Russian Natural Gas Dependence: The European Commission's Response

Leiden University

Faculty of Governance and Public Affairs

MSc in Public Administration

11 August 2016

Russian Natural Gas Dependence: The European

Commission’s Response

Master Thesis

Author: Felix Sebastian Schulz

Supervisor: Pr. Dr. Joris Voorhoeve

Second Reader: Pr. Dr. Arco Timmermans

! ! ! !

Table&of&Content&

5.1.1 Proposal: Measures to Safeguard Security of Gas Supply#...#39!

5.1.2 Energy 2020: A Strategy for Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy41! 5.1.3 On Security of Energy Supply and International Cooperation – “The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners Beyond Our Boarders”#...#42!

5.1.4 Proposal: Guidelines for trans-European Energy Infrastructure#...#44!

5.1.5 Energy Roadmap 2050#...#45!

5.1.6 Implementation of the Communication on Security of Energy Supply and International Cooperation and of the Energy Council Conclusion of November 2011#...#46!

5.2 Identified Patterns among the Commission’s documents#...#47!

5.2.1 Patterns concerning Threats#...#48!

5.2.2 Patterns concerning Portrayal of the Problem#...#48!

5.2.3 Patterns concerning Goals#...#50!

5.2.4 Patterns concerning Solutions#...#52!

5.3 Analysis#...#54!

5.3.1 The Discursive Construction of Existential Threats#...#54!

5.3.2 The EU and Vulnerable Member States#...#56!

5.3.3 The Commission’s Goals as Extraordinary Means#...#58!

5.3.4#The#Commission’s#Solutions#as#Extraordinary#Means#...#60! 5.3.5#The#Commission#embedded#in#Multi#Policy#Streams#...#62! 5.4#Results#...#65! 6.#Critical#Reflection#on#the#Results#...#68! 7.#Policy#Conclusions:#Reducing#Vulnerability,#Russian#Dependence#and#Beyond#...#70! 8.#Conclusion#...#73! 9. Data of Analysis#...#75! 10. Bibliography#...#76! 11.#Annex#...#81!

! ! ! ! ! ! & & To!my!mother!and!the!people!supporting!me.& & & ! & & & & & & & & & & & & & & &

1.&Introduction&

Energy within the European Union (EU) has two dimensions, which can be differentiated into an internal and an external dimension. The former goes back to the starting point of the EU as such, namely the European Coal and Steel Community. In 1950 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands founded the European Coal and Steel Community in order to create lasting peace through political and economic cooperation 1 . The interconnectivity between these countries indicates the internal aspect of energy security within the EU. It deals either with secure supply of energy among member states or security of supply through transit countries within the EU. In contrast, the external dimension of EU energy security includes the same aspects but applied to a bigger picture and goes beyond EU boarders. Consequently, it is either engaged with security of external energy supply (e.g. Algeria, Norway, Russia) or external transit countries (e.g. Ukraine).

In!recent!years!the!aspect!of!the!external!dimension!has!become!increasingly!important.! One! indicator!is!the!high!dependence!of!the!EU!on!Russian!natural!gas.!The!impact!of! this! dependence! was! shown! by! the! gas! disputes! between! Russia! and! Ukraine! in! 2006! and! 2009.! Gas! supply! through! Ukraine! stopped! in! 2006! for! four! days! during! winter,! whereas! the! disruptions! in! 2009! were! more! severe! and! prolonged.! In! total! the! disruptions! lasted! over! two! weeks.! During! this! time! seventeen! European! states! were! affected! and! Bulgaria! and! Slovakia! suffered! even! a! total! cut! off! from! Russian! natural! gas2_{.! These! events! revealed! the! importance! of! a! constant! flow! of! natural! gas! from!}

supplier!to!customer.!In!addition,!EU!member!states!noticed!that!the!flow!of!natural!gas! should! not! be! taken! for! granted,! even! if! the! contracts! between! supplier! and! customer! have!a!longJterm!range.!!

After! the! gas! disputes,! the! Commission! released! the! first! list! of! Projects! of! Common! Interest!(PCI)!in!2013.!According to the Commission, the PCI are projects with the aim of integrating the EU energy market, crucial for completing the European internal energy market and decisive for reaching the EU’s energy policy goals of affordable, secure and sustainable energy3. Most of the projects are related to electricity and gas transmission, but also include electricity storage, LNG terminals, underground gas storage and smart grids4. The projects benefit from a faster planning and administrative granting process, a single national competent authority, lower costs regarding administration, higher transparency and better !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1_{!EU!(2016,!August)!} 2_{!Stulberg!(2015,!P.!117)!} 2_{!Stulberg!(2015,!P.!117)!} 3_{!COM!(2016b)!} 4_{!COM!(2013b,!P.!1)!}

public participation and, lastly, the possibility of receiving financial support. Under the umbrella of the Connecting Europe Facility (ECF), 5,85 Billion Euro between 2014 and 2020 are available for grants or financial instruments5. However, projects are not funded automatically but chosen by the Commission. Consequently, the overall purpose of the PCI is manifold and constitutes of benefitting at least two EU member states, contributing to the integration of electricity markets, improving security of supply, greater competition within the EU and more electricity from renewable energy6.

According to Günther Oettinger, the PCI “would do nothing less than revolutionize Europe’s energy system”7. This energy revolution does not appear out of the blue. The question my research is based on is how did these projects come to the forefront. Hence, I am trying to reveal the process resulting in the establishment of the PCI. The research question I want to answer is, what process led to the political decision of the PCI list in the NSI East Gas Corridor.

My underlying assumptions reflect two theoretical approaches. First, I predict that the discourses within the EU Commission are influenced by the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes and affected their understanding of energy security in such a way that they perceived the PCI as means to alleviate the threat of Russian supply disruptions. Second, I assume that the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes opened a window of opportunity, where the Commission could place its agenda on energy security. These assumptions lead to the purposes of my research, to establish a causal explanation of how specific crisis events influence political decisions and if either constructivist securitization discourses or the multi stream approach (MSA) explain the Commission’s approach better.

In order to explain this connection and the informative value of the theories, I focus on a single case study of high importance for the EU. This importance is reflected through the large investment the EU provides for the funding and the nature of energy as a crucial source for maintaining social functions today and in the future. In! this! context! the! former! Commissioner! Jose! Manuel! Barroso! emphasized! “[i]f I am asked today what is the most important issue for global security and development, the issue with the highest potential for solutions but also for serious problems if we do not act in the right way, it is energy and climate change…!It!is!the!great!challenge!of!our!generation”8_.!

The structure of the paper reads as follows. First, I provide a general overview of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

5_!Ibid.!

6_{!Terna!(2016,!August)!}

7_{!Van!Renssen!(2011,!October)!} 8_{!Barroso!(2007,!P.!2)!}

European natural gas sector and its main supplier, in order to introduce the reader to the general context of the thesis. Afterwards, I discuss the literature about crisis events and how they shape the agenda and how the securitization theory and the multi stream approach contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how this process unfolds in the energy sector. In addition, I elucidate the literature about energy security and vulnerability and how I position myself within this debate. The next step is concerned with the theoretical framework, which is split in two parts. First, I delineate the Copenhagen School and how the Paris School differentiates itself from it. Second, I present the MSA and how it can be applied to the energy sector. Within this context I illustrate what I understand as a securitization process and MSA, which is then constructed into hypotheses. In the fourth chapter, I present the methodology, including the case selection, unit of analysis, the dependent and independent variables and how they are measured. The last section deals with the limitations of my research. In the analytical chapter, I present the data collection and discuss the findings. Afterwards, the results are presented and the hypotheses answered. Furthermore, the results are complemented with two documents from the European Parliament in order to test my findings. In the next chapter, I reflect critically on the results. After providing policy conclusions in chapter seven, chapter eight includes my conclusion and answers the research question. In addition, I elaborate on the appropriateness of the theory and describe possible incentives for further research.

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1.1&Natural&Gas&Supply&in&the&European&Union&

In order to present the impact of crisis events for the NSI East Gas corridor it is decisive to portray a picture of the European natural gas market and how it is embedded in this sector. The central questions are who is getting how much from whom for what purpose through what means. In 2013 natural gas represented 23% of the total energy consumption in the EU, making it the second most important energy source after crude oil9_{. Within the same year the}

EU produced 131,9 million tons (Mtoe) of natural gas, whereas the gross inland consumption constituted 386,8 Mtoe10. This led to the necessity of importing the missing 65,3% of natural gas, in order to meet the EU’s demand and making the EU the biggest importer of natural gas

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

9_{!COM!(2015,!P.!22)!} 10_{!COM!(2015,!P.!174)!}

in general and the biggest importer based on pipelines (70%)1112. Within the EU the only net exporter are The Netherlands and Denmark, making it mostly dependent on external supply13. In 2013 the main supplier of natural gas were Russia, Norway, and Algeria14. Russia delivered 39,0% of the imported gas, Norway 29,5%, and Algeria 12,8%15. After examining the period between 1995 and 2013 one can contemplate an increase of import dependency from 43,4% to 65,3%, indicating the rising importance of natural gas for the EU 16. In total, sixteen countries are over 90% dependent on external natural gas supply, namely BE, BG, CZ, EE, IE, EL, ES, FR, LV, LT, LU, PT, RO, SI, SK, FL, and SE17. Countries located within the NSI East Gas corridor being 90% dependent and more consist of BG, CZ, RO, and SK. In addition, the amount of member states importing all their needs from a single supplier is nearly equally high. Besides IE, importing natural gas from the UK and SE, importing from DK, member states such as BG, SE, LV, EE, FI, IE, LT and SK, receive their natural gas exclusively from Russia18. The only countries placed in the NSI East Gas corridor are BG and SK.

The biggest net-importer of natural gas within the EU, are Germany (23,7%), Italy (14,7%), the United Kingdom (12,0%), and France (11,0%)19.

Natural gas is delivered to the EU either through pipelines or tankers. The former is conducted through a system of high-pressure transmission systems and local distribution grids. The latter involves tankers, injecting liquefied natural gas (LNG) into the grid via re-gasification terminals, where the gas is reheated and transformed into gas again20. These necessary investments for ensuring a functional supply chain indicate a high capital-intensity in distribution and transportation infrastructure and explain why the system is expensive to maintain21.

Natural gas reaches the EU from several directions. The EU can be split into four main gas corridors, existing of the North-Eastern corridor (from Russia), the North-Western corridor (from Norway), the South-Western corridor (from Algeria), and the South-Eastern corridor !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 11_{!IEA!(2014,!P.!52)!} 12_!Ibid.! 13_{!COM!(2015,!P.!72)!} 14_{!COM!(2015,!P.!65)!} 15_{!COM!(2015,!P.!26)!} 16_{!COM!(2015,!P.!24)!} 17_{!COM!(2015,!P.!72)!} 18_{!COM!(2013b,!P.!16)!} 19_{!COM(2015,!P.!56)!} 20_{!COM!(2013b,!P.!14)!} 21_{!IEA!(2014,!P.!53)!}

(from Caucasus and still under development). The main supply route is the North-Eastern corridor with 23% of the EU’s total consumption, followed by the North-Western (18%) and the South-Western (10%)22.

Natural gas arriving in the EU serves several purposes. It is predominantly used for generating electricity and heating. The former constitutes 16,6% of the total generation and the latter 40,2%2324. Approximately one-quarter of the natural gas is used for the residential sector, within which heating accounts for the highest demand, whereas the majority of natural gas is used for electricity generation (in 2006-2010 about 25%)2526.

The future demand of the EU is assumed to rise, making it also in the future the largest natural gas importer world-wide27. Nowadays the natural gas market is becoming more global due to inter-regional trade and longer pipelines. The volume of natural gas is expected to increase between 2012 and 2018 by 30%. The increasing connectivity among gas markets would increase the effect supply disruptions between two states have on the global market28. In the EU there are currently two main ways of gas trading mechanisms, having an effect on the security of supply of member states. They constitute of long-term contracts and spot markets. Long-term contracts are negotiated bilaterally and are normally oil-indexed. Usually they include a take-or-pay clause, stating that the buyer has to purchase in advance a brokered amount of gas, notwithstanding the country’s actual demand. The spot market model functions as a regular market and provides a trading platform for the demand and supply side. Because of the economic nature, these spot markets are more flexible and are able to adjust to changes in demand or supply29. The most important trading platforms are located in Northern and Western Europe (APX UK, APX NL, Powernext, EEX), whereas Southern Europe is equipped with less developed platforms. In contrast, Central and Eastern Europe have no equivalent platform and the gas price is still oil-indexed30. Member states making use of more market-based mechanisms are less impacted by supply disruptions as has been shown by the German case during the gas supply shortage in 201231.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 22_{!European!Parliament!(2009,!P.!8)!} 23_{!COM!(2015,!P.!91)!} 24_{!COM!(2015,!P.!110)!} 25_{!IEA!(2014,!P.!49)!} 26_{!COM!(2013b,!P.!14)!} 27_{!IEA!(2014,!P.!52)!} 28_{!IEA!(2014,!P.!49)!} 29_{!COM!(2013b,!P.!15)!} 30_!Ibid.! 31_{!COM!(2013b,!P.!15)!}

Until 2010, gas prices and oil prices correlated to a great extend in Europe, due to the mentioned oil-indexing32. Since spot markets for natural gas increased in importance, a declining global oil price and a low demand for natural gas have led to the re-negotiation of many indexed contracts. Therefore more gas contracts are linked to the spot markets33. The results are lower gas prices, because spot markets reflect the actual relationship between supply and demand34. Since 2009 gas prices were more and more decoupled from oil prices, and in 2012 and 2013 one could not observe significant movements in both resources.

Recent developments regarding gas pricing indicate differences among larger EU member states. For example, in Italy consumer gas prices declined by 10% in 2014 whereas other EU regions did not face such a significant decline. Italy also had the highest consumer gas price among larger EU economies with 9,5€ per kWh, followed by Spain (8,9€), France (7,3€), and Germany (6,9€). The EU average amounted 7,9€ per kWh35_.

After providing a general overview of the European natural gas sector in terms of supply and economic organization, I explain the special role of Russia for the natural gas supply of the EU as the main supplier of natural gas. Within this chapter, I also elucidate the process of the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes in 2006 and 2009.

&

1.2&The&EU&Supply&of&Natural&Gas&from&Russia&via&Ukraine&&

Most of the natural gas to the EU is supplied from Russia. The amount of Russian natural gas constituted of 39,0% in 201336. For decades Russia has been a reliable supplier of energy to the EU37. However, the gas crises in 2006 and 2009 interrupted the reliability of Russia’s supply. The history of the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine can be traced back to the 1990s, when Ukraine started to purchase gas from the affiliate Ukrgazprom of Gazprom38_.

The close ties between the two countries in term of natural gas started in the 1960s when infrastructure for Ukrainian industry and related urban expansion was steered to gas as the preferred energy source39. After the fall of the Soviet Union, a mutual dependence was created, due to Ukraine as the main transit country to the EU and Ukraine’s dependence on Russian gas. The economic decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union emphasized this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 32_{!ECB!(2014,!P.!33)!} 33_{!ECB!(2014,!P.!33!f.)!} 34_{!ECB!(2014,!P.!34)!} 35_{!ECB!(2014,!P.!35)!} 36_{!COM!(2015,!P.!26)!} 37_{!COM!(2008,!P.!3)!} 38_{!IEA!(2009,!P.!35)!} 39_{!Pirani!(2009,!5)!}

dependency. Ukraine needed Russia as a supplier because of lacking alternatives and Russia relied on Ukraine as a transit country for receiving steady gas revenues from the EU. The time was characterized though divergent problems, such as deliveries to Ukraine significantly under the market price, gas theft from Ukraine, increasing Ukrainian debt for Russian gas. Consequently, several supply disruptions occurred on various occasions40. During the 2000s Russia and Ukraine recovered economically, but other problems related to high oil prices appeared. The oil-indexed gas price rose steadily since 2002, resulting in huge divergences between European gas prices and prices charged from countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent Countries (CIS). In Ukraine a dispute occurred in January 2006, because of gas prices and the circumstances of importing gas. The reason was that Gazprom and Ukraine were more divided than ever about the adjustment of prices, how the Turkmen-Russian-Ukrainian relation would be administered and what the role of mediators would be41. Consequently, Gazprom halted the gas flow through Ukraine on 1 January, constituting of 80% of its deliveries to the EU42. The dispute resulted in disruptions to the EU but gas was never cut off completely. It was the first time the supply dropped significantly to the EU, even though the impact on the countries was not regarded as severe43. The dispute was settled on 4 January by an agreement on pricing, including average prices with Central Eastern suppliers. However, the agreement was regarded as weak and left issues unsolved because the Ukrainian economy could not cope with the additional burden of higher gas prices and the government would use its transit position as a bargaining instrument 4445. The issue of the divergent pricing continued and was the reason for the second gas dispute to occur. Both sides failed to come to an agreement before the end of 2008 with respect to gas prices and how to handle the Ukrainian debt. The negotiations stopped because Ukraine wanted to raise the transit fees, even though they were already settled in a different agreement. Another factor for the second dispute to occur were the significant Ukrainian debt and additional fines for delayed payment46. Even though both parties confirmed that European states were granted supply, the events of 2009 portray a different image47. Gazprom cut all supplies to Ukraine 1 January, while supply to Europe continued. Supply to the EU stopped !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 40_!Ibid.!! 41_{!Pirani!(2009,!P.!8)!} 42_{!IEA!(2006,!P.!25)!} 43_!Ibid.! 44_{!IEA!(2006,!P.!26)!} 45_{!Pirani!(2009,!P.!9)!} 46_{!IEA!(2009,!P.!36)!} 47_!Ibid.!

on 7 January and returned to normal on the 22 January48. The impact differed among EU member states and the countries with no LNG terminals, no sufficient gas storage and no connectors to neighboring countries, suffered the most from the dispute49.

After having described the relation between Russia and the EU in terms of natural gas and the context of the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes, the next chapter deals with possible emergency response mechanisms for natural gas.

1.3&Emergency&response&measures&for&natural&gas&

Natural gas involves some specific features distinguishing it from other energy sources, such as crude oil. It is less replaceable than oil, especially when it comes to transportation to consumers. The downstream transport takes place exclusively through pipelines and no other means can be used. In cases of a destroyed or damaged downstream infrastructure, the supply usually completely stops, while other supply routes are not feasible50.

Emergency measures should be seen as means of last resort. They should be undertaken when the market shows its inability to cope with the occurring fluctuations. Consequently, emergency measures are not available for the market under regular conditions51. One possible measure is setting up emergency gas stocks. Currently there are two main ways of storing gas, namely under- and aboveground. The decision of investing in either of the two depends on the geological circumstances, security and commercial requirements, structure, and household of a country. The rate at which gas can be added or taken out of the stock depends on the type of gas storage. Consequently, it is desirable to have a mix of withdrawal rates in order to ensure a complete response mechanism with divergent extraction rates52.

The costs of setting up gas storage facilities are, compared to the ones of oil, five times higher. The investment costs for building LNG storage is even higher with around ten times the amount of stocks in oil tanks and around fifty times higher than underground oil storage per tonne stored53. Additionally, there are varying costs for maintaining gas storage facilities. Economic factors determining the price are personnel costs, interest rates and maintaining costs54. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 48_{!Pirani!(2009,!P.!19)!} 49_{!IEA!(2009,!P.!36)!} 50_{!IEA!(2014,!P.!53!f.)!} 51_{!IEA!(2014,!P.!54!f.)!} 52_{!IEA!(2014,!P.!55)!} 53_!Ibid.! 54_!Ibid.!

Another emergency response is employing additional LNG tankers for the LNG market. Since the LNG market is expanding, a customizable response is feasible in each IEA regional market. However, due to the global characteristic of the market, an increase of demand in one region reduces supply in another one and consequently puts pressure on the price55

Switching fuels is another emergency measure countries can conduct in order to meet their need. For example, some power stations are able to switch from gas to light oil under the costs of lesser efficiency and increased maintenance costs56.

The response measures mentioned above differ in the EU and the NSI East Gas corridor from member state to member state. Reasons are based on the geological features of a country, making it not feasible in some cases to set up certain types of gas storage, or budget related constraints, when more efficient measures are too expensive. This issue is also touching upon the debate about vulnerability of countries. If a country has not the necessary resources in order to create emergency response mechanisms it is more likely to be exposed to the risk of severe consequences during gas disruptions.

After providing a detailed insight into the EU natural gas sector and what response mechanisms exist in order to deal with supply disruptions, I turn to the literature review. Within the next chapter it is explained what possible explanations can be found from public administration for answering the research question at hand.

!

2. Literature Review

The literature, in which my research is embedded, derives from the research question, regarding what process influenced the political decision of implementing the list of PCI in the NSI East Gas corridor. I seek to find out how leaders interpret specific phenomena and realities and how they articulate their experiences into political decisions. Hence, the research is anchored in the field of public administration as "the study of government decision-making, the analysis of the policies themselves, the various inputs that have produced them, and the inputs necessary to produce alternative policies"57. Bearing in mind the variety of literature in public administration, the literature addressed in this chapter embraces three dimensions. First, I present from the public administration literature about how crisis events shape and influence political decisions, how securitization and MSA contribute to the field and, lastly, the literature about vulnerability and energy security.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

55_{!IEA!(2014,!P.!56)!} 56_{!IEA!(2014,!P.!57)!}

First, I present my understanding of crises and what particularities are surrounding them. Even though the term of crisis has not been adequately researched, according to Borodzicz (2005), one has to distinguish the motion from disasters and emergencies clearly58. This differentiation needs to be done in order to allow precise responses to crises and permit precise theorizing59. Heinzen (1996) presents a plausible way of approaching crisis events, incorporating the former mentioned details and characterizes crises in four steps. They constitute of a series of events, might be the outcome of a disaster, the origin is multi-faced and solutions to the crises are unclear and not determined in advance60.

In the constructivist stream of thought crisis events can be regarded as ideas shaping the perception of reality. From the perspective of discursive institutionalism, political decisions, such as the PCI, are the outcome of ideas and discourses. According to Schmidt (2008), ideas and discourses are the driving forces fostering institutional change. In that context, ideas are the substance of discourses and constitute of the interactive means of transporting ideas61. The external dimension of institutional change becomes less relevant because of ideas, focusing on internal constructs and structures of agents. These agents generate institutional change through assigning meaning to certain subjects within a specific context, explaining how institutions are created, persist or change62. In the case of the EU’s debt crises, Schmidt (2014) shows that crises influence political leaders’ perception of reality and shape the solutions they come up with63. The weakness of this approach is that it depends to a large extent on the researchers inherent subjective understanding of reality and provides no guideline of how certain ideas are formulated into political decisions and how the process behind the transformation unfolds.

A different understanding of how the political decision of the PCI list was taken derives from the literature on agenda setting and policy-making. For instance, Downs (1972) describes a so-called “issue attention cycle” consisting out of five stages, where the!attention!regarding! one!issue!goes!up!until!it!reaches!a!tipping!point!and!afterwards!goes!down,!because!it! has! been! replaced! by! other! issues! or! it! has! been! solved.! Downs! (1972)! illustrates! his! model!in!the!context!of!environmental!concerns!in!the!US!and!illuminates!how!societal! actors!perceive!the!topic!differently.!Noteworthy!is!the!second!stage,!where!the!public! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 58_{!Borodzicz!(2005,!P.!78)!} 59_{!Borodzicz!(2005,!P.!76)!} 60_{!Heinz!(1996,!P.!16!f.)!} 61_{!Schmidt!(2008,!P.!321!f.)!} 62_!Ibid.! 63_{!Schmidt!(2014,!P.!206)!}

becomes!aware!of!the!problem!and!people!urge!to!take!action!against!the!issue64_.!The!

issue!attention!cycle!could!explain!how!the!list!of!PCI!came!to!the!forefront,!because!it! traces!a!process!from!the!discovery!of!an!issue!to!the!undertaken!solution.!Nevertheless,! it! lacks! to! provide! an! in! depth! understanding! why! certain! actors! undertook! specific! decisions.!!!!

An alternative approach, also related to agenda setting, derives from the theory of punctuated equilibrium. It is originated in evolutionary biology and was developed by the paleontologists Eldredge and Gould65. The model inspired Baumgartner & Bryan (1993) to explain policy change in the US and consequently introduced the model into social science. According to Baumgartner & Bryan (1993) the theory implies that areas in a political system are connected and that policy ideas exchanging beyond these areas’ frontiers. Related to agenda setting and policy-making periods, one can observe phases of stability and small adjustments, whereas other phases are marked through more significant changes, involving a more radical impact on the agenda. Reasons for the shifts involve “information signals increase in magnitude and cascade in the social and political environment”66_{. According to Princen (2013) the model}

unfolds in two ways, describing individual issues and one that examines the general distribution of policy change. The former is mainly applied to EU decision-making, whereas the latter still needs further development67. Alexandrova et. al. (2012), illustrate in their article “Policy Punctuations and Issue Diversity on the European Council Agenda” the general agenda distribution of agenda and policy change and diversity over time. In their explanatory study, they apply the theory of punctuated equilibrium to the European Council and analyze how its agenda changes and diversifies over time. In this context they argue that the European Council needs to react fast to so-called focusing events. These events give a certain issue the notion of urgency68. Applied to my research, one could identify certain events as focusing events, but the process I am interested in, is not revealed entirely. The theory leaves the perception and interpretation of certain events aside, what would be necessary to reveal, and the reasons why certain solutions were taken.

After paying attention to the discursive institutionalism, the “issue attention cycle” and the theory of punctuated equilibrium, one has to choose an approach allowing to interpret the leaders’ decisions and, at the same time, shed light on the transformation process. Following I !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 64_{!Downs!(1972,!P.!39)!} 65_{!Gould!(2007,!P.!3)!} 66_{!Alexandrova!et.!al.!(2012,!P.!72)!} 67_{!Princen!(2013,!P.!854)!} 68_{!Alexandrova!et.!al.!(2012,!80)!}

present two possible explanations from a constructivist perspective and how they contribute to the understanding of how political decisions are made.

The first view on crisis events derives from the perspective of security as either the “freedom from danger, or a show of force (or strength), able to respond to or deter threats”69. Security in that sense serves the purpose to avoid crisis in the form of threats, which is also covered by the concept Heinzen (1996) uses. Within the literature about security, the Copenhagen School stands out because of its contextual security approach. The constructivist securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School argues that security is not only socially constructed, but is the result of an inter-subjective process. Securitization!as!a!concept!was!first!developed! by! Ole! Waever! in! his! contribution! Security) the) Speech) Act:) Analysing) the) Politics) of) a) Word) (1989)) and! he! then! developed! his! ideas! further! in! Securitization) and) Desecuritization) (1995).! Afterwards! Barry Buzan, Ole Waever & Jaap de Wilde brought their knowledge together in order to frame a consistent theory in their contribution Security: a new framework for analysis (1998). In this context, securitization is characterized as lifting an issue above politics and beyond established rules. Therefore, it can be seen as an extreme version of politicization70. Since then, a variety of securitization studies arise, due to its wide range of application and ability to incorporate divergent sectors, such as the military, economy, politics society and environment71_{. This causes Balzacq!(2015)!to!state!that!one!}

cannot!observe!one!securitization!theory,!but!numerous, which, when combined, form the ideal type of securitization72_.

Within the literature, two schools are dominant in the context of securitization. According to Trombetta (2014), the Copenhagen School, representing the philosophical approach, focuses on the outcome of alerting demands and decisive speech acts, and converting the manner of how to deal with an issue73. In contrast, Balzacq (2005), who is one of the representatives of the social approach of securitization, proposes to develop a strategic and pragmatic practice in order to focus on structural facts, incorporating the context, the psycho-cultural composition of the audience, and the mechanism letting the listener and speaker interact. However, the focus of the research should be to increase the understanding of how processes unfold in the empirical world and, therefore, the researcher should attach value to the approach, which fits

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 69_{!Borodzicz!(2005,!P.!50)!} 70_{!Buzan!et.!al.!(1998,!P.!23)!} 71_{!Buzan!et.!al.!(1998,!P.!30)!} 72_{!Balzacq!(2015,!P.!103)!} 73_{!Trombetta!(2014,!P.!133)!}

his/her research question and methodological approach best74. For instance, Trombetta (2014) uses both schools to explain, on the one hand, environmentally and climate-induced migration and, on the other hand, migration in general. The combination of both schools allows her to create a more accurate and precise picture of climate-induced migration75.

Choosing an approach fitting the researchers approach caused Léonard & Kaunert (2010) to use Kingdon’s policy stream model in order to provide a better understanding of how the audience interacts with the securitizing actor.

Untangled from the securitization theory, Kingdon’s (1984) three-stream-model offers itself a plausible way of describing the process behind the implementation of political decisions. His constructivist approach is inspired by the puzzle of what makes an idea to evolve and change the agenda76_{. To this end, he develops three explanations constituting of three major policy}

streams, the problem, policy and politics stream, explaining policy change77_{. When the}

streams overlap a policy window opens, being characterized by critical times and consequently policy entrepreneurs can place an issue on the agenda78. In the process of my research, I aim to explain which of the two constructivist theories serves better to explain the Commission’s response to the Russian dependence on natural gas.

The third dimension my research refers to is vulnerability and energy security. The two concepts are closely connected, shown by Cherp & Jewell (2014). They define energy security as ‘the low vulnerability of vital energy systems’79. In this context, vital energy systems mean maintaining critical social functions, while vulnerability touches upon the combination of exposure to risks and resilience capacities80. Here, risk is assessed through the lens of three disciplines. The first is the ‘sovereignty perspective’, examining the issue from the political science perspective. The second is the ‘robustness perspective’, with its roots in natural science and engineering. The third is the ‘resilience perspective’, contemplating the issue of energy security through an economic approach81. Each perspective focuses on decisive features, but also overlaps with the others. For instance, disruptions, due to natural catastrophes or market volatilities, urge politicians to undertake measures in order to encounter them. An! important! distinction! needs! to! be! done! between! vulnerability! and! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 74_{!Balzacq!(2005,!P.!111)!} 75_{!Trombetta!(2014,!P.!144)!} 76_{!Kingdon!(1984,!P.!1)!} 77_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!92!f.)!} 78_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!165)!} 79_{!Cherp!&!Jewell!(2014,!P.!419)!} 80_!Ibid.! 81_!Ibid.!

import! dependency,! because! of! the! fact! that! a! country! can! be! at! the! same! time! dependent! and! not! vulnerable82_{.! However,! a! country! producing! its! own! energy! by!}

means! of! old! technologies! or! at! inadequate! costs! is! considered! vulnerable.! On! the! contrary,!a!country!importing!most!of!its!energy!needs!at!sustainable!costs!and!through! diversified! suppliers,! is! mere! dependent! but! not! vulnerable83_{.! In! addition,! the!}

perspective!from!which!vulnerability!is!examined!is!crucial!because!vulnerability means different things to different actors across the supply chain84. For the purpose of my research the focus lies on the supply side and leaves other perspectives aside.

The notion of energy security itself is discussed controversially in the literature. Ang et. al. (2015), who conducted a study on energy security definitions, found out that there is no agreed definition of the concept. Nevertheless, one can observe several key ideas, but energy security itself remains contextual85. Classic!formulations!of!the!term!energy!security!focus! on!the!notions!of!affordability!and!availability!of!energy,!as!presented!by!Deese!(1979).! Also!today!the!aspects!of!availability!and!affordability!are!included!in!the!definition!of! energy! security.! In the 1980s and 1990s, according to Umbach (2012), the traditional interpretation of energy security meant the all-time availability of energy in numerous forms, an adequate amount, and at an affordable price. Furthermore, it depended either on the perspectives of the producer, the consumer, or the transit-state, leading to the outcome that no precise definition could be developed86. According to Chester (2010), the reason why no common definition could be agreed upon, is because the term energy security is too slippery and multidimensional. As a result, Winzer (2012) is in favor of narrowing the notion of energy security down, in order to obtain a quantifiable definition.

In my research I follow the definition of energy security of the European Commission, constituting of the institution of which perspective I examine energy security concerns. The IEA (2014), the UNDP (2000) and the World Energy Council (2008) use the same definition of energy security, whereas the last two do not refer to the environment87. The Commission defines the concept of energy security as “uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price while respecting environmental concerns”88. Energy security is understood from the perspective of supplies, which are unequally distributed throughout the world, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 82_{!WEC!(2008,!P.!1)!} 83_{!WEC!(2008,!P.!1)!} 84_{!Bhattacharayya!(2011,!P.!448)!} 85_{!Ang!et.!al.!(2015,!P.!1081)!} 86_{!Umbach!(2012,!P.!376)!} 87_!Ibd.! 88_{!COM!(2013b,!P.!5)!}

creating dependencies among the actors. This leads the Commission to the assumption that threats for supply arise from inadequate diversified energy sources, politically unstable suppliers and transit countries, competition over energy sources and accidents resulting from technical or natural disasters or terrorism89.

In this chapter I delineated the three dimensions my research is embedded in, and presented possible answers to my research question from the field of public administration. Afterwards, I narrowed the answers down to the securitization theory and MSA and elaborated on the concepts of vulnerability and energy security. In the following chapter I demonstrate the application of the securitization theory in combination with Stone’s (2012) concept of “goals” and MSA in the energy sector.

3.&Conceptual&Framework&&

In!the!previous!chapter!I!executed!the!argument!why!the!securitization!theory!and!MSA! constitute! of! appropriate! theories! to! answer! the! research! question! at! hand! and! I! provided!the!reader!with!the!definitions!I!am!using,!regarding!vulnerability!and!energy! security.! In! this! chapter! I! aim! to! elaborate! on! my! understanding! of! a! securitization! process!and!MSA!and!how!they!are!applied!in!the!energy!sector!and!how!they!contribute! to!our!understanding!of!vulnerability!and!energy!security.!!

&

3.1&The&Securitization&of&Natural&Gas&in&the&EU&

In the following chapter I provide a short definition of what constitutes of securitization in my research and then apply the framework to the natural gas sector in the EU. From the perspective of the Copenhagen School, securitization consists of a securitizing actor presenting an existential threat for a referent object in a speech act to an audience and, after the audience accepted the threat, extraordinary means are taken in order to tackle it90. The process behind this is inter-subjective and socially constructed, reflecting the social constructivist nature of the theory91.

The! field! of! energy! is,! due! to! its! importance! for! a! state’s! survival,! a! crucial! subject! to! securitization! and,! at! the! same! time,! connected! to! other! referent! objects! in! different! sectors92_{.!As!a!result,!the!issue!is!infrequently!understood!independently!but!often!part!} !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 89_!Ibid.! 90_{!Buzan!et.!al.!(1998,!P.!25!ff.)!} 91_{!Buzan!et.!al.!(1998,!P.!31)!} 92_{!Christou!&!Adamides!(2013,!P.!510)!}

of! a! broader! picture,! affecting! politics,! the! economy,! or! the! military93_{.! Since! the!}

industrialization,!energy,!for maintaining social functions and the overall survival of states, gained significant importance94. For most of the 20th century, energy security was concerned with the supply of oil as the dominant energy source, because of the importance of modern armies and economies95_{. The oil crisis in 1973/74 and 1979/80, culminating in high oil-prices}

and shortages, revealed the high dependence of Western states of Middle-Eastern suppliers and caused many European states to diversify their energy sources96. Nowadays natural gas consists of the third most important energy source after oil and coal. It is brought to the end consumers via pipelines and LNG tankers, making it, compared to oil, a relatively inflexible energy source.

Traditionally, securitization, as the Copenhagen School formulated the concept in their contribution Security: a new framework for analysis (1998), included five!distinctive!sectors! consisting! of! military,! economy,! politics,! society! and! environment97_{.! Since! energy! is! a!}

multidisciplinary! field,! touching! aspects! of! all! the! former! sectors,! it! is! difficult! to! categorize.! It! applies! not! only! to! divergent! sectors! but! can! also! be! applied! to! the! international,!national,!regional,!and!individual!level!and!embrace!various!actors,!such! as! states,! companies,! NGOs,! international! institutions,! and! lobbies98_{.! Hence,! debates!}

about! the! expansion! of! sectors! arose! among! scholars! and! it! is! still! unclear! whether! energy!is!seen!as!a!referent!object!or!as!an!additional!sector99_.!!

Talking about the process of energy securitization, one has to bear in mind the three stages of energy supply, consisting of production, transportation and consumption. Due to the unevenly distribution of natural gas and demand, a situation of dependence arises between supplier, transit country and consumer, whereas the focus mainly lies on the supply side100101. In the EU this is reflected through the high dependence on external natural gas supply. Therefore, natural gas in the EU’s energy sector is likely to be lifted above politics and securitized. A particularity about energy securitization is the form of how the speech act is presented. Nowadays the number of governments increases, incorporating energy security within their

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 93_!Ibid.! 94_{!Sovacool!&!Brown!(2009,!P.!8)!} 95_{!Cherp!&!Jewell!(2011,!P.!202)!} 96_{!Krakasis!(2015,!P.!10)!} 97_{!Buzan!et.!al.!(1998,!P.!30)!} 98_{!Özcan!(2013,!P.!13)!} 99_{!Christou!&!Adamides!(2013,!P.!509!f.)!} 100_{!Özcan!(2013,!P.!13)!} 101_{!Nyam!(2014,!P.!45)!}

national agendas. This means, specifically, that they transform the speech act into official documents and thereby place it within the public discourse102. An accompanying particularity is the government as the securitizing actor. If certain threats are recurrent, securitization can become institutionalized103. This is shown through the implementation of ministries dealing with energy security on the national level. By mentioning the mere notion of energy security, it is implicitly assumed that the matter is securitized.

As a result of the particularities in the energy sector, regarding securitization, I come up with the following hypothesis: H1: The list of PCI is the outcome of a “securitization process” that occurred among the European Commission officials in the aftermath of the 2006/2009 events. In the following chapters the individual concepts important for my understanding of securitization are highlighted. Moreover, it is shown how the securitization process unfolds.

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3.2&Existential&Threat&in&the&Gas&Sector&

In the previous chapter I described why the natural gas sector in the EU is prone to securitization, what particularities the energy sector contains and how it differentiates itself from other sectors, such as military, economy, society or environment. I outlined my understanding of a securitization process and presented the main hypothesis I want to test. The following chapter concentrates on the fact of how specific events are interpreted as existentially threatening. Taking into account the existential threat, I present the first subsequent hypothesis related to my research.

According to the Copenhagen School, something translates into a security issue not because an objective existential threat exists, but when the issue is interpreted as such104_{. This clarifies}

the subjective character of the portrayal and the discursive construction of a threat through an inter-subjective process105. Characteristic of the existential threat is the point of no return, indicating the need to act urgently and pointing to a possible solution out of the situation106. Even though the construction of the threat unfolds subjectively, the threat needs to be located in the external reality and bear the potential of being prone to be threatening107. Within the securitization process, the actor takes up a threat being perceived as dangerous, to legitimize

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 102_{!Janeliunas!&!Tumkevic!(2013,!P.!65!f.)!} 103_{!Buzan!et.!al.!(1998,!P.!27)!} 104_{!Buzan!et.!al.!(1998,!P.!24)!} 105_{!Buzan!et.!al.!(1998,!P.!31)!} 106_{!Buzan!et.!al.!(1998,!P.!33)!} 107_{!Balzacq!(2005,!P.!182)!}

his/her action to break free of rules, after the audience accepts the issue as a potential threat108.

Potential threats in the energy sector are related to energy security and constitute of the absence of energy, high prices influencing the economic competitiveness and sustainability being related to environmental concerns. In addition, the presentation of threats regarding energy security implies a more objective portrayal109.

Applied to the natural gas sector of the EU, existential threats are primarily concerned with the external dimension of energy security, because of the EU’s high import dependence. However, also the internal dimension of energy security plays a role when examining the overall availability of natural gas. Cherp & Jewell (2011) identify numerous threats, which can be applied to the European natural gas sector. They categorize the threats into sovereignty, robustness and resilience110_{. Potential threats are political embargos, sabotage}

and terrorist attacks, extreme natural events, failure of energy infrastructure, market volatility, variations of climate etc.111. Most of these threats deal with the availability of energy and, afterwards, with the economic competitiveness. Threats to sustainability appear less important than the other ones. It also indicates that the political dimension has become more important than the economic perspective112. If these threats are finally regarded as existentially threatening depends on the framing of the securitizing actor.

After having described how existential threats contribute to the understanding of how crisis events can be perceived, I come up with a hypothesis linking crisis events to an existential threat. Since the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes in 2006 and 2009 resulted in supply disruptions the hypothesis reads as follows: H1.1: The Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes in 2006 and 2009, are regarded as an existential threat by the European Commission.

3.3&The&Multidisciplinary&Nature&of&Referent&Objects&in&the&Gas&Sector&

The previous chapter dealt with potential interpretations of crisis events and how the securitization theory contributes to our understanding of the way these events translate into the actors’ interpretation of threats in the European natural gas sector. In the following chapter I seek to shed light on the referent object of the securitization and what or who is

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 108_!Ibid.! 109_{!Nyam!(2014,!P.!47)!} 110_{!Cherp!&!Jewell!(2011,!P.!207)!} 111_!Ibid.! 112_{!Özcan!(2013,!P.!12)!}

affected by the previously described threat. The description is embedded in the natural gas sector of the EU and emphasizes possible referent objects.

According to Buzan et. al. (1998), the referent object represents objects that are regarded to be existentially threatened and that demand a legitimate right of surviving. Traditionally, the referent object has been the state and, implicitly the nation113. Also in the energy sector one can identify the state as the referent object, as it provides crucial functions for its citizens. One way of identifying referent objects can be done through looking for vital energy systems. They constitute of resources, infrastructure and usages, which are connected through the flow of energy and permit the maintenance of decisive social functions114. However, energy consists of a multidisciplinary sector linked to military, economy, society and environment. Consequently, one cannot mention one precise referent object and it is likely that several sectors are involved and interconnected. In the past the economic perspective of energy has been stressed, through threats related to market volatility and price shocks115. Another way to identify referent objects in the energy sector is done through the concept of vulnerability as the exposure to risks and their resilience116. It is important to consider that both, vital energy systems and vulnerability, do not reflect objective phenomena, but are also socially constructed117. Applied to the EU natural gas sector, referent objects, in case of the absence of natural gas, threaten the economy, the transportation sector and the military, and, therefore, they can claim a legitimate right of survival118. Other possible referent objects are the EU, the EU citizens, single member states, and in general vulnerable costumers being related to divergent sectors.

After describing what the securitization theory perceives as the referent object and how it refers to the EU natural gas sector, I apply the concept to my research. After characterizing the existential threat, the subsequent step of the securitization process is to identify the referent object. The hypothesis I want to test in my research reads as follows. H1.2: The Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes in 2006 and 2009 threatened EU Member States in the NSI East Gas corridor.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 113_{!Buzan!et.!al.!(1998,!P.!36)!} 114_!Ibid.! 115_{!Özcan!(2013,!P.!12)!} 116_{!IEA!(2011,!P.!1)!} 117_{!Cherp!!&!Jewell!(2011,!P.!419)!} 118_{!Özcan!(2013,!P.!11)!}

&

3.4&The&Role&of&Extraordinary&Means&

In the previous chapter I delineated the second step of what I perceive as a securitization process. It has been shown that the referent object in the energy sector is, due to its multidisciplinary manner, difficult to determine and often connected to different referent objects. In this section, I elaborate on the possible solutions, dealing with the initial threat. First, I describe the characteristics of the so-called extraordinary means and, afterwards, how they can be applied to the EU natural gas sector. In addition, I elaborate on Stone’s (2012) concept of policy goals and how they contribute to draw a more nuanced picture of securitization regarding energy security.

A securitization process is witnessed, when an actor assigns priority and urgency to an existential threat and breaks free of rules he/she would be otherwise bound by119. Thus, agents portray an incident as a security issue and claim to be eligible to take extraordinary means to tackle the problem. Within the Copenhagen School this includes a set of connotations, referring to the understanding of “threat defense”, the identification of an adversary or enemy and, finally, the ultimate logic of war120. The concept of extraordinary measures is not static and differs in each case and policy field. They come to existence after the audience has accepted the existential threat and legitimized the securitizing actor to implement the measures he/she proposed, but before the actor has already implied the measures in the portrayal of the solutions to the threat121_.

In the EU natural gas sector, extraordinary means have to be characterized through the ability to deal with emergency cases such as supply disruptions. They need to consist of means, which could not have been implemented if the former threat did not occur. Possible means are the emergency response measures presented by the IEA (2014) in order to deal with emergency situations such as severe supply disruptions. Also in this case, a static understanding of extraordinary means should be avoided and the focus should lie on the notion of priority, urgency and breaking free of rules.

In order to receive a more nuanced picture of the solutions undertaken to deal with the existential threat, I incorporate Stone’s (2012) approach about policy goals regarding security. In general, goals serve as standards for analyzing policy debates122. With respect to!security,! being!regarded!as!a!form!of!ideal!type!of!absolute!safety!and!the!absence!of!bad!things! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 119_{!Buzan!et.!al.!(1998,!P.!25)!} 120_{!Waever!(1995,!P.!54)!} 121_{!Buzan!et.!al.!(1998,!P.!33)!} 122_{!Stone!(2012,!P.!14)!}

happening,! she! sketches! out! three! perspectives! on! security123_{.! First,! she! presents! the!}

political!ideal!where!politicians!inhibit!harmful!things!from!happening!through!policies,! second!the!psychological!ideal,!where!people!do!not!learn!about!insecurity,!and!third!the! scientific! ideal,! where! it! is! tried! to! maximize! security124_{.! Applying! Stone’s! (2012)!}

understanding! of! security! as! policy! goals! to! the! natural! gas! sector! of! the! EU! helps! to! portray! the! big! picture! of! energy! security.! Especially! the! first! perspective! of! how! politicians! avoid! harmful! things! to! occur,! sheds! light! on! the! goals! that! actors! in! the! energy!sector!pursue.!Applied!to!my!research,!I!am!able!to!differentiate!broad!goals!from! specific! solutions! and! gain! an! insight! in! how! far! security! plays! a! role! in! EU! decisionJ making.!

Having!described!extraordinary!means!as!matters!of!priority,!urgency!and!breaking!free! of! rules,! I! want! to! test! the! hypothesis! if! the! final! list! of! PCI! can! be! regarded! as! extraordinary!means!dealing!with!the!initial!crisis!events!of!the!RussianJUkrainian!gas! disputes!in!2006!and!2009.!Consequently,!my!hypothesis!reads!as!follows:!!

H1.3: The PCI are extraordinary means in the NSI East Gas corridor, in order to encounter the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes in 2006 and 2009.

In the previous chapters the securitization theory has been described and in how far it contributes to a better understanding of the natural gas sector in the EU. The following chapter presents the MSA of Kingdon (1984) and illustrates how it is embedded in the energy sector.

&

3.5&Kingdon&and&the&Multi&Policy&Stream&in&the&Energy&Sector&

In! the! previous! chapter! securitization! and! its! particularities! in! the! energy! sector! has! been!introduced!in!order!to!provide!the!reader!with!a!possible!concept!to!understand! the!process!behind!the!implementation!of!the!PCI!list.!In!the!following!chapter,!I!provide! a! different! perspective! on! the! energy! sector! through! Kingdon’s! (1984)! threeJstreamJ model! or! multi! stream! approach.! The! chapter! concludes! with! the! formulation! of! the! competing!hypothesis.!

Kingdon! (1984)! introduced! his! model! as! a! possible! answer! to! the! puzzle! how! policy! change!occurs.!His!model!focuses!on!a!problem,!politics!and!policy!stream,!which,!when! combined!open!a!policy!window!for!a!short!amount!of!time125_!126_{.!However,!only!politics!} !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 123_{!Stone!(2012,!P.!130)!} 124_{!Stone!(2012,!P.!132!f.)!} 125_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!93!f.)!}

and!problem!streams!are!able!to!open!the!policy!window127_{.!The!constructivist!nature!of!}

the!theory!is!reflected!through!the!perception!of!the!participating!parties!that!a!policy! window!opened,!which!in!turn!is!crucial!for!the!policy!change128_!129_{.!Policy!windows!can!}

open! predictably! and! unpredictably! and! they! only! stay! open! for! a! small! period! of! time130_{.! During! this! period! soJcalled! policy! entrepreneurs! push! their! solutions,! they!}

formulated!in!advance!for!the!upcoming!problem!and!use!their!money,!time,!reputation! and! energy! to! reach! their! aims.! In! other! words,! they! use! these! means! to! position! themselves! in! the! policy! realm,! in! order! to! receive! future! gains131_{.! In! addition,! policy!}

entrepreneurs!inherit!three!other!distinct!features.!They!provide!expertise,!are!able!to! speak!for!others!and!are!in!a!relevant!position!in!the!decisionJmaking!process132_.!!

In! the! context! of! my! research! the! Commission! constitutes! of! an! example! of! a! policy! entrepreneur,! incorporating! all! the! mentioned! qualities.! Other! possible! entities! in! the! energy!sector!range!from!state!(executive,!judiciary!and!legislature)!to!nonJstate!actors! (energy!companies,!nature!conservation!organizations,!action!groups!etc.).!Reasons!why! a!window!closes!are!that!it!has!been!seemingly!fixed,!no!alternative!is!available,!people! think!it!is!not!going!anywhere!and!the!problem!passes133_.!

Regarding! the! problem! stream,! Kingdon! (2014)! differentiates! between! conditions! and! problems.!Conditions!are!not!necessarily!a!problem!and!only!become!one!if!it!is!believed! that! something! has! to! be! done! to! engage! them134_{.! Conditions! are! translated! into!}

problems! and! reach! peoples! attention! if! changes! of! indicators,! feedback,! personal! experience,!cirses,!symbols!and!focusing!events!occur135_{.!Applied!to!the!energy!sector,!}

indicators! are! those! features! pointing! to! the! amount! how! much! something! changed.! Therefore! policy! makers! use! them! to! determine! the! magnitude! to! what! extent! something! changed.! Possible! ways! of! application! in! the! energy! sector! are! natural! gas! prices!and!market!volatility!in!general.!Feedback!in!the!energy!sector!could!mean,!that! the!government!or!the!Commission!receives!information!from!market!participants!or!EU! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 126_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!165)!} 127_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!168)!} 128_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!171)!} 129_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!168)!} 130_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!203!f.)!} 131_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!181)!} 132_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!180!f.)!} 133_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!170)!} 134_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!109)!} 135_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!113)!}

member! states.! Regarding! focusing! events! in! the! energy! sector! one! could! think! of! disasters!and!crises.!Possible!events!are!the!nuclear!accident!in!Chernobyl!in!1986!or!the! supply!disruptions!due!to!the!RussianJUkrainian!gas!disputes!in!2006 and 2009.

The issues manifested in the problem stream are dealt with in the policy stream, which is still independent from the former. Within this stream policy solutions are formulated and policy alternatives generated and proposals within the community of specialists are selected after a natural selection process136. Furthermore, in the so-called “primeval soup” ideas occur, float around the former described communities and then disappear137. Related to the energy sector and specifically natural gas, one can examine three overall perspectives. They are related to the supply chain and illustrate the perspectives of supplier, transit country and costumer. For the purpose of my research the view from the costumer is decisive. Consequently, possible solutions presented in the policy stream, refer to energy security. They might constitute of securing internal and external supply, diversification of routes, increasing emergency response measures etc.

The politics stream consists of “public mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and changes of administration”138_{. The}

changes in the political stream have a tremendous impact on the agenda. Consensus among the participants is reached through bargaining, which is accompanied by bandwagoning and coalition building139. Lastly, a shift in the political stream occurs, if either crucial participants shift (e.g. parliament or administrations) or the public mood changes140. Applied to the EU energy sector especially the public mood appears as an important factor, because it influences the policy makers’ decisions significantly141_{. One might think of NGOs or companies}

lobbying for or against certain legislations regarding natural gas, what then is perceived by the policy makers as the public mood. Other possible applications to the energy sector are changing strategies regarding natural gas, because of favoring lower emissions by the newly implemented administration or political party.

After having described the theoretical relevance of the MSA, I assume that the PCI list is rather the outcome of the combination of multiple streams, opening a policy window, within which the Commission placed the PCI list. Consequently, my competing hypothesis to the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 136_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!143!f.)!} 137_!Ibid.! 138_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!145)!} 139_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!149)!} 140_!Ibid.! 141_{!Kingdon!(2014,!P.!147)!}

previous securitization process is the following: H2: The list of PCI is the outcome of the combination of multi streams, occurring in the aftermath of the 2006/2009 events.

!

4.&Methodology&

After! outlining! the! conceptual! framework! I! chose! in! order! to! examine! my! research! question,! I! present! in! the! following! chapter! the! methodological! approach! to! my! research.!It!includes!a!justification!for!the!case!selection,!the!unit!of!analysis,!the!method! for!analyzing!the!data!and!the!connected!data!collection.!Subsequently,!I!operationalize! the! dependent! and! independent! variable! and! explain! how! they! will! be! measured.! I! conclude!with!the!limitations!of!my!research.!

&

4.1&Case&Selection&and&Unit&of&Analysis&

In the following chapter I explain how the case selection unfolded and what the unit of analysis is. In order to answer my research question, I conduct a single case study of how crisis events are transformed into political outcomes. Single case studies have the advantage over other types of studies, of how the researcher arrives at inference and explanation. The analysis takes place within, instead of across cases and they are beneficial when dealing with well-established theories142. The securitization theory and MSA have been successful, because of their straightforward application to the empirical world. In addition, my overarching hypothesis aims to reveal a process within the Commission and assumes that it is influenced through either a securitization process or MSA, making a single case study an appropriate means to answer my research question. In addition, conducting a single case study is appropriate, if the researcher wants to evaluate competing theories and the predictions they make, constituting in my research of the securitization theory and the MSA143.

Focusing on the MESO-level where the Commission operates is justified because of the prerogative position it holds in the EU legislation process related to energy security as a field of shared competences144. As a supranational body it is meant to act beyond the interests of single member states and act on behalf of the EU145. Due to its crucial role in the legislative process, I argue that I am able to capture the initial moment, when crisis events are transformed into the institution’s perception, reflected in policy documents and further influencing the policy outcome.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

142_{!Toshkov!(2016,!P.!285!f.)!} 143_!Ibid.!

144_{!EurJLex!(2016b)!} 145_{!COM!(2016a)!}