How does the risk management approach explain the operation Iraqi Freedom?

(1)

HOW DOES THE RISK MANAGEMENT

APPROACH EXPLAIN THE OPERATION

I

RAQI

F

REEDOM

?

Noora Ida Eveliina Kinnunen ID: s1639374

MSc Crisis and Security Management

Leiden University Campus The Hague – Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs Date: 16.03.2016

Supervisor: Dr. Alastair Reed 2nd Reader: Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker

(2)

Abstract

This thesis explains how the risk management approach outlined by Ulrich Beck in his World Risk Society-work is used in the context of Operation Iraqi Freedom by the United States and the United Kingdom. Risk Management approach has been further developed to include use of force by frameworks provided by Rasmussen, Coker and Clapton and they explain how this sociological concept can be adopted to security and strategic studies. The end of the Cold War created a new security environment that the West needed to adapt to. As the traditional existential threats imposed by other states have disappeared, the West is focused on deterring possible future risks imposed by rogue actors such a terrorism and WMD. This thesis shows how and why the risk management approach has been adopted by the US and the UK administrations, through framing of threats in the case study of Iraq. Concepts such as preventive war, precautionary action and pre-emption are widely used in the current literature when talking about the Western use of force. These concepts are essentially ways of framing the taken action as risk management. The case study of the Iraq war shows in action what part risk language played in the framing of the possible risk Saddam Hussein’s regime posed to the international and regional security. After Kuwait war, Hussein was seen as the key risk in the Middle East and 9/11 created the window of opportunity to act on that risk. The use of risk language and framing Operation Iraqi Freedom as risk management exercise has shown both how to and how not to utilize he risk management approach, from successful framing to catastrophic boomerang effect.

(3)

HOW

DOES

THE

RISK

MANAGEMENT

APPROACH EXPLAIN THE OPERATION IRAQI

FREEDOM

?

“A genuine risk of major war is not from ‘accidents’ in the military machine, but through a diplomatic process of commitment that is itself unpredictable.”1

1. Introduction

The military strategies of the United States and the United Kingdom have gone through changes in the past decades. The end of the Cold War and the lack of existential threats has brought a change in focus. In order to adapt to this new security environment, the US and the UK are focusing on risk management rather than reacting to threats. Risks, being non-imminent and partly constructed by the nature, require new ideas to tackle them. Adopted from sociology, the idea of preventing and deterring risks rather than waging total wars has gained a lot of attention. Theories of security are essentially praxeologies: theories guiding action, whereas the risk management approach can help to guide action taken towards smaller threats and risks. Lawrence Freedman asserts that ‘International security addresses questions of force: how to spot it, stop it, resist it, and occasionally threaten and even use it’.2 This approach applies to risk management, as it is essential to spot the risk, make sure to what ever can be done to prevent or deter it, and if needed, use force to make sure it will not materialise.

1

Thomas Schelling. Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword. Yale University Press, (2008): 93.

2

Lawrence Freedman. “International Security: Changing Targets.” Foreign Policy, no. 110 (1998):

2

Lawrence Freedman. “International Security: Changing Targets.” Foreign Policy, no. 110 (1998): 48.

(5)

The risk management approach is a relatively new idea in the field of security studies and governance of security, which is why the theory is heavily focused on the works of Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck. This thesis argument is based on the adaptation of the Beck’s World Risk Society and prevention of risk, because Giddens focuses more on the governance side of risk management it is not as relevant in this research. In order to understand the military strategy adopted by the US and the UK during Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is important to understand the role risks play in international security. In the 21st Century, Western states are left with very few existential threats, so the US and the UK have adopted a more preventive and precautionary approach to possible threats. Through the concepts of prevention, precaution and pre-emption, the West has adopted risk language to its approach to deter possible risks to its safety. The new security environment requires new framework and new ways of tackling issues related to global and national security.

This thesis is divided in two parts. The first part will include the literature review and theoretical framework, as well as the description of the risk management approach and use of force and a brief explanation of the evolution of modern military strategy. The second part then applies the concepts and issues of the first part to the case study of the Operation Iraqi Freedom, looking at how the theories apply and why in this case. This thesis will first look at the theories involved in the risk management approach in security studies in the literature review and explain Ulrich Beck’s World Risk Society –theory in the context of use of force. This approach is then applied to the Operation Iraqi Freedom to contest how ideas work on a real example. The third chapter briefly explains the evolution of the US and the UK military strategies and how and why the Cold War and post-Cold War world shaped the security environment. The fourth chapter ties the military strategy and use of force closer to the risk management strategy and explains further the precautionary and preventive theories and measures used to implement them. This chapter gives a thorough explanation of what risk management actually means in the sense of use of force and why this approach is essential in understanding Operation Iraqi Freedom. The fifth chapter applies the theories and issues involved in war as risk management strategy to the case study of war in Iraq in 2003. The chapter looks at the framing and risk language used between 2001-2003 and the implementation and analysis of the risk management exercise. Finally, this thesis will end with some concluding remarks about the risk management approach and its practicality with the use of force and

(6)

military strategy, as well as with some policy recommendations and issues that need to be addressed in future research.

(7)

2. Literature review and theoretical

framework

Risk is becoming an increasingly central and accepted component of the contemporary conceptualisations of security.3 War as risk management strategy is essentially tied to the concepts of risk and use of force. Risk in the context of security is perceived as a question of what can happen and what the cost of that possibility is. Use of force can be condensed into a question of what constitutes as war and what the limit of coercive force is?

Use of force as risk management strategy is a relatively new concept in academic studies, which is why there is a lack of wide debate on its utility and practicality. This is especially evident in the use of risk language to justify use of force. The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on the current theories of the risk management and their application to military strategies by the US and the UK. To understand the role risk management plays in the military strategy Rasmussen’s three factors of risk management are the key component. The idea of risk management is focused on Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society -theory and will be incorporated to the Bush Doctrine and how the risk management framing played a role in the decision to go for the war in Iraq.

2.1. Definition and nature of Risk

Risk in everyday language means “hazard” and something to be avoided, but in another context it can have the meaning of opportunity. It is the combination of likelihood and impact, including perceived importance. In this thesis, risk is defined as uncertainty of outcome, the possibility of negative threats, actions and events. Risk management covers processes involved in identifying, assessing and judging risks, assigning ownership, taking

3

Anne Hammerstad and Ingrid Boas, "National security risks? Uncertainty, austerity and other logics of risk in the UK government’s National Security Strategy." Cooperation and Conflict (2014): 2.

(8)

actions to mitigate or anticipate them, and monitoring and reviewing progress.4 According to Gill, risk is defined by the following questions; what can happen, how likely is it that it will happen, if it does happen, what are the consequences.5 Clapton adds the issues about who seeks to define and manage particular risks to the list.6

Risk and threat need to be defined separately, even though they often are used interchangeably in everyday language. Risk is a perceived future threat that is yet to materialise. In the risk literature, threats are externally produced insecurities subject to means-ends rationality, whereas risks are the products of one’s own actions and therefore reflexive.7 This means that risks derive from the person’s actions and perspective, rather than them existing as universal threats and change accordingly to one’s actions. According to Petersen, threats are quantifiable, specific and about intentions. Risks, however, are about the unforeseen and not related to specific incident.8 According to van Loon, ”as soon as risk becomes real, it ceases to be risk and becomes a catastrophe”.9 Risks only exist as possibilities and probabilities. This means that risk does not exist in the present, as when a risk materialises, it becomes a threat or crisis by nature. Due to the problems with materialisation, risks are defined as ’real virtualities’.10 The uncertainty of risks causes issues to states, as there cannot be specific information about when the risks may or may not materialise. Risks are not imminent, as imminent threat cannot be demonstrated without a reference to a specific timeframe.11 Thus, Williams argues that in a sense, risk is about choice — a choice in the present based on the future scenario of possibilities.12

4

Strategy Unit. "Risk: Improving government’s capability to handle risk and uncertainty." Cabinet Office (2002): 25.

5

Peter Gill. "Intelligence, Threat, Risk and the Challenge of Oversight." Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 2 (2012): 207.

6

William Clapton. "Risk in international relations." International Relations 25, no. 3 (2011): 284.

7

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen. "It Sounds Like a Riddle': Security Studies, the War on Terror and Risk." Millennium-Journal of International Studies 33, no. 2 (2004): 381-395.

8

Karen Lund Petersen. "Risk Analysis-a Field Within Security Studies." European Journal of International Relations (2011): 11.

9

M. J. Williams. "(In) Security studies, reflexive modernization and the risk society." Cooperation and Conflict 43, no. 1 (2008): 66.

10

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen. "A parallel globalization of terror': 9-11, security and globalization." Cooperation and Conflict 37, no. 3 (2002): 329.

11

William Clapton. "Risk and Hierarchy Within International Society: Liberal Interventionism in the Post-Cold War Era." PhD diss., Murdoch University (2010): 129-130.

12

(9)

Rasmussen argues that risk management is defined by three factors. The first factor is the management. This means that politics in reflexive modernity are no longer the pursuit of ends, but rather governments are forced to take position where they have to continuously construct new means in order to manage risks. The second is the presence of future, meaning that scenarios for the future guide politics, as modern causal temporality breaks down in the face of proliferating risks. The last one is the boomerang effect. This means that the breakdown of the distinction between ’self’ and ’other’ creates threats that are often consequences of one’s own actions. Managing risks can create new, unforeseen risks elsewhere.13 The boomerang effect is important part of the evaluation of risk management, as despite managing an initial risk, the actions may have caused a greater risk that is yet to unfold. In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, by preventing Saddam from gaining WMD by regime change, the coalition created a power vacuum that escalated to current turmoil and surge of terrorism in the region. The boomerang effect is a combination of the unknown unknowns and the known unknowns and thus cannot be fully anticipated. In risk analysis, the boomerang effect is often neglected, as the focus is on non-events. However, boomerang effect is what causes future risks, when the risk management or its aftermath is not handled properly. Thus, in order to fully evaluate risk management procedures, boomerang effect needs to be included in the evaluation; with a distinction of what events are directly caused by the risk management exercise and which are not. Shortly, the boomerang effect is direct unwanted consequence of one’s actions during or after risk management exercise. Not all boomerang effects can be anticipated, which is why the aftermath of the risk management exercise is important.

Rasmussen argues that risk is a scenario, which is followed by policy proposal for preventing the scenario from becoming real.14 However, before risk can be managed, it needs to be defined either as a social construct or as a rational response. Probability does not define the risk, because risk is closer related to the perceived costs of the threat and the prevention. As such, uncertainty exists in relation to future loss, and the loss is a consequence of the decision taken.15 According to Rasmussen, risk societies are not only

13

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen. "Reflexive security: NATO and international risk society." Millennium-Journal of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2001): 286.

14

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen. "The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century." (2006): 4.

15

(10)

afraid of their enemies, but they also avoid identifying them, because this can become a boomerang effect.16 This means that identifying new enemies can create a self-fulfilling prophecy, where groups that feel antagonised by a certain state will start acting against it despite their original goal. From this perspective, risks provide more qualitative than quantitative risks.17

Risk is used to justify decisions and political actions.18 In sociology, there are two ideas for this risk management; that of a global risk management19 and world risk society20. From these two major perspectives on risk management this thesis will focus on the world risk society perspective. Ulrich Beck suggests that government departments and regulatory agencies are increasingly assuming the form of a ”risk bureaucracy”, which means that they are dedicated to forecasting and developing risk-based guidelines to regulate and manage risks.21 The current phase of modernity with risk society emerges from the fact that people no longer know for sure what to do or what to expect from uncertain events.22 This is why policy makers choose the system of risk they prefer rather than aim at a universe of safety that does not exist.23 Following this thought, Rasmussen argues that in risk society politics are not about bringing an end to a specific problem, but rather about managing the process and means. This means that the precautionary argument determines the established security doctrine; avoidance of a risk is more important reaching a specific goal. This is due the fact that the high consequence risks are remote from the individual agent, as they are hard to determine or predict.24 Corry argues that risk society has an in-built uncertainty due to the central role of science and reflexivity, rapid technological change, information revolution and high consequence ’manufactured’ risks, such as nuclear weapons and climate change.

16

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen. (2006): 10.

17

William Clapton. (2010): 112.

18

Karen Lund Petersen. (2011): 5.

19

Ibid. p.3.

20

Ulrich Beck. "Risk society revisited." The risk society and beyond (2006).

21

Yee-Kuang Heng and Kenneth McDonagh. "After the ‘war on terror’: Regulatory states, risk bureaucracies and the risk-based governance of terror." International Relations 25, no. 3 (2011): 316.

22

23

Ibid. p. 36.

24

(11)

As the nature of international society is dynamic and regularly re-constituted at various intervals, new forms of risk are challenging the governance of the risk society.25 Evaluation of risk and the willingness to accept risk are social problems above all.26 This means that a transformation from deterministic analysis to probabilistic risk analysis.27 Due to the uncertainty of the future, policy judgements in risk society are evaluated by terms of political defensibility, not whether they are right or wrong. According to Klinke and Renn, the debate on how to evaluate and manage risks focuses on the three major strategies. First strategy is risk-based approaches, including numerical thresholds, such as quantitative safety goals, exposure limits and standards. The second strategy is reduction of activities derived from the application of the precautionary principle, meaning the use of the best available control technology, containment in time and space, or constant monitoring of potential side effects. The third strategy consists of standards derived from discursive processes such as roundtables, deliberative rule making, mediation, or citizen panels. 28

2.2. Risk Perception

Risk as a subjective perception is heavily depending on the framing and sense making by the actors perceiving the risk. Consequently, different actors contest risks. As a result, ’pure risk’ is only denoting to the prospect of harm, whereas ’speculative risk’ entails the possibility of gain in return for accepting some harm. As a response to this, risk management is anticipatory action to forestall adverse outcomes.29 Risk management is not focused on an existing existential threat; the logic of risk management is by definition preventative. However, the problem is that there are no means to gather reliable data from the future.30 Hence, risk management is about preventing concrete, acute threats to the

25

William Clapton. (2010): 107-108.

Olaf Corry. "Securitzation and ‘Riskization’: Two Grammars of Security." 7th Pan (2010).

26

Niklas Luhmann. (1993): 3.

27

Ibid. p.19.

28

Orwin Renn and Andreas Klinke. "A new approach to risk evaluation and management: Risk‐ based, precaution‐based, and discourse‐based strategies." Risk analysis 22, no. 6 (2002): 1071.

29

Yee Kuang Heng. "Unravelling the ’War’ on Terrorism: A Risk-Management Exercise in War Clothing?." Security Dialogue 33, no. 2 (2002): 228.

30

(12)

survival of the community or the state from taking place.31 When we seek to manage a risk, we seek to prevent particular future possibilities from occurring.32

Eriksson argues that threats, risks and dangers are all social constructs.33 However, the risk society thesis challenges the notion that risk can be subject to classification, quantification and elimination through rational behaviour. This is manifested in what Beck calls reflexive modernisation. Reflexive modernisation means that states are moving from a world of enemies to a world of risks.34 In order to prevent risks, states need to stay reflexive towards possibilities. How risk is socially constructed directly influences the measures adopted to manage it by states.35 Beck argues that risks are both real and constituted by social perception and construction, thus describing himself as both realist and constructivist. According to Beck “the decision whether to take a realist or constructivist approach is ... a rather pragmatic one ... I am both a realist and constructivist”. Beck’s statement means that while risks are out there (a realist ontology-approach), it depends upon cultural, subjective and social categories which risks are selected for treatment (a constructivist epistemology approach).36 This thesis will thus use this dualistic nature of risk in its analysis, as socially constructed phenomenon that has real life implications. The realist camp is convinced that technical assessments of risk constitute true representations of observable hazards that can and will affect people as predicted by the calculated results regardless of the beliefs or convictions of the analysts involved. However, the constructivist camp claims that risk assessments constitute mental constructions that can be checked at best against standards of consistency cohesion and internal convictions of logical deductions.37

Risk requires new kinds of routine politics, rather than politics of emergency and exception. Risk management focuses on the conditions of possibility, which means the things that

31

Rens van Munster. Logics of security: the Copenhagen School, risk management and the war on terror. Syddansk Universitet, (2005): 7.

32 William Clapton. (2010): 149. 33 Ibid. p.137. 34 Ibid. p.115. 35 Ibid. p.135. 36

Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster. Governing terrorism through risk: Taking

precautions,(un) knowing the future." European journal of international relations 13, no. 1 (2007): 13.

37

(13)

can materialize the risk.38 Risk approach can be compared to that of securitization theory. However the difference is that securitization process is not a subjective process.39 Risks occur and emerge through perception rather than through universal elements. However, one can make the distinction that securitization theory personalises, whereas risk approach objectifies the perceived threat.40

2.3. Governance of Risk

According to Aradau and van Munster, risk can be understood as a dispositif41 to govern social problems. This is a Foucaultian approach of examining for example governance, consisting of discourses, institutions, regulations, laws, and administrative measures. In this analysis, risk is a multiform and heterogeneous combination of rationalities and technologies, mixing both the realist and constructive views of risk. According to Foucault, the power/knowledge ratio is an agent of transformation of human life when it comes to risk management.42 Furthermore,

”a dispositif of risk creates a specific relation to the future, which requires the monitoring of the future, the attempt to calculate what the future can offer and the necessity to control and minimise its potentially harmful effects. Thus a dispositif of risk goes beyond the ecological, economic, and terror risks identified by Beck to link in a continuum everyday, ordinary, everyday risks such as crime risks and extraordinary and catastrophic risks such as terror risks”.43

McLean et al. claim that the ideas of hazard, risk and precaution are embedded in the legal, institutional and regulatory practices of policy making, in particular via the

38

Olaf Corry. (2010): 8.

39

Rens van Munster. (2005): 3.

40

Olaf Corry. (2010): 17.

41

Foucault uses the term dospositif to refer to institutional, physical, and administrative mechanisms and structures which maintain the exercise of power within the social body

42

Rens van Munster. (2005) 8.

43

(14)

precautionary principle, which states that the absence of evidence does not mean the evidence of absence, adding to Foucaultian idea of governance.44

2.4. Risk Analysis

Reflexive security has to battle daily between probabilities and the consequences. It is impossible to eliminate all threats that exist, so the cost-benefit equation needs to be thought through before acted upon. If the consequences and the costs of the risk management are greater than the outcome of the possible risk, it will not be worth to deter the risk. Giddens states that risks are core elements of modernity, and there is no way to escape them.45

According to Renn and Klinke, there are five major themes in risk analysis. The first theme is the debate between realists and constructivists. Constructivists claim that risk assessments constitute mental constructions that can be checked at best against standards of consistency, cohesion and internal conventions of logical deduction. Realists are convinced that technical estimates of risk constitute true representations of observable hazards that can and will affect people as predicted by the calculated results regardless of the beliefs or convictions of the analysis involved. The second is the relevance of public concerns revealed through perception studies as criteria for risk evaluation. This means that the public involvement is required in defining tolerable risk levels. The affected people’s prerogative should be to determine the level of risk they judge tolerable for themselves and for their community. However, sensational press coverage and intuitive biases may misguide public perceptions and this needs to be taken into account when including the public with the risk assessment. The third is the appropriate handling of uncertainty in risk assessments. The fourth theme is the legitimate role of science-based versus precautionary-based management approach. This is related to the realist versus constructivist debate, as realists look risks more through the science-based approach, and constructivists through precautionary-based approach. The fifth theme is the optimal

44

Craig McLean, Alan Patterson and John Williams. "Risk assessment, policy-making and the limits of knowledge: The precautionary principle and international relations." International Relations 23, no. 4 (2009): 553.

45

Anthony Giddens, Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991)

(15)

integration of analytic and deliberative processes. In practice this considers the situations when the public preferences do not match with the real interests of the public.46

Heng argues that risks are constructed and that due to the constructive nature of risk it has to be evaluated through non-events, what did not happen.47 Risk management is not focused on an existing existential threat; the logic of risk management is by definition preventative. Disaster threshold plays an important part of risk analysis. The idea of disaster threshold is that one accepts the results of such a calculation, if at all, only when it does not touch the threshold beyond which a misfortune would be experienced as a disaster, no matter how unlikely.48 The current risk analysis approach is leaning heavily in the Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society-concept, which states that after the Cold War, the new non-military threats require more proactive, rather than responsive, approach. Jarvis argues that Beck fails to recognise that risk distribution and compensation have always been contentious affairs fraught with different legal opinions. Those with responsibility for the generation of risk are keen to avoid the costs associated with it.49

2.5. Use of force and risk management

Risk management should be considered as a regulating form of security that permanently identifies, classifies and constitutes groups or populations on the basis of the risk that is ascribed to these groups.50 Warfare as risk management perspective is about proactively averting probabilistic scenarios, usually leading to preventive strategies, according to Heng. In the current field of strategic studies, these risks are not necessarily imminent material threats.51 It is arguable that the new way of perceiving the Western use of coercive force is changing the nature of war, as globalised risk scenarios can cause precautionary strategies over conventional net assessments.

46

Orwin Renn and Andreas Klinke. (2002): 1072-1075.

47

Yee-Kuang Heng. (2002): 228.

48

Niklas Luhmann. (1993): 2.

49

Darryl Jarvis. "Risk, globalisation and the state: a critical appraisal of Ulrich Beck and the world risk society thesis." Global society 21, no. 1 (2007): 45.

50

Rens van Munster. (2005): 6.

51

Yee-Kuang Heng. War as risk management: strategy and conflict in an age of globalised risks. Routledge, (2006): 2.

(16)

Mythen and Walklate argue that the shift from an industrial society to risk society lies on three pillars. The first pillar is that contemporary security risks are unique to their temporal and spatial mobility. This means that the current threats cannot be geographically or temporally pinned down or enclosed, such as terrorist networks, imposing borderless risks rather than national security issues. Second pillar argues that risks possess greater potential for harm in current world. Acceleration of techno-scientific development has the potential to intensify rather than alleviate risk production. The third pillar is that the destructive force of manufactured risks shatters methods of insurance, such as industrial accidents. In global risk society, the ‘worst case scenarios’ overpower institutional regulation, as in the case of Chernobyl. This means that normal insurances and preventive measures cannot foresee all possible catastrophes and risks. These pillars mean that political conflicts are more and more about avoidance rather than possession.52 Western states do not attempt to acquire new territories or conquests, so they focus on avoiding possible emerging problems through means of force.

According to Clapton, there are three key characteristics in risk management in international security perspective: proactive anticipation, precautionary principle, and prevention.53 ’Horizon scanning’ becomes a highly important activity in risk society with these characteristics.54 Giddens argues that Western states are lacking ontological security, meaning the sense of continuity from the actions taken and experiences. Hence, the risk management approach is used for compensating this void.55 Rasmussen adds that the Western security is defined by security challenges and risks rather than a lack of ontological security.56 What the West considers a risk will be moulded by its values and norms. Like anxieties, risks do not exist independent of our perceptions of them.57

Risk management has resulted in ”American policing”, as especially the US and the UK use the risk language and practice risk management against actors that are perceived as new security risks, such as rogue states or terrorist organisations, in residual warfare,

52

Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate. "Terrorism, risk and international security: The perils of asking'what if?'." Security Dialogue 39, no. 2-3 (2008): 223-224.

53 William Clapton. (2010): 149. 54 Ibid. 150. 55 Ibid. 128. 56

57

(17)

rather than a full scale conflict.58 These governments are increasingly preoccupied with anticipating and preventing risks before they occur. They have taken up the mantle as global risk managers, seeking to govern risks and prevent negative future occurrences, mainly through promoting liberal values and political indicators.59 Due to the nature of the current conflicts, they rarely result in decisive victories, which means that language and attitudes need to be changed to appreciate the partial results.60 As a result, the major goal in modern conflict is not to lose, rather than a conclusive victory. The change is clear in the strategic language, as ’threats’ are now called as ’risks and challenges’.61

This new approach to the military strategy highlights the role of the military in deterrence, pre-emption and prevention of risks.62 Pre-emption and prevention are both controlling strategies that do not rely on the adversaries making cautious decisions, but assume that given the opportunity, the adversary will use force. Freedman argues that prevention is a form of risk management because it is anticipatory and forward thinking strategy towards the adversary. 63 In the military point of view, the key issue in risk assessment is accuracy, which means avoiding over-prediction and under-prediction, as both add to the cost of the assessment it is trying to minimize.64 Pre-emption differs from prevention, as it is usually a strategy employed amidst the crisis, whereas prevention is anticipatory action before imminent threat.65 In the Post-Cold War Western military operations, risk language is being used in order to depersonalise the danger.66 Corry claims that deterrence is losing its credibility as events (historical) give way to eventualities (future) as main focus of security analysis. This is partly due to the idea that one cannot expect future to follow the same path as history and that absence of threats at the time does not mean security.67 According to Williams, war as risk management strategy is a way of transferring the risk. Waging a war is relatively low risk for states like the US and the UK, but the boomerang 58 Yee-Kuang Heng. (2006): 5. 59 William Clapton. (2010): 145. 60 Yee-Kuang Heng. (2006): 143. 61 Ibid. 161. 62

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen. (2006).

63

Lawrence Freedman. "Prevention, not preemption." The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2003): 105-106. 64 Mikkel Rasmussen. (2006): 122. 65 Lawrence Freedman. (2003): 105. 66

Anne Hammerstad and Ingrid Boas. (2014): 4.

67

(18)

effect might cause unanticipated results and greater risks.68 This means that by eliminating the original risk, the boomerang effect may bring new, more serious risks as an aftermath to the risk management exercise.

2.6. Evolution of war and use of force

War, according to Coker, has three meanings as a concept. First, as instrumental concept war refers to the ways in which force is applied by the state, the ways it is used to impose one state’s will upon other. War is rational instrument employed by states in a controlled, rational manner for economic or political purposes. In this context war is a supreme act of will, even more so a way to compel others to your will. Second, war as existential concept refers to those who practice it — warriors. Coker refers to Hegel to explain this point, ”war would only end when warriors no longer need it to affirm their own humanity”. Thirdly, as metaphysical concept, war translates death to sacrifice. It invests death with a meaning, in a way no other form of violence can. War persuades societies of the need for sacrifice, which makes it qualitatively different from other forms of violence.69 War has gone through changes in the last centuries, from cultural to societal selection, as states no longer seek to expel or eliminate, but to expand or absorb.

War has transformed since the Cold War, as both life and war can be perceived as information, processed as data sources. As a result, cities do not need to be dismantled anymore, but they can be shut down. Armies can be neutralised rather than taken out, and soldiers are information gatherers more than combatants.70 Technological advances increase the societal rationality as time and speed have become increasingly conflated. Due to these advances, limited war is increasingly used, because optimum firepower is seen as more effective than maximum firepower.71 Following this logic, limited war works

68

Michael J. Williams. (2008): 64.

69

Christopher Coker. The future of war: the re-enchantment of war in the twenty-first century. John Wiley & Sons, (2008): 6.

70

Ibid. 35.

71

(19)

as risk management strategy, as the conventional war aims to win, whereas limited war aims to convince.72

Interventions are now seen as the support of the promotion and enforcement of liberal democratic values. Clapton argues that this is partly due to the fact that old colonial hierarchies still structure the Western relations with the former colonies, which consequently are the main targets of interventions.73 In the example of Iraq, the intervention was based on the idea of prevention. That is to stop a long-term future scenario from happening such as prevent Iraq from gaining extensive WMD capabilities.74

According to Buchanan and Keohane, there are four distinct positions in the current debate on preventive force: the Just War Blanket Prohibition; the Legal Status Quo; the National Interest and the Expanded Right of Self-Defence. The dominant view in the just war tradition has been that preventive force is strictly forbidden. Force may be justified in cases in which an attack has not already occurred but imminent threat is present, but there is generally thought to be a just war blanket prohibition on preventive action. Prevention carries special risks that may not be present in the armed responses. It is important to make the distinction between the justification of a particular action and the justification of the rule that allows the action. If preventive action was morally justified in ideal conditions, it does not mean that we should replace restrictions on preventive force with a permissive rule. However, the problem with using this position, as form of risk governance is that adherence to it is too risky, when taken into account the widespread capacity and possible willingness of states and non-state actors to deploy WMD covertly and suddenly against civilian populations. Likewise, this position requires the state to refrain from acting even when it could prevent human rights violations at little cost.75

In the second position, state’s preventive use of force is generally regarded as prohibited in contemporary international law unless they have received collective authorization by the UN Security Council. According to the Legal Status Quo view, this highly constrained

72

Beatrice Heuser. The evolution of strategy: thinking war from antiquity to the present. Cambridge University Press, (2010): 462. 73 William Clapton. (2010): 71-72. 74 Michael J. Williams. (2008): 62. 75

Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane. "The preventive use of force: a cosmopolitan institutional proposal." Ethics & International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2004): 2-4.

(20)

stance on preventive force needs to be maintained. In effect, preventive force should be used only with Security Council authorization.76

In the third position, the National Interest, Buchanan and Keohane claim that realists hold that states may do whatever their leaders deem necessary to serve the best interests of the state. According to this view, leaders of states may disregard universal moral principles when they conflict with the national interest. This means that they may employ force, including preventively, if they deem it necessary for the pursuit of state interests. However, the National Interest view repudiates the progress that has been made in constraining the international use of force. National interest is extremely malleable concept that its invocation would probably cause a rational for aggression and recipe for international instability. By reducing the grounds for the preventive use of force to self-defence, the potential preventive action can be conceived too narrowly. This position also fails to consider the possibility that there are circumstances in which the preventive use of force can be justified to protect the rights of people other than fellow citizens.77

The Bush administration’s “National Security Strategy” articulates a fourth position of expanded right of self-defence as it asserts that states possess a right of self-defence that entitles them to take preventive action.78 However, the extended right of self-defence is problematic as the international law and the UN Charter article 51 have very vague definitions of what counts as reasonable claim for preventive action. As the US or the UK rarely faces traditional, existential military threats anymore, the threats can be seen as constructed risks. The use of force and the steps taken towards the Iraq War will be looked at through the three factors of risk management argued by Rasmussen; management, presence of future and boomerang effect.

2.7. Methodology

2.7.1. The Research Question and research method 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid.

(21)

The research question of this thesis is how does the risk management approach explain the Operation Iraqi Freedom? To answer the question this thesis will also look at what has made risk management a viable option for the US and the UK as a military strategy. In order to do this, the thesis is in two parts. The first part, including chapter 3 and 4, explain what risk management theory is, how and why it can be applied to military strategy. The second part applies the risk management approach to the case study of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The method of the research is qualitative historical case study analysis. This research is descriptive, explaining the role risk has in security management through a single case study. The thesis researches the evolution of the risk management approach in the field of security studies and how the approach can be used in the Post-Cold War military strategy. This is to illustrate a different way of explaining the reasons to go to war, by framing the threats through risk management, which is a relatively new approach. The focus is at the modern military strategy and how and why it has transformed especially in the late 20th century and in the beginning of 21st century. The case study to illustrate and explain its usage in Post-Cold War military operation is the Operation Iraqi Freedom. This case study shows clearly the three characteristics of risk management as outlined by Rasmussen; management, presence of future and the boomerang effect. As risks depend on the perception, qualitative methodology is more plausible than quantitative.

The literature used in this thesis is a mixture of secondary and primary sources. The research is conducted by analysing academic articles, news articles, books and speeches on the case study, the risk management theory and military strategy. The primary sources used are speeches and news articles about the Operation Iraqi Freedom, to gain perspective of how and why the operation was conducted and framed at before and during the operation. Examples of speeches given by George W. Bush and Tony Blair and their administrations have been chosen to look at the specific risk language used, which illustrate the grammar of risk language in framing of the risk. These speeches show how the risk was framed and are used to analyse the rhetoric means of such a language. Despite using the risk language to illustrate the framing of the threat, this thesis is not a pure discourse analysis, but rather showing the different aspects that need to be considered with using risk management approach and the use of force. Thus the speeches are not the major component of the analysis, but rather a way of highlighting ways of framing the risk. The

(22)

theoretical framework is then taken from the academic research conducted on risk management approach and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The secondary sources used have been chosen to explain the different aspects of the risk management approach and how it relates to the use of force. Sources used on Operation Iraqi Freedom have been chosen to illustrate the logic behind the framing of the operation.

The first time that force was used as a risk management exercise in the way described in this thesis was in Kosovo in 1999, which was a primary example of intervention used by choice in a conflict that did not pose direct threat to the US or the UK territory.79 Operation Iraqi Freedom has been chosen as the case study over Kosovo because it shows the different aspects of risk management better. This includes the boomerang effect, which was a result of inadequate aftermath of the risk management exercise, as stated by Rasmussen. Likewise, the Iraq war had a clear risk language grammar in the framing to the public. Kosovo crisis was itself a boomerang effect of NATO’s actions in Yugoslavia during the 1990s80, and thus the approach was slightly different compared to Iraq.

Kosovo war was used as a means to reinvent NATO’s purpose on international relations and create new purpose for the organization.81 During Kosovo Blair claimed that NATO was ‘fighting not for territory but for values’.82 Clapton argues that this form of value exporting is still inherently a risk management exercise, as a form of ‘first line of defense’.83 Similarly to the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Kosovo was focused against a person, in this case Slobodan Milosevic.84 However, Operation Iraqi Freedom was chosen over Kosovo because of the risk language aspect that can be analyzed in more depth through the speeches given by Bush administration and Blair before and during the war. The risk language section is added to the thesis to show how framing of the risk management exercise happened in this case study and how such an operation requires specific kind of grammar.

79

Lawrence Freedman. (2003): 111.

80

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen (2001): 306.

81

Ibid.

82

Mark Duffield. Global governance and the new wars: the merging of development and security. Vol. 87. London: Zed books, (2001): 41.

83

William Clapton. (2009): 190.

84

(23)

2.7.3. Definition of Risk

For the purpose of the analysis, risk is defined as uncertainty of outcome, the possibility of negative threat, actions and events, as defined by the UK Cabinet Office. Risk management covers processes involved in identifying, assessing and judging risks, assigning ownership, taking actions to mitigate or anticipate them, and monitoring and reviewing progress.85 The discussion will be based on the debate between the realist and constructivist schools of thought in the questions of security and use of force, outlined in the literature review. This thesis attempts to differentiate the risk management from the concept of coercive force and show why it can be used as a strategy to use force in the military thought. The analysis will be looking at the preventive, rather than pre-emptive use of force, which is defined as initiation of military action is anticipation of harmful actions that are neither presently occurring nor imminent.86

2.7.4. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical focus on this thesis is within

a. Rasmussen’s three pillars of risk management; b. Beck’s World Risk Society;

c. Clapton’s separations of proactive anticipation, prevention and precautionary action; d. and Hammerstad and Boas theory that the language of risk serves rhetorical

purposes.

Rasmussen has modeled his pillars of risk management by using the Beck’s World Risk Society –idea in the global security setting. These three pillars are management, presence of future and the boomerang effect. The management pillar means that societies attempt to manage possible risks. There are no ends to possible risks, as after managing one, new ones will emerge. This means that the society chooses which risks it will take, as it is impossible to prevent them all from happening. Presence of future means that all future risks are consequences of the actions taken in the presence. This means that societies

85

Strategy Unit. "Risk: Improving government’s capability to handle risk and uncertainty." Cabinet Office (2002): 25.

86

(24)

need to try to calculate the future scenarios of the actions that are chosen at the present time. This means that what is possible to happen in the future is the object of the actions taken in presence. For example, current measures to combat climate change are such a risk management exercise, that all of the policies and actions have effect in the future. Therefore the boomerang effect is the outcome of failing with the first two pillars. In boomerang effect one becomes the object of their own actions.

The boomerang effect is where reflexivity comes to play. As with risks it is not possible to control ends by the means, loss of control is the key to reflexivity. This means that making decisions can become a risk itself. The boomerang effect thus creates the possibility of greater risk happening from the actions taken to deter one risk. The possibility of the boomerang effect then has an impact on management and choosing the risks which to address, while presence of future is also an attempt to avoid the boomerang effect.

Table 2.1.

Risk Management87

Management Presence of Future Boomerang Effect

Managing the perceived risks within the society while recognizing that there is no end

to emerging risks.

- Surveillance for terrorists as an example

Risks are consequences of actions that have not yet materialized, so present problems need to be defined by their future consequences.

- Attempting to tackle climate change and issues related to it

One becomes object to their own actions, as the consequences of the action cannot be fully managed and may create further and more severe risks.

- Mutually Assured Destruction as the worst case scenario

Beck’s World Risk Society looks societal risks on three levels: ecologic crises, global economic crises and transnational terrorist networks.88 This thesis focuses on the third level and how that level can be integrated with the use of force. The focus on risks is on constructed and man-made risks are causation of one’s actions. Beck’s theory claims that these are the biggest security concerns in the modern world and require proactive way of deterring. Thus, this thesis shows how the deterrence of the security risk happened in Iraq.

87

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen (2001).

88

(25)

Beck’s argument is that the global focus on security issues on prevention rather than reaction is evident in the case study and the transnational terrorism level is the only one that can be managed through the use of force. This is why governmental departments and agencies on national level are becoming “risk bureaucracies”, dedicated to developing risk-based guidelines to regulate and manage risks.89

Furthermore, Clapton’s three key characteristics, proactive anticipation, precautionary principle and prevention are key issues in the current risk language adopted by the West. These concepts are important in understanding how risk approach affects on the current security environment how issues perceived as security concerns are handled. The case study then combine these two approaches to Coker’s first meaning of war. War as instrumental concept refers to the ways in which force is applied by the state, the ways it is used to impose one state’s will upon other. The case study explains how war used as a rational instrument employed by the US in a controlled, rational manner for political purposes took place in Iraq. The framing of the war required Clapton’s characteristics and implementation needed Rasmussen’s management and boomerang effect concepts. The case study of Iraq war and the steps taken towards the war during 2001 - 2003 will be analysed through the concepts and theories of risk management mentioned here. The theoretical focus will be on the debate between the realist and constructivist schools of thought, preventive use of force, precautionary principle and proactive anticipation.

The fifth chapter looks at how the risk management approach worked in practice in the case study of Iraq war. Based on Coker’s instrumental concept of war, this thesis will look into how coercive force against Iraq was used to prevent future possibilities, namely Iraq’s acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. What need to be taken into account in the case of Iraq are Rasmussen’s three factors of risk management, as risk management evaluation cannot be executed without looking at the boomerang effect. Evaluation will be done through comparing the non-events as well as the boomerang effect. Heng argues that risk analysis is dependent on the non-event, but this thesis will argue that since risk

89

Yee-Kuang Heng and Kenneth McDonagh. "After the ‘war on terror’: Regulatory states, risk bureaucracies and the risk-based governance of terror." International Relations 25, no. 3 (2011): 316.

(26)

management is all about preventing costs, boomerang effect needs to be taken into calculation.

The fifth chapter will also look at the risk language and how it was used to frame the justification for the war. For the analysis of risk language I am using Hammerstad and Boas theory that the language of risk serves rhetorical purposes, but also reveals shifts in security elites’ perception of the nature risk or security threat.90 Risk language is a specific way of framing a threat or risk, through what could happen and should be done, if certain conditions are met. Risk language often used head of states is an indirect speech act, implying on future security problems if something does or does not happen. Risk language shows what the means of risk management are, as well as the deterrable ends. The point of risk language is to imply what can become a security issue, rather than simply state what is causing security issue, as in the Copenhagen school. Thus, in the analysis of the risk language I am focusing on the conditional use of language, rather than what the security issue is. This way of framing is typical for risk language and plays a great part in the risk language analysis. Part of the risk language used in the fifth chapter is to show how this language is used to avoid directly saying critical information that is not fully supported by the evidence. Accordingly, with the reflexive nature of risk, risk language cannot state certain materialised threats. As Hammerstad and Boas claim the function of risk language is to depersonalise the threat.91 This is then explained in the speeches given before the Iraq war, through the choice of words used by Bush and his administration, as well as in the speeches given by Blair.

90

Anne Hammerstad and Ingrid Boas. (2014): 3.

91

(27)

3. Evolution of modern military strategy

”Indirect strategy seeks to obtain a result by methods other than military victory”92

During the late 18th century, a widely accepted military strategy came to define the questions of force in terms of means-ends rationality.93 Inspired by Clausewitz, this meant that the military strategy was a means to a certain (political) end(s), and this approach has been widely used until recently. Certain means result in to certain ends and the correlation between them is clear. Presently, governments master means, not ends. This meant that the means can be used to attempt certain ends, but this cannot be guaranteed in the unpredictable world.94 In the modern world no actor can be certain of the outcome they are attempting but need to actively construct new means to prevent certain ends. There are numerous other actors and issues with multilateral relationships affecting the attempted ends as no actor can work in a vacuum. Gray argues that strategy is the “the bridge that relates military power to political purpose; it is neither military power per se nor political purpose ... [S]trategy ... [is] the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy”.95

Military strategy is no longer a science of decisive military victory. It needs to focus more on coercion and deterrence, as the aims of war are more punitive than acquisitive.96 The current threats faced by states are not caused by individual states per se, but by individuals and groups of people, possibly sponsored by other states. Military campaigns involve non-state actors as combatants and organisations that are integrated in the social structures of the societies they operate in rather than in the institutionalised bureaucratic

92

Beatrice Heuser. (2010): 441.

93

94

Ibid. 286.

95

96

Stefan Ring. "Two perspectives on conflict management." Hallenberg, Jan, and Håkan Karlsson, eds The Iraq War: European perspectives on politics, strategy and operations (2005): 122.

(28)

organisations.97 The War on Terror is an example of such threat and should be conceptualized in terms of reflexive nature of politics in risk society, rather than in traditional means-ends rationality.98 Terrorism, as an example of one of these new challenges, is to an extent a ”risk beyond risk”; of which we do not know and cannot have the knowledge or the measure of.99 Attaining national security in the face of terrorism requires innovative techniques.100 When it comes to terrorism and other non-state threats, the state is the security provider, instead of international organisations.101 According to Jarvis, in this sense, ”globalisation is what states make of it”.102

3.1. Strategy during the Cold War

According to van Creveld, strategy during Cold War was to define “war’s conduct as a ‘science’ whose principles could be discovered, laid down in a ‘system’, and taught in the military academies that were just beginning to open their doors”.103 Use of force by the US and the UK and their overall military strategies were reactive during the Cold War. Using force was a reaction to certain, specific event, rather than an anticipatory or preventive action. Obedience to the United Nations Charter meant that many wars after the 1945 did not have formal beginning, or formal ending, to avoid the UN Charter’s legal penalties.104 The UN Charter outlaws the use of force as furthering ones own state interests, except in self-defence against aggression, which is why use of force and terminology of war had to be extremely well reasoned.105 Like with risk management, use of force is not legitimate if its consequences are worse than the wrong it was supposed to undo.106

During the Cold War a new way of analysing military strategy came about. Brodie called for strategy being academically analysed through genuine analytical methods and treated

97

Brian Reed and David Segal. "Social network analysis and counterinsurgency operations: The capture of Saddam Hussein." Carlton-Ford, Steven, and Morten G. Ender, eds. The Routledge handbook of war and society: Iraq and Afghanistan. Routledge, (2010): 68.

98

99

Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster. (2007): 102.

100

Craig McLean, Alan Patterson and John Williams. (2009): 549.

101

William Clapton. (2010): 140-141.

102

Ibid. 138.

103

Martin van Creveld, "On future war." New York (1991): 96.

104

105

United Nations. Charter (1945) Chapter VII, Article 51

106

(29)

in more scientific way, like for example economics. According to him, both prediction and uncertainty played great parts in science and in military strategy. Academic knowledge as a proper science would increase the qualitative and quantitative analysis and improve the field of strategic studies.107 Referring to the logic of warfare, Rasmussen argues that since the 1960s security studies and strategic studies have followed separate paths, as those studying security mostly fail to take the logic of war and conflict into account, while those studying strategy fail to consider the political and sociological framework of conflict.108

3.2. Traditional warfare

According to Coker,109 there are four stages of traditional warfare: deterrence and engagement, seizing the initiative, decisive operations and post-conflict. These are still relevant to the post-Cold War warfare, with even greater emphasis put on the post-conflict actions, in order to prevent the boomerang effect of the conflict. The modern conduct of war is derived from Clausewitz’ ideas. While Clausewitz argued that war was a means to achieve political ends, he sought to define the rationality of war. War has a meaning shared by no other form of violence because it is defined as a means to ends beyond the acts of violence themselves. This is visible in his view of the trinity that is essential in war:

“As a total phenomenon its [war’s] dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second, the commander and his army; and the third, the government. The passions that are kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of the government

107

Bernard Brodie. ”Strategy as Science.” Mahnken, Thomas G., and Joseph A. Maiolo, eds. Strategic studies: a reader. Routledge, 2014.

108

109

(30)

alone.”110

Clausewitz recognised the difference between the logic of means-ends rationality and the difficulties arising from its practical implementation. Between the logic and the grammar of war, ‘friction’ asserted itself. Weather, terrain and various unintended consequences made Clausewitz conclude that ‘everything in war is very simple… but the simplest thing is difficult’.111

3.3. Limited War

During the Cold War, the Weinberger doctrine was the norm between the East and the West. This doctrine implied that the war between the great powers, the US and the Soviet Union, should be the very last resort, due to the destructive power that both of these countries had.112 War between the US and Russia is still not strategically or logically sensible, but from any of the larger powers, total war is out of the question unless absolutely necessary. The introduction of the nuclear age has changed the possibilities of destruction and for the sake of self-preservation; total war is not an option to any country in possession of nuclear weapons. Limited wars are wars of persuasion, where arguments and incentives complement limited use of force.113 The idea in limited warfare is not total annihilation, but coercion. Due to the destruction capabilities of the total war, the ultimate case of a boomerang effect is the mutual assured destruction, a term coined by the dilemma posed by the nuclear age.114 Since the mid 20th century, the social institutions of industrial society have been confronted with the historically unprecedented possibility of the destruction through decision-making of life on this planet, causing problems for the strategists.115

According to Kissinger, “a limited war ... is fought for specific political objectives which, by their very existence, tend to establish a relationship between the force to be employed and

110

Michael Handel. Masters of war: classical strategic thought. Routledge, (2005): 77.

111

Gian P. Gentile. "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army." Parameters 41, no. 4 (2011): 13. 112 Beatrice Heuser. (2010): 379-380. 113 Ibid. 459. 114

115

(31)

the goal to be attained. It reflects an attempt to affect the opponents’ will, not to crush it, to make the conditions to be imposed seem more attractive than continued resistance, to strike for specific goals and not for complete annihilation.”116 Beaufre argues that “the new fundamental principle is that limited war, on the material level of forces ... is unlimited on the psychological and moral level ... The new strategy is a very indirect military strategy where the psychological decision is sought directly by the preponderant application of psychological means”.117

The goal of a war is not to lose, rather than to win the war. Beaufre continues that “only by a pseudo-Clausewitzian aberration have we been led to believe that cases existed where one aim was clearly predominant over all the others. ‘Winning the war’ is not a political aim; as Liddell Hart has clearly demonstrated, the real political aim is the type of peace to follow the war”.118 Creating a lasting peace that is respected by all actors involved is more important than destroying the opponent.

3.4. Modern strategy

“The military today in liberal societies is seen and respected more as a professional fire brigade or a police force, there to protect security and fight rogue states, than as warriors or a special social caste that was once supposedly the hallmark of all Indo-European societies.”119

The declining role of the military in the modern society had lead to the perception of the use of force, comparable to police action against violent criminals, as a necessary evil for the protection of world society and local communities, and aim to limit casualties on all sides, attempting to establish a viable peace.120 War always includes a degree of uncertainty. Major wars are possible only in the presence of uncertainty, which is why the

116 Beatrice Heuser. (2010): 458-459. 117 Ibid. 462. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 485. 120 Ibid. 486.

How does the risk management approach explain the operation Iraqi Freedom?