Tailored funding for democracy : an analysis of democracy promotion by the European Union in post-Arab Spring countries between 2014 and 2016

TAILORED FUNDING FOR DEMOCRACY

An analysis of democracy promotion by the European Union in post-Arab Spring countries between 2014 and 2016

Master’s thesis Political Science:

Political Economy

Name: S.F. (Bas) de Groot

Student number: 10346252

Supervisor: Dr. F. Boussaid

Second reader: Dr. D. Bouris

Date: 29 June 2018

Word count: 23389

2

Abstract

The persistence of authoritarian regimes is a characteristic of the Middle East and North Africa

(MENA) region. In 2011, various protesters across this region showed their discontent with the

economic and political policies of multiple regimes. The call for ‘democratisation’ has been one of

that often adduced motives during this ‘Arab Spring’. The European Union (EU) has promoted the

concept of democracy prior the Arab Spring and continued to do so after the uprisings. Despite the

fact that the majority of MENA-states did not go through a democratisation process after the

uprisings, the EU has not decided to reduce their funds for democracy promotion. In fact, the EU

has implemented revised (financial) strategies to promote the concept of democracy and the

additional principles of human rights from 2011 onwards. Within the new democracy promotion

strategies, tailored funds are central for the target states in the region. The EU revised their existing

financial instruments in 2014 to make this possible. Two of these are: the European Instrument for

Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). Besides

these, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was succeeded by the

European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) in 2014. In sum, various financial tools have been

available for the EU since the end of the Arab Spring. This thesis poses the following research

question: Has the EU differentiated in using its financial instruments for democracy promotion

in post-Arab Spring neighbourhood countries between 2014 and 2016? By taking the beneficiaries

of democracy promotion funds in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, this thesis examines in whether the

EU has differentiated in using their latest instruments and in what way the funds are adapted to the

divergent political environments of the post-Arab Spring neighbourhood states. The named

beneficiaries, ENPI, ENI, EIDHR and DCI, are included in the analysis. The analysis of the cases

finds that each financial instrument supports diverging projects that differ in term of scope and

budget. Between 2014 and 2016, the EU has differentiated in targeting democracy promotion

projects, depending on the Arab Spring political outcomes. Countries that are stable authoritarian

and do not show intentions to democratise, are likely targeted with projects that improve human

rights and fundamental freedoms. When countries show that they are willing to democratise, the

EU rather focusses on assisting the process by supporting projects that improve good and

democratic governance. In the latter case, when target countries are democratising, the total amount

of funds that is disbursed by the EU is significantly higher.

The findings regarding the

differentiation between the instruments cannot be generalised, but pose

new hypotheses for future

research in EU democracy promotion.

Keywords: Democracy promotion, human rights promotion, European Union, European

Neighbourhood Policy, MENA, Arab Spring, financial instruments, democratisation, democratic

transition

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Table of Contents

1.

INTRODUCTION ... 7

2.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 9

2.1

Democracy and democratisation ... 9

2.1.1

The concept of democracy promotion ... 10

2.1.2

Democracy promotion and human rights ... 12

2.1.3

Three models to map promotion strategies ... 12

2.1.4

Funds for democracy promotion ... 14

2.2

Democratisation and democracy promotion in the MENA region ... 15

2.2.1

Authoritarian persistence in MENA ... 15

2.2.2

Arab Spring background ... 17

2.2.3

EU support for democracy promotion ... 18

2.2.4

EU democracy promotion and the Arab Spring ... 20

2.2.5

Revised strategies after the Arab Spring ... 22

2.2.6

The academic debate ... 24

2.3

Research design ... 25

2.3.1

Operationalisations ... 25

2.3.2

Case selection ... 26

2.3.3

Methodology ... 28

2.3.4

Data selection ... 29

3.

RESULTS & ANALYSIS ... 32

3.1

The Egyptian case ... 33

3.1.1

Egypt and the EU ... 34

3.1.2

Overview of DP-expenses ... 35

3.1.3

Scope of the different financial instruments ... 36

3.1.4

The DP-expenses in the Egyptian political context ... 38

3.2

The Moroccan case ... 41

3.2.1

Morocco and the EU ... 42

3.2.2

Overview of DP-expenses ... 43

3.2.3

Scope of the different financial instruments ... 44

3.2.4

The DP-expenses in the Moroccan political context ... 47

3.3

The Tunisian case ... 50

3.3.1

Tunisia and the EU ... 51

3.3.2

Overview of DP expenses ... 53

3.3.3

Scope of the different financial instruments ... 53

3.3.4

The DP-expenses in the Tunisian political context ... 56

3.4

Comparative case study ... 60

3.4.1

Overview of expenses ... 60

3.4.2

The type of projects within the financial instruments ... 61

3.4.3

Scope of the different financial instruments ... 62

3.4.4

The DP-expenses in their political contexts ... 67

4.

CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION ... 71

LITERATURE ... 75

4

Maps of Europe and the MENA region

Map of Europe

Source: One World (Nations Online, 2018)

Map of the Middle East and North Africa region

Source: One World (Nations Online, 2018)

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List of Tables

Table 1: EU-MENA partnerships that include democracy promotion ... 19

Table 2: EU’s financial instruments that include democracy promotion ... 19

Table 3: Matrix of Political Rule in the Middle East after the Arab Spring ... 27

Table 4: Categories and subcategories in EU- democracy promotion, by author ... 30

Table 5: Indicative schedule for commitments of ENI funds (European Commission, 2014b, p. 24) .. 35

Table 6: Expenses of all instruments together versus DP-share per year ... 35

Table 7: DP-expenses in Egypt per EU instrument between 2014 and 2016 ... 37

Table 8: Multiple country projects in Egypt (2014-2016) ... 38

Table 9: Highlighted Human Rights Projects between 2014 and 2016 ... 39

Table 10: Highlighted CSO beneficiaries in Egypt ... 40

Table 11: Indicative schedule of ENI commitments (European Commission, 2014, p. 23). ... 43

Table 12: Expenses of all instruments together versus DP-share per year ... 43

Table 13: DP-expenses in Morocco per EU instrument between 2014 and 2016 ... 45

Table 14: Multiple country projects in Morocco (2014-2016) ... 46

Table 15: Total of beneficiaries in Governance & Democracy per year (all instruments) ... 48

Table 16: Indicative schedule of ENI commitments in Tunisia) ... 52

Table 17: Expenses of all instruments together versus DP-share per year ... 53

Table 18: DP-expenses in Tunisia per EU instrument between 2014 and 2016 ... 54

Table 19: Multiple country projects in Tunisia (2014-2016) ... 55

Table 20: Summary of beneficiary types per instrument (all cases, 2014-2016) ... 62

Table 21: Total amount of DP-beneficiaries compared per instrument (all cases, 2014-2016) ... 63

Table 22: Total amount of DP-beneficiaries compared per state (all cases, 2014-2016) ... 64

Table 23: Total amount of multiple country projects (MCP) in all cases (2014-2016)... 65

Table 24: Total amount per category (all cases, 2014-2016) ... 66

Table 25: Adjusted matrix of Political Rule in the Middle East after the Arab Spring. ... 68

Table 26: Overview political context and beneficiaries ... 70

List of Figures

Figure 1: Timeline Egypt from Arab Spring onwards ... 33

Figure 2: Expenses in Egyptian specific projects per category (2014 and 2015 respectively) ... 38

Figure 3: Subcategories in Human Rights ... 40

Figure 4: Expenses in Egyptian specific projects per category (2016) ... 40

Figure 5: Subcategories in Governance (2014-2016) ... 40

Figure 6: Expenses in Moroccan specific projects per category (14 -16) ... 47

Figure 7: Subcategories in Governance (14 - 16) ... 47

Figure 8: Subcategories in Governance and Democracy... 48

Figure 9: Subcategories in Human Rights (2014-2016) ... 49

Figure 10: Subcategories in Development (2014-2016)... 49

Figure 11: Timeline Tunisia from Arab Spring onwards ... 50

Figure 12: Expenses specific projects per category (2014) ... 56

Figure 13: Subcategories in Human Rights (2014) ... 56

Figure 14: Expenses Tunisian specific projects per category (2015) ... 57

Figure 15: Subcategories in Governance (2015) ... 57

Figure 16: Expenses Tunisian specific projects per category (2016) ... 59

Figure 17: Subcategories in Governance (2016) ... 59

Figure 18: Total amount of specific country DP-funds per state (all instruments, 2014-2016) ... 60

Figure 19: Subcategories in Governance (all cases, 14-16) ) ... 66

Figure 20: Subcategories in Human Rights (all cases, 14-16) ... 66

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List of Abbreviations

Acronym

Meaning

CAP2D

Focus on Decentralisation and Integrated Territorial Development’

CFSP

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security

Policy

CSO

Civil Society Organisation

DCI

Development Cooperation Instrument

DP

Democracy promotion (broad definition including, human rights ed.)

EIDHR

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights

EED

European Endowment for Democracy

EIB

European Investment Bank

EMP

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

ENI

European Neighbourhood Instrument

ENP

European Neighbourhood Policy

ENPI

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

EU

European Union

HRDF

Human Rights and Democracy Initiative

IESS

Initiatives d'Emploi en Economie Sociale et Solidaire en Tunisie

LADDER

Local Authorities as Drivers for Development Education and

Raising-awareness

MCP

Multiple country projects

MEDA

Mediterranean Development Assistance

MENA

Middle East and North Africa

MEPI

Middle East Partnership Initiative

NGO

Non-governmental organisation

SPRING

Support to Partnership and the Reform and Inclusive Growth

UCLG

United Cities and Local Governments

UfM

Union for the Mediterranean

US

United States

USAID DG

Democracy and Governance Unit of

the

United States Agency for

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1. Introduction

‘’If we have a good neighbourhood that is sustainable and secure, that is democratic and

economically growing, that that is to our advantage because we are able to trade with them,

to work with them, to support them and to see them as our neighbours into the future. So as I

began, Europe should be judged by its ability to operate in its own neighbourhood and my

determination is to make sure that the judgment is a positive one.’’

(Ashton, 2011a, p. 5)

This statement by Catherina Ashton, former High Representative of the Union for Foreign

Affairs and Security Policy (CFSP), describes a desirable ending of the regional Arab uprisings

in the eyes of the European Union (EU). To be precise, the EU neighbourhood should become

more sustainable, secure, democratic and economically growing. At the time of the speech, the

spirit of the Arab Spring was still lively in various states across the Middle East and North

Africa region (MENA). The motives of the protesters in the different countries cannot be

generalised into a few demands. However, similar to the wishes of the EU, scholars often

summarized the movements as a call for more economic prosperity and democracy.

Long before the uprisings, the European countries have been trying to stimulate

economic development and democratisation in other regions. Since the creation of the European

Economic Community, European countries have been a donor of development aid in order to

achieve more economic prosperity across the globe. Policies for democracy promotion were

first implemented at the end of the 20

th

century.

EU-states have been committed to promote

democracy by the founding treaty of the EU in 1992 (Huber, 2008).

As democracy promotion

is anchored in its foundations, it is n

o wonder that the CFSP Ashton openly supported the calls

for democratisation during the Arab Spring.

Despite the years of democracy promotion prior and during the protests, democracy has

not consolidated in the MENA region. When the last flames of the Arab Spring slowly

extinguished from 2012 onwards, the results of the uprisings could be properly assessed by

scholars. It appears that the outcomes of the revolutions differ vastly per state. Cases like Syria

and Libya are still coping with the results of the revolts as civil wars continue to disrupt their

societies. In contrary, Tunisia is an example that is in the trajectory of a transition towards a

democratic regime. Other regimes, like in Morocco and Jordan, coped with their relatively

minor protest by implementing governmental changes. Generally, it can be concluded that the

Arab Spring have not met the often heard prophecy of democratic transition.

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In the light of these outcomes, the EU adjusted their foreign policy to provide new tools

for promoting and assisting democratic processes in neighbourhood countries. First, the EU

revised its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2011. Subsequently, the EU financial

instruments were restructured in 2014. Two of these instruments were the European Instrument

for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI).

In addition, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was succeeded

by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) in 2014. One year later, in 2015, the EU

revised its ENP once again. With all these new policy tools available, it became possible for

the EU to ‘operate in the own neighbourhood’ through multiple ways. Unlike Ashton

mentioned, this thesis will not assess whether these interventions have been ‘positive’. Instead,

the focus will be on how the EU used all the financial instrument next to each other to promote

democracy in post-Arab Spring states. The following question will be addressed in this thesis:

Has the EU differentiated in using its financial instruments for democracy promotion

in post-Arab Spring neighbourhood countries between 2014 and 2016?

The question examines EU democracy promotion and its funding, while applying these

concepts to post-Arab Spring states. By answering this question, a twofold goal is being

pursued: (1) to understand how the EU uses their different financial instruments to promote

democracy (2) to explore to what extent the latest financial instruments are used differently in

states of the Southern neighbourhood.

In the first part of this thesis, the theoretical framework will lay the foundation to

understand the concept of democracy and democracy promotion. The particular role of

democracy promotion in the context of the Arab Spring will also be elucidated. Also, the

policies that the EU uses specifically to promote democracy will be discussed. In the subsequent

chapter, the research design, the case selection and methodology will be explained. After the

research design, the results and analysis chapter will address the research question. Three cases

Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, are analysed separately where after they are analysed together in

a comparative case study. At the end of the thesis, the conclusions will be summarised and the

research question will be answered. In addition, the limitations and hypotheses for further

research will be described.

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2. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework describes the concepts, theories and associated debates that are

linked to democracy promotion. This framework for further analysis can be formulated by

reviewing the available literature. This chapter will start with the general theories on

democracy, democratisation and democracy promotion. Subsequently, these concepts will be

discussed in light of the EU policies and developments in the MENA region. The end of this

chapter contains the research design, including the mythology and case selection, in order to

address the research question.

2.1 Democracy and democratisation

Scholars of political science seek to provide general theories that can be widely applied. The

fact that the theories need to be applicable to multiple cases poses challenges for defining the

concepts within the theory. This also counts for one of the most discussed concepts in political

science, the regime type ‘democracy’. Is it even possible to formulate a dominant definition?

The widely cited

(Dahl, 1971, p. 12)

takes the ‘procedural’ definition of Schumpeter

(1942) and the polyarchy conditions from Dahl (1971) to give an idea on how ‘democracy’ can

be described. Schumpeter sees democracy as ’that institutional arrangement for arriving at

political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive

struggle for the people’s vote’

(Schumpeter, 1942, p. 269)

. From this definition can be

concluded that democracy contains (1) an institutional arrangement in which political

decision-making is made; (2) individuals with passive suffrage that participate in competitive elections

and (3) the convergence of the ‘will’ of the people to political power. Dahl approaches the

definition differently by stating that a democracy, or polyarchy, must fulfil the conditions of

contestation and inclusiveness. Respectively, to reach a high degree of political competition

and to implement universal suffrage

(Dahl, 1971, p. 12)

. Schumpeter’s and Dahl’s definition

might help to understand further references to the concept of democracy. Still, democracy and

its negation, ‘authoritarianism’, continue to be terms that are associated with evaluative and

context-dependent connotations that impede consensus on an objective definition

(Whitehead,

2002)

.

Democracy can be described as a regime type, while democratisation is a type of process

that is used in transitology. The concept is derived from Huntington’s theory in The Third Wave:

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Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, in which he points at three time periods

wherein multiple states democratised. In this volume, the concept ‘democratization’ is

described as the movement towards a government that is selected in a free, open and fair

election, as a replacement of a government that was not chosen this way

(Huntington, 1993, p.

9)

. After Huntington’s publication, scholars have elaborated extensively on the ‘waves of

democratization’. The creation of a universal model to concretise democratisation is described

as the transition paradigm

(Carothers, 2002)

. This paradigm assumes that democratisation

starts already when a state is moving away from an authoritarian regime type toward democracy

(Carothers, 2002, p. 6)

. The process happens in three stages: opening, breakthrough and

consolidation. First, there is a period of political liberalisation by an authoritarian regime, then

more democratic policies break though and finally there will be a total consolidation of

democratic forms into one substance

(Carothers, 2002, p. 7)

. This transition paradigm has been

a respected theory in transitology, on which various scholars built. One of them is the widely

cited author Fukuyama. In his famous volume ‘The End of History and the Last Man’, he stated

that it is likely that every country will go through the process of democratisation. In this case,

the universalization of Western liberal democracy is the final form of human government

(Francis Fukuyama, 1989)

.

Besides the scholars that elaborated on the theory, the paradigm has also been under

scrutiny. One of the critiques is that the paradigm is often not fully completed. In various third

wave states, the opening stage of the paradigm started with political liberalisation and multiple

democratic reforms. However, it is the breakthrough and consolidation stage that are not

completed, stranding the transition into a political grey zone. This is a stage where some states

show attributes of a democracy together with clear democratic deficits

(Carothers, 2002, p. 9)

.

Such states are often characterized as a hybrid regime, illiberal democracy, facade democracy

or competitive authoritarianism regime

(Carothers, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002)

. In such a

regime, the transition to democracy has been stalled and is not likely to proceed. For some

consolidated democratic states, this phenomenon has been dissatisfying and a reason to provide

these regimes with ‘democracy assistance’ or ‘democracy promotion’.

2.1.1 The concept of democracy promotion

The promotion of democracy is not equal to the concepts ‘democracy’ and ‘democratisation’.

Schmitter and Brouwer (1999) use the following definition, consisting of two qualitatively

elements:

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(1)

‘’Democracy Promotion consists of all overt and voluntary activities adopted,

supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors

explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes and

the subsequent democratization of autocratic regimes in specific recipient countries

(2)

Democracy Protection consists of all overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported,

and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly

designed to contribute to consolidation of democracy in specific recipient countries.’’

(Schmitter & Brouwer, 1999, p. 55)

Different from the concept democratisation, democracy promotion contains a normative aspect.

It is the encouragement of an external state to implement particular democratic reforms. These

reforms can be policies like political liberalisation or the consolidation of democracy in

autocratic regimes, both in line with the discussed stages of democratization by Carothers. The

definition above states that promotion can be executed by both public and private external

actors. This means that for example governmental organisations, non-governmental

organisations (NGO’s) and enterprises can all engage in democracy promotion.

Particularly Western democratic states engage in promoting their concept of democracy

on a global scale

(McFaul, 2004, p. 155)

. Why do these states want to promote their regime

type in external non-democratic states? Motives for states to export their regime type can be

defended from a safety and an economic angle. A dominant theory is that democracies are less

likely to engage in war, benefitting both sender and target state. Kant described this assumption

in his conditions for perpetual peace, on which the later democratic peace theory is based. In

this theory, democratic governments are less likely to fight each other as they are held

accountable for their acts by voters. This provides more incentives to governments to consider

the negatives effects of an inter-state war carefully

(Doyle, 1983)

. The theory is also supported

by the fact that Western states engaged more in democracy promotion at the beginning of the

21

st

century. The increase in democracy promotion policies from 2001 onwards can be regarded

as a response to aggression from terrorists groups in the September 11 attacks

(Carothers, 2010;

Dalacoura, 2005)

. As these groups came from non-democratic states, democratisation even

became a means to reduce attacks by terrorist groups.

Next to safety considerations, another prevalent argument for democracy promotion can be

found in economic theories. In this view, democracies are more likely to conclude trade

agreements with similar regimes than other regime types

(Mansfield, Milner, & Rosendorff,

2002)

. Subsequently, the promoting of democracy could lead to an increase in trade. An

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economic argument can also be a supportive argument for the Democratic Peace Theory, as

developed integrated economies are less likely to go to war

(Gartzke, 2007, p. 178; Howse,

2005)

.

A last motive for promoting democracy is that the regime type is good in itself. Democracy

is not only a way of organising politics, but provides more advantages in the eyes of the sender

state. In their view, an instrumental worth can be found in democratic regimes as they encourage

to respect human rights, provide development aid and promotes policies like the United Nations

(UN) Development Goals (Burnell, 2008). The normative aspect of democracy promotion is

clearly visible in this reasoning, as democracy is presented as a state form that is good for human

kind in general. The regime type ‘democracy’ should be a universal norm in this last way of

reasoning.

2.1.2 Democracy promotion and human rights

Schmitter and Brouwer (1999) described democracy promotion as the political liberalization of

autocratic regimes and the subsequent democratization. A broader definition of democracy

promotion does not only contain political liberalisation, but also the promotion of human rights.

This includes political and civil rights such as the rights to free expression, free association,

freedom for movement and equality before the law

(Carothers, 1994)

. In this view, democracy

and human rights are considered as inseparable and combine a new basic norm in the

international order

(Guilhot, 2005)

. However, this inseparable connection is not free from

theoretical and practical critiques. Theoretically, democracy is a political ideology while human

rights are a based on international law

(Carothers, 1994)

. The fact that these concepts differ in

origin does make them separable, according to criticasters. An example of a more practical

critique is that funds for human rights promotion can be remarked as uncomfortable. An

example is that ‘neutral’ NGO’s can be placed in an awkward position, when these funds are

linked with political motives of the sender state

(McFaul, 2004)

. In sum, the distinction between

is not easy to determine, but fact is that democracy promotion often contains both democracy

assistance as well as human rights promotion.

2.1.3 Three models to map promotion strategies

The steering towards a democratic transition can be executed via various strategies. Scholars

wrote extensively on the different methods for sender states. Two experts on the matter,

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Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011), provide three models to characterise strategies; linkage,

leverage and the ‘governance model of democracy promotion’.

The first model, linkage, refers to the political or economic connections between the

sender and target state. Democracy promotion via linkage can be divided into a direct and

indirect form. The direct way supports the democratic civil society and political opposition

groups materially or educationally. Examples of material support are the funding of civil society

organisations (CSO’s) or NGO’s. Educational support can be given by organising conferences

and lectures on democracy related topics (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011, p. 891). The other

form, the indirect way of linkage, promotes democracy through intensified transnational

exchanges with democratic countries. Economic development, or modernisation, is done by

increasing trade relations, investment and development aid (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011,

p. 891). Due to extensive financial cooperation, target states can see the (economic) advantages

of a democratic procedures that are plied by sender states.

The methods used in linkage are popular democratic aid policies, but also received

criticisms. One is that a lot of direct promotion funds to strengthen civil society are targeted at

NGO’s. However, there is no proof that NGO’s are at the heart of civil society

(Carothers &

Barndt, 1999)

. Apart from the fact, a strong civil society does not even ensure a better

functioning of a democratic society

(Carothers & Barndt, 1999)

. A critique on the indirect way

is that trade engagements cannot be underpinned as an effective method for democracy

promotion

(Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008)

. The multivariate analysis by Schimmelfennig

and Scholtz does not show a correlation between trade engagement and the democratisation of

target states. In addition, a study by Knack shows that the relationship between development

aid and democracy is even weaker

(Knack, 2004)

. One has to keep in mind that the methods

vary in terms of success in each case. Although linkage methods are often used by democracy

promoters, the learning point of this review is that the effectiveness of these methods are not

undisputed.

Leverage methods stimulate democratisation via political conditionality, a bargaining

process between the democracy promoting agency and a target state (Lavenex &

Schimmelfennig, 2011, p. 892). The sender state can impose conditions in a positive way by

providing rewards and incentives for certain policies. More negative methods of ‘leverage’ are

the imposition of economic sanctions, diplomatic coercion or even warfare

(Levitsky & Way,

2002)

. Scholars have examined the success rate of these methods and agree that a reward can

only be effective for democratization, when the membership of an organisation like the EU is

concerned

(Ethier, 2003; Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008)

. Other rewards like financial help

14

or economic sanctions do not prove to be effective for democratization compared to

membership conditionality

(Peksen & Drury, 2010; Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008)

.

The last model, the governance model of democracy, promotes democratic principles

through policy-specific and functional cooperation with external states

(Lavenex &

Schimmelfennig, 2011)

. When governmental departments of democratic promotor states and

target states cooperate in transnational networks, the policies of the target state can be

influenced by democratic ways of working. This model focuses on promoting democratization

indirectly by joint problem-solving with an emphasis democratic values like transparency,

accountability and participation

(Freyburg, Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, Skripka, & Wetzel,

2009; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011)

. In this way, states are able to persuade target states

to adopt policy-specific democratic governance provisions when there is no potential of

accession conditionality

(Freyburg et al., 2009, p. 916)

.

2.1.4 Funds for democracy promotion

Established democracies started with the sponsoring of democracy promotion to

non-democratic states since the mid-80s

(Ottaway & Carothers, 2000)

. As a response to the

September 11 attacks, democracy promotion became a significant theme in United States (US)

and EU foreign policy from the beginning of the 21st century onwards. Since then, budget

allocations have increased for promoting democracy externally. The allocated funds are usually

assigned to the financial arms of certain policies or partnerships, the financial instruments. An

instrument is used to carry out the goals of one or multiple policies, meaning that its cope can

be divergent. For example, a financial instrument can support development projects that

improve infrastructure, while also supporting an NGO-projects that promotes gender issues.

When looking at the instruments that engage in democracy promotion, the US uses the

following programmes

(Huber, 2008)

:

1. Democracy and Governance Unit of the United States Agency for International

Development (USAID DG);

2. The State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Initiative (HRDF)

3. Regional instruments, like the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)

As discussed, the EU uses instruments like ENI, EIDHR and DCI. Looking at the models of

Lavenex & Schimmelfennig (2011) the projects that these instruments support mostly fall under

the linkage model. This is because they mostly consist of direct or indirect economic support.

15

The US and EU instruments are similar as they both support projects via the linkage

model. In general, they support the same set of institutions or civil society organisations in

target states

(Huber, 2008)

. The US and EU programmes are dissimilar in other facets. Contrary

to the EU, US programmes often fund particular party programmes or projects that encourage

religious freedom (Huber, 2008). Different to the US, EU programmes fund projects that: (1)

have a bottom-up approach; (2) engage in state capacity building and (3) fight for human rights

(Huber, 2008; Youngs, 2003)

. Examples of human rights programmes are projects that strive

to abolish the death penalty or projects that aim to resolve issues of racism and xenophobia.

The differences in the US and EU programmes underline the various views of understanding

‘democracy’ and the ways to consolidate it.

2.2 Democratisation and

democracy

promotion in the MENA region

The MENA region did hardly take part in the third wave of democratisation and is still known

for its high number of repressive regimes. This made scholars curious why the waves of regime

change did not affect the region. An important decelerator of democratic transition has been the

strong persistence of authoritarian regimes in the MENA. What factors make the region

favourable for authoritarian regimes and challenging for democratisation? This question will

be answered in light of different scholarly insights. Subsequently, the specific democracy

promotion policies by the EU in the region will be analysed.

2.2.1 Authoritarian persistence in MENA

Authoritarian regimes provide a challenging environment political liberalisation and

democratisation. Why can authoritarian regimes be find all across the MENA specifically?

From a social-economic point of view, scholars point at multiple factors that feed the

consolidation of authoritarianism in developing MENA states. These are the persistence of:

widespread poverty, low literacy rates, high income inequality and a lack of modernisation in

the economy

(Hinnebusch, 2006, p. 391; Posusney & Angrist, 2005, p. 23)

. These problematic

economic characteristics do not make political input by the inhabitants the main priority of the

citizens. On the other hand, the MENA does not only consist of developing states, but also of

rich fossil fuel states. According to the widely cited Ross (2001), authoritarianism in these states

persists because of the rentier-effect. Resource-rich governments use low tax rates and

patronage to confine tendencies for democratization. In addition, resource wealth allows

16

authoritarian regimes to strengthen their internal security forces and repression capabilities

(Ross, 2001, p. 325)

.

Bellin (2004) does not point at the absence of democratic or economic prerequisites in

the region, but the presence the presence of a coercive apparatus. This apparatus has both the

capacity and will to repress democratic initiatives originating from society (Bellin, 2004, p.

128). A coercive apparatus is therefore critical in determining the durability of authoritarian

regimes in the Arab world (Bellin, 2004, p. 142).

Other political explanations can be found in

the lack of a strong civil society in MENA states. A counterbalancing power for the regime in

the form of NGO’s, labour unions and protest movements are predominant respected

ingredients of a democracy. The lack of a strong civil society is also related to the repression

by the authoritarian regimes. Apart from non-co-opting Islamist groups, there is a low amount

of social forces with significant organisational capacities that are independent from their

regimes in terms of finance, organization, and personnel

(Albrecht & Schlumberger, 2004, p.

386; Carothers, 2003)

.

A latter argument is that the lack of democracy is not only a result of social-economic

or political conditions. In this view, democracy is not only a regime type, it also is a cultural

and intellectual tradition

(Ayubi, 1996)

. Contrary to the relative bigger communities in

European cities, active political involvement has not been part of the culture in MENA

communities. The cities in the MENA region were rather smaller communities with no norm

of active citizenship

(Ayubi, 1996)

. Besides the cultural tradition, a latter reason can be found

in the involvement of Islamism in the region. This can be seen as a variable, not a constant, that

works against democracy and feeds authoritarian persistence

(Posusney & Angrist, 2005, p.

226)

. On the contrary, it has to been noted that there is no absolute causality for Islamism as an

input for authoritarianism

(Nasr, 2005)

.

The various mentioned factors make it hard for democracy to consolidate in the region.

Social-economic areas and civil society are, as discussed, often the target of democracy

promotors in the MENA region. Although the MENA region might not be sensitive to

democratisation, this does not mean that there were no attempts by the population. The Arab

Spring became a popular subject of scholars that are specialised in democratisation. But was

the Arab Spring a call for democratisation?

17

2.2.2 Arab Spring background

The Arab Spring started in December 2010 with local uprisings in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. The

local protests against the regime of Ben Ali, resulted in protests in the whole country. The

Tunisian revolution inspired multiple populations from other states in the MENA region,

causing regime changes or major uprisings in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen

(Campante & Chor, 2012, p. 167)

. Other states in the MENA region were also affected and had

to cope with continuous street demonstrations. Scholars have been trying to understand the

quickly succeeding uprisings, as were not many indicative signs prior to the revolution.

From an economical side the revolutions could not be predicted as well. World Bank

data indicate that all MENA states made progress in educational achievement from 1970 to

2010. Educational attainment has been growing faster than in other developing regions

(Iqbal

& Kiendrebeogo, 2014)

. An important factor, and a remarkable commonality of the uprisings,

is the fact that young people and labour unions were the main initiators to express dissatisfaction

during the demonstrations. Instead of economic growth numbers, the lack of adequate economic

opportunities for an increasingly educated young population explains the discontent with the

regimes

(Campante & Chor, 2012, p. 184)

. Before the Arab Spring, unemployment figures of

the younger generations were relatively high across countries in the MENA region

(Cammett,

2018, p. 4)

. This partly due to the weak private sector development in MENA countries

(Malik

& Awadallah, 2013)

. Next to the widespread involvement of young people, the Arab Spring is

known for the common usage of modern communication tools, like mobile phones, personal

computers, and social media

(Bellin, 2004; Hussain & Howard, 2013; Khondker, 2011)

. The

absence of an open media and a strong civil society in these states made this information

infrastructure vital for sparking the uprisings.

In addition to the economic side, the uprisings can be analysed from a political angle.

This review has already mentioned that the lack of democratic regimes in MENA can be a result

of authoritarian persistence. Were the people tired of their authoritarian leaders? There are

studies that show the decreasing legitimacy of authoritarian regimes and the will for more

political representation

(Malik & Awadallah, 2013; Thyen & Gerschewski, 2018)

. Most

certainly these have not been the main incentives of the revolts.

To illustrate: a poll conducted

in Egypt in April 2011, after the resignation of Mubarak, revealed that 64 % of the

self-proclaimed protesters cited ‘low living standards/lack of job’ as their primary motivation

(Campante & Chor, 2012, p. 178). This is significantly higher than the 19% who mentioned

‘lack of democracy and political reform’ as their primary motivation (International Republican

18

Institute, 2011).

Concluding it can be stated the Arab Spring was not solely a movement for

democratisation. The discontent of the economic front rather interacted with a broader

socio-political context to start the revolution. Both dissatisfactions likely sparked the wave of

revolution

(Cammett, 2018, p. 4)

. Thus, various European leaders referred to the Arab Spring

as a call for democratisation. According to this section, this could be a wish rather than reality.

In what way did the EU try to stimulate democratisation in the region?

2.2.3 EU support for democracy promotion

EU states are committed to democracy promotion by the founding treaty of the EU (Huber,

2008). The export of its model of liberal economics and democracy to its neighbours

immediately had a place in their foreign policy from the 90’s onwards (Hollis, 2012, p. 81).

Therefore, the EU has created various initiatives in which it combines democracy promotion

with other policy areas. These can be categorised in overarching partnerships and financial

instruments, where the latter provides financial support to carry out the goals of particular

partnership policies. A chronological order of these initiatives can be found in table 1.

The first mentioned, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), was created in 1995

when the member states of the EU, together with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel,

Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, the Palestinian Authority, Cyprus and Malta, signed the

Barcelona Declaration which launched the EMP

(Hollis, 2012, p. 82)

. As this partnership fell

short, the organisation was restructured and continued as the Union for the Mediterranean

(UfM). Where democratisation and human rights were important pillars of the EMP, it

disappeared in the UfM. The partnership rather focusses on regional stability, integration and

human development. The other important partnership that contains policies of democracy

promotion is the ENP. Through economic development and political reforms, the ENP

contributes to the EU objective of establishing ‘a ring of friends’ in its neighbourhood

(Del

Sarto, 2016, p. 221)

. The partnerships provide a legal framework for promoting democracy by

the EU in the MENA. The difference between ENP and UfM lies in the fact that the ENP is

part of the EU foreign policy, while the UfM is an intergovernmental organisation with the EU

as a member. Table 1 shows through which financial instruments the policies of particular

partnerships are funded.

Corresponding financial instruments can be found in table 2. These instruments are

either self-contained or connected to a partnership agreement. It is clear that the EU has

financed democracy promotion via multiple ways. The first one listed, the European Investment

19

Table 1: EU-MENA partnerships that include democracy promotion

What

Timeline

Description & scope

Instruments

EMP

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

1995 – 2008

Then UfM

Regional cooperation between Europe and

Mediterranean, based on Barcelona process. Both

non-EU and non-EU states.

MEDA

ENP

European Neighbourhood Policy

2004 – present

EU regional cooperation between European and

neighbouring states.

Themes:

-

Moving neighbours towards more stability in

political, socio-economic and security terms

-

Promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect

for human rights, and social cohesion.

ENI

UfM

Union for the Mediterranean

2008 – present

Regional cooperation between European and

Mediterranean states. Has (non) EU members.

Themes:

-

Politics and Security

-

Economics and Trade

-

Socio-cultural

-

Justice and Interior Affairs

ENPI

ENI

EIB

Table 2:

EU’s financial instruments that include democracy promotion

What

Timeline

Scope

Active between 14-16

EIB

European Investment Bank

1958 -

present

EU bank. Works within and outside EU (global)

Themes in external policies:

-

Pre-Accession

-

European Neighbourhood relations

-

Development

-

Economic Cooperation

Yes

EIDHR

European Instrument for Democracy

and Human Rights

1994 –

present

EU instrument. Global scope.

Projects in the area of human rights, fundamental

freedoms and democracy in non-EU countries.

Yes

MEDA I & II

Mediterranean Development

Assistance

1995 – 2006

Were instruments of EMP, regional scope

Barcelona process pillars:

-

Political and security partnership

-

Economic partnership

-

Social cultural and human affairs

No

ENPI

European Neighbourhood and

Partnership Instrument

2007 – 2013

An instrument of ENP, regional scope. Themes:

-

Political reform

-

Economic & social reform

-

Sectoral cooperation

-

Regional and local development

Partly

DCI

Development Cooperation

Instrument

2008 –

present

Focus on developing states, global scope

Themes (selection):

-

Human rights, democracy and good governance

-

Inclusive and sustainable growth for human

development

-

Migration and asylum

Yes

EED

European Endowment for

Democracy

2012 –

present

Focus on neighbouring EU states. Autonomous, but

dependent on voluntary sponsoring from EU-members

Themes:

-

Support democratisation particularly when

cooperation with governments is difficult.

-

Support activities in complex situations of

radical change.

Yes

ENI

European Neighbourhood

Instrument

2014 –

present

Instrument of ENP, regional scope

Themes (selected):

-

Democracy & Human rights

-

Internal market integration

-

Security & managing mobility

-

Development

20

Bank (EIB), is an EU institution that lends money for particular projects. Projects within the

UfM used this instrument for divergent goals, but democracy promotion has not been the

primary focus. In MEDA, democracy promotion has initially been an important goal, where

after it merged into other themes of UfM. The second EU instrument, EIDHR, is designed for

democracy promotion with a global scope. EIDHR sees human rights projects as an integral

part of democracy promotion. The fourth listed instruments, the European Neighbourhood and

Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was the predecessor of ENI and has been revised after the Arab

Spring uprisings. Both ENI and ENPI were primarily created to finance the goals of the ENP.

The instruments have also been used to execute goals from the UfM. The second-last listed

instrument, the DCI is used to assist developing states financially on diverse themes like

governance and democratisation, but also migration. DCI often complement other financing

instrument in developing regions. The last instrument to discuss, the European Endowment for

Democracy (EED) is the relatively new instrument to promote democracy in the EU

neighbourhood states. The EED is autonomous from the EU, but is dependent on voluntary

financial support from EU-member states.

2.2.4 EU democracy promotion and the Arab Spring

Academics seem to agree on the fact that the EU had no demonstrable contribution in sparking

the uprisings. Before the Arab Spring, the European Neighbourhood Policy made good progress

in modernising energy infrastructures and developing renewable energy plans, by funds through

the financial instruments ENPI and ENI (Biscop, Balfour, & Emerson, 2012, p. 51). The ENP

policy papers that were written prior the Arab Spring have been sceptical of the EU democracy

promotion projects. A call for democracy has not been identified as potential motive for

political unrest. The ENP policy papers do point at other risks that might cause dissatisfaction:

the high youth unemployment, ill managed resources and volatile food prices (Biscop, Balfour

& Emerson, 2012). In hindsight, these have been ingredients for the discontent of the population

in the region. Thus, it can be concluded that EU democracy promotion has played no part in

sparking the Arab Spring.

The uprisings took the EU by surprise, but also gave them reason to change their policies

towards the region. During and after the uprisings, the EU formulated a new strategy to assist

the democratisation process. The exact response of the EU to the Arab Spring can be derived

from two documents: (1) The revision of the ENP as described in the Joint Communication of

May 2011, ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood’ and (2) a study by the Directorate

21

General External Policies that was published in 2012. The revised ENP outlined a new approach

towards EU’s neighbours by introducing two new concepts. The first, deep democracy, aims at

setting a baseline of necessary accomplishments to which progress can be assessed. The second

is the more-for-more principle, meaning that willing countries for democratic progress are

rewarded with additional funds for cooperation (Directorate-General for External Policies of

the Union, 2012, p. 14). This resulted in two initiatives that were accommodating the

consolidations of potential new democracies: the EED and the Support to Partnership and the

Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING).

The EED is an addition to existing financial instruments. It is distinct from ENPI and

EIDHR as EED focusses at: donors through emergency funding; broad eligibility criteria

support to emerging actors; core funding of NGOs; small size of grants and; support in

politically sensitive environments

(European Commission, 2015a, p. 2)

.

The EED is

independent from the EU, making it an instrument that is less bureaucratic and easier to deploy

without permission from third countries (Directorate-General for External Policies of the

Union, 2012, p. 16). When compared to SPRING, the EED can be seen as a long term project.

SPRING was created in 2011 to quickly address and facilitate democratic transitioning the

region, until the programme was closed in 2013. Projects supported by SPRING focussed on

promoting democratic transformation and institution-building, as well as sustainable and

inclusive growth, under the ‘more for more’ principle (Archick & Mix, 2013). In sum, directly

after the Arab uprisings the EU responded by creating a short- and long term instruments that

can respond relatively quickly.

How did the Arab Spring unfold in terms of democratic development? As mentioned, the

divergent reasons for inhabitants to take part in the protests are hard to generalise. Motives were

based on economic reasons, like the high unemployment rates, or political reasons like the lack

of possibilities in public participation. One thing is certain,

democracy has not consolidated in

the vast part of the MENA region after the Arab Spring. In fact, cases like Syria, Libya and

Yemen are still coping with the results of the revolts as civil wars continue to disrupt their

societies. The Egyptians have seen multiple regime changes since the ousting of Mubarak and

are now led by the previous chief of the military. Other regimes, like in Morocco, Jordan and

Lebanon maintained by implementing minor governmental changes to satisfy the protesters.

One example, the Tunisian case, is often described as a state that actually moved towards a

more democratic regime. Taking out the Arab Spring goal of democratisation, its success rate

cannot be reviewed as positive.

22

2.2.5 Revised strategies after the Arab Spring

The financial instruments SPRING and EED were created to respond quickly to rapidly

evolving developments in the MENA region. This short term vision for democracy promotion

in the region was described in the revised ENP in 2011 ‘A New Response to a Changing

Neighbourhood’. A long term vision regarding democracy promotion in the region, with

specific measures to increase effectiveness, can be found in different documents that were

published from late 2011 onwards:

- Commission Communication of 13 October 2011 entitled ‘Increasing the Impact of

EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change’

- Joint Communication by the CFSP and the European Commission on 12 December

2011: ‘Human Rights and Democracy at the heart of EU external action — Towards a

more effective approach’

- EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, adopted

by the Council of the EU on 25 June 2012

Critical takeaways regarding the funding of democracy promotion are as follows:

1. The political and policy dialogue with all stakeholders will be pursued. The mix and

level of aid will depend on the country’s situation, including its ability to conduct

reforms (European Commission, 2011, p. 5)

2. EU general budget support should be linked to the governance situation and political

dialogue with the partner country (European Commission, 2011, p. 5)

3. The EU has not always been as effective or as joined-up as it might have been. The

task in hand is to ensure the clarity, coherence, and effectiveness of policy, by being

smarter and more strategic (Ashton, 2011b)

4. Tailor made country strategies covering human rights and democracy should

therefore be an integral part of the EU’s overall strategy towards that country (Ashton,

2011b, p. 8)

5. The EU will continue supporting human rights defenders under the European

Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and make funding operations more

flexible and more accessible (Council of the European Union, 2012, p. 3)

With these statements, it is clear that the EU recognises that democracy promotion has not been

successful and needs to change in order to be more effective. More funds are needed and these

need to by assigned based on the target state governance situation. Tailored funds should

23

enhance both democratisation and human rights, making them inseparable concepts. In

addition, the documents also endorse the goal of ‘deep democracy’ and the ‘more-for-more’

principle in line with the revised ENP of 2011.

The latter changes were adjusted to the idea that democratisation in various countries

could still be achieved. A few years after the Arab Spring, it could be concluded that the call

for democratisation had failed. Authoritarianism seems to persist in the region. According to

the current CFSP, Frederica Mogherini, it is rather ‘a region in flames, both to the East and to

the South’ than a breakthrough for democracy in the MENA. Therefore, the EU again adapted

their policies to the developments in the region. On the 11

th

of March 2014, new instruments

and policies were presented to achieve foreign policy goals, including democracy promotion:

- ENI 2014-2020: establishing a new European Neighbourhood Instrument

- EIDHR 2014-2020: establishing a new financing instrument for democracy and

human rights worldwide

- DCI 2014-2020: establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation

Both EIDHR and ENI/ENPI are financial instruments, but they differ in the way democracy

promotion is financed. As shown in table 2, EIDHR is not connected to a policy or partnership,

while ENI and ENPI are linked to the strategies of the ENP. EIDHR is fully devoted to

promoting democracy, while ENI also supports other projects. The revised EIDHR and ENI

explicitly state that they do align with the democracy promotion strategies that were created in

2011 and 2012. Lastly, the revised ENP of 2015 offered an extensive revision of the 2011

revision, as the latter did not meet the set goals:

‘It has not proven a sufficiently strong incentive to create a commitment to reform, where

there is not the political will. In these cases, the EU will explore more effective ways to make

its case for fundamental reforms with partners, including through engagement with civil,

economic and social actors’ (European Commission, 2015b, p. 5)

This revision changed the focus of the 2011 ENP, that was narrowed down to direct democracy

promotion. Instead, the ENP of 2015 provides an umbrella for policy framework and shows the

ambition to play a role as a conflict resolution actor and transformation entrepreneur in its

neighbourhood (Bouris & Schumacher, 2017, p. 2). Although the financial instruments had

their own revision in 2014, the revised ENP will also provide determine which projects will be

supported through the financial instrument. Likely, these funds from the instruments will partly

exists of direct democracy promotion projects, but will also contain no DP-projects than fall

under the broader policy framework.

24

2.2.6 The academic debate

Promoting democracy outside of the own borders, and the additional funds to make it possible,

know academic supporters as well as criticasters. There are two debates in which the concept

of democracy promotion is put under scrutiny.

In the first debate, the effectiveness of democracy promotion is assessed. One side of

the scholars in this debate states that democracy promotion can be successful, but its

effectiveness is dependent on divergent conditions

(Dimitrova & Pridham, 2004; Risse &

Babayan, 2015; Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008)

. Subsection 2.1.3 already touched upon an

effective condition in the leverage model of democracy promotion, membership conditionality.

These scholars are entangled in a continues debate on the most favourable conditions for

promotion effectiveness. The contrary side of scholars in this debate is more sceptical of

democracy promotion. In their view, the effects of the policy are either minor, non-existent or

even strengthening for authoritarian regimes

(Börzel & Lebanidze, 2017; S. Brown, 2005;

Knack, 2004)

. Moderate scholars on this side of the debate are also sceptical, but emphasise

that democracy promotion might destabilise authoritarian regimes. However, the policy is not

effective for consolidating democracies in target states

(Kopstein, 2006)

.

Scholars in second debate examine whether EU can be seen as a normative power in

promoting democracy. This means that the EU is able to formulate conceptions of ‘normal’

through its external policies

(Manners, 2008, p. 239)

. A vast amount of scholars emphasise that

the EU can actually be seen as a normative power by promoting democracy and human rights

(Diez, 2005; Manners, 2008; Sjursen, 2006)

. Criticasters state that the EU cannot be seen as a

normative power, as it is an international actor whose motivation is self-help

(Hyde-Price,

2006)

. Realists stress the security aspect of the policies, not the imposition of a norm is the goal,

but rather the security or balance of power it creates in the neighbourhood of a state. A third

group of scholars raise the question on the legitimacy of the EU as a normative power, as the

EU has got democratic fallacies itself

(Sjursen, 2006)

. In addition, EU democracy promotion is

based on the European model of constitution liberal democracy without taking the different

characteristics of partners countries into consideration

(Bouris & Schumacher, 2017, p. 63)

.

The question on the effective conditions and the legitimacy of the EU as a normative

power are widely discussed in scholarly literature. Yet these studies are not exhaustive of the

manifold theoretical and empirical insights that could be gained of EU democracy promotion,

its role in EU foreign policy, and in relation to the target states

(Kurki, 2011, p. 354)

. This thesis

does not focus on the effectiveness of EU-policies in MENA-states, nor does it interfere in the

normative debate. Rather, the research question focusses on financial differentiation.