Basic income or universal basic services : which radical welfare proposal best enhances democracy?

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Basic Income or Universal Basic Services:

Which Radical Welfare Proposal Best

Enhances Democracy?

By Sasha Waloff

June 2019

Master’s Thesis: MSc Political Science (Political Theory)

Supervisor: Dr. Afsoun Afsahi

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The idea of a ‘welfare state’ is of relatively recent origin, being coined to describe the system of social security instituted by the British Labour government following World War II (Briggs, 1961:221). Developing around the start of the 20th century, welfarism as we know it has become so culturally and constitutionally entrenched that it is presently inconceivable that a western democracy would fail to have a comprehensive welfare programme. However, the contexts in which these welfare systems now operate are markedly different from the ones they set out to mitigate against. This has led many to posit that welfare systems are ‘no longer fit for purpose’ (Huws in Reed and Lansley, 2016:7). As Sage and Diamond explain, ‘in English speaking welfare states, the benefits system is derided as stigmatising, punitive and overly complex, while the continental insurance-based systems have been criticised for preserving ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ labour market divisions (2017:13).

In addition, worsening rates of relative and absolute poverty in western democracies demand new and radical solutions. For instance, in Europe, in ‘2005, 16% of the EU population was at risk of poverty’, and by 2014 ‘this had risen to 24.4%’ (Zarkov, 2018:134). To meet Europe 2020 targets, 24.7 million people will have to be moved out of poverty in the upcoming year (Sage and Diamond, 2017:3). Furthermore, an estimated 43 million face ‘food poverty’ (Zarkov, 2018:134), and in half the EU’s member states, 1 in 3 children are considered to be living in poverty (Zarkov, 2018:135). All of this occurs at a time when, in 2016, ‘the wealthiest 10% of households owned 52.3% of the total net wealth; and the bottom, 5% of households had a negative net wealth’ (Zarkov, 2018:136). Indeed, by the end of this year, private wealth in Europe is expected to reach almost 80 trillion (Zarkov, 2018:136).

Today’s welfare states must also contend with threats to employment posed by rapid advancements in technology, which require significant forethought and social ingenuity to manage effectively. Though the full impact of automation is unclear, ‘jobs across the whole employment spectrum are simultaneously challenged by technology that combines the speed and efficiency of a machine with the creativity and agency of a human’ (Bruun and Duka, 2018:4). Frey and Osbourne

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(2017) calculate that in the US, 47% of jobs are at high-risk of automation, and with the price of ‘robots expected to fall by 10% a year on average’ (Bruun and Duka, 2018:5), pressure on employment will undoubtedly increase; heightening demand on the welfare state to deliver an adequate safety-net.

This context of worsening poverty, persistent inequality, failing welfare provisions, shifting social landscapes and increasingly precarious employment has inspired a radical reassessment of the way we provide for those most in need. At the forefront of such discussions is the widely debated notion of ‘basic income’ (BI) which has seen a revival in popularity on the fringes of the political mainstream1_{. However, a newly-developed proposal - ‘universal basic services’ (UBS) - is also gaining}

traction; demanding incorporation into the debate on the future of welfare. Studies thus far have primarily focused on the ability of each system to adequately tackle the issues above. However, this paper seeks to offer a new assessment, considering instead the credibility of both proposals claims to enhance democracy. While sharing a number of outlooks, aims and critiques of existing welfare, these proposals offer fundamentally different solutions to the problems faced in western democracies and thus a comparative approach will provide an insightful method of assessment.

Addressing the democratic side of this discussion, one might question: why does democracy need enhancing and how do BI and UBS propose to do so? Considering ‘democratic’ governance today, persistent trends demonstrate how ‘participation is fleeting, accountability is little more than nominal and the true mechanisms of ‘democratic’ decisions are obscure’ (Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon, 1999:1). Attempts at achieving democratic aspirations often fall short and the legitimacy of many political decisions is questionable. For instance, the average turnout in parliamentary elections for the EU member states is 66.5% (Dempsey and Loft, 2019:5) and ‘democratic’ governments may be elected with as little as 21.6% of electorate support2_{(Mellows-Facer, 2005:8). Similarly, there is evidence that}

1_{For instance, 2020 presidential candidate Andrew Yang is pledging to implement a BI - ‘the Freedom Dividend’}

- as his main campaign point (Friends of Andrew Yang, 2019:The Freedom Dividend). Likewise, the British Labour Party have committed to trialling a BI if elected to power (Press Association, 2019).

2_{As was the case in the UK 2005 General Election where Blair’s Labour government gained a majority of 64,}

taking 355 of 646 parliamentary seats. Overall turnout was 61.4% and Labour received 35.2% of the vote share (Mellows-Facer, 2005:8).

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citizens residing under ‘democratic’ rule are increasingly losing confidence in their political institutions (Dahl, 1999:8), undermining the popular basis upon which democracy is premised.

Despite this, it seems that democracy is still commonly considered a popular, desirable doctrine. This is exemplified in the fact that both BI and UBS proposals see the enhancement of democracy as an important part of their overall aims. Held proposes that the persisting attraction of democracy lies in its ‘refusal to accept, in principle, any conception of the political good other than that generated by ‘the people’ (2006:260). It does not presuppose agreement on ideals of justice, liberty or equality but serves as a tool to navigate these debates and mediate among competing conceptions of the good life. It strives to be an adaptable process, not a fixed end goal; a ‘programme of change’ through which substantive issues ‘receive a better opportunity for deliberation, debate and resolution than they would under alternative regimes’ (Held, 2006:261). Placing power in the autonomy and consent of the people, it also provides a compelling case for the legitimacy of political rule (Held, 2006:ix). Thus, democracy’s persistent popularity in the face of its own crisis, demonstrated by both BI and UBS’s claims to its enhancement; its neutrality as a political process; and its logical relation to political legitimacy, all constitute compelling reasons for its use as the basis of this policy comparison.

To address the question ‘basic income or universal basic services: which radical welfare proposal best enhances democracy?’ the first section of this paper will explore the topic of democracy - considering how the role of the state and extent of popular participation may form central pillars of our democratic understanding. From this, I develop the notion of the ‘democratic duality’ to explore the complex, mutually-reinforcing relationship between democratic citizens and the democratic state and the roles, rights and responsibilities of each in striving towards a healthy and functioning democracy. After establishing this theoretical foundation, section two will explore both approaches in turn; outlining the aims, ideas and features of BI and then UBS. Overall, this paper will argue that the provisions offered under UBS present more potential opportunities for successfully enhancing democracy than a BI does.

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To advance this position, the third section of this paper will consist of three distinct parts. First, I will consider the democratic case for BI advanced by Pateman3_{(2003; 2004). Next, I will assess}

these claims and present a number of criticisms against the democratic case for BI. In the process, I will also consider the capacities of UBS and how its differing approach might help overcome the issues faced by BI. The final part of section three will present the democratic case for UBS. Building on the criticisms of BI and the ways in which UBS might address these, this part will draw upon the democratic duality framework established in section one to demonstrate the affinities between UBS and democracy, thus formally espousing its greater democratic potential. Despite criticising the democratic case for BI, the two proposals don’t necessarily exist in opposition; they share numerous commonalities and there is scope to combine them. However, services would have to pave the way for a successful BI. Thus, the fourth and final section of this paper will explore the possibility for incorporating BI as a provision of UBS.

1. CONCEPTUALISING DEMOCRACY

Democracy: A Contested Term

To assess the democratic claims made by BI and UBS advocates, a consideration of what is entailed by ‘democracy’ is essential. Democracy is one of the most widely used terms within political science; ‘exalted not only across the globe today but across the political spectrum’ (Brown, 2010:45). Even authoritarian governments frequently ‘attempt to cloak their regimes in pseudo-democratic rhetoric’ (Dahl, 1999:7), demonstrating the distance across which democracy has been co-opted. Focusing on the democratic canon, a range of theories may be identified: from classical liberal and republican understandings to direct or representative models; from competitive elitism to pluralism, to deliberative or even global democracy (Held, 2006). In addition to these theoretical divergences, there is also a disjuncture between democracy as an ideal and democracy enacted as a political process

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(Dahl, 1999:10). Given such discrepancies, it is unsurprising that democracy has come represent ‘all things to all people’ (Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon, 1999:1). As Crick claims, democracy is both ‘a sacred and promiscuous word… everyone claims her, but no one possesses her fully’ (Crick, 2007:240). Hence, it is useful to clarify the range of democratic theories relating to this discussion.

In Pateman’s democratic case for BI, she advances an understanding of democracy as primarily contingent upon the ‘capacity for individual autonomy and self-development’ (2004:91). While this conception will prove insightful, I have developed a more comprehensive account of democracy as the basis of this comparison between BI and UBS as I believe Pateman’s conception fails to fully capture the complex relationship between the state and citizens in modern democracies. I am cautious of aligning this account of democracy too closely to any one creed for fear of overlooking convergences between differing democratic theories. However, a number of conceptions of democracy are fundamentally opposed to both BI and UBS and thus need segregating from this discussion. Inspired by Dahl’s graphical approach to theorising democracy (1971), I have mapped out the relationship between state involvement in society on one axis, and citizen engagement in politics on the other (Figure 1). I have also plotted numerous democratic positions4_{to demonstrate their}

general theoretical proximity. Displaying the relationship between citizens and state in this way, I hope to separate certain, more radical, conceptions of democracy from this discussion and clarify the boundaries of this enquiry into the democratic claims of BI and UBS welfare proposals.

4_{The positioning of these democratic theories on Figure 1 is a rough approximation, designed for general context}

rather than scientific analysis. E is towards the limited citizen engagement end due to the ‘democratic deficit’ reasons outlined in the introduction.

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Figure 1.

As both BI and UBS proposals claim to be implementable now - evidenced by extensive reports charting their economic and political feasibility (Painter and Thoung, 2015; Reed and Lansley, 2016, 2019; IGP, 2017; Martinelli, 2017) - they see themselves as able to enhance existing democratic systems. The presence and prevalence of a state is inescapable in our modern world and all contemporary democracies operate with some model of state welfare. As such, the place and extent of state involvement forms a fundamental part of this enquiry and is thus justified as an axis. Theories of democracy situated towards the left extreme of the X axis, advocating either no or extremely limited state involvement, might include radical direct democracy (A), Marxist democracy (B) or libertarian democracy (C). Towards the right of the X axis, democratic theories accepting an unequivocal place for state involvement and, more specifically, the existence of a welfare state, might include variations of existing western liberal democracies (E), liberal democracy (F), republican democracy (G), social democracy (H), deliberative democracy (I) and parliamentary democracy (J). Whether we agree or disagree with the normative or descriptive aspects of any theory on the left of the X axis, we must exclude them from this discussion as a matter of relevance. BI and UBS seek to improve existing democratic political systems via mechanisms of the welfare state; they are not advancing idealistic, presently unachievable conceptions of what democracy should be. This is not to say that existing

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states aren’t faultless. But rather that, despite these shortcomings, there is still a central place for the state in creating conditions whereby democracy can flourish.

The extent of citizen engagement in politics forms our second axis as popular participation is prioritised by many democratic theories5_{, which reserve a central role for citizens in collectively}

determining the scope of their society and influencing the conditions of their existence. Indeed, the very etymology of democracy translates to ‘rule by the people’. Democracy requires what Crick terms an ‘active’ (2000; 2007) account of citizen engagement in processes of governance for two instrumental reasons. Firstly, in having ‘rule by the people’ as its central tenet, democratic legitimacy is directly contingent upon citizens’ active involvement in decision-making processes affecting their lives. Secondly, the quality and success of democratic policy relies on individuals’ behaviours and choices to be effective. As Kymlicka and Norman state, ‘attempts to create a fairer society will flounder if citizens are chronically intolerant of difference and generally lacking in a sense of justice’ (1994:360). Citizens active involvement in democratic processes helps increase awareness of the needs of different groups and the impacts of decisions. Individuals become more attuned to and invested in democratic outcomes and more inclined to practice the behaviours and uphold the values necessary for their success. As Barber claims, ‘community grows out of participation and at the same time makes participation possible; civic activity educates individuals how to think publicly and act as citizens... citizenship informs civic activity with the required sense of publicness and justice’ (1984:152).

To summarise thus far, we first established that democracy is an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Gallie, 1955). To define the boundaries of democracy that our welfare proposals operate within we delineated the presence and mechanisms of the state on the one hand, with the democratic aim of citizen engagement in politics on the other. If high citizen engagement is critical to the instrumental functioning of democracy, the ideal theory would be situated along the top-periphery of the top-right segment of our graph, as indicated by the red arrow (Figure 2). The question now is: what

5_{Excluding libertarian conceptions (C) of democracy or more minimalist theories (D) as advanced by Schumpeter}

(1942) who sees ‘little scope for democratic participation and individual collective development’ and considers democracy ‘at best a means of choosing decision-makers and curbing their excesses’ (Held, 2005:125).

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extent of state involvement is necessary to achieve the democratic aim of high citizen engagement in politics? To understand the relationship between these axis better and formulate a more concrete democratic framework for the basis of our comparison between BI and UBS, this paper will develop the notion of the ‘democratic duality’.

Figure 2.

The Democratic Duality

The phrase ‘democratic duality’ will be used to delineate the delicate relationship between the state and the citizen in a democratic polity; denoting the balance of conditions, actions, rights and obligations on the part of both to ensure that democracy functions. The notion of duality is drawn from Giddens’ ‘Structuration Theory’ (1984) in which he uses it to refer to the continuously active, mutually reinforcing relationship between social structure and individual agency in the constitution of society. According to Giddens, ‘we should see social life not as ‘society’ out there or the product of the ‘individual here’, but as a series of ongoing activities and practices that people carry on, which at the same time reproduce larger institutions’ (Giddens and Pierson, 1998:76). It is important to distinguish between a duality and a dualism (Giddens, 1984:xx-xxi). As Jackson outlines, a duality ‘resembles a dualism in that it retains two essential elements, but, unlike a dualism, the two elements are interdependent and no longer separate or opposed, even though they are conceptually distinct’

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(1999:549). Thus, we might think of the two elements of a duality as ‘different sides of the same coin’ (Ritzer and Goodman, 2003:510).

When conceptualising democracy, the notion of duality is salient in embodying the dynamic continuity between state and citizens in the ongoing production and reproduction of democratic society. The state must afford citizens equal democratic rights and ensure the minimum basic conditions necessary for adequate participation in decision-making in order for democracy to function. Citizens in a democratic polity must recognise these rights and act upon them. They must uphold their role in the decision-making process, recognise the importance of respecting democratically-reached decisions and reinforce the outcomes of democratic governance. In essence, the democratic duality consists of the state and citizens mutually upholding and enforcing the conditions whereby both can operate and function together democratically. To consider what these conditions, actions, rights and obligations may look like, this paper will explore the democratic citizenry and democratic state in turn.

The Democratic Citizenry

Since the time of the ancients, citizenship has meant ‘people acting together publicly and effectively to demonstrate common values and achieve common purposes’ (Crick, 2007:247). It can be viewed as comprised of three distinct dimensions: membership, legal status and rights, and activity (Honohan, 2017:9). Membership addresses issues such as legal requirements for acquiring citizenship, cultural dimensions of citizenship and processes of in and exclusion. However, given the complex, case-specific nature of such debates, this discussion of democratic citizenship will focus on the other two dimensions: legal status and rights and activity.

I. Legal Status and Rights

A number of common principles emerged in the early modern European city republics that are still cherished, at least in sentiment, as central to democratic governance today. The right to: vote in free and fair elections, run for office, free speech, due process, peaceful assembly and education are

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considered inalienable and are legally entrenched in all modern democracies. These rights often constitute the minimum conditions necessary for democracy6_{. However, for a democracy to properly}

function it is not enough that citizens merely possess these rights. They must understand them, respect them and use them effectively. As Kymlicka and Norman highlight, problems such as voter apathy, welfare dependency, far-right populism and multicultural tension demonstrate that the ‘health and stability of a modern democracy depends, not only on the justice of its ‘basic structure’ but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens’ (1994:352). Thus a crucial aspect of citizens’ democratic rights is the context within which they are enacted, including the extent of individual autonomy and the opportunities for self-government available in any democratic society.

Held (2006) places the importance of individual autonomy at the heart of his democratic interpretation. He outlines four democratic aspirations - the best circumstances for human development; protection from arbitrary power and coercion; citizens involvement in conditions of their association; and maximisation of available resources (Held, 2006:263) - the link between which is autonomy. Each aspiration presupposes the citizens capacity to ‘reason consciously, be self-reflective and be self-determining’ (2006:263). If everyone is inherently capable of acting appropriately, they should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly, equal obligations to deliberate and determine the conditions of their lives, so long as the rights of others are consistently upheld (Held, 2006:264)7_.

Pateman (2004) takes this argument further, articulating the democratic duality in claiming that it is not just about possessing autonomy, but rather exercising it within structures that actively promote it. As she explains, ‘self-government requires that individuals both go about their lives within democratic authority structures that enhance their autonomy and that they have the standing and are

6_{Other factors may also be considered paramount, depending on the democratic theory in question. For}

instance, republican conceptions would emphasise the right to non-domination (Pettit, 1999).

7_{The broad nature of this definition of autonomy has the potential to be manipulated in ableist ways, excluding,}

for instance, individuals with cognitive or even physical disabilities from being understood as equal political participants. I do not support this interpretation and believe all individuals, under the right democratic conditions, are capable, equal political participants that deserve adequate circumstances to enable their individual participation.

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able (have the opportunities and means) to enjoy and safeguard their freedom’ (Pateman, 2004:91). Only under these conditions can democratic rights become meaningful. The importance of individual self-government is often ‘overshadowed by collective (national) self-government’ (Pateman, 2004:91) as democracy is primarily aligned with more public rights, such as the right to vote in free and fair elections. However, as Kymlicka and Norman (1994) allude to, the ability to adequately access and use these rights is essential to their functioning and thus exercising individual autonomy and achieving self-government is the first step to enacting other democratic rights. Pateman’s argument here is important to note as it forms the basis of her democratic case in favour of BI, to be subsequently explored.

II. Citizen Activity - Participation

This right to conditions that enable individual autonomy, and subsequently, the achievement of more formal democratic rights, informs the second aspect of democratic citizenship - activity.Participation is so integral to the concept of democracy that a whole branch of theory defends its centrality, developing methods through which it might be increased or improved (Pateman, 1976; Barber, 1984; Bachrach and Botwinick, 1992). I wish to distinguish a more socially-guided notion of ‘civic engagement’ (Putnam, 2001) from formal and informal politically-focused participation. While high civic engagement is beneficial for self-development and community cohesion, the extent of the democratic deficit in many western democracies also invites a consideration of how improved state welfare might facilitate political participation. Indeed, we must avoid absolving the state of the responsibility to ensure adequate conditions of participation by over-emphasising the democratic potential of civil society (Young, 1999). ‘Civil society alone cannot do the major work of… ensuring investment in needs, infrastructure, education and training enough to support self-development for everyone’ (Young, 1999:158).

Formal participation has an institutional focus, including actions such as voting in elections and political party or trade union membership. Informal participation entails activity which seeks to better understand and impact upon policy and political change - for instance, protesting, pressure

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groups, social movements, citizens juries, focus groups, petitions, debates, online activism and political consumerism. While equally important, the formal/informal distinction becomes necessary when relating back to the two instrumental reasons why participation is central to democracy: quantity of participation ensures democratic legitimacy while quality of participation is necessary for successful implementation of policy and the promotion of values needed for democratic stability.

Regarding quantity, this may be best fulfilled by more formal political participation - by exercising your right to vote and actively supporting political parties. Such participation is widely accessible, easily quantifiable and has, generally, come to eclipse most other forms of participation in discussions about contemporary democratic governance. However, taking high turnout or strong party membership as a sign of functioning democracy is inadequate if taken alone, as it fails to account for the second instrumental reason why active participation is essential to democracy. Access to informal participation would ensure people have as much chance of involvement in processes of governance, deliberation and policy formulation as possible; which is important for three reasons. First, citizens must understand how power functions to be attuned to different interests and respecting of other’s needs, so that democratic outcomes are adequately considered, and democratic values and behaviours are cultivated. Second, informal participation reinforces the credibility of formal participation, improving democratic accountability. One would be ‘better able to assess the performance of representatives’, ‘better equipped to take decisions of national scope’ and ‘better able to weigh up the impact of decisions taken by national representatives’ (Pateman, 1976:45). Third, focussing on education, debate, activism and interaction with political issues, informal participation has great potential for self-development (Honohan, 2017:11). As Barber emphasises, through such action ‘politics becomes its own university, citizenship its own training ground and participation its own tutor’ (1984:152). Through also prioritising informal participation, democratic governance stands a better chance at becoming self-sustaining - it ‘develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the more individuals participate, the better able they become to do so’ (Pateman, 1976:41).

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In sum, democratic citizens possess a number of rights - to vote, run for office, free speech, due process, peaceful assembly and education. To ensure these are adequately realised, a democratic state must protect and enhance the individual’s right to autonomy and self-government - both types of rights must be accounted for in the democratic duality. Alongside this exists an obligation for citizens to participate in democratic processes so as to uphold the political framework. As both formal and informal participation is essential to a functioning democracy, the facilitation of both will be a crucial factor to account for when considering the extent to which BI and UBS enhance democracy.

The Democratic State

Having considered the citizen, we must now explore the flip-side of the democratic coin and address the state. Skinner defines the state as ‘a locus of power distinct from either the ruler or the body of the people’ (1978:355). An arbiter of interests, it seeks to articulate popular will, provide stability and protection from threat and create the conditions whereby people can realise freedoms, practice autonomy and achieve their potential. In a democracy, the state’s main roles consist of enforcing democratic rights and ensuring the necessary conditions for active citizenship. Citizens must ‘enjoy a range of rights’ in principle and practice and ‘have the actual capacity (the health, education, skills and resources) to take advantage of the opportunities before them’ (Held, 2006:227-228). Indeed, the question persistently posed is: how can democratic citizenship be realised under conditions of increasing social and economic inequality (Honohan, 2017:22)?

To delineate the scope of the democratic state we must first define the political. Historically, politics has been associated with the public domain; with formal rights, institutional mechanisms, public bodies and action in communal spaces. This is important to democratic theory as the public realm is a ‘neutral’, shared territory; a space for active citizenship and political participation. However, if democratic rights are to be actualised and active participation successful, the many ways personal and private circumstances determine access to this sphere must be politically recognised. Championing the slogan ‘the personal is the political’ (Hanisch, 1969), second-wave feminists drew

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attention to the ways private subordination is detrimental to the public realm. Indeed, ‘the meaning of the civil freedom of public life is thrown into relief when counterposed to the natural subjection that characterises the private realm’ (Pateman, 1988:11). If society prioritises the action of some over others by excluding them from public citizenship, then democracy has failed.

We can extrapolate this insight to account for a range of subjugating forces that confine social groups and diminish the quality of democracy. Indeed, Young outlines ‘five faces of oppression’ (1990), exposing the multiple, insidious ways oppression manifests. Exploitation occurs through the labour, energy and wealth of one group being continuously used to benefit another (Young, 1990:278-279). Marginalisation refers to the people the system of labour cannot or will not use, who are ‘expelled from useful participation’ in society and resultantly ‘subjected to severe material deprivation’ (Young, 1990:279). Powerlessness regards how norms of respectability - including dress, speech, tastes and demeanour - are associated with professional culture. Those excluded from this realm lack the ‘authority, status and sense of self’ (Young, 1990:280) accompanying professionalism and are socio-culturally shunned. Cultural imperialism involves the ‘universalisation of a dominant groups experience and culture, and its establishment as norm’ (Young, 1990:281), diminishing other cultures in the process. Finally, Young acknowledges the threat and experience of systemic violence as many live ‘with the knowledge that they must fear random, unprovoked attacks… which have no motive but to damage, humiliate, or destroy the person’ (1990:281). When assessing the democratic claims of BI and UBS, we must consider which proposal might advance a situation whereby non-participation in democracy is not affected or caused by any of these faces of oppression.

With the scope of politics established and the reality of repression outlined, it is clear that social and economic inequalities expose a malaise in democracy. They threaten its instrumental functioning by constraining opportunities for democratic participation and undermining the popular basis of democratic legitimacy. Historically, the state has sought to address debilitating inequality via economic redistribution and social security. However, the welfare policies of many democratic states

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‘fall far short of… setting conditions so that everyone is able to develop and exercise capacities’ (Young, 1999:159). While specific necessary provisions depend upon socio-political contexts, some broader conditions can be identified as indispensable to democracy. This list is by no means exhaustive, but certainly provides a starting point for assessing the capacity of BI and UBS to enhance democracy.

Firstly, we might consider the basic physical and material conditions necessary for free, equal, easy access to opportunities for participation. This includes adequate subsistence through access to food and shelter and the physical capacity to participate through necessities like time and transport. Individuals may require these in different capacities and adequate support mechanisms, for instance disabled access or childcare support, must ensure everyone is equally physically capable of participating. Secondly, adequate knowledge conditions are essential to ensure a high-quality, self-sustaining democratic process. These include free and equal access to adequate education; balanced, accurate, accessible information regarding issues of political concern; and fair conditions of deliberation involving, at minimum, non-domination and freedom of speech. Thirdly, the constitutional conditions necessary for democracy might include: the legal entrenchment of democratic rights; checks and balances to state power; conditions of government transparency and evidence of effective participation to demonstrate the success of democratic processes.

To help conceptualise how these basic democratic state conditions might relate to the rights and obligations of citizens, we can collate them in a flow chart mapping the features of the democratic duality (Figure 3).

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The yellow boxes refer to state obligations in the democratic duality while the blue boxes depict citizen obligations. The green arrows represent their dynamic interrelation. Without adequate conditions afforded by the state, citizens would be unable to fulfil their role in the democratic duality. Likewise, without autonomous citizens practicing their democratic rights and participating in political processes, the democratic state would fail to enforce genuinely democratic decisions and its power and policies would lack legitimacy. With this democratic duality framework established, we can now turn to address the proposals.

2. THE PROPOSALS: BASIC INCOME AND UNIVERSAL BASIC SERVICES

Introduction to Basic Income

As with democracy, an ‘intriguing aspect of basic income is its capacity to secure support from across the ideological spectrum’ (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004:226). Espoused by radical-left and far-right alike, proposals for its implementation are many and varied, resulting in confusion as to what BI proponents stand for. Furthermore, a multitude of terms are used interchangeably: from ‘Universal’ Basic Income to Citizens Income, Social Dividend, Basic Income Guarantee or Demogrant (Piachaud, 2018:300). Addressing such uncertainties, this section will begin with a broad definition of BI and brief exploration of some core features, from which we will delineate a more specific definition, applicable to the aims of this paper.

Defining Basic Income

Van Parijs, a prominent advocate of BI and co-founder of Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), defines BI as: ‘an income paid by a political community to all its members on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement’ (2004:8). How this translates into actual policy, however, is widely interpreted and largely ambiguous. Defining the boundaries of the BI debate, De Wispelaere and

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Stirton (2004) delineate six core ‘dimensions’ - universality, individuality, conditionality, uniformity, frequency and modality - all of which vary between proposals due to differing socio-political contexts.

Universality refers to the extent of the population covered by a policy (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004:267). BI proposals aspire to full universality and some, such as the Alaska Permanent Fund, have achieved such - all Alaskan residents over 18 that have lived there for at least one year8

are entitled to the Permanent Fund (Berman, 2018:161). However, often BI pilot programmes and research trials require multiple test groups (Arnold, 2018:627) and lack adequate funding, resulting in necessarily selective recipient conditions. Conditionality may further vary in relation to different citizen groups, such as children, pensioners or inmates.

Individuality is the ‘unit’ at which BI is directed. An important aspect of BI is that it is ‘routinely advocated as a form of income support that caters to individuals’ (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004:267) as opposed to households or families. This position, however, has attracted criticism as some BI advocates (Martinelli, 2017) highlight the potential for individuality to worsen income inequality due to the economic benefits of cohabitation. In his simulation of a BI in Finland9_{, Martinelli}

discovered that 65% of pensioner couples would gain financially, whereas 76% of lone pensioners would lose (2017: Table 3). Likewise, 85% of couples with children would profit, whereas 69% of single parents would lose out (2017: Table 3). Thus BI advocates such as Martinelli, would argue instead for adjustments accounting for living situations that might disadvantage vulnerable individuals.

Conditionality addresses the conditions built into a BI that may restrict a person’s eligibility. As De Wispelaere and Stirton outline, BI is distinctive in being ‘purportedly unconditional or… only employs conditions that do not violate the programmes inclusiveness’ (20014:268). The latter may arise, for instance, in order to increase political support for BI proposals, as is the case with Atkinson’s ‘Participation Income’ (1996).

8_{And has not been absent from the State for more than 180 days per calendar year (Berman, 2018:161).} 9_{Set at the level of existing benefits.}

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Uniformity considers the extent to which all eligible receive a similar level of benefit (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004:269). This implies the level of income aspired to or the favoured outcomes of a BI programme, which may vary from a small top-up to ensured subsistence and may either supplement existing welfare or replace it entirely. Further differences in uniformity may arise for reasons such as disability requirements or even differences in regional cost of living.

Frequency refers to how often BI payments are administered. In the late 1990’s, proposals for a ‘Capital Grant’ or ‘Stake’ (Ackerman and Alstott, 2000) emerged, advocating a one-off lump-sum, administered when the recipient reaches a certain age. However, such ideas have since been rejected by BI proponents who favour a more regular income stream of weekly, fortnightly or monthly payments; each of which has differing merits (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004:270).

Finally, modality refers to the form a BI transfer takes. While almost always monetary, there are multiple forms cash transfers may take - for instance, cheque, debit card with automatic top-up or refundable tax credit - which each have implications for accessibility (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004:270).

As evidenced in these examples, variations upon the core dimensions of BI often arise due to implementation constraints or differences in policy objectives (Piachaud, 2018:301). This latter point is relevant as we are focusing on the democratic merits of BI as opposed to, for instance, its strengths as a means of tackling poverty. Thus, for this discussion, a definition of BI as a means of enhancing democracy must be advanced. This is best captured by Goodhart, who defines basic income as:

‘an unconditional social transfer set at a level that assures every citizen subsistence. It is payable to all individuals regardless of their economic means, family or employment status, willingness to seek paid work or accept jobs, or any other status or requirement’ (2008:139). This definition emphasises universality, strict individuality and complete unconditionality. Regarding uniformity, the central emphasis is on being adequate for subsistence; it must be ‘sufficient for a modest but decent standard of life’ (Pateman, 2004:93). This is, arguably, the most important feature of this definition of BI as the ambitious achievement of subsistence for all is where the potential for

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democratic social transformation arises. This BI definition ‘makes subsistence a core entitlement of citizenship’ (Goodhart, 2008:139); it ‘is not just another idea for rejigging the existing system’, it is ‘a different way of relating individual to society’ (Barry, 1997:161). Details of frequency are unclear, however Pateman favours regular payments as opposed to a Capital Grant (2004:90). Finally, modality is also undefined, however inclusivity and accessibility would undoubtedly be prioritised.

In sum, BI advocacy is broad and varied and its core dimensions may differ based on overall aims, policy design and context-specific application. Despite this, these dimensions provide a framework for understanding BI, anchoring Goodhart’s (2008:139) definition which will serve as the basis of the case espousing the democratic potential of BI.

Introduction to Universal Basic Services

UBS is a newly developed proposal championed by the Institute for Global Prosperity (IGP) whose Social Prosperity Network Report (2017) details their radical vision of future welfare as the provision of seven basic services free and unconditional, at the point of need, for any member of society. Using the UK as their blueprint, the IGP seek to prove that ‘we can have a modern welfare state for the 21st century and we can afford to pay for it’ (Moore, 2017:6). They believe the state has a responsibility to invest in its citizens and that adequate welfare provisions have the potential to ‘make accessible a life that includes participation, builds belonging and common purpose and… strengthens the cohesion of society as a whole’ (Moore, 2017:6). To acquaint ourselves with the proposal, this section will define UBS, discuss its aims and then explore the services and features it entails.

What Are Universal Basic Services? UBS is defined as:

‘the provision of free public services, as can be afforded from a reasonable tax on incomes, to enable every citizen’s safety, opportunity and participation’ (Universal Basic Services, 2019:Home).

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The IGP set out the seven basic services deemed ‘the most fundamental building blocks for life required by every citizen in the 21st century’ (Moore, 2017:6): healthcare, education, democracy and legal services, shelter, food, transport and information (IGP, 2017:2). If the implementation of these services were to be successful, UBS could be extrapolated to include additional provisions, such as social care (Percy, 2018a) or clothing (Percy, 2018b).

UBS returns to first principles, viewing citizenship as the achievement of three core goals (Leicester, 2018:Para 7). Firstly, the material safety of each citizen is foundational to all other conditions and is essential for achieving the most basic, decent standard of living (Percy, 2017:11). Secondly, every citizen must have ‘the opportunity to use their own efforts to make personal contributions to their society’ (Percy, 2017:11). Thirdly, ensuring opportunities for all to participate in society is both critical and ‘necessary to the functioning of our democratic political system’ (Percy, 2017:11). Taken together, these goals constitute the criteria for determining which services UBS must prioritise, as exemplified in Table 1 (IGP, 2017:11).

Table 1.

As Portes posits, the implementation of these services, selected with the aim of ensuring safety, opportunity and participation, will help us communicate better, participate more fully, get and sustain better jobs, give us choice in how to participate in the labour market and generally make us wealthier (in Journalista, 2017:0;20-0:43).

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The Basic Services

The services are divisible into two main categories - existing public services and services requiring implementation. Healthcare, education and legal and democratic services constitute the former as these are universally available and free at the point of need for British citizens via the NHS, state education system, universal suffrage and legal aid. While these provisions are far from perfect, the necessary state infrastructure for their delivery is in place. As Portes outlines, ‘ensuring the services that people need to be able to participate in society are available to everybody, that is absolutely not a new idea… the question is, as the economy and society changes, do the types of services also need to change’ (in Miliband and Lloyd, 2018: 23:23-23:39).

The social value gleaned from these existing services, and the need to modernise welfare provisions inspired the second category of services: shelter, food, transport and information. These are presently either state-provided, but limited and conditional, or are not typically considered the states responsibility. However, given their roles in securing safety, opportunity and participation, these must be ‘elevated to more fully-fledged basic services’, to ‘reap the maximum returns’ (Percy, 2017:11). The projected costs, economic feasibility and required political will necessary for the implementation of all these services is detailed in the IGP’s report (2017). However, a brief overview of the services requiring implementation will now be outlined.

The desperate need for shelter isn’t a new or surprising claim. Many developed countries face drastic increases in housing-costs, with rising market values, fewer able to enter the property ladder and sharp increases in homelessness. To tackle these problems, the IGP advocate a radical expansion in housing provisions10_{. They advance the case for a significant expansion of housing units (1.5 million}

in the UK), offered on a need basis at zero rent with council tax exemptions and a utilities allowance to help cover the cost of basic bills (Percy, 2017:12).

10 _{A similar approach is presently being trialled in Finland through their ‘Housing First’ programme which}

prioritises the provision of social housing as a precondition for social (re)integration. Since the implementation of this programme, Finland has been the only EU country where homelessness is declining (Grey, 2018).

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Food insecurity would be reduced by extending community food programmes, including food banks, free school meals and ‘meals on wheels’ (Percy, 2017:12). Critics of this question the number of individuals likely to use these services despite not needing them. However, Moore disputes this, claiming that while partly inevitable, people who can afford food often don’t use food banks as they recognise their value for those less fortunate (in Miliband and Lloyd, 2018: 8:36-8:55). Thus, food services would become self-selecting, available as a fall-back for those in need.

With transport, the objective is to provide ‘free local public transport services that enable citizens and residents access to jobs, education, health care and participate fully in their community’ (Percy, 2017:12). This would be achieved through extending free bus passes - as available in many developed countries for senior citizens - to people of all ages. By increasing mobilisation and access, universal basic transport serves as a critical link between all the basic services.

The most unique proposal advanced under UBS is the universal accessibility of information. Promoting digital inclusion, this provision would include a basic phone, internet connection and TV license (Percy, 2017:12) for all. This is estimated to be the most expensive additional service, which they justify based on the unequivocal centrality of technology in modern society and its role in perpetuating new conditions of social inequality. As Portas explains, most high-paying jobs couldn’t function without a smartphone so ‘why should we expect anyone else to find, get and hold down a decent job, develop themselves and look for alternatives and opportunities if they don’t have a smartphone’ (in Miliband and Lloyd, 2018: 25:13-25:30).

To design and deliver the services, the IGP proposes and financially accounts for the creation of a whole new level of local government apparatus. In the UK, this would include 650 new local assemblies, 25 elected members per constituency and 2 administrators per elected representative (Reed and Percy, 2017:53). These bodies would have direct democratic control over the administration of UBS funds. This devolution would be significant in ‘restoring power, money and control back to democratic institutions closest to the citizens they serve’ (Percy, 2018c:para 4). Notably, this could provide significant scope for regional specificity in service provisions based upon demand, population

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needs and geographical variation. ‘While with some existing universal services... there is a strong public view that quality of service and access to services should be broadly uniform, that need not be the case for all’ (Portes, 2017:24).

A further noteworthy feature of UBS is the ‘social wage’ - ‘the value of public services to an individual citizen, expressed as a replacement for financial income’ (Percy, 2017:14). In essence, this refers to the weekly savings - that would have been spent on the basic services now provided - subsequently accessible as disposable income. This is hailed one of the more progressive aspects of UBS as the benefits of the social wage would only apply to those using the services. Thus, ‘it delivers where it really matters… it puts money back in people’s pockets by not extracting it in the first place’ (Moore in Miliband and Lloyd, 2018: 12:29-12:49).

In sum, UBS entails the delivery of three existing unconditional services (health, education, legal and democracy) with the implementation of an additional four (shelter, food, transport, information) financed through taxation and delivered by a newly created layer of democratic governance. As the IGP argue, ‘universally available public services have the potential to provide the flexible, need specific and responsive support that could affordably replace much of the current conditional benefits system while also preserving the value of remuneration, conforming with public attitudes, and building social institutional fabric at the same time’ (Percy, 2017:10).

3. WHICH RADICAL WELFARE PROPOSAL BEST ENHANCES DEMOCRACY?

An important distinction between the proposals is that a concrete democratic case for BI has already been advanced, whereas the democratic claims made by UBS are more akin to general sentiments, yet to be formalised. As such, this section will start by outlining the arguments made for BI’s capacity to enhance democracy. Following this, a critical assessment of these ideas will be undertaken, alongside a consideration of the strengths of UBS and its potential to remedy the problems BI is purported to face. This will provide the basis from which we can construct the democratic case for

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UBS. Drawing upon the democratic duality framework developed in the first section, the democratic case for UBS will argue for its prioritisation over BI as a more democratically viable radical welfare proposal striving for implementation.

The Democratic Case for Basic Income

While BI and democracy are often semantically aligned, Pateman (2003; 2004) formulates the most concrete democratic case for BI which Goodhart (2008) further develops. Central to Pateman’s case is an understanding of democracy as entailing individual autonomy and the capacity for self-government (2004:91). To recap, it is not about individuals acting upon private interests or the state dictating conditions of association, but rather focuses on the state’s role in creating conditions whereby individuals are best facilitated to access, enjoy and safeguard their freedoms (Pateman, 2004:91). This is where BI enters this discussion. Indeed, Pateman (2003;2004) outlines two core ways a basic income administered to all, unconditionally and set at a level ensuring minimum subsistence would have important consequences for democratisation.

Firstly, BI ‘would allow individuals more easily to leave or refuse to enter relationships that violate individual self-government or involve unsafe, unhealthy or demeaning conditions’ (Pateman, 2004:65). This argument has also been articulated as ‘endowing the weakest with bargaining power’ (Van Parijs, 2004:16), however this wording is problematic, suggesting persisting relations of domination and subordination. As Pateman explains, BI isn’t about affording individuals some leverage but rather empowering them with democratic citizenship (2004:65); removing the economic dimension of structural subordination that limits self-government and constrains social participation. Referring back to Young’s five faces of oppression (1990), a subsistence-level BI may liberate individuals from exploitation by creating the income stability necessary to seek better, fairer conditions of employment. Furthermore, a BI may protect against violence, freeing those trapped in abusive relationships by providing them the financial support needed for independent subsistence. Without the guaranteed monetary safety net that BI provides to subjugated groups, other democratic

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rights - such as education, participation, personal security or freedom of expression - are jeopardised (Goodhart, 2008:150). Thus, it is argued that if a subsistence-level BI were introduced, it would break persisting undemocratic relations of economic dependency by providing the personal income security and guaranteed subsistence that would allow individuals to survive, participate and develop autonomously as equal democratic citizens.

The second argument highlights the benefits of ‘breaking the longstanding link between income and employment’ (Pateman, 2003:90). This would have two democratic benefits. First, it would separate social entitlement from labour, endowing all with the ‘freedom not to be employed’ (Pateman, 2004:92). As mentioned, this would provide the security necessary for individuals to escape exploitative working relationships. Beyond this, however, uncoupling income and employment has the potential to break down the broader, structural systems of subordination implicit in, and reproduced by, the centrality of labour as a social institution; the rules, habits, behaviours and expectations associated with work which favour dominant social groups. This argument, amongst others11_{, forms the crux of the feminist case for BI. As McKay outlines, ‘the value placed on}

employment in modern capitalist societies derives from patriarchal structures and serves to constrain the choices of many women’ (2001:99). To female subordination we might add further gender-based, class-based, racial and ableist exclusion. Separating the right to subsistence and independent income from the labour market, BI would overcome the marginalisation face of oppression (Young, 1990), elevating groups that are systematically excluded from the traditional labour market from conditions of material deprivation. A further feminist argument highlights the economic rewards BI gives to important contributions that are persistently unrecognised in a society where ‘only paid employment [is] seen as ‘work’’ (Pateman, 2004:98). Indeed, BI ‘acknowledges and provides support for the mass of unpaid work, disproportionately undertaken by women in childcare, care for the elderly and

11_{Other arguments put forward as part of a feminist case for BI include its capacity for: ‘strengthening family}

life; improving work incentives and incentives to invest in human capital; securing financial independence within families; and providing the basis for a more equal sharing of domestic responsibilities betwen men and women’ (McKay, 2001:103).

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voluntary help in the wider community’ (Reed and Lansley, 2016:10). This would enhance democracy by promoting the importance of undervalued contributions, thus deconstructing the undemocratic narratives that restrict equal-citizenship and individual autonomy.

The second democratic benefit of breaking the link between income and employment acknowledges the flexibility, time and energy individuals would gain to engage in pursuits with the potential for autonomous self-development. With the financial security afforded by a BI, one might ‘go back to school, retrain for a new occupation or open a business... learn to surf, write or paint [or] devote themselves to family life’ (Pateman, 2004:96-97). A BI may also make low-paid or voluntary positions in socially valuable jobs more viable and attractive (Pateman, 2003:141). A guaranteed standard of living would, arguably, spur individual creativity (Painter and Thoung, 2015), encourage self-flourishing and greater participation in social and political life, and strengthen both the quality and quantity of democracy. This view is premised upon ‘a belief in the best of people, that they want to and can contribute in a huge variety of ways and will flourish into so much more than worker ants and turbo-consumers’ (Reed and Lansley, 2016:13) if given the opportunity.

As part of the democratic case for BI, Pateman (2003; 2004), Goodhart (2008), and others (De Wispelaere and Morales, 2016; Pettit, 2007; Standing, 2002), advance a case for instituting BI as an entrenched democratic right. Pateman (2004:93-94) views the guarantee of subsistence and security afforded by BI as foundational to enabling citizens to participate fully, extensively and autonomously in the life of their society. Given its pivotal role in the democratic polity, a BI should be adequately recognised, protected and entrenched in the same way that similar democratic rights presently are. To ground this point, Pateman draws a link between BI and universal suffrage, quoting Marshall who states: ‘to have to bargain for a living wage in a society which accepts the living wage as a social right is as absurd as to have to haggle for a vote in a society which accepts the vote as a political right’ (Marshall, 1963:116). De Wispelaere and Morales (2016) advance a more instrumental argument, stating that granting BI rights status ‘has the crucial implication that it shifts the burden of proof onto

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those failing to institute the relevant legal right’ (2016:921). Thus, it would hold the state accountable and ensure it fulfils its obligations within the democratic duality.

To summarise, the democratic case for BI consists of the following arguments. Firstly, it has the capacity to free individuals from relationships of economic dependency by affording them the financial means for equal democratic citizenship. Secondly, it breaks the link between income and employment which has two important consequences: I.) it empowers those excluded from traditional structures of work and acknowledges contributions that are undervalued by presently undemocratic institutions and II.) it provides the freedom and ‘power to say yes to activities that are poorly paid or not paid at all but are nonetheless attractive in themselves’ (Van Parijs, 2013:174). Referring back to the democratic duality framework (Figure 3), BI has the potential to enhance democracy via the opportunities it provides for increased individual autonomy and self-government, and the time, flexibility and stability it creates for engaging in more formal and informal means of participation. Furthermore, in hailing BI as a democratic right, their case seeks to update the minimum constitutional conditions necessary for a democracy and increase mechanisms of democratic accountability.

Assessing the Democratic Case for Basic Income

While these arguments are compelling and show parallels with the democratic duality framework, they are not without criticism. This paper will now turn to address the drawbacks that hinder the advancement of democracy and assess them alongside the provisions of UBS.

Responding to the first argument - BI can free individuals from relationships of economic dependency - one might posit that provision of a monetary income seems like an illogical way of decreasing the dominance of economic relations in society. As Panitch outlines, being issued as a cash transfer, ‘it would effectively reinforce market dependency by making it necessary for citizens to enter the market in order to satisfy their basic needs’ (2011:940). While some financial dependency may be reduced, individuals would have to contend with new relations of economic subordination. For instance, a guaranteed higher minimum income level may lead to more expensive food, increasing

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rent prices and rising fuel costs affecting public transport and amenities; all of which minimise the autonomy and economic freedom a BI claims to impart. Furthermore, Lavinas (2018) reports that a BI distributed to those whose basic needs are unmet effectively ‘feed[s] them into a global debt machine’ as recipients ‘leverage future incomes to meet basic needs in the present’ and ‘finance operators extend credit on the basis of a state-guaranteed future income stream’ (in Percy, 2019:Para 4). This could be minimised by increasing state intervention in the economy through price fixing and the imposition of controls on the movement of capital, but such provisions have yet to enter the mainstream of the BI debate.

Similarly, the idea that the link between income and employment would be broken by a BI is misguided, as individuals would still be dependent on the productivity that delivers subsistence as commodified objects and services. Indeed, ‘work and subsistence do not simply exist as a bipolar relationship that can be easily broken without wider ramifications but are embedded within much wider structures of power and social reproduction’ (Pitts, Lombardozzi and Warner, 2017:16). As such, while a BI might liberate some from personal relations of economic dependency, all citizens may become increasingly subject to the unpredictability of market interests. Likewise, individuals remain dependent on the centrality of production and its accompanying employment structures. Thus, a BI might be less effective in increasing financial independence, and hence promoting individual autonomy, as it first seems.

The service-based focus of UBS goes a significant way to overcoming this economic problem. A safety-net of the seven public services would provide similar conditions of security and stability that BI seeks to. Thus, UBS also has the potential to liberate individuals from relationships of economic dependency. Not only this, UBS would further ensure that the subsistence of society’s most vulnerable isn’t threatened by private market interests as a basic standard of living would be secured by the state. One criticism against UBS might attack the paternalism inherent in the provision of services which undermines the trust endowed in individuals by BI proponents to prioritise their own interests. However, the ‘social wage’ overcomes this, increasing the financial freedom and autonomy of the

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individual who now has the capacity to spend this money on pursuits besides a basic social existence - citizens gain ‘meaningful agency’ rather than mere ‘consumer agency’ (Percy, 2019:Para 7). In short, the service-orientation of UBS can enhance the economic independence of individuals and endow them with conditions of more equal citizenship, as can a BI. Not only this, UBS may also overcome the threats posed by market dependency that a BI may expose individuals to.

A second criticism of the democratic case for BI addresses the feminist argument implicit in the ‘freedom not to be employed’ (Pateman, 2004:92) which emphasises BI’s capacity to overcome undemocratic social narratives by remunerating traditionally unpaid roles. While this could ‘shake things up’ by ‘offering both men and women the opportunity to… reorient their relationship to their jobs and households accordingly’ (Weeks in Cruz, 2016:Para 15), under current cultural conditions, those most likely to withdraw from the labour market are women (Bergmann, 2004:116). Hence, BI might instead entrench gendered social expectations that view women as mothers, carers and secondary earners and men as subjects of the workforce (Roebyns, 2001:103). Empirical studies by Kesenne (1990) and Nelissen and Polk (1995) both found that a BI makes women want to work less and in the ‘Mincome’ BI experiments in Canada, ‘female spouses reduced their hours and re-entered the workforce less quickly after a break’ (Forget, 2011:286). Besides reinforcing traditional heteropatriarchal expectations, this shift may disproportionately affect women choosing to pursue careers, creating a triple disincentive whereby their ‘work-load increases’, they are ‘extra taxed to pay for the housewife’s wage’ and they ‘do not receive allowance for the household work they perform’ (Roebyns, 2011:95) as they likely pay more in taxes than they receive as BI. Thus, a BI might hinder democracy by reversing previous gains made by women in the workplace by financially reinforcing women’s place in the private sphere. ‘In a society that is not neutral, most obviously on gender grounds, BI will not be neutral either… people’s behaviours decisions and choices will continue to be structured by existing inequalities, institutions and social norms’ (Sage and Diamond, 2017:28).

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The second point associated with the ‘freedom to not be employed’ (Pateman, 2004:92) emphasises the opportunities a BI presents for engaging in voluntary, leisure or political pursuits and the benefits this may endow on the quality of democratic relations. However, critics attack the optimism of this argument, claiming that if given this freedom, people would opt out of employment altogether. Indeed, ‘proponents of UBI describe a utopian society where people would voluntarily do socially useful things, from caring to canal clearing. Yet it is hard to believe that many wouldn’t choose to sit back, relax and tune into daytime television’ (Cruddas and Kibasi, 2016:Para 16). While citizens would ‘be better off working than out of work’ (Van Parijs, 2004:13), a BI makes free-riding on other people’s efforts easy and without consequence. When advocates of BI like Van Parijs (1991) defend the right of the ‘Malibu surfer’ to receive a BI to support a life of leisure with no intention of productive contribution to society, one can see how a BI might encourage passivity, individuality and atomisation as opposed to the values of collectivity, mutual respect and participation that democracy depends upon.

Whether BI has an impact on employment levels or not, a further argument here addresses the value of reciprocity in most modern democracies. Indeed, welfare is closely tied to ideas of deservingness, defined by either need or reward for contribution (Van Oorschot, 2006), and for many, work is valued for the moral and social benefits it brings to society. The problem with BI is that by being unconditional and divorced from the willingness of the able to work, it ‘promotes freedom without responsibility and thereby both offends and undermines the ideal of social obligation that undergirds the welfare state’ (Anderson, 2000:Para 4). In addition, ‘it would depress the willingness to produce and pay taxes of those who resent having to support them’ (Anderson, 2000:Para 4); instilling social divides that threaten the cohesion of democratic society. For a BI to gain genuine democratic support, it should aim to complement the cherished social narratives about work and reward that presently predominate, rather than wholly undermine them.

Pateman makes a crucial contribution in drawing attention to the need for a ‘critical reassessment of the mutually reinforcing structures of marriage, employment and citizenship’

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(2004:97). However, her attempts to divorce income and employment are not entirely convincing. By seeking, instead, to uncouple subsistence from income and employment, UBS overcomes BI’s problems by retaining the financial incentive to work, upholding notions of economic reciprocity and recognising the social and moral benefits the institution of work can bring. This isn’t to say that employment structures aren’t still undemocratic, but rather that providing everyone with the income necessary to abstain from work would not adequately overcome issues of gender inequality which run deeper than mere financial dependency (which a BI may be unable to avoid anyway). By securing a basic subsistence for all and freeing up the social wage, UBS would still provide support to presently undervalued social contributions. However, UBS would simultaneously complement traditional work structures, preserving the advances made by women in the workplace and retaining the financial incentives necessary to avoid increases in unemployment and excessive free-riding. The security and flexibility provided by the safety-net of services would also be complementary to other purposeful activity, providing the same opportunities for citizens to engage in self-developing voluntary, leisure, creative or political pursuits as would a BI. By building on, improving and extending current western welfare models, UBS would also be more closely aligned with public attitudes to citizens’ rights and responsibilities than a BI, and thus it is likely to be more democratically accepted and politically sustainable over the medium term (Portes, 2017:24).

Before formulating the democratic case for UBS, some further criticisms of BI can be used to draw attention to a further way that UBS might be more successful at enhancing democracy than BI. One critique attacks the high, if not unrealistic, cost of implementing an adequate subsistence-level income and questions its priorities in being provided to even the richest members of society. Advocates of BI are quick to defend the egalitarianism of this form of unconditional universality, arguing that the richest will pay more than they receive and thus it is the principle of fairness that is important. However, this results in a highly inefficient process of ‘churning’ whereby money is

Basic income or universal basic services : which radical welfare proposal best enhances democracy?