The changing role of the city
A case study of Amsterdam’s local climate change governanceBachelor thesis Joris den Breejen 10716637
jorisq@hotmail.com
1e lezer/begeleider: Jaap Rothuizen
2e lezer: Andres Verzijl
Bachelor scriptieproject
Future Planet Studies; major Sociale Geografie en Planologie 734301500Y
13-7-2018 Words: 14906 Abstract
Climate change is a widely recognized global challenge that requires local action. The complexity of local climate change governance reveals itself in the manifestation of the myriad of barriers and opportunities which are identified in the scientific literature. This thesis sheds light on three issues: first it will reveal how the barriers and opportunities related to local climate change governance have recently manifested themselves in the case of Amsterdam. Secondly, an analysis of the governance approach the city of Amsterdam followed in the period 2014 - 2018 will be done, and thirdly, it will review what the characteristics and distinguishes features of a governance structure capable of governing climate change impacts in the future are. The thesis concludes that the recent societal and governmental developments paired with the manifestation of various barriers and opportunities are indicative of a changing dynamic regarding local climate change governance.
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Table of contents p 1
Introduction p 3
1. Theoretical framework p 5
- 1.1 Barriers to effective climate change governance p 5
- 1.2 Recent opportunities in Amsterdam’s climate change governance p 6
- 1.3 Local climate change governance approach p 7
2. Methodology p 9
3. Results & analysis p 11
- 3.1 Climate change governance in Amsterdam; setting the scene p 11 • Climate adaptation plans, 2014-2018 p 11
• Sustainability budgeting p 12
- 3.2 Barriers and opportunities in Amsterdam’s local climate change
governance system p 12
• Leadership: government & society p 12
• Leadership: policy directives p 13
• Place-based information rethought p 14
• Place-based governance p 14
• Cooperation between government and society p 15
• Afrekencultuur p 16
• Externalisation p 16
• Decentralisation p 17
• Capacity p 18
- 3.3 Reshaping Amsterdam’s approach to governance p 19 • From mainstreaming to dedicated approach p 19
• Hybrid form of approaches p 21
- 3.4 A resilient governance system for the future p 21
• Participatiemaatschappij p 21
• Hybrid approach p 22
• Mobilise existing capacity? p 23
• Top down vs. bottom-up p 24
• New way of thinking p 25
4. Reflection: a conceptual model for Amsterdam p 27
5. Conclusion & discussion p 29
- 5.1 Conclusion p 29
- 5.2 Discussion p 29
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• Thoughts on vision p 30
• Barriers as opportunities p 30
• Recommendation for further research p 31
References p 32
Appendix A – conceptual model 1.0 in large p 34
Appendix B – operationalisation scheme p 35
Appendix C - item lists p 36
Appendix D - transcripts p 38
- D.1: transcript interview councillor Choho p 38
- D.2: transcript interview Caroline Uittenbroek p 43
- D.3: transcript interview Thijs Haverkamp p 54
Appendix E – miscellaneous notes p 64
3 Introduction
Climate change is a widely recognized global problem that requires local action. As a large part of the global greenhouse gas emissions are produced in cities, action on city scale is crucial (Pachauri, 2014). Municipalities are in a good position to develop mitigation and adaptation measures as they are large emitters of greenhouse gasses and they themselves have to adjust to climate change as well (Den Exter, Lenhart and Kern, 2015). As urban climate governance does not take place in a policy vacuum, in many cases it incorporates a multi-level perspective (Gupta, Lasagne and Stam, 2007; Bulkeley 2010; Kern 2014). This means that even though the local government often remains the responsible and legitimate entity for managing climate impacts, climate change governance is orchestrated through the interrelations between global, national and local actors across state/non-state boundaries (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2013, p. 136). While the interest in local adaptation planning and policy highlights the relevance of the local government for adaptation, its ultimate role with respect to practical implementation of policies and measures is dependent upon other actors within the governance network. This thesis analyses three knowledge gaps, which will be briefly described in the next section. The complexity of effective multi-level climate governance emerges in the manifestation of the myriad of barriers and opportunities that are identified in the scientific literature (Measham et al., 2011; Burch, 2010a; Burch, 2010b; Den Exter, Lenhart and Kern, 2015). Barriers such as capacity and leadership complicate the already complex process towards conceptualizing integrative climate governance, and in order to overcome these barriers in-depth knowledge on how these barriers manifest themselves is required. Similarly to the barriers, in-depth knowledge is required on the plane of opportunities as well. Often, the way in which the barriers and opportunities manifest themselves is case specific (Burch, 2010a; Burch, 2010b). No extensive research is currently available on how both barriers and opportunities materialize in the case of Amsterdam, which forms the first knowledge gap that this thesis attempts to fill.
Besides the manifestation of the barriers and opportunities, a third defining characteristic of a local climate change governance system is the governance approach followed. Uittenbroek et al. (2014) identified two approaches related to local Dutch climate change governance: the dedicated approach and the mainstreaming approach. According to Uittenbroek et al. (2014), in the period 2010-2014, Amsterdam was characterized by a mainstreaming approach. As since the publication of her research many changes regarding Amsterdam’s climate change governance approach have materialised, most evidently in the creation of a sustainability department and the appointment of a sustainability councillor, it is interesting to see what approach Amsterdam has taken since the publication. As no data is available on the approach taken by Amsterdam in the period 2014-2018; this constitutes the second knowledge gap. Moreover, various highly-cited papers call for a rethinking of climate change governance (Wise et al., 2015; Amundsen, Bergland and Westskog., 2010; Pahl-Wostl, 2009). The reconceptualization of Amsterdam’s local climate change governance system constitutes the third knowledge gap that this thesis attempts to fill.
The three knowledge gaps each form the basis of the three sub question answered in this thesis. The first sub-question analyses the first knowledge gap and is ‘how have barriers and opportunities regarding climate change governance recently manifested themselves in the case of the Amsterdam’s local government?
The second sub question that will be answered analyses the second knowledge gap and is ‘what climate change governance approach did the city of Amsterdam follow in the period 2014-2018?’
4 The third sub question will then be used to analyse the third knowledge gap and is ‘what are the characteristics and distinguishes features of a future governance structure capable of governing climate change adaptation and mitigation measures?’
Combining the three knowledge gaps and sub questions described above, the all-inclusive main research question that is answered in this thesis is ‘what recent developments define the changing dynamic regarding Amsterdam’s local climate change governance system?’
In the next section, the theoretical framework from which this thesis is developed will be outlined, after which a chapter on the methodology follows. Amsterdam’s local climate change governance structure will be analysed with data gathered through interviews and readings and supplemented with various grey data sources. In the results and analysis chapter, the three knowledge gaps analysed in this thesis are illustrative for different levels of abstraction. The first two subchapters of this chapter are focused on the measurable and perceptible level, constituting of an analysis of conceived climate change adaptation plans and budgeting in the period 2014 – 2018 in combination with an analysis of the way the barriers and opportunities manifest themselves in the case of Amsterdam. The third subchapter focusing on the governance approach followed by Amsterdam in the period 2014 – 2018, and thus cover a more abstract level of conceptualization. The final subchapter focuses on the most abstract level and covers the reconceptualization of Amsterdam’s local climate change governance system. In the conclusion and reflection, an answer is given to the main research question as outlined above, which will then also be placed in a wider historical and societal perspective.
5 1. Theoretical Framework
Climate change is a widely recognized problem due to the far-reaching consequences that it will have on society and nature on the global and the local level (Pachauri, 2014). Governance regarding climate change adaptation and mitigation measures is taking shape on various governance levels; the local, the national and the global. Mitigation measures are measures taken to tackle the causes of climate change, whereas adaptation measures are measures taken against the harming effects of climate change. Even though the two terms describe different concepts, they generally grow from similar institutional and developmental roots, and therefore can best be analysed in tandem (Burch, 2010b, p. 288). As a result of varying goals and needs, the integration of the various governance levels often leads to complex governance strategies. Amundsen, Bergland and Westskog (2010) recognize this issue and state that there is a ‘need for a multilevel governance framework in which the national government gives a clear role to municipalities through setting goals, creating regulations, and financing adaptation processes for the local governments to implement’ (p. 278).
Local climate change governance and national/international climate change policy are closely related to each other (Bulkeley et al., 2013). Local needs are translated into national and international policy, and national or international policy is created in order to cater to the local needs. This two-way interplay creates a tension between the two, as the needs of the local and the policy and goals of the national/international often do not perfectly align. Numerous barriers and opportunities are identified in the scientific literature, and after reviewing them, the choice was made to particularly focus on four barriers and two opportunities. The decision to include them is based on unambiguity and diversity of the concepts, relevance for the case, and researchability. The four barriers that are analysed in the following section are (i) leadership, (ii) competing priorities, (iii) place-based information and (iv) capacity. The opportunities analysed are (a) decentralisation and (b) externalisation. Other barriers are not explicitly mentioned in this thesis, such as resource constraints, but are taken into account as part of other barriers, such as the capacity barrier. Based on the same three reasons that were used to decide which barriers to include, two barriers which are explicitly excluded in this work are planning constraints and institutional constraints. Both barriers would significantly broaden the scope of this study and thus jeopardize the researchability. For more information on these barriers, see Measham et al., (2011). Finally, an excluded opportunity is regionalisation, which was excluded as this study primarily focusses on the case of Amsterdam, and not how Amsterdam behaves itself in relation to its surrounding region. For more information on regionalisation, see Den Exter, Lenhart and Kern (2015), or Hajer (2011).
1.1 Barriers to effective climate change governance
Good local leadership (i) can be a direct link between local politicians and the preferences of the local population, and thus is of paramount importance regarding efficient local climate change governance (Burch, 2010a; Burch, 2010b). Furthermore, strong leadership is required to address inefficiencies and redundancies within the organization of local governance, and can stimulate a path shift, which might be required to overcome the new realities of climate change. Measham et al. (2011) describe in their paper that depending on the local governments’ leader, his/her mentality and effectiveness of leadership regarding climate change, the issue of climate change might be a priority (ii) or pushed down onto the planning agenda. Without clearly articulated priorities, it is challenging for the local government to act effectively on climate change. As the consequences of anthropogenic climate change might take decades or even centuries to fully unfold, and are often surrounded by many uncertainties, climate change adaptation does not lend itself well for exciting new initiatives for council elections, held only every four years. As Gupta, Lasage and Stam (2007) also acknowledge, different councillors often have different views regarding climate change governance, and in the (relatively)
6 rapid changing political landscape, long-term climate change policy is more challenging to substantiate than short-term issues, such as improving public transportation or healthcare. As a result, climate change adaptation and mitigation policies might be pushed down the ‘priority ladder’, further complicating effective climate change governance.
Measham et al. (2011) note that the lack of useful, credible, and relevant information regarding the nature of climate change risk and measures is still regarded as a key barrier for proper local climate change governance. Even though mitigation and adaptation measures are primarily taken on the local level, most data on climate change is on the national or international level (Turner et al., 2003). Measham et al (2011) stress the need of place-based information (iii) regarding climate change policy. Place-based research makes the information and data gathered a lot more case specific, significantly increasing the usefulness of the gathered data for adaptation and mitigation planning, and can therefore play an important role in translating local needs into policy and goals.
In addition, even though plenty financial, technical and human capacity (iv) might be available, often it remains a challenging task to transform this into effective climate change governance and policy (Burch, 2010a; Burch, 2010b). Various other authors (e.g. Klein et al., 2007; Adger et al., 2004; Yohe, 2001) also quote capacity as a primary barrier regarding effective climate change governance. Often, it is not so much an issue of creating more capacity, but rather an issue of arranging existing capacity effectively (Burch, 2010b, p. 296). In this regard, path dependency is quoted as a key factor regarding the arrangement and distribution of existing capacity (Burch, 2010b). The path dependent municipal structure has created hurdles that lead to an inefficient arrangement of capacity, hindering successful climate change governance. As mentioned above, effective leadership can help to coerce a shift regarding path dependent climate governance structures.
1.2 Recent opportunities in Amsterdam’s climate change governance
Research provided by Den Exter, Lenhart and Kern (2015) identifies three main opportunities related to climate change governance specifically for Dutch cities, of which two are analysed here in detail: (a) decentralisation within municipal organisations, and (b) externalisation of initiatives that place climate policy outside the municipal organisation. A third trend, regionalisation, is not taken into consideration in this thesis due to this thesis only focusing on the city of Amsterdam, and not how the city relates to the surrounding region and vice versa. It should be noted that the paper by Den Exter, Lenhart and Kern (2015) identifies these concepts as trends, however this thesis rephrases this to opportunities for inclusivity, comprehensibility and practicality reasons.
The main development regarding decentralisation (a) is that municipalities reduce their internal climate coordination. This is often done to symbolize that climate adaptation strategies are important for all council offices across the entire municipal structure, not just the environmental department. The goal is to have multiple departments engaged in climate-related concerns simultaneously. A more decentralised government assumes that all relevant departments should work together to reach effective climate governance. Den Exter, Lenhart and Kern (2015) reckon that a combined centralised and decentralised approach will most likely be the most effective but give no definitive answer and call for more research on this matter. With an issue that has as many unpredictability’s as climate change, it is likely that new issues and challenges will arise, which need to be dealt with within the governance structure. Den Exter, Lenhart and Kern (2015) argue that the ideal situation ‘[…] consist of central steering with a decentralised team, located in different departments, to facilitate integration […] of climate change governance (p. 1076).’
Municipalities are inclined to place climate change governance entirely outside of their administration (Den Exter, Lenhart and Kern, 2015). This externalisation (b), with the goal to stimulate private actors
7 and organisations to initiate their own efforts, increases stakeholder involvement (Den Exter, Lenhart and Kern, 2015). This is often beneficial for both the local government as well as the other (private) actors involved. For the local government, the cost of climate change mitigation and adaptation is not exclusively carried by them but shared with other actors, and these local actors might benefit from investing as profits are potentially realized, and the public image of a company investing in sustainability initiatives can improve. Especially in light of recent budget cuts and expiring subsidy schemes, externalisation might prove fruitful for the continuation of local climate change adaptation (Den Exter, Lenhart and Kern, 2015). Areas where externalisation might be the most effective are those areas in which the most profits for businesses are to be made, such as the energy sector. In areas where less profits can be realised, it is more difficult for the municipality to delegate and externalise all its climate efforts. If a sustainable culture is already rooted in society, externalisation most likely will have positive effects (Den Exter, Lenhart and Kern, 2015).
The barriers and opportunities described above are visualised in figure 1, indicating the relations and positions of the various terms within the multi-level governance structure.
Figure 1: conceptual model. Visualised are the relationships between the various barriers and opportunities, and how they position themselves within the governance structure. Found in large in appendix A.
1.3 Local climate change governance approach
In their 2014 article, Uittenbroek et al. describe two main approaches of political commitment regarding municipal climate change governance.
• The dedicated approach; in which climate change governance is a positioned within a new governance field
• The mainstreaming approach; in which climate change governance is integrated in existing governance fields
In their paper, Rotterdam and Amsterdam are taken as two case studies, Rotterdam being characterized by a dedicated approach and Amsterdam by a mainstreaming approach. Their research period spans 2010-2014. In Rotterdam, climate change adaptation was framed as an opportunity, which made politicians wanted to commit directly to the issue. As a result of this wish, climate change
8 adaptation was put on the agenda and budget made available. Most projects during that time were considered as learning experiences. As a dedicated approach is characterized by direct political commitment, this can speed up the planning process in relation to a mainstreaming approach. However, this can also mean that important decision on for example maintenance are postponed. The focus is primarily on implementing measures. Furthermore, as has become evident in the case of Rotterdam, projects can also easily become profile-raisers of councillors (Uittenbroek et al, 2014, p. 1052).
In the case of Amsterdam, a mainstreaming approach was followed. Climate adaptation was not explicitly placed on the political agenda for the period 2010-2014. Climate adaptation was considered a bonus which came along with some governmental projects. Due to this, no additional resources or human capital were provided by the government. ‘The policy design in Amsterdam entailed ambitions and intentions, but there were no clear objectives in terms of planned outcomes (Uittenbroek et al., 2014, p. 1054).’ In practice, this meant that institutional entrepreneurs who focussed on climate adaptation often had to hook on to existing projects, in which technical difficulties, uncertainties and unfamiliarity often complicated their efforts.
For both approaches, table 1, adopted from Uittenbroek et al. (2014, p. 1048), summarizes the way they play out considering various conditions indicative of the type of political commitment and their implications.
Table 1: conceptual understanding of political commitment in the two approaches. Adopted from Uittenbroek et al., 2014, p. 1048.
9 2. Methodology
In this thesis, the local climate change governance structure of Amsterdam will be subject to a case study. In a case study, one case is researched intensively, and analysed in detail (Bryman, 2012, p. 66). Data was collected through structured interviews. A conscious choice was made to conduct semi-structured interviews, as such interviews leave room for the interviewer to follow up on responses if necessary, provide the interviewees with space for them to answer a question as they see fit, and are most effective at creating an in-depth image of the situation (Bryman, 2012, p. 469).
Three interviews have been conducted. The interviewees represent the three pillars on which the modern environmental governance structure is build, namely councillor Choho for the governmental, Caroline Uittenbroek for the academic, and Thijs Haverkamp for the societal pillar. By interviewing one of each pillar an accurate sketch of the governance landscape in Amsterdam can be created. Furthermore, bias towards one of the three pillars is also minimized. As the personal perspectives of the interviewees are the most interesting for this thesis, qualitative interviews can be best conducted (Bryman, 2012, p. 470).
Following Bryman (2012, p. 473), the primary consideration that was asked before the creation of the item list was ‘what does this person know that will help this thesis in answering it’s research questions?’ As the answer to this depends on the person in question – Choho was able to give me great insight within the municipal government structure, but Haverkamp gave me a lot of data on society’s perspective - for each interview, tailor-made item lists were created to better fit that person’s knowledge and phase in the data collection. The item lists can be found in appendix C. The lists are in itself based on the operationalisation of various concepts into variables. Those variables reflect the measurable concepts that this thesis is most interested in (Bryman, 2012, p. 161). Variables that have been focused on include the degree of cooperation between the government and research institutes and society, the degree of autonomy of the sustainability department within the governance structure of Amsterdam, budgeting of climate change, and the amount of sustainability initiatives from the municipality. For the operationalization table, including a full list of variables, see appendix B. As in qualitative interviews it is not a requirement to tightly follow the item list (Bryman, 2012, p. 470), often during the interviews questions were asked that were not originally on the item list. In particular, in the interview with Uittenbroek questions specifically aimed at gaining data regarding the governance approach ware asked. In all interviews, the vision on the future of local climate change governance is asked. This data will be used to answer the third sub question on the distinguishing features of a resilient future climate change governance system. The data gathered through interviews is supplemented with readings, scientific literature and other grey data sources.
Considering respondent validation (Bryman, 2012, p. 391), the transcripts of the interviews have immediately after completion and thus before analyzation been e-mailed to the interviewees. The primary goal of this is, according to Bryman (2012) ‘to seek confirmation that the researcher’s findings and impressions are congruent with the views of those on whom the research was conducted (Bryman, 2012, p. 391).’ In no instances did the interviewees ask to censor parts of the transcripts.
In a qualitative social study, the degree to which a study can be replicated is referred to as external reliability (Bryman, 2012, p. 390). It is hard to precisely replicate the study, as social settings cannot be ‘frozen’. However, in order to make sure that this study remains as replicable as possible, particular attention is paid to the transparency of data collection and analysis parts of this thesis. As this study is conducted by one researcher, internal reliability or inter-observer consistency – which describes to what extent members of a research team agree on something (Bryman, 2012, p. 390) – does not need to be specifically considered. The concept of internal validity describes whether there is a good match
10 between the researcher’s observations and the theories they develop (Bryman, 2012, p. 390). According to Bryman (2012, p. 390), qualitative social research often enables a researcher to ensure a high level of congruity between observations and ideas, as prolonged research in social settings can give a clear picture of reality. However, Bryman (2012) does not give any indication how long ‘prolonged’ is. As the research period of this thesis is rather brief, it is possible that internal validity might be partly compromised as a result of this. Nevertheless, special care is given to the development of theories on the basis of the observations, as the data will be combined with data from scientific sources such as Hajer’s (2011) work on the Energetic Society, at least partly mitigating the potentially compromised internal validity. External validity refers to the degree to which the findings can be generalized across other social settings other than the one researched (Bryman, 2012, p. 390). As the social setting of climate change governance differs greatly across cases – see for example the differences between the cases of Rotterdam and Amsterdam in Uittenbroek, Lenhart and Kern (2015) – Bryman also recognizes this as a constraint.
The research period on barriers and opportunities and the approach spans four years, 2014-2018. This coincides with the previous college period and forms a smooth follow-up on Uittenbroek, Lenhart and Kern (2015) research, in which the research period was 2010-2014, spanning the college period two elections ago. For the final reconceptualization of governance, visions from the various speakers will be combined to form a framework to effective future climate change governance.
The interviews were conducted in Dutch, the native language of the interviewees and the interviewer, and thus it would be only natural to conduct the interviews in Dutch. As an academic with extensive knowledge of the English and Dutch language, no strife is expected related to translating the relevant concepts and terms, be it from English to Dutch or vice-versa. In order to keep this work accessible to English speakers, all direct quotes are translated to English, and thus be placed next to the Dutch quote. Small language bumps akin to direct quotes might persist, but will on occurrence be indicated.
The core sources and research techniques used in this thesis are put together and visualised in table 2. The main reasons behind the use of those sources is also explained briefly in table 2. For the complete references, see the references section. For the full transcripts of the interviews, see the respective appendices.
11 3. Results & analysis
During the period March 2018 – May 2018 data has been collected. In the next chapter, the data is analysed and used to answer the research questions, ultimately leading to the conclusion. The first subchapter of this chapter is a short analysis of various plans conceived by the municipality in the period 2014 – 2018, and a budget analysis for the same period. This is to set the scene of local climate change governance in Amsterdam during the period 2014 – 2018, and to provide the other subchapters with a solid base from which to develop. The second subchapter is on the manifestation of barriers and opportunities, the third section on the governance approach followed in the period 2014 – 2018, and the fourth section on the reconceptualization of local climate change governance.
3.1. Climate change adaptation in Amsterdam; setting the scene Climate adaptation plans, 2014 -2018
In the period 2014 – 2018, various plans related to making Amsterdam more sustainable have been conceptualised by the municipality. In the table found below (table 3), six core plans can be found, and are in the next section briefly elaborated on to illustrate Amsterdam’s local climate change governance and policy. The choice was made to elaborate these specific plans because in the interview with Choho he made mention of these six plans, and because of the societal relevance of certain plans such as Amsterdam Aardgasvrij.
12 The plans illustrate the strong ties between the main involved sectors; businesses, government and citizens. In all plans the necessity to cooperate is visible, as even in the most centralised plan, that being Amsterdam Aardgasvrij, the municipality cooperates with energy companies and network controller Liander. The five other plans are all illustrative of the trend of climate change measures being externalised and decentralised. Finally, in some plans, the municipality takes on a more active role, whereas in other plans, the role of the government it is more facilitating, signifying the two main roles that Amsterdam’s local government can take on. More on the changing role of the city can be found in section 3.2.
Sustainability budgeting A quick analysis of the past four financial plans of the city of Amsterdam reveals a drop of close to 25% in funding for the sustainability depart-ment over the past four years. The first financial plan that the previous council developed (for
the year 2015) constituted a total of 5339 million euros, of which 33 million (roughly 0.62%) was allocated towards sustainability (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2014). In the fourth and final budget (for the year 2018) by the previous council, the total budget was 5654 million, of which 25 million (0.44%) was allocated towards sustainability (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017). In the years 2016 and 2017, the percentage of budget allocated to sustainability was 0.56% and 0.52%, respectively (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2015; Gemeente Amsterdam 2016). Based solely on these figures, also visualised in table 4, it would seem that sustainability becomes of a lesser priority. If this trend of decreasing financial capacity continues to develop, in the near future the topic of sustainability might be subject to financial stress.
3.2. Barriers and opportunities in Amsterdam’s local climate change governance system
Leadership: government & society
The city of Amsterdam first installed a councillor of sustainability in 2014, a function carried out by Abdelduheb Choho. When he first arrived in office in 2014, the governmental and societal sustainability initiatives ‘landscape’ was rather fragmented and uncoordinated. In order to create a more central platform from which adaptation measures could be developed, Choho centralised most of the governmental efforts under his leadership, with the idea that members of the various teams which were currently looking into sustainability could learn from each other. Choho calls this continued learning ‘kruisbestuiving’ (cross-pollination) (Choho, 2018, pers. comm.).
At the same time, the role of city regarding climate change adaptation changed quite drastically from an initiating role to a more facilitating role (Choho, 2018, pers. comm.). These changes have multiple implications regarding the way the climate change adaptation and mitigation measures are implemented. Related to the point made in the previous paragraph, the barrier of leadership is being reshaped. Where initially it was the government’s responsibility to initiate climate change measures and take a leading role in developing and implementing such measures, more and more this responsibility is being externalised to non-governmental organisations such as businesses and civil movements. Over the past four years, councillor Choho has made considerable steps in facilitating this
Table 4: total budget and sustainability budget for the city of Amsterdam, and percentage of total budget allocated to sustainability, over the period 2015-2018. Source: Gemeente Amsterdam.
13 continued externalisation, considered also by Wijffels, Stikker and Koornstra (for more on these speakers, see appendix E) as a crucial development.
Considering this trend of increasing externalisation, central, strong leadership from the government is becoming less relevant than it was before. This then brings up the question as to how important central leadership really is. On the one side, effective leadership is required in order to address inefficiencies and redundancies within the organization of local governance (Burch, 2010b). On the other hand, if the role of the local government is changing from initiator to facilitator, some of these redundancies are being placed outside of the governmental structure. Leadership outside of this structure remains desired and important, as the establishment of the informal energycommissioner (Ruud Koornstra, see appendix E) seems to implicate.
As a mediator between the government and businesses, civil movements and other actors, Koornstra has a leading role in coordinating their combined efforts and blending that with knowledge and capacity from the government. Interestingly, Koornstra does not have a governmental background, but rather is a self-proclaimed businessman on sabbatical (Tegenlicht, 2017). His position outside of the government may add to his credibility towards society. Strong leaders remain of great importance regarding the transition but most likely will – in part - be furnished from society and not the government. As such, the declining trend of central governmental leadership should not be confused with a declining trend in leadership in general.
Leadership: policy directives
Governmental leadership, or rather, authority, continues to play a large role in corrective legislative measures. Even though plenty of favourably opportunities for businesses and industry lie in wake, potentially stimulating them to take the lead (Tegenlicht, 2017), not every company will submissively change their business plan. Sometimes, coercive force in the form of lawsuits against fraudulent and law-rejecting companies is required. From the interview with councillor of sustainability Choho, it became clear that Choho is able to single-handedly initiate lawsuits against businesses, which signifies that Choho remains an authoritative figure with far-reaching regulatory control, being able to initiate lawsuits against businesses on his own initiative. Even though the leading role of the government is changing, with leadership being placed outside of the government structure, councillor Choho retains his coercive tools to force businesses to abide the law.
“… de wet ‘Milieubeheer’, die stelt dat alle investeringen die zich binnen vijf jaar terugverdienen, die moet een bedrijf doen. Dus dan heb ik ook geïnvesteerd om alle middel- en grote bedrijven in Amsterdam om daar handhavers op af te sturen om te controleren of zij zich houden aan die wet. En ik heb zelfs nog rechtszaken gevoerd, omdat dan sommige bedrijven ter discussie stellen of dan wel of niet een investering zich terugverdient in die vijf jaar tijd.” (Choho, 2018, pers. comm.)
“… the natural-management law, which dictates companies that investments that earn themselves back within five years must be done. So I have invested in law-enforcers to check on all middle- and large businesses to make sure that to adhere that law. An I have even followed lawsuits, because some businesses then put in question whether or not an investment can be earned back within those five years’ time” (Choho, 2018, pers.comm.)
On the national level, Choho aimed together with the other three large Dutch cities – Utrecht, Den Haag and Rotterdam – to reshape the national and European policy structure in which cities like Amsterdam do not have the necessary authority and control over climate change adaptation and mitigation policies and initiatives to adequately respond to very local, case-specific instances. As the impact of climate change is often very local, and can differ substantially across relatively small
14 distances, what is needed according to Choho and nearly all other interviewees, is more place-based information and governance (Choho, 2018, pers. comm.; Uittenbroek, 2018, pers. comm.). The development of the new ‘omgevingswet’, or environmentlaw (see the section on place-based governance) gives the local government level more jurisdiction when implemented, which could indicate that his lobby was successful. However, no research concerning any connection between his lobby and the development of the omgevingswet and their causality has been conducted, so it may very well be the case that the omgevingswet was developed regardless whether or not Choho was lobbying for such a law.
Place-based information rethought
In the theoretical framework of this thesis, a main barrier identified was the lack of place-based information. During the analysis of data on Amsterdam, it became clear that this barrier has not adequately been conceptualized and developed. In the data-gathering and analysis parts of this thesis, this barrier is split up in two distinct, yet related barriers; place-based governance and cooperation between government and society . Place-based governance is defined as local, case-specific policy and management of climate change measures and indicates the degree of freedom that the local government has related to implementing climate change measures. Cooperation between local government and local society and research institutions can be indicative of the degree to which place-based information is available, and to what degree society is engaged within the governance process. Both barriers will be analysed separately in the following two sections.
Place-based governance
According to Choho (2018, pers. comm.), the Dutch national government maintains a vision on climate change governance which entails that all municipalities are equal and assumes that every measure taken on the national level will play out in a comparable way in different municipalities. However, Amsterdam is on many planes quite different from the Dutch ‘average’. Amsterdam’s antique and unique inner-city layout often brings forth very specific planning challenges, unencountered in other places. The policy of both the European Union as well as Dutch national policy is not specific enough for cities such as Amsterdam. According to Choho, his view regarding the need for more and deeper place-based governance is also shared by the councillors of the other four big Dutch cities, being Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht.
“Dat [de stad Amsterdam in verhouding tot het Nederlands ‘gemiddelde’] is een heel ander principe. Dus ik heb altijd gepleit voor meer bevoegdheden als steden en meer diversiteit in de Rijksregelingen zodat steden en gemeenten ook ieder daar hun eigen dingen mee kunnen doen.” (Choho, 2018, pers. comm.)
“That [the city of Amsterdam in relation to the Dutch ‘average’ (emphasis added)] is a very different principle. So I have always plead for more authorization as cities and more diversity in the government regulations so cities and municipalities can do their own things (Choho, 2018, pers. comm.)
In the interview, Uittenbroek argues that the new omgevingswet is a major step towards achieving more place-based governance. In reaction to the question whether or not on the national level structural changes regarding policy-making need to be implemented, she says that the omgevingswet facilitates this.
15 “Dat wordt allemaal losgelaten met de
omgevingswet. Er komt een nieuwe omgevingswet over ruimtelijk beleid, en daarin gaan ze van heel veel wetten naar één wet en dan gaat het juist over flexibiliteit en een goeie beargumentatie van waarom je iets wel of niet doet.” (Uittenbroek, 2018, pers. comm.)
“That is all released in the new environmental law. A new law is being developed regarding spatial planning, in which many separate laws will be combined to one law, mainly focused on flexibility and good argumentation as to why you do or do not do something.” (Uittenbroek, 2018, pers. comm.)
This new law, expected to be implemented in the year 2021, does four main things. Primarily, the various plans and laws regarding environment, nature and spatial planning currently in effect will be combined and better aligned with each other. Secondly, sustainability projects, such as the construction of wind mills, will be stimulated. Thirdly, the local level of governance, which includes water boards, provinces and municipalities, will receive more space regarding the development of local policy. Finally, there will be more space for initiatives from private actors. Instead of very detailed permits, there will be a set collection of rules, in which the goal takes priority over the means (Rijksoverheid, no date). From a governance point of view, especially the final two points are fundamental regarding more place-based governance. More jurisdiction for lower governance levels is needed according to Choho (2018, pers. comm.), and the third point perfectly supports this, while at the same time further strengthening the opportunity of decentralisation. According to Choho, in a sustainable world centralised structures – of any kind, be it energy networks, supply chains or governance structures – will need to be reshaped to more decentralised structures, and the development of the omgevingswet can be viewed as a first substantial step to this end. More space for actors outside the government structure and making that structure easier for those actors to manoeuvre in, strengthens the opportunity of externalisation, which according to Haverkamp (2018, pers. comm.) will really help to propel the transition to new heights.
Cooperation between government and society
The fruitful cooperation between the government and society is also evident in the case of 02025. Haverkamp (2018, pers. comm.) mentions that the cooperation between 02025 and the municipality over the last six months has really taken flight. Instead of the municipality merely providing funding for 02025 in the form of subsidies, they are now actively shaping and participating in 02025 events. Where initially either party took the lead and the other party followed, causing problems such as little support for government-initiated projects, or good ideas from citizens which failed due to the citizens not knowing their way around the governance structure, now climate adaptation projects are done in much more intimate collaboration.
“Wat er heel vaak gebeurd is of de gemeente neemt de lead, en zegt, ‘nee wij hebben de lead, dus jullie luisteren naar ons.’ Dat werkt niet. En wat daarna heel veel is gedaan is andersom, dus jullie hebben de lead, maar dat werkt ook niet want mensen met een goed initiatief kunnen vaak de weg in de gemeente niet vinden. […] Als je dat samen gaat doen, en ook samen de verantwoordelijkheid neemt, en dan het liefst ook nog met bedrijven, bewoners, organisaties vanuit de samenleving en onderwijsinstellingen, als je dat met zo’n groep samen wilt doen, dan krijg je echte vernieuwing, en kracht ook.” (Haverkamp, 2018, pers. comm.)
“What often happens is that either the municipality takes the lead, and says, ‘no, we have the lead, and you listen to us.’ That does not work. And what was often done after that was vice-versa, where you have the lead, but that also did not work, as often people with a good initiative cannot find their way around the municipality. […] If you start to do that together, and also take responsibility together, preferably in combination with businesses, inhabitants, organisations from society and educational institutes, if you do that together with such a group, then you get real change, and vigour too.” (Haverkamp, 2018, pers. comm.)
16 As an academic, Uittenbroek is able to explain in the interview that the cooperation between the government and research institutes such as universities works rather fluent as well. Her 2015 paper is part of what is called a joint knowledge production, in which municipalities, universities, other research institutes and the government all work together to produce knowledge. From this research even new institutions spawned, such as the Climate Adaptation Services.
Afrekencultuur
Even though a more intimate relationship between government and society undoubtedly leads to more powerful policy, Haverkamp adds that this cooperation is also characterized by long waiting times and other institutional constraints before an initiative can be implemented (Haverkamp, 2018, pers. comm.). Due to the way the governance structure has developed and evolved over time, this institutional barrier, or rather bureaucrational barrier, has been able to manifest itself. In the literature the institutional barrier is a widely recognized barrier to climate change governance (Measham et al., 2014; Ivey et al., 2004). In the case of Amsterdam’s local climate change governance structure, a key characteristic of this barrier is the so-called ‘afrekencultuur’, or victimization culture. What is meant by this Dutch term is the deeply rooted fear of civil servants to make false judgements and other mistake and subsequently be held responsible for the his or her actions. As the government uses public resources – money collected through taxes -, often little room is left for government officials to experiment with that money. In case anything goes wrong during such an experiment, the civil servant in question will be summoned to the Raad, or Board of the city, in which he or she has to explain him or herself. The liability that a government official has, and that he or she has to account for everything that he does – as a result of the fact that the government uses public resources - leads to this afrekencultuur. It is due to this that government officials take their time analysing new projects, and during that time concern themselves a lot with that system and its protocols. As a result, a lot of time is often spent reviewing one project. Furthermore, some officials might become so anxious to do something wrong, that sometimes, the system becomes more important than the potential results. As the idea of this afrekencultuur is such a key concept within Amsterdam’s government and the fact that the institutional barrier is already covered in various scientific sources, the choice was made to specifically elaborate this part of the institutional barrier, rather than the entire institutional barrier.
“En daardoor denken ze [overheidsambtenaren] dat ze dus ook alles heel lang en heel goed moeten bekijken, ze richten zich heel erg op het systeem en protocollen en niet op resultaat. En omdat ze dus zo angstig zijn dat ze zich niet kunnen verantwoorden, wordt soms het systeem belangrijker dan de mensen.” (Haverkamp, 2018, pers. comm.)
“And as a result, they [government officials] think that they need to look long and carefully at everything and place a lot of emphasis on the system and its protocols and not on results. And because they are fearful that they cannot account themselves, the system because more important than the people.” (Haverkamp, 2018, pers. comm.)
The inertia regarding policy development which stems from this system places extra strain and pressure on the governance system. Even though important steps have been taken in recent years to strengthen the cooperation between the government and society, the embedded fear to do wrong hinders the development of more vigorous and dynamic measures, thus this barrier substantially limits the opportunities for the government and society to develop such measures and increase their cooperation efforts.
Externalisation
In Amsterdam in the period 2014-2018, the initiative of local sustainability projects has in an extensive amount explicitly been externalised outside of the government structure to the level of inhabitants,
17 businesses and NGO’s. The government functions to facilitate initiatives developed by those sectors through subsidies and regulations (through a project called Duurzaam Initiatief, or Sustainable Initiative. See also table 3) but does not explicitly initiate sustainability projects on a large scale. This way, according to councillor Choho, the city of Amsterdam will be its own initiator of the transformation required to remain a frontrunner regarding sustainability (Choho, 2018, pers. comm.).
“Dus iedereen in de stad, die een duurzaam initiatief op gang wil krijgen, kan bij de gemeente aankloppen voor subsidie om dat op gang te krijgen […] Dus niet meer dat wij vanuit het stadhuis alles sturen, maar juist stad faciliteren. Ik geloof dat als de stad het zelf gaat doen, dat dat is wat de transformatie echt op gang gaat krijgen.” (Choho, 2018, pers. comm.)
“So everyone in the city, who wants to initiate a sustainability idea, can come to the municipality for subsidy in order to help develop that initiative. […] So no longer is everything controlled from the town hall, but mainly facilitate the city. I believe that when the city does it itself, that that will be the basis to really get the transition going.” (Choho, 2018, pers. comm.)
The development of the omgevingswet will no doubt function as a facilitator of the increase in externalisation and have an impact on the way the government cooperates with society. However, Uittenbroek (2018, pers. comm.) fears that the continued externalisation might cause people to be left out of the transition. Climate adaptation measures might not be implemented evenly across the city, as only certain demographic groups (think of wealthy, highly-educated young entrepreneurs) might be involved in this process, and those groups might only live in certain areas of the city. This brings up a myriad of questions, such as how to make sure that the whole city is included, whether or not citizens and the municipality accept their responsibility regarding climate change adaptation, and how they can most effectively cooperate to come to inclusive city-wide climate change adaptation policy. These and other justice-related questions will need to be answered but fall outside the scope of this thesis. More on this in the recommendation section of chapter 5.
Den Exter, Lenhart and Kern (2015) argue in their paper that the increasing degree of externalisation is coupled with a decrease in funding and expiring subsidy schemes. During the analysis of city budgeting in the period 2014 - 2018, indeed a decrease in funding has been found, as visualised in table 4 and argued above. However, various sources contradict the statement of expiring subsidy schemes. Councillor Choho has made it evident that various plans set up by his office (see table 3) actually are subsidy schemes. Furthermore, Uittenbroek (2018, pers. comm.) and Haverkamp (2018, pers. comm.) both argue that subsidies are still a primary tool for the government to stimulate involvement of local inhabitants. In addition, Haverkamp states that 02025 receives funding for its energy-breakfasts. Of course, the work by Den Exter, Lenhart and Kern (2015) describes nationwide trends, and this thesis only reviews the case of Amsterdam, but still this discrepancy is remarkable. Decentralisation
Even though externalisation plays a key role in contemporary climate change governance, many other related governance areas remain the responsibility of the municipality. Within the municipality structure, often tasks are delegated downwards to the more local city districts, thus remaining within the municipality governance structure. As an example for this decentralisation, Choho gives ‘Amsterdam Rainproof’, a project which aims to improve Amsterdam’s resilience against heavy rainfall. Amsterdam Rainproof is designed at city hall level, however the development and roll-out of concrete, practical measures is left to local city districts, as issues such as whether or not to plant extra trees or remove pavement are deemed to be a local affair. The leading role that the central government takes regarding Amsterdam Rainproof is quite contrary to the trend of externalisation in which more and more it becomes the primary objective of the local government to facilitate rather than initiate. In a
18 wider national perspective, the ongoing trend of decentralisation is also illustrated by the development of the omgevingswet.
According to Choho, in order to facilitate the transition, the wider governance system needs more decentralisation. A trend of decentralisation is not only visible within the governance structure but also more widespread across society. Technically, previously centralised systems such as power networks are increasingly being decentralised, and socially, the emergence of freelance workers (zzp-ers in Dutch) reflects the same trend. The importance of this opportunity lies in the reinforcing effect that a simultaneous shift of the socio-technical system as well as the governance system to a more sustainable system can have on each other and thus society as a whole. The continued decentralisation can be the next step towards such a system. As a result of the continued decentralisation and externalisation, the social capital which is currently stored within the structures of existing cities, could be utilised to the fullest. Choho argues that the ‘non-logical and outdated’ governance system currently effective severely complicates achieving the goals set forth in the Paris Agreements (Choho, 2018, pers. comm.).
“Ik zou het onderdeel van de transitie noemen. Als je gewoon naar het energiesysteem kijkt in Nederland, dan is ons energiesysteem altijd centraal geweest, terwijl de toekomstige energiesystemen decentrale energiesystemen zullen zijn. Dus dat betekent ook dat je de verantwoordelijkheden en de wetgeving zult moeten veranderen naar decentrale systemen, decentrale wetgeving en sturing. Dus als je het hebt over governance, vind ik dat ons transitie denken niet alleen naar de technische en de reële maatschappelijke kant moeten kijken, maar dat we onze wetgeving, op dezelfde manier moeten laten meebewegen zodat het elkaar versterkt.” (Choho, 2018, pers. comm.)
“I would call it a part of the transition. If you just look at the energy system in The Netherlands, then you will see that our energy system has always been centralised, while the future energy systems will be decentralised. So that means that also the responsibilities and the law-making needs to change to decentralised systems, decentralised governance and control. So when you discuss governance, I think that our transition-thinking should not only concern itself with the technical and societal side, but that also our law-making needs to evolve in a similar fashion, so that it strengthens each other.” (Choho, 2018, pers. comm.)
Uittenbroek (2018, pers. comm.) however places question marks at the combined effects of decentralisation and externalisation. She argues that due to the ever-increasing workload of the national government, now having to deal with more issues than ever before, various tasks – such as climate change adaptation - are pushed down the government ladder. However, like the national government, the municipality also has an ever-growing list of tasks and issues that it needs to deal with. As a result, climate change is being externalised by the municipality outside of the government structure, placing the responsibility in increasing degree at the level of citizens, businesses and other non-governmental organisations. But also those groups have more to do. People only have a pre-determined capacity to handle things and deal with issues and now, Uittenbroek argues in the interview, the externalisation might be asking too much of people. The government should take on a more central role regarding the issue and add more vigour to its plans. It remains important to involve the other sectors, but Uittenbroek (2018, pers. comm.) fears that governmental inertia and negligence of its responsibility might convert the opportunities of decentralisation and externalisation to barriers, hindering the process of climate change adaptation.
Capacity
A mayor barrier for Choho was his limited funding, as was evident in table 4. As Haverkamp puts it, his limited financial capacity made Choho ‘a tiger without teeth’ (Haverkamp, 2018, pers. comm.).
19 According to Haverkamp, Choho was allocated low funding to symbolize the desire of the college for the sustainability department to cooperate with other departments and create collaborative plans with collaborative funding. Due to Choho often being the one with the least available funding, it was hard for him to make a fist in the conceptual phase of planning, and thus ambitious adaptation measures were sometimes abandoned (Haverkamp, 2018, pers. comm.). Even though Choho restructured the governance structure and created various subsidy schemes, due to his low funding, the implementation of practical adaptation measures in some instances left something to be desired. What is needed here, according to Haverkamp, is simply much more funding. Interestingly, this is contrary to what is stated in the paper by Burch (2010b), in which she argues low capacity often does not stem from little allocated resources, but rather from an ineffective arrangement of those resources. The most effective way to maximize capacity based on these two sources is not only rearrange existing resources, but also to create and allocate more resources towards climate change adaptation measures.
The main stimulant for citizens to be involved with sustainability comes in the form of subsidies, but according to Uittenbroek (2018, pers. comm.), those subsidies might only reach the active 10% of society already possessive of knowledge, capacity and will to be involved with climate change adaptation. The money might have been better spent elsewhere, but this remains speculative and no concluding evidence for this statement was found during this research. The establishment of the various plans as found in table 3 seems to indicate sufficient human capacity to conceptualise plans, the development of which can - as was evident in the section on the afrekencultuur – sometimes be quite problematic.
In a wealthy city like Amsterdam, situated in a wealthy part of the world, capacity in general should not constitute a major barrier. If it does evolve to be a limiting factor in climate change adaptation, like Burch (2010b) argues, it is often not so much that there needs to be more capacity, but rather existing capacity needs to be rearranged. This would require leadership from the government. Tying into the point made in the section on leadership about governmental leadership remaining important on various different planes, here governmental leadership remains important as well.
3.3. Rethinking Amsterdam’s approach to governance
From the data used in the previous section on the manifestation of barriers and opportunities for the case of Amsterdam it became clear that many of those barriers and opportunities play out in a very specific way in Amsterdam. The next section will use that data and supplement it with more data gained from the interview with Uittenbroek and her 2014 article on governance approaches and analyse the way in which Amsterdam’s local government conceived climate change governance in the period 2014 – 2018.
From mainstreaming to dedicated approach
In the past four years councillor Choho reshaped an organisationally fragmented climate change governance structure into a more centralised governance structure. Instead of conceptualizing climate change policy through the various inputs of for example ‘team air’, ‘team water’, and ‘team waste’, all those teams and their inputs were combined and became centrally supervised by the sustainability department.
“… mijn doel was ook om al die versnippering die er organisatorisch was, bij elkaar te brengen, vanuit ook het idee dat als je het team luchtkwaliteit en het team zon bij elkaar stopt, dat er ook kruisbestuiving plaatsvindt, omdat je
“I would call it a part of the transition. If you just look at the energy system in The Netherlands, then you will see that our energy system has always been centralised, while the future energy systems will be decentralised. So that means that
20 uiteindelijk verandering teweeg wilt brengen, en
dat die expertise van verandering en hoe doe je dat nou in de stad, door de kruisbestuiving elkaar zou kunnen versnellen en elkaar zou kunnen helpen. Dus dat betekende dat ik moest beginnen met ook gewoon eerst, organisatorisch, een fundament of een platform te creëren om de veranderingen die ik wilde te kunnen, überhaupt te kunnen realiseren” (Choho, 2018, pers. comm.)
also the responsibilities and the law-making needs to change to decentralised systems, decentralised governance and control. So when you discuss governance, I think that our transition-thinking should not only concern itself with the technical and societal side, but that also our law-making needs to evolve in a similar fashion, so that it strengthens each other.” (Choho, 2018, pers. comm.)
The main goal behind this reshape was that during the development of climate change measures, the various teams would not only have their separate inputs, but the combined inputs of all teams would be greater than the sum of the various inputs. This is what Choho calls ‘kruisbestuiving’, or cross-pollination. The continued procreation of information, data, plans and management practices is aimed to make Amsterdam’s climate change governance more resilient and vigorous. Uittenbroek (2018, pers. comm.) also argues that this cross-pollination might require a central sustainability coordinator, who is tasked to join various projects together. In the case of Amsterdam, such a position has been fulfilled by the appointment of Choho as councillor of sustainability.
The different perspective from which councillor Choho conceptualised policy has a multitude of implications regarding the governance approach followed. Whereas in the period 2010-2014 Amsterdam’s climate change governance structure has been characterized by a mainstreaming approach (Uittenbroek, Lenhart and Kern, 2015), in the period 2014-2018 a more direct, centralised and dedicated form of governance has been developed. Various trends and factors are indicative of this. For example, in the article, Uittenbroek argues that ‘politically, climate adaptation was considered an added value (to the compact and sustainable city). Therefore, no additional financial or human resources were provided for it during 2010–2014’ (Uittenbroek, Lenhart and Kern, 2015, p. 1053). Table 5 shows that since 2014, funding – however little – is going to the newly created department of sustainability. The creation of a new department is further illustrative for a dedicated approach. Additionally, the absence of clear goals and directives in the period 2010-2014 and the presence of such goals in the period 2014-2018 indicate a change as well. Finally, the absence of a central figure to coordinate sustainability efforts and the subsequent appoint of a central councillor of sustainability indicates a change in approaches as well. The above-mentioned points are visualised in table 5.
Table 5: indicators of the changing approach of Amsterdam's local climate change governance over the last two college periods.
As existing organisational structures and routines can be rigid and therefore difficult to change, Uittenbroek, Lenhart and Kern (2015) reckon that ‘it will be relevant to explore how existing structures can be changed where there is only indirect political commitment, as in municipalities that apply the mainstreaming approach (Uittenbroek, Lenhart and Kern, 2015, p. 1058).’ The four factors elaborated on in the above section and featured in table 5 are the main drivers behind the change from a
21 mainstreaming approach to a dedicated approach and thus constitute the answer to Uittenbroek, Lenhart and Kern’s (2014) question. The repositioning of the topic of sustainability within the local governmental structure as its own department was a primary development to commit Amsterdam to a more dedicated approach. This development came paired with the appointment of a central director and leader, who then composed clearly articulated goals and directives in various policy plans (such as Agenda Duurzaamheid) and received funding to support those plans. Even though difficulties – especially on the plane of funding – remained, Amsterdam was in the period 2014-2018 more directly committed to climate change adaptation then it was in the period 2010-2014.
Hybrid form of approaches
A dedicated approach might lead to more capacity since a central figure with a supporting agenda is positioned on the issue of sustainability. However, as identified in the theoretical framework and also recognized by Uittenbroek in the interview, a barrier here is the fact that college periods only span a maximum of four years. As climate change is a problem which has long-term implications, a change in college can also mean a change in priorities or approach. According to Uittenbroek (2018, pers. comm.), what is required is a long-term, institutionally integrated approach regarding climate change governance. Most effective might be a hybrid approach between dedicated and mainstreaming, or an interswitching between the two. What either of the two might do is create continued attention for the issue, as a result of the more central placement of sustainability within the government structure (dedicated approach), but at the same time also safeguard the fact that all departments need to be involved with sustainability, not just the sustainability department (mainstreaming approach). A change of college has little influence on the character of the governance structure if sustainability is integrated in its very core. Also, if climate change adaptation becomes a more central priority, long-term plans can be more effectively conceptualised and implemented.
As Haverkamp (2018, pers. comm.) argues, the limited funding of the sustainability department meant that Choho was forced to seek alliances and cooperate with the other departments, further integrating climate change governance within the wider government structure. Even though, as Haverkamp explains, this might not have played out the way it was intended and made Choho somewhat of a ‘tiger without teeth’ (Haverkamp, 2018, pers. comm.) and might have caused Choho and his department to lose some of its capacity, steps like this can form the basis of a rethinking on how to better integrate or interswitch both approaches. In the following chapter, this rethinking is evaluated and elaborated on.
3.4. A resilient governance system for the future
The previous section identified that Amsterdam’s governance approach to climate change adaptation was characterized by a dedicated approach in the period 2014 – 2018. In the last two paragraphs arguments were made in favour of a combination or interswitching between the mainstreaming and dedicated approach. In the next section, these arguments will the basis from which the visions of the interviewees and ideas from Hajer’s (2011) work on the Energetic Society will be analysed and combined to come to a reconceptualization of local climate change governance. The ultimate goal behind this reconceptualization is to identify the main componets of a resilience governance system capable of dealing with the local impacts of future climate change.
Participatiemaatschappij
A distinguishing component of the continuing trend of decentralisation and externalisation and the changing role of the city as facilitator instead of initiator is the increasingly large responsibility that is being placed on non-governmental actors such as local inhabitants, businesses and other institutions. These trends do not only resonate on the local level but are also visible on the higher levels of
