Small Gulf states on the rise

Leiden University

Bachelor Thesis — Small States in World Politics Mike de Wit – S1659650

Supervisor - Dr. W.P. Veenendaal Second reader – Dr. F.E. Bakker

Amount of words: 8387

Small Gulf States on the Rise

A study of the foreign policy differences between Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain

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Introduction ... 4

Literature review on small states... 5

2.1 Classic (neo-) realist approaches on small states ... 5

2.2 Liberalism and small states ... 6

2.3 Constructivist approaches on small states ... 6

Tensions in the Persian Gulf ... 7

3.1 The foreign policy differences between Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain ... 8

Scientific relevance, purpose, and research question ... 9

Expectations ... 10

Conceptualization & operationalization ... 11

Methodology ... 13

Qatar... 14

8.1 Historical and regional context ... 14

8.2 Change in the foreign policy behaviour ... 15

8.3 Crisis within the Gulf Cooperation Council ... 15

8.4 Domestic characteristics ... 16

8.5 Political characteristics ... 16

Kuwait ... 18

9.1 Historical and regional context ... 18

9.2 A turning point for Kuwait ... 18

9.3 Contemporary foreign policy of neutrality ... 18

9.4 Domestic characteristics ... 19

Bahrain ... 22

10.1 Historical and regional context ... 22

10.2 Iran as foreign policy driver ... 22

10.3 Domestic characteristics ... 23

10.4 Political characteristics ... 24

10.5 Domestic threats to the regime ... 24

Conclusion ... 26

Bibliography ... 28

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In traditional theories of international relations, certain assumptions have been developed about the relationship between smallness, weakness, and limited capacities of states (Browning, 2006, p. 681). One small Gulf state that does not meet the classical assumptions about small state behaviour is the oil and gas abundant State of Qatar. The situation in which the small Gulf state finds itself is unique and the foreign policy behaviour of Qatar cannot be explained with classical theories on small state behaviour. Qatar will be the first Middle Eastern state to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022, owns the criticized media network Al Jazeera, holds different sorts of unorthodox diplomatic ties, and causes dissatisfaction among surrounding states (Cooper & Momani, 2011, pp. 118-127). In 2017, several states such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Saudi-Arabia have placed an economic and diplomatic embargo on the tiny state. Qatar refuses to give in to the demands that were made and, remarkable enough, it seems that it has so far largely been able to bypass the effects of the boycott (Jebreili, 2019).

Research on the behaviour of small states is limited due to the focus on great states. The deviant foreign policy of the small state of Qatar is especially interesting in comparison to similar small Gulf states such as Kuwait and Bahrain, that are seeming to behave more in accordance to the classical expected behaviour of small states and, ‘’fly low under the radar’’ (Cooper & Momani, 2011, p. 129). Research on the foreign policy behaviour of these three states could contribute to the general understanding of contemporary foreign small state behaviour and could contribute to future insights. Especially since these Gulf states have been modernized rapidly in recent decades and play an increasingly visible role on the international stage (Ulrichsen, 2015). Therefore, this thesis will conduct research into the foreign policy behaviour of Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain.

First, literature on small state behaviour will be discussed and an introduction of the selected cases will be provided. Subsequently, the scientific relevance, goal and expectations of this thesis will be discussed. The conceptualization, operationalization and methodology are then discussed before the data analysis will be conducted and the findings of this thesis will be examined.

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In classical international relations theories, (neo-) realism has a structural emphasis on the behaviour of great states, and small states are hardly included except in terms of security-issues. Small states would have limited capabilities and lack the abilities to defend themselves against great powers. Therefore, small states would be more concerned with external threats. The foreign policies of small states would reflect their constraints in the international environment and would limit foreign policy options (Elman, 1995, pp. 175-178). This would make them act more passive instead of behaving proactive, and the freedom of action of small states would depend on the benevolence of great states (Browning, 2006, p. 670). Small states could not take for granted that their sovereignty would be respected and violations by great states would take place when deemed necessary (Cooper & Shaw, 2009, p. 3). Small states would therefore be strongly affected by greater powerful states in the international system.

Precisely because of their limited capabilities, small states would sometimes act more risky than great states, because limitations in organizational capacities and resources would cause an inability to properly analyse the international environment (Hey, 2003, pp. 4-6; East, 1973, p. 576). This vulnerability derives from multiple factors such as geographical location, economic openness, and the dependence on the international system in terms of security (Sutton & Payne, 1993, pp. 582-591). This vulnerability of small states is especially important in the context of globalization that has strengthened the split between strong and weak actors (Cooper & Momani, 2011, p. 115).

Because of these vulnerabilities, different theories on security strategies developed. According to Vaicekauskaite (2017), in realism a state could either bandwagon or balance against larger powers. A small state could align itself with a threatening power and become subordinate to a dominant state, a bandwagon strategy, or form an alliance with states to balance a potential threat, a balancing strategy. A state could also try to remain neutral, and later on an alternative to realist theories developed, the theory of strategic hedging. Through this strategy, a state conducts an engagement policy at the same time as a balancing policy. In doing so, the state attempts to avoid one particular strategy and pursues a multilateral policy without confronting either of the threatening states (Vaicekauskaite, 2017, pp. 10-13; Salman & Geeraerts, 2015, p. 2; Goh, 2006).

2.2 Liberalism and small states

Classical liberalism also perceives the role of small states as less important compared to great states. However, neoliberal institutionalism, challenged (neo-) realism with its focus on security issues by addressing the importance of economics, international organizations, and relative gains instead of the emphasis on absolute gains (Ingebritsen, Neumann, Gstohl, & Beyer, 2006, p. 11). Suggested is that small states could actually have, mostly economic, issue specific influence (Browning, 2006, p. 672). The rise of international institutions gave small states greater diplomatic and legal status. According to Nye (2004), the increased interdependence of states reduced the emphasis on military aspects of power and expanded the influence and flexibility of small states in certain areas by the use of soft power (Long, 2017, pp. 6-7). As a result, the position of small states in relation to large states is perceived differently and small states became more visible.

2.3 Constructivist approaches on small states

The constructivist approach regards smallness as a relative concept, which depends on the self-perception of the state and its perceived role in the international community (Ingebritsen et al., 2006, pp. 23-24). The diplomacy of small states has decreased the perceived image of small states as weak (Cooper & Momani, 2011, pp. 116-117). Small states in contemporary international relations often behave as active mediators who set certain norms, for example, on the use of violence, human rights, and environmental issues. These so-called ‘norm entrepreneurs’ try to create support for certain standards (Long, 2017, pp. 8-9; Browning, 2006, p. 673). It is increasingly perceived that smaller states take the lead in concluding international treaties, with or without great states. With this so-called ‘non-great power law’, smaller states try to generate new international standards that may develop into general behaviour (Bower, 2015, p. 348). An example of this is the Mine Ban Treaty, which was signed by multiple states except by a number of large anti-personnel mine producing states. In the end, the treaty had great influence and caused general change of behaviour (Bower, 2015, pp. 356-358).

Many small states also would seek areas of activity that are not constrained by their geographical size. Small states find niches in which they actually exercise significant influence and are therefore in some respects stronger than great states (Ingebritsen et al., 2006, p. 190). Small states with significant influence mostly possess a lot of natural resources or are specialized in an issue-specific sector (Easterly & Kraay, 2000, p. 2014). For example, small states with an abundance of natural resources can compensate for the general disadvantages of

smallness. The economic wealth of some Arab states, due to the abundance of gas and oil, has increased their international economic influence because they possess a significant part of crucial energy sources for global industries (Baabood, 2018, p. 110). As a result, these states have power at the political-economic level, which allows these states to exercise both regional and global influence (Ingebritsen et al., 2006, p. 178). This approach poses a challenge to classical theories where the role of small states is experienced as marginal. From this perspective, it is suggested that a small state can actually exert influence, depending on the perceived role of that state and the possibility of developing issue-specific influence.

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Despite the fact that, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, most of the Gulf states are small, they play a major role in the global economy. Together, these states hold about 29 percent of the world's oil reserves, therefore eventual tensions in the Gulf region has considerable influence on the global economy (Baabood, 2018, pp. 109-110). In 2017, multiple states broke-off diplomatic ties with Qatar, which was accused of destabilizing the region by holding unorthodox diplomatic relationships such as those with Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood (Yom, 2018, pp. 67-69). Interesting is that the boycott of the small state of Qatar is led by fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. The GCC consists of six Middle Eastern states, namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait. Although these states have slightly different Freedom House scores (Freedom House, 2019a), these member states have similar ‘sultanistic’ authoritarian monarchist regimes, which would not or barely be limited by bureaucratic rules or institutions (Rathmell & Schulze, 2000, p. 48). The GCC was founded in 1981 in a time of regional instability, experiencing increasing domestic unrest and foreign threats with post-revolutionary Iran (Yom, 2018, p. 68; Macaron, 2018, pp. 101-102). However, although the GCC was created out of the urgent need for unity, member states have been disputing on various regional issues for decades (Macaron, 2018, p. 101). The GCC achieved most progress in more apolitical areas, by standardizing economic regulations (Ulrichsen, 2018, pp. 49-52). Three types of relationships can be observed within the GCC: a competitive relationship between Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia; Bahrain that almost entirely follows the policies of Saudi Arabia; and the relatively independent states of Kuwait and Oman (Colombo et al., 2012, p. 9). The

2017 once again exposed deep divisions between the Gulf states (Vakil, 2018). These tensions among the, mostly small, GCC-members and their resistance to regionalism offers an interesting contrast to the aforementioned theories on the expected, more cooperatively, behaviour of small states.

3.1 The foreign policy differences between Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain

While small states are generally considered as vulnerable actors in the international system, Qatar behaves as the opposite with its hyperactive foreign policy (Ayub, 2013, p. 3). Qatar took on the role of regional mediator and is not afraid to defy other Arab states when deemed necessary (Park, 2018, p. 6). Qatar hosts various political exiles, owns the by numerous criticized media network Al Jazeera, and creates and cuts various unorthodox diplomatic relationships. For example, Qatar strengthens diplomatic ties with the West, such as with the U.S., but also with Iran, Israel, Syria, and non-state Islamic movements as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, and Hamas (Rabi, 2009, p. 454; Trager, 2017). Two comparable members of the GCC are Kuwait and Bahrain, which seem to behave more in accordance with traditional expectations of small state behaviour. Kuwait took on the role of mediator within GCC tensions, and its foreign policy would be characterized by neutrality and hedging toward Iraq and Iran (Guzansky, 2015, p. 113; Harb, 2018, p. 2). Bahrain’s foreign policy would represent a policy of bandwagoning with Saudi Arabia (Guzansky, 2015, p. 116; Colombo et al., 2012, p. 9). According to Harb (2018, p. 14) and Guzansky (2015, p. 114), Qatar’s foreign policy could be perceived as strategic hedging by maintaining relationships with many regional and international powers, without being completely dependent on any power. However, some of these diplomatic relationships are very complex, unorthodox, and oftentimes conflicting (Kamrava, 2013). Qatar’s foreign policy significantly differs from that of the other GCC states on various issues, acting curiously free as it wishes (Roberts, 2012, p. 239). This makes Qatar an unusual case that is hard to understand with the traditional literature on international relations and challenges the contemporary understanding of the role of small states in the international system (Cooper & Momani, 2011, p. 114; Kamrava, 2013). The differences in the foreign policies of these three states is therefore interesting for further research.

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The Gulf region is generally not well studied in academic studies (Kamrava, 2013). The case of Qatar is difficult to understand with traditional theories and is especially conspicuous in comparison to Kuwait and Bahrain, which seem to behave more in accordance with traditional theories on small state behaviour. For clarification, two other smaller Gulf states, the UAE and Oman, will not be analysed. In part to keep this thesis feasible but also because these states are larger in terms of population and geographic size (Gulf Labour Markets, Migration, and Population, 2017; Worldometers, 2019)

Research into the foreign policies of Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain could complement classical literature on small state behaviour and could contribute to the understanding of small state behaviour in the Middle East. The role of small Gulf states has only been discussed to a limited extent in the literature of international relations. Research into these states is of importance because these states have become considerably more active at the international level due to the fact that these states possess crucial energy sources. Therefore, these states experience increasing global political-economic influence. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the contemporary understanding of the role of small states in the international system, and particular to contribute to the understanding of small states in the Middle East who have become considerably more active at the international level. This research could therefore provide more insight into the policy motivations of these states in the region and beyond.

Research will be conducted into the foreign policy differences of these three states in order to find out why Qatar is pursuing such a remarkable foreign policy, where Kuwait seems to prefer neutrality, and while Bahrain seems to bandwagon with its neighbour. The goal of this thesis is to find out what could explain these foreign policy differences and to contribute to this missing piece in the literature. The main question of this thesis will therefore be: ‘How can the foreign policy differences between Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain be explained?’

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It is expected that there are several complex explanations for the different foreign policies. In contrast to (neo-) realist assumptions, this thesis expects that certain domestic factors have great influence on the foreign policy decisions of Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain. According to Rosenau (1971, p. 97), the analysis of the political system of a state is crucial in the understanding of foreign policy choices. Elman (1995, p. 211) also argues that small state behaviour in the international environment is influenced by domestic structures and political processes. Foreign policy behaviour would be an interaction between both the international level as well as with the domestic level, and the foreign policies of some small states therefore only can be explained in context of domestic politics (Elman, 1995, p. 217). States behave differently because of different internal factors such as the political system, culture, and leaders (Partowazar, Jawan, & Soltani, 2014, p. 344). Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain have authoritarian monarchist regimes with authoritarian leadership, which would not or barely be limited by bureaucratic rules or institutions (Rathmell & Schulze, 2000, p. 48). However, these states have slightly different Freedom House scores (Freedom House, 2019a). According to Hussain (2011), decision-making would be influenced by the dynamics of the domestic political system in which leaders operate. Although the overall development of such dynamics in these authoritarian regimes is limited, it is expected that in each state the degree of political participation and the concentration of power will differ and therefore could determine foreign policy differences.

The second factor that is expected to explain the differences in the foreign policies, is related to the socio-demographic characteristics of the population. Decision-making can be understood by specifying the situation to which policymakers respond and the context in which this occurs (Farnham, 2004, p. 443). Small states would also be more subject to a close link between domestic and external affairs (Vital, 1967, p. 3). According to Sutton and Payne (1993, pp. 579-580), threats to national security not only derives from external issues, but also from internal issues such as economic development, public welfare and communal harmony, which the ruling elites experience as vital concerns for national security. In the complex Gulf region, which has a long history of cross-border conflicts, uprisings, and sectarian divisions (Vox, 2017; Harney, 2017), it is expected that internal issues such as the degree of communal harmony could be of influence on the regime in determining foreign policy choices.

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In order to conduct this research, the following concepts are important to explain. The smallness of a state could be defined on the basis of concrete data such as population number, geographical size, and the total income (Crowards, 2002, p. 143). According to Sutton (2011, p. 151), a state could be considered a small state if there is a population of 1.5 million or less. It is important to mention that Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain can be considered as small states but have large groups of labour migrants, which even constitute a majority over the domestic citizens, as shown in Table 1. The scope of this thesis is limited to the official citizens of these states only. Although this is difficult to determine in a region with very complex tribes and population groups, such as the Bedoon in Kuwait who are denied official citizenship (Kareem, 2013, p. 13), this limited scope is mainly aimed at the huge numbers of labour migrants.

In context of authoritarian regimes with authoritarian leadership, it is important to determine the concept of political leadership. According to Paige (1977), political leadership could be defined as the behaviour of persons in positions of political authority, their competitors and the interaction with members of society. Authoritarian leadership in particular could be defined as any political system in which power is concentrated with one leader, or a small elite, who is not responsible to the people (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017). Political decision-making is influenced by the dynamics of the domestic political system, which is therefore also important to define. According to Hussain (2011), the political environment of a state includes all laws, government agencies, and lobby groups that influence or limit individuals or organizations in society.

The characteristics of the states and socio-demographic characteristics of the population also need clarification as these are expected to influence foreign policy decisions. Different characteristics such as the ruling monarchy, Freedom House Score, population size, GDP per capita at purchasing power parity, nominal GDP per capita, and sectarian division are shown in Table 1. It should be noted that regarding the sectarian division, this thesis provides a rough estimation of the division between Sunni and Shia Islam. These religious movements are very complex and may differ in each region. Therefore, this thesis will not discuss the content of these religious movements.

Table 1

Characteristics of Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain

Qatar Kuwait Bahrain Ruling monarchy House of Al-Thani House of Al-Sabah House of Al-Khalifa

Freedom House Score 25/100

Not Free 36/100 Partly Free 12/100 Not Free Population size 2,404,776 10.1% national 89.9% foreign national 4,294,171 30.6% national 69.4% foreign national 1,314,562 48% national 52% foreign national GDP per capita PPP $ 133,254 World Rank #1 $ 69,257 World Rank #9 $ 52,129 World Rank #23 GDP per capita Nominal $ 72,677 World Rank #7 $ 32,737 World Rank #31 $ 27,538 World Rank #36

Sectarian division 75% Sunni 10% Shiite

70% Sunni 25-30% Shiite

25% Sunni 65-75% Shiite

Note. Ruling monarchy and Freedom House Score retrieved from Freedom House (2019a) with a score ranging from Least Free (0) to Most Free (100); population size retrieved from Gulf Labour Markets, Migration, and Population (2017); GDP per capita at Purchasing Power Parity – to compare living standards in states – retrieved from International Monetary Fund (2018); Nominal GDP per capita – to compare economic performance – retrieved from International Monetary Fund (2018); estimation of the sectarian division retrieved from Pew Research Center (2009).

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In order to do research on the different foreign policies of Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain, qualitative research will be conducted. Research will be conducted on the basis of a most similar systems design, in which similar cases will be compared and the focus will be on the variables that differ, which could explain the observed differences (Della Porta, 2008, p. 214). The most similar system design is chosen because Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain are very comparable states being the smallest states in the GCC, with a small number of official citizens, many labour immigrants, high incomes, and influential Sunni monarchies, as shown in Table 1. However, there is a difference in the Freedom House scores and the degree of sectarian division, which could explain foreign policy differences.

An in-depth analysis will be made of various written sources. These carefully selected sources will consist of scientific papers, books, videos, websites, news articles, reports, and an interview. During this research, news coverage from Al Jazeera will be critically examined because it is argued that Al Jazeera can be seen as a foreign policy tool of Qatar, or at least is influenced by the regime (Pourhamzavi & Pherguson, 2015, p. 20; El-Zayat, 2012)

In addition, an interview will be held with Mrs. Yvette van Eechoud. Mrs. van Eechoud is a former Dutch ambassador to Qatar from 2013 to 2016 and currently Director of European and International Affairs at the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy. Because of her position as former ambassador, Mrs. van Eechoud cannot be quoted. As a result, statements made during the interview by Mrs. van Eechoud will not be discussed and the interview will serve as an indicator for further research into certain issues addressed during the interview. As a result, no transcript can be made of the conversation and the interview will be referred to as personal communication with Mrs. van Eechoud. The appendix contains proof of the correspondence.

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Between 1972 and 1995, Sheikh Khalifa ruled over Qatar. Qatar’s foreign policy was focused on the securitization of Qatar through an alliance with Saudi Arabia (Pulliam, 2013, p. 5). His son - Sheikh Hamad - seized power in 1995 by a palace coup, and a clear change in the foreign policy of Qatar has since been recognized. Qatar developed an active foreign policy, whereby it exponentially increased its regional and international image (Boyce, 2013, pp. 367-368). Qatar tried to overcome its limited demographic, geographic and military capabilities and took on the role as active mediator in various conflicts, in order to securitize its position in the region, and prevent conflict from reaching its borders (Boyce, 2013, p. 372; Abu Sulaib, 2017, p. 31). The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 underscored the vulnerabilities of small states (Abu Sulaib, 2017, p. 36). Qatar and other Gulf states therefore consciously chose to increase military relationships with the U.S., in order to protect themselves against regional threats, as shown in Table 2, and therefore were able to focus on non-military issues (Haykel, 2013, p. 2).

Table 2

Estimated number of U.S. troops based in Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain

Qatar Kuwait Bahrain U.S. military personnel 10,000 15,000 7,000 U.S. military bases 1 4 3

Note. Estimated number of U.S. military personnel retrieved from McCarthy (2017); estimated number of U.S. military bases retrieved from the American Security Project (2018)

The founding of the media network Al Jazeera in 1996 was also part of Qatar’s foreign policy strategy (Pulliam, 2013, pp. 5-6). It was the first time that a media network in the Middle East did not refrain from openly criticizing regional politics and provided the same news coverage throughout the Arab world. (Khatib, 2013, p. 426). Al Jazeera reported extensively on the uprisings of the Arab Spring in 2011 and therefore contributed to the spreading of protests throughout the Middle East (Haykel, 2013, p. 2). However, critics claim that the news coverage of the state-owned Al Jazeera often matches the tone of Qatar’s foreign policy (El-Zayat, 2012). By the creation of Al Jazeera, Qatar invented a new model of diplomacy by the

usage of international broadcasting (Samuel-Azran, 2013, p. 1293), which bolstered Qatar’s foreign policy making.

8.2 Change in the foreign policy behaviour

A change in Qatar’s foreign policy can be recognized during the Arab Spring that started in 2011 when Qatar engaged with various political groups and actively participated in interventions (Mohyeldin, 2017; Khatib, 2013, p. 421). During the Libyan uprising, Qatar was one of the leading supporters of intervention against the Gaddafi regime, and supported Libyan rebels through military, financial, and logistical assistance (Boyce, 2013, p. 374). Qatar also directly and indirectly backed anti-government movements in uprisings such as in Syria, Tunisia, and Egypt (Nuruzzaman, 2015, p. 3; Fisher, 2018). Multiple states perceived this behaviour as overreaching and increased regional scepticism about the foreign policy motivations of Qatar (Ulrichsen, 2014a, p. 1). This clearly illustrates the unusual foreign policy of Qatar, which causes dissatisfaction among neighbouring states.

8.3 Crisis within the Gulf Cooperation Council

A breach in GCC consensus could be seen in Qatar’s support for Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations across the region during the Arab Spring (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018a, p. 35). Qatar is seen as supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, against which the other Gulf states are strongly opposed (Lo Galbo, 2014). The conversation with Mrs. van Eechoud (personal communication, May 28, 2019) showed that further research into this matter could be useful in understanding the regional context. Since the 1960s, many Brotherhood-associated arrived in Qatar – such as the influential Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi – and gained influential positions. According to Roberts (2013, p. 11), there is generally no ideological support between the Brotherhood and the Qatari regime. The relationship would be based on a network of personal contacts that has developed over the past decades, as Qatar became the host of a variety of actors (Trager, 2017). Other Gulf states perceive the Brotherhood as a threat to stability and this eventually led the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia to withdraw their ambassadors from Qatar in 2014 (Bohdan, 2017; Abu Sulaib, 2017, p. 32). In 2017, several states such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain broke all diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar and several demands were made, which would effectively end Qatar’s independence (Windrem & Arkin, 2017). Qatar refuses to give in and the emir - Sheikh Tamim, who succeeded his father in 2013

far it seems that Qatar has largely been able to bypass the effects of the boycott (Jebreili, 2019), and increased ties with states such as Iran, precisely the opposite effect of what the boycott was trying to achieve (Van Straaten, 2017). The way that the small state of Qatar responds to the boycott is a typical example of its peculiar foreign policy.

8.4 Domestic characteristics

Qatar only in recent decades transitioned from a small peninsula full of fishing villages to one of the richest states in the world under the leadership of the Al-Thani family, whose power was not challenged by, for instance, a merchant class. As a result, civil society has not been able to develop well (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018a, p. 28). Qataris are in many ways oppressed and there are restrictions on, for example, the freedom of expression and assembly (Freedom House, 2018). As the interview also indicated (Van Eechoud, personal communication, May 28, 2019), although civil society is very limited, and there are undoubtedly citizens who want more personal liberties, Qatari seem relatively satisfied with the status quo (Pulliam, 2013, p. 2). The events of the Arab Spring and the 2017 boycott have shown that Qatar is remarkably stable and no protests in Qatar are known (Azzam & Harb, 2018, pp. 73-74).

The absence of opposition is due to political repression (Freedom House, 2018). However, it is also due to the fact that the Qataris are extremely rich, as shown in Table 1. Qatar has a generous welfare system in terms of health care, taxes, education, and access to basic needs (Dargin, 2007, p. 136; Azzam & Harb, 2018, p. 74). In addition to this extensive welfare system, Qatar is a small state with a homogeneous and small population (Park, 2018, p. 8; Bank, Richter, & Sunik, 2014, p. 173). The Shia minority in Qatar only accounts for about 10% of the population and enjoys equal social-economic rights (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018a, p. 28). While it could be argued that these social programs are consciously designed to undermine any opposition, it could also be argued that the combination of the extensive wealth and the homogeneity of the population makes Qatar remarkable stable.

8.5 Political characteristics

Qatar’s decision-making power is controlled by the Al-Thani family and is highly centralized (Khatib, 2013, p. 429). The emir seems to possess all executive, judiciary, and legislative power, making his power is virtually unlimited. The only elections are for an advisory municipal council, which has a purely monitoring and advisory role on municipalities issues (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015). Elections for the legislature, the Advisory Council, have been repeatedly postponed and all members are appointed by the emir (Freedom House,

2018). It seems that the emir is the primary person who determines policies, and the ruling family occupies the most crucial state posts (Bank et al., 2014, p. 175). Due to this highly centralized leadership Qatar’s foreign policy is characterized by great flexibility (Kamrava, 2013). However, Qatar’s foreign policy is therefore also subject to unpredictability due to the lack of consultation in institutions and personality-driven foreign policies (Walsh, 2018; Abu Sulaib, 2017, p. 32). The enormous wealth and the absence of a domestic opposition paves the way for those in power to pursue a foreign policy without experiencing domestic interference, as long as the status quo is preserved.

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Kuwait has been ruled by the Al-Sabah dynasty since 1756 who have still a lot of political power (Sadek et al., 2019). Kuwait is a small state that is surrounded by Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, and therefore has a long history of mediating and compromising in order to maintain its independence (Guzanksy, 2015, p. 113). Kuwait was shocked by the Iraqi invasion in 1990 (Katzman, 2004, p. 2), and sought rapprochement afterwards with Iran in the hope that a balance of power between the two states would arise. However, relationships in recent years have been tense. Kuwait still sees both Iraq and Iran as potential threats and continues to appease both states by maintaining diplomatic ties with both parties, which could be recognized as strategic hedging (Guzanksy, 2015, pp. 113-114).

9.2 A turning point for Kuwait

Before Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Kuwait’s foreign policy resembled much of that of present-day Qatar. Kuwait pursued an ambitious and independent foreign policy that often went against the interests of neighbouring states (Abu Sulaib, 2017, p. 37). However, Kuwait was military virtually unprotected (Katzman, 2004, p. 2). Kuwait tried to safeguard its sovereignty by joining political organizations such as the United Nations, the GCC, and others (Boyce, 2013, p. 370). However, this did not prevent Iraq from invading Kuwait (Katzman, 2004, p. 2). Following Kuwait’s liberation, Kuwait stopped its active foreign policy behaviour and isolated itself more from regional affairs (Abu Sulaib, 2017, p. 37). The fear and threat of Iraq determined almost all facets of Kuwait’s foreign policy. Only after the fall of the Iraqi president - Saddam Hussein - there was a change in Kuwait’s foreign policy, when Kuwait started to engage again in important regional issues (Katzman, 2004, p. 4).

9.3 Contemporary foreign policy of neutrality

Kuwait now has a foreign policy that is characterized by neutrality (Naser, 2017, p. 95). Kuwait, like other small Gulf states, has a large U.S. military presence, as shown in Table 2, to protect itself against regional threats. Two states within the GCC that did not join the boycott of Qatar in 2017 were the small states of Kuwait and Oman. Because Kuwait has good relationships with the GCC members and has a long history of mediating in various regional crises, Kuwait

took on the role of neutral mediator (Kabalan, 2018, p. 23). Kuwait would take these mediation efforts because Kuwait does not want to get in a similar position as Qatar, which is just like Kuwait a small state in the Gulf region and could be vulnerable to regional disruptions (Abu Sulaib, 2017, p. 32). Despite these efforts, Kuwait did not resolve the Qatari crisis and is suspicious about new developments within the GCC, as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have announced a new bilateral partnership (Dudley, 2018), which could threaten the survival of the GCC. As a result of the invasion of Kuwait, it is aware of potential threats and tries to reduce these threats as much as possible. Therefore, Kuwait’s foreign policy is characterized by neutrality and mediation.

9.4 Domestic characteristics

As shown in Table 1, Kuwait has a relatively large Shiite minority, which is estimated to be about 20 to 25% of the population. The Shiite population generally enjoys the same rights as the Sunni population, hold governmental positions, and are represented in the parliament (Stephenson, 2011; Wells-Goldburt, 2015). However, conflicts with Iran and the uprising in Bahrain in 2011 have increased sectarian tensions. As a result, the Shiite population has suffered increased discrimination and a sectarian debate is taking place in society, although to a lesser extent than in, for example, Bahrain (Ahmed, 2016; Freedom House, 2019b).

Due to the oil wealth of Kuwait, Kuwaiti enjoy an extensive welfare system (Black, 2012). Although it is one of the world's richest states, shown in Table 1, it seems to develop less rapidly than other Gulf states. About 90 percent of Kuwait's incomes still derives from oil, and for a long-time diversification of the economy was not seen as priority. Although the government tried to cut spending, the parliament, about which will be more explained later, blocks many of these unpopular austerity measures. Although it seems that with the announcement of the 'New Kuwait' programme, the regime tries to boost the diversification of the economy and wants to become less dependent on oil revenues (Ramdharie, 2014; Flanders Investment & Trade, 2017; Al-Jouan, 2018). However, it is remarkable that attempts for further development are made, but that political stalemate is an obstacle for the implementation of policies, where in Qatar and Bahrain this is fully subject to the regime.

9.5 Political characteristics

Kuwait is known for having the most open political system in the Persian Gulf (Colombo et al., 2012, p. 5; Ulrichsen, 2014b, p. 216). In 1961, Kuwait became the first state of the Persian Gulf with a constitution and a parliament (Yom, 2018, p. 86). Conflict between tribal leaders and merchant families dates back to the 18th _{century, which led to series of negotiations. Therefore,}

the Al-Sabah family came to power by consensus rather than conflict. The Al-Sabah family still has executive power and dominates the judiciary. The emir – Sabah IV - appoints the prime minister and approves the cabinet that the prime minister appoints. The emir also has various ways to limit the power of the opposition, such as blocking proposals from parliament, the dissolvement of parliament, or calling out new elections (Freedom House 2019b). Despite the powers of the regime, parliament possesses certain monitoring rights, functions as a control mechanism and, although political parties are illegal, could be divided into different political blocks (Fanack, 2018a; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018b, pp. 13-14). Certain members of parliament offer opposition and have criticized the regime multiple times. This shows the relative liveliness of political dynamics in Kuwait, although its existence still depends on the emir (Rathmell & Schulze, 2000, p. 51). However, Kuwait's political system is also known to be dysfunctional because of an almost permanent impasse between parliament and government (Black, 2012; Boyce, 2013, p. 369), which hinders policy making.

As shown in Table 1, Kuwait is considered as partly free. Although Kuwaiti enjoy slightly more personal freedom than citizens in other Gulf states, they are in many ways oppressed by the regime (Yom, 2018, p. 79). During the Arab Spring starting in 2011, massive protests took place in Kuwait, leading to unprecedented criticism of the ruling monarchy (Bank et al., p. 164). The call for political reform caused an interaction of protest, parliamentary dissolutions, multiple elections, and interference of the regime - resulting in a series of changes in the composition of the parliament and cabinet (Freedom House, 2019b; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018b, p. 16). However, opposition groups still hold a significant number of parliamentary seats and Kuwait remained relatively stable, certainly in comparison to certain other states during the Arab Spring (Anthony et al., 2019). Despite this, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring restrictions have increased and dozens of activists have been prosecuted and imprisoned for criticizing the emir (Freedom House, 2019b; Ayub, 2013).

Despite the great influence of the emir and its royal family, there is a certain degree of opposition to be recognized, which creates a remarkable dynamic. An example of this dynamic could be perceived in the ratification of the Internal Security Pact of the GCC in 2012, which was controversial among Kuwaiti because some were afraid that it would turn out to be a

repressive treaty that would make GCC intervention possible (Van de Pas, 2014; Yom, 2018, p. 78). Although the Emir eventually signed the pact, parliament still has not ratified the treaty (Van de Pas, 2014; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018b, p. 37). This is a clear example of the interesting dynamics of parliament relating to foreign policy decisions. Although Kuwait is not a fully-fledged democracy and the regime certainly has authoritarian power, it does have more domestic political pressures in comparison to Qatar and Bahrain. As a result, domestic pressures has to be considered by the regime when determining policies.

B

The Kingdom of Bahrain is an island state near the coast of Saudi Arabia. When the British withdrew from the Gulf region in the 1970s, the idea emerged that the so-called Trucial Sheikhdoms, Qatar, and Bahrain would form a federation (Boyce, 2013, p. 366; Al–Sayegh, 2002, pp. 124-126). An important reason to include Bahrain was to guarantee its security in the long term, because the Shah of Iran claimed Bahrain as one of its regions. When this claim was dropped, Bahrain decided to remain independent because it was more advanced than the emirates in the east, Qatar also decided to remain independent, and the remaining Trucial Sheikhdoms together would form the UAE (Boyce, 2013, p. 366). The regional competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran has a significant impact on the foreign policy decisions of Bahrain, as Bahrain has ties with both states and is a small state in the Gulf region (Mabon, 2012, pp. 86-87).

10.2 Iran as foreign policy driver

According to Guzansky (2015, p. 119), the security agendas of the Gulf states are determined by the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which is especially true for Bahrain. Bahrain could be seen as 'the epicentre of the peninsula sectarian disenfranchisement’ (Mabon, 2012, p. 84). An authoritarian Sunni monarchy rules over a Shiite majority which constitutes about 65 to 75 percent of the population, as shown in Table 1. The Bahraini regime sees Shiite Iran as a threat to its national security and sovereignty and claims that Iran undermines the Sunni regime by supporting Bahraini Shiites (Guzansky, 2015, pp. 116-117). Tensions between the states have not decreased. The U.S. puts more pressure on Iran, which has consequences for the entire Gulf region. For example, the U.S. has stated that it will no longer tolerate states to purchase Iranian oil without imposing sanctions. In response, Iran threatens to block the Strait of Hormuz, which not only affects the Gulf region but also the global economy because it is an important route for global oil supplies (Nussbaum, 2019). Bahrain stated that it would not tolerate Iran blocking the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s response demonstrates the tense relationship between the small state of Bahrain and Iran, as an Iranian spokesperson responded with: "Mind your small size and don't threaten someone bigger than yourself" (Noack, 2019). Because Bahrain feels threatened by Iran, it seeks rapprochement with the West and with other Gulf states, in particular with Saudi Arabia. Bahrain, just as Qatar and Kuwait, partially protects

itself by the presence of U.S. military forces on its territory, as shown in Table 2, and houses its main maritime base in the Gulf region (Haykel, 2013, p. 2; Powers, 2018).

Bahrain has close ties with Saudi Arabia. The states are geographically close together, and as the interview also suggested, their ruling families also have close ties with each other (Van Eechoud, personal communication, May 28, 2019; Stratfor, 2018). Bahrain is of importance to Saudi Arabia because it is concerned that Iran increases its influence in the region and in particular in Bahrain. This generates concerns about the shared ties between the Shiites in Bahrain and the Shiites in eastern Saudi Arabia, which could affect its local population (Mabon, 2012, p. 87). The combination of these factors causes that Bahrain bandwagons with Saudi Arabia and uses its protection as a way to resist Iranian influences. In 2012, Saudi Arabia called for far-reaching unity between the GCC. The call for unity arose from the fear of Iran's increasing influence, the increase in sectarian conflicts in the region, and political pressures of the Arab Spring. However, this call did not receive much support from other Gulf states, except from Bahrain (Colombo, et al., 2012, p. 6). Because of these Iranian threats, Saudi interests, and its close ties with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain behaves more in accordance to the classical theories on small state behaviour by protecting itself through a bandwagon strategy with Saudi Arabia.

10.3 Domestic characteristics

Bahrain has the smallest economy of the GCC and although oil revenues still support the majority of the government budget, it is the first among the Gulf states to almost run out of oil. This has led Bahrain to lead the region in pursuing economic diversification (Fanack, 2018b; BBC News, 2019a). Bahrain has an extensive welfare state with free education, health care, and various extensive government subsidies. Strengthen its economic competitiveness and aligning this with the generous welfare system is challenging to the regime. As a result, the regime began to restrict access for foreign workers and politically active citizens to certain welfare services (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018c, p. 22).

The majority of the citizens, the Shiites, are strongly oppressed. The Shiites are economically and politically marginalized and plagued by relative poverty and unemployment (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018c, p. 16). The Shiites are discriminated in access to public services, jobs, and live in less developed neighbourhoods. As a result, Bahrain is characterized by a sectarian dispute between the Sunnis and Shiites (Riaz, 2017; BBC News, 2018a). The Sunni regime takes measures in order to create a sectarian balance to their advantage by offering

foreign Sunnis the Bahraini nationality, including various social benefits. The army and security services also mainly consist out of Sunni Muslims in order to create loyalty and protect the ruling regime against domestic threats (Spiegel, 2019; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018c, p. 23). Because of this sectarian debate, Bahrain has a lot of social unrest that provides the regime with internal security challenges that limits foreign policy options.

10.4 Political characteristics

The Al-Khalifa family rules Bahrain and dominates all important government functions. The King of Bahrain – King Hamad - has power over the executive, legislative and judicial authorities, and appoints and dismisses members of the government (Freedom House, 2019c). There is a parliament, but the appointed government is only accountable to the King. Parliamentary elections are not free, as election monitors and opposition parties are banned, and most opposition leaders have been prosecuted (Wintour, 2018; England, 2018). The power of the parliament is also very limited, it can propose legislation to the government but only the government is allowed to draft and submit the legislation (Freedom House, 2019c). These restrictions ensure that the majority of the population is excluded from politics and provides full political power to the Sunni monarchy, which therefore personally set foreign policies to their interests

10.5 Domestic threats to the regime

In 2011, the Arab Spring hit Bahrain. Large-scale protests arose and were driven by the demand for democratic reforms (Mabon, 2012, p. 89). The Bahraini security forces intervened violently, but protests continued (Klis, 2011). The protests posed a great threat to the legitimacy of the Bahraini regime. The Sunni Gulf states were deeply concerned about the uprising in Bahrain because these Gulf states have Shiite minorities themselves and unrest could spread across the region (Mabon, 2012, p. 87). The GCC's Peninsula Shield Forces, led by Saudi Arabia, eventually entered Bahrain at the request of the Bahraini King – King Hamad - and violently crushed the mass protests (Colombo et al., 2012, p. 11; Riaz, 2017). Bahrain is, especially since the 2011 uprising, one of the most repressive states in the Gulf region and began to adopt more characteristics of a police state (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018c, p. 3). Many civil rights and liberties have since been eliminated, formal political parties are prohibited, and opposition is not tolerated (Freedom House, 2019c). Due to the Arab Spring, Gulf states became aware of the vulnerabilities to political change, securing regime stability therefore gained priority

(Colombo et al., 2012, p. 11). Given the many internal challenges within Bahrain, its foreign policy is mainly focused on maintaining internal stability and the securitization of the regime, which explains why Bahrain has close ties with its neighbour Saudi Arabia.

C

In contrast to classical assumptions, this thesis expected that certain differences in domestic factors would have influence on the different foreign policy decisions of Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain. The aim of this thesis was to contribute to the contemporary understanding of the role of small states in the international system, and particular to contribute to the understanding of small states in the Middle East that have become considerably more active at the international level. This thesis tried to provide an answer to the following question: ‘How can the foreign policy differences between Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain be explained?’. First, it was expected that, although the overall development of dynamics of the domestic political system in authoritarian regimes is limited, the degree of political participation and the concentration of power would differ and could determine foreign policy differences. The results show that despite the fact that Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain have introduced certain forms of elections, popular vote does barely affect the position of the ruling families. However, the results did show that Kuwait actually differs from Qatar and Bahrain with its relative liveliness of its domestic political dynamics. Although the ruling family still has very extensive authoritarian powers and the population is oppressed, the regime has to deal with considerably more active political pressures. Decision-making therefore is influenced by the dynamics of the political system and the regime has to take these domestic pressures into account. The combination of these political dynamics and Kuwait's past with threatening neighbours causes that Kuwait's foreign policies are not as bold as, for example, Qatar. This expectation provides an answer to the case of Kuwait but does not apply to Qatar or Bahrain where the political elites have virtually unlimited control over foreign affairs without any significant form of domestic political pressure.

The second factor that was expected to explain the differences in foreign policies was related to internal issues such as the degree of communal harmony. The results show that some crucial domestic differences between these states can determine certain differences in foreign policies. Bahrain has a high degree of authoritarian leadership under a Sunni monarchy that rules over a Shiite majority, which are excluded from political participation. The regime is mainly concerned with maintaining internal stability and the securitization of its own position due to social unrest, which limits the foreign policy options. The combination of social unrest, an authoritarian minority regime, regional threats, and the importance of Bahrain to Saudi Arabia causes that Bahrain conducts a bandwagon strategy with Saudi Arabia. Qatar on the

other hand has a highly homogenous and small population that enjoys extensive wealth. Although there is certainly repression of the Qatari citizens, a part of the Qataris could be seen as 'too rich to protest'. This provides the regime with few domestic problems and makes Qatar remarkable stable (Roberts, 2013, p. 9). These circumstances provide the Qatari regime with virtually unlimited power. Because of the regime’s personalist political nature, the foreign policy of Qatar will depend on the ambitions of its political elite. The combination of a very small population, extreme wealth, and highly centralized decision-making ensures that the political elite, who seem to have become increasingly ambitions in recent years, can pursue a foreign policy without domestic pressures.

In general, the foreign policy differences between Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain can be explained by Kuwait’s relatively active civil-society, Bahrain’s main concern with the securitization of the regime, and Qatar’s small and homogenous population in combination with extreme wealth and highly personalized politics. However, potential challenges are ahead. As on June 13, 2019, two oil tankers were attacked in the Strait of Hormuz, which increased regional tensions. Although it is officially unknown who is responsible, Iran is already being accused by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia (Wintour, 2019). The attacks have increased the fear of a major regional conflict, with the small Gulf states in between. The region therefore remains highly relevant for future research and it will be interesting to observe how the small Gulf states will deal with this new crisis.

R

Further research on the cases of Oman and the UAE is recommended in order to get a more comprehensive understanding into the foreign policy differences of small states in the Persian Gulf. It might be useful for further research to include labour migrants as it is expected that in the long term these majority groups will have a greater impact on the societies. In addition, further research into the family structures of these regimes could be relevant in order to gain insight into the motivations of decision-making in these authoritarian states.

B

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