Leiden University
Faculty of Social Sciences
Bachelor thesis
Juul Mantel
s1983792
Stability and change in belief systems about terrorism
The operational code of Barack Obama
Supervisor: Dr. F.E. Bakker
Second reviewer: Dr. W.P. Veenendaal
Study program: Political Science
Specialization: International Relations and Organizations
Preface
This thesis is about the stability and change of the operational code of political world leaders, in this case applied to President Barack Obama, who was the President of the United States of America between 2009 and 2017. This thesis is written in the context of my graduation from the International Relations and Organizations Bachelor’s degree program at Leiden University. My interest in security and the fight against terrorism has increased excessively in the recent years. Hence, the subject of my thesis is based on the fight against terrorism. I have devoted the first semester of the 2019-2020 academic year entirely to my research and the writing of this thesis.
After doing a lot of scientific research myself, I came up with my research question with some help and influence of my thesis supervisor Dr. F.E. Bakker. My questions were always answered quickly so that I could continue with my research. Hereby, I would like to thank her for her great guidance and her support during this process.
I have also received wise advice from my friends and family. Moreover, they supported me morally during the writing process. Finally, I want to thank my parents in particular. Their wisdom and motivational words helped me to bring this thesis to a successful conclusion. I hope you will enjoy reading my thesis.
Juul Mantel
Abstract
The traumatic event of 9/11 as Renshon (2008) describes, has brought a fundamental change in the belief system of President Bush at the time. This thesis builds on Renshon’s research. The effect of the elimination of Osama bin Laden, described as a victory event, on the belief system of Barack Obama is measured. Bin Laden was considered as the responsible man for the 9/11 attacks and was the most wanted man on earth since 2001. This research has been done with an operational code analysis with the Verbs in Context System. 22 Speeches of Obama during his presidency were analyzed. Although the theory of the operational code analysis claims that beliefs are stable over time, Renshon has showed that traumatic events can have a negative change in a leader’s belief system. The results of this thesis show that the victory event of eliminating Osama bin Laden did have significant effect on the belief system of Barack Obama. Therefore, the existing theory of cognitive consistency can be falsified. However, changes in someone’s belief system still depend on the type of event.
Table of contents Preface ... 2 Abstract ... 3 Introduction ... 5 Literature review ... 6 An actor-centric perspective ... 6 Beliefs ... 7 Terrorism ... 8 Theoretical framework ... 9
The Operational Code ... 9
Stability and change of the Operational Code ... 10
Victory event ... 12
Research design ... 13
Method ... 13
Operationalization ... 15
Data ... 15
The effect of a victory event ... 16
Discussion ... 19
Stability in the belief system of Barack Obama ... 19
War on Terror and ISIS ... 20
Conclusion ... 21
Recommendations ... 22
References ... 23
Introduction
On the 11th of September 2001, the most radical and devastating attack in American
history took place. The most significant characteristics of the operation were its ambitious scope and dimensions; impressive coordination and synchronization; and the unswerving dedication and determination of the 19 aircraft hijackers who willingly and wantonly killed themselves, the passengers, and crews of the four aircrafts they commandeered and the approximately 3,000 persons working at or visiting both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Until the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, no single terrorist operation had ever killed more than 500 persons at one time. The attacks that day were therefore unparalleled in their severity and lethal ambitions (Hoffman, 2002). President G.W. Bush spoke the morning after the terrorist attacks. “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror, they were acts of war. This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail.” Bush here declared the War on Terror (Entman, 2003; Graham, Keenan & Dowd, 2004).
Soon after the attacks it was announced that terrorist organization Al-Qaeda had claimed the attacks. Measures were immediately taken against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, after which the first action was taken on October 7th, 2001. A few hours after the first American air strikes
against Afghanistan, a pre-recorded videotape was broadcast around the world. On the videotape, there was a man with a long beard, wearing a camouflage fatigue jacket and the headdress of a desert tribesman, with an AK-47 assault rifle at his side. This man was Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda, who declared war on the United States. Bin Laden’s declaration was regarded with a preternatural seriousness that would previously have been unimaginable (Hoffman, 2002). Since then, Osama bin Laden has been held responsible for the 9/11 attacks and was the most wanted terrorist in the world, and the search for Bin Laden began. For many years, the United States, headed by President Bush, have sought for the man with everything within their power. During Bush’s presidency, he did not succeed in eliminating Bin Laden. In 2009, Bush handed over the presidency to Barack Obama, who continued the search for the most wanted man on earth. Obama did succeed and eventually Bin Laden was killed by American elite troops in Pakistan on May 2nd, 2011. The boss of Al-Qaeda
was eliminated (Inkster, 2011).
Renshon (2008) has investigated whether, and to what extent, the 9/11 attacks have had an impact on the leadership style of President Bush. This research carried out by Renshon will be the basis of this thesis. The impact of the 9/11 attacks is measured through an ‘Operational Code Analysis’ (OCA), which is an at-a-distance method of research to examine someone’s
beliefs and leadership style (Schafer & Walker, 2006). Renshon also investigated Bush’s beliefs in other periods of his presidency, but I will not focus on that since this thesis is about the impact of terrorism. Renshon presents the 9/11 attacks as a traumatic event. He does not elaborate his definition of a traumatic event, but he does note that such an event gives a traumatic shock to the people. This traumatic event of 9/11 had caused a significant negative change in Bush’s beliefs about the nature of the political universe, realization of political values, and the predictability of the political future, which are all measured by the OCA. He had a more friendly and cooperative world view before 9/11, which changed to a more conflicting and hostile world view after 9/11. He also was more pessimistic about achieving his political goals (Renshon, 2008).
So it is known that the biggest terrorist attack in the American history has brought a fundamental negative change in President Bush’s belief system. It is also known that the person who was held accountable for this terrorist attack, was killed by the United States on May 2nd,
2011 (Inkster, 2011; Renshon, 2008). If the 9/11 attacks had such a negative impact on Bush’s beliefs, will the elimination of the responsible person have a positive effect on the belief system of the then president, Barack Obama? I think it is important to turn over Renshon’s research and to mirror it to find out what the impact of killing Bin Laden has done to Obama’s beliefs. Therefore, my research is based upon my research question: to what extent has the elimination
of Osama bin Laden had an effect on the belief system of Barack Obama?
At first, I will present my literature review and my theoretical framework, in which I will describe the theories and hypothesis of this research. I will then describe my research design in which I explain the methodology I have used for this research and how I collected my data. Thirdly, I will present the research results that I have collected by using an operational code analysis. Finally, I will present a discussion, conclusion and recommendation.
Literature review
An actor-centric perspective
A president has a certain leadership style that is influenced by various factors. Likewise, President Bush also had a certain way of leadership. In international relations, this is a much researched topic, where scholars try to prove if particular factors or events can influence someone’s leadership style in a certain way (Schafer, Walker & Young, 1998). During the bipolar international system that characterized the Cold War, structural approaches dominated
when it comes to explaining the leadership style and policy of a political leader. These structural approaches focused on the distribution of power, international institutions, and domestic politics.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, there was less consensus on the nature of the ‘new world order’, and there became more room for interpretation, innovation, disputes and miscommunication. In such an ambiguous environment, the perspectives of policy leaders can have more influence on what governments do. Foreign policy scholars have increasingly focused on the individuals behind the decisions of world leaders’ administrations. The interest in the beliefs of world leaders increased. International relations theorists have also begun to recognize the need to include the analysis of beliefs and norms in their research programs (Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Smith, 1988; Schafer & Walker, 2006).
The leadership style of a president reflects the beliefs he or she has. Based on their perceptions and interpretations, they make expectations, strategies and insist on actions with their government that conform to the assessments of what is possible and what is likely to hold the leader in his or her position. The perceptions help to give direction to the orientations of governments in international affairs. A leader’s interpretation comes from their experiences, goals, views about the world and sensitivity to the political context. Therefore, in the study of international relations, we especially try to uncover the belief systems of individuals to demonstrate how someone’s leadership style is shaped. This is being done with an actor-centric
perspective, which means that the state is not seen as a black box, but the actors in it are looked
at in order to have a better understanding about the world (Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Shafer, Walker & Young, 1998).
Beliefs
As the interest in beliefs grew, the need for a model that makes the methods and applications of the operational code analysis available to a new generation of scholars or students with research interests in foreign policy or international relations grew as well. That is why Schafer and Walker (2006) have explained and detailed the study of the operational code analysis in their book Beliefs and leadership in world politics: methods and applications of
operational code analysis.
For this research, it is necessary to explain what beliefs are, why they are important in the context of political decision making, and why and when do they change? Beliefs are that, which we hold to be true. Beliefs may be propositions about causal relationships or fundamental assumptions about the way the world operates. Beliefs are important because they act as a
primary filter through which other perceptual processes operate, whether the effect is to maintain stability or not (Lane, 1962; Knutson, 1972; Renshon, 2008). However, according to Jervis (2006), beliefs are central to political psychology, but remain undertheorized. He raises the question whether beliefs are autonomous and powerful and explains that this can vary from case to case. The relationship between expressed attitudes and behavior is mediated and complex, but we often do find that beliefs are linked to behavior.
Although the study of beliefs is becoming increasingly important in cognitive psychology, it is still unclear when and why beliefs change. Generally, beliefs are assumed to be stable, because individuals try to adjust new information as much as possible to what they already know (Renshon, 2008). However, beliefs change in certain situations, as proven by Renshon with his analysis of the operational code of G.W. Bush after 9/11. As a result, in recent years, scholars have increasingly investigated the stability of beliefs in certain situations, such as crises and traumatic events as Renshon describes (Feng, 2005; Marfleet, 2000; Renshon, 2008). For example, Walker, Schafer and Young (1998) examined the operational code of President Jimmy Carter both before and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and found a large statistically significant decrease in his cooperative view of the political universe and his optimism concerning the realization of his goals. Also, Walker and Schafer (2000) analyzed the operational code of President Johnson during two phases of the Vietnam War, and found that he exhibited a loss of control, attributed a greater role to change, and became more risk averse. Finally, Feng (2005) found that the Korean War affected Mao’s operational code in a way that he became more hostile and confrontational during the conflict.
Terrorism
Besides the growing interest in the beliefs systems of world leaders, terrorism has increased as well in the last decades. The events of 11 September 2001 have led to a higher level of perceived risk of terrorism in the United States and as well in the rest of the world (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos & Provost, 2002). Terrorism is mostly described as the systematic use of terror or violence to achieve political goals, but there are various different definitions of this term because there are many types of terrorism that differ in time, motivation, and manifestations, and there is no agreed-on definition. Nevertheless, elements of terrorism that are generally agreed on are its use or threatened use of violence to achieve some political goal, the acquisition and use of power, and the planned, calculated, and systematic characteristics of the act itself (Sullivan, 2009).
Since the excessive 9/11 attacks, every world leader has focused more on counterterrorism policy and the War on Terror as Bush had introduced. Finding the boss of Al-Qaeda in particular was a top priority of most world leaders. Al-Al-Qaeda was the largest terrorist organization at the time and needed to be tackled. Hence the long search for Osama bin Laden. At the same time, the terrorist attacks in the rest of the world also increased, making the finding of Bin Laden increasingly important (Hoffman, 2002; Coaffee, 2017).
Despite the fact that terrorism has increased in the last decades and that the policies of world leaders are inextricably linked to it, little research has been done into the question whether terrorist attacks have an effect on the beliefs of a political leader. However, Renshon (2008) shows that a traumatic event such as 9/11 actually can have significant influence on someone’s beliefs. All this makes it even more important to examine the influence of the elimination of Bin Laden on Barack Obama’s belief system and operational code.
So in sum, little research has been done into the relationship between terrorism and change in belief systems of political world leaders, but in the contemporary political world, terrorism is an important factor. We know that traumatic events and crises can have a significant negative influence on leaders’ beliefs (Renshon, 2008). It is therefore important to mirror this finding and examine the (positive) influence of eliminating the world’s most wanted terrorist on the beliefs of a world leader, in this case Barack Obama, who has been president of the United States from 2009 until 2017.
Theoretical framework
The Operational Code
This cognitive theory assumes a model of bounded rationality in which the decision maker is steered by his/her system of beliefs in the identification of options, ends/means calculations, and choice of action (Schafer & Walker, 2006; Simon, 1985). The operational code is a subset of political beliefs that are especially relevant in the context of political decision making. George (1969) divided these beliefs into the philosophical beliefs (general assumptions regarding the fundamental nature of politics, conflict, and the individual) and instrumental beliefs (more specific beliefs concerning the methods leaders should use to attain the ends they desire). The answers of an individual to the questions presented in table 1 give an impression of the operational code of someone (Renshon, 2008; Schafer & Walker, 2006).
Stability and change of the Operational Code
The study of beliefs has long been dominated by the principle of cognitive consistency (Renshon, 2008). This approach assumes that beliefs are stable over time, internally consistent and interdependent and hierarchical. The cognitive consistency theory predicts the relative stability of core beliefs due to the tendency of individuals to absorb new information in such a way that it is consistent with their existing beliefs. Beliefs are assumed to be hierarchical because individuals can think of which beliefs are more important than others. In the operational code analysis, a distinction is made between instrumental beliefs and philosophical beliefs,
Table 1. The Operational Code Philosophical beliefs
P – 1: What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents? P – 2: What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values
and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?
P – 3: Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
P – 4: How much control or mastery can one have over historical development? What is one’s role moving and shaping history in the desired direction?
P – 5: What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?
Instrumental beliefs
I – 1: What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? I – 2: How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
I – 3: How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted? I – 4: What is the best timing of action to advance one’s interest?
I – 5: What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interest? Source: George 1969; Renshon 2008; Schafer & Walker 2006.
where the instrumental beliefs on the one hand illustrate the core beliefs which are not sensitive to change and the philosophical beliefs on the other hand, will change faster (Jervis, 1976; Renshon, 2008; Schafer & Walker, 2006). Even though the assumption exists that beliefs are stable over time, the studies of Walker, Schafer and Young (1998), Walker and Schafer (2000),
Feng (2005), and Renshon (2008) discovered the significant effects of specific events on a leader’s operational code, as described before. These studies all share the result that the changes in the leader’s operational code are in the philosophical beliefs. Since the theory of cognitive consistency claims that beliefs are stable over time, but when change does occur it will be more likely in the philosophical beliefs, and because all significant changes of these studies were found in the philosophical beliefs, these findings indicate that philosophical beliefs are more prone to change than instrumental beliefs (Schafer & Walker, 2000).
A change in beliefs can be recognized by a statistically significant shift in the operational code. This statistical significance shows the magnitude of the change and reflects how big the change is. But there is a third element that is important to look at: the type of change. There are two types of change; beliefs can be reinforced, or they can be reversed (Renshon, 2008). Renshon for example found a reverse change in beliefs of President Bush after the attacks of 9/11 happened. Whereas Bush viewed the world as friendly and cooperative before 9/11, those views became significantly more conflictual and hostile after 9/11.
The studies described above indicate that, despite the expectation of the existing theory of cognitive consistency, the beliefs of leaders following certain events, defined as traumatic events, can change significantly (Jervis, 2005; Renshon, 2004; Renshon, 2008; Robison, 2006).
In addition to studies that have examined the influence of a traumatic event on the beliefs of world leaders, it has not yet been examined what an opposite event of such a traumatic event will do to a leader’s beliefs. In order to measure the complete influence of these kinds of radically events, it is in my opinion necessary to investigate the influence of a (self-named)
victory event on the beliefs of a leader. I will therefore examine this, based on the research
question mentioned before. In this research my independent variable will be: eliminating Osama bin Laden as a victory event and in addition my dependent variable will be the change in the belief system of President Barack Obama.
Hypotheses
Since I will examine the change in the belief system of Barack Obama after the American troops killed Bin Laden in May 2011, my research will exist of two time periods, showed in table 2.
Based on these two phases, and the available and relevant literature, I will use three hypotheses to investigate the relationship between a victory event and the beliefs of Barack Obama. I will try to show whether or not the victory event of eliminating Osama bin Laden has
Table 2. Phases
Phase 1. The term of office of President Obama from his inauguration as president until May
2, 2011.
Phase 2. The term of office of President Obama from May 2, 2011 up to and including his last
year of office, 2016.
had a positive effect on President Obama’s beliefs and whether any changes only occur in the philosophical beliefs rather than the instrumental beliefs of Obama, by using three hypotheses:
1. Hypothesis 0 (H0): following the elimination of Osama bin Laden, there is no significant change in the belief system of President Barack Obama.
2. Hypothesis 1 (H1): following the elimination of Osama bin Laden, there has been a significant and fundamental change in the belief system of President Barack Obama. 3. Hypothesis 1a (H1a): the changes in the belief system of Barack Obama as a result of
the elimination of Osama bin Laden, are the most common in his philosophical beliefs and less or not in his instrumental beliefs.
Although there has been considerable debate over the extent to which the attacks of 9/11 significantly changed the beliefs of President Bush at the time, scholars have argued that the terrorist attacks not only gave the president a new sense of purpose, but had also fundamentally changed his views about the nature of international politics, indicating that he became more conflictual, saw the world as more hostile, and was less optimistic in achieving his political goals (Heclo, 2003; Renshon, 2004, Renshon, 2008; Robison, 2006; Jervis, 2005).
Because the elimination of Bin Laden is directly related to the traumatic event of 9/11 and the fundamental negative change in the beliefs of Bush after the attacks, I expect, in contrary, a positive change in the beliefs of President Obama after the victory event of the elimination of Bin Laden.
Victory event
It is necessary to clearly conceptualize the concept of a victory event, to be able to answer my research question properly. For the purpose of this thesis, I call the elimination of Osama bin Laden a victory event. This concept has not been used in research before, but arises from
Renshon’s research (2008) which examined the traumatic event of 9/11. Even though he does not clearly conceptualize the definition of a traumatic event, its meaning arises from the context. It is about an exogenous shock, which is a dramatic and/or unexpected event that influences change (Tetlock, 2005).
However, an exogenous shock can also mean something positive, something that is very much desired: a victory. In addition to eliminating the one who has always been held responsible for the most destroying terrorist attack in history, ending a long-term war for example can also be seen as a victory event by which the belief system of a political leader can be influenced in a way that the operational code changes in order to prevent such a period in the future.
So, a victory event is about a long-term goal, something that is very much desired. In this case, the desired goal was to eliminate Osama bin Laden. Out of the very negative and mournful circumstances of 9/11, a goal has been set to eliminate the person who was held accountable for this, which can serve as a small piece of closure of a painful and anxious period for the American people and their leader.
Since the concept of a victory event itself is not measurable, indicators of the concept are needed for the operationalization. The operationalization of a victory event is done as follows: I will analyze specific texts (which I will specify later) by searching for verbs in relation to terrorism, Bin Laden, the use of power and Obama’s view of the political universe. The texts and verbs that I will examine in this research will be discussed further in the method of analysis-section below.
Research design
Method
The biggest challenge for international relations scholars is how we can rigorously assess psychological characteristics of individuals when we do not have direct access to the leaders who interest us as our subjects. The most common solution in the political psychology literature to this challenge is called ‘at-a-distance’ methodology (Herrmann, 1980; Schafer & Walker, 2006), meaning that we assess the psychological characteristics of individuals from a distance without having direct access to them. The logic behind this is the assumption that we can infer psychological characteristics based upon the subject’s verbal behavior. What an individual says and how he or she says it can tell us important things about his or her beliefs (Schafer & Walker, 2006).
For this research I used the program Profiler Plus to carry out an ‘operational code
analysis’. Profiler Plus was developed by Social Science Automation
(www.socialscienceautomation.com), and is an automated, full-language parser software program for personal computers and intended particularly for at-a-distance, psychological assessments of subjects (Schafer & Walker, 2006). The operational code-scheme uses the VICS-system; Verbs in Context System, which is developed by Schafer, Walker and Young (1998). The core of the OCA is to derive a leader’s beliefs about the political universe and the use of power and violence (Renshon, 2008).
VICS is the systematic, at-a-distance method that has been developed for quantitative operational code analysis (Schafer & Walker, 2006). VICS is a statistical method that focuses on verbs in speech acts of the individual(s) that are the subject of the analysis. VICS consists of two phases. In the first phase, verbal expressions (sentences containing verbs) are coded, in which a ‘+’ stands for cooperative and a ‘-’ stands for conflictual. Then, the intensity is measured, as either deeds or words. Deeds indicate the exercise of power in the form of positive and negative actions. Words used by leaders represent the exercise of power in the form of making threats of violence and promises or in the form of invoking authority to support or oppose actions between states or other leaders in world politics. The intensity is measured on a scale from –3 (punish) to +3 (reward) (Renshon, 2008; Schafer, Walker & Young, 1998; Schafer & Walker, 2006).
The second phase of the VICS-coding involves the attribution of the verbs. The beliefs of a leader regarding his or her own best approaches to the exercise of power can be found in sentences in which the subject refers to itself. These are therefore the instrumental beliefs of the OCA. In addition, sentences that refer to the political universe and other actors in the political universe give an impression of how others exercise power in the international system, from which we can derive the philosophical beliefs of the OCA. It is therefore necessary that when the subject is talking about himself and when he or she is talking about others is distinguished in my content analysis system. This distinction is relatively simple by looking at the grammatical subject of the verb; either President Obama is talking about others in the political universe or about himself (Schafer & Walker, 2006; Renshon, 2008).
In sum, verbs are first coded for direction as cooperative (+) or conflictual (-), and then coded for intensity as words or deeds, measured on a scale with six values ranging from –3 to +3, which are marked by the following verb signifiers as the exercise of different forms of
power: punish (–3), threaten (–2), oppose (–1), support (+1), promise (+2), and reward (+3) (Schafer & Walker, 2006).1
By coding the direction and scaling the intensity of transitive verbs in the subject’s rhetoric and then indexing the results, we end up with a broad picture of the way President Obama sees the exercise of power in the political universe by himself and others: his operational code (Schafer & Walker, 2006).
Operationalization
I will examine the change in the belief system of Barack Obama after the elimination of Bin Laden, by analyzing verbs in sentences in Obama’s speeches before and after May 2, 2011. These verbs will relate to the use of power and the vision towards the political universe of President Obama. Additionally, the verbs that are analyzed are determined by the VICS system. Words that the VICS system will analyze are for example: to be at war, to be in conflict, to
attack/invade, to terrorize, to be at peace, restraint from the use of power, securitize, use of violence, to be (un)safe, to be deterred, to fight, to threaten, to protect.
Data
The OCA is a research method whereby beliefs of a political leader are being examined at a distance (Schafer & Walker, 2006). The data for this research was gathered from speeches of President Obama in the two phases, mentioned in table 2. All speeches were obtained from the Obama White House Archive Press Office (www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov). The speeches that I have used for my research all met the three criteria that each speech must consist of 1,500 words at least and/or must have a minimum 15 to 20 coded verbs, and all speeches must primarily focus on terrorism and counterterrorism policy, since this research is about the beliefs of Obama regarding terrorism (Schafer, Walker & Young, 2003; Renshon, 2008).
President Obama’s archive of speeches contains 473 pages, each with around 10 speeches. Of all these speeches, there were 22 speeches that met all three criteria.2 The speeches
are, as mentioned before, divided over two periods. For phase 1, the term of office of President Obama from his inauguration as president until May 2 2011, I will analyze 8 speeches. In addition, for phase two, the term of office of President Obama from May 2 2011 up to and including his last year of office, 2016, I will analyze 14 speeches. It is important to note that I
1 A further guide to verbal descriptors for VICS’ numerical scores can be found in Appendix A. 2 For all used speeches, see appendix B.
used all the speeches that were available in President Obama’s archive that met the three criteria. I have merged two speeches which were analyzed for period 2 to meet the criteria of 1,500 words and a minimum of 15 to 20 coded verbs, which is possible when a speech does not meet the criteria, but is considered too important not to include in the analysis. In that case, the speech that does not meet the criteria must be merged with a speech that is similar in terms of date and subject (Schafer & Walker, 2006). I consider my source to be reliable, because it is the official archive of President Obama where all speeches and such are available without biases.
Results
Table 2 shows the results of the operational code analysis. The results show the differences in the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of President Barack Obama across two phases: phase 1, the term of office of President Obama from his inauguration as president until May 2, 2011, and phase 2, the term of office of President Obama from May 2, 2011 up to and including his last year of office, 2016. The differences mark the effects of a victory event between phase 1 and phase 2. This victory event is described above.
The values outside the parentheses are the average scores of Obama’s operational code of phase 1 and 2, the values inside the parentheses are the t-statistics for change from phase 1. The effect size is indicated by ‘r’. To measure the effect of the victory event, it is common to use a significance level of .05, but because of the small number of cases, t-statistics with p ≤ .1 are also considered significant (Field, 2013).
The effect of a victory event
As we look at table 2, the results of this operational code analysis indicate two significant changes in President Obama’s beliefs (I-4b and I-5 punish). There is a difference in I-4b between phase 1 (M = .641, SD = .194), and phase 2 (M = .739, SD = .169) which is significant (t(df) = 20, p ≤ .1, r = .395). I-4b measures the diversity of the leader’s actions in terms of the distribution of words and deeds. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher flexibility. I-4b also balances the risk of doing too much against the risk of not doing enough, by linking the words to actions. The idea is that diversity levels provide insight into the relative frequency, and therefore, the flexibility of actions (Schafer & Walker, 2006). As shown, I-4b has increased between phase 1 and phase 2, which means that the
Table 2
The Operational Code of Barack Obama
Phase 1 Phase 2
(n = 8) (n = 14)
P-1 Nature of Political Universe .241 .206
(.467)
P-2 Realization of Political Values .102 .059
(.661)
P-3 Predictability of Political Future .101 .117
(-1.253)
P-4 Control Over Historical Development .386 .340
(.670)
P-5 Role of Change .961 .959
(.231)
I-1 Strategic Approach to Goals .301 .183
(.954)
I-2 Tactical Pursuit of Goals .096 .027
(.983)
I-3 Risk Orientation .100 .131
(-1.029) I-4 Timing of Action
a. Cooperation/Conflict .679 .719
(-.412)
b. Words/Deeds .641 .793
(-1.920*)
I-5 Utility of Means
a. Reward .161 .169 (-.220) b. Promise .091 .070 (.865) c. Appeal/Support .399 .355 (.819) d. Oppose/resist .115 .134
(-.561)
e. Threaten .075 .045
(1.081)
f. Punish .151 .231
(-2.181**)
Note: Data in bold denote significant results. Values in parentheses are t-statistics for change from phase 1.
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
flexibility of actions between words and deeds of President Obama has increased from medium to high. The effect size (r = .395), indicates a relatively weak effect. Eliminating Osama bin Laden therefore has a weak effect on the flexibility of actions between words and deeds of President Obama. But, despite the weak effect, there is still a significant effect.
In addition, there is a difference in I-5 (punish) between phase 1 (M = .151, SD = .044), and phase 2 (M = .231, SD = .124) which is also significant (t(df) = 17.715, p ≤ .05, r = .460). I-5 shows the leader’s beliefs about the utility of different tactics, punish in this case, that mark the exercise of political power. Again, the index ranges from 0 to 1, with low scores indicating less utility and higher scores indicating more utility of punish as a tactic (Schafer & Walker, 2006). There is a significant increase in Obama’s beliefs about the utility of punishment between phase 1 and phase 2. Despite the fact that Obama’s beliefs about the utility of punishment have increased, his beliefs about it still remain low. As we look at the effect size (r = .460), the victory event of eliminating Bin Laden has a moderate effect on the beliefs of President Obama about the utility of punishment as a tactic.
These results indicate that the victory event of eliminating Osama bin Laden has had a significant change on the belief system of Barack Obama between phase 1 and 2. Therefore, I can support hypothesis 1 (H1), because there has been a significant and fundamental change. On the other hand, I can invalidate hypotheses 0 (H0) and 1a (H1a), because the changes do not only occur in the philosophical beliefs rather than the instrumental beliefs. Moreover, the significant changes only occur in his instrumental beliefs.
As I mentioned, I expected positive changes in Obama’s beliefs because of the elimination of Bin Laden. However, the results indicate a more negative change. I-4b is about the flexibility of actions between words and deeds, and therefore the significant change does not denote a positive or negative change. I-5 (punish) on the other hand does denote a negative
change. President Obama’s beliefs about the utility of punishment as a tactic have increased, which indicates a more negative world view.
Besides the significant changes in Obama’s beliefs in I-4b and I-5 (punish), the other beliefs in Obama’s operational code have also experienced a negative change. But these changes are so small that they are negligible. To clarify this, this is explained in appendix A.
Aditionally, to come back to the type of change as Renshon (2008) describes in his research, which can be a reinforcement of beliefs on the one hand, or beliefs can be reversed on the other hand. Renshon found a reversal of beliefs of President Bush after the traumatic event of 9/11. He significantly became more conflictual and hostile after the attacks. The significant changes in President Obama’s beliefs indicate a reinforcement of his beliefs, because his view on the utility of punishment as a tactic increases, which reinforces his existing beliefs. However, this does not explicitly mean that a victory event reinforces the beliefs, and a traumatic event has a reversal effect on the beliefs of a political leader. This can also be an effect of this single case study. I will further explain this in the discussion-section.
Finally, the overall result of this operational code analysis means that a victory event such as eliminating Osama bin Laden, who was held responsible for the attacks on September 11th, 2001, does have a causal effect on the belief system of President Obama. President
Obama’s beliefs about the flexibility of actions between words and deeds and his beliefs about the utility of punishment as a tactic have increased. Because of the significant results, I can falsify the theory of cognitive consistency and the stability of the core beliefs, the instrumental beliefs. In this case, the philosophical beliefs remained stable instead of the instrumental beliefs. Even though there are few changes, the belief system of Barack Obama can be considered as relatively unstable.
Discussion
Stability in the belief system of Barack Obama
My hypotheses are based on earlier research, which indicated that certain events, such as a crisis or traumatic event, could have a fundamental change on a leaders’ belief system, even though the theory of the operational code analysis claims that the belief system of a political leader is mostly stable (Feng, 2006; Marfleet, 2000; Renshon, 2008). Based on these studies, I expected that the elimination of Bin Laden had caused a more optimistic view of the political universe for example, because the most wanted and most dangerous man on earth
according to the United States was killed and could not endanger the world anymore. Besides, the above described victory event had everything to do with the biggest and most destroying traumatic event ever in the history of the United States of America (Hoffman, 2002; Renshon, 2008). Instead, the beliefs of President Obama experienced a more negative change than a positive change. If we compare this analysis with Renshon’s research (2008), it becomes clear that such a traumatic event as 9/11 has a reversal effect on the belief system of a political leader, and the victory event of eliminating Bin Laden reinforces the existing beliefs of a political leader. Also, there were more significant changes in the belief system of President Bush after 9/11 than there were in Obama’s belief system after killing Bin Laden. This may be because a traumatic event like 9/11 affects the nation and its president more personally, because many lives have been lost there. If then the person who was held responsible for this event is being killed ten years after, that may be have a smaller effect on the nation and its president. Nevertheless, since this is a single case study with a targeted operational code analysis, I cannot conclude that every victory event has the same effect and reinforces the belief system of a political leader.
Besides a traumatic event may cause instability in the belief system of a political leader, my research shows that a victory event, which is very related to a certain traumatic event, can also cause instability in the belief system of a political leader, in this case President Obama. This indicates that the existing theory of cognitive consistency can be disproved. Also, it is expected that the core beliefs, the instrumental beliefs, remain stable over time, and that the philosophical beliefs will experience change sooner (Jervis, 1976; Renshon, 2008; Schafer & Walker, 2006). This theory can also be falsified, because the results show a change in Obama’s core beliefs. However, it is again important to mention that this is a case study of one single event with a targeted operational code analysis instead of a general operational code analysis as Renshon (2008) did in his research. Because this is a targeted analysis, we cannot directly assume that the impact of other victory events will be the same. Fortunately, that was not the goal of this study, but it is an interesting research area. This can possibly be the goal of an analysis in another study.
War on Terror and ISIS
Another explanatory factor of the more negative changes in Obama’s beliefs than positive changes, can be the ongoing War on Terror since 2001 that Bush declared right after 9/11 (Entman, 2003; Graham, Keenan & Dowd, 2004). The elimination of Bin Laden can be
in general, because during the war on terror since 2001, another terrorist organization has reported itself, named Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This organization became bigger and bigger in the last years of Obama’s presidency, and in 2014 there was a peak when ISIS claimed their own declared caliphate. This could explain his more negative changes in his beliefs than positive changes. Even though ISIS did not commit an attack similar to that of 9/11 during the presidency of Obama, the number of terrorist attacks by this organization has increased dramatically in the last years of his presidency, also in countries other than the United States (Holbrook, 2015).
Therefore, the constant fear of another terrorist attack is still present, even though the great boss of Al-Qaeda has been caught. Besides, there is no certainty, and perhaps this can also be defined as fear, that a new leader of the terrorist organization will arise whose intentions we do not know. The fear that a new leader of a terrorist organization will constantly emerge when the old boss is caught and eliminated or the fear that a new terrorist organization will form itself, may explain why Obama’s beliefs about the political universe overall became more skeptical rather than they have undergone a positive change.
Conclusion
In this research, I examined the operational code of President Barack Obama between his presidency from 2009 to 2016, under the guise of political psychology. The analysis and my hypotheses were based upon the existing theory of the operational code. This theory claims that the operational code of a political leader is relatively stable and consistent over time. However, scholars have proved that the operational code can change from time to time due to certain events such as traumatic events as 9/11 or a crisis (Feng, 2006; Marfleet, 2000; Renshon, 2008). No research has yet been done into the impact of a victory event on the beliefs of a political leader. In the aftermath of 9/11, President Bush opened the hunt on the person who was held responsible for the 9/11 attacks. This hunt came to an end on May 2nd, 2011, when Osama bin
Laden was killed and eliminated. In this analysis, I have examined the effect of the elimination of Osama bin Laden, as a victory event, on the belief system of President Obama, based on my research question: to what extent has the elimination of Osama bin Laden had an effect on the belief system of Barack Obama? My expectations were based on other studies which proved some instability in the operational code. I therefore expected that the belief system of Obama would change significantly in response to the elimination of Bin Laden, and that the change in
his beliefs would primarily occur in his philosophical beliefs rather than in his instrumental beliefs.
For the analysis, I used the operational code analysis as described, with the corresponding VICS system. VICS is constructed so that the philosophical beliefs would represent attributions about the ‘other’ and instrumental beliefs would represent attributions of the ‘self’ (Walker, Schafer & Young, 1998; Schafer & Walker, 2006). Scores for the philosophical indices, represent the beliefs about the nature of the political system insofar as it is shaped by the actions and beliefs of other actors. Instrumental indices in the VICS system represent a political leader’s beliefs about how he or she should or does act in the international system.
The output of the operational code analysis, listed in table 2, shows significant changes in President Obama’s beliefs about the flexibility of actions between words and deeds (I-4b), and the utility of punishment as a tactic (I-5 (punish)). I expected more positive changes in his beliefs, due to the victory event, but instead, there were more negative changes in his beliefs after May 2nd, 2011.
I can conclude that the victory event of eliminating Osama bin Laden has had a significant effect on the belief system of President Obama, and the event reinforced the existing beliefs of Obama. I can therefore invalidate my hypotheses 0 and 1a (H0 and H1a), and I can support my other hypothesis, hypothesis 1 (H1), which indicated the same as the result of this research. This means that the theory of the operational code which claims to be stable over time, can be falsified, at least when it is the case of a victory event such as this. Again, since this is a targeted operational code analysis, I cannot prove that other victory events can bring about the same significant and fundamental change in the belief system of a political leader.
As mentioned before, the negative changes instead of positive changes in the beliefs of Obama can be explained by the continuing war against terrorism, and the rise of the new terrorist organization ISIS, which has become bigger and bigger during the presidency of Obama. The fear of another terrorist attack and the fear that there will always be a new leader of the organization can explain his increased skeptical view about the political universe.
Recommendations
I think that the influence of terrorism in general on the belief system of a political leader is a very interesting research area. The big question in the political psychology is therefore about what causes a change in the belief system of a political leader. Although this analysis is
a single case study, we do now know that the elimination of the person responsible for the biggest and most destroying terror attack in American history did have an effect on the belief system of the president of the United States. This does not mean that other events, described as victory events, have an effect on the belief system of a political leader as well. The influence of a victory event, in relation to terrorism, and the influence of terrorism in general on the belief system of a political leader can be an interesting research area for further research according to me. This research can also be done with an operational code analysis in general, instead of a targeted one, to measure the overall effect of a victory event on the belief system of a political leader.
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Appendices
Appendix A
The Operational Code (Verbs in Context System Indices)
P-1: Nature of the Political Universe
Hostile Friendly
Extremely Very Definitely Somewhat Mixed Somewhat Definitely Very Extremely -1.0 -.75 -.50 -.25 0.0 +.25 +.50 +.75 +1.0
P-2: Realization of Political Values
Pessimistic Optimistic
Extremely Very Definitely Somewhat Mixed Somewhat Definitely Very Extremely -1.0 -.75 -.50 -.25 0.0 +.25 +.50 +.75 +1.0
P-3: Predictability of Political Future
Very Low Low Medium High Very High
0.0 .25 .50 .75 .1.0
P-4: Control over Historical Development
Very Low Low Medium High Very High
0.0 .25 .50 .75 .1.0
P-5: Role of Change
Very Low Low Medium High Very High
0.0 .25 .50 .75 .1.0
I-1: Direction of Strategy
Conflict Cooperation
Extremely Very Definitely Somewhat Mixed Somewhat Definitely Very Extremely -1.0 -.75 -.50 -.25 0.0 +.25 +.50 +.75 +1.0
I-2: Intensity of Tactics
Conflict Cooperation
Extremely Very Definitely Somewhat Mixed Somewhat Definitely Very Extremely -1.0 -.75 -.50 -.25 0.0 +.25 +.50 +.75 +1.0
I-3: Risk Orientation
Risk Averse Risk Acceptant
Very Low Low Medium High Very High
0.0 .25 .50 .75 .1.0
I-4a: Flexibility of Tactics (between Cooperation and Conflict)
Very Low Low Medium High Very High
0.0 .25 .50 .75 .1.0
I-4b: Flexibility of Tactics (between Words and Deeds)
Very Low Low Medium High Very High
I-5 Utility of Means (Reward, Promise, Appeal/Support, Oppose/Resist, Threaten, Punish)
Very Low Low Medium High Very High
0.0 .25 .50 .75 .1.0
Source: Walker, Schafer and Young, 2003; Renshon, 2008.
Appendix B All analyzed speeches
Phase Date Link
1 02-27-2009 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-ndash-responsibly-ending-war-iraq 1 03-27-2009 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/remarks-president-a-new-strategy-afghanistan-and-pakistan 1 05-06-2009 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/remarks-president-after- trilateral-meeting-with-president-karzai-afghanistan-and-pr 1 05-21-2009 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09 1 10-06-2009 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/remarks-president-national-counterterrorism-center 1 12-01-2009 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/remarks-president-address- nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan 1 08-31-2010 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2010/08/31/remarks- president-address-nation-end-combat-operations-iraq
1 12-16-2010 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2010/12/16/statement- president-afghanistan-pakistan-annual-review 2 05-02-2011 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2011/05/02/remarks-president-osama-bin-laden 2 06-22-2011 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-president-way-forward-afghanistan 2 05-01-2012 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2012/05/01/remarks- president-obama-address-nation-afghanistan 2 05-23-2013 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-barack-obama 2 06-19-2014 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2014/06/19/remarks-president-situation-iraq 2 08-09-2014 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2014/08/09/statement-president-iraq 2 09-10-2014 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1 2 02-11-2015 merged with 07-06-2015 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2015/02/11/remarks- president-request-congress-authorization-force-against-isil and https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2015/07/06/remarks-president-progress-fight-against-isil
2 10-15-2015 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2015/10/15/statement-president-afghanistan 2 12-07-2015 https://time.com/4137986/obama-address-transcript-terrorism-isis-isil-oval-office/ 2 02-25-2016 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2016/02/25/remarks-president-progress-against-isil 2 06-14-2016 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2016/06/14/remarks-president-after-counter-isil-meeting 2 07-06-2016 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2016/07/06/statement-president-afghanistan 2 12-06-2016 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2016/12/06/remarks- president-administrations-approach-counterterrorism
