“This is Our Land”: How Likely is the Palestinian Youth to Instigate a Third Intifada?

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“This is Our Land”

How Likely is the Palestinian Youth to Instigate a Third Intifada ?

Nils Steven Mollema

January 2017

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1 Nils Steven Mollema (s1251708)

University of Leiden

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs Supervised by Jelle van Buuren, PhD

Second Reader Edwin Bakker PhD Msc Crisis and Security Management

“I come bearing an olive branch in one hand, and the freedom fighter's gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.” – Yasser Arafat, 1974 (BBC, n.d.)

Thesis in fulfillment of the Master of Science in Crisis and Security Management at the Faculty Campus The Hague at Leiden University

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“I don’t believe that all the people who died for the sake of the Palestinian land should go to waste. I believe we have a responsibility to keep working for what they originally did.”

(Student Bethlehem University #3)

Abstract

The violent means employed in the Second Intifada resulted in the death of 4,173 people. Of these, 3,223 were Palestinians, 631 of them minors. The remaining 950 were Israeli, of which 112 were minors. The violence did not improve the situation of the Palestinian people. With the occupation of the Palestinian Territories going into its 50th year, recent surges in violence from both sides have made a peaceful solution in many ways more inconceivable than ever before. Increasing Israeli security measures have created an entire generation of Palestinians which has been segregated from Israel, and vice versa, fostering hatred and dehumanization of the other side, making engaging in violence all the more attractive. This begs the question, how likely is it that Palestinian youth will once again organize and rise up against the occupation of their land? Answering this question is best done through the lens of Social Movement Theory. Historical analysis and a review of Social Movement Theory show that past intifadas were born from frustration, collective action, strong leadership and a great deal of youth participation. Today the frustration is there. The youth are upset with Israel, as well as their own government, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Many no longer believe in the two-state solution, and they are willing to engage in violence to find any solution, or at the very least to be heard. However, mobilization of a social movement has been made very difficult. The PNA, under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas, says it is committed to a non-violent path to resolution through international diplomacy and intervention. They have actively disarmed the population, tempered even moderate resistance, and consistently cooperated with Israel on security matters. The PNA’s leadership is likely to be key to any successful social movement and possible intifada, violent or otherwise. Therefore, it is unlikely that another intifada will erupt as long as Abbas remains in power.

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Acknowledgements

For this research to be possible there are several parties. I would like to thank the men and women at:  The Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah

 Al-Haq

 The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research  Birzeit University

 Bethlehem University  An-Najah University  Hebron University  Al-Quds University  The Youth Peace Initiative

For their assistance in gathering data, finding interviewees, and allowing me to use their vast network of contacts to produce as valid and reliable research as possible.

I must also thank all those that proofread and assisted in the editing of this work. Most notably, Prof. Jelle van Buuren PhD, for supervising the writing of this thesis.

For those that wished to remain anonymous, I thank you for your bravery to speak out and for your honesty in interviews.

At this point a disclaimer must be made. This research does in no way reflect the views of the institutions that assisted in the research. All statements are entirely my own.

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Map of the West Bank, Area A, B and C

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Context

“To be Palestinian is to resist. It is a part of our identity”, these were the words of a young professional I spoke to while doing research in Ramallah in the first half of 2016. These words have had a resounding effect on this dissertation. Palestinians have never had their own nation-state. For almost their entire history they have been under some form of foreign rule, be it by the British, the Jordanians, the Ottomans, or the most recent example, the Israeli’s. The occupied Palestinian Territories2_{(oPT) have been occupied}

by Israel for roughly 50 years, since 1967 (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 156). This is one of the longest ongoing occupations in the world. In that time, there have been countless pieces written about the history of the conflict, the rise of Zionism and the Nakba, or "catastrophe" of 1948, referred to in Israel as the war of independence. The First and Second Intifadas3_{, or uprisings, in the late 80's to the early 90's and early}

2000's have been extensively researched, as have the Oslo accords and the development of the Palestinian Authority. No less attention has been paid to the rise of Hamas, the Gaza wars, the function of International Law, Palestinian resistance, the separation wall, and a nearly endless list of other subjects. Yet, there is more to say and investigate still.

Near the end of 2015 there was an increase in violence across the West Bank, Gaza and parts of Israel. From September to December there was a clear rise in incidents initiated by both sides, Involving Palestinian as well as Israeli civilians (including settlers living in the occupied West Bank), the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), and Palestinian Security Forces (as shown in graph 1.1 and 1.2).

Graph 1.1 - Statics regarding security incidents in the West Bank4

2_{The term occupied Palestinian Territories is a contested one. The borders of the region are still unclear, as is the}

name. The attempt to stay as neutral as possible, while still acknowledging that the region is contested, the term oPT was deemed most suitable.

3_{A period of resistance with all three elements of longevity, central support, and the aim of emancipation.} 4_{These statics are gathered from media source and are not verified. They are therefore unsuitable for research}

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8 Graph 1.2 - Statics regarding security incidents in Jerusalem5

The more news about the attacks appeared in the media, the more suggestions of a third intifada started to come out. Was this the next chapter in this conflict? Was this the start of another war? (Walters, 2015; Becker, 2015). This thesis does not attempt to answer the question of why this increase in violence happened, or what motivated individuals to commit stabbing attacks, commit car-rammings, use pipe bombs and other forms of interpersonal violence. These are questions that are being answered by other researchers and other institutions. This research, instead, raises the question of why the increase in violence did not translate into a violent, nationwide, population-wide, social movement similar to that of the Second Intifada. In doing so it will also discuss the preconditions for a (third) intifada and how likely it is one will occur. The main research question reads as follows:

“Which factors, be they facilitating or restrictive, can explain for the (lack of) potential of eruption of a (third) intifada, instigated by the youth, in the near future across the oPT and Israel?”

1.2 Structure

The answer to this question will be discussed in the coming six chapters. The initial chapter of this thesis, explores general literature regarding social movement theories, specific literature on the region and the likelihood of a third intifada. The second chapter explains the exact methodology employed to answer the research question. The third chapter uses in depth qualitative interviews to test the accuracy, validity, and applicability of the reviewed literature with regard to the subject. In the fourth chapter statistical tests are conducted to see whether these interviews are representative. The fifth chapter uses literature, interviews and statistics to look towards the future and give a description of the possible

5_{These statics are gathered from media source and are not verified. They are therefore unsuitable for research}

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9 development of this conflict in terms of social movements. The sixth and final chapter holds the conclusion and the recommendations that follow from this thesis.

1.3 Scientific relevance

The majority of research and literature on the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians approaches the conflict from an International Relations (IR) point of view(Norman, 2009, p. 15). This framing has mainly been used to paint a picture of this conflict as two clashing nationalities fighting over borders and land. This is an appropriate approach, but it has its limitations, which limitations stem from a definition issue in terms of what type of conflict is being analyzed. In this case, only one side is an internationally acknowledged, self-governing, highly developed nation-state, namely Israel. The Palestinians on the other hand do not hold the same internationally recognized status as their Israeli counterpart. The Palestinians are in many aspects under Israeli control (Pappe, 2015). Therefore, the conflict is not between two nationalities, but rather between two national movements. The case of Israel and the Palestinians has some characteristics of an international conflict, but it is more accurate to label this an internal struggle, with a ruling power suppressing a group within its borders (Norman, 2009, p. 15). Framing this conflict solely as an international one, would mean ignoring the other dynamics at play. The conflict stems from organizations within a region actively mobilizing the public (i.e. social movements) to challenge the governing and in the Israeli-Palestinian case, oppressing power, Israel. The presence of social movements and their clear aim to establish an independent nation, whether alongside or in place of Israel, makes the use of social movement theory a more pertinent one. A social movements approach may yield different insights and uncover different dynamics than the more general IR point of view has yielded in the past.

This research serves a broader academic goal as well. Much of the literature available in English is based on studies set in western countries. This thesis takes the time to look at the extent to which these theories are applicable in a non-western setting, namely the Middle East. Interviews with researchers from the region that have devoted their careers to the study of social movements and related fields in the region have allowed this thesis to build on extensive Arabic-language research, even though I do not speak the language. The interviews hold interesting insights into the application of social movement theory and show areas of potential expansion. This means that these researchers serve as a gateway into the Arabic-language academic field, and allow for comparison with English-Arabic-language texts and analysis. They are, however, not a representation of the entire field. Regardless, they are reliable enough to be used as an indicator of the applicability of western theories to this conflict.

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10 Much of this research is based on the work of Julie M. Norman (2009). Her work with social movements in this conflict is extensive and valuable, but also becoming outdated, nearly 7 years have passed since publication, and 9 since the interviews her research is based on were conducted. In that time, there have been three wars in Gaza (Middle East Eye, 2014; BBC, 2014), further political stagnation, no change of national representation, further settlement expansion and several upsurges of violence, as well as significant changes in the region around Israel and the oPT. It is logical that these changes, escalations, and stalemates have had an impact on the views of the youth and the population at large. Therefore, it is academically suitable to return to Norman's research and update the research to match the views of today.

A special focus on the views of the students across the Palestinian Territories is academically crucial, as this is one of the least studied subjects in the conflict. It is well known that most of the leaders who currently hold the power within the Palestinian Authority (PA), as well as the two main political parties Fatah, Hamas and others, played prominent roles in student movements in the past (Zelkovitz, 2015). The only comprehensive English work on this subject is written by an Israeli scholar at the university of Haifa, Ido Zelkovitz (Zelkovitz, 2015). This presents a glaring hole in the academic work on the subject. By noting the state of student movements currently, the views of their supporters, and the relationships to their formal counterparts, this work explores an, as of yet, nearly inaccessible field within the English-language academic framework.

The goals of this research could have been achieved in a variety of settings. The choice for this particular conflict has both a personal basis, as well as a societal motivation. The social motivation is outlined below. Having family present in the area and working with the conflict on a political level since the end of 2014 increased my interest in this specific area. Additionally, the complexity and longevity of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict make it exceptional, and therefore fascinating to research. An internship at the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah subsequently provided a large network of resources to investigate the ins and outs of the political views of the youth in Palestine. Thus, this case was selected based on the availability of resources to conduct an in-depth analysis, a strong personal interest, and the potential for social change following this research.

1.4 Social relevance

From a societal point of view, this thesis is relevant as it gives an insight into a group of the Palestinian population which at present is largely voiceless. The researched selection of the Palestinian population has never had a chance to vote or gain influential positions in their national government, given

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11 that the last national elections were in 2006 (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 372). They are institutionally underrepresented. Giving them a way to express their ideas and creating an overview of how these ideas coexist is vital in understanding the next period of the conflict. The age of President Mahmoud Abbas has many experts indicating a change of course upon his resignation or possibly his death (Interview Professor Birzeit University #1). The interviewed population stated that the youth will play a significant role in shaping the future of this conflict.

The research for this thesis was conducted during an internship with the Netherlands Representative Office (NRO) in Ramallah. This was a unique opportunity, not only for a master’s student but also for the NRO. Rarely do they have the opportunity to send someone into the field and get a ‘live’ view of developments. This was precisely my role during my internship with them. Therefore, the NRO has requested a short analysis on the youth focused on youth’s political views, radicalization and mobilization. For them and others in the field, a better understanding of the youth and a better understanding of future developments means an improved planning process, better and more effective diplomacy and better preparation for the future. With the Middle East at this moment in time engaged in several conflicts, many extensively covered by western media, attention is being diverted to neighboring countries, which poses the risk of forgetting about one of the world’s longest lasting occupations, and thus any possible solutions. Therefore, it is important that research continues to be undertaken on this conflict. This thesis will not hold the answers to the solution, but it helps those working to end the occupation to do so moving forward.

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Chapter 2: Historical Background of the Conflict

2.1 A political road map of Palestine

A general understanding of the political parties in Palestine is vital for one to understand the views of the youth. Most the of the interviewees for this research felt that Palestine was not united, because people adhered to strongly to party lines. Many also felt that they were represented by one part or another. When an individual says, they are represented by the PFLP, the PNI, or Fatah, what does that say about the way they view the conflict and the way they see the future of Palestine. Therefore, understanding the general views of the parties helps understand the positions of the youth. The most important parties in the oPT are the Popular Front for the Fatah, Hamas, Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestinian National Initiative (PNI), and the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP).

2.1.1 Fatah

“For many Palestinians, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah) is not just one of several political movements but the embodiment of secular Palestinian nationalism per se.” (Bröning, 2013, p. 57).

Founded in 1959 in Kuwait by graduates of Cairo University, Fatah is currently the largest of the Palestinian parties (Bröning, 2013, p. 59). Ideologically Fatah has always claimed to transcend the narrow political ideologies, even though it is a member of Socialist International (the global organization of social democrats, socialists and labor parties across the globe, SI) (Bröning, 2013, p. 58). Fatah aims to embody the needs and wishes of the Palestinian people regardless of religion or ideology.

In principal, Fatah stands for the reunification of Palestine per the historical borders, prior to the establishment of the Israeli state. As is stated in their constitution, Fatah’s goal is “the complete liberation of Palestine and eradication of Zionist political, military, and cultural existence.” (Bröning, 2013, p. 59). In attempts to achieve this goal Fatah engaged in forms of guerrilla warfare and in ‘terrorist’ activities in the 1960’s, eventually resulting in their exile to neighboring nations. Their exile and continual resistance to the Israeli military made them very popular among the Palestinian public. (Bröning, 2013, p. 59). The most notable altercation between the Israeli military and Fatah was the Battle of Karameh in 1968. The success of Fatah in inflicting large casualties on the Israelis resonated with Palestinians. In the aftermath of this battle Yasser Arafat was announced as the leader of Fatah (Bröning, 2013, p. 61).

Under Arafat the organization became the largest of the Palestinian parties, and the largest in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), established following the Oslo accords, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), a body comprised of different political organizations from across Palestine

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13 that was the spokesperson for the Palestinians prior to the PNA’s establishment. Arafat’s success in garnering major international attention for himself and his organization put Fatah at the forefront of the conflict with Israel. Both in armed resistance and in negotiations, Fatah was the leading organization (Bröning, 2013, p. 57). The political success of Fatah makes it difficult at times to differentiate between Fatah policies and institutions and policies and activities of the PNA and the PLO. Mahmoud Abbas’ current position as President of the PNA, the PLO and Fatah is an example of how intertwined these institutions are (Bröning, 2013, p. 57). The devotion to the reunification of Historical Palestine was put aside at least temporarily in 1974 in favor of a stronger support of the two-state solution. This shift was formalized when the PLO accepted the so called, Ten Point Program. Even though this did not satisfy the Israelis it showed a change in Fatah policy (Bröning, 2013, p. 60). Following the invasion of Lebanon by the Israelis, per experts to eradicate the PLO and Fatah (Friedman, 1995, p. 129; Bröning, 2013, p. 61), Fatah entered a tumultuous period leaving their leadership in Tunisia with no significant role in Palestinian activism.

To regain a position of power and relevance, Arafat agreed to the Amman Accord, in 1985. This signaled reconciliation between the PLO and Jordan, calling for a confederation between Palestine and Jordan (Bröning, 2013, p. 61). When the First Intifada broke out in 1987, it caught Fatah and its leaders off guard. The intifada used tactics that were, at the time, foreign to Fatah, which was still focused on armed resistance. Even though Fatah only played a minor part in the intifada itself, the PLO did play a major role in the negotiations that followed, in Madrid in 1991. The First Intifada was one of the major reasons for the Madrid Peace Conference, and by extension the Oslo accords, which followed in 1993 (Bröning, 2013, p. 62). By signing the Oslo Accords Arafat formally recognized the right of Israel to exist. Officially Fatah held onto its claim to be fighting for the liberation of Historical Palestine until 2009, even though their actions reflected a different position. This disconnect between their rhetoric and their actions cost them support on the ground (Bröning, 2013, p. 63).

Following the Oslo accords Fatah struggled with the internal contradiction of being an all-encompassing resistance movement and the leading political party in the PNA. This contradiction was also clear in the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Assessments have come to different conclusions regarding the level of involvement of Fatah leadership in instigating the unrest. What is apparent in most of these assessments, however, is that Fatah did little to control the unrest and limit demonstrations (Bröning, 2013, p. 63). The Second Intifada brought with it a great deal of fighting between Fatah affiliated groups, increasing the unrest within the party (Bröning, 2013, p. 64). The party was further weakened by the loss of its leader, Arafat, in 2004. His replacement, Mahmoud Abbas, brought an end to the violence of the

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14 Second Intifada (Bröning, 2013, p. 64). His approach of engaging and cooperating with the Israelis was not supported by a large segment of Fatah’s supporters (Bröning, 2013, p. 64). The discontent with Fatah became clear in the parliamentary election of 2006 where the party suffered great losses, which went hand in hand with a victory for Hamas. An international refusal to accept Hamas’ rise to power in the oPT, based on the party’s more extreme and violent ideology, eventually led to a violent split of the Territories. By 2007 (Bröning, 2013, p. 15), Gaza was under the rule of a de facto Hamas government, and the West Bank was ruled by Fatah and the PNA (Bröning, 2013, p. 65). Although many reconciliation efforts have been made, this situation has hardly changed since.

In summation, Fatah under Arafat before the Second Intifada was a secular revolutionary group, that fought for the unification of Historical Palestine and a single state. Through the years, first under Arafat and later under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas, this goal has been relinquished for the more pragmatic goal of a two-state solution. Thus, when referring to Fatah, one must make clear if this is pre-Oslo Fatah or post-pre-Oslo Fatah.

2.1.2 Hamas

Internationally the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) is often seen as the great spoiler of the peace process in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In most western nations, Hamas is recognized as a terrorist organization, due to their refusal to denounce violence. Thus, they are not seen as a legitimate political organization (Bröning, 2013, p. 15). The Palestinians disagree. In the oPT they are a legitimate organization, with a great deal of democratic support. As shown by their success in the 2006 elections, where they defeated Fatah (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 372). Hamas’ origin can be traced back to the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization of Sunni Muslims, which originated in the 1920’s in Egypt. Hamas was founded during the First Intifada in 1987. Originally it was a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, but it soon outgrew this status (Bröning, 2013, p. 16). The establishment of its military wing was not far behind, with its first notable incident in 1989 (Bröning, 2013, p. 17). Ideologically Hamas seeks the liberation of Historical Palestine from Israeli rule while also pushing back against the secular movement in Palestinian politics represented by Fatah and the PLO (Bröning, 2013, p. 16). Hamas has been kept out of the PLO because of internal resistance and outside pressure (Bröning, 2013, p. 15). Initially Hamas took pride in this rejection by the PLO and outside parties. Recently, however, it has been seeking stronger international support, recognition and cooperation by downplaying the importance of their charter, which contains crude anti-Semitic sentiment (Bröning, 2013, p. 17).

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15 Originally Israel tolerated Hamas and paid little attention to it, as it did not consider it a threat. Following the shooting or two Israeli military personnel, in 1989, Israel began to take Hamas more seriously. Their leader and founder, Ahmed Yassin, was captured and sentenced to a life in prison in 1991 (Bröning, 2013, p. 17). Hamas also faced resistance in Jordan, where it was outlawed. The organization has managed to survive their exile by so many institutions with the financial support of private donors from the Gulf States, Syria and Iran (Bröning, 2013, p. 18). In the years following the arrest of Yassin, the support for Hamas grew tremendously. The hard crackdown by Israel in the years following 1989, gave Hamas the exposure it needed to be able to grow. Their supporters believed the violence Hamas employed was legitimate. Tactics include car-rammings, suicide bombings, and other forms of terror attacks (Bröning, 2013, p. 18). Hamas’ rejection of cooperation with Israel continued with their rejection of the Oslo accords on the basis that the negotiations were deeply flawed, but also because of the inherent recognition of Israel that came with the accords. Between the Oslo accords and the Second Intifada both the PNA and Israel engaged in targeted killings of Hamas leaders (Bröning, 2013, p. 19).

During the Second Intifada, Hamas became closer to the political mainstream, as more organizations employed terrorist tactics. Many Palestinians saw the failure of the Oslo accords as legitimization of Hamas’ rejectionism (Bröning, 2013, p. 19). Nearing the end of the Second Intifada Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire that did not last long, as neither party fully halted operations. In 2004, Ahmed Yassin was assassinated, opening up space for new leadership. The new leaders agreed to another ceasefire, which has halted suicide attacks from Hamas to this day (Bröning, 2013, p. 19). The following year Hamas chose to enter the established political institutions. Running for election in 2005, the party won most the seats in municipal councils. They also ran in the 2006 elections, winning those as well, to the surprise of the international community. Prior to the 2006 elections Hamas published an election platform that continued to legitimize the use of armed resistance to liberate Palestine, but did not call for the demolition of the Israel state and did not reiterate the anti-Semitism in their founding charter. Following the elections the co-founder of Hamas, Mahmoud Al-Zahar, stated they would agree to a prolonged peace if Palestinians received an independent state on the lands occupied in 1967 (Bröning, 2013, p. 20). This did not go far enough for the international community, who produced the ‘quartet principals’ that were rejected by Hamas. Hamas responded by proclaiming they would never recognize the Zionist state on their land (Bröning, 2013, p. 21).

2006 saw the first of several wars in Gaza, where Hamas was now the de facto government, following bloody clashes with Fatah. The wars were triggered by the killing of eight Palestinian civilians by Israeli

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16 cells. Although Israel never claimed responsibility, the ceasefire was proclaimed over. The first of the Gaza wars became known by the Israeli operational name: Operation Summer Rain (Bröning, 2013, p. 21). In 2008-09, the world saw the second deadliest clash between Hamas and Israel, Operation Cast Lead. This led to the deaths of 13 Israelis and 1400 Palestinians (Bröning, 2013, p. 23). The third and most recent Gaza war was in 2014 resulted in the death of over 2200 Palestinians (BBC, 2014; Power & van Hooydonk, 2015, p. 28).

To this day Hamas has not recognized Israel, but has repeatedly stated its willingness to engage in a ceasefire in return for an independent state along the 1967 borders (Bröning, 2013, p. 24). A clear deviation from their original stance, although the term cease fire does imply the conflict would not be over.

2.1.3 The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was founded following the Israeli occupation in 1967, as a revolutionary movement. It is built on a secular and socialist foundation. The PFLP is the result of a merger between the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) and several militant organizations, including the Palestinian Liberation Army (Bröning, 2013, p. 97). The PFLP’s aim is to create a single state through a people’s war, stemming from their anti-imperialist neo-Marxist Ideology. In this state, minority rights would be granted only to “Palestine’s original Jewish in habitants” (Bröning, 2013, p. 98). The PFLP does not recognize the right of Israel to exist anywhere between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. It also publicly rejects the regimes of the neighboring Arab countries, advocating for an overthrow of the ‘Arab bourgeoisie’ (Bröning, 2013, p. 98).

Although significantly smaller than Fatah and Hamas, the PFLP remain a significant player on the Palestinian Political playing field (Bröning, 2013, p. 97). They are the second largest member of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and have significant popular support (Bröning, 2013, p. 98). The relationship between the PLO and the PFLP has been a strained one at times, most notably when the PLO took steps towards a two-state solution. The PFLP has often plighted for democratization of the PLO to gain more power within the organization (Bröning, 2013, p. 99). The relationship with the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) is not a strong one. In 1996, the PFLP boycotted the PNA elections, out of an unwillingness to support its acceptance of the two-state solution (Bröning, 2013, p. 100). On October 21st_,

2001, the PNA banned the PFLP’s military wing and arrested the PFLP’s newly elected secretary general, as a result of strong pressure from the USA (Bröning, 2013, p. 101).

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17 The violent methods employed by the PFLP throughout the organization’s history, such as hijacking airplanes, have made many Israelis see them as the most ruthless of Palestinian terrorist organizations (Bröning, 2013, p. 98). Internationally the PFLP is also viewed as a terrorist organization by several international entities including the EU and the United States of America, along with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 372; The U.S. Department of State, 2016; The Council of the European Union, 2016). In summary, the PFLP is an organization that employs violence with the goal of removing Israel and its citizens to establish a state of Palestine within its historical borders.

2.1.4 The Palestinian People’s Party

The Palestinian People’s Party (PPP) was originally named the Palestine Communist Party (PCP), with roots going as far back as 1919. The PCP was first established, as an anti-Zionist movement. Following the establishment of the Israeli state the PCP was broken up as members joined Marxist movements from Israel, Egypt and Jordan depending on their geographic location. It reemerged in 1982 when the PCP gained its independence from the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP) (Bröning, 2013, p. 147). The PCP joined the PLO in 1987 as the only member not engaged in armed resistance. Their leader, Bashir Barghouthi, was one of the main leaders in the First Intifada. His creation of ‘popular committees’ is often seen as one of the steering factors of the intifada (Bröning, 2013, p. 148). The name change from the PCP to the PPP occurred following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1991. With the failure of the Eastern European regimes the PCP/PPP deviated from its strict Marxist views, arguing that the class struggle should be put on hold to seek reunification of all Palestinians in an independent state.

Bashir Barghouthi played an important role in the discussions leading up to Oslo accords (Bröning, 2013, p. 148). Over time, internal power struggles became more important than the goals of the organization. Resulting in more internal debate than external action. This ultimately was the reason the PPP lost one of its most prominent members, Mustafa Barghouthi who left to establish the PNI in 2002 (Bröning, 2013, p. 150). The PPP has lost influence over the years in the PNA and the PLO, but they have remained true to their popular resistance methods to establish an independent socialist state and remain supported, at the local level for their grassroots movements (Bröning, 2013, p. 151).

2.1.5 Palestinian National Initiative

The Palestinian National Initiative (PNI) was founded in 2002 in the middle of the Second Intifada, by Mustafa Barghouthi, Edward Said, Haider Abdel Shafi and Ibrahim Dakkak (Bröning, 2013, p. 122). These secular intellectuals that created the PNI proposed a different approach than those of organization such as Hamas, the PFLP, and the more violent elements of Fatah. While these parties were preoccupied with

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18 violence at the time, the PNI proposed a peaceful approach. The core values of the PNI are National Unity, nonviolent resistance, good governance and social justice (Bröning, 2013, p. 122). In the 2005 presidential elections, the PNI’s leader, Mustafa Barghouthi, was viewed by many as the main competitor to Abbas, receiving 19% of the votes, partly due to the stamp of approval given by the PFLP. The majority of the support came from the young educated voters with limited affiliation to the PNA and Mahmoud Abbas. This group was believed to be frustrated with the PNA, the failure of Fatah to lead them to greener pastures and the established elite that lead the country. Even with a popular leader the PNI has largely failed to take on positions of real power and influence in the political field (Bröning, 2013, p. 124). With regard to the conflict with Israel the PNI supports a two-state solution, with the borders of 1967 and East Jerusalem as the capital of, a future Palestinian state. The party believes this must be achieved through nonviolent means. A possible explanation for why the PNI has failed to grow beyond its grassroots foundation is that other parties have in recent history adopted similar non-violent policies, therefore diluting the support base of the PNI (Bröning, 2013, p. 127).

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2.2 A Brief History of the Palestinian Israeli Conflict

2.2.1 The establishment of Israel

Prior to the establishment of the Israel as a nation state in 1948, the region between the Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and the Jordan river, was known as Palestine. This region was never a sovereign entity and has known many occupations and forms of external control. This region is referred to as Historical Palestine. On May 14th_{, 1948 David Ben Gurion proclaimed the state of Israel. This led to the first Arab-Israeli war. By the}

end, Israel spread over roughly 75% of Historical Palestine, with the region the West Bank under Jordanian rule and Gaza under Egyptian control (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 97). The war left between 600,000 and 760,000 Palestinians as refugees, most which are unable to return to their homes to this day. Most of them found refuge to the West Bank or Gaza and roughly 36% were housed outside Historical Palestine (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 100).

2.2.2 The occupation in 1967

The situation remained relatively stable until the Six Day War of 1967, the second Arab-Israeli war. In less than a week Israel successful expanded its borders, taking control of the Gaza strip, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. This left roughly 1.3 million Palestinians under Israeli occupation (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 156). The Six Day War resulted in a growing sense of Palestinian Identity and nationalism. “Israeli

occupation (…) encouraged the evolution of Palestinian nationalism and the emergence of new leaders not associated with the Arab governments and Arab armies that had dismally failed the Palestinians in 1967.”

(Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 156). In the same year, the PLO distanced themselves from the Arab governments and committed to an armed struggle. This change was soon followed with the emergence of new leadership. By 1969, Al-Fatah was the most important group in the PLO and Arafat emerged as the new face of the PLO, a position he held until his death in 2004 (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 157).

2.2.3 The First Intifada

The period between 1969 and the First Intifada was anything but uneventful. There were conflicts between the PLO and the Jordanians, in 1973 Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in the Yom Kippur War, Israel and Lebanon had gone to war, and several peace efforts were conducted in the region with mixed result. The Intifada, however, was the major Palestinian Israeli clash and is the most relevant to this thesis.

The years leading up to the Intifada were marked by tensions between the Palestinians, their Arab neighbors and the Israelis. Palestinian refugees had issues in almost every nation they had fled to. Most were treated as second class citizens, unable to work and failing to gain citizenship for themselves or their

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20 children (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 101). Palestinians lived in a political limbo, felt their economy was hostage to the Israel’s economy, had little faith left in Arab governments to aid them, and were disillusioned with the PLO. Although the latter was a potent nationalist symbol, it had failed through diplomatic and military means to gain the right of self-determination for its people (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 218).

On December 9th_{1987, an Israeli vehicle plowed into a line of oncoming cars at the checkpoint at}

the border in Gaza. Four Palestinians were killed and another seven were injured. This was the spark that caused a great deal of Palestinian frustration to explode into a fully-fledged popular uprising or Intifada (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 220). The first year of the Intifada saw 150 Palestinians killed, a further 11,500 were wounded and many more were arrested. Roughly two thirds of those involved were under the age of 15. Israel shut down schools, universities and other institutions. They also instilled a curfew, yet failed to stop the rock throwing, harassment and demonstrations. The methods Israeli employed to counteract the Intifada caused significant backlash to their reputation. The International community at large felt the Israelis acted too strongly in response to what would be known as the ‘stone throwing’ intifada (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 220). The use of lethal force to mostly peaceful resistance enabled the PLO to gain diplomatic traction at the international level (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 222).

The PLO took some time to take control of the Intifada, because of its originally independent and spontaneous nature. The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), a small leftist confederation of groups, were the real organizers of the Intifada in its initial stages. Arafat moved quickly to co-opt these groups under the PLO umbrella (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 220). The PLO’s aim was made clear between June and August 1988, with claims that they would accept an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza as outlined in the 1947 UN Partition Plan (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 220).

Even though the Intifada was known mostly as relatively peaceful movement, especially at its conception, it became more violent as time passed and as Hamas gained more influence in the resistance movement. The Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, employed far more violent methods that the PLO supported. Hamas gained support during the Intifada and rose to be a true competitor of the PLO, even causing debate within the PLO (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 222). Even so, by the end of the year, Arafat was firmly in control of a much more unified PLO, in part due to his denouncement of terrorist activities (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 226). This led to the declaration of independence by the Palestinian National Covenant (PNC) on November 15th_{, 1988 (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 223). This naturally}

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21 government, as well as the Russians. Israel, however, proclaimed it irrelevant and the USA also did not recognize the declaration.

The intifada did lead the USA as well as other powerful international actors, to take an interest in the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The peace process started before the end of the decade and continued until 1993 when the Intifada was considered over with the signing of the Oslo Accords.

2.2.4 The Oslo accords (Oslo I & Oslo II)

The build up to the Oslo accords is not very relevant to this thesis and is therefore omitted in favor of a more elaborate explanation of the contents of the accords and the impact they have on the current situation between Israel and Palestine.

The Oslo accords is the most influential document with regards to the current state of the Palestinian territories. The peace agreement between the PLO and Israel, which is outlined in the first and second Oslo Accords, is the foundation for the PNA and the power structure in the West Bank and Gaza. They represent the only time that the Palestinians have come close to the establishment of their own state.

The first of the Oslo accords6_{was signed on September 13}th_{, 1993. There are a few key elements from}

the accords that require illumination. The first, is the establishment of a Palestinian authority, originally named the council. This authority would have governing control over Gaza and the West Bank. It was to be the result of a democratic process. The elections would be conducted by the Palestinians and under the supervision of the international community (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 263). Oslo I goes on to describe a five-year transition period in which control of Gaza and the West Bank would be given to the council. This would start with the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. The council would be responsible for education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. Other sectors would be discussed in later agreements between the council and Israel. The first Oslo accord leaves open the issues of Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 264). Although it was stated that Israel would remain responsible for external security and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 265).

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22 Following two years of negotiations, Oslo II was signed on September 28th_{, 1995. This agreement}

elaborated on several of the issues left open in Oslo I and gave a more detailed account of how authority would be transferred. Oslo II is important to the current status of the oPT for three key reasons. The first of which is the recognition of the PNA as the replacement for the council7_.

The second reason is that Oslo II divides the West Bank into Areas A, B and C. Area A, is comprised of six cities: Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Kalkilya (also spelled Qalqilyiah), Ramallah and Bethlehem. The Palestinian National Authority would have full responsibility for internal security and public order, as well as full civil responsibilities. Area B comprises the Palestinian towns and villages of the West Bank. In these areas, which contain 68 percent of the Palestinian population, the PNA will be granted full civil authority as in Area A. It would be charged with maintaining public order, while Israel would have overall security authority, which would allow it to safeguard its citizens and to combat terrorism. This responsibility was to take precedence over the Palestinian responsibility for public order. Finally, in Area C, which comprises the unpopulated areas, including most Palestinian farmland, areas of strategic importance to Israel and the Jewish settlements, Israel will retain full responsibility for security and public order. The PNA will assume all those civil responsibilities not related to territory, such as economics, health, education, etc. (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 290). The accord outlines the transfer of area C to the PNA over three phases at six-month intervals, with the exception of settlements and military locations (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 290). This has not taken place to this day. Less than one percent of Area C was transferred to PNA control as of 2016, over 20 years after the accord was signed. The same is true for the withdrawal of IDF forces from the West Bank, which was agreed to happen from the entire area, with the exception of Hebron (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 272)..

The third way in which the Oslo accords effect the current situation is the establishment of security coordination between the PNA and Israel. The Palestinian Covenant agreed to revoke the statements regarding the destruction of Israel, and the PNA committed to establishing the Palestinian Police, which would act systematically against all violence and terror. The Palestinian police was decreed to arrest those suspected of terrorist acts, confiscate illegal arms and to exchange information to counter terrorist activities. The Palestinian Police was never permitted to arrest Israeli citizens. These agreements stand to this day (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 291).

7_{See Annex II, article I}

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23 Oslo II also outlined some smaller yet important elements of Israeli and Palestinian cooperation. The first of these, is the release of Palestinian prisoners, an element that was very important to the Palestinian population (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 292). The second is the joint water committee’s establishment. The control of the water will remain in the hands of the Israelis and any change in the use of water on the Palestinian side must be approved in the joint water committee. It is structures like these that several interviewees took issues with, stating they don’t even have control of their own resources.

With the Oslo accords signed, it appeared as though the two parties were on a path to peace, but this course hit a bump in the road with the assassination of Yithzal Rabin on November 4th_{, 1995, by a}

Jewish zealot. Rabin had been the driving force behind the peace negotiations on the Israeli side. His death opened political opportunities for those that were opposed to the peace agreements. The political divide widened as time passed following Rabin’s death (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 273). This was despite the majority of Israelis supporting the Oslo accords. In the initial years following Rabin’s death saw both sides take steps to rectify the accords. The appointment of Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister marked the start of a different path (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 274). Both the Palestinians and the Israeli’s took steps that led to the inevitable stalling of peace negotiations in mid-1997.

2.2.5 The Al-Aqsa Intifada

On September 28th_{, 2000, Ariel Sharon (who would be voted Prime Minister in 2001) visited the Temple}

Mount/Haram al-Sharif. His statement that Israel would never give up the temple mount, a holy site in Judaism which is also home to the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa mosque, which are religious sites to Muslims, set off riots where Israeli police killed Palestinian demonstrators. This killing ignited a fuse of frustration that exploded into the Second Intifada, better known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The reason for the frustration among the Palestinians were anger toward Israel for controlling their lives, loss of faith in the PNA for failing to make progress with the establishment of the Palestinian state, and disillusionment with the entire Oslo process. The continued settlement expansion was another element that caused anger, as they were seen as a threat to the Palestinian state and a contradiction of the Israeli promise to retreat from the West Bank. The Palestinian’s had believed that Oslo would lead to the Palestinian state, yet the deadline for a complete handover had expired and still the situation remained unchanged. As a result, many Palestinians felt as though the PNA was colluding with Israel, leading it to be accused of corruption and fraud (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 323).

The first six months of the Second Intifada resulted in the deaths of nearly 500 people, and more than 8,000 wounded (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 324),most of which were Palestinians. The high death

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24 tolls were the result of the type of protest methods that were employed. The First Intifada was mainly based on popular resistance and relatively innocent acts of violence. In the Second Intifada, however, stone throwing youths were joined by armed Palestinian police. The situation resembled all-out warfare more than it did a protest movement. Among the methods employed were sniper attacks, car bombs and roadside bombs. The Israelis responded with tanks and Blackhawk gunships. (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 324). Although this intifada was most renowned for its violent nature, there were also significant popular protests being undertaken. Some state that the intifada was hijacked by a minority of violent protesters (Norman, 2009, p. 2). Never the less this intifada is seen in the frame of violent resistance and had a different character than the First Intifada.

The PNA did very little to stop the movement, and several groups, such as the “Tanzim” were Fatah-linked groups that worked in cooperation with Hamas and Islamic Jihad to target Israeli civilians, including Israeli women and children (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 325). The link with groups like Fatah and Hamas in these movements is why the Palestinian political parties can be seen as social movements. They identify as social organizations and are at their core resistance groups with political roles to play.

Throughout the Al-Aqsa Intifada, there were several peace initiatives. The first was in late 2000 and early 2001. In an attempt to be reelected, Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak engaged in peace negotiations with Arafat. These were almost successful, but failed on the issues of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and the right of Palestinian refugees to return. The failure marked the end for Barak (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 326). Ariel Sharon was elected, a confirmation for Palestinians that the Israelis were not serious about peace. Sharon was notorious for his statements about never sharing Jerusalem, not handing over any more Israeli territory and is opposition of the right to return. The appointment created opportunities for Hamas and Islamic Jihad to garner more support and continue their violent methods (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 327).

On June 2002, almost two years after the start of the Intifada, Israel began the construction of the “Security Fence”8_{(Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 340). The concept alone was enough to infuriate}

Palestinians. The ‘fence’ has been dubbed the apartheid wall by many Palestinians, as was pointed out by several interviewees. The international community was also in opposition of the wall, with several countries calling for its construction to be ceased and parts that were built to be destroyed. This included the USA (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 353). Despite this the ‘fence’ has been constructed and is close

8_{The security fence is an Israel term, most Palestinians refer to it as the wall or the Apartheid Wall. Both terms are}

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25 to finalization today. The wall’s construction sparked a debate on the Palestinian side as well. It was seen by some as a symbol for how the use of violence and suicide attacks were harming the Palestinian cause. Despite calls for a cease fire, both internally and externally the death toll continued to rise, the suicide attacks increased and settlement expansion continued (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 341).

In 2002, the EU attempted to initiate a cease fire by meeting with Tanzim and Hamas officials. These attempts failed, with Hamas and Tanzim continuing their own violent agendas. The “Quartet” of the USA, UN, EU and Russia came out with a “road map” to peace, in October 2002, that would give Palestine and independent state by 2005 (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 343). Even though the initial stages were promising, with the restructuring of the PNA, the creation of the prime minister position (this was given to Mahmoud Abbas/Abu Mazen), and the tentative support of Sharon, the “road map” came to an end when Hamas vowed to continue the intifada, because Abbas was making too many concessions to the Israelis (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 347).

In December 2003, the idea for a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza began to be floated around by Sharon. It wasn’t until the spring of 2004 that it became clear that this would mean the dismantlement of all Israeli settlements on the strip and a complete Israeli withdrawal. This plan was a response to an intensification of violence in 2003 through 2004 in the Gaza Strip (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 350).

The death of Yasser Arafat on the eleventh of November, 2004 was a turning point in the resistance movement of the Palestinians. He had been the face of the conflict for many years and had achieved much in his life. Most Palestinians still see him as their emotional leader, despite his passing (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 355). Abbas, who won the elections in January 2005, would call for the end of the Intifada, and a commitment to none violence. Abbas’ supporters insisted he had the same aims as Arafat, but different methods. Security forces were ordered to stop attacks against Israel, the PNA resumed security cooperation with Israel, and Abbas held talks with Hamas and Islamic Jihad to instate a ceasefire. This eventually succeeded in easing tensions between Palestine and Israel.

2.2.6 The 2006 elections

On January 24th_{2006, Hamas won a historic victory in the PNA. They claimed 67 of a possible 132 seats in}

an election that nearly didn’t happen. The Israelis originally decided to decline Palestinian citizens of Israeli-ruled East-Jerusalemites the right to vote in the elections. Under the threat of the PNA to call off the elections, the USA put pressure on Israel to approve the elections and allow all Palestinian nationals to vote. Upon its victory, Hamas stated that as Israel would not recognize them as members of the

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26 government, Hamas would not negotiate with them, nor recognize Israel. The international community followed Israel’s lead despite hailing the will of the people. They would not recognize a Hamas lead government unless it denounced violence (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 372). Hamas did not denounce violence after its election, and Israel responded by freezing the taxes it collects for the PNA. The USA followed by retracting their nearly 250 million dollars of aid to the PNA. Soon after most other institutions and countries did the same, fearing the legal consequences of dealing with Hamas, which to this day is an internationally recognized terrorist organization (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 373).

Tensions mounted between Hamas and Fatah-backed President Abbas. Eventually a clash occurred between the two organizations, in May 2006, resulting in the death of both civilians and fighters from both sides. Israel also got involved, with rockets be launched back a forth between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, and the capture of 64 Hamas leaders. All of this did no good, the calm that had been in place since February 2005 had come to an end and the violence only made Hamas look stronger, while weakening the public image of Abbas (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 374). By June 2007, the tensions between Fatah and Hamas lead to a split government with Hamas as the de facto government in Gaza and the PNA, with a Fatah majority emergency government, in the West Bank (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 379). This saw a lot of the international support return to the West Bank, but made aid to Gaza much more difficult, as it was now being ruled by a terrorist organization. The tensions between Hamas and Israel were far from being settled. Since 2007 there have been three Gaza wars (Middle East Eye, 2014), with both Israel and Hamas accusing each other of ending ceasefires and initiating new conflict (Bickerton & Klausner, 2010, p. 381). The tension between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza strip remains to this day.

2.2.7 International community in the conflict

Since the Oslo accords there have been many initiatives, including initiatives lead by, several UN resolutions, the Arab Peace Initiative and the French Peace Initiative. All of them have had the goal of achieving the two-state solution. These have all failed. In the meantime, facts on the ground have gradually changed. According to US secretary of state, John Kerry, the two-state solution is in serious jeopardy due to several factors, most notably settlement expansion across the west bank and around Jerusalem (Diamond & Labott, 2016). When the Oslo accords were signed, there were 262,500 settlers in 1993. Today there are over 520,000 settlers in the West Bank in 247 settlements (Oxfam, 2013; B'tselem, 2015).

Kerry’s speech was in wake of resolution 2334 being passed, with no votes against and only the USA abstaining. This resolution stipulated the international community’s continued commitment to the

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27 two-state solution as well as stating out right that Israel is taking deliberate steps to undermine the peace process with the establishment of new settlements and outposts, as well as the expansion of established ones as shown by the following quote from the resolution. (settlements have) “no legal validity and

constitutes a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-State solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.” (United Nations, 2016).

The Israeli response to both the speech and the resolution has been one of anger. Netanyahu immediately called ambassadors from all the voting nations for and explanation. This was followed by statements that Israel will not freeze or remove settlements as outlined in the resolution. He also stated that Kerry’s statements are dangerous for the stability of the region and undermine the security of Israel (Agence France-Presse, 2016; Avishai, 2016). Trump’s election has the potential to lead to a change in direction for the USA and possibly the international community at large, with Tweets such as, “stay strong Israel, Jan. 20th_{is coming” (Eglash & Morello, 2016).}

Although resolution 2334 was passed after the interviews were conducted they are illustrative for how the international community views the situation and how Israel responds to international pressure. In recent years, the issue of Israel and Palestine has not been as high on the international agenda as in the past, especially with the situation in Syria and other countries following the Arab spring. It remains a conflict with a large international involvement.

2.2.8 The role student movements in the conflict

“Student activism served as the meadow upon which the Palestinian political sphere matured, evidenced

by the establishment of Fatah in 1959 and, later, by the formation of the PLO (…)” (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 11)

The establishment of the PNA would not have been possible it wasn’t for the role of the student movements. In the absence of national institutions, students took on the roles of leaders. Higher education can be seen as a catalyst for social change throughout the history of the Palestinian struggle for independence (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 8). In fact, until the establishment of the PLO, the Cairo student association was the only political organ representing the Palestinian issue (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 14). As many Palestinians had been forced to leave the land they grew up in, the diaspora played a large role in student politics. Most organizations had a form of international cooperation (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 19). This is also why the first parties for the Palestinian cause were erected outside of Historical Palestine. Many of the political parties which now operate in the oPT, began as student movements, including Fatah. Not only

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28 parties were forged in universities, but also the faces of the Palestinian struggle, such as Yasser Arafat (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 15).

In both intifada’s students from both high school and university were one of the largest groups of participants, and they were the driving force behind the two uprisings (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 122). In the ‘west’, universities are often described as ivory towers with a level of seclusion from the surrounding community. In the oPT, this is not the case. Historically they could not afford to separate themselves from the reality around them, as demonstrated by the student involvement (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 123). It was not only peaceful movements that came from the universities. They were a breeding ground for radical ideas, and some of the first ‘violent’ groups began as student movements (Zelkovitz, 2015, p. 164).

Following the Oslo accords, universities became much more controlled. There was supervision from the PNA, in an attempt to safe guard the future of the Palestinian state. As Arafat said: “The future

begins with the ministry of education, without which our national project would not be realized” (Zelkovitz,

2015, p. 128). Paradoxically, supervision undermined the freedom that had made the universities and student movements the bedrock of the national struggle. Over the years, the formal political parties have sought to conquer the campuses. Where universities were once a breeding ground for new ideas, today well-established movements dominate the discussion and are attracting students to their cause, while actively putting down new movements (Zelkovitz, 2015; interview Haifa Professor #1). This state of suppression continues to this day. Part of the focus of this thesis is to understand the strength of modern student movements, given the current state of affairs.

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Chapter 3: Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework of this thesis outlines the necessary conditions for social movements to be established and for them to be successful in achieving their goals. To understand these conditions, the following subjects have been examined; rational choice theory, political opportunity structures, cultural framings, media discourse, and transnational activism. Following the explanation of these conditions is an examination of the driving forces behind the decision of social movements to employ either violent or non-violent methods.

3.1 Rational Choice Theory

For a social movement to have even the potential to exist there must be an aggrieved group or groups. This is a prerequisite, but not sufficient to explain the establishment of social movements (Edwards, 2014, p. 45). Aggrieved groups need more than their feelings to act; they must have the means to act. Thus, per rational choice theorists, the focus of social movement theory must be on how resources are mobilized and not the reasons behind the grievances (Edwards, 2014, p. 45). According to Edwards resources may be tangible, for example financial means, or intangible, for example influence. Both tangible and intangible resources are needed. According to rational choice theorists, people join social movements based on rational, deductive reasoning. Their individual actions while they are a part of the movement are rational as well (Edwards, 2014, p. 47). In accordance with this line of thinking, someone would never join a social movement they believe has no chance of success based on the resources available to the movement.

There are several other conditions for social movements to be successful. This thesis focusses on the following conditions besides resource mobilization: Political opportunity structures, cultural framings, media discourse and transnational activism (Norman, 2009, p. 15). These conditions are drawn from several theoretical models including, Political Process Theory (PPT), Contentious Politics (CP), Structuralism and Constructionism. These models do not so much contradict rational choice as they do, expand the theory with other influences on social movements that just resource mobilization.

The rational choice theory has several limitations. The most important one to understand is that of collective action. Why would someone spend energy and resources for a movement that one can benefit from without investment? In economic terms this is referred to as the free rider dilemma (Edwards, 2014, p. 45). In this thesis, collective action is defined as actions of group to achieve a common group goal, often unachievable by an individual. A prerequisite for collective action is a collective identity

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30 (Norman, 2009, p. 26). A collective identity is defined as a process that extends across time and space, involves a network of active relationships and contains a sense of emotional investment that establishes a common unity between to individuals (Melucci, 1995, in Norman, 2009, p. 25). This plays a role in the framing process that will be elaborated upon further on in the text. Norman (2009, p. 26) argues that in 2007 there was a collective identity in Palestine amongst the youth, but it did not result in collective action.

Rational choice theorists outline three potential ways to get individuals to participate in collective action. The first is social sanctions, a method that forces everyone to join the movement (Edwards, 2014, p. 54). Most movements are too large for this to be possible, the Palestinian national movement is likely too large for this method to be effective. The second method that may be employed is Selective incentives. These coax people into joining a movement based on private benefits, such as financial gain (Edwards, 2014, p. 54). The third method is based on the concept of a critical mass. This assumes that actors are interdependent rather than isolated. A social movement does not require everyone, but a ‘critical mass’ of highly resourceful individuals that are willing and able to carry the costs of the movement. Having critical mass increases the believe that a movement may be successful, thereby making it more attractive to join for outsiders (Edwards, 2014, p. 55). The issue with these is that they only explain the growth of a movement, there must still be a core group of individuals dedicated to the cause beforehand. This is where movement entrepreneurs come in. These are resource rich individuals that are willing to take the burden of startup costs as they have an abundance of resources making collective action relatively less costly to them (Edwards, 2014, p. 55). They are also the ones that stand to benefit the most once the social change has occurred, making the investment more attractive to them than to other, less resource rich, individuals (McCarthy and Zald 1977 in Ewards, 2014, p. 56).

3.2 Political Opportunity Structures

Structuralists argue that the success of social movements is greatly determined by their external environment, most notably the political institutions and the state. The political environment must be favorable before social movement can mobilize or be successful (Edwards, 2014, p. 78). In the most absolute structuralist view social movements will not come into being when faced with unfavorable political circumstance. In more tempered form of structuralism social movement are likely to emerge and succeed if there is a favorable political environment (Edwards, 2014, p. 79). A favorable environment is one that provides potential challengers with political opportunities for action. (Tarrow 1998 in Edwards, 2014, p. 81) This may be in a positive sense, a political process is structured in such a way that the voices