Taking responsibilities to address climate change : South Africa's position in BRICS and the climate change response : a single case study analysis of factors influencing South Africa's national policy based on the resp

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Taking Responsibilities to address

Climate Change: South Africa’s position in

BRICS and the Climate Change Response

A single case study analysis of factors influencing South Africa's national policy based on the responsibilities for BRICS countries to address climate change arising from the Paris Agreement.

Anne Vermeulen

29 June 2018

Master Thesis

Political Science - International Relations

Transnational Sustainability Governance

University of Amsterdam

Student number: 11253053

Supervisor: Philip Schleifer Second reader: Jasper Blom Word count: 23938

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Preface

Before you lies the thesis ‘Taking Responsibilities to address Climate Change: South Africa's position in BRICS and the Climate Change Response’. This thesis has been written to fulfil the graduation

requirements of the Master’s Program in Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. I was engaged in researching and writing this thesis from the beginning of February 2018 until the end of June 2018. In 2011 and 2013 I visited South Africa for a while and what I can say about the country is that it leaves you enraptured. While writing this thesis, my passion for the country has been encouraged again and I realize how much I want to go back to South Africa. However, in South Africa, you also experience the structural problems such as inequality and poverty, which are mainly the consequences of the Apartheid. In addition to these structural problems, South Africa is extremely sensitive to the consequences of climate change. As the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of South Africa responded to the report “Turn Down The Heat” from the World Bank:

At the very moment that Africa is poised to make its mark on the global economy…the continent will be one of the worst affected by climate change. We need strong commitments and urgent action to mitigate the impact, and to assist countries to survive and develop in a context of climate change and extreme weather patterns (The World Bank n.d., p.1).

Therefore, it is necessary for South Africa to address climate change.

With this research, I want to contribute to the scientific and societal knowledge of how a developing country like South Africa responds to a combination of climate change and high levels of inequality since these factors combined pose an existential threat to the survival of the poor (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2018).

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Philip Schleifer for help in the preparation of this research and his excellent guidance. I am also grateful to the second reader Jasper Blom, for taking the time to read this research. Further thanks to Maxime Kleuskens, Roos van Tilborg, Roos Banning, Tim Morrenhof, Remy Donk and my mother, Rosie Vermeulen, for their encouragement.

Above all, I am especially grateful to my father, Gé Vermeulen, for his tireless support, helpful comments and motivation that allowed me to continue in difficult times. I do not know how I would have

accomplished this period without your support. I hope you enjoy your reading!

Anne Vermeulen

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Abstract

At the international level, countries conclude agreements to address climate change. In the Paris

Agreement, it was agreed that every country with high-level emissions must take on more responsibilities to address climate change. From emerging international powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), the Paris Agreement expects more responsibilities. However, South Africa has a less ambitious climate policy than other countries in the BRICS. To address climate change, it is necessary for every country to implement as many mitigations and adaption policies as possible. South Africa is particularly vulnerable to the consequences of climate change and it is unclear why South Africa has a less ambitious policy to address climate change than other BRICS countries.

The aim of this research was to determine which factors influence South Africa's national policy to address climate change. In this research, it is therefore asked: Which factors influence South Africa’s national policy based on the responsibilities for BRICS countries to address climate change arising from the Paris Agreement? The research question is answered through an in-depth case study analysis of South Africa. First, the literature was assessed on the factors influencing the degree of ambitious climate policy. Subsequently, various government documents were analysed and various data sources were used to determine whether the factors found provide an explanation for why South Africa has less ambitious policies to address climate change. The results show that especially institutional, economic, ideological and legislative factors are influencing the degree of ambitious climate policy in South Africa. The political influence of the department in South Africa which is responsible for climate policy, the influence of stakeholders, limited legislation, a laborious legislative process and the government's focus on national and economic

development led to climate change not being high prioritized.

Based on these findings, it is recommended for South African government to introduce more legislation to address climate change. A positive additional advantage is that governments knowledge will improve of ways how climate change can be prevented. In addition, it might be recommended to create a new lead agency that monitors the drafting, implementation and compliance for ambitious climate policy. This is due to South Africa's sensitivity to the consequences of climate change and the country’s national development. Further research could be done to examine the impact of the same factors used in this study on the climate policy in other BRICS countries. Ultimately, the results can then be compared with each other, so that more knowledge is gained about how emerging powers deal with possibly one of the greatest challenges facing the world today: climate change.

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Preface ... 3

Abstract ... 5

Contents ... 7

List of figures and diagrams ... 10

Abbreviations... 11

Chapter 1: Introduction ... 13

1.1 Research question ... 14

1.2 Academic and societal relevance ... 14

1.3 Main argument ... 15

1.4 Outline of the study ... 15

Chapter 2: BRICS in the politics of climate change ... 17

2.1 Introduction ... 17

2.2 Common but Differentiated Responsibilities ... 17

2.3 Responsibilities of BRICS to address climate change ... 18

2.4 Differences in the degree of ambitious plans to address climate change ... 18

2.5 Conclusion ... 20

Chapter 3: Literature Review ... 21

3.2 Increasing interest in BRICS countries ... 21

3.3 Existing literature on BRICS countries in international climate politics ... 21

3.4 Factors that influence the position of BRICS countries during global climate negotiations ... 22

3.5 Factors which shape national policy to address climate change ... 23

Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework ... 25

4.2 The dependent variable ... 25

4.3 The independent variables ... 26

4.3.1. Institutional factors ... 27 4.3.2. Economic factors ... 28 4.3.3. International factors ... 31 4.3.4. Ideological factors ... 31 4.3.5. Legislative factors ... 32 4.3.6 Overview of factors ... 33 4.4 Conclusion ... 33

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5.2 Deductive and inductive qualitative research ... 35

5.3 Single case-study ... 36

5.5 Considerations of validity, reliability, and replicability ... 38

Chapter 6: South Africa’s policies on addressing climate change ... 41

6.2 First policies on addressing climate change ... 41

6.3 South Africa’s current strategy to address climate change ... 42

6.4 Other relevant climate change policies ... 42

Chapter 7: South Africa’s political system ... 45

7.2 South Africa’s institutional framework ... 45

7.3 Departments involved with climate policy ... 46

7.4 Veto players ... 47

7.4.1 Government institutions as veto players ... 47

7.4.2 Stakeholders as veto players ... 48

Chapter 8: Economy and welfare in South Africa ... 51

8.2 Economic development and social welfare ... 51

8.3 South Africa’s coal-dependent economy ... 52

8.4 Energy crisis ... 53

8.5 Eskom’s monopoly position ... 54

Chapter 9: South Africa’s relationship with the international society ... 57

9.2 South Africa’s relationship with the European Union... 57

9.3 South Africa’s membership in International Groups ... 57

9.4 Implementing international plans into domestic policies ... 58

Chapter 10: The ideological position of the government ... 61

10.2 South Africa’s 25th_{and 26}th_{Parliament ... 61}

10.3 Three biggest political parties in South Africa since 2014 ... 61

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10.3.3 Economic Freedom Fighters ... 62

10.4 Right-left positions of the Parties ... 62

10.5 Parties manifestos for the elections in 2014 10.5.1 ANC Manifesto ... 63

10.5.2 DA Manifesto ... 63

10.5.3 EFF Manifesto... 63

10.6 Parties emphasis on environmental issues ... 64

10.7 High priorities on economic development ... 64

Chapter 11: Legislation ... 67

11.2 Legislative process: enactment of a law ... 67

11.3 Legislation to address climate change in South Africa ... 67

11.4 Policies and strategies to address climate change ... 68

11.5 Plans for a Carbon Tax legislation ... 69

Chapter 12: Conclusion & Discussion ... 71

12.1 Summarizing the results ... 71

12.2 Answering the research question ... 72

12.3 Discussion of the findings ... 72

12.4 Extending knowledge about ambitious climate policy ... 73

12.5 Limitations of this research and recommendations for further research ... 74

12.6 Practical implications and recommendations for policy making... 74

Bibliography ... 77

Appendix I: Overview of factors... 93

1. Figure 1: Overview of factors ... 93

Appendix II: Economic Factors ... 95

1. Figure 2 GDP per Capita in South Africa ... 95

2. Figure 3 Citizens of South Africa and their opinion on climate protection. ... 96

Appendix III: Ideological Factors ... 97

1. Figure 4 Right-left position of the parties. ... 97

2. Figure 5 Positions of the Parties on Climate Issues. ... 97

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List of figures and diagrams

Figure 1.Overview of Factors ... 33

Figure 2 GDP per capita in South Africa. ... 51

Figure 3 Citizens of South Africa and their opinion on climate protection. ... 52

Figure 4 Right-left position of the parties. ... 62

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Abbreviations

AMCEN – African Ministerial Conference on the Environment ANC – African National Congress

BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa CAT – Climate Action Tracker

CBDR – Common But Differentiated Responsibilities CME – Coordinated Market Economies

COPE – Congress of the People DA – Democratic Alliance

DEA – Department of Environmental Affairs

DEAT – Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism DME – Department of Minerals and Energy

DoE – Department of Energy

DPE – Department of Public Enterprises DTI – Department of Trade and Industry EEF – Economic Freedom Fighters EKC – Environmental Kuznets Curve EU – European Union

IEP – Integrated Energy Plan IFP – Inkatha Freedom Party IRP – Integrated Resource Plan

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GDP – Gross Domestic Product GHG – Greenhouse Gases

HME – Hierarchical Market Economy LME – Liberal Market Economy LTAS – Long Term Adaption Scenarios LTMS – Long Term Mitigation Scenarios

LULUCF – Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry MEC – Minerals Energy Complex

NAMA – Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions NEMA – National Environmental Management Act NCCRP – National Climate Change Response Policy NCCRS – National Climate Change Response Strategy NDC – Nationally Determined Contributions

NDP – National Development Plan

PCEA – Portfolio Committee on Environmental Affairs POLCON – Political Constraint

REIPPPP – Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme REWP – Renewable Energy Policy White Paper

SME – State-Permeated Market Economies UN – United Nations

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Climate change is one of the greatest challenges that the international society is currently facing. At all levels of society and governance, attempts are made to address climate change. Climate change is a long-term problem and a low-carbon development is required for effective governance of climate change (Never 2012; Pralle 2009). Since no country can address the impacts of climate change with its efforts alone, agreements are made at the international level between the world’s governments to meet the climate challenge. When establishing international agreements, a distinction is made between developed countries and developing countries on varying responsibilities to address climate change. The reason for this is that countries vary in their levels of responsibilities for causing climate change. It is recognized that developed countries were the source of most greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions (Rajamani 2000, p.122). Therefore, it was expected that most of the developed countries would have more responsibilities to address climate change since the first international climate agreement concluded under the responsibility of the United Nations in 1992. However, since 2010 there has been a change in the economic and geopolitical constitutions in the world. Emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) have drawn significant attention to international affairs. Together they are an international intergovernmental formation (Abashidze, Solntsev, & Kiseleva 2016, p.1). Due to their economic growth, this group is increasingly influencing the international world order (Papa & Gleason 2012, p.915). On the other hand, the energy consumption of countries in the BRICS continues to rise as their economic growth increases (Sasana & Ghozali 2017, p.194). All BRICS countries, except for Russia, are categorized as Non-Annex I Parties under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Non-Annex I Parties are mostly developing countries which are being recognized as especially vulnerable to the adverse impact of climate change or where climate change response measures are expected to have a lot of adverse influence on the economic development of the country. Countries in this group can receive extra support in combatting climate change and have fewer responsibilities than developed countries. As a result, four out of five BRICS countries had limited responsibility to address climate change since the first international climate agreement established in 1992 (United Nations 1992).

In recent years it became clear that it is necessary for each state to reduce emissions. Therefore, one of the main principles from the Paris Agreement reached in 2015, was that major emitters submit progressively more ambitious goals to reduce emissions, regardless if they are categorized as a developed or developing country (United Nations 2015). In view of rising energy consumptions since the last couple of years, BRICS countries, consequently, have come under increasing international pressure to reduce emissions.

BRICS countries vary in their responsibilities to address climate change. For the Paris Agreement, participating countries had to submit Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (United Nations Climate Change n.d.). In the NDCs, states must set targets to address climate change. Of all the BRICS countries, China and India are argued to be pioneers in the field of ambitious national policy to address climate change, while South Africa has less ambitious plans (Climate Action Tracker 2018c; Gladun &

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Ashan 2016; Kopra 2016). For example, India already undertook more activities on energy efficiency and renewable energy and has more ambitious plans to address climate change (Never 2012, p. 382). This contrasts with the role that South Africa is trying to show. South Africa is constructively involved in the global environmental politics and uses climate problems to present itself as a global player (Death 2011, p.100; Upadhyaya 2016). South Africa’s NDC aims to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. However, if other countries would have the same targets as South Africa then the goals of the Paris Agreement would not be achieved (Climate Action Tracker 2018b). In addition, the implementation of various commitments South Africa made have already been delayed, such as the introduction of a Carbon Tax (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2018). National plans do not correspond with the ambitions they show during international climate negotiations. It is not fully understood why South Africa has less ambitious plans to address climate change compared to other BRICS countries. The aim of this study was to clarify why South Africa has a less ambitious policy based on the responsibilities for BRICS countries to address climate change arising from the Paris Agreement.

1.1 Research question

This research seeks to address multiple questions. The central question of this study is:

“Which factors influence South Africa’s climate policy based on the responsibilities for BRICS countries to address climate change arising from the Paris Agreement?”

To answer the main question, the following sub-questions have been drawn up:

1. To what extent does South Africa differ in the degree of ambitious plans to address climate change compared to other BRICS countries?

2. Which factors influence national policy to address climate change?’

1.2 Academic and societal relevance

This thesis aims to contribute to existing scientific knowledge on climate policy and, more specifically, to the research that examines factors that influence national climate change policy-making.

Historically, global governance on addressing climate change was focusing on creating an overarching international institutional framework and setting global goals and targets. The Paris Agreement offers countries the opportunity to determine their own contribution to addressing climate change. With this, the focus shifts from a top-down to a bottom-up approach, since it is now about the national implementation of domestic policies. In the discussion paper of Bhandary et al. (2016) is suggested to do more research on how these policies are established. More specifically, there are opportunities for research on factors influencing policy choices and what drives countries to decide to adopt certain policies over others.

In addition, Tobin (2014; 2017) composed a framework which explains variation in ambitious climate policy for developed countries. He assumed that there might none pioneers among Non-Annex I

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laggards in the fields of ambitious climate policy. Tobin suggested that more research should be done here (Tobin 2014). Considering these recommendations, this study aims to contribute to the research of policy-making by exploring which factors influence the national policy of developing countries like South Africa to address climate change.

South Africa is a member of BRICS. Although much attention is paid to the rising position of BRICS in the media and academics, little research has been conducted into which factors determine national policy for BRICS countries to address climate change. Climate change is considered to be one of the most difficult challenges the international society is currently facing and is therefore of social importance. Recent developments in climate change have increased the need for reducing emissions (Walsh et al. 2017). Contributions from states are essential for countering further climate change since states have a primary role in drafting and implementing national policy (Purdon 2015, p.5). As BRICS countries have increasingly more influence on the international order, it is important to learn more about BRICS countries in general. More knowledge on what drives BRICS national policy can play an important role in addressing the issues of climate policy. Hochstetler & Milkoreit (2014) argued that when there is more focus on the individual identities of emerging powers in environmental negotiations, more knowledge will be gained into the explanation what shapes states national climate policy approach. Lachapelle and Paterson (2013, p.567) consider drivers of national climate policy in emerging countries broadly but mention that more focus is necessary on the national level to understand drivers of climate policy. This research seeks to address these recommendations by doing a single case study analysis on South Africa. South Africa is extremely sensitive to the effects of climate change and at the same time, the country still struggles with the consequences of Apartheid.

1.3 Main argument

It will turn out that institutional, economic factors, ideological factors, and legislative factors are influencing South Africa’s climate policy. More specifically, institutional, economic factors and legislative factors explain why South Africa has a less ambitious policy to address climate change. Surprisingly, ideological factors offer an opposite explanation. International factors do not offer an explanation since international policies are not becoming implemented in South Africa when they are not in line with national interest.

1.4 Outline of the study

The overall structure of the study takes the form of twelve chapters, including this introductory chapter. Chapter two offers some more background information about the position of BRICS countries in the politics of climate change. Subsequently, the third chapter reviews the literature written on BRICS countries and the politics of climate change. The fourth chapter begins by laying out the theoretical dimensions of the research and looks to factors influencing national climate policy. The fifth chapter is concerned with the methodology used in this study. Chapter six will focus on South Africa’s policies to address climate change. It will move to the following five chapters which present the findings of the research, focusing on five key themes that could offer an explanation of why South Africa has a less ambitious policy to address

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climate change. The final chapter draws upon the entire thesis, tying up the various and empirical strands in order to explain which factors shape South Africa’s national policy to address climate change and includes a discussion of the implication of the findings to future research into this area.

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Chapter 2: BRICS in the politics of climate change

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will provide more background information to the position of BRICS countries in the politics of climate change. First, an explanation will be given to the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR). Subsequently, it will be made clear what CBDR means for the responsibilities of BRICS countries to address climate changes. Since the Paris Agreement requires more expectations from each major emitter to reduce emissions, every country had to submit their plans to combat climate change in their NDC. It will be discussed to what extent South Africa’s plans to address climate change differ from other BRICS countries.

2.2 Common but Differentiated Responsibilities

CBDR is a principle about the responsibilities of states to address climate change. The principle has been established in the first Climate Convention concluded under the responsibility of the United Nations (UN) in 1992. The aim of this United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was to reduce GHG emissions and to prevent the undesirable effects of climate change (United Nations 1992). In this treaty, an explicit distinction was made between developed countries and developing countries through CBDR. Due to the reason that developed countries have contributed more to the causes of climate change, it was expected that they would take more responsibilities to address climate change than developing countries (Rajamani 2000, p.122). The Climate Convention recognizes that developing countries are particularly sensitive to the consequences of climate change and that measures developing countries take to address climate change could have an adverse effect on their economic growth (United Nations 1992). Due to their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and the impact on their economic growth, developing countries be eligible for support to address climate change such as extra funding (United Nations 1992). CBDR is still included in international agreements on climate action which are concluded under the responsibility of the UN.

CBDR has been discussed in recent years. The discussion focused mainly on how ‘differentiated responsibilities' should be interpreted (The Global Climate Change Regime 2013). For a long time, developing countries refused to set targets in agreements to address climate change because they were afraid of the impact on their economies (Gladun & Ashan 2016; Nobbe 2015). On the other hand, over the years it became clearer it is crucial for large emitters to reduce their emissions. Among the big

polluters are also developing countries (e.g. most countries within the BRICS). These are mostly countries with fast-growing economies which as a result have grown more in their GHG emissions. For this reason, developed countries argued that developing countries with high emission-levels should take more

responsibilities to reduce emissions. As a result, countries agreed upon the fact developed countries, who are major emitters, will make more ambitious plans to address climate change for the Paris Agreement. Developed countries are still expected to continue the lead and to contribute to support developing countries (United Nations 2015). However, developing countries now also need to address climate

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change, both in the financial infrastructure and in the formation of global climate policy (United Nations 2015). Both developed and developing countries need to develop market-based and non-GHG emissions regulation mechanisms (United Nations 2015). Due to these new commitments, the Paris Agreement is a historical moment.

The Paris Agreement strives towards a global average temperature below 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels but aims to limit the temperature to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels (United Nations 2015). In order to meet these goals, a new committing instrument was set up. Each country was expected to submit an Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) with plans to address climate change. Compared to earlier climate agreements, the Paris Agreement uses a bottom-up instead of a top-down approach since each country is free to decide what contributions they want to make. However, as explained, it was expected that each country makes ambitious plans to address climate change. After participating countries signed the Paris Agreement, their INDCs converted into NDCs. 2.3 Responsibilities of BRICS to address climate change

Previously BRICS countries had few responsibilities to address climate change due to CBDR. All countries in the BRICS are categorized as Non-Annex I parties under the UNFCCC, except for Russia. Due to the reason BRICS countries were afraid for the impact on their economies, they did not want to have the same targets as developed countries (Nobbe 2015). However, countries in the BRICS made a significant economic growth and have developed themselves into major emitters over the last couple of years. In 2014, BRICS countries were responsible for about 38 per cent of global carbon emissions (Greenpeace 2015, p.2). At the same time, they represent one-third of the world's total gross domestic product (GDP) and therefore can be seen as emerging economic markets (New Development Bank 2017). Both in the public media and in academia, this group is positioned as an important group because of their growth and their significant common characteristics (Chen & De Lombaerde 2014). It is speculated that BRICS are becoming increasingly important and might belong to the largest economies in the world by 2050 (Wilson & Purushothaman 2003). Due to their growing markets, their rapidly growing pollution rates, BRICS countries are required to make more ambitious plans to address climate change since the Paris Agreement.

2.4 Differences in the degree of ambitious plans to address climate change

During the period in which BRICS countries got more responsibilities to address climate change, preferences and interests increasingly seemed to diverge between BRICS countries (Stokes, Giang & Selin 2016, p. 13). In the past, BRICS countries showed a common strategy, so they would have more influence during international negotiations (Stokes, Giang & Selin 2016, p.17). Since BRICS countries got more responsibilities and the Paris Agreement uses a bottom-up approach, many differences emerged in how ambitious countries in the BRICS are to address climate change. Since Russia is categorized as a developed country and therefore has different responsibilities, this country is excluded from the discussion. The differences will be discussed below.

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of other BRICS countries. The South African NDC's objective states that the country wants to achieve the main goals of the Paris Agreement in cooperation with other countries (Department of Environmental Affairs 2015b, p.1-3). As earlier discussed, the Paris Agreement aims to limit global temperature to 2 degrees Celsius from above pre-industrial levels. However, if each country would have the same targets as South Africa, then warming would reach around 3 degrees Celsius. South Africa’s NDC is, therefore, assessed by the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) as highly insufficient. The CAT is an independent scientific analysis which tracks progress towards countries goals and targets of holding warming well below two degrees Celsius (Climate Action Tracker n.d.). The NDCs of Brazil, China & India are judged more optimistic by the CAT compared to the one of South Africa (Climate Action Tracker 2018b).

Brazil, China, and India have already introduced and adopted effective laws and legislation in the fight against further climate change (Gladun & Ashan 2016, p.37). The legislation is important because it is otherwise unlikely that national policies will be implemented and it could make policy more ambitious (Fankhauser, Gennaioli, & Collins 2016; Knill, Heichel & Arndt 2012). South Africa has paid attention to the drafting of legislation in its objectives, but to date, this has not been implemented. For example, South Africa made a call for a tax on carbon which was expected in 2010 (Department of National Treasury 2010). To date, the implementation is postponed. Therefore, South Africa has a less ambitious policy to implement legislation to address climate change compared to other BRICS countries.

China and India are creating a lot of regional programs to address climate change. It is crucial to set regional programs for a better implementation of climate change targets (Engel 2005, p.59). In China’s provinces and India’s states regional programs are increasingly growing, while there is little progress in South Africa (Gladun & Ashan 2016, p.38).

South Africa has less ambitious plans compared to other BRICS countries in terms of improving countries' energy sources. Brazil, China, and India pay a lot of attention to energy efficiency in their objectives. India, for example, already made several plans for regulation in energy efficiency and renewable energy (Never 2012, p.382). Brazil proved to be a leader in low carbon agriculture and biofuels, but at the same time, its emissions have increased since the last couple of year due to deforestation (Climate Action Tracker 2018a).On the other hand, South Africa intends to undertake mitigation actions to reduce their emissions but still has enormous coal reserves as an energy source and devotes significantly less attention to alternatives for energy (Upadhyaya 2016, p.468).

Abovementioned differences illustrate that South Africa differs in the degree of ambitious plans to address climate change compared to other BRICS countries. According to experts' analyses, it is important for South Africa to implement additional policy if it wants to achieve its objectives for the Paris Agreement (Climate Action Tracker 2018c). However, this has not happened yet. This contrasts with the role that South Africa is trying to show. South Africa is constructively involved in the global environmental politics and uses climate problems to present itself as a global player (Death 2011, p.100). All together this indicates a need to explain why South Africa has a less ambitious policy to address climate change and which factors

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influence this.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, it was made clear BRICS countries, except for Russia, had few responsibilities to address climate change due to CBDR since 1992. Since the Paris Agreement of 2015, more responsibility is expected from BRICS countries due to their growing economy and their growing percentage of emissions. South Africa differs in the level of ambitious national climate policy to address climate change compared to other BRICS countries. In the next chapter will be discussed which studies have been carried out into the position of BRICS in the politics of climate change and which investigations have been conducted into factors influencing national climate policy.

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Chapter 3: Literature Review

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, it became clear that South Africa has less ambitious plans in the degree of national policy to address climate change compared to other BRICS countries. This chapter discusses that more research was conducted into the position of BRICS countries in recent years. In this chapter will also be showed that most research focuses on the international negotiating position of BRICS countries. Several studies about factors influencing climate policy will be the last to be discussed.

3.2 Increasing interest in BRICS countries

A large and growing body of studies has investigated the politics of climate change. Most of the literature on climate change politics paid attention to developed or developing countries (Joshi 2013). A lot of research focused on the differences in climate politics in North-North politics or North-South politics. However, the North-South dichotomy in the literature on global environmental politics is breaking down (Stokes, Giang & Selin 2016, 16). Since the last couple of years, upcoming emerging countries play an increasingly larger role in climate politics (Never & Betz 2014, p.1) Therefore, more attention has been paid in the literature to the role of upcoming emerging powers in the politics of climate change since the last couple of years.

Many researchers agree that BRICS play an important role in the politics of climate change. A debate is going on about their significance and responsibilities in the international order (Papa & Gleason 2012). Simultaneously their increase in both the population and the economy means that they can exert much influence on the global political agenda (Papa & Gleason 2012, p.915). In overall, researchers have admitted that participation of BRICS-countries in international environmental politics is significant and meaningful (e.g. Gladun & Ashan 2016; Gray & Murphy 2013; Nayyar 2016). According to Hurrell & Sengupta, countries in the BRICS belong to a different category of countries than other developing countries due to their success (Hurrell & Sengupta 2012, p.480). This view is supported by Hochstetler & Milkoreit (2014, p.224) who wrote that every country within the BRICS contains an "emerging power” element, which enables them to make a significant contribution during climate negotiations. We, therefore, need to consider BRICS countries as a separate group with special rights, commitments and normative obligations in relation to other developing countries (Hochstetler & Milkoreit 2014, p.224). Even though BRICS-countries, except for Russia, are categorized as developing countries, we should see BRICS as a distinct actor compared to other developing countries.

3.3 Existing literature on BRICS countries in international climate politics

By far most studies on international climate politics focuses on the role and the behaviour of BRICS countries during international climate negotiations (e.g. Giang, Stokes & Selin 2016, Hallding et al. 2011; Hurrell & Sengupta 2012). The majority of these studies have shown that in the past BRICS countries

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gained additional power through a common strategy, even if they had different preferences and their underlying interests were not perfectly aligned (e.g. Giang, Stokes & Selin 2016, p.17). However, it also appeared to be, as emerging countries gain greater negotiation power and as variation in their development statuses, they are less willing to work in large, negotiating blocs (Giang, Stokes & Selin 2016, p.16). In overall these studies concluded that the more power and influence BRICS countries have started to exercise, the more differences in their national preferences emerged.

Most of the existing research focusing on the international position of BRICS countries in combatting climate change have analysed climate politics in particular countries. Especially, most studies have focused on China and India (e.g. Dubash 2009; Kopra 2016; Michaelowa & Michaelowa 2012; Stokes, Giang and Selin 2016). Both countries have drawn attention to the international order because they are the states with the most rapidly increasing source of emission (Dutta and Radner 2010; Humphrey & Messner 2006). As was clear from the previous chapter, China & India have ambitious plans to address climate change. Due to their ambitious plans and their high level of emissions, most research is being done on China and India and less research has been focused on South Africa.

3.4 Factors that influence the position of BRICS countries during global climate negotiations

The studies presented thus far focused mostly on the international negotiation position of BRICS countries. Three studies looked for an explanation about the differences in the international environmental negotiations between BRICS-countries. Stokes, Giang and Selin (2016) found three key factors which explain the increasing variances between upcoming emerging countries: “domestic resources and regulatory politics, development constraints, and domestic scientific and technological capacity” (2016, p.3). In the same vein, Never and Betz (2014, p.1) found that agreements made by BRICS countries during international climate negotiations are similar in many areas, but there is a lot of difference between the actual climate policy performance of countries in the BRICS. The results of this study show that “a bad ratio of domestic fossil fuel production to financial power and a weak environmental society are a sufficient condition for weak climate policy performance” (Never & Betz 2014, p.1). Similarly, Rong (2010) compared the influence of different domestic and international factors to predict the future international negotiation positions of several countries, including countries in the BRICS. The findings of this research suggested that the mitigation capability of a country is a crucial factor to gain a better position during negotiations, while ecological vulnerability might be a hindering factor for a significant position during international environmental negotiations. All these studies together illustrate various factors which determine the positions of BRICS countries during international environmental negotiations.

The factors which determine the international negotiation positions of BRICS countries are also relevant for understanding BRICS national climate policies. Lachapelle & Paterson explained that “although the international politics of climate change depend on how states interact with each other in international environmental negotiations, such interactions take place in the context of forces influencing and being influenced by state-level climate policy” (2013, p.547). It is, therefore, important to understand factors

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influencing states national climate policymaking. This was also confirmed by Hochstetler & Milkoreit (2014), who argued if we focus more on the individual identities of emerging powers in environmental negotiations, it provides new insights into factors influence states national climate policy approach. Having discussed what factors influence their international negotiation position, it is necessary to understand which factors shape national climate policy.

3.5 Factors which shape national policy to address climate change

Only a small number of studies are concerned with variation in national climate policy and which factors shape national climate policy (Bättig & Bernauer 2009; Bernauer and Böhmelt 2013; Lachapelle and Paterson 2013; Tobin 2014; 2017). Lachelle and Paterson (2013) examined patterns of national climate policy performance and their implications for the geopolitics of climate change. Their research came closest to the work of Bättig and Bernaeur (2009) who found a positive relationship between the effect of democracy national on climate policy. The research of Lachapelle and Paterson (2013) was extended to other types of institutional variation across states. One of their findings was that political variables are of limited explanatory power regarding climate policy when examined on their own (555). In contrast to this, Tobin (2017) argued that political factors might explain ambitious climate policy when combining these factors. To discover this link, Tobin (2017) analysed variations in ambitious national climate policy among developed countries. For his research, he conducted an extensive literature study into factors which shape the climate policy of developed countries. His results suggested that the literature can be divided into institutional, economic, international and ideological themes (2017, p.32). From each theme, he took different factors to investigate whether they explain the variation. The outcomes of his research were that a left-wing government is sufficient for ambitious climate policy. In addition, having a high GDP per capita is in conjunction with close links to the European Union (EU), and few political constraints, sufficient for a state to have a high degree in ambitious climate policy (Tobin 2017, p.28). Together, these studies argue several factors or combinations of factors which shape or have an influence on national policy to address climate change. These factors will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, it became clear that most studies only focus on the behaviour of BRICS countries during international negotiations. No specific research has yet been conducted into the reason why South Africa appears to have a less ambitious climate policy than other countries in the BRICS. In the next chapter, a theoretical framework will be drawn up to explain which factors could influence the national climate policy of South Africa.

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Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, it was mentioned that Tobin (2014, 2017) has carried out a study to explain variation in climate change policy among developed countries and to determine which factors explain this variation. Based on the literature, Tobin divided the factors into four themes. In this chapter will be explored to what extent Tobin’s framework is applicable to South Africa. For this reason, the articles of Tobin (2014, 2017) are the basic scientific articles used in this chapter. It will be made clear that Tobin's framework is not fully applicable to South Africa. Hence, Tobin, his framework will be criticized. Factors that Tobin has examined to explain variation will be adapted in a way that is suitable for both developed and developing countries and, more specifically, for South Africa. Even more, additional factors are added to this research. For each theme will be discussed which factors are important and those factors will be converted into independent variables. Before this is done, the dependent variable will be explained.

4.2 The dependent variable

In this research, the dependent variable is national climate policy. An intention of ambitious policy does not mean it will be automatically implemented in that way (Knill, Heichel & Arndt 2012, p.44).Since this research has its focus on ambition in climate policy, the policy output is more important than the actual outcomes. Policy output could best be described as actions or decisions, from governmental bodies, which are the result of the policy process in which communication and negotiation take place between the formal and informal procedure, rules and institutions (Howlett & Cashore 2009). Most of the research that tries to define ambitious climate policy does this in terms of leadership. Some studies define leaders or pioneers as those who promote cooperation in the international sphere (e.g. Baettig, Brander & Imboden 2008; Saul & Seidel 2011), while others define them as the ones who make most progress in their domestic policies (e.g. Huitema et al. 2011; Knill, Heichel & Andt 2012; Liefferink et al. 2009). In this research, the intention is to do the opposite. An attempt is made to explain why South Africa has a less ambitious policy to address climate change.

Since this research focuses on South Africa’s NDC, submitted for the Paris Agreement, national climate policy is based on the policies South Africa wants to implement for keeping up the rise in global mean temperature below 2 degrees Celsius. As mentioned earlier, the objective of the Paris agreement is to limit GHG emissions, so that global warming does not exceed 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels. This limitation requires highly ambitious and effective climate change mitigation policies (McGrath & Bernauer 2017, p.12). South Africa has set out its contributions to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement in its NDC. For example, the country has promised to develop a Carbon Tax and made targets to limits GHG emissions including land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) to between 398 and 614 MtCO2e over the period 2025-2030 (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change n.d.b). South Africa’s NDC was formulated in the context of national strategies and policy

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documents of South African government to address climate change. Since South Africa aims to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, targets formulated in its NDC and national policies, strategies and legislation on which South Africa’s NDC is based, are taken into account. In the methodology chapter, these will be operationalized.

4.3 The independent variables

For the purpose of explaining why South Africa has a less ambitious policy to address climate change, a number of independent variables have been developed for this research. As mentioned, Tobin (2014; 2017) developed a framework containing variables that explain variation in climate policy. He based these factors on found literature and accommodated them under the following themes: institutional, economic, international and ideological. The conditions which he considered from each theme were: government partisanship on the left-right spectrum, a state’s relationship with the EU, the degree of political constraints in a governance model and the extent to which economic growth affects ambitious climate policy. Tobin discovered that a combination of these factors can offer an explanation why some developed countries are pioneers in the field of ambitious climate policy and others are laggards.

However, Tobin applied his model for explaining variation in ambitious climate policy among developed countries. Developed countries face differences in relation to developing countries such as the degree of industrialization, unemployment, poverty and living conditions. In other words, this means that Tobin's model is not directly applicable to developing countries. For example, one of the causal conditions in Tobin his model was EU membership. Tobin (2017) analysed twenty-three Annex II countries which he considered as developed countries. Most of these countries are a member of the EU or at least have close ties to the EU such as the acquis communautaire. None country in the EU is categorized as a Non-Annex I country, according to the UNFCCC. South Africa is a developing country and categorized as a non-Annex I country at the UNFCCC. Besides, due to its geographical location, it is not possible for South Africa to become a member of the EU. Hence, for every theme, it will be made clear how Tobin investigated factors and these factors will be modified towards an approach which is suitable for both developed and developing countries. Moreover, Tobin, his model will be adapted in a way it will be applicable to South Africa. Next, as an additional contribution to this research, an extra theme is added in this research regarding the legislative process. Townshend & Matthews (2013, p.1) found a link between strong domestic climate change legislation and a high international ambition at the UNFCCC. They emphasize the importance of domestic legislation and what role domestic legislation can play if a country wants an ambitious position (Townshend & Matthews 2013). Hence, legislation has been added as a fifth theme. Despite all these factors, there could have been many other factors which influence the degree of ambitious climate policy. For example, geography is a plausible factor. However, in the literature, there exists no strong relationship between geographical settings and national climate policy (Tubi, Fischhendler & Feitelson 2012). It was already said by Tobin (2014; 2017) and Christoff and Eckersley (2011, p.444) that it is almost impossible to discover every factor which forms climate policy due to the complexity of climate

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change. Therefore, this research will only explore the independent variables which are categorized in the five themes below.

4.3.1 Institutional factors

Various studies show that institutional factors play an important role in the formulation of ambitious climate policy. Already a while ago, Congleton (1992) and Hahn (1990)discovered the important role that political institutions have on domestic climate policy. Bättig and Bernauer (2009, p.281) found a favourable relationship between the effect of democracy on levels of political involvement in climate policy output. In the same vein, Lijphart (1999) wrote that the type of democracy in place shapes policy output. A democracy appears to be an essential factor for ambitious climate policy. In addition, the type of governmental system in a state appears to influence the degree in ambitious climate policy. Jahn (1998), Liefferink et al. (2009) and Scruggs (1999) found that corporate states are generally more environmentally friendly because there is a smaller chance of potentially debilitated actors during the process when policy gets created. Lachapelle and Paterson (2013) found in their research that the degree of ambitious climate policy could be dependent on whether a country has a parliamentary or a presidential system. Their research suggests that parliamentary systems generally have a greater chance of implementing mechanisms, for example, to mitigate emissions (Lachapelle & Paterson 2013, p.564). This could lead to more ambitious climate policy. Tobin also considered the type of political system as a condition for his case-study in one of his researches (2014, p.101). From the found literature it can be concluded that a parliamentary democracy has more ambitious climate policy output than a presidential democracy.

Another institutional factor which influences the degree of ambitious climate policy is the number of political constraints in a country. Political constraints are also known as veto points. The concept of veto players, drawn up by Tsebelis (1995), is a game theory analysis of political behaviour. A veto player is a political actor with the possibility to refuse a certain decision when a veto player has other preferences. The more veto-points within a state, the greater the chance that a particular choice will be refused. The literature discusses this concept of veto points in a distributed manner. Some studies indicate that veto points increase the level of influence for people or groups that usually have little influence (e.g. Baumgartner and Jones 1993). This could lead to an increase in the policy ambition. On the other hand, the most literature indicates that the fewer veto points within a state, the greater the chance of more ambitious climate policy output (e.g. Alesina, Ardagna & Trebbi 2006; Hallerberg & Basinger 1998; Madden 2014).

In his own study, Tobin (2017) made a comparison between twenty-three developed countries and within this study, the number of points was one the conditions. His findings were that a few veto-points in relation to other conditions (which will be discussed in other parts of this chapter) are sufficient for ambitious climate policy. The results of the Tobin study (2017) are in line with the research by Christoff and Eckersley (2011: 444), who argue that the concept veto players can explain why some states can be seen as laggards in the field of ambitious climate policy. For this research, it is possible to determine South Africa’s political system and the degree of veto players. Thus, in this theme, Tobin his model is applicable

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to developing countries and, therefore, to South Africa. Based on this literature the following assumptions are made:

Hypothesis 1: South Africa has a presidential democracy which explains its less ambitious climate policy.

Hypothesis 2: The high number of veto-points in South Africa’s political system explain its less ambitious climate policy.

4.3.2 Economic factors

Several studies have been conducted to discover a relationship between the economic development of a country and climate policy. Some studies discovered a favourable relationship (e.g. Birdsall and Wheeler 1993; Börzel 2002; Frankel and Rose 2002; J

ä

nicke 2005; Liefferink et al. 2009). Other studies found an unfavourable relationship or did found that economic development has no significant effect on climate policy output (Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Kachi, Bernauer & Gampfer 2015; Kim and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2014; Madden 2014; Tamazian, Chousa & Vadlamannati 2009). From this, it can be noted that varying results exist.

To measure the relationship between the economic development and climate policy output, most studies focus on the degree of wealth via GDP per capita in a state. In general, most studies found that states with a higher GDP per capita have a strong climate policy. According to Recchia (2002), citizens play an additional role in this story. In a wealthy state, post-materialist citizens would put more pressure on governments to draw up more legislation or policies to address climate change (Inglehart 1990; Recchia 2002). Tobin measured the factor economic development also by GDP per capita. His results suggested that GDP per capita in collaboration with other factors such as institutional factors influence climate policy ambition (Tobin 2017, p.32). More specifically, Tobin (2014) explained that wealth (in GDP per capita) could be an indicator for explaining policy differences between developed and less economically developed states. The economic development of a state expressed in GDP per capita can, therefore, provides information about variation in the degree of ambitious climate policy.

Another way to determine the relationship between the economic development of a state and climate policy is by applying the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). The EKC suggests that if a state is experiencing economic growth and this growth reaches a certain peak, more will be done from that point to protect the environment. Governments then set more ambitious climate policies or, for example, invest more money in technology that causes less damage to the environment (Ekins 1997, p.805-830). Tobin discussed the EKC in his research but did not bring it into account as a condition. South Africa is a developing country that is experiencing economic growth and it might, therefore, be interesting to discover if the EKC can be applied to the country. In this way, the EKC is extended in this research in contrast to Tobin his framework. Thus, GDP per capita and the EKC are both ways to determine the relationship between economic development and ambitious climate policy output.

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In addition to the economic development, different forms of capitalism matter to the extent of ambitious climate policy output in a state. Lachapelle and Paterson (2013) discovered a difference between Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs). Their results suggested CMEs generally have more ambitious climate policy than LMEs (Lachapelle & Paterson 2013, 549). They suggest that it could be expected CMEs (for example Japan and Sweden) have more ambitious climate policies then LMEs (for example the United States and the United Kingdom) because CMEs have a greater capacity to affect GHG emissions. In general, LMEs are more focused on market-based mechanisms as a preferred instrument of climate policy (Lachapelle & Paterson 2013, p.549-550). Because of these reasons, countries with a CME have a relatively more ambitious climate policy. Tobin did not take the categorization of a country as a CME or an LME into account in his studies.

However, it is not possible to categorize each country as a CME or LME. A popular theory about the explanation of LMEs and CMEs was suggested by Hall and Soskice (2001) and called Varieties of Capitalism (VoC). To determine whether countries under an LME or CME are accommodated, Hall and Soskice (2001) looked to the extent to which companies deal with each other and other actors such as trade unions. For example, companies within LME coordinate their activities through hierarchies and market mechanisms, while companies within CMEs rather focus on non-market forms of interaction (Hall and Soskice 2001). The VoC-theory has been focused on countries with advanced capitalistically economies such as European Countries. Hall and Soskice explain this by arguing that “we know them best and think the framework applies well to many problems there” (Hall and Soskice 2001, p.2).

Despite, the basic ideas of the approach should also have relevance for understanding countries with developing markets (Hall and Soskice 2001, p.2). This view is supported by Lachapelle and Paterson (2013) who wrote that developing countries could neither be classified as CME or an LME due to the reason that developing countries have other priorities for their economic growth (Lachapelle & Paterson 2013, p.550). They argue that in the field of environmental policy, it might be expected that developing countries will experience more pollution because of their focus on economic growth. Their results suggested that countries categorized as LMEs or CMEs experienced significantly lower emissions growth than those categorized as developing countries (Lachapelle & Paterson 2013, p.560). South Africa has a growing economic market, but it cannot yet be categorized as an economy with relatively high levels of development in order to be classified as LME or CME. Although, the basic principles of the theory may apply to South Africa.

While South Africa cannot be categorized as LME or CME, South Africa's market economy is explored through the perspective of the VoC approach. At first, it seemed South Africa would develop itself to a CME since the end of the Apartheid regime1_{in 1994. South Africa undertook steps to develop a} “social-democratic and co-ordinated variety of capitalism” (Nattrass 2014, p.56). Nevertheless, the policy drawn up by the government corresponded more to the type LME (Nattrass 2014, p.56). This was against

1_{Between 1948 until 1994, South Africa had a political system based on institutionalised racial segregation and}

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the wishes of actors which were involved in the labour market policies, for example, trade unions. They could achieve protective labour market policies but at the same time, the liberalistic policies continued to exist. This contradictory position led to many adverse consequences, for example, a high level of unemployment (Nattrass 2014). Nowadays, South Africa’s economic system still contains elements of both a CME and an LME.

Some researchers looked for alternative theoretical models for the VoC which suits South Africa. In 2008, Schneider categorized South Africa as a Hierarchical Market Economy (HME) (Schneider 2008). In an HME the focus is on the coordination problems which get solved between hierarchical or vertical relationships instead of the market (LME) or corporatist institutions (CME) (Schneider 2008; Nattrass & Seekings 2010, p 39). In contrast to the categorization of Schneider, the results of Nattrass and Seeking (2010, p.24-27) suggested that an HME is not suitable for South Africa.

Furthermore, Nölke and Claar (2013) found that South Africa has some matching characteristics with the model of state-permeated market economies (SME). However, according to Nölke and Claar (2013), South Africa’s capitalism “foregoes the most valuable advantages of the SME model while sharing its disadvantages” (Nölke & Claar 2013, p.50). Various attempts have been made to open up the South African economy to the international market but the national market has remained dominant (Nölke & Claar 2013, p.46). This is described as the Mineral Energy Complex (MEC) (Fine & Rustomjee 1996; Fine 2009). Since the last twenty years, the South African economy has been managed by various MEC businesses. There is a lot of cooperation between the government and big companies. This fits within the SME Model (Nölke & Claar 2013, p.46). More specifically, in South Africa, there is cooperation between energy and infrastructure companies and the state. Some of these companies are owned by the state, such as Eskom, South Africa’s largest energy company. In other countries with an SME-model, this close cooperation between companies and the state has led to economic dynamism, whereas in South Africa these companies have led to the prevention of a strong development of the economic market (Nölke & Claar 2013, p.46). In general, countries with an SME-model have a larger population and a larger economic market, which makes it attractive for foreign companies to work together. The South African domestic market is relatively small (partly due to its population), but the high degree of inequality also makes it unattractive for foreign companies to cooperate with South African companies (Nölke & Claar 2013, p.50). This unattractiveness combined with the dominance of national MEC companies thus created an obstacle to the economic growth.

From the above, it can be noted that the literature is disputed about South Africa’s type of capitalistically market and that there seems to be a mixed system not enjoying the benefits of any specific type of capitalistic system. What these studies have in common, is that the researchers agree upon the fact that the state and the role of businesses, such as MEC-companies, affect the economic growth. Therefore, it will be investigated, as the researchers own contribution, how the influence of a MEC-company in South Africa affects the degree of ambitious climate policy.

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Hypothesis 3: South Africa has a low GDP per capita which explains its less ambitious climate policy.

Hypothesis 4: Citizens in South Africa prefer economic growth over protection of the environment which explains its less ambitious climate policy.

Hypothesis 5: The EKC is not applicable to South Africa which explains its less ambitious climate policy.

Hypothesis 6: MEC-companies in South Africa have much influence during the policy-making process of addressing climate change which explains the less ambitious climate policy.

4.3.3 International factors

The third theme relates to the influence of international factors on the formulation of national climate policy. Many investigations argue that international factors influence climate policy (e.g. Averchenkova & Bassi 2016; Fankhauser, Gennaioli & Collins 2016;Jahn & Müller-Rommel 2010). Tobin suggested in his research that close links to the EU, or ideally, when a state is a member of the EU, it has a positive effect to the degree of ambitious climate policy (2014; 2017). This is not applicable to South Africa since it is not a member of the EU. Therefore, this research will explore the relationship between South Africa and the EU but this will also be extended to international inter-linkages on a broader level. Evidence suggests that a country’s relationship with the international order has a positive influence on ambitious climate policy. For example, it is more likely that states make their national commitments come true, based on the Paris Agreement if the national policymaking process is linked with the international process (Averchenkova and Bassi 2016). Partly, this could be related to the evidence which Fankhauser, Gennaioli & Collins (2016) found for the influence of international policy diffusion. If countries have a lot of climate policies, then it is plausible that another state will implement more policies. Also, the reputation of a state is important. If a state wants to be known as a pioneer or leader within the international community, it feels compelled to have an effective policy on various policy areas, especially for smaller countries (Jänicke 2005). Therefore, international factors seem to shape countries national climate policy.

Hypothesis 7: South Africa has few international inter-linkages which explain its less ambitious climate policy.

4.3.4 Ideological factors

The fourth theme that influences ambitious climate policy is about ideological factors. There is evidence in the literature that the left-right pollical spectrum influences the degree of ambitious climate policy. Most research finds a positive link between a left-wing party and ambitious climate policy (Neumayer 2003; Rohrschneider 1993; Spoon, Hobolt & Vries 2014). There are indications that left-wing governments have a greater chance of adopting laws to address climate change in difficult economic times (Fankhauser,

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Gennaioli & Collins 2015, p.52). McCright and Dunlap (2011) describe that conservative parties ideologically dislike the idea of strong climate policies when it intervenes in markets or when heavy regulation is necessary. Tobin (2017) his own results suggest that the presence of a left-wing government is sufficient for ambitious climate policy. The striking part is that a left-right political spectrum only makes a difference at the national level. A study by Hoff (2013) shows that left-wing or right-wing government has no effect on climate policy at the municipal level. As such, government partisanship on a left-right spectrum is assessed as a variable that may influence climate policy ambition.

Hypothesis 8: South Africa has a right-wing government and there is less emphasis from the government on environmental issues which explains its less ambitious climate policy.

4.3.5 Legislative factors

The last theme regards the influence of domestic legislation. Tobin (2014; 2017) did not take legislative factors into account as a factor in his research. However, Townshend & Matthews (2013) found that countries with ambitious climate legislation, and where climate policy is a much-discussed topic, often have a lot of influence on the international order. This relates to why some states can be seen as pioneers and others as laggards to the degree of ambitious climate policy. Pioneers can motivate other countries to follow their example through the international diffusion of policy (Fankhauser, Gennaioli, & Collins 2016, p. 328). In addition, strong legislation has another advantage, namely that states' knowledge of climate change grows and in this way, they will look more often for climate-friendly alternatives, such as low-carbon development. Townshend & Matthews found evidence that developed countries had higher domestic binding legislations then developing countries (2013). It could be a hindering factor when a state has a laboriously legislative process. Therefore, they recommend binding legislation for each country which is categorized as a major emitter.

Hypothesis 9: South Africa has less binding policies and legislation to address climate change which explains its less ambitious climate policy.

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4.3.6 Overview of factors

Figure 1 shows an overview of factors which are taken into account in this research. Based on the literature all mentioned factors should influence the degree of ambitious policy to address climate change. Figure 1 is also included in Appendix I.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, factors are discussed that could have an influence on the degree of ambitious climate policy. More importantly, for the purpose of this research hypotheses have been drawn up to provide an explanation for why South Africa has a less ambitious climate policy. Tobin (2014; 2017) developed a theoretical model on factors which explain variation in ambitious climate policy among developed countries. Due to the reason South Africa is a developing country, this framework is not fully applicable to South Africa. In this chapter, Tobin’s model is criticized and adapted in a way it is suitable for both developed and developing countries and, therefore, to South Africa. In contrast to Tobin his model, additional factors are added. Factors in the institutional, economic and international theme are extended and the fifth theme about legislative factors is added. The next chapter is concerned with the methodology used in this study.

. Policy to address climate change Institutional theme Type of Democracy Presidential Democracy Parliamentary democracy Political constraints Many veto-points Few veto-points Economic Theme GDP per Capita High GDP per capita Low GDP per capita Environmental Kuznets Curve Applicable Not applicable Type of Capitalistic

Market Cititens their opinion

Prefer economic growth Prefer protection of the environment International Theme Many international inter-linkages Few international inter-linkages Ideological Theme Left-right political spectrum Left-wing government Right-wing government Legislation Many legisation Less Legislation

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