Balancing ethics and interests : European power and its goals

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University of Amsterdam

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Master Political Science: European Politics and External Relations

Research Project: The EU and Its Neighbours: Politics, Policies, Challenges and

Opportunities

Title: Balancing Ethics and Interests: European Power and its Goals

Submitted by Nick van Impelen

Student Number: 10858210

Supervisor: Dr. Dimitris Bouris

Second Reader: Dr. Vivienne Matthies-Boon

Date: 23/06/2017

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Nick van Impelen (10858210)

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Acknowledgements

I want to thank my supervisor dr. Dimitris Bouris for his guidance throughout the writing process for this thesis. His help in steering the process of finding a topic, formulating a research question, and providing feedback over the past few months has proven essential in helping me getting to a finished product. Supervisors are always a vital source of information and inspiration when writing a thesis, but his support and commitment to his students have been nothing short of excellent and have certainly helped in making this a thesis I am proud of. Without his knowledge of relevant institutions and people working for the EU it would have been unlikely that I would have been able to perform the interviews I have done for this thesis.

I would also like to send my gratitude to Ms. Kati Piri and the other two (anonymous) interviewees for their time and answers: they have been extremely kind to make free part of their day just to be interviewed for a master thesis, even though their lives for the EU are extremely busy (as I have been able to experience when I visited Brussels). I was pleasantly surprised by their willingness to participate in my research, and it shows that EU officials are very open to their citizens.

I would also like to thank my fellow students that were part of this research project for their feedback throughout this project, especially Maarten Dinkelberg en Mylo Houghton for their conversations and whose input has helped me more than once. I would also like to thank Minke Krijnen, Romy Eskens, Henriëtte Arnold, Marije Dümmer, Joeke Veldman, Byron van Bekkum, Theresa Redl, and all my other friends for their feedback and support in the past few months; I probably would not have been able to finish this thesis without them. I also definitely need to thank my supervisor for my other thesis back at Utrecht University, Dr. Jos Philips, for his patience: it is thanks to him that I have had the time and peace of mind to finish this thesis within the deadline. Lastly, I want to thank my parents, Klaas en Herma van Impelen, for all their support throughout my life and my time as a student; it is thanks to them and their upbringing of me that I have so far been able to pursue the trajectory in my life that I want to follow, and that is not something that I take for granted.

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Balancing Ethics and Interests: European Power and its Goals

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Abbreviations

CPE Civilian Power Europe

DG NEAR Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations EaE Europe as an Empire

ENP European Neighbourhood Policy EPE Ethical Power Europe

HPE Hard Power Europe MPE Market Power Europe NPE Normative Power Europe IPE Ideal Power Europe

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Introduction

And what answer is the EU sending to the millions of Turkish citizens, who are fighting for a democratic future in their country? Is it “we have too many interests, we’ll go for a transactional relationship”? You can’t turn your back like that to the Turkish population, and you shouldn’t turn your back on the EU’s credibility either. Yes, future EU-Turkey relations are important, but [they] cannot be value-free. (Piri 2017)

In its relationship with countries in its neighborhood, the European Union is limited in what it can do: values form an inherent part of interactions between the EU and third countries, and the EU’s credibility is often claimed to hinge on the way it acts towards those living outside its borders. While other global powers are also worried about how they are

perceived by others, the EU seems notably more concerned with being (and remaining) an actor that does not lose sight of the ethical side of international politics. Why is this the case? The question of whether the EU is an ‘ethical actor’ in this sense forms part of a larger debate on the EU’s external governance, which can be named the ‘Europe as a power’- debate. Increased European integration during the Cold War combined with the location of Europe in the geopolitical balance of power of that time led to the rise of the idea that Europe might be able to play a unique role in the world. When the USSR collapsed, the Cold War ended, and European integration became consolidated with the establishment of the European Union (in 1993), the debate shifted towards the nature of this new power in the world, and the way this new Union exercises its powers.

The debate on `Europe as a power´ evolved and wondered what kind of power the EU actually was. Given the absence of military power, how does the EU use its power to shape the wider world? Does it do so through the diffusion of its norms? Is it its vast economic power? Its power of attraction? It is clear that the EU does have some form of power, but what sort of power is far less obvious. What is also clear is that the EU is an actor with a large concern for ethics, yet increasingly (especially since the 2000s) also an actor pursuing its own interests beyond its own borders. These two goals often stand in tension: supporting democratic revolutions in the European neighborhood might undermine stability in the periphery, and seeking ways to fulfil energy needs might sometimes require making deals with governments that have a poor track record on human rights. This tension between

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acting ‘in a good way’ and pursuing interests leads to an obvious question, one that will be the research question of this thesis: how does and how should the EU balance its interests with ethical considerations when it comes to its relations with neighboring countries? To answer this question, I will consider two theories on European power, both (at first glance at least) standing on opposite sides of what I will call the ‘values versus interests’-debate. The first of these two is the conceptualization of the EU as an ‘ethical power’, a Union which has a self-image of being an ethical power ‘doing good’ in the world (Aggestam 2008, 2). Ethical Power Europe (EPE) problematizes this self-image and asks what it means for the EU to ‘do good’, ‘be good’, or ‘act in a way that is ethical’. The other

conceptualization I will consider sees the EU rather differently, namely as “a kind of empire, however peculiar” (Zielonka 2008, 484). Europe as an Empire (EaE) holds that the best way to explain the EU’s policies and ways of external governance is to understand the Union as an empire or hegemon not much different from traditional empires, one that puts its own interests first. My position falls not on either side of this spectrum, but rather sees values and interests as intrinsically linked in the case of the European Union. As such, I will use both EPE and EaE (and elements of the other conceptualizations of European power) to link together the different ways of looking at Europe in a holistic approach towards

understanding European power and behavior. This will lead to an analysis of the ways the EU can pursue its interests without undermining its credibility (or rather its moral standing), and a list of options available to the EU to exercise its power. The purpose of this

contribution to the ‘values versus interests’-debate is twofold: to put forward the set of options available to the EU, and to help evolve the scholarly debate.

This thesis contains three chapters. The first chapter gives an overview of the existing literature on the ‘Europe as a power’-debate which traces how the debate has evolved and how the different conceptualizations relate to one another, and provides a modest analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the different conceptualizations. Such an overview is necessary both to gain a better understanding of how European power can be conceived and which tools the EU has available to exercise this power, as well as to provide a

justification of my choice to focus the rest of my thesis on EPE and EaE. The second chapter will conceptualize European foreign policy according to the values and interests at play, linking EPE and EaE together in a way that shows that ethics and interests are closely

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interrelated in the case of the EU. The first part will focus on European values, differentiate EPE from other conceptualizations, interpret Europe´s ´ethical power´ in two different ways (as both a limitation on, and an instrument for European foreign policy), and discuss the relationship between (universal) ethics and European values. The second part shifts the focus towards the ‘interests’-side of the debate, look at the way Europe tries to exercise its influence while keeping ethics in mind, and show which possibilities and (mostly) limitations this approach brings with it, culminating in an argument for the EU to influence the wider world through a combination of functioning as a model and raising awareness of the EU’s values and the successes the Union has achieved with these values. The third and last chapter will list the options available to, and problems that need to be solved by, those pursuing new models of European power, going through the different junctions that exist and the difficulties that arise. From there on I will propose some possible reasons why the European Union is so concerned with ethics, which can serve as starting points for

arguments on why the EU should be ethical. Last, I will look at two aspects of European power that need some further discussion as they otherwise would remain underexposed in this thesis, even while they are necessary components of my (or frankly any) analysis of European power.

Before I begin, a few words on a terminological issue are in order. The word ‘normative’, within the context of this topic, has two very distinct meanings. The first is the one as for example Ian Manners uses it when he speaks of ‘norms and standards’: in this context it means ‘setting the norm’, or influencing what is perceived to be ‘normal’. However, especially within philosophy there exists a very different interpretation of the word

‘normative’, for example when speaking about ‘normative ethics’. In this case, ‘normative’ refers to a category within the study of ethics used to differentiate this branch of ethics from descriptive ethics (the empirical study of how actors practice morality and ethics) and meta-ethics (which discusses issues of how ethics and morality work in a metaphysical sense, for example by discussing what makes a certain norm or principle a moral principle). Normative ethics in this latter sense is conceptually close to prescriptive ethics: it discusses whether certain beliefs, actions, and principles are morally right or wrong, and what makes them right or wrong. To put it in other words, it discusses what principles and beliefs a moral actor should have, and which norms one should abide by.

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Throughout this thesis I will discuss some issues that are normative, or prescriptive, in this latter sense. In order to avoid confusion between these two meanings of the word

‘normative’, I will use the term ‘prescriptive’ when referring to the latter meaning, as ‘prescriptive’ and ‘normative’ in this sense are roughly interchangeable. Because part of my research question is concerned with what the EU should do, some elements of this thesis will be prescriptive. Prescriptive elements rely on arguments rather than empirics, and the prescriptive parts of this thesis (notably the third chapter) are therefore proposals that should be considered, but should not be uncritically accepted outright; my background in moral philosophy means I have a tendency to include prescriptive elements in research, and it is important to stress that these elements have the goal of furthering debate rather than establishing fact. To make myself clear, my approach goes directly against Isabel Nunes’ (2011, 5) call for an analytical approach towards the EU’s external policy outcomes, as she is afraid that a prescriptive approach is potentially misleading in attributing aims to the EU that are not reflected in actual policies. Her word of caution is one I take seriously, which is why I felt the need to include this explanation.

Methodology

This thesis has a theoretical focus, which has influenced the methodological approach I have taken in writing it. The first chapter consists of analyzing secondary literature on the

debates of Europe as a power: arguments and research from other scholars will be

compared with one another and critically reflected upon, with the goal of gaining a better grasp on the different conceptualizations that already exist in the debate, how these relate to each other, and how the elements that each of these approaches stress are essential to understanding European actions and goals in external governance. In the second chapter, knowledge gained during this literature research will form an essential backbone for the arguments and connections that are put forward. However, the second chapter also relies on other forms of information gathering, most importantly the understanding of internal perceptions of the European Union but also knowledge on moral concepts and ethical philosophy. With regard to the latter: my background as a student of ethics and political philosophy means that I can provide some insights not commonly available to political scientists, which forms part of the contribution that I hope to make with this thesis. The

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sources of these insights come from my background knowledge on moral philosophy, but are backed up with research in philosophical literature.

For a better understanding of the EU’s own position on its external governance approach, I have interviewed three EU officials in relevant positions, in this case people who play a role in EU-Turkey relations. To get these interviews, I have approached and received a response from officials in the EU Commission’s Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and

Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), the Delegation of the European Union to Turkey (part of the European External Action Service, EEAS), and Member of the European Parliament and Rapporteur of the European Parliament on Turkey, Ms. Kati Piri. I have performed interviews with an anonymous DG NEAR policy officer who has Turkey as his focus, a

Political Counsellor of the Turkey Delegation, and Ms. Piri. These interviews were between a half hour and two hours in length and performed face-to-face or (in the case of the

Counsellor) via video call. The interviews were open-ended with some prepared questions as a back-up; I have chosen for this approach as to allow for a more natural and honest conversation, allowing me both to deeper question topics that sprung up during the interviews as well as broaden the areas of focus with creative input received during the interview. The interviews had two main goals: to triangulate sources of information

between official documents, secondary sources, and the interviews, and to get access to the EU’s internal attitudes towards its external policies. The latter was to me especially

important as it is difficult to get an account of the EU’s actual position, one not mired by diplomatic concerns (which for example would be difficult to find in official EU documents). With my interviewees I have chosen for quality over quantity by interviewing the relevant actors in the relevant institutions, and the nature of these talks disallowed me from

recording and transcribing these interviews. I do not see this as a problem, both because the interviews will only be a source of reference and because these references have been

checked back, in writing over e-mail, with the interviewees.

The topic of interviews brings me to an important point on the methodology and topic of this thesis: In my original conception of topic and approach I had planned to include a case study on EU-Turkey relations as a way of empirically testing the arguments put forward throughout this thesis. However, during the writing process it became increasingly clear to me that I had more to write on the existing literature than I had originally envisioned, and I

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started to feel that my contribution to the debate could be more substantial if I shifted my focus towards the theoretical side of this topic. As such, I have decided to abandon EU-Turkey relations as a case study, with the possibility that this might provide a topic for a future article (either by me or someone else). The choice of interviewees reflects this original intention to include EU-Turkey relations as an example, while the end result does not give any special considerations to the relationship between the EU and Turkey but more generally focuses on the EU’s external governance. Nevertheless, I feel that in the end the interviews are still relevant to my thesis: the open approach to the interviews allowed me to dive deeper into more general topics of external governance throughout the conversation, which means I have still received valuable insights in the EU’s inner workings and attitudes. As such, the open approach was unexpectedly beneficial to the final thesis.

The end result of my research in the first two chapters is reflected in the third chapter: the thesis will end in a series of propositions and suggestions which have the aim of furthering the debate on Europe as an ethical power as well as to open up these proposals to empirical scrutiny by others. Here, arguments trump over empirics as the tone shifts from an inquiry towards a set of proposals; in other words, the majority of the legwork on research has already been processed by the start of the last chapter. Overall, the thesis is intended as a contribution to the ‘values versus interests’-debate and as an introduction to a new way of thinking on what it means for the EU to be an ethical power, and what constraints such an approach to foreign policy would bring.

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Chapter 1. Literature Overview: Existing Frameworks

for Understanding European Power

The relative lack of military capabilities of the collective European Union (in other words, military power that the EU as an institution on its own has access to) combined which the Union’s size and influence in the world have spurred on debate on what kind of power the EU actually has. For example: if the EU has no power through military coercion, how is it that the Union was able to broker a nuclear deal with Iran? Or how is it that the EU is an equal partner in TTIP trade deal negotiations with the U.S.? European power is visible in the world, yet it seems to be a different flavor of power compared to the hard power traditional regional or global powers (the U.S., the USSR) possess of have possessed in the past.

Because of this, and because of the EU’s increased attempts to make its voice heard in the wider world, several conceptualizations of ‘European power’ have been put forward over the years. This debate finds its basis in Duchêne’s exploration of Europe’s role in geopolitics during the Cold War and beyond, notably his introduction of the idea of ‘Civilian Power Europe’ (CPE) (Duchêne 1972). Duchêne held, even before the EU as an political entity came into existence, that Europe’s unique position as ‘rich and unlikely to be too powerful’ allows it to be a potential moderator in world affairs in a political climate where soft power

matters (Duchêne 1972, 41).The concept, while vague, is often referred to, and it has been suggested that this is precisely because CPE provides a lead for addressing the topic of the EU’s role in the wider world (Orbie 2006). However, it is difficult to find research explicitly written in the CPE tradition as opposed to other conceptions of European power, because over time the question on European power has changed from whether it exists to why it exists. Fortunately, in the past years (especially from the 2000s onwards) more elaborative ways of looking at European power have been developed. Some of these can be traced back to CPE and critiques to Duchêne’s original conception (like Bull’s (1982) famous critique of CPE as ‘a contradiction in terms’), but from there on have been ‘fleshed out’ into distinct groups.

There are several conceptualizations of European power, not all focusing on the same aspects of it. We can roughly divide the different ‘lenses’ of looking at European power in

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two groups: those that focus on the tools that the EU has available in its attempts to

influence its neighbors and beyond, and those that focus on the goals that the EU attempts to pursue and how these are shaped. A similar (but not identical) distinction has been made by others between what the EU is and what it does (see for example Nunes 2011, 2;

Manners 2002, 252; Aggestam 2008, 6). However, I feel that a discussion on what the EU is hinders our understanding of the EU as an actor with self-chosen objectives by presupposing that the EU’s nature decides its actions; at the same time, a discussion on what the EU does is closer to a descriptive exercise than a prescriptive discussion on the way the EU should behave. By dividing up the literature in conceptualizations of European power that focus on its tools and its goals, the focus shifts towards the EU as an organization which possesses a certain level of actorness, and with it certain responsibilities. Tools and goals are also very closely linked to the terminology of means and ends as they appear in the debate, but these latter dimensions can be found back in all of the conceptualizations; as such, I have chosen for a different terminology as to make clear that we are speaking of a categorization of the different conceptualizations here (cf. Orbie 2006, 124-126; Diez 2005, 615-616). Another reason to speak of ‘goals’ rather than ‘ends’ is that the terminology of ‘goals’ leaves us free to discuss both the objective and the process of European policies within this category. This chapter will provide the necessary overview on the debate of Europe as a power and the ways the EU has tried to influence its neighboring countries in order to provide the framework from where on considerations of values and interests can be discussed. The EU’s foreign policy and its geopolitical role and nature as a Union holding power have been much discussed, which necessitates an expansive introduction to the debate. Only by

understanding which different elements are at play when it comes to European power can we properly understand fully how the EU exercises its powers, and why. These different elements all play a part in the issue of values and interests and are linked together in ways not always initially expected. Moreover, and most importantly, I can only justify picking two of them as my main focus by providing arguments against some theories, and in favour of others. The debate on European power has seen roughly two time periods: initial debate on the role Europe (then considered weak in international relations) should pursue (should it develop military capabilities or remain an actor committed to negotiations and non-coercive approaches to foreign policy?), and the debate started by Ian Manners in 2002 which

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accepted that such a thing as ‘European power’ exists, yet searches for an answer why it exists. I will begin with the first debate.

1.1 Initial Debate: Civilian or Military Power?

As mentioned before, the prototypical debate on European power harks back to the debate between Civilian Power Europe and Bull´s critique of this position, which we might call Hard Power Europe (HPE). Both speak of means: in what ways can (and do) European countries expand their international power, mostly against the threat of invasion by the Soviet Union and the divergence in interests with their close ally, the United States? The goal was

therefore more or less the same between the two, which ensured that the debate focused on what the source of this new European power should be: military, or diplomacy (i.e. through cultural example, pressure groups, and economic capacity; Bull 1982,150-151; Duchêne 1972, 47)? The former idea is firmly rooted in the realist tradition, the latter more in the idealist one. Their time of conception was relevant to their conceptualization:

Duchêne (who came first and whose idea was new) wrote his piece in the years of détente between the two great powers, where Bull wrote his response (which was reactionary and committed to the ideas of the Cold War regarding national self-interest) in a period of renewed tension between the U.S. and the USSR. Both however saw Europe as a continent of relative peace under what I will call a ‘cloak of hard power’: the threat of nuclear war had made open violence on the European continent unlikely. But where Duchêne saw in this an opportunity for civilian power to flourish (and for European countries, militarily weak in comparison to others but economically strong and more predisposed to keep a good relationship with both great powers, a possibility to again exercise some influence in international politics), Bull saw a need for the European countries to become more self-sufficient and able to both hold their own against the U.S. on the Western side as well as to keep the continuing Soviet threat at bay (a need, it must be mentioned, he thought was unlikely to be answered). Nonetheless, both agreed that Europe was a group of states bound by shared interests, and although certainly not a single actor (although with a shared participation in the European Community), a group that stood on the fringe of geopolitics and needed to reinvigorate its position on the international stage.

This position of Europe changed together with the end of the Cold War: with the Soviet threat (at least for the time) gone and the U.S. as the sole hegemon, CPE was better

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positioned in the sense that the soft power which it saw as the source of European power started to matter more while military power mattered less. A quick succession of events followed: the countries of the European Community formed the European Union (which also established a framework for a common security and defense policy), relations with the East were improved and tensions were eased (eventually leading to many members of the former Warsaw Pact joining the EU), but shortly afterwards the wars on the Balkan

immediately put the capacities of the EU to the test. The European forces, bound by the UN to a peacekeeping role, failed to keep the peace, and the general discord among the

European states compared to strong NATO and U.S. responses raised serious questions on the limits of soft power and questioned whether the EU actually was as powerful as it was perceived and hoped to be (or rather become; Hyde-Price 2006, 227). This deficiency would become known as the ‘capabilities-expectation gap’ and is still a relevant cause for caution to anyone eager to claim superpower status to the EU (Hill, 1993). The creation of the EU and a common security and defense policy changed the nature of the European states from a group to a Union with an eye on becoming a single international actor. However, military integration within the EU has remained mostly limited to the intergovernmental level, and Europe’s continued relative lack of ‘hard power’ capacities has limited debate on HPE to whether or not the EU should become a military power, or how the fact that the EU lacks hard power influences its choice to resort to other means of influence. One such example is Robert Kagan’s (2002) characterization of Europe as a ‘Kantian Paradise’ where soft power matters, but only “under the mantle of the U.S. security guarantee” without which the EU in this new form could not have come into existence (idem, 23). Duchêne would most likely not disagree with this claim, but the fact that European power only exists under the cloak of hard power does not mean it does not exist. And given that it exists, new conceptualizations have sprung up that have tried to define it.

1.2 Normative Power Europe

The debate between CPE and HPE was a direct influence on the conceptualization of European power that catalyzed the debate on how Europe’s soft power actually works: Normative Power Europe (NPE), a term coined by Ian Manners (2002) in his influential paper on the EU’s source of strength. Manners responded directly to Bull’s criticism on the

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Duchêne’s CPE by moving away from Europe’s empirical capabilities towards the EU’s ideological power, the ‘normative dimension’ coming from its unique internal makeup and history (Manners 2002, 239-244). As with Duchêne and Bull, Manners’ work also comes from a specific period in time: Manners readily admits that “the developments of the 1990s in international relations lead us to rethink both notions of military power and civilian power in order to consider the EU’s normative power in world politics” (idem, 236). His post-Cold War perspective is one of optimism: the EU’s historical context, hybrid polity, and legal constitution have committed it to placing universal norms and principles at the center of its relations both inside and outside its borders. This commitment manifests itself in different ways within EU policy, both intentional (for example when placing conditions on EU enlargement or trade deals or when opening dialogue with other institutions) and unintentional (for example when other regions want to emulate European integration or want to join the EU as a matter of status).

Key to Manners’ conception of European power are two ideas: first, that the EU places universal norms and principles ahead of prudential interests; and second, that what matters is what the EU is rather than what it does. It changes norms because it is predisposed to do so, and it is predisposed to do so because of its unique qualities. NPE gave an answer to the question of ‘what role for the EU in the world?’ (Orbie 2006, 123) that satisfied the ideas that soft power matters, that the EU was uniquely predisposed to exercise this soft power, and that it was a good thing that this is the case. Manners did not see the EU’s power as imperialism in disguise (and gives a particularly flimsy argument why: because “the EU often finds itself at odds with other developed OECD states, such as the US and Japan, as in the case of the abolition of the death penalty” [Manners 2002, 253], which is no argument at all against European normative imperialism), but prescriptively states that the EU should act to extend its norms in the international system (idem, 252). Why this is the case remains unclear. Nevertheless, his initial paper spurred on a debate both within the

NPE-conceptualization as well as against it. The first debate was one of testing, criticizing, and contributing to the hypothesis put forward by Manners (see for example Diez 2005; Hyde-Price 2006; Bicchi 2006). What developed from here on is sort of a back-and-forth between Manners, defending and evolving his position, and others reflecting on and criticizing it. Most relevant for our purposes in this debate are two contributions: the first is Manners’

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(2008) article on the normative ethics of the European Union. We will come back to this article when I will compare this ‘normative’ (or rather, prescriptive) quality of NPE with Ethical Power Europe in the next chapter.

The other contribution which needs some elucidation is Hyde-Price’s (2006) realist perspective on NPE, which (in essence) updates the position of Bull from the 1980s so it reflects the evolutions that the EU has gone through since. To Hyde-Price, the EU is an instrument through which its member states can exercise their soft power (under which I also include economic conditionality) in the neighborhood, initially not even very

successfully (Hyde-Price 2006, 227). Again like Bull, Hyde-Price also acknowledges that the EU was able to become this civilian or normative power (he uses both terms more or less interchangeably) only under the cloak of hard power (idem, 225). He sees three problems with the idealist approach (but does not explicitly elaborate on these), two of which are relevant: their lack of attention to power relations, and their explicitly normative claims in the sense that normative power is automatically considered to be a ´good thing´ (idem, 218). I disagree with the first: Duchêne explicitly acknowledged the (nuclear) cloak of hard power, while the whole point of Manners’ introduction of NPE was to move away from the discussion of empirical capabilities towards one on the EU’s normative ones. To the second problem Ethical Power Europe can be seen as an acknowledgement of this shortcoming Hyde-Price mentions, where EPE problematizes what it means for soft power to be a ‘good thing’. I will go further into this in the paragraph introducing EPE.

1.3 New Conceptualizations

The second debate Manners’ initial article on NPE spurred on happened at a metalevel, where NPE functioned as a starting point for other conceptualizations of European power which emphasized different aspects of the EU’s external policies. Some of these focused on the tools at the disposal of the EU, others on the goals the EU wanted to pursue. NPE itself is a theory of the former category: when Manners argues that “because of its particular

historical evolution, its hybrid polity, and its constitutional configuration” the EU has a different basis for its relations with the world and claims that “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is”, he looks at the source of European power rather than the EU’s aims in wielding this

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examples of goals that the EU pursues, but the focus and starting point of his argument is trying to explain the ‘nature of the beast’; that is, what the EU has to offer in its battle for power. NPE tries to find why the EU acts in a certain way, but not per se what it tries to achieve.

Another conceptualization that I must briefly mention and that falls under this category is Market Power Europe (MPE), which understands the EU as a market power that exercises its power through the externalization of economic and social market-related policies and regulatory measures (Damro 2012). According to MPE the EU has its vast economic power at its disposal when it wants to influence companies, groups, institutions, and governments both internally and beyond its borders. MPE focuses on the tools of coercion or influence that the EU has at its disposal when it wants to influence actors, but what the EU wants to achieve with this takes a backseat in this conceptualization. MPE is at least as much a reaction to NPE as it is a conceptualization in itself: it is a turn away from the prescriptive and idealistic towards the empirical and realistic, putting the immense power of soft

coercion that the EU possesses as a large single market at the front and center. The EU uses its market power to drag the wider world with it in its quest to increase the quality of goods and services. Conveniently, this favours the EU economically as it can remain competitive in a world where its (more expensive) standards of quality are shared globally. MPE goes back to that other aspect of ‘normative’ in NPE: the EU’s ability to ‘set the norm’, in this case on regulatory standards. Debate on MPE is not terribly interesting or relevant for our purposes (and the concept itself is a recent one), but it is a good thing to keep in mind where the brunt of the EU’s soft power comes from: its economy. Economic power is the main tool the EU can use to motivate those countries not susceptible to European ideals in order for them to cooperate with the EU anyway.

1.4 Ethical Power Europe

Another conceptualization that sprung up from the debate surrounding NPE is one that is especially relevant for our purposes: Ethical Power Europe (EPE). This conceptualization was introduced with by Lisbeth Aggestam (2008) in a special issue of International Affairs which conveniently brought with it the immediate start of a debate on this conceptualization through contributions by (among others) Hill, Manners, and Hyde-Price. As mentioned before, EPE problematizes the prescriptive aspects of NPE criticized by Hyde-Price, as well as

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the EU’s self-proclaimed goal of acting as a ‘force for good’ (Aggestam 2008, 1). It is

therefore a debate on the moral aspect of NPE (as opposed to the norm-setting capacities of the EU) and a switch back from a discussion on what the EU is to what it does. This means an underlying assumption of the EU as a single actor with intentionality and an agenda, a move that is justified by the EU’s search to become a proactive player in the international arena. EPE also shows a shift in focus away from the tools of power available to the EU to the goals that it pursues, in this case the goal of being a responsible ethical actor in the world.

Aggestam’s article also goes into the interplay between ethics and interests, where this interplay in European foreign policy goals can be conceived in three ways. First, “as being driven by an honest concern for the well-being of others in an altruistic sense” (idem, 8). The EU would then be an ethical power because it puts the good of others front and center. Second, ethics as an instrument to pursue strategic goals, where the ethical power that the EU possesses is deployed as a way of influencing the broader international environment in a way that suits the Union; in this sense ethical power is ideological power used to control the behavior of other actors. The second conception therefore returns to ethical power as a tool, in much the same way as how the EU’s market power is a tool. Third, we can conceive of the EU as a ‘responsible power’ that keeps the interests of others in mind when pursuing strategic goals, and therefore limits itself to soft power approaches such as diplomacy and the power of attraction, although in some cases military power might be appropriate as well (for example in the form of peacekeeping forces). In Aggestam’s own article the question which of these three conceptions of ethical power we should use remains an open one, which she defends on the grounds that “the EU does not fall squarely within any one of these descriptions of ethics, power and interests” (idem, 9). Nonetheless, a strong demarcation on what is meant by ‘ethical power’ is necessary when applying the

conceptualization; I will return to this issue in the next chapter, where I will unpack ‘ethical power’.

Ethical Power Europe, as a conceptualization, did not find the same resonance as for example NPE did: even some of the aforementioned contributions to the original special issue on the topic do not explicitly mention EPE (e.g. Manners 2008; Dunne 2008). But EPE is worth considering for two reasons: because it problematizes the more prescriptive elements of NPE, and because it looks at the EU as an actor with intentionality and choices to make

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rather than an institution with almost mythical qualities of attraction and influence. The question of European goals is explicitly what differentiates EPE from NPE (Aggestam 2008). Where NPE (and CPE before that) focus on the opportunities the EU has in attempting to find its place in regional and geopolitics, EPE moves to the question of what it can use this place in international politics for. Europe is developing a strategic role which “seeks to make the EU more 'capable' in order to engage in conflict prevention around the globe”

(Aggestam 2008, 3). EPE therefore lies a lot closer to the actual realities of EU foreign policy than NPE usually does. The EU has, especially in recent years, acted as a strategic actor with needs and interests, but one which takes special interest in the ethical dimension of policy. As such, EPE will form part of my own arguments on European power in the following chapter.

1.5 Criticism on Idealist Conceptualizations

The conceptualizations mentioned so far that follow in the footsteps of the CPE tradition (that is, NPE and EPE) are keen to emphasize the ‘normative difference’ of the EU (stemming from its roots as a peace project), its post-sovereign nature (being different from and acting differently than traditional powerful nation-states), and its capacity to act as a model for other states and organizations (leading by example). This meta-narrative of Europe as a desirable new force in geopolitics has been criticized under the ‘Ideal Power Europe’ moniker (IPE), a term introduced by Münevver Cebeci as a criticism towards European identity creation (Cebeci 2012). Coming from a post-structuralist perspective, she criticizes the construction (especially by the research community, and at least for a significant part unintentionally) of a myth-like European grand narrative legitimizing the EU’s purpose and policies through the idea that the EU has authority on what defines the normal, is a positive force in world politics, and acts in certain ‘ideal’ (as defined by the EU itself) ways or at least tries to do so. To Cebeci this narrative is actually a cover for far more prudential interests: in her article introducing the concept she mentions examples ranging from economic interests, stability on the borders, securitizing (and thereby limiting) immigration, to something as simple as a member state (in this case France) getting access to Libyan oil (idem, 572, 575, 581). Her main conclusion is that the IPE narrative is empowering the discourses on power, sovereignty, and the state. The IPE narratives (CPE, NPE, EPE) are thereby themselves a tool

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to provide the EU with a legitimization of its foreign policy and the European project itself, where both actually are far more interest-driven than the IPE narrative would admit. Cebeci was not the first to write in this tradition (although I will use her IPE terminology to group this conceptualization): criticism towards the idealization of the European narrative can be found back in for example the work of Diez (2005) and Sjursen (2006), which were written as critical assessments of NPE as introduced by Manners. The contributions of Hyde-Price discussed earlier can also be seen in light of the IPE tradition. As is traditional for poststructuralist accounts, IPE assessments focus on hegemony in discourse, the self-other distinction, and identity creation as a tool in the struggle for power. Their criticisms are effective: those writing in the IPE tradition (that is, those criticizing the metanarrative of Europe as an ideal power and, confusingly, therefore opposed to those writing under the IPE narratives of CPE, NPE, and EPE) are keen on exposing inconsistencies between European rhetoric (just as much put forward by researchers as by EU policy officials) and actual policies, and raise serious problems with NPE claims of the EU as a normative power in (what Manners calls) its ontological and positivist qualities of the concept: that is, the claim that the EU is predisposed to act in a normative way, and the claim that it does so in

actuality (Manners 2002, 252).

However, criticisms on IPE narratives do not defeat the ‘normative’ (i.e. prescriptive) quality of NPE, the claim that the EU should act to extend its norms in the international system. It does not attack the moral element of the EU’s normative power directly, but rather questions the matter of whether claims that the EU has the power to set norms are true, and whether claims that spreading the EU’s norms is desirable are honest (as opposed to instrumental and driven by prudential interests). Questioning whether such claims are honest is not the same as questioning whether such claims are right (morally speaking): the fact that an action is dishonest does not necessarily make the action morally wrong, as can be the case in a situation where someone tells a white lie in order to make someone else feel better.1 In the end, IPE does not morally evaluate the EU: those writing in the IPE tradition (again in line with poststructuralism) are busier with breaking down the IPE narratives (the tools of influence) rather than focusing on what the EU actually tries to achieve with its policies (the goals). If I must criticize IPE it is on this: the fact that the EU

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(and researchers on the topic) use meta-narratives to justify European foreign policy and dominate discourse does not mean that it is wrong that they use this power to change the normal (even though it might stifle critical discussion on EU foreign policy, a very legitimate issue raised by Cebeci [2012, 578]). Whether or not changing the normal is a good thing depends on what you intend to change the normal into, and whether or not other

participants in the discourse on ‘the normal’ are voluntarily adapting to this new normal or are coerced to do so. This would be were EPE comes back into play: the EPE tradition

problematizes precisely these issues that IPE overlooks, and asks the question of what is and is not acceptable behavior in European foreign policy.

1.6 Interests: Europe as an Empire

A theory that agrees with the underlying claims of the IPE tradition (or at least its implicit claim that what underlies the use of a tool such as the European meta-narrative is a struggle for hegemony), but focuses on the goals such tools might be used for is that of Europe as an Empire (EaE). EaE conceives of the EU as far more traditional than CPE and NPE do: in its eyes the EU is primarily interest-driven and behaves in much the same way as empires have done over the centuries. Examples of interests pursued are stability in the borderlands (that is, the European neighborhood), general security (including limiting unwanted migration), and the creation of economic advantages of EU members vis-a-vis the wider world (Del Sarto 2016, 225). EaE’s understanding of the EU provides a powerful explanation for several inconsistencies in the behavior of the EU in its neighborhood, for example in its reaction to the Arab Spring (idem, 223-226). The main draw of EaE is how well it fits with European behavior in the recent past, the EU’s introduction of the ENP and the way the policy

functions: third countries part of the ENP framework cannot determine the content of their relationship with the EU, but only the pace in which they adopt European rules and policies (Cebeci 2017, 62). Under EaE, norm diffusion would be one of the tools at the EU’s disposal in its quest for hegemony, where the EU exercises power “through seeking to shape and transform the international environment by diffusing norms of multilateralism, the rule of law, human rights, democracy and good governance – normative structures conducive to EU interests” (Aggestam 2008, 9). Leverage over third countries in the form of prospective membership is another bargaining chip in negotiations, as is access to the European

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common market. Del Sarto thus aptly names EU a ‘normative empire’ because of the Union’s ability to shape discourse in a way that favors the Union.

Jan Zielonka (2008, note 17) focuses a bit more on the EU’s nature as an Empire, and ascribes the following characteristics to it: “soft borders in flux; persistence of socio-economic and cultural differentiation; disjunction between authoritative allocations, functional competencies and territorial constituencies; and interpenetration of various types of political units and loyalties.” The EU legitimizes its policies by claiming they are the ‘best practices’ in achieving economic and political integration, and by claiming their moral rightness. Its tools are chiefly ‘sticks and carrots’: punishment through economic sanctions (a recent example would be the sanctions against Russia after the latter’s annexation of Crimea) and rewards through economic and political incentives (for example the prospect of visa liberalization for Turkey as a chip in the negotiations on the so-called Turkish ‘migrant deal’). Zielonka acknowledges the demarcation between the EU’s norm-setting capacities on regulations and its normative-ethical aspirations (although not explicitly naming it as such), arguing that promotion of the imperial core’s norms and values to the periphery is typical for an empire (Zielonka 2008, 480).

Although Zielonka’s argument also encompasses a European global agenda, the EU’s

regional agenda is more relevant to our purposes given the EU’s relative capacity to act as a hegemon in its neighborhood (idem, 476-478). Here he stresses the asymmetrical

relationship between the core (the EU) and its periphery (the neighborhood), an advantage which, joined by the EU’s know-how in setting up regulatory standards gained from doing so on an intra-European level, allows the EU to make the periphery more like Europe in its standards of goods and services, allowing for easier trade, labour migration, and

investment, and for European corporations to remain competitive beyond the borders. Zielonka asks the question of how this is to be done: through a traditional superpower approach (although in a distinctly European way, with economic coercion in lieu of military power and with a chief reliance on economic ‘sticks’), or by acting as a model power, functioning as an example for third actors and providing economic incentives (‘carrots’) for those adopting European norms (idem, 483-484). He ends with a prescriptive argument for the EU to act as a model power, given the EU’s constraints in traditional hard power, and calls for the promotion of policies and rules that empower other actors; the reasoning being

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that only in this way third actors can be charmed into converging to European norms. Zielonka therefore points to the same ‘power of attraction’ that Aggestam refers to in the last of her three conceptions of EPE. Zielonka’s conception of EaE would therefore fall under the ‘EU as a responsible power’ conception within EPE. I will discuss Zielonka’s conception of EaE more thoroughly in the next chapter.

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Chapter 2. Towards Understanding European Goals:

Linking Ethics with Interests

The debate that ensued after the publication of Manners’ original article where he

introduced Normative Power Europe has spawned the plethora of conceptualizations that have been discussed above. All have focused on different aspects of European power; some on its tools, and some on its goals. Much debate has been had on the nature of European power, its difference from other world powers; in other words, what Manners calls ‘what the EU is’. Even when Cebeci (as one of the most influential authors in the IPE tradition) writes on the EU’s inconsistent behavior towards its Southern and Eastern neighbors, she does so with the goal of exposing the inconsistencies between what the EU institutions (and those writing in the tradition of the IPE narrative) claim that the EU is, and what it is in actuality. While such a debate is extremely useful in understanding European power, it does not paint the full picture: the EU is an international actor with agency, goals, and policies. Aggestam’s wish in her introduction to EPE for debate to move back from discussion on what the EU is to ‘what it does’ is therefore a necessary step to understanding that other half of European power: its goals.

In the overview above I argued that two conceptualizations of European power focus on the EU’s goals: Ethical Power Europe (EPE), and Europe as an Empire (EaE). At first glance, they represent the two sides of the ‘values versus interests’ debate: EPE representing the idea of the EU as an ‘universal force for good’ and an actor willing to set aside its own interests in favor of a better world, and EaE representing the idea of Europe trying to find new ways to return to hegemony and imposing its will on others. However, in the following part I will attempt to demonstrate that the divide is not that simple: the EU’s ethics have an

instrumental edge to them, while its ‘imperial’ aspirations are not quite as unscrupulous as the label would suggest. Most of all, understanding European behavior towards its

neighbors and beyond requires breaking down the divisions between the different conceptualizations of European power. To gain a deep understanding of the motivations and goals that steer the EU´s policies, negotiations, and rhetoric, I will in this chapter attempt to link EPE and EaE in a holistic approach to the different conceptualizations,

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drawing on these two approaches as well as the tools available to the EU that are the point of focus of the other ways of looking at European power.

In the first part of this chapter I will focus on my choice for Ethical Power Europe (EPE) as the main conception of European power used in this thesis, where it is necessary to differentiate EPE from one of the main frameworks in which European power usually is discussed, Normative Power Europe (NPE). NPE has been a major influence on, and a major catalyst of, the debate on European power. I will argue why I have chosen for EPE as my main ‘lens’ for looking at European power in the context of relations in the European neighborhood; this neighborhood does not only cover those countries that fall under the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), but also those neighboring countries that have entered the EU’s accession process or are potential candidates for future membership. To explain, most countries in the European neighborhood are treated by the European Union under the ENP, a framework for cooperation between the EU and third countries which aims to provide these countries with everything short from EU membership. As such countries that take part in the European accession process do not fall under the ENP. The ENP, by its nature, lacks the most important form of leverage that the EU holds over third countries in negotiations on cooperation: the possibility of eventually joining the Union as a full member (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011; interview with Kati Piri).

After arguing for the choice for EPE I will shift the focus towards the other chosen conceptualization, Europe as an Empire (EaE). EaE has emerged as a response to

conceptualizations that have emerged in the CPE tradition (which can be grouped together under the concept of ‘Ideal Power Europe’, or IPE), and frames the EU more like a traditional empire rather than the ‘post-sovereign’ or ‘post-Westphalian’ system that it has been called by those in the IPE tradition (Cebeci 2012, 566-569). More deeply discussing EPE and EaE sets the stage for the ‘values versus interests’-debate on European external policy that will form the main framework of this thesis, with EPE as a more idealistic conception and EaE as the conception that focuses more on European interests. Balancing values with interests will prove vital in any legitimate conception of the European Union as a power block that uses its powers to be a ´universal force for good´ while at the same time not losing sight of the European population that it purports to represent.

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Values: Ethical Power Europe 2.1 Differentiating Ethical Power Europe

There is some difficulty in making a proper distinction between NPE and EPE: both share a similar tradition drawn from CPE, both are concerned with European values and ethical considerations, and some authors who claim to write following one conceptualization actually put forward arguments that look very close to the other: Manners’ (2008) contribution to the International Affairs issue on EPE is a prime example of this. In her introductory article in the same journal Lisbeth Aggestam (2008) tries to differentiate her concept from NPE by shifting the debate from what the EU is to what it does. While this shift from the EU’s nature to its goals is the one I try to make as well, it is not the main reason I have chosen for EPE instead of NPE (even though the body of literature available in the latter tradition is far bigger than in the former). Rather, what EPE does is that it disentangles ethics from the EU’s capacity to shape the ‘normal’.

In the introduction of this thesis I already mentioned some terminological issues

surrounding the word ‘normative’, where I mentioned the difference between ‘setting the norm’ and ethical norm-setting aspirations, or prescriptivism. Manners’ use of the word ‘normative’ has created a certain ambiguity in the debate, and I would argue his

understanding of normativity is conceptually confused. Manners refers to the EU’s norm-setting capacities (for example when it comes to regulatory standards for traded goods and services) and its normative-ethical aspirations (moral norms and values that the EU ascribes to and wants to spread both inside and beyond its borders) with the same terminology, for example when referring to the difference between how the EU is and how it acts:

In this respect the EU is a normative power: it changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expectations of state-centricity. However, it is one thing to say that the EU is a normative power by virtue of its hybrid polity consisting of supranational and international forms of governance; it is another to argue that the EU acts in a normative (i.e. ethically good) way. (Manners 2008, 45)

What Manners calls ‘what the EU is’ in this passage refers to its norm-setting capacities; what he refers to as ‘how the EU acts’ is normative or rather prescriptive ethics. Ethics are no inherent part of discussion on norm-setting capacities. To give an example: most

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ethically wrong with driving on the left (or rather, with laws dictating driving on the left that exist in some other countries), it is just an arbitrarily chosen standard that has seen

widespread adoption. To be sure, a moral issue can arise when it comes to discussion on norms (such as if it for example were to be proven that driving on the left causes fewer accidents than driving on the right), and some moral beliefs are norms as well, and therefore moral norms. But the distinction between discussion on norms and on ethics is very important, especially when considering the EU’s power: are we speaking of its capacity to change the world to be more like itself (to Europeanize it, so to say), or about its capacity to change the world for the better? EPE removes any confusion surrounding the

terminology of ‘normative power’ by explicitly referring to the EU’s goals and the ethical dimension that these have, leaving aside the EU’s non-ethical norm setting capacities: it conceptualizes an EU with has clear actorship which can be morally evaluated. This is truly what is meant with the shift from what the EU is to what it does. Nevertheless, EPE in its original conception contains large ambiguities and an open interpretation on what is actually meant by the label. As such, understanding the ethics of European actions requires a more detailed interpretation on what the EPE conceptualization actually entails.

2.2 Interpreting Ethical Power Europe

Aggestam’s introduction to EPE leaves open considerable definitional issues on what EPE is supposed to be. What, for example, is an ‘ethical’ foreign and security policy (Aggestam 2008, 8-9)? A policy that is fully altruistic towards the external world? One that shapes the notion of ‘good’ in a sense that it transforms the wider neighborhood and wants it to become more ‘like Europe’, hinging on the claim that what is good for Europe is also good for the world? Or a policy that is limited by ethical concerns (for example concern for the wellbeing of others), and which tries to influence the wider world through persuasion and dialogue rather than coercion? Also, who decides which ethical concerns to abide by? Can the EU decide this for itself? These are conceptual issues EPE raises to purposefully

problematize some claims taken for granted in Manners’ conception of NPE, but issues that nevertheless need answers if we are to apply the conceptualization to real-world cases and policy proposals with the aim of morally evaluating them. Therefore, I will demarcate in this paragraph what I will take EPE to mean, and argue why this is the best interpretation of EPE.

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As mentioned earlier, we can conceive of the idea of the EU as an ethical power in three ways: as an altruistic institution at least as much concerned with the wellbeing of those living outside its borders as those living within them, as a self-interested institution seeking power over opinion and combining ethical with strategic considerations in a narrative that claims that what is good for Europe is also good for its neighbors, or as a traditional yet responsible regional power that restrains its actions according to ethical considerations when pursuing its interests so as not to mistreat others. Of these three, the first conception seems one unlikely to fit the EU: The Union fundamentally aims “to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples” according to Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (Member States 2012, 326/17). The establishing treaty (amended under the Treaty of Lisbon) has a strong focus on the internal dimensions of the EU, and in its paragraph on relations with the wider world states that “the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens” (ibid.). Implicit in this wording is that it shall uphold, promote, and protect its values, interests, and citizens against the wider world. Make therefore no mistake: the EU primarily exists for its own members and peoples. This makes sense: the EU is a form of government created by the countries of Europe, and consisting of people from those countries. Its leaders are chosen by the people of the EU (directly or indirectly), and they are chosen to represent them. Their legitimacy hinges on the consent of the member states and their populations. And as I shall discuss further below, the Union’s action do not match any rhetoric on the EU as a fully altruistic institution. There is simply no reason to adopt the position that the EU is, or should be one. Yet, at the same time the same Article 3 of the same treaty mentioned above also states that the Union

shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. (ibid.)

As such, the Treaty explicitly claims its objectives vis-à-vis the wider world to be more than merely strategic; more importantly, it binds the EU to certain ethical considerations

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other conceptions of EPE, which ascribe certain ethical considerations to the EU without denying its fundamental purpose as interest-driven (that is, primarily concerned with the interests of own members and citizens). This leaves open the question of the role of ethical considerations within the EU: are they an instrument for, or a constraint on the Union in its pursuit of its interests? I would argue they are both: relying on normative power when shaping discourse on such topics as human rights and democracy restricts the EU to behave in such a way that it itself respects the values it claims to be right, lest it could be accused of hypocrisy or at the least inconsistency. If such accusations are justified, normative power diminishes as the EU loses credibility (interview with Kati Piri). As such, the second and third conceptions of EPE are not mutually exclusive, and I will rely on both in the rest of this thesis. For the sake of clarity I shall call this first dimension of ethical power ‘instrumental ethical power’ and the second ‘limiting ethical power’, because the second relies on ethical power (the norm-setting power to dictate what is right and wrong) as a strategic instrument or tool, while in the third conception the desire to not lose ethical power limits both the aims the EU can pursue and the means available to pursue those aims. Both conceptions are also related to two conceptions discussed by Zielonka; I will return to this relationship later on.

2.3 Which Moral Values?

An inherent characteristic of ethics is the lack of consensus that exists with regards to ethical principles, values, or judgements. This makes a conceptualization of Europe as an ethical power inherently a difficult task: because which values and principles should we (that is, those that want to morally evaluate the practices and policies of the EU) use as a ‘moral yardstick’ to hold the EU up against? Should moral evaluations be considered according to a deontological (e.g. a Kantian) theory, or a consequentialist (e.g. a utilitarian) conception of the good? If a deontological theory, do we consider some imperatives (e.g. the categorical imperative, one formulation of which prescribes that moral actors should always treat other persons as ends in themselves) to be absolute, or is there some leeway when it comes to situations where giving every person a fair treatment leads to great

suffering for a large group (Johnson and Cureton 2017; McConnell 1981)? What if two moral absolutes collide, for example when the European value of spreading peace leads to support for authoritarian regimes and therefore undermines the European value of democracy? If

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we follow a consequentialist theory, who do we make part of the moral calculus (Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2013)? Europeans, those living in the European neighborhood, all people affected, or all living beings affected? Why should we pick one moral theory and not

another? What if certain European values are justified on different grounds? Do we then use several theories as moral yardstick? What if these theories lead to reasonably argued yet incompatible and opposing imperatives (leading to what is called moral ambivalence; Wong 2006, 20-28)? Does moral ambivalence mean that ethics must be reduced to moral

relativism? If that is the case, how can we morally evaluate EU actions and policies at all? The barrage of questions posed above might feel overwhelming, but moral issues like these are well-known (to the extent one might consider them blasé) to moral philosophers. The plurality of ethical theories that exists, each with their own principles, justifications, and foundations, has been a structural problem for those studying ethics for as long as ethics exists as a study. Nevertheless, those writing under EPE seem relatively unaware of the fact that ‘ethics’ is not at all one set of principles or values, but a concept in dire need of

clarification when used. Usually, what is meant by ‘being a force for good’, ‘doing good’, or ‘universal [moral] norms’ is left undefined (As both Manners [2002] and Aggestam [2008] do in their original articles, although the latter purposefully), pre-emptively disregarded as an impossibility (as Hyde-Price [2008] does), or uncritically defined (for example as that what ‘international public opinion’ desires, as Dunne [2008, 14], with a particularly flagrant lack of attention to ethical considerations, does in one case). The most explicit effort to ground European principles and actions in ethics I have seen comes from Manners (2008) in his discussion on the normative ethics of the EU. Sidestepping the fact that Manners

remains imprecise in his terminology on ‘normativity’, the first part of this article is, in my opinion, an excellent treatment of the nine normative principles Manners found in the EU’s law and policies (Manners 2008, 47-55). My only criticism here is the following: when Manners refers to parts of EU treaties, it is unclear to which groups the goals stated in the treaties should apply. This is for example the case with the reference he uses as his

foundation for the principle of inclusive equality. To justify his claim that inclusive equality is part of European values, he references Article 3.3 of the Treaty on European Union Member States 2012, 326/17; Manners 2008, 52. However, Article 3.3 sets up the internal