a legal and peaceful manner (Carranza-Franco, 2019: 12). So the FARC are not demobilising in the traditional sense. Additionally, the FARC sought a collective

reincorporation process contrary to the usual DDR approach of individual reintegration whereby ex-combatants are individually provided with reintegration incentives. As such, the term ‘reincorporation’ was to be used instead of ‘reintegration’ under the 2016 agreement (Ibid.). Lastly, the ACR, Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración (now the ARN), which managed DDR processes in Colombia, was created by Uribe’s government as a

counterinsurgent strategy to attack the guerrillas and favour the interests of his paramilitary allies undergoing demobilisation (Ibid.). Thus, unlike Uribe’s DDR process which was

security-oriented in the assumption that security would lead to development opportunities, Santos’ DDR has been negotiated as development-oriented as the government and the FARC agreed that the solution to the country’s security problems could not be solved by simply dismantling the guerrilla, but rather by addressing the causes of the country’s profound inequality (Ibid.: 82). With the 2016 agreement then, development is expected to provide a basis for the creation of security (Ibid.).

The peace process began its implementation in December 2016 when the FARC troops began their last military march out of the forest and towards the 26 concentration zones (Carranza-Franco, 2019: 11-12), the Zonas Veredales Transitorias De Normalización (ZVTN). These cantonment areas were created as temporary shelters to last for the 6 months of disarmament and registration of ex-combatants (Ibid.: 12). By March 2017, over 7,000 FARC guerrillas had moved to these ZVTN from their bases of support across 11 regions in Colombia (LeGrand et al., 2017: 260). After the successful disarmament process, which was completed in the ZVTN in June 2017 under UN international supervision (Ibid.), it became clear that the ex-combatants would not be returning to their areas of origin as had been expected as the vast majority (77%) had no place to live (Carranza-Franco, 2019: 12). So, some of the ZVTN were made permanent, and were renamed as Espacios Territoriales

de Capacitación y Reincorporación (ETCR) (International Organisation for Migration, 2017).

Since then, 3,700 of the original 7,000 FARC ex-combatants have been engaged in their process of reincorporation from within the ETCR. This process has not been without its complications, however. The ETCR were initially set to close in August of 2019, however their future remains uncertain. Many ex-combatants are leaving the ETCR due to the arduous living conditions therein, some to return to arms. This process has been further complicated by the election of conservative leader, Iván Duque into government in 2016, a fierce attacker of Santos’ peace process and one of the main leaders driving the “No” campaign urging the public to vote against the initial agreement.

1.2 Problem Statement

The Colombian peace agreement succeeded in putting an end to the country’s enduring conflict, as well as creating a framework through which ex-combatants who have been in

arms for up to forty years could reincorporate back into Colombian civil society. There is evidence, however, that the peace process and consequently the FARC’s process of reincorporation is failing in certain respects.

Since signing the agreement just two and a half years ago, the Colombian government has failed to fulfil many of the promises it made in 2016, including, most notably, the protection of former FARC combatants. This is reflected in the killings of many ex-combatants since their disarmament by various other armed actors, including the state police (“Protect Ex-FARC Members”, 2019). By failing to protect ex-combatants who have handed in their arms, the government risks losing the peace process entirely (Ibid.). Thousands of FARC members have already returned to arms, largely due to the

government’s failure to act on what it promised in the peace agreement (Casey and Rios Escobar, 2018). In addition, Colombia’s right-wing President Duque has been trying to dismantle the peace agreement and its institutions since his election last year (“Colombians Protest”, 2019). This includes efforts to reform the law around the Justicia Especial Para la

Paz (JEP), a key component of the 2016 peace agreement which sought to bring justice to

the country’s 50-year conflict (Ibid.). In theory, doing so would be a symbol of the

government’s failure to recognise the FARC as a valid political actor in the country’s conflict and grant them their due justice. This would call into question the labelling of the 2016 peace agreement as an “agreement” between equal players, rather than simply a document on which the FARC signed up to surrender their arms. The DDR process could then be

understood more clearly as a security mechanism, as it was under Uribe, than as method of development.

This is where the theory of counterinsurgency (COIN) can come in as a security strategy to give more clarity to Duque’s implementation of Santos’ DDR. The provision of compensatory justice by the government to the FARC in the ETCR would represent their recognition of the FARC as both a legitimate actor and victim of the conflict and their efforts to bring about a developmental process of DDR in turn. The FARC’s opportunities for

reconciliation within the ETCR can be interpreted in the same manner. The absence of these peacebuilding measures of compensatory justice and reconciliation in the FARC’s

reincorporation in the ETCR may be indicative of a process with more in common with COIN than DDR. So COIN will be pitted against these peacebuilding theories of compensatory justice and reconciliation to explore where DDR ends with regard to the FARC’s process of

reincorporation, and where COIN begins. In order to understand this process in its many minute variables, we must move beyond the bulk of literature which focuses on the macro-structures of DDR and deeper into the details of the process of reincorporation as it unfolds within the micro-spaces of the ETCR. I therefore suggest an exploration of the spatiality of reincorporation in order to identify the grey areas between processes of COIN and DDR.

1.3 Research Gap

The signing of the peace accord between the FARC and the Colombian government took place just two and a half years ago. The transfer of thousands of FARC guerrillas to the newly constructed ZVTN only happened in early 2017. So these are very recent political developments. Generally, literature around DDR has focused on Africa and Asia. While some research has focused on Colombia’s history of DDR, specifically on the DDR implemented during Alvaro Uribe’s presidency, given its recency, very little research to date has focused on the FARC’s peace process. It seems particularly pertinent to examine the current

implementation of this peace process within the ETCR under the management of right-wing Duque in order to understand its successes and failures within the DDR framework. To truly understand its implementation at a micro-level, an ethnographic study of the ETCR and the actors it involves will be necessary. The peacebuilding theories of compensatory justice and reconciliation can help us explore the FARC’s reincorporation as a process of DDR. However, by connecting these theories with that of counterinsurgency (COIN), we may begin to understand some of the shortcomings of this reincorporation process as a strategy of DDR. In particular, given the unusual spatiality of the ETCR, an exploration of the spatial

mechanisms of COIN can offer us some interesting insights into how the ETCR can be understood, not only as DDR spaces, but also as spaces of COIN.

Some analysts have already focused on the commonalities between the theories of DDR and COIN. There is also some existing literature which focuses on the spatial

mechanisms of COIN. However, the unique academic contribution of this thesis is its

examination of the spatiality of reincorporation and how that connects with the spatiality of COIN. In exploring these, this thesis aims to come to a clearer understanding of the current peace process in Colombia, and possibly of DDR processes more broadly.

2. Research Questions

2.1 Research Question:

How are the Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación (ETCR) shaping the process of reincorporation of FARC ex-combatants in Colombia?

2.2 Sub-Questions:

a) How are the ETCR affecting the de-militarisation of the FARC, and what impact is this process having on their cohesion as an organisation?

b) What impact does the spatial segregation of the ETCR have on relations between their FARC inhabitants and the local community?

3. Theoretical Framework

This section outlines the theories I will be employing to examine my data: compensatory justice, reconciliation and counterinsurgency. For each theory, I explain what it means, how it applies to my research, and how I operationalised it within my research. These are

elaborated on in more detail in my Operationalisation Table (see Annex III).

3.1 Compensatory Justice

Though ex-combatants have been perpetrators of often horrific violent acts, they can also be seen as victims of conflict (Rolston, 2007: 261). Often members of irregular forces have been motivated to take up arms at a very young age after witnessing the repression of their families and communities (Ibid.), as is frequently the case with FARC recruits. In other instances, rural Colombians chose to join the FARC due to a lack of alternative options. Many ex-soldiers believe they have done their duty as members of liberation forces (or in other instances, as defenders of the state), and thus expect their contribution to be officially recognised (Ibid.). Such is the case with the FARC whose battle was born out of political motivations to alter Colombia’s oppressive and exclusive political system. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in this sense can be understood more as a negotiation than a surrender on the part of the combatants. This understanding of DDR is evident in what Rolston labels ‘compensatory justice’ - the ex-combatants’ desire for recognition through governmental assistance (Ibid.: 262).

This assistance can take various forms, including monetary assistance, the provision of education or vocational training, basic services and infrastructure, and security

provisions. Some posit that compensatory justice measures can help prevent recidivism within ex-combatant populations. According to Humphreys and Weinstein, ‘through the provision of training and transfers of monetary compensation, DDR programs may alter the relative benefits and costs of engagement with a peace process and remove the incentives for spoilers to maintain organizational structures.’ (2007: 535). The Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) processes recommends the provision of a ‘transitional safety net’ which is a mix of in-kind and cash entitlements for combatants and their families to cover their basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing, health and education requirements (2006, Article 42:

24). These allow the combatant to survive and take care of their family while adjusting to their new civilian status (Ibid.). In the case of collective demobilisation, a military structure or ‘holding pattern’ is often employed to allow for the concentration of resources for a limited period of time while focusing on the basic needs of their inhabitants (Ibid. Article 44 & 45: 24-26). These structures are often referred to as cantonment sites (Knight and

Özerdem, 2004). Colombia’s Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación (ETCR) could be considered an example of such a cantonment site where the FARC ex-combatants receive economic assistance as they engage in a process of reincorporation (or

reintegration) back into Colombian society.

All ex-combatants engaged in a process of reintegration are tasked with the challenge of finding alternative methods of income generation and support since they no longer depend on the war economy for their economic subsistence (Rolston, 2007: 261). This is a demand for which most ex-combatants find themselves ill-equipped due to their absence from formal education or training during their time in arms (Ibid.: 261-263). The ex-combatants’ lack of credentials presents a significant disadvantage for them in the job market (Ibid.: 263). Equally, ex-combatants may face the further disadvantage of discrimination in the hiring process (Carranza-Franco, 2019: 122). Unemployed ex-combatants are often depicted as a security threat as, in the absence of other income-generating opportunities, it is posited that they are more likely to return to arms (Rolston, 2007: 263). Thus, DDR programmes may seek to address these issues by providing other forms of economic assistance, such as vocational training or support for the development of micro-businesses (Carranza-Franco, 2019: 122). Indeed, the UN has suggested that

education and training are the two quintessential strategies for achieving a successful long-term economic reintegration (Ibid.: 124). According to the International Peace Academy, for DDR programmes to be successful, ‘ex-combatants must be able to earn a livelihood

through legitimate means’ (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007: 534).

Where insurgent weapons are decommissioned early in the process of DDR, as was the case in Colombia, ex-combatants are likely to feel highly vulnerable and insecure

(Rolston, 2007), perhaps especially outside the cantonment sites or ETCR which may hinder their reintegration into society. In particular, ex-combatants often fear that those who are still active in their former military group could see them as deserters and thus come and attack where they are staying (Anaya, 2007). To address these feelings of insecurity among

ex-combatant populations, in some DDR processes the government may agree not to require them to fully disarm before the political terms of the peace agreement have been fulfilled (Rolston, 2007: 267). The provision of security measures for the ex-combatant population can also contribute to their sense of safety. However, in an institutionally weak environment, distrust of guarantees of protection among ex-combatants are common (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007: 535). This can hinder the process of disarmament (Ibid.).

In the literature around DDR programmes, there is debate over the extent to which economic reintegration programmes such as these can actually prevent ex-combatants from returning to arms. While the SIDDR recognises that these compensatory justice measures cannot guarantee that ex-combatants do not return to violence for personal reasons, they are critical to ensuring combatants´ need not return to the use of violence simply to survive (2006, Article 41: 24). Thus, the satisfaction of ex-combatants (including those in Colombia’s ETCR) is vital to the success of DDR programmes.

Where the state fails to deliver promised benefits to ex-combatants, political

disaffection may occur among the ex-combatant population (Rolston, 2007: 262). This could take the form of violent activities and rebellion from within the cantonment site which would undermine the peace process (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 508). However, often political disaffection may manifest itself as a threat to security rather than an actual violent uprising (Rolston, 2007: 262). Where political disaffection is present among ex-combatant populations, they will often play a double game of formal negotiations with the government while simultaneously reminding the government of the possible consequences of failed negotiations (Ibid.). These threats aid the bargaining position of the ex-combatants (Ibid.). In the case of cantonment sites, inadequate facilities could also motivate political disaffection amongst the site’s ex-combatant inhabitants (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 508).

If the presence of compensatory justice within the Colombian peace process can be understood as a symbol of the government’s recognition of the FARC as both a valid political actor and a victim, as well as a perpetrator of the Colombian conflict, then its absence can be interpreted as the government’s denial in this regard. Where compensatory justice is not present in a process of DDR, it begins to look less like a development-oriented example of DDR, based off a negotiation of peace, and more like a security-oriented strategy of counterinsurgency. My research thus took a look at some of the compensatory justice measures being taken by the Colombian government in the ETCR, with a focus on financial,

educational and security provisions as well as basic infrastructure and services with a view to coming to a better understanding of the orientation of the FARC’s process of

reincorporation within this security-development nexus, and thus where it might fall on the scale of COIN to DDR.

3.2 Reconciliation

Reintegration is the last stage in the international peacebuilding framework of DDR. Reintegration is often divided into three parts: economic, political and social (SIDDR, 2006, Article 40: 23). DDR programmes tend to place more emphasis on the economic or ‘hard’ developmental element of peacebuilding, while often ignoring the need to rebuild the social relationships which were destroyed in the conflict (Simpson, 1997: 475; Özerdem, 2012: 51; Carranza-Franco, 2019: 4). Without this focus on the social side of reintegration, post-conflict economic reconstruction is futile. As Simpson points out, ‘we can rebuild economic infrastructure, but political upheaval will destroy it again overnight’ (1997: 476). Özerdem goes as far as to label the social reintegration of former combatants the most important aspect of the DDR process, as well as the most likely guarantee for its long-term

sustainability (2012: 51; 60). The merit of social reintegration lies in its capacity to reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict by helping ex-combatants feel socially fulfilled and accepted by their communities, thereby reducing their need to maintain social connections with their former comrades in arms (Kaplan and Nussio, 2018: 133).

It is worth noting here that the term ‘reintegration’ with regard to Colombia’s peace process holds some political weight there. As mentioned in the Introduction, in the peace negotiations with the Colombian government, the FARC rejected the reintegration approach of the ACR, Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración (the Colombian Agency for

Reintegration) (Carranza-Franco, 2019: 102). Reintegration here refers to the method employed by the organisation throughout Colombian ex-President Uribe’s DDR (Ibid.). The reintegration of ex-combatants occurred on an individual basis (Ibid.). The FARC thus feared that the scheme of individual benefits might fracture their collective project (Ibid.). Instead, they came to an agreement with the government on the more collective strategy of

reincorporation which most ex-combatants are now following in the ETCR, though some chose to continue on the individual project of reintegration (Ibid.). The ACR thus was

transformed into the ARN, Agencia de Reincorporación y Normalización (the Colombian Agency for Normalisation and Reincorporation) (Ibid.). So, while I make liberal use of the term ‘reintegration’ throughout my thesis simply for ease of communication, I wish to acknowledge this important distinction between it and ‘reincorporation’ in Colombia.

Özerdem defines social reintegration as ‘the re-establishment of social ties between the former combatant and the community’ (2012: 59). Social reintegration is therefore more challenging in contexts where high levels of mistrust and fear of former combatants exist within the receiving community (Ibid.: 63). Armed conflict can generate feelings of resentment or even hatred towards the instigators in communities such as these,

particularly where the ex-combatants integrating back into these communities are tied to various atrocities committed there during the conflict (Ibid.: 64). Such is often the case in the communities surrounding the ETCR in rural Colombia where a large part of the conflict has played out over the past 50 years. Often the members of these communities will be victims of various atrocities carried out by the FARC in their towns. So, resentments towards the FARC may run deep there. It is in high-tension contexts such as these that bridges need to be built between the two war-affected groups in order for social reintegration to truly occur (Ibid.: 63). Lerche and Montville would argue that the construction of these

relationships between former adversaries occurs through a process of ‘reconciliation’ (2000; 1993).

Reconciliation could be defined as ‘the process of developing a mutual conciliatory accommodation between antagonistic or formerly antagonistic persons or groups. It often refers to a relatively amicable relationship, typically established after a rupture in the relationship involving one-sided or mutual infliction of extreme injury’ (Lerche, 2000: 62). The process of reconciliation can occur at various levels, from the individual to the more collective or public level (Ibid.). National systems of reconciliation, such as truth

commissions, tend to be more political (Ibid.: 66-67). They are often employed as a means of consolidating new democracies in post-conflict societies (Ibid.). Where reconciliation systems become more political, their effectiveness as a means of conflict resolution becomes less clear (Ibid.: 65). Given this and the micro-level focus of my research on the experiences of ex-combatants in the ETCR and civilians around it, I will just be exploring the theory of reconciliation at an individual level.

There are various methods of reconciliation between individuals from antagonistic populations. However, dialogue seems to be central to all of these methods. Lederach promotes reconciliation as a systems approach to conflict which focuses attention on the dynamics of relationships within the conflict system, ‘reconciliation must be proactive in seeking to create an encounter where people can focus on their relationship and share their perceptions, feelings, and experiences with one another, with the goal of creating new perceptions and a new shared experience’ (Lederach in Lerche, 2000: 62). Fisher, who supports a method of Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) believes an ‘adequate degree of genuine dialogue’ is crucial to reconciliation (Fisher in Ibid.). Montville argues that when it comes to conflict resolution, constructive communication between representatives of groups in conflict can help de-legitimise stereotypes about the enemy by introducing new cognitively dissonant information that may challenge that stereotype (1993: 113). For this, he promotes problem-solving workshops between members of both groups which facilitate dialogue and gradually lead to mutual confirmation and rehumanising (Ibid. 114-115). Montville introduces with a quote from Thich Nhat Hanh, a Vietnamese Zen master, ‘reconciliation is to understand both sides, to go to one side and describe the suffering being endured by the other side, and then to the other side, and describe the suffering being endured by the first side.’ (Ibid. 115). Dialogue, as the engine of relationships, is the necessary tool to bring about reconciliation of this nature.

Different theorists measure successful social reintegration in different ways. Indeed its definition and measurement tend to be a bit hazy. In an effort to give clarity to this murky concept, Kaplan and Nussio de-limited and operationalised social reintegration as the social participation of ex-combatants in the communities where they settle (2018: 147). Civic participation is an important element of both political and social reintegration of ex-combatants as, firstly, it gives them access to community decision-making mechanisms and, secondly, it creates significant opportunities for social cohesion by placing the

ex-combatants in frequent contact with other community members through civic institutions and groups (Özerdem, 2012: 67).

Other theorists, such as Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) and Özerdem (2012) adopt a broader understanding of social reintegration to refer to community acceptance of ex-combatants. Crucial to this social acceptance is both the community’s willingness to welcome the ex-combatants as well as the willingness of the ex-combatants themselves to

reintegrate into the community (Ibid.: 62). While civic participation can play an important role in the construction of social cohesion, given the importance of dialogue in the

realisation of reconciliation, I would argue that processes of social reintegration can include multiple other means of social cohesion outside the formal structures of civic participation. Thus, while including civic participation within my interpretation of social reintegration, I will adopt a broader understanding of the concept akin to that of Özerdem or Humphreys and Weinstein which allows for the inclusion of day-to-day reconciliatory activities, such as polite small-talk. These passing interactions can help ex-combatants overcome two of the greater challenges to their social reintegration: security and discrimination (Carranza-Franco, 2019: 113).

One of the points of critique of cantonment sites such as the ETCR is their isolation of the ex-combatant community from the population into which it is meant to be

integrating (Knight and Özerdem, 2004: 508-509). So it is easy to imagine how the ETCR may actually inhibit rather than create opportunities for reconciliation between these two

groups. Spatial segregation such as this is apparently more intuitive to a strategy of

counterinsurgency than one of DDR. Given the importance of reconciliation in the process of DDR, this spatial segregation, and its motives, should be called into question. My research thus specifically explored how the spaces of the ETCR affect the social reintegration of FARC ex-combatants by providing or preventing opportunities for reconciliation with the local communities. Specifically, it focused on reconciliation through dialogue and mutual confirmation which may occur via daily social interactions, problem-solving workshops or via official interactions through civic participation.

3.3 Counterinsurgency

According to the U.S military field manual, an insurgency is ‘an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.’ (Kilcullen, 2010: 1). The same manual then defines counterinsurgency (COIN) as ‘the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.’ (Ibid.). In other words, COIN can be understood as an umbrella term to refer to whatever action governments take to defeat rebellions (Ibid.: 2). While the military strategy of COIN dates back to the Vietnam War, the COIN doctrine as we

know it today arose out of the US army’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan where, unlike conventional wars, what the army faced was an insurgency (Friis, 2010: 50). As Friis

underlined, ‘in an era of insurgencies, guerrilla tactics and terrorism, even the most

powerful army in the world has to reconsider its approach’ (2010: 51). It became clear that traditional kinetic or offence military strategies alone would no longer be sufficient to defeat the enemy (Ibid.: 50). Thus, the COIN doctrine was born.

According to Kilcullen, the influential soldier-scholar and ‘counterinsurgency guru’ (Khalili, 2011: 7), in order to survive and push their agenda, insurgents require the support of the population (2010: 7-8). ‘Without access to a mass base, an insurgent movement suffocates, so cutting the insurgent off from the population is a critical task in

counterinsurgency.’ (Ibid.: 8). For this reason, where traditional warfare was enemy-centric and thus emphasised the killing of combatants, COIN is population-centric (Khalili, 2010). The counterinsurgent seeks to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population to persuade those who may be likely to support the guerrillas into acquiescing with the

counterinsurgents (Ibid.; Wong, 2017). With COIN, the welfare of civilians is prioritised over killing the enemy (Kilcullen, 2010: 4). Violence against non-combatant civilians and the collateral damage brought about through traditional full-fire warfare are kept to a minimum in counterinsurgent strategies, not simply for moral reasons but also because they are counterproductive to the aim of gaining popular support (Ibid.). That is not to say that killing is not still an inevitable part of COIN (Kilcullen, 2006: 3). But with regard to

counterinsurgencies, it can be said that ‘the more force you have to use, the worse the campaign is going’ (Ibid.). The strategies employed to win over the population are comparable and compatible with compensatory justice measures applied within the framework. This is a clear example of how DDR and COIN strategies and goals can align.

So, the way that counterinsurgents then succeed in destroying the enemy is not necessarily by killing them but by marginalising them, starving them of support and by controlling the population (Ibid.). This population control is not achieved through

unquestioned dominance, but rather by ‘achieving collaboration towards a set of shared objectives’ (Ibid.). This method of population control requires the categorisation of the population into combatants and non-combatants or those who can be considered ‘low-risk’ or ‘high-risk’ (Khalili, 2010: 9). However, in modern warfare where guerrilla tactics tend to be employed, identifying the enemy can be one of the greatest challenges (Stepputat, 2018:

112). According to Trinquier, a French Army officer who was trained in COIN tactics in Algeria, ‘in order to efficiently drive a war and win, it is vital to define and precisely locate the adversary to whom we are opposed […] [But] in the modern war [read here guerrilla], the enemy is [….] difficult to define. No material border separates the two camps. The limit between friends and enemies goes right to the heart of the same nation, the same village, sometimes the same family’ (Trinquier in Ibid.). Because of this, space plays an important role in COIN.

3.3.1 COIN and Space

According to Khalili, the spaces and subjectivities ordinarily considered collateral to the main job of war-fighting in traditional warfare are central to the work of COIN operations (Khalili, 2010: 3). The sites of counterinsurgency are usually civilian spaces that are walled off (figuratively or literally) as a sub-section of battle-space to form ‘a grid square that can be more easily pacified’ (Ibid.: 8). Stepputat carried out a study on the COIN strategy employed by the Guatemalan army in the early 1980s whereby it used the transfer and concentration of rural populations in nucleated settlements or camps to reassert control over the national territory and defeat the armed insurgency (2018). Turner and Khalili have both focused on the spatial COIN strategies employed in the Israeli occupation of Palestine via the mass resettlement of the Palestinian population (Turner, 2015; 2017; Khalili, 2010). Focusing on these two examples of counterinsurgency in practice can tell us a bit about how space can be employed as a mechanism of COIN and how these strategies in turn might relate back to Colombia’s Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación (ETCR) where the FARC are engaged in a process of reincorporation.

According to Lefebvre’s theories on space, space is a contested rather than fixed category which is shaped by conflictual political, economic and social forces (Lewis et al., 2018: 495). As such, space isn’t just the theatre in which conflict plays out, but is also a resource employed by conflicting actors to their advantage (Ibid.) As a result, the state can view space as a resource which could be used by rebels or insurgents to impose their normative order on the population, thus strengthening their discursive appeal to a wider community (Ibid.). In order to prevent this, the re-centring of political space in the state is often a central objective of conflict management (Ibid.). In the case of Guatemala, the army

sought to reclaim zones of insurgency through the delimitation of what De Certeau has called its ‘own “proper” place’ (Stepputat, 2018: 112). From this ‘own space’, the actor in question can build relations with a distinct exteriority or the “Other”, as well as use the space to survey and control this exteriority (Ibid.).

Firstly, to determine who was the “Other”, the Guatemalan army carried out a series of massacres on rural villages. These attacks gave the army the opportunity to reorganise these conflict zones and thus ‘separate the good from the bad’, or its followers from its enemies (Ibid.: 119). The population was thus dichotomised and spatially segregated into those who were categorised as being with the government, living in closed, surveyed spaces which later developed into ‘model villages’ and those who were against it and lived in the jungle or el monte (Ibid.). A similar method of population control through identification and categorisation was employed in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) through the mass resettlement of civilians in enclosed spaces under watchtowers (Khalili, 2010: 425). ‘Own spaces’ such as these may be further segregated through the implementation of a security perimeter, army checkpoints or even walls (as was the case in the West Bank) around them (Stepputat, 2018: 125; 1999: 62; Khalili, 2010: 425). These techniques also serve as another method of population control. In addition, identities often come to be attached to spaces which can lead to the formation of a collective identity within spaces. However, when identity and place come to be linked in this way, differences from those outside these constructed places are (re)produced and a ‘politics of difference’ is mobilised (Jazeel, 2009). So in spatial COIN strategies such as in Guatemala and the oPt, for the populations living within these enclosures, over time a ‘politics of difference’ with those outside these spaces i.e. the insurgent population is likely to have mobilised. In this way, the counterinsurgents succeed in segregating the non-combatant population from the insurgents both physically as well as through the creation of identity politics. With this is mind, when we consider the ETCR which effectively spatially segregate the ex-combatant population from the civilian one, their constitution seems counter-intuitive to their supposed end goal of

reincorporation. If reconciliation is seen as a vital part of social reintegration and therefore DDR, the presentation of opportunities for reconciliation is then contrary to the objectives of COIN. This is an example of how the DDR and COIN doctrines can, in fact, contradict one another.

Foucault, in his work on the birth of the prison has studied how enclosures serve to contribute to the identification, categorisation and spatial exclusion of “othered”

populations from the sites of normal interaction to prevent them from spreading their ideological differences (1977). Thus enclosures such as Guatemala’s ‘model villages’ or the Palestinian resettlements not only serve to categorise and exclude the insurgent from the rest of the population, but they are also organised so as to allow for the identification of the “Other” within these spaces. As De Certeau wrote, ‘the division of space makes possible a panoptic practice proceeding from a place whence the eye can transform foreign forces into objects that can be observed and measured, and thus control and "include" them within its scope of vision.’ (1984: 36). For this purpose, spaces can be reorganised to permit what Foucault calls an ‘internal, articular and detailed control’ (1977: 172). Such was the case in Guatemala where the villages were reorganised to allow for greater surveillance (Stepputat, 2018: 125). This involved the nucleation of houses around an urban centre as well as the removal of vegetation between houses (Ibid.). Spaces were made similarly legible in

Palestine. The entire inhabited area of the occupied territories was mapped and each house was assigned a numeric designation (Khalili, 2010: 426).

According to Foucault, this reorganisation of abstract spaces to enable their

hierarchised surveillance can also be used to discipline those within (1977: 170-172). In this sense, spaces such as the Guatemalan and Palestinian enclosures can also be understood as disciplinary spaces. This is perhaps unsurprising when we consider that the underlying rationale of COIN is to instil acquiescence in the population and ensure their control (Turner, 2015: 76-77). Thus, the Guatemalan army combined spatial organisation tactics with processes of subjectivation to create civilised and docile subjects in the non-insurgent population (Stepputat, 2018: 110). These subjectivation processes included disciplinary techniques, such as ideological talks and inclusion in economic activities (Ibid.: 122). Through these, the population was impregnated with ideals of the civilised world to aid their transition or ‘rite of passage’ from the subversive space of the jungle to the civilised space of the village (Ibid.: 124). By creating these new acquiescent subjectivities, the army sought to prevent dissidence from within the enclosures. This process of domestication and the docile political subjectivities which emerge out of it could be compared with the similar transition to civilian life the FARC ex-combatants are undergoing in the ETCR as they adapt to life outside the jungle.

The corollary of these counterinsurgent spatial practices is that the spatial

segregation of inhabitants of enclosures or camps can lead to the formation of a collective identity therein. Space plays an important role in the construction of this collective identity. Gupta and Ferguson argue that the connection between identity and place is not a natural given, but rather a social construction tied to historical processes (1992: 16-17). This

imaginary connection between identity and place is known as ‘place-making’. In the absence of a “home”, displaced populations such as the FARC in the ETCR are likely to engage in this process of place-making by attaching themselves to these imagined places, thus

constructing a collective identity therein. (Ibid.). The Guatemalan army was acutely aware of this and therefore deliberately mixed people from different areas to include at least five language groups so that Spanish became the mandatory language in use (Stepputat, 2018: 126). This strategy undermined the possibility of the creation of a common identity among the residents (Ibid.). In fact, there was very little community cohesion within Guatemala’s ‘model villages’ (Ibid.). However, in the case of Palestine, the opposite can be seen to be true. The Israeli occupation and mass displacement of the Palestinian people has led to the development of a transcendent Palestinian national identity which continues to lead the oPt’s anti-colonial struggle (Bisharat, 1994). Within enclosures such as camps, collective identities can be cemented through the shared experiences, conditions and limitations of the space (Ibid.; Stepputat, 1994). Communities may forge this identity by constructing a shared history or envisaging a common future (Ibid.). Recycled symbols and practices of the past contribute to this feeling of solidarity amongst enclosure inhabitants (Ibid.). While a collective identity already exists among FARC ex-combatants prior to entering the ETCR (Anaya, 2007: 184), it is possible that these practices of identity politics could serve to cement this identity and result in the production of new subjectivities which could be mobilised for political ends.

3.3.2 COIN & DDR

This thesis is not pioneering in its comparison of theories of counterinsurgency and peacekeeping, of which DDR can be considered an example framework. However, considering the striking similarities between the doctrines of the two theories, there is a surprisingly small amount of literature comparing them (Friis, 2010: 49). Indeed both

doctrines have the same ultimate objective of stability, though differences could surely be picked out in their mandates (Ibid.: 50). As Kiszely highlighted, in the context of the modern war where ‘war and peace are not easily delineated; “defeat” and “victory” require

definition. The enemy is not obvious, nor easily identifiable, literally or figuratively, and may change on an almost-daily basis’ (Kiszely in Ibid.: 51). Thus, as counterinsurgents continue to move away from the use of kinetic force to achieve their goals, the strategies of COIN and DDR can be seen to more closely align (Ibid.: 51). In fact, the 2009 US Government

Counterinsurgency Guide which argues for the primacy of non-military means of warfare actually argues that ‘[t]he capabilities required for COIN may be very similar to those required for peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, stabilization operations, and development assistance missions.’ Kilcullen himself categorised the social reintegration of combatants, such as through DDR, under the political pillar of counterinsurgency (see Figure 1) (2006: 5). Even within the context of Colombia, COIN and DDR have been previously connected. As mentioned in the Introduction, the DDR framework

instrumentalised by Colombian ex-President Uribe in the early 2000s is often labelled as ‘a form of counterinsurgency strategy to attack the guerrillas and to favour his paramilitary allies’ (Carranza-Franco, 2019: 12). Thus, the theories of DDR and COIN already have some overlap.

However, drawing the theories together can be a helpful tool of analysis. Turner explores this overlap in her study of the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) (2015; 2017). Arguably, for the peacebuilding efforts in the territory to have succeeded in their mission of conflict resolution they would have delivered a viable Palestinian state, which they haven’t (Ibid.). Thus peacebuilding in the oPt can be seen as a failure (Ibid.). However, Turner argues that if this Western donor-led peacebuilding is instead understood as a form of

counterinsurgency whose goal is to secure the population, peacebuilding in the oPt has actually been largely successful (Ibid.). Thus, viewing peacebuilding as counterinsurgency allows us to comprehend policies or practices that seem contradictory when explored through the ‘self-proclaimed benign peacebuilding lens’ (Turner, 2015: 74). With this in mind, as well as the apparent overlap between the ETCR and the counterinsurgent spaces constructed in both Guatemala and Palestine, my research determined to explore the FARC’s process of reincorporation in the ETCR through the theoretical lens of spatial counterinsurgency. Specifically, I examined the continuities between the FARC’s

reincorporation in the ETCR and the spatial COIN strategies employed in Guatemala and Palestine, as well as the new subjectivities which arose out of them. I also employed some of the theories of space and identity politics mentioned above to explore how the ETCR are shaping this process of reincorporation, according to the FARC ex-combatants themselves.

4. Methodology

This section firstly provides an outline of my research location. Then I have detailed the units of analysis and methods employed in my research. This is followed by a reflection on the quality of the methodology I employed as well as its limitations and ethical

considerations. Lastly, I have included the conceptual scheme which seeks to demonstrate how the theories I have employed interact with my research.

4.1 Research Location

I carried out my research in three locations. Initially, while in Bogotá, I had the opportunity to interview several ex-combatants. However, my research was primarily focused on two

Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación (ETCR). The names I employ to

describe these throughout my thesis are the names I came to know them by in my time in the ETCR. However, many of the ETCR have several names which may relate to their location, their official title or the name the FARC has given them.

The first ETCR I visited was Agua Bonita (AB) in the province of Caquetá in the south of Colombia, not far from the Ecuadorian border (located at number three on the map above). The closest town to it is Montañita, although it is also relatively close to the town of Paujil and not far from the province capital of Florencia. Caquetá, which borders the Amazonas region, has been one of the more conflict-ridden areas of Colombia over the last fifty years. In the area surrounding AB, there has been very little conflict since the signing of the peace agreement. However, further into the province, towards the south-east, there remain a number of armed actors engaged in conflict, primarily over narco-trafficking routes. The climate in region is tropical, so it is prone to heavy rains and extreme heat.

Figure 3 Agua Bonita, Montañita, Caquetá

The official title of the other ETCR I carried out research in is ‘La Guajira/ Buena Vista’ (located at number ten on the map above). However, the ex-combatants have named it Mariana Paez (MP) after a female commandant of the FARC. This is the name I call it by throughout this thesis. It is located in the province of Meta in the south-east of Colombia, above Caquetá. The nearest town to the ETCR is Mesetas, however it is not far from the city of Granada or the province capital, Villavicencio, slightly further afield. Like AB, the area

surrounding MP is now relatively free from conflict. However, further south in Meta, towards the area of La Macarena, there remain a number of armed actors at bay. Given its mountainous location, the climate in this region is temperate and rainy.

Figure 4 Mariana Paez, Mesetas, Meta

4.2 Unit of Analysis

My research has two main units of analysis. The primary unit of analysis in my research is the FARC members engaged in a process of reincorporation from within the two ETCR I studied. The vast majority of these FARC members were ex-combatants, meaning they had spent a considerable amount of time as a guerrilla in ‘el monte’1_{. However, some had} transferred to the ETCR as FARC urban militias and had therefore spent limited time in el

monte. I also interviewed some FARC members who are now living in Bogotá, rather than

the ETCR. My second unit of analysis is local civilians who live in the communities

surrounding the ETCR. Additional interviews and informal conversations with employees

1 _{El Monte’ - the term often used by the FARC to refer to the location or period in which they lived as}

from ECOMUN, the Agencia de Reincorporación y Normalización (ARN), the Arando la

Educación programme and victim’s organisations provided context around the FARC’s

process of reincorporation.

4.3 Methods

I employed a combination of deductive and inductive processes to developing the theory around my research data. I entered the field with three theories which helped me to

structure my research process. These included counterinsurgency (COIN) and compensatory justice. The third theory I intended to look at related to the government’s promise to carry out regional development under the peace agreement. However, upon entering the field it became clear that my research focus was too broad for the scope of my study and would have to be narrowed down to exclude my focus on regional development around the ETCR. The reading I did around these theories, combined with my reading around the ETCR and the Colombian context more generally, shaped the criteria of my research which are outlined in my Operationalisation Table (see Annex III). Upon returning from the field and analysing my data, these criteria were updated to exclude those which no longer seemed relevant and include the few I had discovered as being central to my question on the field. These criteria allowed me to critically reflect on the conceptual scheme I developed before entering the field and identify the gap in my data for a theory relating to reconciliation. Further coding and analysis of my data via Atlas TI allowed me to explore where my theories fell short in explaining my data. These shortcomings were manifold as COIN as a military strategy is not a typical theory employed in examining DDR processes. However, identifying these theory gaps also helped expand my conception of theories such as COIN and allowed me to draw closer connections between it and DDR. On the field, I had intended to loosely employ my conceptual scheme so as to avoid being overly led by my theory and thus misinterpreting my data. However, as it turned out, when I returned to my theory after analysing my data, the criteria I had established prior to entering the field were, in fact, highly relevant to the data I collected on the field.

According to Creswell, ‘the intent of ethnographic research Is to obtain a holistic picture of the subject of study with emphasis on portraying the everyday experiences of individuals by observing and interviewing them and relevant others’ (2009: 196). I chose an

ethnographic approach to my research in order to gain an in-depth understanding of how the FARC and the communities who surround the ETCR understand these spaces and their role in the process of reincorporation. The methods I chose are typical to ethnographic research: semi-structured in-depth interviews, participant observations and document analysis.

4.3.1 Semi-structured Interviews

Interviews allowed me to gain a deep understanding of the process of reincorporation in the ETCR from those who are living it and pick out key themes emerging from the language they use which might contribute to peacebuilding and Counterinsurgency (COIN) research. Before entering the ETCR, I created an interview framework (see Annex I) which I followed loosely throughout my research. I adapted this to the ex-combatants’ reality throughout my research, eliminating questions which no longer seemed relevant, and probing further on subjects which did. I had planned to interview more civilians than I did. This was largely due to the fact that once in the ETCR, leaving and entering proved difficult. However, the

interviews I did succeed in getting with local civilians were very useful in providing me with an alternative perspective on the conflict and the FARC’s process of reincorporation, as well as granting me some crucial insights into their process of reconciliation with the

ex-combatant population. These interviews were generally more opportunistic and impromptu, so they were based loosely around the ex-combatant interview framework. The same applied with the other more contextually-focused interviews I had with employees from the

Agencia de Reincorporación y Normalización (ARN) and the Arando la Educación

programme. These interviews provided greater detail around specific areas of the process of reincorporation, such as the ex-combatants’ education and productive projects, as well as providing me with the official or institutional perspective on the process.

These interviews were transcribed on the field and upon returning from my fieldwork with the help of a local student in Bogotá. I then used Atlas TI to code my transcripts. This coding process led to the discernment of two clear phases in the reincorporation process which formed the basis of how I organised my data into my empirical chapters.

4.3.2 Participant Observation

Participant observation is almost synonymous with ethnographic research and is thus a crucial component of it (Bryman, 2012). Throughout my research, I kept a small notebook where I jotted down observations I had made or conversations I had heard throughout my time in the ETCR. These observations were limited by the language barrier I encountered on the field, which I develop on further in my ‘Limitations’ section.

In addition, I kept a fieldwork diary which I would write in every day at the end of the day, reflecting on my observations throughout the day. It was here that I kept thick

descriptions of events as well as of the ETCR spaces themselves. This took the form of a personal diary and was thus very helpful in jogging my memory of everyday details I would have otherwise forgotten when it came to the stage of data analysis upon returning from the field. Both my observations and my fieldwork diary were manually coded and added to the data I collected via interviews. These notes were supplemented with photographs I took on the field.

4.3.3 Document Analysis

Throughout my time on the field I kept up to date with developments in the Colombian peace process via local and international media outlets. These allowed me to shape my research on the field according to recent developments which were impacting the lives of the ex-combatants in the ETCR. Before entering the ETCR, I employed reports from the UN and other institutions on the situation therein to inform my interview framework. Since returning from the field, I have continued this process of discourse and document analysis on NGO and UN reports, as well as current and historic media reports. These have been a useful fact-checking resource and an effective tool in triangulating the data I gathered from my interviews.

4.3.4 Sampling

According to Goodhand, when carrying out research in conflict zones it is best to employ a flexible methodological framework which can be adapted to on-the-ground realities

upon the security and access limitations which exist around them as I elaborate on below. Thus, my case study selection was primarily based on convenience, although it was

purposive in the sense that once I had studied the highly-organised AB, I specifically sought out a more typical ETCR case study – that of MP.

My research participant sample was selected via the typical qualitative method of purposive sampling in that I specifically sought out the FARC ex-combatant population within the ETCR, as well as civilians from the areas surrounding the ETCR for the goals of my research (Bryman, 2012:418). In this way, I sampled on the basis of who would be relevant to interview to answer my research question (Ibid.). Within these targeted populations, given the limited time available to me in the ETCR, my interview participants were sourced through a combination of opportunistic and snowball sampling, either by striking up a casual conversation with them (opportunistic) or through previous participants connecting me with friends or contacts of theirs who share similar experiences (Ibid.: 424). These qualitative sampling methods are recommended in the absence of a sampling frame (Ibid.).

4.4 Methodological Reflections

4.4.1 Quality Criteria Assessment

Given that this research project was entirely qualitative in nature, in order to reflect on the quality of the research, I have elected to examine it through the lens of Guba and Lincoln’s four trustworthiness quality assessment criteria (Bryman, 2012): credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability. While Guba and Lincoln also assess studies on the basis of their authenticity, given the small scope and constrained temporal and financial resources available for this research project, its wider political impact will be limited. I elaborate on these methods, as well as how I analysed the data they generated here.

Credibility

In order to ensure that my interpretation of the social reality of FARC ex-combatants within their process of reincorporation is credible, I used a process of triangulation. The primary data I collected via semi-structured interviews was triangulated with NGO and UN reports,

as well as national and international press coverage of the ETCR and the peace process more broadly.

Transferability

The specific socio-political context in which my research is set and the subjective nature of qualitative research in general, set within the worldview of the researcher, limits the replicability of my research. However, my research design and conceptual approach to understanding peacebuilding processes could be transferred to other locations for future research. The thick descriptions I have supplied in my empirical chapters will be helpful as a context against which future research projects could be compared.

Dependability

Included in the annex of this thesis is an outline of the plan for the semi-structured

interviews used as the primary source of data collection. Additionally, a transparency report including details of all interviews and participants, in as far an anonymity concerns allowed, was submitted to the University of Amsterdam who then carried out an auditing process on these records to ensure their validity. This can be found in Annex II of this thesis.

Confirmability

Confirmability refers to the researcher’s efforts to not overtly allow personal values or theoretical inclinations to sway the conduct of their research, while recognising that complete objectivity is not possible in social research (Bryman, 2012: 392-3). The personal values I have which may have impacted my research, as well as how I tried to counteract these is addressed in more detail below in the ‘Limitations’ section of this thesis. With regard theoretical inclinations, from my reading around theories of COIN before entering the field, my impression of the process of reincorporation of ex-combatants within the cantonment sites of the ETCR was a negative one. In order to avoid theoretical inclinations swaying the conduct of my research and thus the findings that derive from it, I continually adapted the original interview structure as I learnt more about the experiences of the ex-combatants and determined which were more relevant to their reality, rather than projecting my own perceptions onto their reality. Equally, I aimed to avoid any leading questions which might provoke specific answers aligned with my theoretical framework.