The Dynamics of Technologies and
International Relations
Approaching U.S.-China Cyber Negotiations from a Technological
Endogenous IR-analysis
Olivia Lin S1217992
Leiden University
MSc Crisis & Security Management Supervisor: Dr. Vlad Niculescu-Dincă Second reader: Dr. Els de Busser Words: 21.016
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Dr. Vlad Niculescu-Dincă. He was always open for any questions and his quick feedback allowed me to produce this thesis. I would also like to thank my sisters Xiaoqing Vogelaar-Lin and Xiaodan Lin for their feedback and Christie Ebeling for her unconditional support and understanding in the process of writing this thesis. This accomplishment would have not been the same without them. Thank you.
Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations ... 5
1. Introduction ... 6
2. Theoretical Framework ... 8
2.1 International Relations and Technology ... 8
2.2 Traditional IR Theories ... 9 2.2.1 Realism ... 9 2.2.2 Liberalism ...10 2.2.3 Constructivism ...10 2.3 Approaches to Technology ...11 2.3.1 Technological Instrumentalism ...11 2.3.2 Technological Essentialism ...13 2.3.3 Social Constructionism ...16 2.4 Hybrid Approaches ...17 2.5 Herrera’s Framework ...18 3. Methodology ...21 3.1 Research Design ...21 3.2 Methods ...22 3.3 Operationalisation ...26
3.4 Validity and Reliability ...27
4. U.S.-China Cyber Negotiations’ Context ...29
4.1 Step 1 Identifying the Socio-Technical System ...29
4.1.1 Defining Cyberspace ...29
4.2 Step 2 Interaction Capacity ...34
4.2.1 Conceptualisation of Technologies ...35
4.2.2 U.S.-China Cyber Negotiations ...38
5. U.S.-China Cyber Negotiations’ Dynamics...42
5.1 Regulation and Control ...42
5.1.1 Internet Sovereignty ...42
5.2 Knowledge Bases ...45
5.2.1 Information Sharing ...45
5.3 Trust and Security ...52
5.3.1 Confidence Building Measures ...53
5.4 Insights ...55
6. Way Forward...57
6.2 Limitations ...58
6.3 Recommendations...59
Bibliography ...62
APPENDIX A: Analysis of Selected Documents ...72
1. China ...72
2. U.S. ...81
List of Abbreviations
CAC Cyberspace Administration of China CBMs Confidence Building Measures
CICIR China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations CPC Communist Party of China (CPC)
CSIS Center for Strategic & International Studies (U.S.) DHS Department of Homeland Security (U.S.)
DoD Department of Defense (U.S.) DoJ Department of Justice (U.S.)
EC European Commission
EU European Union
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation
ICT Information and Communication Technology IP Intellectual Property
ISP Internet Service Provider IT Information Technology IR International Relations
LECD Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue NCSS National Cyberspace Security Strategy (China) NSS National Security Strategy (U.S.)
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs SCOT Social Construction of Technology STS Science and Technology Studies
UNGGE United Nations Group of Governmental Experts
UN United Nations
U.S. United States
1. Introduction
Recent malicious cyber operations, such as WannaCry and NotPetya, have shown that cyberattacks are able to significantly influence the daily lives of individuals by disrupting critical infrastructures such as hospitals, ambulances, and banks (“Ransomware cyber-attack threat escalating”, 2017). The advanced integration of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) into societies have not only created new ways of interaction and influenced both individuals’ lives and the system of international system positively, it has also given room for malicious use of such technologies.
As there has been a lack of internationally agreed behaviour on cyberspace regarding such operations, several initiatives to reach a more stable cyberspace have been established that are predominantly based on multilateral collaboration. The United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) is a well-known example, but the initiative failed to reach a consensus in June 2017 while its prior attempts have been more successful (Sukumar, 2017). Even though the involvement of a vast number of actors in such initiatives is desirable, a lack of consensus may also be more likely in such cases, which in turn influences the outcomes of collaborations negatively (Jurrjens & Sizoo, 1997, p.34). Moreover, research on such cooperation mechanisms have primarily been approached from a deterrence perspective (such as Harold, Libicki & Cevallos, 2016). In these approaches, technologies are conceptualised exogenously from the international system, in which technologies are not part of the field of international relations. While such deterrence approaches are valuable given their attempts of explaining international relations, they did not significantly contribute to the achievement of a consensus benefiting the stability of cyberspace as the ongoing malicious use of cyberspace shows.
Given that bilateral agreements might be a more effective tool in achieving a stable cyberspace (Bund & Pawlak, 2017, p.1) and have more potential in establishing political binding agreements that have greater effects in the longer term when they involve more powerful states, this thesis will elaborate on cyber negotiations between the United States (U.S.) and China. A strong consensus between both countries regarding cyberspace will add pressure on the issue and might evoke other countries to commit to bilateral cyber negotiations as well. It is particularly interesting to research the relationships between both states because of President Trump’s perception on cyberspace (Lafrance, 2016) and President Xi’s ambitions on becoming a major actor in cyberspace (Xi, 2017, p.27).
In an attempt to approach the bilateral negotiations from an alternative perspective that might lead to a better overall and mutual understanding in each states’ position regarding cyberspace, which in turn might contribute to achieving consensus benefiting cyberspace stability, this thesis proposes a technological endogenous approach to International Relations (IR). In doing so, the research focuses on the role of technologies in an IR context, in which technologies are endogenous to the international system, and makes use of Herrera’s framework (2003) on technological transformations and change in the international system. The research will answer the following explanatory research question:
“How is the role of technologies conceptualized in the dynamics of the U.S.-China
negotiations on cyberspace?”
To help answering the main research question, the thesis will be guided by several sub questions:
(1) Who are the most prominent actors in the history of cyberspace and the Internet? (2) How is the relationship between technology and the human agent perceived in
the U.S. and China?
(3) What were previous cyber negotiations and how have they shaped U.S.-China relationships?
Overall, chapter 2 starts with the theoretical framework in which traditional IR theories, technological approaches, and Herrera’s framework (2003) will be discussed. After the third chapter on the methodology, the thesis applies Herrera’s framework to the case under study in which the sub questions will be answered in chapter 4. Subsequently, the main research question will be discussed in chapter 5 after which the way forward is addressed in chapter 6.
Apart from an extension in the academic literature regarding the role of technologies in IR in general, this research offers an alternative perspective in the U.S.-China cyber negotiations. Moreover, the research will benefit society as it might lead to inspirations in approaching and achieving more consensus in international cyber dialogues, which in turn will lead to more stability in cyberspace. Due to the indispensable relevancy of the area and its high impact on society, this thesis will contribute to an ever-evolving field that is of crucial influence on international security.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1 International Relations and Technology
In this chapter, the thesis will map dominant approaches in conceptualising the role of technologies in the field of IR, and posits why these approaches alone are limited when examining the role of technologies in the case under study. As the combination of IR and technology is a field that is relatively new, it is useful to address this comprehensive field in order to give the reader a more insightful impression on the developments and applicability of this research, especially as the relationship between technologies and IR is generally thought of to be obvious but is in reality rather under-theorized within IR theory (Herrera, 2002, p.93; McCarthy, 2015, p.2).
In general, analyses involving international relations are predominantly approached from a deterrence perspective, including mutual threats in a national security context which are mostly carried out to prevent action (Schelling, 2008, p.x). One of the most common used definitions of politics, “who gets what, when, how” (Laswell, 1936) is inherently based on the distribution of property and power. This view is also shared by Mearsheimer, (2001) who posed that technological resources are often taken as a measurement of the effective power of states. Moreover, Morgenthau (1946) posed that technological development was both productive and destructive (as cited in McCarthy, 2015, p.2), stressing the impact technologies might have on societies and the international system. These scholars conceptualise technologies in terms of material resources and power. More importantly, these conceptualizations treat technologies as an exogenous factor to the international system, which is also done by traditional IR theorists (Herrera, 2003, p.562).
This thesis posits a more holistic approach in analysing the dynamics in the U.S.-China negotiations on cyberspace. Before turning to particular technological approaches in which various forms of how technologies are treated in IR contexts are discussed, traditional IR theories will be reflected on first in order to position this thesis more clearly in the IR field.
For clarification, the concept of ‘technologies’ used in this thesis includes Information Technology (IT), ICT, and the broader cyberspace in general. The ‘international system’ includes the field of international relations and politics, in which states act and interact with each other in various ways. These concepts will not be under further discussion and are analysed in a ceteris paribus manner.
2.2 Traditional IR Theories
Existing IR theories treat technologies as an external factor. Overall, they do not reflect on technologies, such as cyberspace, but rather approach those from a specific theme such as security or governance. This section examines realism, liberalism, and constructivism, and how they conceptualise technology.
2.2.1 Realism
Realism is primarily state-centred and focuses on their struggle for power and national security in a world of anarchy. Due to the lack of a higher authority, states strive to maximise their security to survive. This focus on self-help and state security creates a situation in which the distribution of power is central within the international system.
In general, realists interpretate the use of technologies by states as an advancement of their protection and security (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.7). In the security realm, it is the dominant paradigm as theories such as deterrence can be used for the analysis of a stable cyberspace, and “whether cyber technologies will be a new source of conflict or of peace” (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.7). Moreover, Drezner (as cited in Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.11) poses that state interests determine outcomes in international cyber governance. He focuses on the governance of cyberspace, separating international politics from technology.
Neorealism, in particular, conceptualises technologies as a force which is able to redistribute power in the system. Waltz (as cited in Herrera, 2003, p.568) poses that military technologies are able to increase military capabilities. Moreover, Goldman (2004) and Newmyer (2010, as cited in Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.20) both perceive information technology as a contribution to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in which IT enhances the military power of states. Whereas Goldman (2004) poses that technology is primarily an ‘efficiency-booster’ to states with mature military capabilities, Newmyer (2010) perceives it as a tool in warfare that is advantageous to weaker actors (as cited in Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.21). The nature of states evokes competitive responses from which a shift in the distribution of power in the international system might follow. As the evolution of technologies is not explained, they are treated exogenously but nevertheless are able to influence international politics.
2.2.2 Liberalism
Liberalism is mainly focused on institutions and their ability to influence the behaviour of states. Different from the perspectives of realists, states are not central to liberalists and are influenceable by civil society.
Liberalists perceive technologies as a way of influencing the behaviour of states in the international arena (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.7). Moreover, liberalist theories help explain the spread of ideas and the development of civil society with the use of cyberspace (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.7). To Alden (2003), the differences among and within states in relation to information technology might be perceived as a form of imperialism that only benefits the wealthy (as cited in Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.16). Other liberalist scholars, such as Corrales and Westhoff (2006), argue that it is “the degree to which a regime is economically inward- or outward-looking that determines the strategy it uses toward adopting cyber technology” (as cited in Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.19). All such scholars have adopted positions highlighting the separation between technology and the international system.
Neoliberal institutionalism, in particular, conceptualises technology as a means which is able to benefit cooperation and reduce costs (Keohane, 1984 as cited in Herrera, 2003, p.568). Here, technologies are able to impact cooperation between actors and therefore the set-up of the international system, but technologies are still treated as an exogeneous factor (Herrera, 2003).
2.2.3 Constructivism
Constructivism focuses on the socially constructed aspects of international relations instead of the material aspects that realist and liberalist theories emphasise. As structures in the international system are based on ideas that are subject to change, constructivists pose that the international system in itself is changeable as well.
Constructivists therefore see technologies as an empowerment tool that is able to transform the international system (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.9). Der Derian (2003), for instance, poses that the combination of technology and the September 11 attacks in 2001 have transformed the national security discourse (as cited in Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.22). The interaction between technology and the international system is further elaborated on through a constructivist perspective by Dartnell (2003) who perceives cyberspace “as a medium through which powerful messages can promote change in individuals’ identities and therefore reshape political boundaries and actors” (as cited in Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.23). While ideas are
not able to threaten military structures, they are able to destabilize the international system by changing notions on threat and safety (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.23). These scholars show that constructivists find technologies important but still treat them exogenously as they conceptualise them in terms of tools and measures.
Different from realists and liberalists, constructivists perceive the field of IR and the role of technologies as fields that interact and co-influence each other. Even though it makes less strict separations between the materialistic world that is created by technologies and the social world, which both realism and liberalism do more obviously, technologies are not theorised by constructivists (Herrera, 2003, p.569). They still conceptualise them exogenously, although in less extreme forms than realists and liberalists do.
2.3 Approaches to Technology
In general, three ‘forms’ of approaching the role of technologies in relation to IR can be distinguished. Two dominant forms include technological instrumentalism and technological essentialism, which are determinist approaches to technology (McCarthy, 2015, p.19). These determinist approaches consider that technological developments determine society and the way humans live their lives (Niculescu-Dincă, 2016, p.41). Moreover, they attribute to technology “a rationale beyond human sociality and historical processes” (McCarthy, 2015, p.20).
2.3.1 Technological Instrumentalism
Technological instrumentalism conceptualises technologies as neutral artefacts and deny a path-dependency of such artefacts. In this approach, the technological artefact does not in themselves produce consequences but change rather arises from actions of the end-user (Scolve, 1995, as cited in Niculescu-Dincă, 2016, p.39) and their use of the objects (McCarthy, 2015, p.21). The human agency is dominant in this approach in which technologies are passive and obedient to the user (Niculescu-Dincă, 2016, p.40). Consequences can therefore be ascribed to the user since technologies remain neutral. However, users of technologies are responsible for actions that involve technologies as they are tools used by human agents for a certain goal. Here, instrumentalists position the human agent as privileged with regard to technologies and conceptualise the potential of technologies equally to how human agents use technologies (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.7).
A widely used example of this approach to technology in IR is the use of weapons, which are in themselves not inherent offensive or defensive, but only serve such purposes when they are used by human agents in either manner (Jervis, 1978; Leber, 2000, as cited in McCarthy, 2015, p.21). Concerning the use of cyberspace, the instrumentalist perspective does not ascribe to it a role of stimulating democracy or oppression. Because of the neutral nature of technological objects, it is the human agency who decides to make use of such technologies and for which goal they are used. They decide to go towards either more cooperation or conflict and use technologies as an instrument in doing so.
While the human agent is central to instrumentalists, they disregard human influence in the development of technologies. Here, technological development and design is often related to “an unavoidable progress” as “technology moves forward in virtue of its internal dynamics” (Niculescu-Dincă, 2016, p.40). Moreover, the responsibility of users in the use of technologies is particularly stressed, thereby ignoring the socio-political context of technological developments (Niculescu-Dincă, 2016, p.42). Even though humans are rational animals, they can be subject to social and political dynamics in relation to technologies. Concerning the design of technologies, the approach also ignores social interaction among human agents, their environments, and the organisations and state they are situated in. Furthermore, the instrumentalist approach suggests that the means of technologies are not able to influence ends or outcomes, and stress “agency in the use of technology but not in their design and creation” (McCarthy, 2015, p.27). The view of technology as being neutral in their nature inherently treats it as an exogeneous factor to the international system, and “limits a full grasp of the nature of power in global politics” (McCarthy, 2015, p.26).
In an IR context, the instrumentalist perspective conceptualises the human agent as the dominant factor who can be ascribed full responsibility for the established international order. As technologies are neutral, it is not technologies that have created opportunities for states to interact and to perform international politics but the human agent who have used technologies as means in doing so. For instance, the non-use and non-existence of the Internet for North Korean citizens is enforced by its regime and is a choice made by the human agent, embodied by the regime. The instrumentalist view poses that the situation will remain that way until the agent would decide differently. Simultaneously, the human agent does not have a role in influencing the development of the Internet, and no changes can be made concerning the technology to adapt it to the wishes of the North Korean regime.
This perspective of conceptualising technology is however inadequate in an IR context as it disregards the influence of the human agency in the development of technologies, regardless of its dominance in using technologies. To relate back to the example of weapons, its designers might have developed the mechanisms with an intention: to be able to use them for offensive or defensive purposes, which is essentially a social purpose. In addition, technological advancements have created opportunities to move to better designs for weapons to use them in offensive or defensive ways. Consider the development towards more technically advanced weapons over time, which was driven by a combination of social factors in both the development and use of weapons. As populations desired better ways to defend themselves and to overrule the opponent in war-like situations, human agents sought better designs of these technologies in order to use them more efficiently and effectively.
2.3.2 Technological Essentialism
Different from technological instrumentalism, technological essentialism conceptualises technologies as path dependent and biased instead of inherently neutral. Technologies are privileged in respect to its users, who are rather subject to technological transformations (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.10) and are not free to use technological objects. This approach argues that technological artefacts are inherently powerful and are able to cause social change (McCarthy, 2015, p.29), and to act independent of society (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.3). Rather than being neutral, as instrumentalists argue, technological objects inherently carry characteristics that cause change and lead to definitive outcomes (McCarthy, 2015, pp.20, 29).
In general, technological essentialist literature can be divided into two strands: the so-called optimists, who pose that ICTs lead to more democracy in IR, and techno-pessimists, who pose that ICTs lead to more oppression (McCarthy, 2015, p.29). The optimists argue that it is not the use of technological objects by human agents that spread democracy, but the technology itself. The pessimists, however, stress power as a form of domination (McCarthy, 2015, p.30). For instance, Der Derian (2003, as cited in McCarthy, 2015, p.31) poses that ICTs structure human agencies as the technologies “have overcome our ability to interpret events”, excluding the human agent, and therefore impose that “effects are beyond human control” (McCarthy, 2015, p.31). It is not human action anymore that causes change but rather technology itself.
Other IR scholars, such as Keohane and Nye (1998, as cited in McCarthy, 2015, p.22), pose that IT in particular have played a dominant role in “changing the nature of the
international system”. As technologies have set a context of “increased information flows and thus increased transparency, pushing state interactions towards more cooperative forms” (Keohane, 2002, p.10, as cited in McCarthy, 2015, p.23), they changed “the nature of power in the international system (…)” and diffused “power to a larger number of actors in the international system” (Nye, 2010, as cited in McCarthy, 2015, p.23). Heidegger (1977, p.9) goes further by posing that technologies are overtaking the social world as human agents have become objects of technologies.
Similar to technological instrumentalism, the essentialist approach poses that human agents are not able to change the internal dynamics of technological developments (McCarthy, 2015, p.30). The influence of the human agent is however diminished in many aspects as it is technologies that are dominant in determining outcomes. While it poses that human agents are important as they are “bearers of technological structures”, they are not able to change the structures (McCarthy, 2015, p.32). Technologies are therefore not neutral and regulate the state of being in all contexts. Furthermore, the essentialist approach also conceptualises technology as a separate field from the human agent, treating technology as an exogeneous factor rather than as part of the international system. Moreover, it denigrates the human agency and to what extent it is able to determine outcomes.
In an IR context, the essentialist perspective conceptualises technologies as the dominant factor driving change in the international system. It is cyberspace, for example, that creates opportunities for states to interact and to perform international politics. It is not the human agent that decided it would make use of cyberspace to create such interaction opportunities, but the technology itself that has determined the outcome of opportunities due to its biased nature.
An example of this approach in the conceptualisation of technology in an IR context involves a YouTube interview with then President Obama in 2015, in which he said the following about North Korea: “We will keep on ratcheting the pressure, but part of what’s happening is that…the Internet, over time is going to be penetrating this country…And it is very hard to sustain that kind of brutal authoritarian regime in this modern world. Information ends up seeping in over time and bringing about change, and that’s something that we are constantly looking for ways to accelerate.” (Foster-Carter, 2015). In his statement, Obama adopts a clear technological essentialist view in which he subscribes a dominant position to technology, to which human agents have minimal influence. This essentialist view is limited
as it does not acknowledge the power of the human agent in diplomacy or of influencing the situation regarding North Korea, which the instrumentalist approach overemphasises.
The technological essentialist view of conceptualising technology is however inadequate in an IR context as it disregards the power of the human agency in both the development of technologies and the freedom to use them by overemphasising the position of technologies. Despite of the overwhelming possibilities of technologies and its presence in many aspects of life, the human agent is able to make rational decisions. When considering the historical context of the development of technologies, which essentialists do not incorporate, in relation to rational choice, as in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, it is clear that the human agent is able to influence its use of technologies. The Cuban missile crisis involved a situation in which the confrontation between the United States and the then Soviet Union reached a momentum in which a nuclear war could be an outcome if human agents did not influence the situation by acting rationally. While technologies have contributed to efficiencies in war-like situations or may have created scenarios that would not exist without technologies, such as the nuclear elements in the Cuban missile crisis, the human factor is still able to influence the outcome as they decide to commit to the use of nuclear weapons. Both technologies and human agents are therefore a factor in the dynamics of the international system. The determinist approach to technology is not able to explain these dynamics adequately due to its exogenous conceptualisation of technologies.
The discussed determinist approaches to technology can be associated with more materialist theories including forms of realism and liberalism as discussed above (Herrera, 2003, p.567). They are inadequate for analysing the role of technologies in IR for several reasons. First, they treat technology as an exogenous factor to the social world or disregards this context overall. Both technological instrumentalism and technological determinism separate technologies and the international system. Second, technological determinism separates technology from values. Whereas, essentialists pose that “the meaning of technology is pre-determined”, instrumentalists posit that technologies are answers to the needs of societies (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.14). Third, both approaches stress the use of technologies in particular and do not focus on the development of technologies and the human influence on the development, which is equally relevant when assessing technologies. Fourth, the historical dimension is not significantly discussed in the determinist approaches and rather obscured by depicting technologies as a progress (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.12). For instance, instrumentalists
conceptualise technologies as means of which human agents defines its outcomes, and its history can therefore “be defined as the adaptation of such means to society’s needs and a resulting increase in human agency” (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.12). Essentialists, however, conceptualise the emergence of technologies as “adaptive responses to the limits of existing systems through a kind of evolution” (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.12). Though different, both approaches do not elaborate further on the history of the development of technologies and rather treat it as given.
All in all, the determinist approaches fail to include social, political or historical dimensions and contexts of technology. Accordingly, they are inadequate for assessing the relationship between IR and technologies, especially as IR is inherently build on developments in those dimensions. Moreover, the international system includes various perspectives and human values, and technologies are usually designed in different contexts and places throughout the world. As these designs might have various consequences for different groups (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, p.15), it is necessary to take the development of technologies into account. The lack of focus on this aspect stress that determinist approaches alone are inadequate for analysing the role of technologies in IR contexts.
2.3.3 Social Constructionism
A third form of approaching technology makes use of the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) perspective, which is also called social constructionism or social determinism, and is part of Science and Technology Studies (STS).
This approach can be positioned in between technological instrumentalism on the one hand and technological essentialism on the other hand as it includes path-dependency of technologies but also acknowledges human influence in the development of the artefacts (McCarthy, 2015, p.33). Different from the determinist approaches to technology, this form approaches the relationship between IR and technological development by encompassing the social construction of technologies (McCarthy, 2015, p.32), and can therefore be perceived to be the closest to traditional constructivist IR theory. Both approaches pose that the social world is created by human agents, their interests and choices (Herrera, 2003, p.572). Whereas traditional IR constructivism focuses on the construction of social identities and how they construct actor behaviour, SCOT focuses on social forces who construct technologies and does not dwell on the effects of those social forces on technologies (Herrera, 2003, p.567).
In SCOT, technology is designed and developed by multiple actors that are each able to give and adopt various meanings to the object (Niculescu-Dincă, 2016, p.44), stressing an ‘interpretive flexibility’ of technologies (Herrera, 2003, p.573). Importantly, both the use and development of technologies are “culturally contested processes, shaped by social, ethical and political choices” (Niculescu-Dincă, 2016, p.43). This form treats technology rather as a social process in which technology is entrenched in the social environment and conceptualises technologies in ways where human values are built into (Hamilton & Friesen, 2013, pp.10,14).
The main difference of this SCOT approach from the technological determinist approaches is that technology is inherently part of the international system and is not treated as an exogenous factor to the system (McCarthy, 2015, p.33). Instead of an exogenous context, technological development rather takes place in social and historical contexts, relating to these contexts as the development carries on (McCarthy, 2015, p.33). Moreover, the process of technological development is non-linear, and its outcome is a combination of several political decisions that have been made along the way (McCarthy, 2015, p.33). As Herrera (2006, p.34-36) notes, the use of technological artefacts by human agents have been constructed by earlier technological developments, and thus by prior political decisions. The human choice and interest has developed and shaped new technologies, during which the aspects of innovation have been well thought of (Herrera, 2003, p.572).
Social constructionism conceptualises technology differently than technological determinism and proposes a more endogenous approach to technologies. SCOT alone is however inadequate in analysing the role of technologies in IR. While they emphasise the role of human agents in the design of technologies, they try to explain the development of technologies without discussing the implications and effects of them in detail (Herrera, 2003, p.573).
2.4 Hybrid Approaches
Several authors have proposed alternative approaches on conceptualising technologies, that include both technological determinist views and SCOT. For instance, Feenberg (2002) poses that technology is not neutral or a unique object. With his critical theory of technology, he argues that technological objects embody in their design the purpose for which they are built, and thus are able to guide or push development in a specific direction (McCarthy, 2015, p.152). Moreover, Feenberg “overcomes the unnecessary dualism between instrumentalism and essentialism – or structure and agency – via his understanding of technological artefacts as
‘biased but ambivalent’” (2002, as cited in McCarthy, 2015, p.152), meaning that technologies can push the international system into certain directions but are not fully independent from the human agency. He bridges the gap between determinist approaches and social constructionism by absorbing elements of both approaches into his theory.
Herrera (2003) proposes a social-technical approach which integrates both technological determinism and SCOT, intending to strike a balance between SCOT and technological determinism (Herrera, 2003, p.580). Defining technologies as “socio-technical systems” in which they are both social and technical products, he poses that technologies possess characteristics that are socially originated (SCOT), create social effects (technological determinism), and are formed by human agents and their interests (SCOT) while simultaneously resisting these human intentions (technological determinism) (Herrera, 2003, p.575). Moreover, Herrera (2003, p.573) argues that technologies can have political effects as they are able to create or close off political action mechanisms thereby creating definitive outcomes. Simultaneously, such technologies consist of choices and interests of human agents including underlying reasons that have been subject to their creation (Herrera, 2003, p.575).
Based on these assumptions, Herrera (2003) has developed a framework that proposes a form of analysis in which cases can be researched in an attempt to describe the relevancy of technology to international politics. As Herrera’s work forms a “central reference point” in the research of technologies and IR theory (McCarthy, 2015, p.36), this thesis will apply Herrera’s framework in the analysis of U.S.-China cyber negotiations connecting the role of technologies and the international system in a holistic approach. Before turning to the methodological chapter, the next section will elaborate on Herrera’s framework.
2.5 Herrera’s Framework
In this section, the thesis addresses an alternative perspective in approaching technologies in an IR context, in which technological transformations and change in the international system are connected in Herrera’s framework (2003, p.559). He can be classified as a scholar of the constructivist school as he regards technology as inherently political in which “the construction of technologies is subject to political contestation and technology can be understood as a certain kind of practical knowledge, embedded in material artefacts and in the institutions built to manage them” (2003, p.559). Technology is not exogenous to the international system, but rather systemic and political (Herrera, 2003, p.562), and must be perceived as part of the system
itself. Simultaneously, technology forms states within the international system, and the international system in itself.
This constructivist view is different from realist theories who can explain states’ use of technologies in terms of security and response (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.6), or liberalist theories who pose that accessibility and control of cyberspace might shape the behaviour of states (Reardon & Choucri, 2012, p.7). Moreover, Herrera advocates an indeterminate view of technologies and poses that “the technology and the politics are inextricably intertwined” (2002, p.93). Furthermore, he poses that integrating socio-technical systems into IR theory creates new ways of perceiving technologies in an IR perspective (Herrera, 2003, p.580), of which the effects will be drawn upon in this thesis.
In his framework, Herrera (2003, p.584) proposes two steps in analysing the relationship between technological change and IR to better understand the connection between both fields. Whereas Herrera centralises technological change in general, this research focuses on technological change in context of Sino-American negotiations and its dynamics instead.
The first step focuses on the development of internationally relevant technologies and their dependence on various domestic and international factors (Herrera, 2003, p.584). In this step, the emergence of the socio-technical system within the international system is being identified (Herrera, 2003, p.586). It explores the international context of the developing system including the important players and their interests and objectives (Herrera, 2003, p.584). In other words, technologies are conceptualised as politics, in which the development of technologies are subject to political deliberations (Herrera, 2003, p.560). Similar to the SCOT approach as described above, Herrera (2003, p.560) poses that technologies are political because political debates influence the construction, and thus the development, of technologies.
The second step focuses on the political impact and maturation of the identified technological system (Herrera, 2003, p.586). This step makes use of the argument of Buzan and Little (2000) on interaction capacity, in which technology is conceptualised as a crucial part of the international system (as cited in Herrera, 2003, p.561). In that sense, the capacity of actors to interact is not just part of the actors themselves but is part of the system (Herrera, 2003, p.561). Here, technology has a significant role in the set-up and composition of the capacity of actors to interact in the international system (Herrera, 2003, p.561). It is technologies that are able to determine the interaction capacity of the international system. This
thesis will analyse this interaction capacity at the level of the bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and China.
Herrera’s framework has been developed for the understanding of technological change in the context of IR and system transformation. This thesis makes use of the foundations of the framework but applies it in a different way in order to analyse how technologies are conceptualised in the dynamics of the U.S.-China negotiations on cyberspace. Like Herrera, it will discuss the development of the socio-technical system, cyberspace in particular, in the first step. The second step involves the interaction capacity and the political impact of the socio-technical system, but this research will in particular analyse how the states under discussion conceptualise technologies and what U.S.-China cyber negotiations have followed from the political impact of the system. Subsequently, it will research the dynamics of U.S.-China cyber negotiations in which a technological endogenous IR-analysis is applied that is inspired by Herrera’s framework. Whereas Herrera (2003, p.559) “draws attention to political debate over the shape and content of a global information infrastructure” this thesis will particularly draw attention to the bilateral negotiations on cyberspace between the U.S. and China, proposing an alternative approach in analysing the role of technologies in the identified context. Before applying Herrera’s framework and the technological endogenous IR-analysis to the case under discussion, the methodology of the research will be discussed in the next chapter.
3. Methodology
3.1 Research Design
This thesis makes use of the adequate research strategy selection as identified by Yin on the basis of three criteria: form of research question, whether the research requires control of behavioural events, and whether the research focuses on contemporary events (Yin, 2003, p.5). It is clear that the form of the research question includes a ‘how’ question and that it is not required to have control over the behavioural events, such as the negotiations under discussion, during the research. Moreover, the case under study includes contemporary events, but also historical events which have to be addressed in order to answer the main research question. As direct observation of the events is not part of the research and primary sources of the negotiations are relatively well documented and accessible via the Internet (Yin, 2003, p.8), this research makes use of a case study research strategy.
This research involves a qualitative holistic case study design in which the unit of analysis is the conceptualisation of technologies in an IR context, and the unit of observation are the U.S. and China. Their negotiations on cyberspace comprise the case under study. Not only does a case study gives deeper insight into the process of the subject under study, it also allows for a more intensive research (Lijphart, 1971, p.691).
The decision to examine the case under study is made for various reasons. First, the negotiations offer a setting in which the intersection of the international system and technologies becomes clear. Second, the subject of these negotiations, cyberspace, is a contemporary and dynamic issue which is continuously under development. Third, the negotiations involve the U.S. and China who are major players in both the international system and cyberspace who can influence the behaviour of other actors in the system. Fourth, the states under study are based on different political systems and cultural values, which makes it interesting to analyse and compare each state’s conceptualisation of technologies.
The research is deductively conducted, in which Herrera’s framework is used to answer the main research question and to offer an alternative perspective on the specific field. In chapter 4.1, sub question 1 will be answered in the first step of Herrera’s framework in which an overview of the historical aspects of cyberspace, and in particular the Internet, is given. In the second step of Herrera’s framework, both sub question 2 and 3 will be answered. In chapter
4.2.1 sub question 2 is explored by analysing selected documents with the operationalised concepts as elaborated on further in this methodological chapter. Sub question 3 is explored in chapter 4.2.2, in which an overview will be given on previous and current cyber negotiations and their outcome documents, and how they have shaped U.S.-China relationships. Chapter 5 will apply a technological endogenous IR-analysis to the case under question and answers the main research question. Section 3.2 will further elaborate on the specific methods in conducting the research.
The possible limitations of the research include documents that are not available to the public and therefore cannot be subject to the research. These might include classified information or documents that are only shared with those directly involved with the negotiations. As not all information can be found via open source, this might limit the quality of the research. Moreover, the conceptualisations of technologies by both states under study include opinions and positions that may be subject to change. If these positions change during the analysis or at the publication of the research, this will have consequences for the reliability of the research. However, the validity and replicability of the research will not be affected in such a case even though the analysis could be different. Section 3.4 elaborates on both the validity and reliability of the research.
3.2 Methods
To collect the relevant data that is needed to answer the sub questions and main research question, various documents have been selected. This process has included document analysis, in which the researcher has reviewed the relevancy of various documents based on the subject under study. The analysis of the research and the application of the framework are described as clearly as possible so that the research is replicable using the same or different sources.
To understand the dynamics in the U.S.-China cyber negotiations, this thesis will include a short analysis of the existing system of cyberspace and its historical aspects, as Herrera (2003, p.579) has argued for, which is necessary when explaining the effects of the cyberspace. This is conducted by answering the first sub question in section 4.1. In doing so, academic articles are part of the analysis from which relevant information is selected in order to provide an overview of the most prominent actors in the history of cyberspace.
In addition to the proposed framework of Herrera, this thesis will analyse how both the U.S. and China conceptualise technologies. This is conducted by answering the second sub question in section 4.2.1. In doing so, various documents have been selected that would provide a good overview of the position of the state under question. The aim was to find a relatively equal number of sources which were of equal importance, including legislation, an important presidential speech in an official setting, another speech which is less official, and a national strategy on cyberspace. By including these sources of various origins in the analysis, the way the states under study conceptualise technologies are well represented, and therefore more reliable as the analysis does not rely on only one type of source. Moreover, the maximum timeframe of the selected documents has been set to 2,5 years. This means that only documents that are not older than 2,5 years have been selected so that this research can be considered to be contemporary.
For China, these included the following five documents: (1) Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China (Cybersecurity Law of China, 2016). This legislation was selected as it is the most recent Chinese legislation on cyberspace; (2) President Xi Jinping’s speech during the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Xi, 2017). This speech was selected as the National Congress of the CPC is one of the most prominent events in Chinese politics and can therefore be perceived as relatively equal of importance to the State of the Union; (3) President Xi’s speech at the 2018 Boao Forum for Asia (Xi, 2018). This speech has been selected as this keynote speech of the President has stressed technologies in an economic perspective, providing an interesting view of China on cyberspace; (4) China’s Strategic Thinking on Building Power in Cyberspace (Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), 2017). This CPC journal’s article outlines Chinese thinking on cyberspace and is therefore relevant for this analysis; (5) National Cyberspace Security Strategy (NCSS) (CAC, 2016). This strategy has been selected as it represents the general view of China on cyberspace. For the U.S., these included the following six documents: (1) Presidential Executive Order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure (The White House, 2017b). This executive order was selected as it is the most recent U.S. executive order on cyberspace and the closest to legislation; (2) President Donald Trump’s State of the Union speech (The White House, 2018). This speech was selected as the State of the Union is one of the most prominent speeches in which the President of the U.S. addresses the members of Congress and other Americans; (3) The first Trump-Clinton presidential debate (Lafrance, 2016). This debate is under study as it is one of the few debates
in which Trump openly and specifically talks about cyberspace; (4) National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) (The White House, 2017a). The NSS is selected as it represents the general security strategy of the US. As the U.S. position on cyberspace is addressed in the NSS, this document has been selected; (5) National Defense Strategy of The United States of America (U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), 2018). As the U.S. has published several strategies in which cyberspace is mentioned, their defense strategy has been selected as well; (6) Command Vision for US Cyber Command (U.S. Cyber Command, 2018). The U.S. Cyber Command has recently published a new vision regarding its position on cyberspace. This document has been selected due to its specific focus on the U.S. position on cyberspace.
All sources have been found by using the online searching engine Google and the online University Library, in which relevant documents or speeches of both the U.S. and China relating to technologies and cyberspace have been searched upon. The selected U.S. documents comprise of one executive order, one official speech, one debate, two national strategies and one vision. The selected China documents comprise of one law, two speeches, one party journal article, and one strategy. These have been selected as these documents contained clear positions of the state regarding cyberspace or are important to include, such as the State of the Union of the U.S.
To answer sub question 2, content analysis has been applied in which technology related sentences of the selected documents, as discussed above, have been identified that include one of the indicators as set out in section 3.3 of this chapter, after which the sentences are categorized as technological instrumentalism, technological essentialism or SCOT (see appendix A). These concepts indicate the way the U.S. and China conceptualise the relationship between technology and the human agent. This type of analysis offers the data which is needed to answer the sub question and indirectly the main research question. In order to refer more easily to these documents, they will be referred to as ‘selected documents’ from here on.
For the third sub question, previous and current U.S.-China negotiations on cyberspace have been shortly discussed. They include four different negotiations, of which some have several sequences. As some have been called dialogues, this research will refer to them either as negotiations or dialogues from here on. The dialogues under study will include the following negotiations: (1) the track 1.5 U.S.-China Cybersecurity Dialogue which has been held by the U.S. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) and the China Institutes of
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), of which nine to eleven sequences have taken place; (2) the Obama-Xi agreement; (3) U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogues on Combating Cybercrimes and Related Issues, of which three sequences have taken place; (4) the U.S.-China Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue (LECD).
In order to answer the main research question, chapter 5 will analyse various outcome documents of the four distinguished negotiations as mentioned above. These include the following documents: (1) the Joint Statement that has been published by the track 1.5 U.S.-China Cybersecurity Dialogue (CSIS & CICIR, 2012); (2) the Obama-Xi Agreement (The White House, 2015), of which the cybersecurity agreements are under research only; (3) three Joint Summary of Outcomes by the U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogues on Combating Cybercrimes and Related Issues (U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2015; 2016a; 2016b); and (4) Summary of Outcomes of the first LECD (U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), 2017). In order to refer more easily to these documents, they will be referred to as ‘outcome documents’ from here on.
On these six outcome documents a content analysis has been conducted, of which overlapping themes were distinguished. These include: (1) Regulation and Control, of which internet sovereignty is a subtheme; (2) Knowledge Bases, of which information sharing and Intellectual Property (IP) are subthemes; and (3) Trust and Security of which Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) is a subtheme. These themes could only be distinguished based on the six outcome documents of the negotiations under discussion. By relating those selected themes to the eleven selected documents of the U.S. and China that have been under study in the second sub question, it was possible to conduct a technological endogenous IR-analysis, which essentially analyses technologies from an endogenous perspective in relation to IR. Here, technologies are not conceptualised exogenously from the international system but are rather perceived to be existent in the international system, and thus endogenously, in which technologies and IR co-influence each other.
Sub question 1 and 3 will give the reader more understanding of the setting and context of the research. To answer sub questions 2 the thesis will analyse to what extent the concepts of technological determinism and SCOT are applied in the selected documents under analysis. In doing so and in support of the technological endogenous IR-analysis, the next section will operationalise these concepts.
3.3 Operationalisation
The definitions of the concepts under study have been discussed in more detail in the theoretical framework. This section therefore only explains how the concepts of technological instrumentalism, technological essentialism and SCOT are measured in the research.
The indicators as defined in the table below are measured in the selected documents as discussed in the section above. One of these indicators should be addressed in these selected documents in order to be qualified as one of the operationalised concepts. These concepts are approaches that can be separated from each other. Moreover, the indicators are aspects of an approach which cannot be part of a different approach. Therefore, the research is internally consistent.
Table 1 Operationalisation
Concepts Indicators Sources
Technological Instrumentalism
- Human agent is perceived to be dominant in using the artefact
- Human agent is responsible for actions
- Human agent cannot influence the development of the artefact
- Technologies are perceived to be neutral
Selected documents
Technological Essentialism
- Human agent is subject to biased technologies - Technologies are responsible for actions
- Human agent cannot influence the development of the artefact
- Technologies are able to cause social change and definitive outcomes
Selected documents
SCOT - Technologies are developed by human agents
- Human agent makes choices about how and what to innovate
- Technologies and its effects are shaped by human interest, and by political and economic power
- Interpretive flexibility: different groups associate different meanings with artefacts
3.4 Validity and Reliability
This section discusses the validity and reliability of the research.
Validity includes the question whether what was intended to be measured in the research was actually measured. There are various forms of validity. Construct validity evaluates whether the correct operational measures are used for the identified concepts (Yin, 2003, p.34). As the operationalization of the concepts as been discussed in the section above includes indicators that are derived from the definition of the concepts, construct validity is not considered as an issue in this research.
Internal validity includes whether the research method, as in this case document analysis and content analysis, and data analysis are valid for reaching its conclusion and thus for answering the main research question. The selection of documents to answer sub question 2 has been carried out by the researcher of this thesis and might therefore be subject to bias. Even though the selected documents might be chosen by another researcher as well, the level of importance of the selected documents is ascribed by the researcher and might therefore be biased. The selected documents are however mostly official documents which can be generally perceived to be important, as is in the case of national strategies, legislation and official speeches during major political events. The deductive method of research in which existing theoretical approaches, including technological determinism, SCOT and Herrera’s framework, are used, enhance the internal validity of the research, as they are existing approaches that reflect ways of conceptualising technologies. Furthermore, the outcome documents under analysis are the only available documents that could be found on the dialogues under discussion and are therefore not subject to bias.
External validity assesses whether the identified findings can be generalised. As the research includes a holistic single case study design, in which the position of two distinctive states are researched, the study is not considered to be generalisable. As that is neither the intention of the research, this is not perceived to be an issue.
Assessing the reliability of the research includes the question of whether the produced outcome in this research would be the same if the research would be conducted again. If the selected
documents would remain the same, a replicability of the research could lead to a similar outcome as is produced in this research. However, as a different timeframe could lead to the selection of other documents that are more recent than those used in this research, a different outcome might emerge. Moreover, the positions of the states under analyses can be subject to change and different presidents than those under subject in this research might also produce different outcomes. Finally, as the negotiations are ongoing and the field of cyberspace in under continuous development, new outcome documents can also lead to different outcomes.
4. U.S.-China Cyber Negotiations’ Context
Conform Herrera’s framework, this chapter approaches the case under study in two steps by (1) identifying the socio-technical system; and (2) determining the interaction capacity of both China and the U.S.
4.1 Step 1 Identifying the Socio-Technical System
This section identifies the socio-technical system which is at the basis of the analysis: cyberspace. It is guided by the first sub question: “who are the most prominent actors in the
history of cyberspace and the Internet?” and highlights American and Chinese roles in the
socio-technical system. It is important to identify the system as it affects the interaction capacity of the states under discussion.
The socio-technical system is identified by Herrera as “the mix of material and social institutions that cohere around artifacts” (2003, p.578). It includes technologies that are embedded in social systems and involves the unit of analysis in which technologies are used in social settings (Herrera, 2003, p.578). In particular, the socio-technical system under analysis is cyberspace and its position in the system of international relations. Whereas this section reflects on its development, the following section will discuss its effects on the states under discussion.
4.1.1 Defining Cyberspace
Defining cyberspace is a difficult task as no common definition exists (“Cyber Definitions”, n.d.). China does not officially define cyberspace, but in its NCSS, it refers to “a cyberspace” that is “composed of the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems, automatized controls systems, digital equipment and the applications, services and data they carry” (CAC, 2016). Similarly, the U.S. defines cyberspace “as the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries” (The White House, 2008, p.3). On a more independent note, the Merriam-Webster dictionary defines cyberspace as “the online world of computer networks and especially the Internet” (Definition of Cyberspace, n.d.). All three definitions include tangible elements on which virtual elements exist, implying that information is a necessary component and that the Internet takes up only a part of this cyberspace.
Furthermore, cyberspace is not considered to be geographically located and might rather be perceived as a broader hemisphere which comprises the earth in its entirety (Barlow, 1996). It might even be posed that cyberspace is a parallel domain to the international system as structured in the physical world, in which an office would equate to an individual computer and both the ocean and highway system would equate to the Internet (Jacobs, 1999). From an endogenous perspective it should rather be posed that the socio-technical system of cyberspace is intrinsically part of the international system and should not be treated exogenously to it.
To clarify the identification of the socio-technical system, it is however relevant to distinguish features of the system, including the various layers it is built upon. Van den Berg et al. (2014) identified three layers of cyberspace including (1) the core technical layer that is based on TCP/IP1, (2) a socio-technical layer in which interaction takes place between those active in cyberspace and data processing systems, and (3) a governance layer, through which the technical and socio-technical layer are governed by both human actors and organisations (p.2). This thesis focuses on the outer governance layer in which both the U.S. and China are governing actors. The technical and socio-technical layer are however crucial elements for cyberspace to exist and for the third layer to be valuable and must therefore be taken into account as well. As the socio-technical system of cyberspace is a very broad term and cannot be wholly encompassed in the research, this section discusses a dominant part of cyberspace: the Internet. It is as Gibson described: “the virtual world behind the computer screen” (Gibson, 1984, as cited in Naughton, 2016, p.12).2
Cyberspace and the Internet greatly impact both the daily lives of individuals and the functioning of the international system. As has been posed by the Chinese NCSS it has been “comprehensively changing people’s ways of production and life, and is profoundly influencing humankinds’ social historical development process”, stressing the impact cyberspace is having on all aspects of people’s lives (CAC, 2016). Its influence stretches even broader as “they increasingly penetrate into political, economic, cultural, social, ecological, national defense, and other areas.” (CAC, 2017). The U.S. NSS also highlights the impact of the socio-technical system and that humankind has become dependent “on computer-driven and interconnected technologies” (The White House, 2017a, p.13).
1 The section below elaborates on TCP/IP
The complex system of cyberspace includes technologies and protocols that enable activities that can be legitimate or malicious (U.S. Cyber Command, 2018, p.4). The danger of this dependency on such systems has been acknowledged by both states as the Chinese NCSS posed that “cyber penetrations harm political security” (CAC, 2016), thereby stressing the impact on the political realm, and the U.S. NSS warned that “as our reliance on computers and connectivity increases, we become increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks” (The White House, 2017a, p.13). The impact of cyberspace and the Internet and the possibilities to conduct malicious activities require policies that deal with such issues. Any changes in the architecture of cyberspace will therefore not only impact the daily lives of individuals, but also affect states. Apart from the impact the socio-technical system has had on both the lives of individuals and states, it has also been a platform for businesses who ascribe large part of their success to cyberspace. Online social networking services are part of this group that include Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter, who were respectively established in 2004, 2003 and 2006. Apart from these companies, American-based businesses as Apple, Google, Yahoo, Amazon and Microsoft have also gained power through cyberspace and continuously influence the daily lives of many people throughout the world (Naughton, 2016, p.19). The development of the socio-technical system has thus not only influenced these companies in their growth, these businesses also affected the further development of the Internet itself and continue to do so.
To understand the context of the socio-technical system and to properly conduct endogenous technological-IR analysis in which technologies are not treated exogenously from the international system, it is relevant to shortly describe the historical development of the Internet.
4.1.2 The Internet
When reviewing the roots of the Internet it is striking that state actors have played an important role in its establishment and development. It was the U.S. government who desired a communications system during the arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Cold War (Naughton, 2016, p.7). While it has not developed the network by itself, many American researchers were urged to do so, after which the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) was created that was increasingly used as a communications network by a select group of researchers and computer scientists. It was the development of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP) that allowed the “possibility of organic growth: as long as a given network ‘spoke’ TCP/IP (as it were) it was free to join
the Internet” (Naughton, 2016, p.10). Even though it has been researchers that developed these protocols that connected networks to the overarching network, it was the U.S. Pentagon who required hosts to adopt this so-called lingua franca, marking January 1983 as the start of the Internet as known and used today (Naughton, 2016, p.10). Until then, the Internet was only available to a select group of people. Only when TCP/IP protocols became available to the computer industry in the U.S. market, however, and a new network, the Computer Science Network (CSNET), was created, became the Internet available to a broader range of people (Naughton, 2016, p.11). The transfer of Internet service to commercial Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that would provide it to users became the turning point of the commercialisation of the Internet. Still, it was the American government who made the Commercial Internet Exchange feasible that became the central component of the Internet (Naughton, 2016, p.12). Furthermore, research that established the basis for the World Wide Web was conducted by American and Swiss researchers (Naughton, 2016, p.13). When reflecting on the evolution of the Internet, it might be argued that the network, and therefore a large part of cyberspace, has mostly been an American or western creation as it has been based on American values during its establishment (“Will the Internet always be American?”, n.d.). Not only was it affected by western researchers, it was also influenced by the U.S. government.
As the development of the Internet shows, the socio-technical system holds an infrastructure which is unfinished as technological developments and political debates on the issue continue to take place. As Herrera poses, the “developments of the system are wrapped up in, actually defined by, political contestation” (2003, p.587). Consider, for instance, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that was enforced on 25 May 2018 and includes a set of rules regarding data protection in which “people have more control over their personal data” and “businesses benefit from a level playing field” (“2018 reform of EU data protection rules”, n.d.). The GDPR is the successor of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC that was implemented in the European Union (EU) in October 1995. A renewal of the directive was needed as the socio-technical system had changed tremendously since its implementation as social media was not existent yet and only one per cent of the European population made use of the Internet (“How did we get here?”, n.d.). Moreover, the Cambridge Analytica revelations, which involved a company that had compiled data of Facebook profiles for election purposes, (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018) had particularly caused a “data protection reform” according to the European Commission (EC) (EC, n.d.). In this case, the developments of the
