Think Tanks: EU funding and policy advice

Master Thesis

Think Tanks: EU funding and policy advice

Universiteit Leiden

Date: 11/06/2019 Name: Sophie Zwaan Student Number: s1526502 Supervisor: Dr. J. Christensen Second reader: Dr. B. Fraussen Master Thesis Public Administration

Table of contents

Chapter 1 Introduction

p. 3

Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

p. 6

Literature Review p. 6

Theoretical Framework p. 9

Expectations p. 12

Conceptualization p. 14

Chapter 3 Research Design and Methods

p. 16

Causal Mechanisms p. 16

Research Design p. 16

Most Similar Systems Design p. 16

Cases p. 19

Research Method p. 20

Document Analysis p. 21

Operationalization p. 24

Chapter 4 Empirical Analysis

p. 26

Notre Europe/Institut Jacques Delors p. 26

Migration Policy p. 26

EU-China Relations p. 30

Cohesion Policy p. 31

European Council on Foreign Relations p. 35

Migration Policy p. 35

EU-China Relations p. 38

Cohesion Policy p. 40

Discussion of the findings p. 43

Chapter 5 Conclusion

p. 46

Chapter 1 Introduction

Think tanks are becoming more important across the world. The term think tank applied here refers to “policy research institutes involved in the research and analysis of a particular policy

area or a broad range of policy issues, seeking to advise policy makers or inform public debate on policy issues” (Stone, 2007, p. 1). These research institutions originated in Anglo-American

countries like the United States and the United Kingdom but have expanded over the world. Generally, these organizations are constituted as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) but some are either semi-governmental agencies or quasi-autonomous units within government (Stone, 2014). These institutes have expanded to the European Union (EU) and its member states as well.

Think tanks often depend on donations or funds (Medvetz, 2012). These funds come from a diverse group of actors. They can be individuals, international organizations, foundations, companies and so on. Besides, think tanks may vary by intentions and many scholars have made various categorizations on think tanks (Weaver, 1998; Fraussen and Halpin, 2017). For example, some think tanks are focused on the academic aspect that their research entails, while others are politically oriented towards a certain ideology. These politically oriented think tanks will be the subject for this thesis. These are important because no matter what type of think tank they are categorized as, think tanks still define themselves as research institutes. Often, research is defined as being independent from the political arena. But as think tanks do depend on funding, the question remains whether these think tanks develop different research outcomes or policy advice from this arena. Thus, this makes the think tanks more dependent than other research institutes. This will be especially relevant for politically oriented think tanks, because these will strive for a certain goal, but the way to achieve such a goal may eventually be influenced by the way they are funded. Most importantly, it is especially relevant to analyze if and how these think tanks are influenced by political actors that are donors to think tanks, as political actors also have certain beliefs. An important example of such a political actor that is also a donor to think tanks is the EU, as this organization has clear goals to achieve with political motives.

Therefore, in order to analyze this relationship, this thesis will research the degree think tanks are funded by the EU in relation to the content of their policy advice. This is especially important for think tanks that analyze EU policy issues. This master thesis will attempt to answer the question:

Does the degree of EU funding of EU-policy oriented think tanks influence the content of think tanks policy advice on EU policy?

Goal of the research

Funding is a question that has been addressed more generally in relation to other trends within the think tank research field, such as networking (Stone, 2002; Bajenova, 2018) or the EU institutional environment (Perez, 2014). While research on the relationship between funding and influence in think tanks has been done in different parts of the world, such as Canada (McLevey, 2014), not a lot of research has been done on the influence of EU funding on the policy advice of think tanks. This can be conceived as a gap in the literature. Producing policy advice is an important task of think tanks (Stone, 2000). Besides, in their mission statements, think tanks often claim that they are independent research institutes that provide academic reports on policy themes, and they operate besides governments (Stone, 2000). However, if think tanks are funded by governments, it could be expected that this influences policy advice in such a way that think tanks would produce policy advice that is more positive towards the EU policy positions on the matter at stake.

As mentioned, the gap that exists in the literature is the fact that not a lot of research has been done on the content of policy advices of the think tank in relation to EU funding. As producing such advice for governments, companies or international organizations such as the EU is one of the most important tasks of think tanks, it is important to research this subject and further the scholarly debate. Therefore, this thesis provides scientific relevance on the matter. But the thesis also provides societal relevance. Think tank advice is often used in the media, but funding is often not regarded in inviting think tank researchers for discussions on news shows for example. If funding might have an influence on think tanks, this may have implications for the reliability on think tank advice or its research ability. For example, think tanks may follow EU values too much due to EU funding, in which a contribution to debate on the EU may fall short.

As this has not been researched yet, the aim of this master thesis is to analyze if and how the degree of EU funding influences the content of the policy advice. The focus of this thesis will be on think tanks that are EU oriented and look at different policy issues that concern the EU. The thesis will look at the policy advice provided by these think tanks and look at the EU funding of these think tanks. The research will be based on a comparison of EU oriented think tanks in European member states that either receive or do not receive a certain degree of EU funding. The goal of the research is to examine whether EU funding influences content of policy advice. This will be researched through the theoretical framework of field theory, as provided by Medvetz (2012). The empirical analysis that will be carried out is a qualitative document analysis, comparing two think tanks: Notre Europe and the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). The documents chosen are six think tank policy advices on three policy issues: Migration policy, EU – China relations and cohesion policy. The relation that will be analyzed is whether EU funding influences the content of these policy advices. Often, influence is difficult to trace. Therefore, in order to trace this influence, the analysis will be carried out in three ways. First, by comparing these policy advices to the policy positions of the EU. Second, by comparing the policy advices to the guidelines of certain operating grants think tanks might receive, specifically for this thesis the Europe for Citizens operating grant. Finally, in relation to the theoretical framework of Medvetz, influence will also be traced by looking at different forms of capital, most notably political and academic capital.

Structure of the thesis

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 provides a look at the existing literature on think tanks as well as literature on the relation to think tank autonomy and funding. The chapter further provides the theoretical framework the thesis is based on, namely the field theory as described by Medvetz. Chapter 3 provides the research design and methods of the thesis. Chapter 4 forms this analysis part and will compare these policy advices by think tanks in relation to EU funding. It will also provide a final discussion on the results. Finally, Chapter 5 will conclude the thesis and provide a look at future research and connect the theory and analysis chapter.

Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

The research question above mentions different aspects. In order to get a better understanding of the phenomena that are think tanks, below a literature review will be presented concerning different scholars in the research field of think tanks and a narrower aspect concerning the funding aspect of think tanks.

Literature review

Think tanks present themselves as a relatively new phenomenon, distinct from the usual types of policy advisors. They are different in the sense that they identify as neither universities nor advocacy groups. Even though they are so different, they have become very important in both the media as well as in the government as consultants (Fraussen et al., 2017).

The number of think tanks has increased in recent decades, not only in the English-speaking world, but also globally (Pautz, 2011). There has been a lot of research concerning think tanks, but a clear definition of the phenomenon is still in debate. Therefore, scholars researching think tanks have focused a lot on the descriptive part, namely, to describe what a think tank is (Weaver, 1989; Stone, 2000; Pautz, 2011). As argued by Stone, “‘think tank’ is an umbrella

term that means different things to different people” (Stone, 1996, p.9). She defines a think

tank as “independent policy research institutes containing people involved in studying a

particular policy area or a broad range of policy issues, actively seeking to educate or advise policy-makers and the public through a number of channels” (Stone, 2000, p.154). Another

well-known definition of a think tank is provided by Weaver (1989), where he argues that think tanks are “non-profit organizations having substantial organizational independence” (Weaver, 1989, p. 563).

Think tank independence

In his article, Weaver categorizes the think tanks in three different groups: academic think tanks, or ‘universities without students’; contract research organizations that consists of reports for specific government agencies instead of being directed towards an academic audience; and finally, advocacy think tanks, who serve a strong cause that try to make an effort to influence the policy debate (Weaver, 1989, p. 567). The article as well as the previously mentioned definition are well-known in the scholarly world on think tanks, but there is a problem regarding

the term ‘independence’ he and many other scholars apply. This is further analyzed by Pautz, who argues that the definition provided by Weaver is not good enough (Pautz, 2011). He argues that by stating that think tanks are non-profit neglects the fact that other motives can also influence the independence of think tank advice. He further argues that the not-for-profit argument disguises that think tanks carry out activities because it was commissioned or because it has managed to acquire project-related funding from a variety of sources (Pautz, 2011). This is contrasting for Weaver, because he claims think tank independence, while further in the article, he applies the category of advocacy think tanks (Weaver, 1989). In this category, it is not sure how independent think tanks are, as they receive project-related funding.

Nevertheless, this categorization of Weaver has been used often and a lot of other categorizations are based on this one (Boucher, 2004; Fraussen et al., 2017). Categorizations on think tanks have been applied often, in order to better grasp the think tank landscape, as the number of think tanks are increasing. An important categorization for this thesis has been made by Fraussen and Halphin (2017). They categorize think tanks in two ways, by their level of research capacity and their level of autonomy. Fraussen et al. state that the high level of autonomy is a crucial part of the identity of think tanks (Fraussen et al., 2017). Furthermore, they state that “their integrity seems based on a belief that claims

independence […] and their lack of (structural) affiliations with other political organizations or individuals, should assure the public of the impartial or independent nature of their research”(Fraussen et al., 2017). However, as Fraussen argues, financial resources dependencies might still have a strong impact. Yet, when questioned, few think tanks agreed with this statement (Fraussen, 2017). However, this argument of financial resources in relation to autonomy is still important for the thesis as it will be analyzed if these financial resources can actually be seen in the content of policy advices. It will be researched whether EU funding influences the autonomy of think tank in their content of policy advices. In their research, Fraussen et al. further analyze how think tanks can contribute to strategic policymaking (Fraussen et al., 2017). Their categorization is therefore focused on the level they can contribute to policy-making. First, those think tanks with high research capacity and high autonomy are strategic think tanks. Those with low research capacity and low autonomy are sole-trader think tanks. Low autonomy and high research capacity are advocacy think tanks because they tend to push specific agendas. High autonomy and low capacity are amateur think tanks as they do not have the resources to contribute to policy-making (Fraussen et al., 2017). Such a typology is also important for this thesis, as it shows

how research capacity and autonomy combined influence their contribution to policy making. Furthermore, it also shows the importance of other organizational objectives (as noted by Fraussen et al. in research capacity; Fraussen et al., 2017), which will also be analyzed in this thesis.

Funding theories of think tanks

The argument made by Pautz regarding the independence of think tanks is often used and is important for this thesis (Pautz, 2011). This is because the independence of think tanks influences funding as well, and funding is an aspect that should be regarded when discussing independence of think tanks. Theories concerning think tanks also mention funding. Two theories have competed against each other over the years in relation to the discussion of the position of think tanks in the political arena. These theories have both derived from interest group literature. First, pluralist theory argues that think tanks have to compete for visibility in a political arena for limited resources, together with interest groups, trade unions and businesses (McLevey, 2014). While not directly mentioned, these limited resources may also relate to funding. The theory may have advantages but fails to explain why certain institutes may be better positioned to shape priorities than other groups. This may for example be related to the funding they can receive. Therefore, the theory might not be useful for this thesis, as in effect, it does not really mention anything about the dependence on funding or funding of think tanks in general.

The competition argument of pluralist theory does not directly mention funding. In contrast, elitist theory goes directly against pluralist theory and argues that funding is one of the most important aspects in think tanks competition. Authors focusing on the elitist theory note that organizations are not the neutral actors that transfer knowledge to policymakers in a highly competitive arena but should be analyzed as tools of the ruling class (Domhoff, 2009). Access in this arena is limited (Abelson, 2006). The only way to gain access to the arena is by what they can contribute to the politicians. This is especially the case in the United States, where think tanks are seen as talent pools for presidential administrations or serve as retirement homes for former senior-level policymakers (Abelson, 2006). The argument of this theory is as follows: “in exchange for large donations, think tanks use their policy expertise and

connections with key policymakers to advance the political agendas of their generous benefactors” (Abelson, 2006, p. 21). This shows the heavy dependence on funding relating to

Third, providing a middle ground to both pluralism and elitism, field theory is related to think tanks and in some way their relationship to funding (Medvetz, 2012). This theory will be discussed below the theoretical framework.

EU think tanks

Before discussing the theoretical framework this thesis will apply, it is important to analyze some of the literature on specifically European Union think tanks, as these types of think tanks are the focus of this thesis. Research on EU think tanks has not been done a lot. Most research focuses on the way these think tanks can exert influence in the European political environment. Bajenova (2018) analyzes the various ways in which think tanks will use their symbolic and networking capital to exert influence in Brussels, whereas Perez analyzes how the EU its way of policy-making influences the way to which think tanks can perform their knowledge broker rule (Perez, 2014). Plehwe and Pautz assess the range of European think tanks which are active at the EU level of politics (Plehwe and Pautz, 2014). They argue that there is a substantial lack of information on the role of think tanks in influencing policy and how they should be classified. In their text, they provide examples of EU oriented think tanks based in its member states (Plehwe et al., 2014). They also provide examples of EU oriented think tanks in Brussels itself, and state that these receive a large amount of funding from research-commissioning EU bodies. They gave an example of think tanks influencing EU policy in the case of the Eurobonds. Here, the CEPS and the think tank Bruegel pushed for the idea of Eurobonds (Plehwe et al., 2014). The example of the think tank Bruegel its actions during the financial crisis has been researched many times in many ways. These examples show that there is a certain influence that think tanks can have on EU policy-making. However, it has not yet been researched how the EU with its funding can influence the think tanks policy advices.

Theoretical Framework

The above-mentioned well-established pluralist and elitist theories show two different views on the think tank-funding landscape. But these theories are not enough. Whereas pluralist theory focuses too much on the diversity that the think tanks have to act upon in the wide range of interest group actors and too mildly on funding, on the other end of the spectrum, elite theory focuses too much on the fact that think tanks follow corporate or political interests. This in effect makes think tanks immediately seem too dependent on the elite funding they receive.

What’s more, these elite theorists do not take into account those think tanks that go against the ruling class or that lack connections to the rich and powerful (Medvetz, 2012). The conclusion that follows is that there has to be a middle way.

Recently, another theory provided this middle ground related to think tanks involvement in the political arena. Based on Bourdieu’s sociologist field theory, Medvetz expanded the framework to relate the theory to think tank behavior. This theory has the advantage that it can put aside the split between elitist and pluralist theory and create some combination of the two theories (Medvetz, 2012). For Medvetz, the main critique on both theories was that their conclusions were built in their definitions. For example, pluralist theorists defined think tanks as having cognitive autonomy, so as to differentiate themselves from elite theorists. This eventually let other scholars to conclude that if a think tank is not independent, it is not really a think tank (Medvetz, 2012). Medvetz argues that both theories locked themselves into a certain judgment prior to making any empirical investigations (Medvetz, 2012). McLevey notes that field theory describes think tanks as “dependent on a wide range of external actors”, which in turn emphasize the meanings and strategies they develop around the resources they accumulate (McLevey, 2014, p. 58). The focus in field theory is on the complicated organizational and political environments in which think tanks operate and on their underlying dependencies on powerful sponsors. In contrast to the elitist theory focusing solemnly on the control of elites on the think tanks, more social structures play a part in the shaping of a think tank its actions (Medvetz, 2012).

Medvetz is a sociologist. In his research he extended the question which was elaborately answered by Bourdieu, namely: how do power and influence accrue within organizations? Medvetz focused on US think tanks, which he conceptualized as boundary organizations that are specialized in mediating the relationship among more established fields (Medvetz, 2012). He used two theoretical insights to strengthen the field theory framework which was provided by Bourdieu by two theoretical insights. First, he used the concept of boundary spanners. Boundary spanners refer to individuals located at specific strategic points of juncture, within an organization or in between meeting points. Organizations can do the same thing and place themselves strategically in the larger systems of organizations. Second, he used the spaces between fields (Medvetz, 2012).

According to Medvetz, think tanks consistently depend on four types of field, of which they have to accumulate four different types of capital. First, the political field in which think tanks accumulate political capital, meaning the competence in “specifically political forms of

expression” (Medvetz, 2012, p. 140). These include the ability to generate knowledge and make

statements that can be effective in the competition for control over the state (such as polling data and demographic statistics), but also the ability to provide this knowledge in a way that is accessible to politicians, namely the discussion whether something is politically feasible. Second, the economic field in which they accumulate economic capital. This capital refers not only to funding, but also the ways of acquiring these funds (Medvetz, 2012). Third, the media field in which they accumulate media capital. This capital refers to access to the means of publicity, including the ability to the media institutions in their work. And lastly, the academic field in which they accumulate academic capital, meaning “visible markers of scholarly

proficiency, especially academic degrees and titles” (Medvetz, 2012, p. 140). The main

argument of Medvetz his field theory is that think tanks have as their mission to find a good balance between each of these fields in the capital they accumulate (Medvetz, 2012). In order to accumulate this balance, think tank-affiliated policy experts face certain pressures to cultivate a mixture of skills that mirrors this balance that needs to be accumulated. They need to be able to accumulate forms of capital from each of the above-mentioned fields (Medvetz, 2012).

So how does field theory relate to the research question? Field theory argues that think tanks are not necessarily passive instruments in the hands of their wealthy sponsors (Medvetz, 2012). As McLevey noted, the way they create meaning and strategy within their organization all depends on the capital they can accumulate across each field (McLevey, 2014). This means that what elite theory states, is not true. Think tanks do not belong to the most powerful sponsor. They themselves accumulate other forms of capital in order to maintain a certain balance and regain some sort of autonomy. Besides, some think tanks rely mainly on project-related funding (Pautz, 2011). Therefore, they have a variety of sponsors, and not just one party-affiliated fund. As Medvetz’ criticism also shows, both theories focus their definition of think tanks on their self-perceptive conclusions (Medvetz, 2012). This results in the inability to empirically research a question objectively. The field theory provided by Medvetz does not follow this argument. It can be related to the elite theory, as it does acknowledge donors that fund the think tanks, but also to pluralist theory as it also acknowledges think tanks autonomy. However, Medvetz argues for a balance between the four forms of capital mentioned earlier (Medvetz, 2012). This thesis follows exactly this line of reasoning provided by Medvetz and applies this to the EU context

instead of the US context. The thesis will research this by looking at the content of policy advice the EU oriented policy think tanks produce and argue that the content of policy advice does not necessarily have to be linked to the powerful donator that is the European Union. Instead, these EU think tanks may try to preserve some sort of autonomy. They do so by accumulating other forms of capital, such as political or academic capital. Therefore, the line of reasoning is not a follow-the-money argument, but rather such a balancing act as provided by Medvetz.

This thesis will focus particularly on one of the above-mentioned fields, namely the economic field. However, it does take into account the other fields, in order to find out if think tanks balance these fields in the content of the policy advice, especially since this is the line of reasoning of Medvetz. This is especially relevant for EU funded think tanks, that would otherwise become known as too depended on these EU funds, thereby losing its autonomy. Analyzing this economic field in terms of EU funding will help to study whether one such field has an impact on the way think tanks actually formulate the content of the policy advice. But the theory of Medvetz provides the useful argument that funding is not the only aspect that determines think tank influence but argues for more aspects. This argument is especially useful in the case of the EU, as the EU does not only provide funding to think tanks (which is linked to the economic field) but is also a policy-making political organization (which is linked to the political field). Therefore, the thesis will also analyze the creation of balances between fields. Analyzing policy advice will be useful for this, as it can show whether such balances exist.

Expectations

This master’s thesis is built around the model of field theory and analyzes whether the presupposed ‘follow the money’ strategy proposed by elitist theory is the only element responsible for the content of think tanks policy advice. This theory is mostly appropriate for the strong party affiliations that exists in the United States with think tanks (Medvetz, 2012). Within the EU, it could be totally different. Behind the scenes, an extensive and complex network of organizational features determines the production and eventual content of policy advice by think tanks, as argued by Medvetz (2012). For example, think tanks may rely on different sets of data, such as opinion polls or demographics, that determine a different conclusion than what the EU has developed as a policy over the years, and think tanks will base their advice on this. Another example may be that the history of think tanks may affect the policy advice, such as historically important figures for the think tank. Or academics may play a greater part in the think tank than expected. All these factors are related to the balancing act

Medvetz mentions in his research (Medvetz, 2012). In effect, this will also determine the level of independence of a think tank. However, it has to be noted that some fields may be more important than others for a think tank and think tanks might have difficulty establishing a balance between the four fields. Most notably, this is the case for the economic field. Think tanks often rely heavily on funding or short-term donations. This might limit the range of intellectual stances open to them (Medvetz, 2012). Often think tanks have to direct their work to the market of funding, eventually leading to the thought that money does have considerable power on think tanks. An example that Medvetz gives results in the argument that if a think tank loses financial sponsors, a major organizational crisis can result (Medvetz, 2012). Medvetz further argues “the vicissitudes of specific organizations' histories vividly illustrate the degree

to which a think tank's fate inevitably depends on its ability to provide useful services to financial sponsors” (Medvetz, 2012, p.147). For EU oriented think tanks, the case might be the

same. These think tanks do rely on funding. In order to receive and remain receiving funding (in this case from the EU) they have to orient their work towards the EU as a financial sponsor. This can mean that think tanks have to be positive towards the EU as a funder, as think tanks rely on such funding and want to keep receiving funds. Therefore, this will have an effect on the content of the policy advice in the way that the think tanks may follow the EU its policy positions. In contrast, for think tanks not funded by the EU, the case may be different. Here, these think tanks might orient their work to the EU in a different way, through balancing, in order to remain visible in the EU landscape. Not receiving funds might allow for more independence from the EU and linked to this, the think tanks may have the ability to be more critical of EU policies. Therefore, in order to analyze whether this is the case, Expectation 1 of this thesis is:

Expectation 1: EU oriented think tanks that receive funding from the EU will follow the EU point of view on policies, whereas EU oriented think tanks that do not receive EU funding will be more critical to the EU point of view.

However, as argued by Medvetz, think tanks do have to rely on other forms of capital as well (Medvetz, 2012). These are referred to in the other three fields, namely the political, academic and media field. This eventually leads to the balancing act a think tank will perform, in order to create a balance between distance and affiliation to sponsors and governments (Medvetz, 2012). Sometimes however, this balancing does not automatically work, meaning that one of the four fields might still be overrepresented. This may also be the case for funding in the form

of economic capital. Funding deriving from the EU does not necessarily have to influence the content of a policy advice but can do so only under specific conditions. Therefore, the thesis presents the following expectation 2 for EU funded think tanks:

Expectation 2: EU funded think tanks will follow the EU point of view on policies more, when these think tanks have not accumulated other forms of capital, notably political and academic resources.

Similarly, for think tanks not funded by the EU, the case can have the same effect. In order to remain critical as referred to in the expectation 1, these think tanks may engage in other forms of capital in order to balance their distance and affiliation to the EU. They do so by strengthening the collection of their political and academic capital. Therefore, the expectation 3 for not EU funded think tanks will be:

Expectation 3: Think tanks not funded by the EU will be more critical on EU policy issues, when these think tanks have accumulated other forms of capital, most notably political and academic capital.

Conceptualization

From the research done in the literature review it is clear that a think tank is a contested concept. It is difficult to clearly establish the meaning of a think tank. This master’s thesis will use the conceptualization of think tank as provided by Medvetz which has been elaborated in the theoretical framework above (2012). He argues that many think tank definitions focus too much on the ‘independence’ of the think tanks. However, this does not always have to be the case. Instead, Medvetz argues that think tanks should be built around the notion of Bourdieu’s notion of field. Here, they have to “seek to occupy a liminal structural opposition by gathering and

juggling various forms of capital acquired from different arenas” (Medvetz, 2012, p. 46). These

arenas are the fields as mentioned before: academic, economic, political and media (Medvetz, 2012). The definition that derives from this field theory is that think tanks are actors that exist in their own field that have to play “a game of gathering, balancing and assembling various

institutionalized resources or forms of capital, especially academic, political, economic and media capital” (Medvetz, 2012, p. 140)

To remain in line with the theory by Medvetz, the concept EU funding here is linked to the economic field, as well as the accumulation of economic capital, as described by Medvetz’ field theory (Medvetz, 2012). Economic capital means not only the funding a think tank receives, but also the ability of a think tank to collect funds (Medvetz, 2012). The expectations also mention two other forms of capital, which have already been elaborated in the theoretical framework. Political capital means the capacity to generate knowledge effective for control over the state and knowledge that is understandable for political clients (Medvetz, 2012). Academic capital refers to visible markers of scholarly proficiency (Medvetz, 2012).

Chapter 3 Research Design and Methods

This thesis is a comparative qualitative document analysis. It will compare two think tanks on the content of their policy advice on three different EU policy issues. Below, each of the research aspects will be further elaborated.

Causal Mechanisms

In this research the X-Y relationship is as follows. The independent (X) variable is the degree of EU funding of the think tank policy advice. The dependent variable (Y) is content of the policy advice they produce on several EU integration policies. As the research will be comparative, certain variables will be controlled in this thesis. These variables will be discussed below. The variable of EU funding will be the variable that is different between the think tanks. The causal mechanism in this research will be that when the think tank receives a certain degree of EU funding, they may give a policy advice that follows the EU point of view on policy issues. Therefore, this results in a lack of autonomy of the think tank. However, this lack of autonomy may only be the case if the think tank has not accumulated a lot of other forms of capital, most notably political and academic capital. The opposite is the case for think tanks not receiving EU funding. These think tanks have more freedom which allows them to be critical. However, these think tanks only have the ability to be critical and visible for the EU at the same time if they accumulate other forms of capital, most notably, political and academic capital.

Research Design

Most Similar Systems Design

This master thesis is based on a comparative case studies research design. Comparing think tanks is a useful way of determining the impact of EU funding on the content of policy advice. This is because by comparing one think tank that is funded by the EU and another one that is not can show differences between the content of diverse policy advices of these think tanks. Research with a comparative research design can be done in various ways. One of the most important differences in applying this design is between the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) and the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD). This difference is determined by the variables on which one bases their cases. This master thesis follows the MSSD, even though the think tanks chosen are based in diverse countries and not in one location such as Brussels.

The reason this has been chosen this way is because think tanks based in Brussels often experience the impact of acting within the so-called Brussels Bubble. This can affect the policy advice as well, and those think tanks also receive a lot of funding when based within the EU capital. Therefore, think tanks based in the EU member states are chosen. As nationality also can play a part in this case, think tanks with an international staff are chosen and therefore, one of the control variables is international staff. International staff refers to having a staff that has various nationalities, thereby reducing the effect of nationality preferences. Both think tanks have an international staff. The ECFR is a pan-European think tank, which leads them to having a wide variety of nationalities in their organization. For Notre Europe this is different. While the organization has its headquarters in Paris, it also has an office in Berlin. Besides, the think tank has a variety of nationalities in the organization, thereby also reducing the effect of nationality preferences.

Together with the international staff variable, other variables that can have an influence on policy advice of EU think tanks have been controlled and presented in the covariational table 1. The independent variable of this research is the EU funding of think tanks. However, many other things can influence how policy advice is made. These variables will be controlled. The first variable is the number of academic actors in the organization. This can influence the content of policy advices in two ways. First, when there are too many academic actors, think tanks will get a label that is closely linked to universities, and they do not want that. But too few of these academics and think tanks will become known as party-affiliated. Both these varieties impact policy advices. Think tanks want to get a certain balance in academic actors, and therefore those with many academics in the organization have been chosen.

Second, the political actors in the organization can also impact policy advice. This may especially be the case for EU oriented think tanks. The EU actors in the think tanks may influence the content in such a way that they will remain visible. Because EU oriented think tanks often have these political actors in their organization, political actors in the organization is controlled to include think tanks that have many EU actors in their organizational council or board have been chosen. In relation to the theory by Medvetz, political actors form a part that helps accrue other forms of political capital, such as access to the EU or the provision of strategic advice to the EU (Medvetz, 2012).

A third variable that will also be controlled, is linked to their mission statements. This is linked to the reason why they want to receive EU funding, or the ideology of think tanks or how they relate themselves to EU politics. This will be named the mission variable, as most ideology principles can be found in their mission statements. Some think tanks may be more willing to receive EU funding as they want to be heard in the EU. They argue for more integration or more action in relation to the European values. Therefore, this can also have an effect on EU funding in the first place. The ideology variable can be found in the mission statements of the think tanks. The two think tanks mentioned here all want the EU to develop themselves in relation to the European values. In this instance, they therefore both “Contribute to the European debate”.

The independent variable of EU funding is the variable that differs among think tanks. The think tanks either receive no funding, a lot of funding or only project-based funding. The cases will be outlined below.

Type Variable Notre Europe European Council on

Foreign Affairs Control variable Political Actors in the organization

Many both as experts and in the management board

Many both as experts and in the management board

Control variable Academic actors in the organization Many as experts in organization Many as experts in organization Control variable International staff Yes Yes Control variable

Mission Contribute to European Debate

Contribute to European Debate

Independent Variable of research

EU Funding Yes, most funding comes from the EU

Commission

Funding differs per year, sometimes project related funding Dependent variable of research Policy Advice ? ? Covariational Table1

Cases

This master’s thesis will not focus on economically minded think tanks or solely on Brussels based think tanks. Instead, it will focus on the think tanks that contribute to the European debate. Furthermore, they are based in the member states instead of within the Brussels Bubble. As shown above, many EU think tanks have been funded by the EU Commission, especially those based in Brussels. Therefore, it is useful to look at if the EU funds also expand toward the think tanks based in these member states. This research will be based on two case studies, namely think tanks. These think tanks are all focused on the same theme, namely around EU policy. Normally, the location of a think tanks gives an indirect indication of its target groups (Bajanova, 2018). Two think tanks have been chosen that are based outside of Brussels. The think tanks are chosen from the survey done by the BEPA to assess the think tanks that they would have to work with after the State of the Union in 2018 (Missiroli and Ioannides, 2012).

The first case or think tank is based in Paris and has a subdivision in Berlin, named Notre

Europe and otherwise known as the Jaqcues Delors Institute. This think tank is according to

Phlewe and Pautz (2014) a good example of a revolving door: it has been set up by former Brussels insiders. While the president of the think tank is a former EU official, there are only 2 board members that have a background in politics. It receives a lot of EU funding, both commissioned research and project-based funding on the project “Europe for citizens”. Table 2 shows the amount of funding the Jacques Delors Institute receives from the EU Commission.

Year Funding 2011 553.490 2012 570.575 2013 568.397 2014 470.019 2015 359.685 2016 665.417 2017 458.390

Table 2 EU funding of Notre Europe, retrieved from annual reports of Notre Europe 2011-2017 (Institut Jacques Delors, 2019)

The second think tank is the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). This think tank distinguishes itself from other European think tanks as it is pan-European, meaning that it is based in several member states. It is based in Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Sofia and Warsaw. The think tank states that because it is based in a wide variety of member states, it knows what is going on and has a good basis to produce policy advice. Over the course of the years 2017 the funding of the EU varies (European Council on Foreign relations, 2011-2017). Some years the think tank does not receive funding, while other years it does but only a small amount compared to the other grants it receives. Table 3 shows the amount of funding ECFR receives from the EU Commission.

Year Funding 2011 No funding 2012 6.723 2013 21.701 2014 8.000 2015 No funding 2016 No funding 2017 29.085

Table 3 EU funding of ECFR, retrieved from the annual reports of the ECFR, 2011-2017 (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019)

Method and data collection

This master thesis will look at the policy advice of the EU oriented think tanks. Policy advice is one of the main features of the organization of think tanks. As these documents are available on the websites of the think tanks provided above, the research conducted here will be a document analysis.

Funding can have an influence in the way think tanks produce advice or policy reports. This is shown by Phlewe and Pautz in the case of Bruegel (and also CEPS, but in a minor way) (Phlewe e al., 2014). Therefore, in order to find out how the EU funding (or not) influences the advices think tanks give a document analysis will be conducted.

Document analysis

Bryman produces four criteria for assessing the quality of documents: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (Bryman, 2014). Documents are seen as windows onto social and organizational realities. However, other authors also argue that they represent a distinct level of reality in their own right and that a look at the context in which they are written is also important as well as their implied readership. They can for example be written as a response to other documents, which is also known as intertextuality (Bryman, 2014). This is especially the case for policy reports. They are often an answer to the policies produced by the EU and therefore have to be seen in their own distinct reality.

Policy briefs and reports

So how to choose the policy documents by the think tanks? Think tanks have over time developed a distinct type of policy advice to contrast themselves of other groups that have the ability to influence policy-making (Medvetz, 2012). Think tanks began to write shorter and synthetic policy reports (also known as policy briefs) on faster schedules, instead of conducting empirical research with an academic influence (Medvetz, 2012). The defining features of the policy brief were “its brevity, accessibility and utility to journalists and politicians” (Medvetz, 2012, p. 120). In the United States, of key importance was that the policy briefs should pass the so-called briefcase test, whereby it had to be possible for Congressman to put the report in their briefcase and read it while they were on their way to the airport (Medvetz, 2012). This type of policy report has taken over the think tank world and expanded to the European Union as well.

This thesis will be based on a qualitative document analysis. This will be conducted by analyzing three policy reports funded by the EU from the think tank Notre Europe and three policy reports not funded by the EU from the think tank ECFR. As mentioned, these have been chosen on three different policy issues: migration policy, EU-China relations and cohesion policy. Policy advices by think tanks in general can be produced for two reasons: either as a reaction to an EU policy proposal or as a proposal for the EU to act upon prior to the development of a policy. These policy advice types propose a change in EU policy of some sorts. In order to keep the document analysis constant, policy advices as a reaction to EU policies have been chosen. Think tanks give advice on a wide variety of issues and the think tanks chosen here also focus on a wide variety of European policy issues. As discussing all

these policy advices produced by them would take too much time, this thesis will discuss three policy issues: migration, EU-China relations and cohesion policy. While this is not a lot of policy advices to make generalizable conclusions to all think tanks, the policy issues chosen differ in such a way that it is possible to analyze possible differences between the content of the policy advices. These policy advices were chosen as Notre Europe received EU funding to produce these advices, while ECFR did not. This gives room for maneuver in analyzing these documents and try to find differences.

The policy briefs and reports from think tanks are as follows:

Subject Migration EU- China Relations Cohesion Policy

Notre Europe

For a European policy on asylum, migration and mobility (28-11-2018) EU-funded through operating grant The Challenges of Chinese Investment in Europe (11-02-2019) EU-funded through operating grant Solidarity 2.0 (13-06-2017) EU-funded: through operating grant + directly project-funded

ECFR Pushing the

boundaries: how to create effective migration cooperation across the Mediterranean (15-01-2019) Not funded by EU

Blue China: Navigating the Maritime Silk Road to the EU (28-04-2018)

Not funded by EU

Crisis and Cohesion in the EU: A Ten-Year review (02-2018)

Not funded by EU

Table 4

Analysis

In order to determine whether the content of policy advice from think tanks is influenced by EU funding, the analysis will be conducted in three ways. First, as expectation 1 presented in Chapter 2 shows, think tanks receiving EU funding will develop recommendations closely linked to the EU policy positions. In order to analyze this, two ways of analysis will be carried out. First, to analyze whether the recommendations are indeed close to the EU policy positions, the think tanks recommendations need to be compared to the EU policies mentioned in the

reports. Therefore, policies will be analyzed to see whether the expectation is indeed the case. A specific look will be given to the reason the EU initiated the policy as presented in their policy documents, and this will be compared to the reaction of the policy brief of the think tank. The reason the EU initiated documents can also be found in news reports. In this case, certain news reports of EurActiv have been researched. If these think tanks tend to follow the EU policy positions or reasons for implementing such a policy, then this expectation is indeed one way in which the content of the policy advice is influenced by EU funding. A second way to research the influence of funding is by analyzing whether the think tank is positive towards the EU development of the policies. This will be closely analyzed through the discourse of the policy report. For example, positivity to the EU can be seen through acceptance of EU achievements. In contrast, criticism can also be examined through such a discourse analysis. Criticism can be seen in phases or words such as “shortcomings” or “fail” clearly show whether a think tank criticizes the EU. The EU documents chosen are:

Migration EU-China Relations Cohesion Policy

Lomé Convention (1975) Cotonou Agreement (2000) Schengen Agreement (1985) Regional Disembarkation Platforms (2018) EU-China strategic relations (2016) Framework of screening foreign direct investments (2018) Regional Policy (1980) Regional Policy (2014-2017)

Europe for Citizens (EACEA) (2010-2020)

A second way to analyze whether the content is influenced by EU funding is by focusing mainly on the EU funding projects such as the Europe for Citizens fund. These funds have certain guidelines that the think tanks have to fulfill in order to remain qualified to receive these funds. An example of a think tank that receives these funds is Notre Europe. It receives an operating grant from the fund. It receives this because it has set up a citizen’s dialogues in Europe as well as set up an academy in order for more engagement (Europe for Citizens, 2017). This follows the guidelines of the Europe for Citizens fund. Therefore, it has already complied to the guidelines of the fund. This does not mean that the guidelines do have to be followed in its publications. However, as it is an operating grant, the fund may also be used for the publications of the think tank. Therefore, it is important to analyze whether the guidelines of the fund are

also followed in the publications. These guidelines will be compared to the policy advice and see whether the think tank follows these guidelines in these advices. If this is the case, it can be argued that these policy advices are indeed influenced by the EU funds that the think tank receives.

Third, in order to remain in line with the field theory by Medvetz and following the conditional expectations presented in Chapter 2, think tanks funded by the EU should balance their economic capital with other forms of capital in order to balance between distance and affiliation to their financial sponsors (Medvetz, 2012). This is a more indirect way to analyze the effect of EU funding on the content of policy advice. It will be analyzed how the think tanks funded by the EU try to regain autonomy by increasing political capital by focusing on the type of political strategies they use to have this balance. Below, at the operationalization section, it is shown how it will be analyzed to what extent think tanks draw from political and academic capital.

Operationalization

This thesis will analyze the content of policy advice of one EU funded think tank and one think tank not funded by the EU. Furthermore, it will look at the degree of EU funding, as seen in Medvetz’ field theory in the economic capital. The degree of EU funding needs to be measured. This will be done by looking at the policy advices and analyzing which funds have been used. Generally, publication of policy advices can be funded in two ways: direct or indirect funding.

First, direct funding occurs via commissioned research or project funding. Here, the EU asks the think tank via these funds to analyze a certain topic on the EU policy and requests recommendations on the matter. Second, indirect funding occurs via an operating grant. This means “EFC quote” and are used for example for staff fees or publications or other permanent features of the organization. An example that is especially relevant for the think tanks in this thesis is the Europe for Citizens fund of which think tanks may receive a maximum of 350.000 euros. Both these funds have been granted via the European Political Strategy Center, that plays the part of interlocutor with think tanks (Missirolli et al., 2017).

As noted, the thesis is a document analysis of the content of think tanks policy advices in relation to funding. But the question remains as to how to measure this content of policy

advices? The thesis will look at two specific features that are almost always present in the content of such policy advices by think tanks. First, policy advices always contain recommendations on the future of EU policies. Second, the thesis will also measure the content by providing an analysis at how these think tanks look back at how the EU has performed on its policies.

The thesis also focuses on two other features that are derived from Medvetz’ field theory. First, it will analyze the political capital that has been accumulated by the think tanks. This will be measured by looking at the backgrounds of its policy experts, with a focus on their political background, as for example a former policy officer for the EU. It will also be measured by analyzing the tools these think tank policy experts use to provide useful knowledge to the EU. This can be provided via polling data, demographic data, but also via the provision of strategic knowledge on policies and with this strategic advice (Medvetz, 2012). A second feature of Medvetz’ field theory used is the accumulation of academic capital by think tanks (Medvetz, 2012). An element that this capital will be measured by is through the backgrounds of policy experts, with a focus on their scholarly background, as for example a former university fellow. Often, these academic experts combine their academic background with the other skills necessary for influencing policy outcomes. These ex-scholar policy experts want to uphold the value of academic skills and credentials (Medvetz, 2012). Therefore, a discourse analysis of these documents is also necessary. This difference in language use is often seen in the advice being more objective, but also the fact that they provide less recommendations as they want to be unbiased and not choose sides as to what the best option for the EU is.

Chapter 4 Empirical Analysis

This thesis will compare the funded documents by Notre Europe to the unfunded documents by ECFR. It will look at the discourses of the documents as well as the content of the documents and see whether there is a difference between the two. The differences will be searched by looking at any discontinuities such as a tacit acceptance of the EU policy positions. The analysis will be carried out by comparing two policy briefs on two policy issues. First, the recommendations on migration policy, EU-China relations and cohesion policy provided by Notre Europe will be analyzed. Second, the recommendations on migration policy, EU- China relations and the cohesion policy provided by the ECFR will be analyzed.

The think tanks discussed do differ in some way, as they are somewhat differently focused. Most notably, the ECFR is a foreign policy focused think tank. However, the policy advices discussed can still be compared because the focus of the policy advices is on the same subject. Migration has a focus on the European Parliament elections and far right parties, EU-China relations are related to the trade relations of the EU with China, as well as providing a strategic outlook on these relations. Finally, cohesion policy provides a look back at the ten years the policy was in usage.

Notre Europe/ Institut Jacques Delors

The policy report “For a European Policy on Asylum, Migration and Mobility” by Jerome Vignon was produced on 28 November 2018 (Vignon, 2018). It was written in light of the European Parliament elections in 2019, stating that it provides a helping guide for both the EP candidates as well as its voters (Vignon, 2018). Its recommendations focus on the various aspects of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in order to create more commonalities between member states. The report was funded as part of the operating grant of the European Commission funding project ‘Europe for Citizens’ (Vignon, 2018).

This EFC fund mentioned is an important funding resource for a lot of think tanks. It exists out of two components. The first component is the European Remembrance strand. This strand “aims to foster a common culture of remembrance and mutual understanding between citizens

from different EU Member States” (Europe for Citizens, 2018, p. 5). It does so by supporting

projects reflecting on historical turning points in the EU (Europe for Citizens, 2018). The second component is the Democratic engagement and civic participation strand. This strand “shall give citizens opportunity to express their opinion on what kind of Europe they want” (Europe for Citizens, 2018, p. 7). Within these two strands, the EU has outlined several discussion subjects that need to be handled in activities of think tanks or other organizations.

Think tanks receive an operating grant from this fund, which differs from the usual action grant. The operating grant means that it covers costs not only for projects but provides financial support for organizations in costs required for the proper conduct of research and permanent activities in the organization. These include publications and staff fees. (Europe for Citizens, 2018, p. 8).

The Notre Europe policy report clearly follows the specific discussion subjects that the fund requires from the think tanks. This can be seen from various aspects. First, one of the subjects that the fund expects think tanks to discuss is the “Debate on the future of Europe and

challenging Euroscepticism” (Europe for Citizens, 2018, p. 8). More specifically, the fund

states that the European Commission expects think tanks to reflect on a new narrative for Europe, “citizen oriented, forward looking and constructive” (Europe for Citizens, 2018, p. 8). The EU policy report of Notre Europe has applied this already in the beginning, taking citizens opinions into account in the policy report. While the focus is on one such policy subject that is migration or asylum policy, the report is generated to look at the current opinions of the EU citizens towards migrants (Vignon, 2018). The entirety of chapter 1 is aimed to discuss this issue (Vignon, 2018). Furthermore, the policy report also discusses the nationalist or populist rhetoric, arguing against this and developing a proposal “refusing to give in to populist

injunctions” (Vignon, 2018, p. 62)

A second aim of the Europe for Citizens fund is to promote solidarity in times of crisis. They argue that solidarity is what the EU is built upon. “Solidarity Is a shared value that creates

cohesion and responds to societal challenges” (Europe for Citizens, 2018, p. 9). Activities

under this strand have to contribute to overcoming national perceptions of crises by fostering mutual understanding, with the aim of giving attention to the importance of solidarity and common values in the EU integration process (Europe for Citizens, 2018). In the policy report of Notre Europe, solidarity is also a key theme. First, they address the issue of political crisis

as a crisis of solidarity and that needs to be restored (Vignon, 2018). They argue that solidarity is a key principle. One of their recommendations is “the introduction of a European pool of

solidarity for asylum composed of countries situated on the external borders of the EU and other volunteer countries” (Vignon, 2018, p. 37). In total, the policy report mentions solidarity

23 times which makes it a true important subject for the policy proposals.

Following this Europe for Citizens fund does show a tacit acceptance of EU policies. In general, the policy report acknowledges the positives of EU policies and its achievements regarding its asylum and migration policies. This can be seen in quotes such as “One of the aims of this

report is to learn the lessons of those shortcomings but without neglecting the achievements that have made the EU an exemplary area for asylum worldwide” (Vignon, 2018, p. 17). Many

other quotes mention this world wide exemplary status of the EU, such as “This awareness has

led to the EU to develop world leading experience …” (Vignon, 2018, p. 28) and in its leading

role in the UN Global Compact for Safe, Human and Orderly Migrations, where Vignon states “Due to its experience in managing the transnational mobility of workers internally, the EU

seems well placed to be able to put the Compact into practice and to show it working” (Vignon,

2018, p. 48). This vision does show that the policy report has this tacit acceptance of the EU direction. And this can be linked to its funding because the EU asks for a mutual understanding in times of crisis as well as cooperation between states because that is a common value within the EU and the EU acts with these values as underlying reason (Europe for Citizens, 2018).

However, the report does not only show the positives, but also takes regard of its shortcomings, such as the Dublin Regulation and its failure during the crisis (Vignon, 2018). There can be various reasons for this negativity. First, because the think tank only receives operating grants, which are not directly aimed towards the publication of this report leaves room for the author to remain critical or skeptical towards the EU and its policies on migration. The author does so by mentioning sentences that involve words like “shortcomings” (Vignon, 2018, p. 17), “falls

short” (Vignon, 2018, p. 20) “the asylum capacity failed on two fronts” (Vignon, 2018, p. 31)

and “raises major objections” (Vignon, 2018, p. 42).

A second reason can be linked to the capital collection of the think tank itself. Funding is an important factor for think tanks, but the think tank still needs to be able to balance this funding with other capital. Notre Europe balances economic capital with the accumulation of political capital and these are visible in the report. Importantly, this think tank was created by former

Commission president Jacques Delors (1985 – 1993) (Institut Jacques Delors, 2019). Delors has left the EU with his own ideals and values and made some important contributions to the development of the Union. In this report, this is also mentioned. Most notably, the report argues that “because its founder initiated the first steps towards a common policy on migration back

in 1993, the Jacques Delors Institute wants to play a part in this issue” (Vignon, 2018, p. 6).

Delors has indeed started the foundations of a common policy on migration when he opened the borders of the Schengen area in 1985 (European Commission, 2019). This allowed for a free flow of labour migration. The Schengen area is mentioned a lot in this report as well in a positive manner as something on which all member states agree upon (Vignon, 2018). A second achievement of the Delors Commission was the establishment of the European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) department, mentioned in the report as coordinating a world-leading experience in external humanitarian interventions (Vignon, 2018). The report further argues that the EU could play a leading role in the development of a “global development outlook,

sustainable for the EU and its partners” (Vignon, 2018, p. 26). Finally, the Delors Commission

also signed the Lomé Convention, thereby laying the foundations of a partnership with the ACP countries in 1985. This was replaced in 2000 by the Cotonou Agreement (European Commission, 2019). The report proposes a renewal of the Cotonou Agreement, arguing that it would a be a “unique opportunity”, making human development the main focus of rebuilding the European African relationship, “in contrast to that of the clearly self-centred global powers

such as the United States and China” (Vignon, 2018, p. 57)

Having such a political actor within the organization also influences the content of the policy report. It shows experience and know-how in the workings of the EU as well as its migration policies. The EU or any intended audience likes this, as the think tank knows the standards the EU looks for. Furthermore, as an intended audience, Notre Europe has to direct its recommendations to the EU, and this influences the content of the policy advice again. Notre Europe recalls old policy initiatives, created by Delors, thereby showing knowledge of its history as well as acting according to EU values. This in turn gives room to create strategic policy advice, which is a political resource, as argued by Medvetz (Medvetz, 2012, p. 140).

Political capital is also gathered through another aspect of the policy report, namely the contributors to the report. In this case, they are the interviewees. This also can have an influence on the content of the policy advice, as these actors can have the ability to direct the advice in a

certain direction they want. The list of contributors or “list of personalities met for the report” contains a lot of political actors from the European Commission (Vignon, 2018, p. 65).

EU-China Relations

The policy brief “The Challenges of Chinese Investment Control in Europe” was produced by Elvire Fabry and Jacopo Maria D’Andria on 11 February 2019 (Fabry and D’Andria, 2019). The policy brief focused on the introduction of the control mechanism into the EU to assess the risks posed by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the Single Market. A special focus regarding this was given to the Chinese investment challenges into Europe (Fabry et al., 2019). The brief was funded by the EU through its operating grant of the Europe for Citizens project.

While the publication was funded through this operating grant from the EU, it does not show this as much as in the previous report on migration policy. One aspect that does show the report was funded by this grant is seen in the fact that the paper was aimed to discuss “priorities for

the next Commission” (Fabry et al., 2019, p. 4). This is linked to the specific priority of the

Europe for Citizens project to discuss the future of the EU as mentioned in strand 2 (European Commission, 2017).

The fact that the fund is not really seen in the report could imply that the report can be more critical, as it now has the ability to be more independent. The report shows both positive as well as critical arguments on the policy theme at stake here. First, the authors argue that the control mechanism on FDI is a “decisive step in the right direction” (Fabry et al., 2019, p. 1). So, this is a point of agreement with the EU. However, the authors also pose some critical arguments. They argue that there are some problems with the mechanism that go against the EU policy positions on the matter. First, and importantly, the policy brief argues for a “common

strategic perspective”, arguing that the current control mechanism has as a main weakness that

“it only provides an incentive and not an obligation for the fifteen member states that do not

yet have a control mechanism to set one up” (Fabry et al., 2019, p. 4). While common strategies

are part of the core aspects of the EU, the EU itself has not adopted such a common perspective, and member states are divided on such a perspective (Valero, 2017). Therefore, the position of the policy brief goes against the EU policy position. Second, the policy brief recommends that the EU should integrate the mechanism with other policies, most notably the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in order to still allow for trade with third countries (Fabry et al.,