How the affordances of social media platforms like Facebook shape radicalization and recruitment of ISIS and how it could change after death of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi?
BA Thesis Media and Information Natalia Dercz
11691131 Maxigas Word Count: 9599
Abstract
The most recent events related to the Islamic State, namely: the organization losing all of its controlled territory and its leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, might put its legitimacy and power at stake. Based on the network society theory put forward by Manuel Castells, this research examines how the affordances of social media platforms, with the focus on Facebook, shape and influence the radicalization and recruitment rhetorical tactics used by ISIS to attract more people, and whether these tactics could change, now that Al-Baghdadi is deceased.
Using the platform and content analysis, along with a digital method, this paper researches the content that this organization spreads to draw in followers and further increase its power. I argue that the platform facilitates the extremist activities and explore whether Al-Baghdadi, the former leader of the organization, was a significant factor in radicalization tactics used by the Islamic State on social media platforms. The general assumption that can be drawn from this research, is that the ISIS propaganda machine is not likely to stop after Al-Baghdadi’s death and that companies such as Facebook should implement measures that will more efficiently limit the circulation of extremist content on its platforms.
Table of contents
INTRODUCTION ________________________________________________________________________ 3 Justification and the research focus _________________________________________________________ 5 FACTUAL BACKGROUND ________________________________________________________________ 6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ___________________________________________________________ 9 METHODOLOGY _______________________________________________________________________ 12 Platform analysis _______________________________________________________________________ 12 Digital method: fake profiling and facebook.tracking.exposed ____________________________________ 12 Content analysis ________________________________________________________________________ 14 ANALYSIS _____________________________________________________________________________ 15 Facebook affordances ___________________________________________________________________ 20 Low-level affordances _________________________________________________________________ 21 High-level affordances ________________________________________________________________ 25 DISCUSSION ___________________________________________________________________________ 28 Discussion of the findings on the Facebook profile _____________________________________________ 28 The role of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in Facebook radicalization and recruitment. _____________________ 29 Sketching the path for possible solutions _____________________________________________________ 30 FURTHER RESEARCH __________________________________________________________________ 32 LIMITATIONS _________________________________________________________________________ 33 CONCLUSION __________________________________________________________________________ 34 WORKS CITED _________________________________________________________________________ 36 Appendix A – Facebook.Tracking.Exposed project ____________________________________________ 45 Appendix B – Screenshots from Mohammed’s Facebook feed ___________________________________ 46
INTRODUCTION
The Islamic State, also known as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) or ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) is a jihadist terrorist organization that follows a radical doctrine of Sunni Islam (Antunes and Camisão). ISIS is a self-proclaimed Caliphate that has emerged in 2014 as a side shoot of Al Qaeda (Elbaum). The Islamic State quickly gained control over significant amounts of territories in Syria and Iraq (Elbaum). At the beginning of its activity, the biggest amount of ISIS fighters constituted of Sunni believers from Syria and Iraq, however, since then, it has radicalized and united fighters from multiple Middle Eastern, African and European countries, as well as United States and Canada (Picker).
At the peak point of ISIS’ power in 2015, it has gathered over 30,000 members from over eighty five countries (Picker). Social media allowed the organization to cross
international borders in order to recruit new members (Amidi et al. 27) The Islamic State made sure that the content they spread is available to potential jihadists anywhere on the planet, and thanks to the immediate sharing possibilities of platforms such as Facebook or Twitter, it has become significantly easier to spread the message (Chung-Yin Yeung 5).
On the 29th of October, 2019, the Islamic State’s leader, Abu-Bakr Al Baghdadi, was confirmed dead after a raid in Syria. After losing the last bit of its territory, Al-Baghdadi’s death could hurt the IS’s legitimacy. Thousands of ISIS fighters have pledged allegiance specifically to its leader, rather than to the organization itself (Daragahi). Recruits and groups based throughout Asia and Africa promised loyalty to Al-Baghdadi personally, rather than the organization as a whole, hence now it might be more difficult to sustain ties with such
supporters in many countries (Daragahi). ISIS that has lost its leader and their controlled territory, soon might have no ground to consider itself much different from any other terrorist group (Safi), however, according to a former ISIS fighter, Muhammed Asik, who is now imprisoned in Iraq, it does not matter that Al-Baghdadi is dead (Davies et al). Basing on his
testimony, it makes no difference who is in charge, as there are thousands of believers willing to fight in the name of jihad, despite another person being at the top of the organization (Davies et al).
It is commonly known that terrorism has a different online presence than physical. It is created, maneuvered and amplified disproportionally, as the main weapon is what the public perceives, rather than the actual firearm itself (Chung-Yin Yeung 2). Social media is known to be the best tool for reaching the broadest possible audience. By being open, interactive, immediate and permanent, as opposed to the traditional media characterized as being “one-to-many”, social media platforms allow anyone to publish any content without restrictions (Weimann 2). After the 9/11 attack, numerous anti-terrorist campaigns were launched, and in response, terrorist organizations began to use the potential of Internet, where they created thousands of websites promoting their missions (Weimann 2). Even though other terrorist organizations engage in spreading their ideologies through social media as well, ISIS is known for extremely persuasive rhetorical tactics, meant to attract people to join the self-proclaimed Caliphate. One of the groups that ISIS targets are vulnerable, misunderstood people, who wish to find comfort and connect with like-wise individuals (Winter 37). They often seek a greater purpose in their life and a get-away from frustrations they face on a daily basis. One of such people is Hoda Muthana, a 24 year old woman who has spent five years as an ISIS member (Speckhard and Shajkovci). Muthana was brought up in a Muslim family, being forbidden to access to most technological devices and social practices with peers. On top of that, she was destined by her parents to marry one of her Yemeni family members in the near future (Speckhard and Shajkovci). Once she was given access to a mobile phone, Hoda began using social media platforms such as Twitter, where she encountered a “Twittersphere of Muslims” (Speckhard and Shajkovci). In an interview conducted with Muthana, she says that some of the members of this “sphere” were not strictly practicing
Muslims, but there were also individuals who encouraged others to become more engaged in the practice (Speckhard and Shajkovci). At first, the content she was “fed” was rather neutral; quotes from Quran, interpretations of verses, but gradually it was becoming more radical. Muthana was assured that living under the new, self-proclaimed Caliphate was an obligation for every Muslim (Speckhard and Shajkovci). Muthana was becoming more radicalized and began to isolate herself from those with opposing views to ISIS (Speckhard and Shajkovci). What made the decision to join the Islamic State final, was a testimony of another woman, who has made that last step, whom Muthana encountered on Twitter (Speckhard and
Shajkovci). The IS members often offer potential recruits first-hand information concerning the battlefield, the life as an ISIS supporter as well as logistical advice (Winter 43).
After spending a few years in Syria, Muthana realized she has been brain-washed by the content distributed on social media (Speckhard and Shajkovci). The story of how Hoda Muthana was radicalized and encouraged to join ISIS through social media is only one out of thousands similar ones. The terrorist organization is exceptionally efficient in targeting people on the social platforms, using all sorts of rhetorical tactics and ways of disseminating
propaganda.
Justification and the research focus
Facebook’s legitimacy, personalization algorithms, sharing data with third-party companies, multiple privacy violations, and the ways the platform handles being the biggest social network, are examples of the most heated ongoing debates in the media studies field at the moment. Mark Zuckerberg, the founder and CEO of Facebook, has testified in Congress as the platform was accused of being unable to stop the spread of fake news along with sharing data with third-party companies such as Cambridge Analytica (The Economist). Moreover, Facebook received a backlash for not being able to control the spread of extremist propaganda (The Economist). Additionally, with the auto-generated content (such as
analyzing user’s yearly activity and presenting it in a video consisting of posts, photos or videos shared by the user over the course of the past year), Facebook contributes to popularization of the extremist ideas (National Whisteblower Center). The platform’s
moderators are responsible for implementing accurate measures in order to prevent spread of such content, and as for now, they did not succeed in limiting the extremism within it. Hence, the availability of the extremist content may, and as I will argue in the following paper - has, violent radicalizing effects (Conway 77). I will engage with this debate and address the issue of social media platforms being accountable for allowing, and even facilitating the processes of radicalization and recruitment, that are openly taking place.
As social media and creating networks play a crucial role in radicalization and recruitment of new members, I will analyze the most important factors of it. Namely, I will explore how filter bubbles, personalization algorithms and Facebook’s affordances enable the processes. I will focus on exploring whether well-planned social media rhetorical tactics and creating networks are the key components for encouraging more people to join such
organizations, which results in them gaining power and spreading fear amongst the public. In the next sections I will also seek an answer to how the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi could possibly affect the recruitment rates, as the leader of the Islamic State has been a symbol of the organization and thousands of believers have pledged allegiance to him personally (Daragahi).
The question being answered in the following research is:
How the affordances of social media platforms like Facebook shape radicalization and recruitment of ISIS and how it could change after death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was the “Caliph” of the Islamic State since its
a territory the size of Great Britain in Iraq and Syria (Gibbons-Neff Rubin et al). Al-Baghdadi managed to draw in tens of thousands of recruits from more than eighty five countries and succeeded to carry out terrorist attacks in Iraq and Syria, but also in forty other countries around the world (Callimachi). He was in charge of the operations during the Nice, Sri Lanka and Berlin attacks in the past few years (Callimachi and Hassan).
Before establishing ISIS, in 2010 he became the chief of command of ISI, the Iraqi division of Al-Qaeda and remained the leader of ISI until the expansion into Syria in 2013 (The Middle East Media Research Institute). Later that year, he has announced the creation of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (The Middle East Media Research Institute). In February 2014, Al Qaeda has disavowed any relation to ISIL (Sly), as it did not approve the brutal, and even in the opinion of another terrorist organization, inhumane violence (Gardner). In 2014, on June 29th, ISIL has proclaimed itself a worldwide Caliphate, appointing Al-Baghdadi its Caliph, which brought backlash from the Muslim community and important figures within it (Sanders). Caliph is a successor of Muhammad, the Islamic Prophet and the head of the entire Muslim community (Safi). This title can be given to an individual only by the entire
community, not by a single group, therefore it was considered to be a violation of the Sharia law (Safi). Under Al-Baghdadi’s leadership, the Islamic State has become the most dangerous and prominent terrorist jihadi organization of all (Zelin). After years of bringing terror to the world, on the 29th of October, 2019 Al-Baghdadi died during an US raid in Syria (Safi). He went into a dead-end tunnel, where he detonated a suicide vest, killing himself together with three of his children (Safi). Throughout the paper, I will analyze whether the death of Al-Baghdadi could have an impact on the recruitment rates of ISIS in the years to come. He was not only the leader of operations within the Islamic State, but also a symbol of the
At its peak, the Islamic State controlled almost 90 000 square meters of territory starting in western Syria, reaching as far as eastern Iraq (BBC). Millions of people have been under its ruling for years and ISIS has been generating billions of dollars in revenue from robbery, kidnapping, oil and extortion (BBC). Over the years 2015-2019 the Islamic State has been gradually loosing bits of its territory (see figure 1), and in March 2019 it has lost the last part of controlled land, namely the Syrian city of Baghuz (Callimachi). Losing the territory and its leader does not mean that the Islamic State will now stop its mission. ISIS remains a powerful force and still poses a serious terrorist threat (Callimachi et al). The self-proclaimed Caliphate is in the process of transition and undergoing necessary changes in order to not lose its power, however there are still thousands of fighters supporting the ideology (BBC).
Notwithstanding, now that it has lost all of its territory and its leader, it could start losing legitimacy and trust of the supporters, as well as start becoming weaker and not as dangerous in the eyes of the worldwide public.
Figure 1: The loss of the Islamic State’s territory over the years 2015-2019. Source: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45547595
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This paper focuses on radicalization and recruitment processes through the usage of social media platforms. Such processes and creating relationships between parties involved, are partly possible thanks to the ability of creating networks on platforms such as Facebook, hence I will analyze it through the lens of the network society theory introduced by Manuel Castells.
The network society theory focuses on explaining how the structure of the society is made of networks, which are powered by communications technologies (Cardoso and Castells 3). The transformation that has occurred within the past twenty years is associated with the creation of a new technological paradigm, in which society’s activities are established around microelectronics-based information (Materials for an exploratory theory of the network
society 5). According to Castells, networks have always been present in the society, however
the introduction of information-communication technologies greatly affected and brought changes to the social landscape and played a significant role in shaping the network society (Sardarnia and Safizadeh 1269). In Castells’ view, the set of information technologies present a significantly bigger change in the history of technologies than the ones that were in use during the Industrial or Information Revolution (Materials for an exploratory theory of the
network society 10).
A network is a set of interconnected nodes, which are the points of connection within the network (Cardoso and Castells 7). The networks themselves are open structures that change their construction by adding or removing nodes (Cardoso and Castells 7). The nodes are neutral and can be modified and spread without restrictions, as long as they are receptive to the added index points (Sardarnia and Safizadeh 1270). Facebook is, as the description itself suggests, a (social) network. It is constructed of millions of nodes and the network keeps growing as the already existing nodes (users) are indeed receptive to new index points. If a
user decides to leave the network, the node is simply deleted, while other nodes accommodate themselves to the new situation (Kieschnick 4). What Facebook enables, is creating networks inside a network. Users can find each other, add as friends and form interest groups. These features are beneficial for ISIS content disseminators, who are able to find or even form such networks themselves in order to more easily attract a bigger number of users at once. This is one of the reasons for which ISIS, being a network itself, is able to gain more and more supporters through social media platforms.
What contributes to the Islamic State’s success, is the fact that the organization has built a very strong identity for itself, as it is considered to be the most up-to-date, extensive and media-based terrorist organization (Sardarnia and Safizadeh 1272). According to Castells, identity is a source of meaning for people, and should not be mistaken with roles (The Power
of Identity 6). More specifically, the process that one has to undergo in order to construct an
identity makes it a stronger source of meaning, rather than a role, which is primarily meant to organize functions (The Power of Identity 7). Castells differentiates between three forms of identity building: legitimizing identity, which is introduced by the dominant institutions of society in order to emphasize their domination, resistance identity, created by those who are de-valued by the dominating entity and project identity, which occurs when the social actors build a new identity that reformulates their position in the society (The Power of Identity 8). The Islamic State can be analyzed through the lens of “resistance identity” as it revolts against oppressive governments in the Western countries, as well as “project identity”, because it indeed has built an identity that has given the organization another position in the society (Sardarnia and Safizadeh 1275).
In his research on the network society theory, Castells introduced two concepts; the timeless time and space of flows (An Introduction to the Information Age 145). He proposed them to reorganize the dimensional arrangements under the newly created, technological
paradigm (An Introduction to the Information Age 146). I will elaborate on these two concepts, as they are crucial for applying this theory to the following research.
Timeless time can be defined by the use of the new information-communication technologies in the ever-stopping attempts to obliterate time (An Introduction to the
Information Age 145). At once, time is compressed and de-sequenced, as the past, present and
the future occur in a random sequence (An Introduction to the Information Age 145). In relation to social media, it can be argued that in the online realm, time has a different structure as it does in the physical world. There is a temporality around the technology that we are using, the time online is experienced in a different way than physically. Because social media enables constant connection, time indeed becomes timeless. This is one of the reasons for which ISIS is able to attract so many followers and possible recruits. With the rise in popularity of social media, the Islamic State can spread their message and publish content, while the viewers have the means to access it any time, go back to it, look up the details and view it whenever they please, and potentially, become attracted.
The second concept of the network society introduced by Castells that is of importance in this research, is the concept of space of flows (An Introduction to the Information Age 146). Space of flows refers to the technological and organizational ability of organizing social practices simultaneously, no matter the geographical location (An Introduction to the
Information Age 147). The networks are non-geographic entities, so it does not matter in what
place in the world an individual is, as long as they have connection to the network they will be able to remain in it, because the flow of information can reach any place (An Introduction
to the Information Age 147). This is another matter of crucial importance for ISIS. For such
an organization, global reach and borderlessness are one of the most important factors for radicalization and recruitment, as their goal is to attract as many people from all over the world, spread the message and encourage potential members or supporters to join the cause.
The concepts of timeless time and space of flows touch upon the work of Marshall McLuhan, as he theorized on the implosion of time and space happening due to replacing one of the traditional and dominant mediums, writing, by the electronic media (Kirtiklis 76). Technology and social media being present around us the whole time, make constant connection and reach very wide audiences at the same time, regardless their geographical location possible. This is very important to ISIS, as thanks to such a possibility they are able to spread propaganda, whilst making sure they reach whoever they are targeting (and more), radicalize the individuals and, ultimately, recruit new members.
METHODOLOGY Platform analysis
In the following research I will use platform analysis as my main methodology, as I find it to be the most suitable method for analyzing the affordances and features of
Facebook’s interface. By doing so, I will provide an insight into how certain features are helping the Islamic State spread their ideology and recruit new members to the organization. In the following sections I will discuss the “suggested friends” , “people you may know” and “groups suggested for you” features, as well as personalization algorithms, which lead to creation of filter bubbles and the possibility of forming networks and joining groups, that gather potential ISIS recruits in one place, hence facilitating radicalization and convincing the nodes from the network to become a part of the self-proclaimed Caliphate.
Digital method: fake profiling and facebook.tracking.exposed
On an increasing rate, research across different disciplines is becoming mediated by the digital technologies available to the scholars (Berry 1). Technologies are being used to shift the critical ground of the theories and concepts applied (Hutchinson 1). Digital methods are meant to help researching the societal change and cultural conditions with the usage of online data (Rogers 1). I will employ a digital method used in the field of journalism, in order
to prove that Facebook indeed uses filter bubbles, and ultimately partially excludes content displayed on users’ feeds. The filter bubbles make it more likely that a potential ISIS recruit will see a vast amount of content published by and/or related to the organization. Once the users begins to engage with the content, they are more likely to become radicalized. In one of the university courses that is a part of the curriculum of the Media and Information degree at University of Amsterdam, called “Data Journalism” I have performed a research on Facebook personalization algorithms with fake profiling. The assignment was a part of the
“facebook.tracking.exposed” project, meant to increase transparency that lays behind the personalization algorithms that lead to creation of filter bubbles on Facebook (see Appendix A). Personalization algorithms were implemented by Facebook, as well as other platforms, for example Google, in order to limit the growing amount of data shown to a particular user and only display personalized content (Bozdag and Timmermans 1). The issue with filtering
out parts of the information is that it is never neutral, and is by no means controlled by the user, hence ultimately it leads to creation of the so-called filter bubbles (Bozdag and
Timmermans 1). Filter bubbles have the power to make a huge difference in global matters, as we had the chance to see in the case of the US Elections in 2016 (Alcott and Gentzkow), or as I will try to prove in this research, successful radicalization and recruitment of ISIS members.
In the “Data Journalism” course, within a group, I created a Facebook profile of an Iraqi-born male individual, Mohammed Abadi, who grew up, went to school and completed university in his home town, Baghdad, Iraq. Afterwards, Mohammed moved to the German capital, Berlin, in order to get his master’s degree. On Facebook, Mohammed is interested in news items from the Middle-East and follows pages such as Al-Jazeera or Iraq Solidarity News. He is a practicing Muslim, however by no means radical. Alongside interest in Arabic culture and his roots, he is greatly interested in tattoo art, oceanography, and sports cars, especially the brand Porsche. The profile was already active, and I started engaging with it on
a daily basis. More specifically, I liked more pages and shared more posts that could have been of interest to Mohammed. I liked pages from all fields of his interests and did not favor any particular field. The focus of the profile was still very much equally spread throughout all of his interests. The desired outcome was to see what sort of content Mohammed would be displayed if I slightly nudged him into one direction. Additionally, the goal was to re-assure the statement that Facebook’s personalization algorithms contribute to successful
radicalization, and in the end, possible recruitment of new Islamic State members. I have been observing the profile while paying as much attention to all the interests mention above, but the subject of the analysis was whether much would change if I slightly increased the interest rate of Islam related content, by sharing two articles, adding a few Arabic friends and liking three Islam-related pages, but still engaging with the rest of his hobbies. Once the profile became active enough, I was able to obtain relevant data by collecting screenshots, to provide a visual representation of the findings.
Content analysis
In order to analyze the second aspect of the research, I will use the content analysis method, which enables a systematic analysis of data collected in the research, so that general claims can be made (Haggarty 99). As my defined data set, I will specifically look at articles regarding death of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi within the period of 29th October 2019 – 14th December 2019. By exploring views and opinions of journalists, I want to evaluate whether ISIS, and more importantly, its recruitment rates, might undergo significant changes after Al-Baghdadi’s death. This way, I can verify whether the scenario, which occurred in 2011 after the assassination of Osama Bin Laden, namely that the recruitment rates of new Al Qaeda members decreased, could repeat now with the former leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, being dead. After Bin Laden has been killed, Al Qaeda started to be
Qaeda had no territory nor a powerful leader (Shams). It gives a reason to believe that the self-proclaimed Caliphate, although the ideology is still very much praised by many and, will weaken in power.
ANALYSIS
ISIS usage of social media
ISIS has adopted a decentralized model of spreading propaganda and recruitment of new fighters (Chung-Yin Yeung 3), as the content meant to radicalize potential new-comers is spread over multiple channels. They use social media platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook or Instagram (Weimann 1) as well as private web-communicators like Telegram, which is an example of an ideal platform to connect with fellow members, having secret chat possibilities and security features (Bloom and Daymon 372). The Islamic State has an “army” of disseminators who very often do not have any intention of participating in physical jihad, but are willing to support the organization on an unofficial level through media activism (Winter 35). For example, in 2014, a footage of a game simulating terror attacks with Arabic dubbing over the video was released by an ISIS supporter, portraying men dressed as ISIS fighters, killing police officers and blowing up their cars (see figure 2 and 3) (Grossman). Even though the video was fan-made, it has been viewed more than 10,000 times over the course of a few days and inspired others to make similar videos, which were also seen and shared thousands of times (Chung-Yin Yeung 5). The information-communication
technologies, space of flows and timeless time (Castells 145), as well as the possibilities of networks creation over social media channels, make it easier for the disseminators to reach wide audiences and maximize the circulation of content from Syria and Iraq to the rest of the world (Winter 36), or the other way around.
Figure 2: Screenshot from the footage published in 2014 by an ISIS supporter.
Source: https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/IS-claims-it-created-a-terror-video-game-375935
Figure 3: Screenshot from the footage published in 2014 by an ISIS supporter.
Source: https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/IS-claims-it-created-a-terror-video-game-375935
Furthermore, a group of voluntarily proselytizers whose role is to identify and target vulnerable candidates, later fortify their doubts about their life situations and present joining
ISIS as a way to escape, is another significant part of the Islamic State’s apparatus (Winter 37). Those who decide to support the organization from afar are crucial for ISIS, as these self-appointed members within the network are what makes the spread of propaganda more successful.
The content disseminated by means of social media platforms varies depending on the audience. One of the most prominent targets for ISIS are misunderstood or lost people, who once offered an escape from the frustrations of everyday life, get convinced by the promise of an utopian Muslim experience, which will make them participate in “God’s project on Earth” (Winter 42). These individuals might be experiencing a crisis of identity, in which situation they begin to look for another, more salient one (Amidi et al. 27). ISIS, having a powerful identity and being a strong force in general, becomes a solution for these individual to find what they are looking for. They can create an identity, that could be shared with others who experience the same struggles. This constitutes what Castells calls the “project identity”, which occurs when social actors create a new identity that re-invents their position in the society (Castells 8). Those responsible for reaching out to such individuals, are aware that offering them a way out could potentially lead them to joining the organization. ISIS creates a narrative of sense of adventure (Nurminen 16), which makes the potential recruits believe that they will escape their current problems and be introduced to a new, better world in which they will meet like-wise individuals and together pursue their goals.
Another one of the narratives used by ISIS in order to target and radicalize members, is the religious obligation (Nurminen 16). The propagandists target people who do not agree with how the Muslim communities are treated around the world. One of the rhetorical tactics used by the organization in order to attract Muslim people to join, is depicting Ummah, one of the fundamental concepts in Islam, that in simple terms means community (The Oxford
to the religious obligation, Muslims who are vulnerable to content depicting their religion as attacked by the rest of the world, feel the duty to join ISIS and fight for a just world for themselves. These individuals develop a “resistance identity”, which is generated when social actors are “stigmatized by the logic of domination” (Castells 8). The organization portrays the violence they experience on the side of the enemies as unfair and brutal, as an attack on their community, while normalizing and justifying their own, barbaric acts (Leppink 22). The Islamic State shows this extreme violence as a form of protecting their values and convinces potential recruits that when supporting the organization, they are protecting their religion and enable the future generations to live in a world where Islam is not attacked (Leppink 22). Religion is a reliable type of bond, as it provides a common ground to connect on, and in times of crisis it allows its promoters to spread radical interpretations that emphasizes feelings of individuals (Kfir 5), and bonds affiliates with a shared identity (Amidi et al. 27). The organization spreads the belief that in order to stop being discriminated and disrespected by the Western societies, fighters should join the jihad and protect the Muslim community from oppression (Leppink 22). The organization convinces their audience that supporting it is the only way to protect the core values of Sunni Islam, and if individuals willing to engage with terrorist activities are unable to travel to where the organization holds occupancy, they should plan and execute terrorist attacks in their countries of origin (Nurminen 16).
Another target group of ISIS, are the potential Western recruits. In order to optimize the differences between the cultures and encourage people from Western countries to join the organization, ISIS fighters are being shown posing with products popular and recognizable in the Western culture, such as Nutella jars (Gates and Podder 109). These tactics are meant to create an illusion of familiarity and modern values. Moreover, the videos designed for the Western audiences, not only being translated to English, but also other languages, tend to be less radical and violent than the Arabic language ones (Hubbard and Shane). It is a way of
mitigating the radical aspects of ISIS and facilitating the process of acceptance that one will be joining jihad and supporting a terrorist organization.
Nevertheless, a significant amount of ISIS social media content still uses a narrative that some scholars describe as “brutality component” (Leppink 21). It aims at reaching the broadest possible audience by displaying brutal, violent and unacceptable acts. Even though they can be described as such, they do get attention that ISIS aims for (Leppink 22). Users watch the extremist content, and even though it depicts inhumane acts, they are intrigued by it, so they begin exploring reasons for which the organization performed them in the first place (Leppink 22). Being able to find vast amount of propaganda all over the Internet and other mediums, having created a filter bubble for themselves, users do not see much evidence that could put it in another perspective, so they get convinced that the Islamic State had legitimate reasons to engage in such vicious actions (Leppink 22). ISIS has an explanation for all their extremist behaviors, hence a person might become more likely to consider these as justified and normal (Leppink 22). Being in this cycle long enough, they might start believing the content they are exposed to, consider the violence to be a legitimate response, and
ultimately decide to join the organization to protect its values, thinking the violence was earned by its victims.
ISIS was using the persona of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to a great extent in order to increase legitimacy of the organization, however there is lack of academic evidence that he was a major part of the rhetorical tactics used in the radicalization process particular for social media (Krieg). Nevertheless, as mentioned before, there are thousands of ISIS fighters who became a part of the self-proclaimed Caliphate, not necessarily for the cause of jihad, but because they were trying to get closer to the self-proclaimed Caliph (Daragahi). Before multiple terrorist attacks performed by ISIS, including the Berlin and Nice attacks in 2016 or the shooting in San Bernardino in 2015, the fighters responsible for them would record
messages praising Al-Baghdadi (Callimachi and Hassan). He was the Islamic State’s most important figure, both because he had enough power and knowledge to establish a self-proclaimed Caliphate, but also because he claimed to be a successor of Muhammad (Khatib). There is lack of any complete information and evidence confirming Al-Baghdadi’s relation to the Prophet Muhammad (Alkaff 6), however ISIS still used the fact that its leader was a “Caliph” as a way to convince potential recruits that joining the organization will bring them closer to the Messenger of God. Even though Al-Baghdadi had been in hiding for multiple years, as he was wanted dead by many, the organization was using him as a symbol of the organization (Cockburn). It can be debated whether he was one of the factors in any of the narratives described above (or other ones), however there is no research published explaining his presence in the tactics used by ISIS on social media. Al-Baghdadi was a charismatic representant of the organization that encouraged people to join by highlighting the core values that IS represents, rather than a major factor in the process of recruitment through social media platforms such as Facebook.
Facebook affordances
Affordance is a concept that describes the actions that media technologies users can perform and specify how platforms may be used (Bucher and Helmond 2). According to media scholars, Taina Bucher and Anne Helmond, they can be divided into five groups, each relating to different functions: affordances as relational property, perceived affordances, technology affordances, social affordances and lastly, communicative affordances (Bucher and Helmond). They also specify that the affordances can be high or low-level. The low-level affordances are the specific features or buttons, while the high-level affordances characterize the types of dynamics that technical devices enable (Bucher and Helmond 12).
Low-level affordances
The low-level affordances are the specific technical features or buttons present on the platform within the interface that the user interacts with (Sun and Hart-Davidson 3537). Low-level affordances are for example, what used to be the like button, that has now developed into a range of different emotions that a user can express by clicking it, or the option to “poke” a friend on Facebook. One of the most crucial Facebook affordances, that contributes to a significant percentage of successful ISIS recruitment, are “suggested friends”, “people you may know” or “groups suggested for you” features. Facebook moderators received a serious backlash for not being able to deal with the growing rate of terrorism on the platform, and such features have an impact on the radicalizing activities undertaken by ISIS. Facebook assures they are investing vast amounts of money into implementation of anti-terrorist systems, such as detection and removal of terrorist content as well as users who are responsible for spreading it (Butler and Ortutay), however the rates of radicalization and recruitment are not decreasing (Evans). The data collection that Facebook uses in order to personalize users’ feeds and ads, also enables them to be directed towards people with similar interest, who they might potentially wish to become acquainted with (Evans). Due to lack of successful content check and moderation on Facebook and with the usage of features such as mentioned above, it becomes easier for ISIS to target and radicalize potential supporters by providing relevant content, reaching out and making them feel as if they were entering a network of people with common interests, a network of like-wise individuals. The nodes are able to connect, as individuals interested in extremism and jihadist content are most likely to reach each other and create networks, from which the organization greatly benefits. The Islamic State relies on such features, as they facilitate the selection of users most likely to be radicalized, who are then continued to be fed the relevant content.
While developing and analyzing the profile of Mohammed Abadi in depth, I was able to notice that most of the people in the suggested friends panel and users that “I might know” on Facebook were from from Middle Eastern and Arabic countries (see figure 4 & 5), even though friends that I have added were coming from different backgrounds (mostly European and Russian). On Mohammed’s profile, the information about his home country is present, hence it can be argued that Facebook “assumed” he would only be interested in becoming friends with users born in the same part of the world, despite his current city of inhabitance, Berlin, and current location, Amsterdam. The observation indeed proves the point that the “suggested friends” and “people you may know” affordances on Facebook make it easier for ISIS sympathizers to find one another and create wider networks, exchange ideas and drive the machine of radicalization and recruitment for the Islamic State. Like-wise individuals are encouraged by the platform to become acquainted with one another, which is also beneficial for propagandists of IS, as the supporters of extremism are already within the same network, thus it takes less amount of time to search and target them individually.
One of the affordances that contribute to potential radicalization and recruitment to ISIS through Facebook, is the feature of “groups suggested for you”. According to the Facebook Help Centre, the suggestions are based on pages that a user interacted with, groups that the users’ friends are members of, groups the user have recently joined or visited and groups that are popular near the user’s location (Facebook). They are either displayed on the side of the user’s feed, so one can access a group or community without effort, or the user has the possibility to explore all the recommended groups in a section devoted especially to that. While analyzing the profile of Mohammed, I noted a significant shift in the recommended groups for him to join. Primarily, the suggestions were spread equally and he had the
opportunity to easily join groups with people interested in tattoos, oceanography or sport cars, however after making it slightly more prominent that he has increased interest in Muslim
communities and Islam-related information, Mohammed was being offered almost exclusively groups related to these topics (see figure 6 & 7). Moreover, according to the Facebook Help Centre, one of the criteria for the groups suggestions, is the user’s location. This did not apply in Mohammed’s case, as his IP address clearly indicated Amsterdam, which is where I was while completing the research, but he did not get many suggestions of group based in this particular city.
Figure 4: Example of suggested friends for Mohammed Abadi Source: https://www.facebook.com
Figure 5: “People you may know” section from Mohammed’s profile Source: https://www.facebook.com
Figure 6: suggested Facebook groups for Mohammed Abadi to join Source: https://www.facebook.com
Figure 7: Recommendations for Mohammed in the “Groups” Facebook page Source: https://www.facebook.com
High-level affordances
High level affordances describe what users can do with the website or the platform, and how technology facilitates these activities (Bucher and Helmond 12). At the moment, social media platforms are one of the most popular mediums of communication on the planet, Facebook being the most commonly used one (Ortiz-Ospina). In 2012 the number of
Facebook users exceeded a billion and now it has 2.45 billion of users worldwide (Clement). Because of such a vast number of users, naturally there is an overload of content and
information, which would be impossible to control solely by Facebook employees. For this reason, personalization algorithms were introduced, so the growing amount of data would be partially controlled (Bozdag and Timmermans 1) and the users would not be exposed to random content. These algorithms are not exactly what scholars would describe as affordances, however they do shape the activities that users can engage with within the
platform to a great extent and they do not leave much space for interpretation. Personalization algorithms are used to filter out irrelevant content per individual user (Bozdag and
Timmermans 5), taking into account what they previously showed interest in. Two users within the social network, who might have the same friends and similar interests, may be presented different content on their feeds, if they had interacted with the platform in a different manner (Bozdag and Timmermans 5). Personalization algorithms lead to so-called “filter bubbles”, which are described as users’ personal worlds of information that they navigate while being online (Pariser). Whatever is in that filter bubble, depends exclusively on the individual user - what they like, and what kind of content they browse (Pariser). The main issue regarding the filter bubbles is that the users themselves are not able to decide what they want to filter out, nor what exactly gets filtered out (Pariser). Because of the
personalization algorithms and filter bubbles, the users are stripped of the opportunity to see content that might be of interest to them. It is the case, that even though the algorithms are portrayed as accurate, they do not always work as desired. As some users that might be interested only in specific content published by the IS or simply in some of the organization’s aspects, they nevertheless get trapped in the filter bubble. Subsequently, even though they did not have a particular interest in joining the jihad, they might be convinced to do so, due to an abundance of radicalizing content. Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, some of these users might be vulnerable to specific content, which is exploited by ISIS members or supporters, in order to radicalize them by feeding them messages and ideas that could make them decide to engage with, support, or even join the organization.
This is exactly what happened when analyzing the Facebook page of Mohammed Abadi. I have been “feeding” the profile mostly with news items from the Middle East, Islam related pages, sports cars, more specifically Porsche, tattoo art and oceanography. However, after clicking on a few of the news items and liking some posts related to the Muslim
community, indicating increased, however still not significantly high interest in this content, I noticed a shift in the posts on his feed. After slightly nudging Mohammed into the direction of Islam related content, the feed mostly consisted of posts regarding Iraqi news, Al-Jazeera posts or content related to the religion (see figure 8), while there were barely any posts regarding the tattoo venues that appeared before, oceanography or the sports cars pages (see Appendix B) that were visible multiple times before. This clearly indicates how the filter bubbles lock a user in a specific mindset and does not allow flexibility in browsing the content they are exposed to, especially once they express somewhat higher interest in a specific topic or area of interest.
Figure 8: One of the posts on Mohammed’s Facebook feed Source: https://www.facebook.com
DISCUSSION
The discussion is divided into two sections. The first one examines the findings of the created Facebook profile in more depth, proving that indeed Facebook and some of its
affordances influence the chances of radicalizing and ultimately recruiting new members to ISIS. In the second section I discuss whether Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was a big aspect in radicalization through Facebook, and whether his death will have an impact on the online radicalization and recruitment processes of ISIS. What I was expecting before conducting the research, was that Al-Baghdadi’s persona influenced the online recruitment rates, as believers were convinced to join the organization for the reasons strictly connected to him and his role in the Muslim community. However, there is no clear research indicating that he was one of the significant factors in social media rhetorical tactics. In the following section I will explain possible implications or lack of thereof.
Discussion of the findings on the Facebook profile
By daily checking and being active on Mohammed’s profile, I was able to observe what kind of changes it was undergoing when engaging with certain activities. After accepting a few friend requests from Arabic users and joining three groups related to the Muslim community, while still sharing and liking posts concerning his other interests (non-related to Islam, Muslim community, or his roots) I saw gradual changes in the feed and the profile in general. Mohammed began getting recommendations of almost exclusively groups related to Islam, the suggested friends were mainly from Arabic or Middle Eastern countries (even though Mohammed “lives” in Germany), the posts on the feed were mostly related to Islam, Muslim communities and Middle Eastern cultural and news items. By analyzing the Facebook feed, I argue that due to personalization algorithms and filter bubbles, as well as possibility of creating networks on the social media channels, users of such platforms are categorized, socially sorted and taken away the possibilities to explore the network outside
their bubble. Thanks to such features, once the Islamic State’s potential recruits begin to browse any content related to the organization or matters connected to it, there is a high likelihood that they will not be able to leave the bubble, becoming targets of the IS and potentially get radicalized and ultimately recruited. Filter bubbles and other affordances of Facebook give its users an excessive amount of specific content when they express a slightly increased interest in some subject matter, filtering out, almost completely, content related to their other interests (see Appendix B).
The role of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in Facebook radicalization and recruitment.
Al-Baghdadi was the representant of the core values and ideology spread by ISIS, and at the same time he created a sense of legitimacy to the organization. Now that the leader of ISIS is dead, it could have been expected that the organization’s body responsible for “virtual” part of the Caliphate would have to put emphasis on the online rhetorical tactics of radicalization and recruitment, like the ones I have described in the research, instead of focusing on his persona. It is a fact, that under Al-Baghdadi’s leadership, IS was the most dangerous terrorist organization in the world, occupying a vast territory and killing thousands of people (BBC). However, in an interview conducted by Al-Jazeera, Andreas Krieg, the assistant professor of the Defense Studies Department at King’s College in London, said that the death of the IS leader is only symbolical and that it does not change anything (Krieg). After Bin-Laden has been killed in 2011, Al Qaeda lost some of its affiliates as the leader was not only a spiritual guide for the jihadists, but was also highly involved in the terrorist
operations (Annamalai 22). The assassination of the man who was behind the 9/11 attacks showed to the world that no terrorist organization is irreproachable (Annamalai 22). Al Qaeda was formed in 1988 (Wander), and even though now it does use social media in order to spread the ideology and recruit members, it had its peak of “popularity” in a different era than the Islamic State. At this point, ISIS is a virtual Caliphate with very strong social media
presence and the rhetorical tactics meant to spread their message, praise the ideology and recruit new members are extremely well-planned and very rigorously executed. Using the persona of Al-Baghdadi did not have as big of an impact as anticipated in ISIS’s
radicalization and recruitment processes online. As discussed by Andreas Krieg, the Islamic State is a virtual Caliphate, which will continue to spread its message across the Internet and engage with social media platforms in order to radicalize more people, with our without its “Caliph”.
Sketching the path for possible solutions
As I argued in the paper, the death of the organization’s leader is not necessarily of significant importance for the online radicalization of ISIS sympathizers, as the tactics that have been implemented are strongly rooted in the presence and regular activity on social media platforms, and did not vastly involve Al-Baghdadi. He was an icon and the founder of the self-proclaimed Caliphate, however his persona was mainly used as a representation of the core values, rather than a way to radicalize and possibly recruit members through Facebook. His death might hurt the organization’s legitimacy, however with the
information-communication technologies, such as social media platforms and their affordances, it is still very easy to target people and use the rhetorical tactics to radicalize them online. By
analyzing the interface of Facebook and the specific data set described in the methodology section, I claim that these very rhetorical tactics and the system based around them, that has already been firmly established by the Islamic State, will prevail. The social media platforms and possibility of network creation enabled the terrorists to come into direct contact with their targeted audiences as well as their sympathizers (Alfifi et al. 1). In the findings from the Facebook profile, it was notable that the features of the platform were contributing to “locking” up the individual in his filter bubble, suggesting making friends with radical individuals, joining groups related to Islam and other features described in the paper. Various
users, even ones like Mohammed, who was only slightly nudged into the direction of Islam-related content, was given some results that could potentially encourage him to engage with radical ideologies. Given that what ISIS spreads by the means of social media reaches audiences from various cultural backgrounds, the propaganda machine has the potential to accommodate all of them, despite the fact that these audiences might have completely different reasons to engage with such content. Moreover, besides joining ISIS in order to participate in jihad and support the organization, there are thousands of people, such as
disseminators and proselytizers of the propagandistic content, willing to devote their time into spreading extremist content by the means of social media (Winter). As already established, the Islamic State has the most advanced social media rhetorical tactics from all terrorist organizations and utilized them online at a very high rate. It has specially assigned teams responsible solely for handling the social media channels of the organization. Thus, even the death of the organization’s leader who managed to gather thousands of believers and conduct countless successful terrorist attacks, is not enough to stop the propaganda machine’s
momentum.
From the two factors, being tactics used by ISIS on Facebook that the platform facilitates, and the persona of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the main issue that should be addressed, lays in the affordances of Facebook and the ways in which they enable the
radicalization processes. Rather than hoping that the death of Al-Baghdadi will put an end, or at least decrease, the amount of followers that ISIS keeps on gaining through social media, another solutions could be more effective. Facebook overlooks the moderation issues and implements methods that do not exactly control spread of extremist content. The propaganda machine relies on adding new nodes to the networks of ISIS and on how the organization executes power through those networks. With the help of timeless time and space of flows as introduced by Castells (145), everyone is able to become a part of the network without any
spatial or time limits. Based on this research, I argue that the platforms should try to tackle the issue from “within”, namely, consider implementing more regulations that could limit the amount of extremist propaganda. Platforms such as Facebook should put more emphasis on controlling the processes I discussed in the research and consider limitation of constant additions of features that are supposed to bring the users closer together, because these exact features have a great impact on the terrorist activities on social media platforms. This is not an easy task, as Facebook is not a platform created for ISIS supporters to find one another and create extremist networks, but space for users to connect and share their lives on. However, taking into consideration the fact that to a great extent the platform facilitates the
radicalization processes, some regulations and limitations could definitely make a change. The designers of these platforms should conduct a research that could help control the circulation of the extremist content, and invest funds into implementing anti-terrorist strategies that would actually decrease the rates of online extremism. Additionally, the regulations concerning personalization algorithms that lead to creation of filter bubbles could be put in place, thanks to which such a vast amount of data would not be filtered out.
FURTHER RESEARCH
This research highlighted some main strategies used by ISIS on social media in order to encourage more people to become a part of the apparatus, however there is room for further research that could specify how the recruitment rates could change now that the leader of organization is deceased. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi has been killed only a few months ago, hence the possible changes in rates of recruitment for ISIS are still yet to be defined more specifically. Future research could establish whether he was more of a significant factor for potential members to join the organization than I have proven in this research, and that in years to come the organization could weaken in power and suffer from losing its founder.
Further research could also specify and propose possible measures that social media platforms such as Facebook could undertake in order to tackle the problem of radicalization and recruitment for terrorist organizations such as ISIS, even though such companies claim to be spending vast amounts of money already in order to stop terrorist activities through their services. As for now, Facebook uses artificial intelligence to match images with other, already known by the system extremist videos or pictures so they are immediately removed, language understanding, removing terrorist clusters, recidivism and cross-platform collaboration (Moltzau). These are all helpful tools, however, clearly the measures taken by the platform are not efficient enough to successfully remove terrorism related content from their website, hence more research should be done on what these companies could do in order to limit, and ultimately prevent radicalization and recruitment processes through their services.
LIMITATIONS
There were various limitations of the research. The first one was the lack of ability to understand the Arabic content on the Facebook profile. Posts written in Arabic constituted quite a vast amount of the Facebook feed, however due to lack of the language skills I was not able to understand them. Another limitation is the lack of data concerning ISIS and its
recruitment rates and any significant change after death of the Islamic State’s leader. One of the restraints for this research the lack of accessibility to ISIS’ networks on Facebook, which could have given a good and detailed insight for the research, however for security reasons I did not engage with any extremist content on any of the social media platforms myself and based the research solely on tools available to me. The last limitation I encountered was the error with the FB Trex tool, which was supposed to be a part of the
CONCLUSION
This research aimed at highlighting the ways in which the Islamic State targets and radicalizes different audiences on a social media platform and pointing out how Facebook by having specific affordances, enables the organization to spread its message and rise in power as a virtual Caliphate. The presence of ISIS is deeply based in the online rhetorical tactics that are used to engage as many people as possible, hence the findings of this research indicate that the death of its leader is not nearly enough of a reason to limit the organization’s online activities meant to attract more sympathizers. The nodes within the networks created on Facebook are very receptive to the content being published by the organization and until now, no successful means of moderation were implemented by the company. With the addition of timeless time and space of flows (Castells 145), the online “Caliphate” can easily maintain its power, even if the “Caliph” is deceased. Everyone who has a connection to the network has the means to stay active within it, and the death of such an important person for the structure of the organization does not influence the rules of the networks, nor does it change the already established system. ISIS mastered the art of radicalizing potential members on social media platforms. The digital method has proven the hypothesis that filter bubbles and specific affordances of the platform add up to the problem of online extremism. It is indeed a fact, that social media platforms like Facebook, shape the radicalization and recruitment of ISIS to a great extent, as thanks to the features such as forming groups related to a certain subject matter or the possibility to join “suggested groups”, proselytizers can find their targeted audiences with minimal effort. Furthermore, the “suggested friends” feature enables supporters of the organization as well as potential recruits to befriend one another and start sharing thoughts or information. Because of the filter bubbles, users who expressed an increased interest in a subject matter, as Mohammed did in the Islam related content, are almost immediately locked down in a specific mindset which ultimately can lead to
supporting extremist ideologies. Despite the death of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, these Facebook affordances will continue to facilitate the processes of radicalization and recruitment. As discovered using the content analysis method and focusing on a data set consisting of news items from a specific time period, it has become clear that the persona of the leader was not significantly exploited as one of the rhetorical tactics implemented by the organization. The rates of radicalization and recruitment through social media platforms like Facebook are rather unlikely to be affected by his death. Therefore, based on the research, the solution that could effectively address the problem of radicalization and recruitment with the help of platform affordances, would have to come from within Facebook and other platforms that ISIS operates at. The very nature of the Islamic State, portraited in this paper, suggests that military actions, like the operation during which Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi died, are not in the position to solve the issue of online radicalization. Thus, I argue that the problem could potentially be more effectively addressed on behalf of Facebook, and other platforms, rather that outside of them. The ways of conducting terrorist activities performed by the Islamic State over social media platforms call for unconventional methods, which could concern changing the algorithms that lead to creation of filter bubbles, or implementing different features within the platform.
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