Developing Counter-narratives to Challenge Violent Extremist
Narratives as Part of a Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Effort:
Singapore and the United Kingdom
Master Thesis
Anouk Groot MSc S1309579 August 11th, 2016
MSc Crisis and Security Management Department of Public Administration
Leiden University
Thesis supervisor: Prof. dr. Alex P. Schmid Second reader: Prof. dr. Edwin Bakker
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Abstract
This thesis focuses on how violent extremism can be prevented with the use of counter- or alterative narratives, thereby looking at the development of narratives in theory and practice. This qualitative case study analyses the development of counter-narratives and alternative narratives in Singapore and the United Kingdom. Theoretically counter-narratives contribute to counter violent extremism, since it counters the extremist ideology or provide alternatives for it. The goal of this research is to examine if developed counter-narratives fit into the theoretical model of a counter-narrative and to see if there are characteristics that influence the effectiveness of the
counter-narrative. Singapore’s holistic approach with a strong emphasis on religion is seen as one of the most effective approaches. Its message contains a strong counterargument towards extremist narratives and the religious scholars form a reliable and convincing messenger. The United Kingdom’s approach is characterised by multiple actors from the government and civil society. The message is centered around social inclusion for all identities and an
action-oriented approach. The messenger consists of different actors, like the governments, companies and civil society. Where in Singapore the religious messengers are seen as credible sources, civil society in the United Kingdom does not view the government and
(secretive) funded organisations in the United Kingdom as reliable messengers.
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Foreword
This thesis is written as completion to the master Crisis and Security Management at the Faculty Governance and Global Affairs of Leiden University. The master program focuses on current crises and security challenges, the role of authorities when dealing with crises, public private partnerships, securitisation and crisis communication. The subject of this thesis, the development of narratives to challenge violent extremist narratives as part of counter-terrorism, falls within the scope of this master’s field, because extremism and radicalisation are a security challenge that constantly develops.
Since March 2015 I have been conducting research on the development of counter-narratives and alternative narratives in Singapore and the United Kingdom. I have experienced this time as interesting and I have gained knowledge on the development of counter-narratives and alternative narratives, a topic that I had little knowledge of in the beginning. It was a long process, but I am satisfied with the result that I achieved. I would like to thank my supervisor prof. dr. Alex P. Schmid for his patience, insights and good questions which gave me guidance to complete my thesis. Furthermore, I would like to thank my family and friends for their support and encouragement.
4 Table of Contents Abstract ... 2 Foreword ... 3 1. Introduction ... 6 2. Theoretical Framework ... 7 2.1 Narratives ... 7
2.2 The Islamist Extremist Narrative... 9
2.3 Counter-Narratives and Alternative Narratives ... 11
2.4 The State of the Art ... 14
3. Research Design ... 17
3.1 Research question, Sub-questions and Assumptions ... 17
3.2 Relevance ... 18
3.3 Case Selection ... 18
3.4 Limitations... 20
3.5 Data collection ... 21
4. The Singaporean Case ... 22
4.1 Introduction ... 22
4.2 Singapore’s Historical Experience with Terrorism ... 22
4.3 Singapore’s Counterterrorism Policy ... 24
4.3.1 About the Domains ... 26
4.3.2 About the Components ... 26
4.3.3 About the Rings of Rehabilitation ... 27
4.3.4 About Rehabilitation ... 27
4.4 Singapore’s Response to Counter Violent Extremism ... 27
4.4.1Target group ... 28
4.4.2 Method ... 28
4.5 Religious Rehabilitation Group ... 29
4.5.1 RRG’s Academic Network ... 30
4.5.2 RRG Connections within Singapore ... 30
4.5.3 The Three Cornerstones of the RRG Approach ... 32
4.6 Evaluation ... 35
4.7 Conclusion ... 36
5. Case: the United Kingdom ... 38
5.1 Introduction ... 38
5.2 The United Kingdom’s History with Terrorism ... 38
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5.3.1 Prevent – From Five to Three Components... 41
5.4 UK’s Response to Counter Violent Extremist Narratives ... 43
5.4.1 Channel Project ... 43
5.4.2 Quilliam ... 48
5.4.3 RICU ... 52
5.4.4 De-radicalisation in Prisons ... 55
5.5 Conclusion ... 57
6. Conclusion and discussion ... 62
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1. Introduction
After 9/11 George W. Bush declared a ‘war on terror’ in order to fight against terrorist organisations and regimes. This resulted in military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as special operations in other countries. However, killing terrorists did not lead to the end of terrorist organizations. Al Qaida and ISIS and their affiliates were still recruiting new members and the killing of terrorists in the ‘war on terror’ did not discourage new members joining terrorist organizations. Stronger than the deterrent effect is the appeal of the ideology embedded in the narratives of terrorist organizations. It took some time before counter-terrorist policy-makers realised that terrorists must not only be fought with weapons, but also with ideas. From winning the war on the battlefield, the focus shifted to winning the hearts and minds of the people. This ‘war of ideas’ has two components, namely confronting the ideology that justifies and enables violence and providing an alternative narrative to the violent ideology.
This thesis focuses on Islamist extremist narratives and the counter- and alternative narratives that are developed to compete with the Islamist extremist narratives in the ‘war on ideas’. The thesis will focus on the following research question:
What efforts have state and civil society actors in Singapore and the United Kingdom made to counter extremist narratives?
Both Singapore and the United Kingdom are said to have developed successful counter-terrorism strategic communication tools. What policies have been developed by theses states and what have non-state actors been doing in order to develop counter- and alternative narratives in these states? Is there a common factor that binds these policies and approaches and have they found the key to effective counter-messaging?
In the field of counter-narratives and counter messaging there is still a knowledge gap on what an effective and good counter narrative should encompass. This clearly depends on the context and local circumstances. In this thesis I want to contribute to bridging this knowledge gap by comparing the two states and investigate how these states deal with the development of counter-narratives.
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2. Theoretical Framework
In this chapter the concepts of ‘narrative’ ‘counter-narrative’, ‘alternative narrative’ and ‘meta-narrative’ will be discussed as well as defined. The characteristics of extremist narratives will be discussed and examples of these narratives will be given. Furthermore, the counter-narrative theory will be dealt with, focusing on what elements a counter-narrative should have in order to be effective.
2.1 Narratives
In this part the definition of a narrative will be discussed as well as the distinction between meta-narratives, narratives and stories. Furthermore, it will be explained what components a narrative needs to have in order to be effective.
In general people would define a narrative as an appealing coherent story. According to the Oxford Dictionaries a narrative is a “spoken or written account of connected events; a story” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015). Scientifically, a narrative is more than just a story or a collection of stories. A distinction can be made between story, narratives and master-narratives (or meta-narratives). “A story is a sequence of events, involving actors and actions, grounded in desire (…) and leading to an actual or projected resolution of that desire” (Corman, 2011: 36). Often stories follow standard patterns, story forms, and employ archetypes. In contrary, a narrative is not just a single story, but it is “a system of stories that share themes, forms and archetypes”. In a narrative the stories “relate to one another in a way that creates a unified whole that is greater than the sum of its parts” (Corman, 2011: 37). A master narrative can be seen as a narrative that has become so strong that it no longer needs the actual narrating of the stories in order to be understood. Some narratives are widely known in a culture and are consistently retold over time. Therefore these narratives can be invoked by just words and phrases instead of the full stories. Master narratives can be used to create local narratives. By using certain terms, story forms or archetypes from the master narrative and by combining this with local information and examples the local narrative is appealing to people since it relates to their local experiences but also appears familiar since its core is based on the master narrative. Master narratives can thus provide the core of narratives, but not all local narratives are based on master narratives (Corman, 2011: 39).
According to Corman “narratives are powerful resources for influencing target audiences” (2011: 42). But what makes a narrative a strong narrative? What does a narrative need to have in order to become powerful and be able to influence an audience? A strong and effective
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narrative has to possess five characteristics: (1) it has to articulate a clear, realistic and compelling mission purpose that focuses on long-term, overarching goals, (2) it has to have legitimacy and is seen as justified by the relevant publics, (3) it has to hold the prospect of success and provide a feeling of progress towards its goals, (4) the narrative has to be presented in a consistent manner and (5) the narrative must fit within in overall communication plan that reflects the majority themes of our own identity (Schmid, 2014: 29).
Another set of characteristics has been developed by Furlow and Goodall (2011). Often extremists use war terminology in their narrative in order to make their goals grander and more meaningful (2011: 216). Secondly, narratives make use of specific religious or political texts in order to justify certain actions (ibid: 217). Thirdly, historical battles are being used as metaphors for the current disputes. This helps to enlarge the importance of the present disagreement and links the historic battle to the current cause of the disagreement (ibid: 217). Fourthly, members of extremist groups often appeal to higher authorities to justify their beliefs and actions. Finally, extremist employ specific uses of language like character assassination, name calling, defining moral issues into right and wrong with no grey areas and the assumption of moral authority developed to intimidate their opponents (ibid: 217).
In order for a narrative to work and be successful, it has to have an impact on an audience. Therefore a narrative should be focused on a specific target audience (Al Raffie, 2012:14). By selecting a strategically desired audience and customize the messages to suit the special needs of this target group, and by determining the location and timing of the message, the message will reach the target audience more effectively (Bockstette, 2009: 18). In order to bring the narrative to the target audience, governments as well as extremists make use of strategic communication techniques. Strategic communication management is defined as “the systematic planning and realization of information flow, communication media development and image care with a long-term horizon” (Bockstette, 2009:4).
Jefferis (2014) states that a good narrative (1) craft or supports a believable story and (2) couple this story with actionable plans for those who encounter it. This corresponds with the definitions that Holbrook uses for frame and collective action frame. Holbrook uses the following definition of frames: “interpretative schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and events in the ‘world out there’” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, as cited in Holbrook, 2014: 41). Both the first criterion of Jefferis and the definition of frame thus include the idea that it needs to make sense and needs to be believable for the audience. The second criterion of Jefferis relates to the definition of collective action frame which is defined
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as an “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (Benford, 1997, as cited in Holbrook, 2014: 43). A narrative thus needs to appeal to the audience and it should motivate an audience to execute certain actions.
In sum, an effective narrative consists of appealing stories with which the audience can readily identify because it resonates with the cultural and social values of the audience. A narrative often derives its credibility from references to religious texts or other sacred authorities and is action-oriented by providing a solution recognised by many observers. The narrative needs to be believable and appealing to a specific audience and must therefore be tailor-made and fit in an overall communication plan.
2.2 The Islamist Extremist Narrative
Many extremist narratives exist that are based on political, social or religious beliefs. This thesis focuses on Islamist extremist narratives and the counter- and alternative narratives that are developed to compete with the Islamist extremist narratives in the ‘war on ideas’.
In order to develop and understand the counter and alternative narratives against the extremist Islamist narrative it is important to first understand the Islamist extremist narrative. Islamist extremist groups use narratives for strategic communication purposes. The master narratives help them to persuade their audience to support their causes and tolerate their actions (Corman, 2011: 38). The master narratives are connected and form a rhetorical vision. The rhetorical vision “integrates the master narratives in an emotional and logical sense, and provides resources for constructing personal narratives and developing goals for actions and behavior” (Halverson, Goodall and Corman, 2013: 183). The rhetorical vision is the highest level of the vertical integration model and contains a stock of values, morals, story forms and archetypical actors that can be used in narratives (Corman, 2011: 38). The master narratives that consist of certain values, morals, story forms and archetypical actors can be used to create local or personal narratives. Islamist extremists make use of several master narratives in order to persuade the audience. Halverson et al. (2013) researched thirteen master narratives that are being used by extremists to recruit new members, fortify their position and motivate actions. From each master narrative they analysed the story form and archetypes in order to see how the narratives were being used. While these thirteen master narrative are not the only existing master narratives currently, they do provide an insight in what the master narratives are and
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how they are being used. The current master narratives that are being used by Islamist extremist are, according to Halverson et al., the Pharaoh, the Jahiliyyay, the Battle of Badr, the Hypocrites, the Battle of Khaybar, the Battle of Karbala, the Mahdi, the infidel invaders, Shaytan’s Handiwork, 1924, the Nakbah and seventy-two virgins (Halverson, et al., 2013: 7-8). In order to understand how a narrative is build up, an example of an Islamist master narrative will be discussed below. This narrative is not per se the most important narrative for Islamist extremists, since multiple narratives can be used at the same time and the most used narratives develop over time and depend on the time and location.
The Jahiliyyah narrative has a deliverance story form and includes the archetypes deity, prophet, martyr and pagan. The Jahiliyyah, the age of ignorance, is the time period before the Islam in Arabia. In this period there was corruption, people were ignorant of Allah and the final divine message. The Qur’an provided a strong critique towards the ancient pagan Arabian society. The prophet and his followers faced violent resistance on behalf of the deity and struggled against the infidel forces of the Jahiliyyah. After the victory the society was transformed in a better and more stable society based on the deity’s revealed message and the sacred Ka’aba shrine was purified. The Islamists extremists see the current society as a global reversion to a state of Jahiliyyah and based this idea on the statements of Sayyid Qutb in his book Milestones. Qutb describes the shari’ah as the basis of citizenship, nationhood and family ties in contrast with the racial tribalism of the Jahiliyyah. Therefore an Islamic state with a government based on the shari’ah and with God as the ultimate authority is seen as the solution to the current state of Jahiliyyah by Islamist extremists (Halverson et al., 2013, 37-48).
Such a narrative as the Jahiliyyah narrative help people to explain the world in which they live. If people witness a certain problem in their environment, for example they do not want to pay bribes to officials, the extremist narrative helps them to understand the problem and offers them a solution. In this case the solution would be to establish a new Islamic state is a solution for the bribery. People that hear a narrative over and over again do not tend to think about other solutions like for example raising the salary of officials, increasing transparency or starting a hotline to report corruption. They use the narrative to perceive and understand the world around them. This way the problems and questions of the people come together with the solutions and views of the extremists. Since narratives frequently possess and action-oriented part people feel actually that they can do something about the problem they perceive. If people help to create and Islamic State, they think they will solve the problem of corruption. This way extremist narratives can radicalise people and inspire them for executing certain actions.
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2.3 Counter-Narratives and Alternative Narratives
In order to diminish or even discredit extremist narratives, there is a theoretical assumption that the use of alternative and counter-narratives will prevent people from radicalising, since the counter narrative provides insight in the weaknesses and errors of the extremist narratives and at the same time alternative narratives provide a different framework to view and understand the world. A counter narrative is an attempt “to challenge extremist and violent extremist messages, whether directly or indirectly through a range of online and offline means” (Briggs and Feve, 2013: 6). Counter-narratives can be developed in different ways. They can be part of a bottom up approach or a top down approach, they can be developed by states, but also by Muslim communities, by ex-terrorists and by victims of terrorism. Counter-narratives can furthermore discredit the extremist narrative in several ways. The counter narrative can aim at challenging the assumptions of the extremist narrative, it can amplify contradictions in the extremist narrative and it can be based on humour and ridicule to mock the extremists. Corman describes two approaches for countering narratives. The first approach applies to the narrative rationality in stories in general. By looking at if the stories make sense structurally the narrative coherence of a story can be assessed. Next to narrative coherence, the narrative fidelity can be examined by looking at the plausibility of the story, does the story “ring true” taking into account the experiences and values of the audience (Corman, 2011: 40). The second approach, next to the coherence and plausibility of the stories, is to advocate a different or better interpretation for the target audience.
Next to counter-narratives there are alternative narratives. Where counter-narratives focus on responding to extremist narratives and try to discredit and eliminate them, alternative narratives focus on creating a credible alternative narrative that promotes its own values and ideology. While a counter-narrative is a reactive action, the alternative narrative is an active action that can be pursued simultaneously with the counter-narrative (Schmid, 2014: 30-31). If both counter-narratives and alternative narratives are implemented at the same time, they can reinforce each other’s effectiveness.
An example of a counter-narrative and an alternative narrative will be explained here in order to show the difference between them. If the extremist narrative is “Come live in our Islamic State where we live our lives safely and peacefully and in accordance with Islamic law”, the narrative can focus on reacting to the statements. An example of a possible counter-narrative could be “the Islamic State is not a safe and peaceful place to live, since thousands
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are killed, the violence still continues, there is a lack of food and housing and social activities are not allowed”. A possible alternative narrative could be “do not go to the Islamic State, come live or stay in our state, since we do provide a safe and peaceful place to live for all people and here you can make all your dreams come true”.
When developing counter or alternative narratives it is important to keep in mind what the message is, who the messenger is and what the audience is. For terrorists it is important to have a legitimate cause and credible threats that are relevant to the political process in order to persuade their audience. The same goes for effective counter terrorism measures which also have to have legitimacy, credibility and relevance (Barrett, 2009: 8-10). Legitimacy, credibility and relevance are important characteristics for a counter narrative, since it is only possible to win the hearts and minds of the people with a credible message conveyed by a messenger that has legitimacy in the view of the audience and with a message that appeals to the audience. Concerning the messenger of the counter or alternative narrative, it is important that the messenger is a credible actor in the eyes of the audience in order to convince the audience. The messengers need to talk the talk and walk the walk. It is not effective or can be even counter-productive to promote a certain counter narrative or alternative narrative if there is a credibility gap between words and deeds (Holtmann, 2013: 143). If the messenger is not able to act in accordance with its narrative, it is not likely that the audience will accept the narrative as a credible narrative. Furthermore, the messenger needs to understand the audience. The audience need messengers who are familiar with their culture, since the process of radicalisation takes place in a specific socio-political and cultural environment (Holtmann, 2013: 142). A grass root counter narrative might thus be a more effective narrative than a counter narrative that is established at the state level, because the grass root counter narrative is better able to reflect the socio-political and cultural issues that take place at the community level. Furthermore, relating to the Islamist extremist narrative it seems more effective to let the Muslim community develop narratives instead of the Western governments, since the latter might develop counter-narratives that are not able to reflect adequately the local socio-political, cultural and religious backgrounds of minorities. Furthermore, Western states, especially the United States, have had difficulties in the past with conveying and acting in accordance with their own values which has led to a credibility gap. Since these states do not act consistently according to their defined values, they become a less credible messenger. Another issue with counter-narratives developed by the West is that the counter-narrative tries to convince its audience to be pro-Western and support the Western values. This puts some audiences between two fires, since they might not
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support the extremist Islamist narrative which loathes against the West, and they might be against the use of violence and the aggressive attitudes of these violent extremists, but they do not necessarily want to be pro-Western and thereby indirectly support and approve of all the Western actions in the Middle East. Being against the narrative of Islamist extremists should not force people to agree with the pro-western counter narrative. To overcome this problem there should be more narratives available which the audience is able to identify with. It is therefore important that counter-narratives arise from within the Muslims community, since these narratives are more capable to reflect the local, socio-political, cultural and religious backgrounds of the audience and blend this with the Western values without being labelled as pro-Western.
Lastly it is important that a counter narrative focuses on a specific audience. There are different groups to focus on and counter-narratives should be aimed at specific groups in order to appeal and be effective. In the pyramid of radicalisation there are four groups that vary in the level of radicalisation. At the bottom there are Muslims who currently do not accept anything of the Global Jihad narrative. The second level consists of sympathizers who sympathize with the first step of the jihadist thought, namely that the West is waging a war on Islam. The third level consists of justifiers who believe that jihadists are acting in defence of Islam and that the actions are morally and religiously justified. At the top of the pyramid of radicalisation are the people who feel it is their duty and they are morally obliged to support and participate in the defence of Islam (Leuprecht, Hatalay, Moskalenko and McCauley, 2010: 43-44). Each level in the pyramid thus consists of people with a different view on the global jihadist narrative. Different subsets of Muslims hold different aspects of the jihadist narrative (Leuprecht et al., 2010: 46). It is therefore important to select an audience and focus the counter-narrative on this specific audience and not to see all Muslims as one category. It is also important to note that the level of radical ideas (in the pyramid of radicalisation) does not necessarily determine the level of radical violence, although these two are related. Not all people in the top level of the radicalisation pyramid will use radical violence and not all people from the lower parts of the radicalisation pyramid will stay away from radical violence. Below there is a representation of the radicalisation pyramid with in red the people who use radical violence.
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Figure 2.1 The pyramid of radicalisation (Leuprecht et al., 2010:29).
In this chapter the concepts of narrative, meta-narrative, counter narrative and alternative narrative have been discussed. Furthermore, the counter-narrative theory has been dealt with. In short, people who hold extremist views have a chance to become radical and justify the use of violence based on these extremist views. In order to prevent extremist violence, you have to prevent people from becoming extremists. In order to prevent people from committing to an extremist ideology, people need to get in contact with other narratives that provide them insight into the inconsistencies and errors in the extremist narratives and provide them another narrative that they can use in order to understand the world around them.
2.4 The State of the Art
In the early 2000s the focus of counterterrorism policies and practices was based on the idea of fighting the “war on terrorism”. After 9/11 it seemed important to remove the involved terrorists from their environment and to imprison or kill them in order to solve the problem of terrorism. The war on terrorism thus was a war on terrorists. When the terrorists were removed, it was expected that the level of terrorism would drop since without the core of terrorist organizations there would be less commandments from the top, thus less people would become inspired or forced to commit acts of terrorism. However, this method did not lead to the desired effects. The physical removal of terrorists that had key roles and stood high in the hierarchical ladder of terrorist organizations did not lead to weakening terrorism in general. From the mid-2000’s more practical and scientific attention was paid to why terrorism could still flourish even though influential terrorists were killed or imprisoned. This is where the concepts of narrative and
counter-narrative increasingly gained traction as a way to see the war on terrorism as a war of
ideas. The notion behind the war of ideas is that in order to be able to counter terrorism the ideological view of the terrorists should be countered in order to prevent terrorism from happening. Since the narratives of Islamist extremists are often well-embedded and linked to Islam and the cultural history of a certain region, the narratives can gain a strong position in
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people’s mind. In order to counter the spread of violent ideological views, a strong and well-structured counter-narrative should be present to provide counterweight to the narratives. In the last ten years scientists and practitioners have focused on how to counter these narratives in order to find out what measures are effective and what measures are counterproductive. Unfortunately, it is still not clear what measures are effective and it is hard to measure the effectiveness since this is based on a non-occurring fact (Pizzuto, 2013).
Schmid (2014) has researched the single narrative of Al Qaeda which reflects Al Qaeda’s ideology. Al Qaeda’s ideological writings are based on two core genres, namely the religious exegesis which motivates and instructs Muslims and propagandist speeches aimed at demoralizing the West and inciting Muslims to action (2014: 5). The narrative of Al Qaeda is linked to this ideological vision and uses elements of Islamic myths and symbolism in this rhetoric and uses traditional Arab and Muslim cultural narratives. Based on these elements the narrative of Al Qaeda forms a narrative that is familiar for Muslims but still differs from the traditional narratives and Islamic myths. Al Qaeda’s narrative is more extreme in the sense that suicide operations are legitimate, there is no distinction between civil and military targets and the killing of other Muslims is justified in case of complicity with the West (ibid: 6-7). The narrative of Al Qaeda resonates among Muslims in and beyond the Arab world and while the Al Qaeda core has dramatically reduced, the ideology and propaganda narrative still resonates among thousands of young Muslims from East until the West. While there is no strong core, there are many supporters and groups that adhere the same ideology. In the meantime ISIS has taken the lead in attracting foreign fighters.
Khan (2013) has investigated the Pakistani narratives and how Al-Qaeda has integrated these narratives into their own rhetorical vision. Khan discusses the master narratives of Al-Qaeda and the narratives present in Pakistan. He concludes that Al-Qaeda’s strategy is “to exploit Pakistan’s existing narratives… to gain benefit in the Pakistani arena and on the global battlefield” (Khan, 2013: 7). Al-Qaeda has been able to position itself among the Pakistani narratives and has created a significant freedom to act or speak (ibid: 7). This is a good example of how intertwined terrorist narratives are with local narratives and what the effect is of a rhetorical vision which has lasted for years.
In short it is important to know that there is no single way to deal with countering violent extremism and extremist narratives. However, there are certain issues that need to be taken into account in order to develop a thought-out strategy.
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In order to be able to effectively counter a narrative, it is important to look at what the extremist narratives are based on. Khan states that it is important for counter extremist strategic communication efforts to start at the same point as the extremist narratives, namely the audience’s narratives (Khan, 2013: 8). Since people process events around narratives that resonate on an emotional level it is important to relate the counter-message to the narrative that the people are already familiar with. In case of Khan’s research into the Pakistani narratives in relation to the narratives of Al-Qaeda it would thus mean that in order to reach the Pakistani people one needs to understand the Pakistani narratives in order to create and effective counter message to the Al-Qaeda narratives that are related to the Pakistani narratives. Currently the counter extremist communication plans focus on expanding media outreach and to launch the right message and telling ‘the truth’, based on the assumption that negative media coverage is a result of a lack of access to information. By simply pushing out the ‘real truth’ it is expected that people will switch from believing the extremist vision to believing the truth. However, it does not work that way. People will only believe a certain version of events, or a vision on these events, if they have an emotional interest in doing so. They need to be able to connect this depiction of events to their own values. If the message does not connect to the emotions and values that a person already developed earlier, the new vision will not be accepted and further developed within the audience (ibid: 2). Furthermore, it is important that the counter extremist narrative includes a broad range of issues and is brought by several media channels or platforms since people do not incorporate narratives directly into their thinking. It is unrealistic to expect to have full control on the development and direction of the narrative (ibid: 11).
Holbrook (2013: 894-895) concluded that Al Qaeda deploys different communicative approaches towards different types of Sunni Muslim audiences. For counter extremists it is important to look at the different groups that are being addressed by the extremists. This way the counter extremists know what groups specifically they are targeting and they can focus solely on these groups. It is also important to look at the message or stance of the extremists towards the different target groups. This enables the counter extremists to develop different counter-messages towards the different types of audiences that are addressed by the extremists.
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3. Research Design
In the previous chapter the definitions, concepts and theory of narratives and counter-narratives and its influence on radicalisation and de-radicalisation have been discussed. In this chapter the research design of this thesis will be explained, including the method used, case selection, relevance and its limitations.
3.1 Research question, Sub-questions and Assumptions
This research is based on the theory that a counter-narrative will contribute to prevent radicalisation or contributes to de-radicalisation. The research question is ‘What efforts have
state and civil society actors in Singapore and the United Kingdom made to counter extremist narratives?’ and focuses on how counter-narratives are developed.
Sub-questions within this research are:
1. What characteristics should a persuasive narrative have in theory?
2. When is a narrative (including counter-narrative and alternative narrative) held to be effective in theory?
3. Do effective counter-narratives exist in practice?
4. Which counter-narratives are propagated in Singapore and the United Kingdom?
Deriving from the theoretical debate about what constitutes persuasive narratives and counter-narratives this thesis investigates whether counter-counter-narratives exist and whether they are effective in diminishing or preventing radicalisation. In this research the counter-narratives are the independent variable and radicalisation is the dependent variable. Next to the presence or absence of effective counter-narratives there are other variables that affect radicalisation. Radicalisation and de-radicalisation are complex individual processes resulting from a combination of multiple internal and external factors that can differ per case.
During this research I developed some assumptions about the relation between counter-narratives and radicalisation, namely that:
1. Extremist narratives can foster the radicalisation of vulnerable young people.
2. Counter-narratives can contribute to de-radicalisation of those on a path to extremism
3. Counter-narratives only work if they combine the right message with a credible messenger and a receptive audience
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4. Counter-narratives and alternative narratives should aim at inclusion, provide an answer to isolation and loneliness, and take vulnerable young people from the remote fringes back to the center of society and religion.
5. The use of counter-narratives and alternative narratives alone is not enough to prevent radicalisation or induce de-radicalisation
3.2 Relevance
This research contributes to the larger question of how to counter terrorism in general and how to counter violent extremism. How can violent extremism be prevented and are counter-narratives an effective solution that can reduce or remove violent extremism and radicalisation? This thesis researches the development of counter-narratives and alternative narratives of state and non-state actors in two states. It investigates how the narratives are developed in practice and explored whether these narratives correspond with the theoretical components of an effective counter-narrative. Based on two cases it is not possible within this thesis to find a method for the development of counter-narratives, but the analysis of these counter-narratives can contribute to the theoretical and practical knowledge on the development of counter-narratives. The goal of this research is to gain insight into how counter-narratives and alternative narratives are developed and contain the characteristics that are attributed to persuasive narratives in the academic field.
3.3 Case Selection
In this thesis two cases will be compared, since this enables an in-depth focus on the cases while the comparison of cases can provide a broader view of how state and non-state actors in Singapore and the United Kingdom developed alternative narratives and counter-narratives opposing the Islamist extremist narratives. Both states have a different background, composition and counter-terrorism strategy - this will be explained below.
The Singaporean counter terrorism strategy and its de-radicalisation program is seen as one of the most comprehensive of all disengagement or de-radicalisation programs (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez and Boucek, 2010: 95). It was set up in 2001 and has multiple components like psychological, religious and social rehabilitation, community involvement and family support. (ibid: 96). Singapore is a multi-ethnic state with an estimate of 15% Muslims. The authorities have sought to blur the religious and ethnic distinctions and to encourage a national identity
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independent from religion and ethnicity (ibid: 95). Since it is one of the world’s most religiously diverse nations, in Singapore Muslims are not seen as a threat since there are many religious minorities and there is no religious majority. Nevertheless, the Singaporean strategy places a strong emphasis on religious rehabilitation.
The United Kingdom has one of the most developed counter-radicalisation programs of Europe (Rabasa et al., 2010: 123). It started with its CONTEST strategy in 2003 and since then the strategy has been adjusted multiple times. The strategy is focused on four components, Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare and has a strong emphasis on social rehabilitation. The British government has worked with multiple organizations in order to counter violent extremism. In the United Kingdom the percentage of Muslims is about 4% of the total population. This seems small, but with the rising threat of extremism within the Muslim diaspora and the alienation of the Muslim community from the government and society at large the estimated 3 million Muslims are perceived to be a threat. While Britain is a Christian-majority country with an estimated 59.5% of the population, the Muslim population is the biggest minority in the UK with an estimated 4%. Next to the processes of isolation, alienation and the rising threat of extremism, the Muslim population has also a lack of (higher) education and employment opportunities. This combined with the lack of religious expertise and authority of the British government it makes it harder to tackle the ideological component of an Islamist extremist narrative. Therefore, the problem of radicalisation is addressed within a broader social context where radicalisation is seen as the result of an integration problem where there is inadequate economic, social and political participation (Rabasa et al., 2010: 121-122).
The cases Singapore and the United Kingdom have been chosen, since within both states counter-narratives have been developed by state and non-state actors and both states have well-developed counter-terrorism strategies. Also both states have narratives that are aimed at prevention as well as de-radicalisation, the extent for these two different ways differs though.
Next to similarities, there are also differences within these two cases. The approach towards counter-narratives are different in both states, this helps to get a broader insight into how counter-narratives can be developed. In Singapore the counter-narrative focuses on religious misinterpretations and offers other interpretations. On the contrary in the United Kingdom the counter-narratives are based on social inclusion and giving people an identity that suits them and fits within society and helps them to relate to other people.
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Another difference next to the focus on religion versus social inclusion in both states is in the involved actors, namely who is creating the counter-narratives in these states. In Singapore the approach is more state-controlled where next to the state the religious scholars are the most important actor in developing counter-narratives. In the United Kingdom the development of narratives is more diffused and there are more actors involved in developing counter-narratives. For example the state has developed a strategy and outsourced the development of counter- and alternative narratives to a strategic communication office. There are however also interdisciplinary programs where police, youth and social workers are involved in signalling radicalisation, and former extremists are developing their own counter-narrative.
Both cases come from different regions and have their own social and political characteristics. The cases however do not represent ‘their’ regions, since they are not an ideal-type for states in these regions. It is therefore impossible to make generalizing recommendations for other states in these regions based on the outcome of this case study. However, this case selection makes it possible to show two different methods on how to deal with radicalisation and the development of counter and alternative narratives.
3.4 Limitations
Radicalisation and de-radicalisation are processes that are the result of many intertwining factors. In this thesis it is impossible to control for all the factors that might account for leading an individual to radicalisation and de-radicalisation, since this thesis is a qualitative case study. It is therefore impossible to determine the effect of counter-narratives on radicalisation or to control for all the factors that affect radicalisation and de-radicalisation.
Besides it is also not possible to make a generalization for the development of effective counter-narratives for other states and non-state actors based on these two cases. The results from two cases is not enough to make general statements on what the best way to develop counter-narratives is. Since every state has its own characteristics and developments, there will not be a single best way to deal with the development of narratives. If certain counter-narratives in these cases work, this would not imply that these methods will work in other states that have certain corresponding characteristics or are located in the same region.
Also the case studies itself are not a perfect and complete representation of all the initiatives of counter- and alternative narratives that took or take place in Singapore and the United Kingdom.
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Not all known initiatives could be discussed and there is always a possibility that some counter-narrative initiatives remain undetected.
3.5 Data collection
For the analysis the method of triangulation is used. Different sources have been used in order to form an as objective and a complete as possible presentation of these cases. Next to academic publications, open source, press and media reports as well as ‘grey’ literature from governments, civil society organisations and think tanks have been used.
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4. The Singaporean Case
4.1 Introduction
This chapter explains what the response of Singapore is in countering terrorism and developing counter-narratives. First a general introduction will be provided on the experience of Singapore with terrorism and what the counterterrorism program of Singapore entails. Thereafter the focus will be on how the violent extremism is countered in Singapore, what organizations play a role in this process and in what dimensions violent extremism is countered.
4.2 Singapore’s Historical Experience with Terrorism
Singapore has not had a great deal of terrorist attacks in the past. Since its independence in 1965 there have been three notable terrorist attacks. The first one is the MacDonald House Bombing on 10 March 1965. This bombing was the result of Indonesia’s opposition to Singapore’s merger with Malaya of 1963 when Malaya, Borneo and Sarawak were merged. In 1964 and 1965 there were bomb explosions on a regular basis. Before Singapore became independent in 1965 it was a turbulent period and 29 bombs had been set off. Singapore thus had experienced small bombings, but these bombings did not have a large impact. Since its independence the first serious bombing in Singapore was the MacDonald House Bombing at a 10-storey building that housed inter alia the Hong Kong and Shanghai bank, the Australian High Commission and the Japanese Consulate. Three people were killed and another 33 people were injured (National Library Board, 2014a).
The second terrorist attack took place on 31 January 1974 when four armed men attacked the Shell oil refinery and eventually hijacked the ferryboat Laju. Two of the four men were members of the Japanese Red Army and the other two men were members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The goal of this attack was to disrupt the oil supply to South Vietnam which was fighting alongside the United States against communist Vietnam. The attack was meant as a warning to all monopolistic oil companies and imperialism in general. After the detonation of 3 of the 12 explosives at the oil refinery complex, the terrorists hijacked the ferryboat Laju and held 5 crew members hostage. During the negotiation that lasted seven days, two crew members managed to escape. The terrorists agreed to release the remaining three crew members in exchange for a party of guarantors. This party consisted of four Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Commandos and eight other government officials including mr. S.R. Nathan, the Director of Security & Intelligence (Ong, 2002). The group,
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including the three hostages, the party of guarantors and the terrorists, was transferred to the Paya Lebar Airport where the terrorists surrendered their weapons and the three hostages were freed. Thereafter the terrorists and the party of guarantors left Singapore on February 8th on a specially arranged flight to Kuwait. The following day the party of guarantors returned to Singapore. All members of the negotiating team received an award at the Singapore National Day Awards during the ceremony that year (Ong, 2002; The Straits Times, 1974).
The third notable terrorist attack is the hijacking of Singapore Airlines Flight 117. On 26 March 1991 flight 117 of Singapore Airlines from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore was hijacked in flight by four Pakistani men. The four men claimed to be members of the Pakistan People’s Party and demanded the release of inter alia Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of former Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto. Next to this demand, the hijackers demanded the plane to be refuelled in order to fly to Australia. The plane landed safely at Singapore Changi Airport and the demands of the hijackers were not met. Instead, a team of government officials, representatives from Singapore Airlines and a negotiation team were all standby at the airport. After approximately nine hours, by then it was 6.45AM, the hijackers gave a last five-minute deadline and threatened to kill a passenger every ten minutes if the demands were not met. At this moment an elite unit from the SAF Commandos was given permission to storm the plane. The commandos were able to kill all four hijackers and no passengers were injured (National Library Board, 2014b).
Of these three attacks only the first one tried to influence the decision-making process at the state level. The other two attacks were not aimed at the Singaporean state or the people, but issued their attacks in order to achieve a goal that is not related with the Singaporean people or the Singaporean state. Since the first attack took place before the independence of the Republic of Singapore, the state of Singapore as we know it today has not experienced a successful terrorist attack.
While there has not been a terrorist attack in Singapore since 1991 (Corsi, 2008: 4), this does not mean that in the meantime nobody attempted to execute a terrorist attack. Due to the pro-Western attitude of Singapore, the presence of an Islamist extremist network nearby in the region, and the extensive efforts that Singapore has undertaken nationally and internationally in order to combat terrorism, Singapore is a likely target for terrorists.
That Singapore is a target for terrorists appeared when in December 2001 a terrorist plot was uncovered. The plan consisted of bombing a shuttle-bus that conveyed US military staff and
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their families, the US and Israeli embassies, the Australian and British High Commissions and US firms and US naval vessels in Singapore. In December 2001 15 people were arrested and in August 2002 another 21 people were arrested. Of the 36 people 34 people were members from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a large terrorist organization in Southeast Asia which has links with Al-Qaeda and is responsible for the Bali bombings in 2002 and several other bombings in Southeast Asia.
4.3 Singapore’s Counterterrorism Policy
Corsi states that “Singapore must be regarded as having one of the most successful counterterrorism programs in the world” (2008: 19). Before 9/11 Singapore’s national security was mainly focused on building strong external defence capabilities. Singapore’s citizen-based defence force was trained for meeting clear military challenges from state-based actors. Singapore’s Police Force was responsible for internal order and security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs focused on diplomacy and the external relations. The events of 9/11 highlighted a new era of transnational terrorism and a conventional army geared towards fighting a conventional war was no longer adequate for the changed security environment.
Singapore aims at a comprehensive approach to the threat that transnational terrorism poses for Singapore since the impact of terrorism will affect many areas. Terrorism is therefore not solely a problem for the defence department, but also the foreign, homeland, social and economic policies are included in the total approach. Next to implementing various measures to safeguard the home front security the Singaporean government also involves its citizens in their fight against terrorism and prepares its citizens for their role in defending the country (Corsi, 2008: 7; National Security Coordination Centre, 2004: 7-8). The overall aim of Singapore’s counterterrorism strategy is to prevent threats from developing, to protect Singapore against the more likely threats, to respond to these threats if prevention and protection fail and to quickly recover to a state of normalcy after an attack. In order to reach these aims Singapore uses inter-agency coordination as the cornerstone of the national security strategy. Since terrorism is a problem that cuts through governmental divides, it is important these different governmental departments and agencies work together in order to form a robust national security network (NSCC, 2004: 15). Next to the governmental inter-agency network approach it is also important that the society as well as individuals are psychologically prepared in order to realize the gravity of the threat without being paralysed by it. This way the resilience of the Singaporean society is increased and it contributes to a quick recovery to return Singapore to a state of normalcy.
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Furthermore, the Singaporean government provides a realistic view about the threat of terrorism towards its citizens. The government does not promise an ultimate safe society, but it acknowledges that absolute security is unattainable since ultimately choices need to be made since the resources are not infinite. This way the citizens know that their government is working on the prevention of terrorist threats but at the same time the citizens know that there always be a small chance an attack happens. The citizens are thus aware of the risks and encouraged to be prepared for this threat.
The overall counter-terrorism strategy of Singapore is seen as one of the most successful in the world. This also applies for the de-radicalisation program of Singapore According to Rabasa et al. the Singapore program “is probably the most comprehensive of all disengagement or deradicalisation programs” and its terrorist rehabilitation program “comes as close as any program can to the ideal type (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez and Boucek 2010 in Ramakrishna, 2014: 206). What makes the program close to ideal is that it encompasses several dimensions and layers and includes every imaginable relevant layer. Firstly, it does not only focuses on preventing terrorism, but it also focuses on protecting and responding. Secondly, its terrorist rehabilitation program does not solely look at ideological components, but also addresses behavioural and organisational components. Thirdly, regarding the rehabilitation of terrorists not only the detainees in the inner ring of rehabilitation are addressed but also the family and friends of the detainees and the wider community are included as they form the outer and outermost ring of rehabilitation. Furthermore, the rehabilitation does not only focuses on a single type of rehabilitation but includes psychological, social and religious rehabilitation. An overview of the dimensions and levels can be found in the figure below.
The dimensions and levels of counter terrorism and rehabilitation measures in Singapore
Domains Components Rings of rehabilitation Rehabilitation
Prevent Ideological Inner: detainees Psychological
Protect Behavioural Outer: families and friends Social
Response Organisational Outermost: wider
community
Religious
Figure 4.1 The dimensions and levels of counter terrorism and rehabilitation measures in Singapore (table is based on National Security Coordination Centre, 2012; Ashour, 2011; Ramakrishna, 2014 and QIASS, 2010).
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4.3.1 About the Domains
Singapore’s National Security Strategy has three aims namely (1) “to prevent threats to national security from developing in the first instance”, (2) to “protect Singapore against the more likely threats” and (3) to “respond to such threats if prevention and protection should fail; and achieve a quick recovery to return Singapore to a state of normalcy” (National Security Coordination Centre, 2004: 15).
The integrated layered approach of the national security strategy is structured around the domains Prevent, Protect and Response. Prevention is seen as the most critical layer of this approach and it encompasses an integration of effective diplomacy, good intelligence work and strong border controls. The goal of this layer is to eliminate terror threats before they materialize. While many actions and results are mentioned in this layer (like international cooperation, a UNSC resolution, a UN Convention, an intelligence liaison and effective border controls), the missing part in this layer is the prevention of radicalisation which takes place before actual terrorist plans materialize and need physical measures. In the other layers Protect and Response the role of radicalisation is also not discussed. There are thus measures in place that prevent terrorist attacks from succeeding, but the national security strategy does not discuss how radical extremist views need to be prevented or countered. In the next part it will be discussed if and how the countering of radical extremist views works in Singapore (National Security Coordination Centre, 2004).
4.3.2 About the Components
The three main components of the de-radicalisation approach are ideological, behavioural and organisational. Mohamed bin Ali noted that Singapore is “one of the very few countries in the world whose de-radicalisation programme involved all three components, constituting a holistic approach” (National Security Coordination Secretariat, 2012: 14). The first type, ideological de-radicalisation is a process whereby a person or group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of armed methods to achieve political goals. In this case de-radicalised groups and individuals can still have anti-democratic and non-progressive views, they just are not motived anymore to use political violence. The second type is behavioural de-radicalisation where the use of violence is abandoned without a process of ideological de-legitimisation of violence. The third type is organizational de-radicalisation which comprises the process of dismantling the armed units of the organization (Ashour, 2011: 379-380).
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4.3.3 About the Rings of Rehabilitation
In the counter-ideological rehabilitation program in Singapore three rings of activity were developed. The inner ring includes the detainees, the outer ring targets the detainees’ families and friends and the outermost ring involves the wider community. The detainees in the inner ring participate in a program consisting of psychological, social and religious rehabilitation. The families and friends in the outer ring received counselling and were psychologically and financially aided by the AfterCare Group that focuses on the welfare of the families of detainees. The main focus on the outer ring is sustaining or facilitating family stability during and after detention. This way spouses are less vulnerable to radicalisation and the families are able to stay on their feet financially. By helping the spouses to find jobs and ensuring education for the detainees’ children the welfare of the families of the detainees was continued or improved (Ramakrishna, 2014: 203-204). The outermost ring focuses on the wider community and include activities like community engagement programs, counter-extremist ideology speeches and articles and a counter-ideology blog. This way educational institutions, community organisations, libraries and civil society groups are able to address the issue of radicalisation and de-radicalisation (Ramakrishna, 2014: 205-206).
4.3.4 About Rehabilitation
The Singaporean risk reduction program for violent extremists consists of three core components, namely psychological, social and religious rehabilitation. The detainees are assessed on all three levels and receive psychological counselling, help with their re-integration into society and religious counselling from religious scholars. More details about these three components are discussed below.
4.4 Singapore’s Response to Counter Violent Extremism
After the detected terrorist plot of mainly JI-members in December 2001, the ISD recognized the potential harm posed by the detained JI-members and began to plan for risk reduction interventions. Since 2002 there is thus a risk reduction program for violent extremists in Singapore. The primary objective of the program is to keep Singapore safe and to prevent a terrorist attack in Singapore. Within this overall objective the program aims to restructure the ideological beliefs that might incite violent action (QIASS, 2010: 11-12).
The Internal Security Department is responsible for the program and primarily operates the program with the help of specialists in religious education, social services and health. The
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program consists of three core components, namely psychological, social and religious rehabilitation.
4.4.1Target group
The risk reduction program of Singapore focuses principally on early tertiary prevention (QIASS, 2010: 14). The program targets detainees held under the ISA, persons with connections to JI and self-radicalised individuals. The ISA is mostly used for neutralizing terrorist plots rather than bringing suspects to court, thus the most of the detainees have not executed a terrorist attack. The latter two groups are brought to the attention of the program by the Singaporean security services. As a result, the target group predominantly exists of people who are radicalised and have violent extremist views, but have not yet executed an attack due to early intervention to prevent radicalisation. Potential program candidates are assessed by a multidisciplinary team consisting of an ISD case officer, a psychologist and a religious counsellor. Next to cognitive and personality tests there is an individual case review in order to analyse how the detainee was recruited and radicalised and what capabilities the detainee developed, the nature and degree of risk the detainee poses, the network and intentions of the detainee and the motivation of the detainee to join the program. This is a ‘tailored’ individual procedure, there are thus no standards or measurements used that the detainee needs to have accomplished at the end in order to be ‘declared’ de-radicalised. Up to 2010 all the detainees were male, but female detainees can be accepted if necessary. The detainees are between 20 and 60 years old, with a majority in their 40s (QIASS, 2010:13).
4.4.2 Method
Most detainees start in physical detention when they enter the program. There they will stay for at least two years and are allowed to engage in program intervention activities for two to four hours a day. If there is sufficient progress, the detainee may be granted a release under restrictive orders. When a detainee is released and lives in the community on restrictive orders, he is continuously monitored by ISD officers and community contacts. This monitoring does not end, there is a life-long program participation.
The program consists of three core components, namely psychological, social and religious rehabilitation. The detainee is assessed on all three levels. Psychological counselling is provided on an individual basis twice a month during detention and once a month after release. The aim
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of these psychological interventions is to modify the militant extremist beliefs through cognitive-behavioural intervention and critical self-reflection (QIASS, 2010: 15). The social component evolves around the detainee’s re-integration into society by focusing on the detainee itself but also on the family of the detainee. The Social Rehabilitation Program helps the detainee to enhance his academic achievements, provides vocational training and promotes positive work habits (QIASS). The Inter-Agency After Care Group (ACG) only focuses on the welfare of the family of the detainee. The ACG was initiated in 2002 by five groups: (1) Mendaki, the Council for the Development of Singapore Malay/Muslim Community, (2) the volunteer organization Taman Bacaan, (3) the community self-help group Association of Muslim Professionals, (4) the Khadijah Mosque and (5) En Naeem Mosque (Ramakrishna 2009, 34). The religious component has the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) as its cornerstone. The RRG was formed in 2003 and currently has 39 religious scholars or teachers that provide religious counselling to detainees, those who have been detained and those under restriction orders (RRG, 2015a). The RRG works actively to maintain their independence from the government and with the religious interventions the RRG aims to modify four pillars of JI influence: the ideology, the pledge (Bay’ah), the mandate for militant jihad and the teaching about the meaning of loyalty to Allah and hatred of non-Muslims (QIASS, 2010, 16-17).
Overall, the RRG employs a four-step-de-radicalisation process on the JI detainees. Firstly, the detainees are removed from the radicalising environment. Secondly the extremist discourse will be invalidated in presence of the RRG members. Thirdly the extremist ideas are being replaced with mainstream ideologies and finally the detainees are empowered to return to society (NSCS, 2012: 14).
4.5 Religious Rehabilitation Group
The RRG plays the most important role in Singapore when it comes to help young Singaporean Muslims to understand and clarify issues concerning global affairs and the Islam in context of the global war on terror (RRG, 2015a). While the RRG originally was created in order to counsel JI detainees as part of the rehabilitation program, nowadays the RRG has expended its efforts to mitigate religious extremism in the wider community. Some examples of this expansion are participation in public talks and forums, developing a Website to unmask extremist ideology, providing publications on their own website, and providing information on their website which serves as an effective tool for public education (Ramakrishna, 2009: 34). In order to share information on its work in countering religious extremism and terrorism threats
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in Singapore, the RRG opened a resource and counselling centre on 11 July 2014. Next to the documentation and dissemination of RRG’s research, and the possibilities to collaborate with other academics and professionals, the centre also serves as a resource for the community to learn more about Islam (RRG 2015a, Singaporean Government, 2014).
4.5.1 RRG’s Academic Network
The RRG consists of 38 Islamic scholars, Islamic teachers and staff members, and includes 9 female members and 29 male members. The scholars provide religious counselling for detainees and the community and most members offer their time without compensation. RRG members are mostly highly educated members with strong connections with universities and are thus able to develop, maintain and share their insights with other scholars. Five RRG members have obtained or are currently working on their PhD, twelve members have obtained master degrees and seven members have obtained a bachelor’s degree.
Sixteen RRG members have studied at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. Most of them (10 members) have studied Islamic Jurisprudence, others studied Islamic studies, Islamic theology or Islamic research and Arabic language. Five members studied International Relations at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University. Furthermore, the members have studied at universities in the region (Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and Australia), in the Middle East (Yemen, Saudi-Arabia and Kuwait) and further away (Canada and the United Kingdom). Next to the academic degrees in Islam and Islam-related studies, some RRG members have obtained a degree in Education or Counselling (RRG, 2015b). In order to supplement the religious knowledge fourteen RRG members who are involved in counselling have completed a seven-month diploma course in counselling skills. These counselling skills helps the RRG counsellors to conduct one-on-one sessions with detainees, since these counselling sessions require different skills than speaking in front of large audiences in schools or mosques (RRG 2015b; Ramakrishna: 2014, 202).
4.5.2 RRG Connections within Singapore
The background of the RRG members show that the RRG has strong connections with many religious institutions and organisation within but also outside of Singapore. There are members who are involved with mosques (e.g. chairman, part of management, imam, director or head of a department) at the Khadija Mosque, Al Firdaus Mosque, Sultan mosque, Al-Istighfar mosque,
