The European Union: A benevolent power?
A critical discourse analysis on the justification of the European fight against
terrorism since 2010
Anniina Paula Marika Palmu
Master thesis Political Science: European Politics and External Relations
Supervisor: Dr. Rocco Bellanova Second Reader: Prof. Dimitris Bouris
Abstract
EU norms, such as the norms of individual freedom are fundamental to the governance of European security and counter-terrorism. They are however also one of the most contested issues in these policies; for instance, while the security measures target the cross-border nature of terrorism, they also affect the mobility of people and fundamental rights. In recent years, the EU has been focusing increasingly on external border control, which challenges the EU’s benevolent identity as a guarantor of liberal norms and security. This has contributed to the need for the EU to adjust its discourse to justify the European fight against terrorism.
The thesis seeks to explain how the EU has justified the fight against terrorism
through discourse since the publication of The Internal Security Strategy for the European Union in 2010. For this purpose, it applies Critical Discourse Analysis to official EU
documents and speeches. It revises the original conceptualisation of Ian Manners’ Normative Power theory, addressing its potential to explain the EU’s internal operation to enhance European integration in security. The thesis argues that the EU has justified European counter-terrorism through discourse by appearing as a guarantor of both security and fundamental rights, and by highlighting its role as a normative power in the internal security governance of Europe.
The results strongly support the idea of the EU as an internal normative power. They show that all analysed documents and speeches share the same discourse, aiming to reassure the population that increased security measures will not result in forgone liberty. In effect, they stress that the harmony between freedom and security is achievable.Furthermore, the thesis shows that the EU treats terrorism as a threat to its benevolent norms, which helps to justify the defence of its collective identity. It is concluded that the EU’s use of internal normative power in its discourse guaranteeing its commitment to fundamental rights and security is a major contribution to justify the fight against terrorism, as it is strongly articulated as a European way to fight terrorism.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my friends and family for their support and encouragement during the research process. I would also like to thank my brilliant colleagues and my supervisor, Dr. Rocco Bellanova, for invaluable comments, advice and corrections.
List of Abbreviations
AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice CDA Critical Discourse Analysis
COR Committee of the Regions CSS Critical Security Studies
EC European Commission
EESC European Economic and Social Committee
EP European Parliament
EDPS European data protection supervisor
EU European Union
EUROPOL European Police Office
NPE Normative Power Europe
PNR Passenger Name Records
TEC Treaty establishing the European Communities
TREVI Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale
List of Tables
Table 1. Selected Documents 31
Table 2. Selected Speeches 33
Table 3. Codes and Descriptions 34
Table 4. The EU’s Benevolent Identity in the Fight against Terrorism 41
Table 5. EU Norms against Terrorism 44
Table of Content
Abstract ... 1 Acknowledgements ... 2 List of Abbreviations ... 3 List of Tables ... 4 1. Introduction ... 61.1. Context of the thesis ... 6
1.2. Thesis puzzle, objectives and the research question ... 8
1.3. State of the Art ... 9
1.4. Structure of the thesis ... 14
2. Theoretical Framework ... 15
2.1. Introducing Normative Power Europe ... 15
2.2. NPE in relation to EU studies and Critical Security Studies ... 19
2.3. Critique and refinements ... 22
2.4. How NPE is applied in this study? ... 24
2.5. Conclusions ... 25
3. Methodology ... 27
3.1. Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis ... 27
3.2. Limitations and critique ... 28
3.3. Data collection and presentation of material ... 30
3.4. Methods and procedures ... 34
3.5. Concluding remarks ... 35
4. Analysis: Results and Discussion ... 37
4.1. Introduction ... 37
4.2. The EU’s benevolent identity in the fight against terrorism ... 38
4.3. EU norms against terrorism ... 42
4.4. Fundamental rights and freedoms in counter-terrorism measures ... 44
4.4. Conclusions: Discussing the interests behind the discourse ... 50
5. Conclusion ... 52
1. Introduction
In the security field, as in many other areas in Europe, fragmentation makes us vulnerable (European Commission, 2016, p. 2).
1.1. Context of the thesis
The recent wave of terrorism has brought the European Union’s (EU) role in guaranteeing European security and fundamental rights again into the discussion. According to Europol (the European Police Office), for example in 2015 ‘[s]ix EU Member States faced 211 failed, foiled and completed terrorist attacks’ (Europol, 2016). The attacks have also attained wide media coverage, and the attackers’ mobility through the EU borders has raised concerns about the EU’s effectiveness to respond to the threat (BBC, 2016; Bloomberg, 2017; The Guardian, 2017). These figures and discussions have heightened the need for the EU to address them in its security policies, highlighting the Union’s position according to which national efforts are no longer effective enough to combat terrorism (European Council, 2003; Council of the European Union, 2005; European Union, 2010; European Commission, 2015).
The EU has further highlighted its presence in the field of European security politics by the publication of The Internal Security Strategy for the European Union (2010), which addresses the core developments in European security in addition to a series of other strategic documents published in the 2000s (European Council, 2003; Council of the European Union, 2005; European Union, 2010). However, from 2010 onwards the EU’s focus is on
internal security, while acknowledging the interlinkage of internal and external threats in the
fast globalising environment. Globalisation, and the increasingly cross-border characteristics of terrorism have further directed the EU’s policy reforms towards bordering and the mobility
of people (European Commission, 2015, p. 2). These reforms, which are designed to ensure
safer travel and to track and arrest terrorist suspects are an integral part of the European fight against terrorism. European fight against terrorism is a term that has been used for example by the European Council, and it is adopted in this research. As defined by the European Council, the fight is a strategy, ‘[which] aims to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and to make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice’ (European Council, 2016). Its evolution since 2010 is the focus of this thesis.
Since terrorism has been described by the European Commission as ‘constantly evolving’ (European Commission, 2010, p. 2), as well as ‘more varied and more international’ (European Commission, 2015, p. 2), it is not surprising that the securitisation of movement has drawn the attention of policy-makers at the European level. However, this can be seen paradoxical to the EU’s founding principles, such as free movement. Traditionally, the EU has been particularly proud of the abolition of border control in the Schengen area (European Union, 2010; European Commission, 2017). However, increased external border control stands in contrast to the EU’s liberal values. This contradiction contributes to the debate on the EU’s commitment to the freedom of movement as a fundamental right, as well as to the ‘uncertainty over what border control stands for, the proliferation of values and orders of worth it can be associated with, and their compatibility’ (Jeandesboz, 2016a, p. 229).
Because of the rising concerns on safety, ‘Member States [have] either adopted new laws or amended the existing legislation’ (Europol, 2016). These developments have provided the EU an opportunity to show leadership in European internal security governance, which in the field of counter-terrorism can be defined as:
an advanced institutionalized system of cooperation and coordination between national governance frameworks constructed around a core of common instruments and procedures with a cross-border reach (Monar, 2014, p. 195).
On the one hand, the EU presents Member State cooperation as the key to combat terrorism, encouraging them to intensify their national efforts, but on the other hand, the EU also declares to play ‘an important role as a security provider’ (European Union, 2017). This raises important questions of who is the leader of the European fight against terrorism, how the fight is governed and how the answers to these questions are justified.
The thesis shows that EU norms hold a pivotal role in justifying the European fight against terrorism. This relates to the theoretical framework of Normative Power Europe, which sees the EU as an actor that promotes its norms to others (Manners, 2002). Throughout this research norms are used to refer to benevolent values the EU declares to stand for, hence values are discussed in close conjunction with the concept of norms. Benevolence can be defined as: ‘the quality of being well meaning; kindness’.1 The general assumption that the EU
1Oxford Dictionaries (2017) English Oxford Living Dictionaries. Available at:
acts as a ‘force for good’ (Sjursen, 2006, p.235) is hereby linked to the idea of the EU’s
benevolence in the fight against terrorism. The way the EU highlights its commitment to fundamental rights and freedoms in security policies works as an illustrative example of the EU’s benevolence. That is, the appearance as a benevolent actor makes the EU’s objectives and policy outcomes to be considered as ‘good’. In other words, the idea of benevolence in this context obliterates the notion that the EU’s norms would have harmful impacts on fundamental rights.
As a benevolent identity, the EU’s counter-terrorism policies respect fundamental rights and freedoms, which represent the EU’s norms. Norms can be defined as ‘written and non-written rules which are reasons for action [and] enable, restrain, or constitute different actions by providing a standard of appropriate behaviour for a particular reference group’ (Kaunert et al., 2012, p. 479). According to Manners, these norms comprise peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights with fundamental freedoms (Manners 2002, p. 242). In respect to these definitions, the EU’s benevolent appearance associates strongly to its norms. By highlighting its norms’ benevolence, which it sees as part of its identity, the EU justifies its actions by their ‘goodness’ and ‘kindness’ to others.
1.2. Thesis puzzle, objectives and the research question
As the EU’s founding principles include free movement of persons (European Commission, 2017), it remains ambiguous how the European fight against terrorism stands in relation to liberal EU norms and values. Up to now, only a few studies have attempted to address the question of how the EU’s role or its security measures in the fight against terrorism are justified (Eckes, 2011; Jeandesboz, 2016a). The scientific literature has concentrated on the EU’s capabilities and rights in leading the fight (Bossong, 2008; Monar, 2015). Hence, the thesis contributes to the discussion on the relation between EU counter-terrorism measures and the EU’s principal values including respect for fundamental rights and freedoms. The central question of the thesis asks:
how has the EU justified the fight against terrorism since the publication of The Internal
Security Strategy for the European Union in 2010?
Given the EU’s commitment to its norms, and its mission to provide both freedom and security to its citizens, the specific objective of this study is to research how the EU has justified the
fight against terrorism in relation to its normative power identity in the internal security governance of the Union. It seeks to explain the development of the EU discourse in justifying the fight against terrorism since the publication of The Internal Security Strategy for the
European Union in 2010, which further highlights the EU’s growing aspirations for internal
security governance of the Union.
This thesis supports the idea of conceptualising the EU as an internal normative power, that is, as an actor which aims to influence others’ perceptions of the norm (Manners, 2002). Therefore, it addresses the research question from the normative power perspective, and argues that the EU has justified European fight against terrorism by appearing as a guarantor of both security and fundamental rights, by highlighting its norms’ benevolence and its role as an internal normative power in the security governance of Europe. To do so, the Normative Power theory by Ian Manners (2002) is revised for the purpose of this thesis.
As still relatively little attention has been paid on the EU counter-terrorism discourse (Jackson, 2007; Baker-Beall, 2014), this thesis contributes to filling this knowledge gap in literature by using Critical Discourse Analysis as a methodology. A contemporary analysis of the EU counter-terrorism discourse makes a significant contribution to the EU studies. As discussed in more detail in the Methodology chapter, the thesis applies CDA to official EU documents and speeches, which discuss the relationship between freedom and security in EU counter-terrorism policies. In respect to the collection of the data, this thesis considers the EU discourse as discourse produced by the three main EU bodies, European Commission, European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.
1.3. State of the Art
In the academic literature on EU studies, there is widespread consensus that the EU is heading towards a more significant role in European security governance, and even targeting a place in global governance (Boer and Monar, 2002; Kaunert, 2009; Brattberg and Rhinard, 2012). The discussion focuses on the EU’s capacities and capabilities as a security actor, but relatively little on the question of how the EU’s role in European security governance and counter-terrorism can be explained or justified (Baker-Beall, 2014; Jeandesboz, 2016a). This discussion can be categorised in three parts. One line of debate highlights the EU’s supranational characteristics in leading the fight against terrorism (Coolsaet, 2010; Kaunert et al., 2012, p.
478; Bremberg, 2015). From this perspective, the EU’s role in the European fight against terrorism relates to the EU’s capacities to govern through different institutions above the Member States. This explanation stands in contrast to the traditional view, according to which Member States are the principal actors in guaranteeing their national security (Eckes, 2011, p. 129). Hence, the challenge to the EU’s governance mainly concerns some Member States’ hesitation to ‘hand over their autonomy on certain (often sensitive) security issues to the Union’ (Eckes, 2011, p. 129). The second critical discussion considers the EU’s capabilities to guarantee fundamental rights when introducing new counter-terrorism measures such as border control (Bigo et al., 2008; Vermeulen and Bellanova, 2012; Jeandesboz, 2016a). Finally, the third group of scholars emphasise the EU’s identity and values as constructing the EU counter-terrorism discourse (Jackson, 2007; Manners, 2013; Baker-Beall, 2014). In other words, the debate is gradually shifting from the EU’s institutional capacities to govern towards its
capabilities to guarantee fundamental rights in conjunction with security in the European fight
against terrorism.
When it comes to the EU’s capacities to lead the fight against terrorism, various scholars argue that institutionalisation has been the key dynamic in developing European security cooperation and the EU’s role in European security governance (Coolsaet, 2010; Kaunert et al., 2012, p. 478; Bremberg, 2015). The early developments of the institutionalisation of European security politics can be traced back to the 1970s and to the creation of the TREVI group (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale) (Monar, 2014, p. 196). According to Coolsaet, TREVI is ‘[t]he first organized platform for European counterterrorist cooperation’(Coolsaet, 2010, p. 857). Moreover, it signifies one of the first steps when counter-terrorism became part of European security cooperation (Monar, 2014, p. 197). Since its creation, ‘terrorism slowly entered the realm of the European integration process’ (Coolsaet, 2010, p. 857). As Monar argues, counter-terrorism has been an important ‘driving factor’ in shaping the direction of the future institutional developments in the field of European security governance (Monar, 2014, pp. 196–197).
Others call the EU a ‘security community building institution’, referring to its ambitions to enhance European security with the help of regional organisations (Bremberg, 2015, p. 677). This shows in practice that, the Council, the Commission and the Parliament have ‘all become major actors in EU decision making on internal security matters’ (Monar, 2014, p. 196). Further, to strengthen the capacities of Eurojust and Europol has been on the EU’s agenda especially since the 9/11 attacks (Monar, 2014, p. 198). According to the
supranationalist view, the process of regulating new policy areas on the EU level is beyond the control of the Member States (Schimmelfennig and Rittberger, 2011). As Monar argues: ‘[t]hrough the treaty reforms of Amsterdam and Lisbon, the Member States have given the EU a formal mandate with the necessary competences to act in the internal security domain’ (Monar, 2014, p. 196). These developments, which signal the supranational form of the EU governance, have contributed to further integration in the field of security. This involves the adoption of various EU-level counter-terrorism measures. The supranationalist view can help to explain how the EU has appeared as a security providing actor above its Member States, and thus gradually adopted the leadership role in the European fight against terrorism.
To further examine the supranational capacities of the EU, bordering as a form of governance has received increasing attention among scholars (Manners, 2013; Jeandesboz, 2016a). According to Manners, due to the interlinkages between internal and external security, the concepts of security, bordering and governance have become considerably ‘interwoven’ (Manners, 2013, p. 416). This, ‘broadening security approach’, can help to explain how the EU has gradually justified its contribution to European security governance (Manners, 2013, p. 403). The use of high-tech systems for border control is a core EU tool for increasing border
security and combating terrorism (Baldaccini, 2008, p. 32).For example, the establishment of
Frontex as a European wide border management is a case in point (Neal, 2009). To support
Member States with ‘risk analysis reports’ is an important strategy to justify its operation, yet their effectiveness has been criticised (Léonard, 2015; Jeandesboz, 2016a, p. 230; Léonard and Kaunert, 2016, p. 148).
In addition to the traditional understanding of border control as the control of
movement, other measures have also been put in place to enhance border security. These other
measures, which go hand in hand with advanced technology, raise questions in terms of privacy and data protection. The diverse instruments in border control and their impact on EU governance have received growing interest in academic literature (Manners, 2013; Jeandesboz, 2016b). They comprise various relatively new concepts and issues in the academic discussion. Different information systems, and large-scale data collection methods, such as Smart Borders and Passenger Name Records (PNR), are just a few to mention. According to Jeandesboz, ‘the aim of the [“Smart Borders”] package is to establish two new databases for the purpose of border control, the Entry/Exit system and Registered traveller programme’ (Jeandesboz, 2016a, p. 233). PNR, on the other hand, is designed for collecting a list of traveller’s personal information, ‘for the purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting terrorist
offences and serious crime’ (Léonard, 2015, p. 322). The list includes information of passenger’s contact details, identification documents, payment and personalised travel services and preferences (Huijboom and Bodea, 2015, p. 241).
Some critical scholars in the field including Vermeulen and Bellanova have contributed to the debate on the EU’s role in guaranteeing the future state of privacy and liberty as fundamental rights when introducing such measures. Vermeulen and Bellanova (2012) consider these measures as smart surveillance, which can be understood as ‘surveillance systems [that] are able to achieve their intended aims without being noticed by the person or the group that is monitored’, or alternatively as, ‘the (use of a) surveillance technology [which] is “privacy-proof” and/or “data protection-proof”’ (Vermeulen and Bellanova, 2012, p. 298). The authors argue that introducing such systems impact fundamental rights ‘both at the political and academic level’ (Vermeulen and Bellanova, 2012, p. 298).
When it comes to the possible violations on fundamental rights, Jeandesboz argues that it remains unclear how these contested security measures are ‘justified’ (Jeandesboz, 2016a, p. 222). According to Jeandesboz’s research, there have been efforts to justify Smart Borders as being ‘about border control, not to manage border surveillance [and] to help the border guards controlling travellers at the external borders’ (Jeandesboz, 2016a, p. 234). However, it has been criticised that ‘[t]here is no clear evidence that the Commission Proposals to create a smart border system for the external borders of the EU will fulfil the aims that it has set out’ (EDPS 2013 cited in Jeandesboz, 2016a, p. 234). As Jeandesboz states, there has been ‘uncertain shifting grounds on which such measures [EU border control] are based, and […] these grounds are hardly ever cleared before a measure is adopted’ (Jeandesboz, 2016a, p. 232). The lack of clear justification for these measures, while the EU is supposed to ‘uphold fundamental rights’ has therefore been criticised in academia (Jeandesboz, 2016a, p. 221).
To guarantee fundamental rights and security in EU policies is recognised as an uphill struggle. The creation of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ (AFSJ) is one of the contested milestones of the EU, and the critical literature recognises the (in)compatibilities of these concepts (Bigo et al., 2008; Manners, 2013). Counter-terrorism is one of the key issue areas in AFSJ (Eckes, 2011, pp. 127–128), with objectives including freedom of movement, in addition to other fundamental rights and security (Eckes, 2011, p. 128). Manners (2013) argues that the compatibility of fundamental rights and security is an important part of EU institutional
discourses on counter-terrorism. For example, in various EU strategic policy documents published in the 2000s, the Union clearly emphasises ‘to maintain a balance between security and rights’ (Manners, 2013, p. 411).
The above discussions connect to the debate on the EU identity, which nevertheless remains under-studied in EU counter-terrorism discourse (Baker-Beall, 2014, p. 218). Baker-Beall argues that discourses ‘create and reflect identities’ (Baker-Beall, 2014, p. 216), and that ‘“EU identity” is constituted through and is central to the constitution of EU counter-terrorism policy’ (Baker-Beall, 2014, p. 212). The EU identity is based on values, including ‘“liberty”, “equality” and “respect for human rights”’ (Baker-Beall, 2014, p. 222). By promoting these values the EU aims to reflect an image ‘of the type of actor it aspires to be and partly through that which it differentiates itself from’ (Baker-Beall, 2014, p. 217). Hence, an identity always comes with a counterpart, or the ‘other’, which becomes visible when contrasted to the EU values (Baker-Beall, 2014, p. 231). It has been discovered that the EU presents its identity as distinguishably positive terms compared to others, which is visible in the way the EU justifies its counter-terrorism measures. As Jeandesboz argues:
[m]easures that would amount to systematically recording data about all foreigners entering and exiting the Schengen area are further justified on grounds that they are less extreme and intrusive than what others are doing, and therefore consistent with a European way of doing things that is more acceptable than the purported US or Russian way (Jeandesboz, 2016a, p.235, emphasis added)
The EU’s emphasis on its appearance in contrast to others has been noted also elsewhere in academic literature that discusses the EU’s external identity (Jackson, 2007; Manners, 2013). For example, Manners argues that: ‘EU institutional discourses sought to avoid the US securitising discourse of “war on terror” and “state security” by speaking of “counter-terrorism” and “safety of individuals”’ (Manners, 2013, p. 411). The EU’s discourse is therefore seen as governance that reflects its benevolent identity, and contrasts the EU to others, creating a sense of unity among its Member States. The sense of unity may help to justify the EU’s presence in the fight against terrorism (Eckes, 2011; Manners, 2013; Monar, 2014).
In overall, the debate in academic literature emphasises both the EU’s institutional capacities and its capabilities to guarantee fundamental rights in the European fight against terrorism. The critical perspective, which highlights the latter, is more closely assessed in this thesis. In addition, previous discourse studies that have focused on the EU’s
presentation of its identity inspire this thesis. However, for the purpose of this research it should be noted that the EU’s presence as normative power identity in the context of European counter-terrorism discourse and the internal security governance of the EU has not been fully examined in literature (with certain exceptions of such contributions, including Manners, 2013). Therefore, the previous research has largely failed to consider the potential of the EU’s normative power identity in helping to explain the EU’s internal operation, which contributes to supporting integration. These are crucial points for the originality of this thesis, which appears as a useful account of how the EU uses its norms to govern European security and to justify its role in the fight against terrorism.
1.4. Structure of the thesis
The thesis is composed of five main chapters including this introduction. The second chapter lays out the theoretical framework of the thesis, Normative Power Europe (NPE). Further, it discusses NPE in relation to EU studies and Critical Security Studies. It also addresses the main critique and refinements of the theory and illustrates its applicability in this thesis. The third chapter is concerned with the methodology chosen in this research, namely Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). It begins by introducing CDA as a methodology, and outlining its main limitations and critique. Then, it presents the data collection process and the material selected for the analysis, as well as the methods and procedurescarried out in the analysis. The fourth chapter presents the results of analysis. It begins by the findings on the EU’s benevolent identity in justifying the fight against terrorism, leading to the discussion on the role of EU norms in the EU discourse. Then it further examines the relationship between fundamental rights and security presented by the EU. To present a discussion on the findings, it then assembles the interests of the EU’s main discursive strategies. The conclusions and recommendations for future study are discussed in the final chapter of the thesis.
2. Theoretical Framework
This chapter discusses the theoretical framework guiding this thesis: Normative Power Europe (NPE). NPE was originally introduced by Ian Manners (2002), to conceptualise the EU’s global role as a normative actor. That is, it was designed to describe the EU’s external actions through the influence of norms. According to Manners, to consider the EU as a normative power implies that the EU uses its norms as a method for global governance, by aiming to diffuse them to other states and actors, signifying its power over others. His understanding of NPE is multidimensional, as it has ontological, positivist and normative features (Manners, 2002, p. 252). As he states:
the EU can be conceptualised as a changer of norms in the international system […] the EU acts to change norms in the international system [and] the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system (Manners, 2002, p. 252)
As can be noticed from the above, in his seminal work Manners highlights his understanding of NPE as international, indicating the EU’s external representation (Manners, 2002, pp. 238– 239). However, by this conceptualisation he neglects to address the EU’s role as an internal normative power, which promotes its norms to its Member States. This internal function is important for further understanding the EU’s external representation. Therefore, in this thesis NPE is reconsidered to explain the EU’s normative power vis-à-vis its Member States in the justification of the European fight against terrorism, and to enhance European integration in the field of security.
This chapter is divided into three main parts. It starts by introducing the origins of NPE, including its basic definition, and its original conceptualisation in the EU’s external agenda. In the second part NPE is further situated in relation to EU studies and Critical Security Studies (CSS). The third part considers the main critique of the theory, leading to discussing its refinements. In the fourth part, the way how NPE is applied to this research is considered. The chapter concludes with the principal findings.
2.1. Introducing Normative Power Europe
NPE has its roots in the creation of the EU in the post-war environment (Manners, 2002, p. 240). According to Manners (2002): ‘the creation of Community institutions and policies took
place in a context where Europeans were committed to “pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty”’ (TEC Treaty cited in Manners 2002, p.240). As Manners argues, these early developments contributed to shaping the EU’s ‘normative difference’ in world politics, that is, its commitment to human rights norms in external relations (Manners, 2002, pp. 240–241). These attributes became even more visible in the 1990s (Manners, 2002, pp. 236, 238). The change in power politics at end of the Cold War enabled the EU to further rely on its institutional power, namely through the different EU institutions created in recent decades (Manners, 2010, p. 75). This in turn has contributed to the interests in the academic field ‘to analyse Europe’s “presence” in world politics’ (Manners, 2010, p. 75)
NPE was introduced by Ian Manners (2002), to further enhance François Duchêne’s notion of Europe as a ‘civilian power’ (Diez, 2005, p. 617). As a civilian power, Europe prefers civilian means over military, for example in form of economic power (Diez, 2005, pp. 617–618; Merlingen, 2007, p. 436). Manners’ objective was to develop this conceptualisation, by contributing to the debate on the EU’s role in global governance; whether the EU can be conceptualised as a soft power, civilian power, hard power, or military power (Diez, 2005; Hyde-Price, 2006, p. 217; Forsberg, 2011, p. 1185). The first two powers can appear mutually inclusive as neither of them involve the use of military means (Nielsen, 2013, p. 728). In principle, ‘soft power’ involves ‘diplomatic persuasion, negotiation and compromise’ (Hyde-Price, 2006, p. 227), and it is used in opposition to ‘hard power’ which refers to coercive economic or military actions (Hyde-Price, 2006, pp. 218, 227). The difference between soft and civilian power is relatively vague, as they both imply a preference for ‘non-military foreign policy instruments’ (Diez, 2005, p. 616; Merlingen, 2007, p. 436). Yet the key here is the difference with normative power. NPE is about ‘non-material’ power, making it ‘independent of the discussions between soft versus hard power or civilian versus military power’(Whitman, 2011, p. 4). In other words, NPE adds the importance of norms into the analysis which makes the EU appear as a distinct international actor compared to others (Sjursen, 2006, p. 236).
The idea behind NPE theory lies in the EU’s ‘strong commitment’ to its norms, which it aims to promote in global governance (Manners, 2002, p. 241). According to Kaunert al., these ‘rules which are reasons for action […] provide a standard of appropriate behaviour for a particular reference group’ (Kaunert et al., 2012, p. 479). However, according to Forsberg, ‘“norm” also has a secondary meaning – namely that of “being normal”’ (Forsberg, 2011, p. 1190). This is also recognised by Manners (2002, p.236). ‘Being normal’ in this sense is
equivalent to behaviour that is determined as appropriate and therefore normalised (Manners, 2002, p. 245). As Manners clarifies, ‘[t]hus the different existence, the different norms, and the different policies which the EU pursues are really part of redefining what can be “normal” in international relations’ (Manners, 2002, p. 253).
When it comes to EU norms, they are seen as the EU’s founding principles and even part of its identity (Manners, 2002, p. 241; Whitman, 2011, p. 2; Baker-Beall, 2014, p. 222). This can be explained by the fact that they have been recognised by the Union in the 1973
Copenhagen declaration on European identity and in the Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty
(Manners, 2002, p. 241; Whitman, 2011, p. 2). When it comes to NPE theory, Manners (2002) distinguishes certain EU norms over others. As he argues, ‘[i]t is possible to identify five “core” norms within this vast body of Union laws and policies which comprise the acquis communautaire and acquis politique’ (Manners, 2002, p. 242). These norms are, peace, liberty,
democracy, rule of law and human rights with fundamental freedoms (ibid.). In other words,
the EU considers these norms as the ‘normal’ (Manners, 2002).
When it comes to the NPE framework, it is important to understand the concept of power and how it can be exercised using norms. In simple terms power can be defined as ‘the ability to affect’ (Forsberg, 2011, p. 1190), or as Dahl has famously illustrated: ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl, 1957, pp. 202–203). In Manners’ view, power can be understood in normative means that are based on the logic of appropriateness, and ‘common principles’ (Manners, 2002, p. 239). Moreover, by referring to Duchêne (1973) and Galtung (1973), Manners states that ‘the notion of a normative power Europe is located in a discussion of the “power over opinion”,
idée force, or “ideological power”’ (Manners, 2002, p. 239, emphasis original). Ideological
power can be understood as ‘power over ideas’ (Galtung 1973, pp.33 cited in Manners 2002, p. 239). In other words, norms can be used as a tool for influencing another actor’s opinions and ideas, to exercise power by defining the normal (Manners, 2002, p. 253). As Manners argues, ‘the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics is, ultimately, the greatest power of all’ (Manners 2002, p. 253).
By building on the above definitions, according to Manners, the EU can be seen as a normative power when it diffuses its norms to other political actors (Manners, 2002, p. 244). This has been visible for example in terms of diffusing human rights norms to the UN in the 1980s (Manners, 2002, pp. 245–246). Manners presents the EU’s diffusion of norms from
different practical perspectives: it happens through institutions, policy declarations, communications, negotiations, agreements (with third parties), financial transferences (including sanctions), or even through cultural inducement (Manners, 2002, pp. 244–245; Forsberg, 2011, pp. 1185–1186). The possibilities of norm diffusion are therefore multifield and they occur in different contexts and through different means. To provide an illustrative example, Manners presents a case study of the abolition of death penalty, which he considers to be a human rights norm in western Europe (Manners, 2002, p. 246). According to Manners, this norm became a universal mission for the EU (Manners, 2002, p.245-246). The norm was first declared by the European Parliament to be ratified in all European states, after which it was called to UN General Assembly and finally diffused to several third countries (Manners, 2002, p.247). The diffusions have taken place through ‘procedural membership conditions, informational common strategies, and the overt role of EU delegations’ (Manners, 2002, p.252). Manners argues that the given case signifies that the EU is aiming to set the stage in global arena, defining the international dialogue on norms ‘in its own image’ (Manners, 2002, p.248, 252). It therefore represents an example of the EU’s normative power, and its ability to change international policies without having to rely on more traditional, military means of power.
However, it should be noted that Manners’ (2002) conceptualisation of NPE focuses on the EU’s global role as a normative power. In other words, his focus remains on the EU’s external influence by concentrating on the EU’s ‘ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations’ (Manners 2002, p.239, emphasis added). The EU’s relations with its Member States are therefore left with less attention, even though Manners acknowledges that norms are ‘at the centre of its [the EU’s] relations with its Member States […] and the world’ (Manners, 2002, p. 241). Moreover, the normative power theory in relation to the EU’s external policies has been widely recognised and followed by several scholars (Diez, 2005; Hyde-Price, 2006; Diez and Manners, 2007; Merlingen, 2007; Bickerton, 2011; Birchfield, 2011; Haukkala, 2011; Nielsen, 2013). For example, NPE has been associated with European Neighbourhood Policy (Diez, 2007; Haukkala, 2011), as well as with various development and peace-building operations in third countries (Birchfield, 2011; Björkdahl, 2011). This indicates that the NPE’s external conceptualisation is the common accepted framework of analysis.
To briefly summarise the principal tenets of the classic NPE framework presented above, there are four core issues to be considered. First, NPE is different from other theoretical considerations on power and global governance. That is, NPE is not about power in material
capacities, as for example military or economic instruments are; instead, it is about ideological power (Manners, 2002, p. 239; Whitman, 2011, p. 4). By normative power, the EU aims to change norms or to redefine the ‘normal’ in global politics, by diffusing its norms to other states or actors (Manners, 2002). Therefore, the units of analysis in the traditional NPE framework include the EU, states (primarily third countries), and international organisations. Originally, Manners (2002) used NPE to conceptualise the EU’s use of power in its external
relations. However, this is critically revised in this thesis.
2.2. NPE in relation to EU studies and Critical Security Studies
NPE has allowed norms and power to gain more analytical attention in EU studies (Whitman, 2011, p. 2). According to Whitman, it has shifted the focus of scholarship from EU integration to EU external relations (Whitman, 2011, p. 1). However, by considering the theory in relation to EU studies it can help to understand European integration in more detail. European integration can be defined as a process that occurs in three different levels:
(a) new policy areas are regulated on the EU level partially or exclusively (sectoral integration), (b) competencies are increasingly shared across EU member states or delegated to autonomous supranational institutions (vertical integration), and (c) the EU expands territorially by accepting new members (horizontal integration) (Schimmelfennig and Rittberger, 2011, p. 74)
Manners’ representation of NPE theory emphasises the EU’s external norm diffusion, which can be linked to the idea of horizontal integration. European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement negotiations are good examples of the EU’s normative power instruments (Haukkala, 2011, p. 46). Thereby external norm diffusion can contribute to horizontal integration. However, Manners (2002) does not assess the full potential of normative power as an integration theory. Thus, to consider how normative power can operate inside the EU to enhance sectoral and vertical integration requires the revision of the theory in the field of EU studies.
To further consider how NPE can relate to integration theories, the leader of the integration needs to be identified. Schimmelfennig and Rittberger (2011, p.74) distinguish between ‘two families’ of integration: intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. For the former, states are the primary actors in leading the integration. To contrast, supranationalists
argue that states are losing control over it, which also impacts the notion of identity of Member States (Schimmelfennig and Rittberger, 2011, p. 78). In other words, according to the supranationalist approach, ‘the international system is not bound to be anarchical, but can be transformed through processes of institutionalisation and identity change’ (Schimmelfennig and Rittberger, 2011, p. 84). Hence, by considering the EU as leading the integration by the diffusion of norms and creating a consensus of collective European identity, supranationalism can be seen closer to this theoretical framework. Therefore, internal normative power in relation to European integration both in sectoral and vertical levels can be understood through the lens of supranationalism.
Normative power can be further considered in relation to European security governance. That is, by examining how norms can guide EU security policies, and how security itself can be seen as a norm in relation to other norms (Christou et al., 2010, p. 341; Whitman, 2011, p. 13). Moreover, understanding power within NPE and how it may be used stands in sharp contrast to the traditional power politics view, which understands security as ‘military-political’ (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21). Therefore, when addressing EU security governance through the framework of NPE the theory can be further situated in relation to CSS.
Security is a contested concept, which can be examined from both traditional and critical approaches (Christou et al., 2010, p. 341). According to Buzan et al., security can be defined as ‘the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics’ (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). According to the traditional view, which flourished especially during the Cold War, security was seen as ‘state security’ (Manners, 2013, p. 402). From this perspective, ‘security is about survival [and] the invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force’ (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21). In other words, by referring to ‘security’ one can explain and justify coercive or exceptional policies and actions (Jackson, 2005, p. 99; Christou et al., 2010, p. 341; Jeandesboz, 2016a, p. 223). To contrast, CSS rejects to see security through this traditional lens. As Jeandesboz argues, ‘critical approaches of security have broadened and deepened discussions on security […] in particular beyond longstanding claims that equate security with the survival of the state in war’ (Jeandesboz, 2016a, p. 223). According to Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010, p.120), the critical approach to security involves:
debates over the ‘broadening’ of security to encompass non-military issues; the relationship of security to freedom; and, most fundamentally, the idea of prioritising
individual humans over the state in understandings of security (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 120).
In other words, by inserting this critical security approach into the NPE framework of analysis allows one to consider how the EU as a normative power addresses the concept of security in relation to its norms of fundamental rights and freedoms, and how it treats security and freedom in relation to each other.
The relationship between security and liberty has been widely discussed in academia (Neocleous, 2007; Bigo et al., 2008, 2015; Jeandesboz, 2016a). The debate among scholars focuses on the underlying collision or compatibility of the two concepts. This is relevant for the analysis of the EU as a normative power as the Union can be seen promoting them both. According to Neocleous, ever since the era of Enlightenment there has been a debate on the balancing between security and liberty; according to others they contradict, but for others they can even be synonyms (Neocleous, 2007, pp. 141–142). As Neocleous argues, ‘the idea of balance is an essentially liberal myth, a myth that in turn masks the fact that liberalism’s key category is not liberty, but security’ (Neocleous, 2007, p. 131). In addition, as Neocleous adds, ‘the assumption is that we must accept that we have to forego a certain amount of liberty in our desire for security’ (Neocleous, 2007, pp. 131–132). However, for example, by establishing
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) in the Treaty of Amsterdam the EU lets one
assume otherwise (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997/C 340/1 Art. 1).2
In AFSJ freedom is not only mentioned first but it is also discussed in conjunction with security. Thus, the EU has inserted security into the realm of the EU commitments
together with its liberal norms (Manners, 2013, p. 399). This relates back to the idea of NPE.
That is, according to Manners’ (2013, p. 399) through the normative power model the EU aims to ‘promote good governance’, in which ‘goodness’ can be understood as the combination of freedom, security and justice policies. From this point of view security can be merely seen as ‘a tool that supports freedom’ (Bigo et al., 2008, p. 302), but does not require forgoing liberty.
2 Treaty of Amsterdam 1997/C 340/1 of 10 November 1997 amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts Available from:
The compatibility of freedom and security can be difficult to justify, which may challenge the EU’s role as a normative power which seeks to guarantee them both. As Manners illustrates:
[c]learly this linking of security and governance, both within EU democratic societies and within the AFSJ, is not unproblematic, as illustrated by questionable practices such as increased surveillance within and along borders (Manners, 2013, p. 406).
According to Manners, border management is a good example of how the EU has discursively managed to associate it with ‘good governance’(Manners, 2013, p. 405). However, from the CSS’ perspective the challenge here becomes how the EU is to maintain ‘good’ security governance in its policies, for example when it comes to EU counter-terrorism policies. However, as Manners argues, ‘EU institutions [have] discursively sought to maintain a balance between security and rights’ (Manners, 2013, p. 411). This seek for legitimacy can be further studied in EU counter-terrorism discourse (Manners, 2013, p. 410), as the following chapters illustrate.
2.3. Critique and refinements
As a theory NPE has been relatively widely criticised. One of the main criticisms concentrate on the conceptual understanding of the theory. Some scholars have argued that the concept of
normative power has become a complex, continuously redefined and contested theory lacking
a clear consensus of what it entails (Sjursen, 2006, p. 236; Forsberg, 2011, p. 1184). This has resulted in different understandings of the theory (Forsberg, 2011, p. 1184). According to Forsberg, even the key concepts ‘normative’ and ‘power’ themselves are contested, which complicates the utilisation of the theory (Forsberg, 2011, p. 1190). Furthermore, by referring to Sjursen (2006), Merlingen states: ‘it remains unclear how the term “power”,which is often seen to allude to “coercion”, can be articulated to the term “normative”, which is typically taken to allude to “legitimacy”’ (Merlingen, 2007, pp. 437–438). In other words, Manners’ key argument that there is no ‘contradiction in terms’ (Manners, 2002, p. 236, 2008, p. 46) has been challenged by this criticism.
The ‘ethical’ notion and the ‘goodness’ associated with EU norms have been questioned. That is, it has been criticised whether being a normative actor necessarily indicates that ‘the EU is a “force for good”’ (Sjursen, 2006, p. 235). In other words, being a normative
power does not ‘automatically make the EU a legitimate actor’ (Bickerton, 2011, p. 28). As Bickerton adds, ‘from being a source of legitimacy, normative power Europe is today in search of legitimacy’ (Bickerton, 2011, p.17). According to Bickerton, there is widespread consensus in academia that ‘ethical aspirations’ are a visible part of the EU discourse (Bickerton, 2011, pp. 27–28). As Bickerton refers to Aggestam, ‘[it is the] discourse of universal ethics which defines the EU as a “power for good”’ (Aggestam 2008, p.1 cited in Bickerton 2011, p.25). However, according to Sjursen, ‘the fact that it [normative power] corresponds very closely to the EU’s own description of its international role could be enough to set the alarm bells ringing’ (Sjursen, 2006, p. 235). This criticism can also be considered in the context of the internal governance of the Union, by asking how well the EU appears as a normative power and a ‘force for good’ vis-à-vis its Member States, which has nevertheless been widely neglected in the literature (Bickerton, 2011, p. 26).
In addition to the conceptual and ethical considerations outlined above, from the realist point of view NPE has been criticised due to its abstract elements and the actual credibility of norms to make a difference in power politics (Sjursen, 2006, pp. 237, 241). That is, realists argue that military force is still seen as the most crucial and credible tool inglobal governance (Kagan, 2002). On the other hand, Diez and Manners argue that ‘normative and military power are not necessarily incompatible’ (Diez and Manners, 2007, p. 187), which indicates that normative power can be combined with other types of power, as in the case of the United States (Zielonka, 2008, p. 473). Others argue that normative power alone is not sufficiently strong without the support of other types of power, and therefore a normative actor requires more than that: ‘[w]ithout the backing of force and a willingness to use it, “Europe” is unlikely to become a normative power’ (Therborn 1997, p. 380 cited in Manners 2002, p. 241). However, it should be noted that these criticisms relate to the EU’s global normative power, overlooking the EU’s internal normative presence.
This leads to a critique which contributes to possible refinements of the theory. Thus, what remains ambiguous in Manners’ theory, as well as dismissed in the wider literature, is the definition of the international within the NPE framework. That is, it is unclarified whether the theory is concerned with the relations between the EU and third countries or also with the relations between the EU and its Member States. However, Manners’ focus seems to lie in the former, i.e. EU external relations (Manners, 2002, p. 239). The theoretical framework clearly lacks a consideration of the EU’s normative presence vis-à-vis its Member States, and thereby it may even let one assume that the EU’s role as internal normative power is taken for
granted, and left with less consideration from further analysis. As Bickerton argues, ‘[a]s the basis for the EU’s foreign policy, the concept of normative power has not been able to shrug off the introspection that has become a hallmark of the EU’s international action’ (Bickerton, 2011, p. 26). However, it should be noted that Manners includes Britain as part of a list of states in which EU norms have been diffused, yet he does not explain the case except from the fact that these norms are environmental (Manners, 2002, p. 245). This lets one assume that the theory is, at least in principle, applicable in the EU internal context.
2.4. How NPE is applied in this study?
As has been discussed above, the EU operates as an ‘ideological power’ by setting its norms as best practices, which it considers ethically good, and which are diffused to the third countries (Manners, 2002, p. 239). While much has been written on the EU’s global role as a normative power, this thesis further develops the theory by looking at the internal aspects of normative power; in contrast to Manners’ emphasis on the external conceptualisation. This is an important differentiation to make. It does not only make this research more unique, but also slightly more challenging, as the theory is not followed in its traditional framework of analysis. Still, it helps to test the applicability of the theory in the governance of the EU area. Moreover, if one tests the theory as internal normative power, the plausibility of the theory’s external application potentially increases (Bickerton, 2011, p. 26). In other words, as Manners’ (2002, p. 241) notes, norms are an integral part of the interaction between the EU and its Member States, and this is also how the Union appears to the external world.
To examine the internal normative power more closely, this thesis focuses on the EU’s role in European security governance in the field of counter-terrorism. In other words, it examines the EU’s objectives in terms of norm diffusion in the EU and how the EU operates as a norm provider to its Member States. Therefore, by looking at how the EU acts as an internal normative power helps to explain European integration in the field of security. This is done by analysing how the EU utilises its norms and values in the justification of the European fight against terrorism and legitimising European counter-terrorism measures, arguing that it highlights the EU’s role as a normative power in the internal security governance of Europe. By keeping in mind the perspective of Critical Security Studies, the focus remains on the interplay of security and fundamental freedoms. The statement by the EU in Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental rights: ‘[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person’ is
therefore critically assessed (Charter of Fundamental Rights 2012/C 326/02 Art. 6).3 The revised version of NPE suits to this research together with critical perspective on security, helping to ‘test’ the EU’s ability to exercise normative power in the justification of the European fight against terrorism.
2.5. Conclusions
This chapter has presented and critically discussed the theory Normative Power Europe by Manners (2002) and situated it in this research. As can be noted, there is a widespread consensus in academic literature that the EU is committed to its central norms, including liberty and human rights, which it aims to diffuse to others. This indicates its ambitions for global governance. The main scientific debate has concentrated on the EU’s international influence, outlined by Manners. However, the debate is lacking an understanding on the EU’s internal presence as a normative power, and its potential to contribute to European integration. Yet, the internal application of the theory has been under-studied (Bickerton 2011, 26), which is important to acknowledge also when assessing the EU’s external influence.
As this thesis concentrates on the justification of European counter-terrorism, NPE has been situated in relation to EU studies and Critical Security Studies. When inserting NPE to the analysis of EU security policies one should note that NPE does not represent a traditional, physical form of power. Therefore, it can be considered in relation to CSS. Moreover, by the lens of CSS the troublesome relationship between security and liberty becomes highlighted. This can help to explain how the legitimacy of the EU as a normative power in the field of security governance is challenged, which may potentially hinder the justification of counter-terrorism policies. The EU’s aims to promote its norms, and the compatibility of fundamental rights and security, is central in this thesis. This makes NPE a relevant choice as the principal theoretical framework to consider.
The main critique to NPE that has been advanced by several scholars, applies to the theory’s external conceptualisation (Sjursen, 2006; Bickerton, 2011; Forsberg, 2011). This critique considers how powerful or ethical the EU norms are in practice, and how reliable the
3 Charter of Fundamental Rights 2012/C 326/02 of 26 October 2012 on Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
EU’s own representation of itself is. However, the internal application of the theory may perhaps contribute to these debates, by examining how well the EU can be seen justifying the European fight against terrorism using its normative power. That is, by investigating how the EU promotes and pursues its ‘benevolent’ norms, and their compatibility, one may gain further understanding of how the EU aims to gain its legitimacy in European security governance. The next chapter introduces the methodology that has been carried out in this research.
3. Methodology
This chapter discusses the methodology chosen for the thesis, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The theoretical framework of normative power that was introduced in the previous chapter reinforces the selection of CDA as a methodology. Hence, CDA is applied to the thesis to investigate how the discourse in the EU’s documents and speeches is articulated to justify the European fight against terrorism, and to examine how the internal normative power appears in the discourse. In other words, the thesis seeks to address the research question from a discourse analytical perspective and with a lens of normative power theory. The research embraces a qualitative approach, using data from the official EU websites and databases to explore the EU discourse and to find elements of justification of the European fight against terrorism.
The chapter is organised in the following way. First, it begins by introducing Critical Discourse Analysis as a methodology and presents its relevance to this study. Second, the chapter follows by a consideration of the main limitations and criticisms of CDA. The third part presents the criteria and methods for the data collection and introduces the selected material for the thesis. Fourth, the methods and procedures in the analysis are outlined. Finally, the chapter provides some concluding remarks.
3.1. Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis
Given the research question and the theoretical framework outlined the previous chapter, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) proves to be a relevant choice of methodology for the thesis. It is also preferred by other scholars who have conducted studies in the field of European counter-terrorism discourse (Jackson, 2005, 2007; Baker-Beall, 2009; Wittendorp, 2016). According to Bryman, CDA ‘draws in particular on the theories and approaches of Foucault’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 537). As one of the founding fathers of discourse analysis, Michel Foucault contributed to the shift from the study of ‘language’ to ‘discourse’, and argued that ‘the rules and practices […] produced meaningful statements and regulated discourse in different historical periods’ (Hall, 2001, p. 72). According to Unger et al., since the 1980s, CDA ‘has become a well-established field in the social sciences’ (Unger et al., 2016, p. 278). Later it has gained more influence in European discourse studies (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000, p. 447). Some of the leading scholars in CDA include Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, who have
helped CDA to ‘become one of the most influential and visible branches of discourse analysis’ (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000, p. 447).
CDA concentrates on the relationship between discourse and social reality (Flick, 2014, p. 446). As Unger et al. (2016, p. 278) argue, discourse is socially consequential and a social practice, in which, ‘a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s)’ shape each other. In other words, as Flick cites Willig (2014, p.341), analysing discourse enables one to understand how social realities become constructed and
mediated through the selection of words (Flick, 2014, p. 446). Analysing how social reality can
be produced through discourse therefore relates to the concept of power.
Several scholars address the concept of power in their interpretations of CDA, which is a crucial criterion why CDA is chosen for the thesis. As Unger et al. argue, power in form of ‘social domination’ is a central element in critical discourse studies (Unger et al., 2016, pp. 279–280). In addition, as Jackson frames it, discourse ‘has a clear political purpose: it works for someone and for something: it is an exercise of power’ (Jackson, 2005, p. 2). Therefore, CDA enables one ‘to analyse both the specific features of the language and the deeper relationship between discourse and the exercise of power’ (Jackson, 2005, p. 27). Moreover, power can also be examined in relation to norms. Wodak (1999) considers discourse as
interaction, in which values and norms play a particular importance. As he argues: ‘[n]o
interaction exists in which power relations do not prevail and in which values and norms do not have a relevant role’(Wodak, 1999, p. 186). As CDA enables one to gain further understanding of the relation between power and norms, the theoretical framework of Normative Power Europe reinforces the choice of CDA as a methodology. By using CDA the goal is to ‘make the implicit explicit’ when it comes to the relationship between power, norms and discourse (Unger et al., 2016, p. 279). In other words, CDA enables one to look at how European security governance is exercised and justified in relation to the use of norms in discourse. That is, it helps to answer the question on how the EU justifies its role in the fight against terrorism, and hence, exercises normative power in Europe.
3.2. Limitations and critique
There are certain limitations in this methodology, which need to be considered. First, CDA does not provide well-defined guidelines for the researcher to follow. Without a clear research
design and focus, the feasibility, transparency and future replication of the study may diminish (Bryman, 2012, pp. 405–406). Moreover, as Flick argues, ‘[i]n some contexts, the fuzziness of the methodology behind discourse analysis is growing because more and more approaches in qualitative research are subsumed under this label by some major protagonists in the field’ (Flick, 2014, p. 450).However, as the lack of universal guidelines and research steps can be challenging, these conditions can also provide potentially fruitful results; that is due to CDA’s applicability to different analytical needs and contexts (Wodak, 1999). As Wodak argues, ‘CDA is not a homogeneous theory with a set of clear and defined tools; rather, it is a research program with many facets and numerous different theoretical and methodological approaches’ (Wodak, 1999, p. 186). These considerations empower one to create a unique research design. As Gee (2011, p. 117) argues, it is not possible to follow an ‘ideal’ discourse analysis, but each analysis is different and adopted to its demands. Therefore, it is important to note that ‘real discourse analysis is always just a partial realization of this ideal’ (Gee, 2011, p. 117).
The second criticism is associated with conceptualising CDA. According to Wodak (1999) there is widespread misunderstanding of what it entails to be critical in CDA. Hence, the purpose is not to detect ‘only the negative sides of social interaction’ (Wodak, 1999, p. 186), but to criticise the simple picture that is transmitted via discourse, as Wodak clarifies:
[c]ritical means distinguishing complexity and denying easy, dichotomous explanations. It means making contradictions transparent. Moreover, critical implies that a researcher is self-reflective while doing research about social problems (Wodak, 1999, p. 186).
Moreover, Unger et al. (2016) add that being self-reflective more specifically refers to being
self-critical. This signifies that ‘CDA does not only mean criticizing others. It also means
critiquing the “critical” itself’ (Unger et al., 2016, p. 279). However, as Blommaert and Bulcaen note, despite the different ways by which one can present critical analysis it remains problematic that ‘CDA does not analyze how a text can be read in many ways, or under what social circumstances it is produced and consumed’ (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000, p. 455).
Third, CDA is associated with the risk of researcher’s subjectivism and selection bias. In other words, the analysis is based on an interpretation, which is why there can exist a bias in the processes of sampling and analysis. As Bryman states, it is often criticised that ‘qualitative findings rely too much on the researcher’s often unsystematic views about what is significant and important’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 405).This can be minimised by a clear research design and precise sampling methods. In addition, it should be noted that this type of criticism
is often found in qualitative research and hence certain level of subjectivism can be difficult to avoid (Bryman, 2012, p. 405).
3.3. Data collection and presentation of material
In order to investigate how the EU has justified the European fight against terrorism, only discourse produced by persons or actors that represent the official view of the EU is considered. In addition, the analysis is based on written text only. As the EU is a relatively complex institution consisting of different bodies, in respect to the limits of this study the research focuses mainly on the material from the European Commission’s database. The aim is not to consider different views from the political spectrum, nor the possibly different perspectives of the EU bodies, hence the views from the representatives of European Parliament is left with less focus while acknowledging its role as one of the main EU bodies.
The thesis aims to find elements of justification of the European fight against terrorism in the EU discourse since the publication of The Internal Security Strategy for the
European Union (ISS) in 2010. The sampling is therefore conducted in respect to the time
range 2010-2017 beginning from the publication of the ISS. This timeframe is chosen because the ISS lays out the EU’s emphasis towards European internal security, which is particularly relevant from the internal normative power perspective. It also provides a practically feasible time range to focus on. After the publication of ISS, the EU has produced a number of documents relating to the achievements and future prospects in the European internal security agenda. By identifying and examining these documents, it lets one to consider possible developments in the discourse. Hence, this timeframe enables a clear and narrowed approach to the research, and permits to produce a more detailed analysis of the developments in recent years.
The research data in the thesis comprises EU documents and speeches which are drawn from the official EU websites and databases, using the advanced search function. The audience for these texts can be seen to comprise all the Member States and the European citizens, but also third countries. Hence, the selected documents are open published, which means that they are ‘accessible to any interested party’ (Flick, 2014, p. 354). As Flick states, ‘documents are not just a simple representation of facts or reality. Someone (or an institution) produces them for some (practical) purpose and for some form of use (which also includes a
