Arab Agonism? The case of Beirut Madinati.

(1)

Arab Agonism?

The Case of Beirut Madinati

Student: J.C. Ramaer Studentnumber: 10540741 Supervisor: Robbert Woltering Second reader:

University of Amsterdam Date: 02-02-2018

(2)

Abstract

In this thesis democracy is reconceptualised with Chantal Mouffe’s agonism. The aim is to provide a new understanding of democracy that can help address the complexity of the concept and thereby provide new insights into the state of democracy in the Middle East. Consequently with this new understanding the hegemonic clash in the case of Beirut Madinati is analysed to research if a process of democratization is taking place in Lebanon. First, a comprehensive account of the hegemonic order in Lebanese society, elite-led sectarianism, is given to show how it serves as a tool for the elites to maintain their privileges and power. Second, it is shown how counter-hegemonic efforts have failed to produce any changes in recent history, but that the lessons from these failures are being learned and that counter-hegemonic efforts are growing in strength. Third, the case of Beirut Madinati is analysed with the agonistic model. This will result in the conclusion that a culture of agonism is spreading, but a practice of agonism has yet to be developed. However, there are significant indicators that on the long term, this culture will indeed transform into practice, given that regional tensions don’t escalate and Beirut Madinati overcomes internal conflicts.

Photo on the cover was taken by author. It is a view from a balcony near Sodeco Square in Beirut. The darkness and the storm signify all the challenges ahead for the culture of agonism identified in this thesis. The light stands for this culture.

(3)

Acknowledgement

First of all, gratitude goes out to all the interviewees, who despite their busy schedules managed to find time to help a student out with his masterthesis. It was inspiring to see the political passion that guided many of our conversations and I wish you all the best on your political journeys. Also I hope I will continue to be inspired by the energy and desire to improve the lives of oneself and others, which I found amongst all of you.

Second, gratitude goes out to my supervisor, Robbert Woltering, and my father, mother and sister whose help and advice were crucial in helping me understand myself and my writings. Without this understanding I would never have been able to deliver this thesis with sufficient clarity and structure.

Third, special mention goes out to Beirut and Lebanon for allowing me as a visitor. I found kindness and a willingness to help everywhere. May former glory be restored rather sooner than later.

(4)

List of Abbreviations BM – Beirut Madinati BL – Beiruti’s List

ADF – (ANT)agonistic Dialogic Framework NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

(5)

1. Introduction

Democracy in the Middle East has been a much-debated topic in academic circles. Civil society theorists in the 90s were optimistic and perceived a growing civil society in the Arab world as a sign of democratization in the region.1_{Unfulfilled promises turned this optimism into pessimism} and a new wave of academics started researching the resilience of the Arab authoritarian regimes. This authoritarianism was often juxtaposed to democratization and therefore the research into resilience can also partly be interpreted as research into why democratization was not happening in the Middle East.2_{Consequently, the Arab Spring of 2011 took the academic world by surprise.}3 Suddenly the Middle East seemed to be on the path towards democracy again.4_{However, this} optimism has by now again made place for pessimism. Democratization seems further away than ever in many Arab countries to the extent that some even speak of the Arab Winter.5

Although a full analysis of the debates on democratization in the Middle East is beyond the scope of this research, what stands out is that the academics in the debate on democratization in the Arab world seldom define how they understand democracy. When one reads between the lines, democracy seems to be equated with concepts like human rights, fair elections, free press, an open public space and equality. Thereby these academics seem to refer to some sort of liberal institutional understanding of democracy. However, a comprehensive definition of democracy is omitted in much of the studies of the Arab world.

Inspired by academics in the field of hybrid political orders, who call for research into other “customary forms of governance that can also be participatory and consultative (…) but are very different from the mechanisms of formal liberal democracy,” this thesis contends that academics need to look beyond the liberal institutional understanding of democracy because this

1_{Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995) “Civil Society and Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World.” In}

Civil Society in the Middle East, Vol. 1, ed. Augustus Richard Norton (Leiden: E.J. Brill), 27-54.

2_{Steven Heydemann (2007) “Social Pacts and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,” in}

Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Non-democratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 21-38.

3_{Gregory Gause (2011) “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian} Stability.” Foreign Affairs

4_{Morten Valbjørn (2012) “Upgrading Post-democratization Studies: Examining a Re-politicized Arab} World in a Transition to Somewhere.” Mediterranean Politics, 21:1, pp. 25-35.

5_{The Economist (2016) “The Arab Winter.” In: The Economist (URL:}

https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21685503-five-years-after-wave-uprisings-arab-world-worse-ever, accessed on 01-02-2018)

(8)

understanding is too narrow to fully research democracy and democratization in all its

complexity.1_{A comprehensive definition of democracy becomes necessary for a more thorough} study of democratization in the Middle East. This thesis will try to provide this definition by using Chantal Mouffe’s agonism. Compared to the liberal institutional definition, Mouffe’s agonism allows for an arguably more complex understanding of democracy. In turn, this complexity allows for a more thorough understanding of the state of democracy in any given society. This thesis will take on this complexity and operationalize it into an agonistic analytic tool. The creation of this tool is the first purpose of this thesis since it hopes to provide a new, more comprehensive way of researching democracy.

Second, this tool will be used to look at Lebanon. Lebanon is characterized by a plethora of features that many would define as undemocratic. To give a few examples: the government doesn’t have a monopoly on arms, many political parties receive orders from foreign

governments and frequently the country is shocked by instances of political violence. However, at the same time Lebanon shows trends that could be defined as democratic. The following thesis will try to address this complexity.

With the developed analytical tool this thesis will focus on the most recent example of non-violent civil political engagement, which occurred during the municipal elections of 2016 when a group of civil society actors, engineers, urban planners and activists decided to start an electoral campaign under the name Beirut Madinati (Beirut, My City). By looking at the case of Beirut

Madinati (BM) through the lens of Chantal Mouffe’s agonism, this thesis strives to research the

state of democracy in Lebanon and aims to set a precedent for a more careful study of democracy in the Middle East.

It mus be mentioned that research into the state of democracy naturally turns into researching a process of democratization, because merely researching the situation at a given moment in time seems irrelevant if this moment isn’t put into context with the past and future. In other words, answers to the questions where Lebanon’s political system has come from and where it is heading, are relevant for making sense out of its current state. As such, this thesis became a research not so much into the state of democracy, but more so in the process of democratization. Hence, by using Chantal Mouffe’s agonism, this thesis will try to answer the research question if the case of Beirut Madinati signifies a process of democratization in Lebanese society? As

1_{Volker Boege, M. Anne Brown & Kevin P. Clements. (2009) “Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile}

(9)

explained the purpose of this research is twofold. First to set a precedent for a more careful study of democracy in the Middle East. Second to research democratization in Lebanon.

In the following, chapter two will first outline the methodology behind this thesis. Reflections on the choice of theory and research method will be given, as well as some further notes to bear in mind. In the third chapter this thesis will develop an agonistic analytical tool. Agonism is predicated on the assumption that every society is inherently conflictual, and that it is the way it deals with these conflicts that defines its democratic nature. In other words, every human society is naturally conflicted to some extent and the more it deals with these conflicts in an agonistic way, the more democratic that society is. In particular hegemonic conflicts are of interest to Chantal Mouffe, because they signify societal conflict on the most fundamental level of society. This thesis will argue that indeed the case of BM signifies such a hegemonic conflict, namely between the hegemonic force of elite-led sectarianism and the counter-hegemonic force of BM. As such, after having developed the agonistic analytical tool, in chapter four this thesis will turn to a thorough analysis of the hegemonic force: elite-led sectarianism. It will do so by providing a detailed account of the history and contemporary dynamics of sectarianism. This will show that sectarianism has served as a tool to produce and reproduce economic, social and political

privileges for the sectarian elites, at the cost of the political independence and power of common people. As such, chapter four will show the hegemony of an extremely non-democratic political system.

Chapter five will look at the recent history of counter-hegemonic efforts to change this political system and show how they have failed to produce tangible changes, but are slowly growing in strength. This chapter serves as context to the actual case-study, to be able to provide a better understanding of the process that BM stands for.

In chapter six, data on the case of BM will be provided. This chapter will provide insight into how the hegemonic conflict between elite-led sectarianism and BM took place.

Consequently, in chapter seven, this data is analysed with the agonistic model developed in the theoretical framework. Through this analysis this thesis hopes to draw conclusions on

democratization in Lebanon. In the conclusion, the main findings and suggestions for further research are repeated.

(10)

2. Methodology

2.1 The theory

In this thesis Chantal Mouffe’s agonism will be used to research the state of democracy in Lebanon. Agonism not only comes up with new ideas about the institutional dimension of democracy, it also looks beyond this dimension and provides insight into the context, principles and procedures that should define democracy. As such it provides a rich understanding of what democracy is, beyond the liberal institutional model. This understanding is important, because too often the Middle East is measured only against the liberal institutional model. Consequently, the absence of fair elections, representativity or free press often lead to conclusions that

democracy is absent entirely. However, with the more complex understanding of democracy that agonism provides, one can question if this conclusion is justified.

Furthermore, this thesis not only tries to provide insight into the state of democracy in Lebanon, it also tries to research how democracy has developed in recent history. As such it becomes a research into democratization, rather than just democracy. The motivation behind this is that insight into this development is necessary for defining the nature of democracy. The democratic nature of any given society is not only defined by its current state of being, but also by the trends that drive it. However, researching a process is more complicated. It necessitates some sort of longitudinal analysis. As such this thesis will provide a historical analysis of the Lebanese political system that is defined by the hegemony of elite-led sectarianism. Also, it will be shown how in recent decades forces from civil society have slowly intensified their counter-hegemonic effort, implicating possible democratization. Consequently, this thesis will research how the case of BM fits into this process. Does it signify a continuation of this trend? Or not?

2.2 Research method

This research consists of an extensive literature-review and qualitative in-depth semi-structured interviews. Research was done in several periods. The first period started in February 2017 and ended in August of that same year. This period consisted of orientation on the subject and preliminary readings in Amsterdam. The second period was partly in Amsterdam and partly in Beirut. It started at the beginning of September 2017 and ended approximately on 15 November 2017. In this period the majority of the academic literature review was conducted and the

(11)

ended at the end of January 2018. This period was in Beirut where the interviews were conducted, the academic literature review was finished and all other chapters were written. Academic literature has been used throughout this thesis. The literature was collected in bookshops, online libraries and online search engines.

All interviews but one were recorded and can be found on the included USB-stick.

Members of BM, Beiruti’s List (BL) and relevant outsiders (see Appendix I for a full list of the interviews) were interviewed. BM is the counter-hegemony under study. BL was used as a proxy for the sectarian hegemonic order, since it was the list that represented many of the traditional parties associated with the sectarian hegemonic order in the municipal elections. The choice for these three different groups of people had mainly to do with bringing nuance and context to the discourse of the respondents. The expectation was that the experience of the case of BM would differ from one’s point of view. Interviewing members of BM and BL, but also the relevant outsiders would provide insight into these different realities and enable a better definition of the nature of the case of BM. However, in reality it turned out to be difficult to speak to

BL-members. Furthermore, it also happened that certain relevant outsiders would refer me to a colleague of them who was a member of BM. This was natural since a lot of BM-members were academics or journalists as well. As such, the majority of my respondents is or was a member of BM.

Not only the choice for respondents was used to bring nuance and context, but also certain interview-techniques. First there was the factor of time. Most interviews took around fifty minutes to an hour which often gave enough time for the respondents to relax and open up. With opening up often came a more detailed account of one’s experience. Especially with BM members this helped in breaking through the official language used by the movement as a whole, and delve deeper into the actual personal experience of the respondent. Second, open and neutral questions proved to be useful in loosening up the respondents and making them break away from their official political language. Questions could be so open and neutral that sometimes it felt stupid to ask them. For instance, asking about the goals of BM can be interpreted as an irrelevant question because one of the innovative features of BM is that it produced an extensive political programme conveying all its goals. However, asking these questions allowed respondents to give their own take on this programme and revealed experiences that couldn’t be deducted from reading the programme alone. Important to note here is that the interviews were

(12)

semi-structured, so for a significant part every interview would be guided by what the respondent deemed most relevant.

Another point has to be made about the author’s own political conviction, which is sympathetic towards the cause of BM. This might have had effects in two ways. First, due to sympathy for BM, there was naturally less inclination to ask critical questions to members of BM. Of course I was aware of this and actively tried to remain neutral, but it might have resulted in a less critical stance. One example is that I gladly took over BM’s claim that their campaign was focused on real issues and thus positivity, rather than negativity. I support such a political approach and I was happy to have found a real-life example of it. However, when interviewing members of BL they came up with examples of social media attacks on themselves, originating from the BM camp. BM members blamed this on supporters who acted on their own and were beyond their control. However, that is not the point. The point is that it was very naïve of me to think that BM’s campaign had only been positive. Politics in the digital age can be very dirty. People behind their laptops feel the liberty to disregard social norms and say whatever comes to their mind. Such naivety was probably absent in the interviews with members of BL, as I am already critical of the system they represent.

The second effect of this sympathy for BM was the effect it had on interviews with members of BL. Of course the questions were as neutral and open as possible, but through certain

intonations and choices of words, BL members could sense my personal political conviction which sometimes put them more in the defensive than one would hope for. An example of such a choice of words was that I spoke of the radicalization of civil society as a positive development. An example of what this could lead to can be found in my interview with BL member Yusra Balaa Sidani. She would interpret many of my questions as a hidden critique, which made her answer not really to my question, but by critiquing BM in a similar way. Although this could also simply reflect an attitude and thus still be relevant for this research, in some cases my choices of words and intonations played a significant role in creating this attitude. To mitigate this effect somewhat, the same questions were often asked differently.

Another issue has to do with the choice for interviewing mostly senior members of BM and BL, and not supporters of both lists or people from Beirut in general. A strong argument could be made that the experience of all people in Beirut is relevant for researching agonistic

(13)

impossible. Nonetheless, for this research people were interviewed that had and have some of the most powerful positions in this case and whose experiences are therefore arguably more relevant than others.

2.3 Further notes

To conclude a remark has to be made about the conflation of the local and national level. The case of Beirut Madinati plays out on the municipal level of Beirut. However, this thesis claims to be researching democratization at the national level. The justification for this is that

democratization in Beirut most likely has a significant impact on democratization in the rest of the country. Beirut is not only the capital, its metropolitan area houses 2.2 million Lebanese making up one-third of the country’s population.1_{Moreover, it is home to important national} institutions like the parliament and ministries and a lot of traditional sectarian leaders live in the city. Changes in Beirut will therefore most likely resonate far beyond the borders of the city. Also, it is important to note that this thesis researches a process. Researching democratization as a process acknowledges the fact that steps are being made towards a democracy, but that this ideal hasn’t been reached yet. As such this approach acknowledges that the political nature of other parts of Lebanon might be obstacles to further democratization. However, steps towards democracy in Beirut can still contribute to overall democratization in Lebanon.

We will now turn to the academic literature on agonism to come up with an agonistic model needed to analyse the case of BM.

1_{CIA World Factbook (URL:} https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html, accessed on: 11-01-2018)

(14)

3. Theoretical background

As was stated earlier, the theoretical framework will be based on Mouffe’s theory of agonism. First the main tenets of Mouffe’s theory will be outlined. Second this thesis will turn to other academics who have criticized and scrutinized her theory. They will help in resolving some critical questions that arise from Mouffe’s work. Finally, this thesis will come up with an operationalization of her theory. Or in other words, an agonistic model.

3.1 Mouffe’s agonism

Mouffe’s theory on agonism starts from the assumption that every human society is ruled by a certain set of institutions and principles that can be perceived as a hegemonic order. To put it simply, different political identities strive for power and the most powerful one can design the institutions and principles that guide society thereby potentially becoming a hegemonic order. According to Mouffe, such a hegemonic order is “never the manifestation of a deeper objectivity that is exterior to the practices that brought it into being.”1_{As an example, it would be best to}

use the hegemonic order that is most recurrent in Mouffe’s work: neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is predicated on principles as the free market and individual rationalism. She argues that especially in the nineties and early 2000s these principles were regarded as universal truths, or as a ‘deeper objectivity’. However, Mouffe argues that these principles reflect a certain vision of reality, a subjective view. Therefore, the fact that they became hegemonic can’t be because of the objective reality they reflect, but because enough people believed in them. Here we come to the second point about hegemonic orders, namely that they are the expression of power relations. They are not given. They are the result of a successful struggle for power by a group of people. They come into being, survive and can be challenged and changed.

According to Mouffe, this hegemonic struggle for power is in essence a conflict between different political identities. Such identities, according to Mouffe, are constructed by the

affirmation of a difference. To her “every identity is relational and (…) about the constitution of a ‘we’ which requires as its very condition of possibility the demarcation of a ‘they’.”2_This ontological dimension of political identities is defined as radical negativity. Radical negativity as put forth by Mouffe refers to the discursive construction of an object such that it acquires a

1_{Chantal Mouffe (2013) Agonistics. London: Verso, p. 2} 2_{Mouffe, Agonistics, p. 5}

(15)

purely negative identity; in other words, it is defined only in relation to something which it is not. For a very clear example of radical negativity, one could think of the way in which Islamism was formed as an ideology against ‘the West’ and the authoritarian Arab regimes that were supported by it.1

Radical negativity means that the nature of a political identity, which lies at the basis of any power structure and thus also hegemonies, is inherently exclusionary. There is always a group of people that doesn’t fit in. As we established any hegemonic order is the result of a successful struggle for power by a certain political identity. Since these identities are naturally exclusive through the mechanism of radical negativity, Mouffe states that there is always the potential for a hegemonic order to be challenged and changed.2_{In other words, for Mouffe, societal consensus is an}

impossibility. To give an example: for a long time, the EU was arguably valued positively as an institution that provided peace and prosperity to the European continent. However, in the past two decades we saw the emphatic rise of groups of people that feel excluded in some way or another by the European Union and have therefore come to oppose it. Where it might have seemed that there was societal consensus about the European Union at one point, these recent developments have shown that such a consensus is always vulnerable because the values that underlie the EU will not forever universally apply to everyone.

This impossibility of perpetual societal consensus leads to the conclusion that any given human society is in a perpetual state of conflict. Since political identities are by nature exclusive, there will always be those that don’t feel represented by the hegemonic political identity and therefore oppose it. This can be done in a silent, non-public way. But still, for Mouffe this is opposition and therefore conflict. She calls this conflictual dimension ‘the political’, the space in which new political identities emerge to oppose the hegemonic one. This dimension of the political is opposed to ‘politics’ which refers to the ways in which a hegemonic order establishes itself and survives through its institutions and practices.3_{In other words, the political refers to the}

theoretical space in which political identities stake their claims and challenge each other. The space in which counter-hegemonic efforts are formulated and undertaken. Politics refers to the

1_{Quintan Wiktorowicz (2005) “A Genealogy of Radical Islam.” In: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28:2, pp.} 75-97

2_{Mouffe, Agonistics, p. 2} 3_{ibid., p. 3}

(16)

metaphorical tools that hegemonic political identities use to affirm and enforce their power. These tools often come down to institutions, discourses and practices.

Mouffe argues that the struggles that arise from the political can come in two forms: antagonistic and agonistic. The antagonistic struggle is between two existential enemies. This means that the survival of the identity of one actor, depends on the annihilation of the other. Therefor

antagonistic struggles are susceptible to turning violent.

In contrast, the agonistic hegemonic struggle is between two adversaries. Adversaries don’t agree with the political identity of the other, but don’t deny the other’s right to believe in it. To

establish this adversarial mode of interaction – or agonism –, it is important that all actors accept certain democratic procedures under which they will play out their struggle. To Mouffe, these procedures correlate to the principles of liberty and equality for all.1_{To elaborate on that she}

states: “The prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions [of antagonism] (…). Rather, it is to ‘sublimate’ those passions by mobilizing them towards democratic designs, by creating collective forms of identification around democratic objectives.”2_{All in a bid to mitigate}

the potential violent consequences of the exclusionary character of political identities. However, a thorough operationalization of these democratic designs and an analysis of how to establish these collective forms of identification, is left out by Mouffe. A significant part of the rest of this theoretical framework will take up this challenge.

This reading of Mouffe’s agonism allows for defining it as a theory of democratization since Mouffe theorizes about a way in which all different political identities can claim their place in a given society without denying each others right to do so. As such agonism is a theory that promotes the creation of political systems that comply with the democratic norms of freedom, justice, and the human right to self-development. Therefore an agonistic society will also be a democratic society.

To summarize, agonism refers to a way of dealing with societal conflict in which all parties perceive their rivals as adversaries instead of antagonists. It is predicated on the assumption that societal conflict is inevitable and that democratic politics should therefore aim at sublimating the antagonistic passions in such conflict. According to Mouffe, these passions can be sublimated

1_{ibid., p. 7}

(17)

through creating collective forms of identification around democratic designs that adhere to principles of liberty and equality for all. I contend that as such, agonism essentially is an attempt to theorize a political system in which the democratic norms of freedom, justice and the human right to self-development play a fundamental role. However, what this political system exactly looks like and how a collective form of identification around this system can be created, remains unclear. We will deal with this in the following by taking on academic literature that has criticized and scrutinized Mouffe’s work.

3.2 Critique on Mouffe

Critiques on Mouffe are manifold and revolve around three main questions. First there are those who ask themselves: how does agonism reconcile the fact that it is promoting the inclusion of all political identities, whilst at the same time explicitly promoting one political identity based on the principles of “liberty and equality for all”? They explain that such a collective form of

identification, following Mouffe’s ideas about radical negativity, is inherently exclusionary to those that don’t feel represented by it. Which makes this agonist model exclusionary to those that don’t adhere to the principles of “liberty and equality for all”.

The second question critiques the assumption that every human society is by nature conflictual. The academics behind this question believe that peace, love and co-existence are just as natural as conflict These critics don’t believe in the primacy of radical negativity.

The third question partly results from the previous two and is of a more practical nature. It asks how an agonistic order would look in practice. Which institutional set-up is in line with an agonistic political system? This last question answers the two more practical questions that Mouffe left open in her book and that were asked at the end of last section. The first and second question are of a more fundamental nature. They are dealt with to reach a better understanding of Mouffe’s theory and give a good overview of the academic debate surrounding agonism. All three questions will be dealt with separately below.

3.2.1 Agonism’s internal conflict

As should be clear from the above, agonism is a way of thinking about human society in which the perpetual state of societal conflict is acknowledged and fostered, whilst preventing this

(18)

conflict from ever turning antagonistic and thus potentially violent. To guarantee this “sublimation”1_{of passions the actors within this society have to respect a certain set of}

etho-political principles and procedures. According to Mouffe, these procedures should equal a right interpretation of the rights of liberty and equality for all.

However, there are those that argue that this ‘respect’ is already a hegemonic order by itself. To put it differently, by respecting a certain set of etho-political principles, the actors have already complied to a certain vision of how society should be. Excluding all those who question this vision. Whereas agonism claims to give free space for societal contestation, it actually limits this space to at least some extent. As such, Westphal asks herself the question: “Is it not (…) contradictory to suggest that it is possible to detect particular institutions and procedures that have a special status for agonism and, therefore, should not belong the range of contested issues?”2

There are many who share Westphal’s concern. Puymbroeck and Oosterlynck state how agonism in its attempt to devise a proper space for societal conflict, already domesticates this conflict which by its nature should be free for all to participate in. They explain that agonism sets rules to societal conflict in such a way that those who don’t know or respect those rules are illegitimate parties in this conflict. Deeming some political identities as illegitimate doesn’t seem to

correspond with the agonist notion that every political order is man-made and therefore should be open to challenges by those who don’t feel represented by it.3_{Knops gives an even clearer} explanation of the problem stating that “Mouffe’s agonist theory of democracy implicitly relies on the concept of a universal rational consensus while explicitly denying its possibility.”4_And there are others who propose similar concerns.5

1_{See page 16}

2_{Manon Westphal (2014) “Applying Principles of Agonistic Politics to Institutional Design.” Paper} for the panel Agonism and Democratic Innovation at the ECPR General Conference at the University of Glasgow, p. 6 3_{Van Puymbroeck, N., Oosterlynck, S. (2015) Opening Up the Post-Political Condition: Multiculturalism} and the Matrix of Depoliticisation. In: Wilson, J., Swyngedouw, E. (2015) The Post-Political and Its

Discontents. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 92-93

4_{Andrew Knops (2012) “Integrating Agonism with Deliberation – Realising the Benefits.” In: Filozofija I}

Drustvo, 24:4, p. 151

5_{Paulina Tambakaki (2016) “Agonism Reloaded: Potentia, Renewal and Radical Democracy.” In: Political}

Studies Review, pp. 1-12

Jason Edwards (2013) “Play and Democracy: Huizinga and the Limits of Agonism.” In: Political Theory, 41:1, pp. 90-115

(19)

To overcome this problem, Westphal argues that indeed agonism can never reach its ideal form, since it will always exclude those that don’t adhere to the agreed upon set of etho-political practices. Thereby agonism becomes – to a certain extent – hegemonic itself. But this

contradiction doesn’t mean that the principles of the theory become useless. As we saw, agonism can be perceived of as a theory of democracy. Therefore, the more agonist principles are applied, the more democratic a society can become. Westphal states that the fact that agonism can never reach its ideal form, doesn’t mean that its principles aren’t a useful tool for analysing the

democratic nature of institutions and societies.1_{Agonism can provide a way of envisaging a} society in its most free and democratic form possible.

Therefore, agonism becomes an analytical tool. And it becomes important to look at what this tool entails. Which policies and institutions are agonistic and can therefore contribute to a further democratization of society? But before this thesis turns to that question, it has to deal with another more fundamental problem. The philosophical conception of society as inherently conflictual.

3.2.2 Agonism’s obsession with conflict

The following criticism was only articulated in one article and wasn’t repeated in any of the other articles that were part of this research. However, fundamentally it asks such an important

question that it is important to pay at least some attention to it.

Bregazzi and Jackson criticize agonism for over-determining sociality as violent. They argue that “while it is important to note that the potential for violence may always be present in social contexts, we argue that the potential for peace, as always- already present itself, struggles to be recognized if we read sociality as irreducibly conflictual.”2_{As such agonism becomes unable to} account for ontological aspects of human agency, like love, compassion, empathy, non-harmful cooperation, and nurture.

Nikolai Roskamm (2015) “On the other side of ‘agonism’: ‘The enemy,’ the ‘outside,’ and the role of antagonism.” In: Planning Theory, 14:4, pp. 384-403

Katie McClymont (2011) “Revitalising the political: Development Control and Agonism in Planning Practice.” In: Planning Theory, 10:3, p. 252

1_{Westphal, Applying Princples, p. 8-9}

2_{Harry Bregazzi and Mark Jackson (2016) “Agonism, critical political geography, and the new geographies} of peace.” In: Progress in Human Geography, p. 3

(20)

They argue that hate nor love is some sort of pre-ordained natural condition. Instead, they are products of relations. According to them “a political subject is simply love (or hate) in its action; the subject does not precede the relation that love, care, or harm manifests.”1_{Hence, the}

agonistic idea that any human society is in perpetual conflict is deluding and potentially

dangerous because it instils a belief in conflict without any ontological justification. They argue that by taking conflict as the ontological state of human society, agonists also contribute to a world in which conflict plays a central role. With potentially dangerous consequences.2_{As such} they propose more research into the kind of relations that bring about peace. Something that often is forgotten by agonists, simply because of their focus on justifying conflict as the ontology of human society.

However, is it not so that by looking into the possible ways to sublimate the passions that can lead to antagonistic conflict, agonists are exactly doing that: researching the kinds of relations that bring about peace? Concepts like empathy, respect, non-harmful cooperation and love start to play a central role in agonism, once one starts thinking about how agonism can be put into practice. Something that will become clear once we start operationalizing agonism. As such this thesis disagrees with the premise that agonism’s ontological starting point forecloses the

possibility of researching the kind of human relations that can lead to peace.

However, Bregazzi and Jackson do rightly point out that this operationalization of agonism has been understudied. There haven’t been many comprehensive studies of the practical dimensions of agonism: the institutions and principles that should be implemented in order to make society as agonistic as possible.

Hence it becomes important for both of the above questions to look into the practical dimensions of agonism. Based on the studies that have been undertaken in this field, the next section will try to provide this answer.

3.2.3 Agonism’s institutional deficit

The need for more research into the practical dimensions of agonism should be clear from the above three sections but is also stressed by many other scholars. Among others3_{, Hilmer for}

1_{ibid., p. 11} 2_{ibid., p. 14-15}

3_{Simona Goi (2005) “Agonism, Deliberation and the Politics of Abortion.” In: Polity, 37:1, pp. 54-81} Tambakaki, Agonism Reloaded, pp. 1-12

(21)

instance states that Mouffe “omits a strategy” for how to construct agonism.1_{Vinnari and Dillard} ask themselves how an agonistic environment in which a society can practically operate can be created.2_{And Westphal problematizes the “institutional deficit” of agonism.}3

Some have undertaken efforts to solve this institutional deficit. In the following their findings will be presented in order to present some insight into the practical or institutional dimensions of agonism.

3.3 Vinnari and Dillard

The articles on the practical dimensions of agonism come from all kinds of disciplines. The principles of agonism have been found useful by urban planners, accountants, psychologists, public policy researchers, anthropologists, philosophers, political theorists, human geographers, pedagogues and probably many more that couldn’t be incorporated into this research. Somewhat surprisingly, it is Vinnari and Dillard’s study on how to incorporate agonism in accounting that proved the most comprehensive and useful as a starting point for the practical dimensions of agonism.4

Vinnari and Dillard bring three different theories together to develop a comprehensive account of how an agonistic decision-making process should go: Mouffe’s agonism, Brown’s principles of dialogical accounting and Latour’s bicameral parliament. To them Mouffe conceptualizes the societal context, Brown the guiding principles and Latour the process.

This thesis already dealt with Mouffe’s ideas extensively. However, it is beyond the scope of this research to analyse Brown and Latour in the same depth. Neither is it necessary, for Vinnari and Dillard incorporate all three of them into an agonistic political decision-making framework which they call the (ANT)agonistic dialogic framework (ADF). Analysing this framework by itself, instead of the theories that underlie it, should be enough in proving its merit for an agonistic political decision-making process.

Bart van Leeuwen (2015) “Absorbing the agony of agonism? The limits of cultural questioning and alternative variations of intercultural civility.” In: Urban Studies, 52:4, p. 794

1_{Jeffrey D. Hilmer (2009) “Radicalizing Democracy, Again.” In: New Political Science, 31:3, p. 394} 2_{Eija Vinnari and Jesse Dillard (2016) “(ANT)agonistics: Pluralistic politicization of, and by, accounting} and its technologies.” In: Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 39, p. 26

3_{Westphal, Applying Principles, p. 1}

(22)

The (ADF) is made up out of three components: the contextualising premises which are inspired by Mouffe’s agonism, the process principles which are inspired by Brown’s principles of dialogic accounting, and the process itself which is inspired by Latour’s bicameral parliament.

3.3.1 The contextualising premises

The contextualising premises are predicated on Mouffe’s theory of agonism and are as follows:1 1 The presence of multiple, incommensurable ideological orientations and asymmetrical

power relationships 

2 Closure of the decision-making process is a political decision always, already open to question  

3 Commitment to pluralistic democratic governance  

4 A recognition of the constructive character of social division 5 A recognition of the transformative potential of agonistic discourse

While the first three premises are extensively discussed above, the latter two (4 and 5) need some more explanation. Premise 4 and 5 follow from the commitment to pluralistic democratic

governance. To be committed to this type of governance, one must have a belief in the constructive character of social division. Or in other words, one must recognize the possibility and contribution of new, previously unimagined ideas emerging out of conflictual interaction. Also, one must be open to the transformative potential of agonistic discourse, or the possibility that the encounter with before unknown ideas inspires a process of self-reflection and learning that in the end transforms one’s own ideas.

Vinnari and Dillard conclude that “these agonistic context characteristics recognize the pluralistic nature of social existence, providing a fundamental premise, and context, for varied expeditions toward agonistic democracy.”2

3.3.2 The process principles

Vinnari and Dillard propose the following principles as useful for the agonistic decision-making process. One can interpret these principles as the ways in which Mouffe’s contextualising premises can be put into practice.

1_{ibid., p. 35-36}

(23)

1 Encourage participatory processes that are alert to the visible and invisible attachments between humans and their environment, imagining new connections and representations between them and giving them voice.

2 Recognize reductionism of any type, being especially attuned to monetary and anthropocentric forms.

3 Recognize the constructed nature of purportedly objective and deterministic ‘facts’ and ‘values’.

4 Enable accessibility for all participants, experts and non-experts, humans and their environment, to the deliberations through clear and complete representation. 5 Recognize the transformative potential of critical reflection and learning.

The first principle relates to the agonistic mindset of being open for the unknown. Latour claims that politics is defined by different relations between humans and their environment. In other words, the way humans relate to other humans and their environment defines their stance in politics. When a certain political process isn’t open for all different relations to participate, according to Latour, this has disastrous consequences for the openness of a political process to different ideas, opinions and values and thus for agonism.1_{Therefore Latour and Vinnari and} Dillard call for the opening up of political debate to the manifold existent voices arising from the different relations between humans on the one and humans and their environment on the other hand. The call for such open-mindedness seems to reflect the third, fourth and fifth

contextualizing premises of Mouffe.

The second and third principle have very much to do with the critical, self-reflective actor. As Vinnari and Dillard explain, in an agonistic debate, one should be weary of reductionist

representations of complex political choices and the assumptions and values that underlie one’s own arguments.2_{I interpret this as the need for participants to always ask the questions how and} why? Especially when numbers are involved, there is a tendency to forget that these numbers

reflect complex political processes and were produced using certain kinds of methodologies and assumptions. To show the contingency of every political order, critical reflection is necessary. The need for self-reflective actors in agonism is stressed by Westphal. She states that “actors are required to engage in critical, self-reflective processes in which they detach themselves from presumptions entrenched in their identities, affirm the contestable character of their perspectives

1_{Vinnari and Dillard, (ANT)agonistics, p. 30} 2_{Vinnari and Dillard, (ANT)agonistics, p. 29}

(24)

and, consequently, acquire an openness towards pluralism and the uncertainty it implies.”1_This self-reflection is needed for the agonistic mindset. However, although this may sound very logical, such an attitude of self-reflection might be hard to achieve. Van Leeuwen explains that actors in the kind of confrontation of identities that agonism prescribes, “run the risk of an ‘existential entrenchment’ by closing up on themselves in an effort to defend their views, values and ways of life.”2_{Especially when confronted with more powerful identities. Manin voices} similar concerns and explains how humans, especially in groups, tend to see a confirmation of their previous beliefs when receiving new information: the confirmation bias.3_{According to} Manin, the confirmation bias is reinforced by the fact that in group interaction shared

information is given more weight and thus tends to have primacy in a discussion. New beliefs, ideas and information are not yet shared by the group and are therefore often deemed less relevant. This results in a repetition of previously known knowledge, at the cost of new knowledge.4

Thus the self-reflective agonistic actor isn’t simply formed by academically stressing the need for it. Van Leeuwen argues that to prevent existential entrenchment from happening, indirect approaches to identity-based disputes are useful. The idea behind this is that direct approaches are too confrontational for a nuanced and in-depth reciprocal learning process to take place. Although Van Leeuwen is not entirely clear what the indirect approach should entail, he thinks that political institutions can play a vital role in making these kind of disputes less direct. For instance by creating possibilities for the telling of and listening to stories, as opposed to a vibrant and passionate exchange of arguments.5

To overcome the problem of confirmation bias, Manin argues that debates should be issue-specific, so that it is easy for participants to develop arguments for and against. According to Manin, multidimensional debates are easily co-opted by dominant discourses because it is hard for opponents to formulate their arguments. Also, speakers should have publicly declared interests in the issue that are linked to the substance of the policy. This makes it less likely that speakers can make use of dominant discourses to promote their individual interests, for instance

1_{Westphal, Applying Principles, p. 11} 2_{Van Leeuwen, Absorbing, p. 797}

3_{Bernard Manin (2017) “Political Deliberation & the Adversarial Principle.” In: Daedalus, 146:3, p. 43} 4_{ibid., p. 44}

(25)

a political career.1

The fourth principle has to do with the openness of the political space for the expression of different kinds of views. The importance of an open public space is stressed by Staeheli, who claims that anyone should be allowed to enter it and stake their claims.2_{To her the public sphere} is made up by the public physical space, traditional media and social media. Especially the potentially inclusive and transformative character of social media is stressed by Zaharna and Uysal on the basis of their case-study on the Gezi-protests in Turkey where social media played a vital role in mobilizing people on the basis of a shared political identity.3

The fifth principle can be interpreted as an openness towards the products of principles one to four. An openness towards being transformed through a process of identity-disputes,

confrontation and critical (self-)reflection.

These five principles seem to be in accordance with Mouffe’s concept of adversarial interaction in which the opposing parties respect each other’s right to claim power. Moreover, many other academics stress the importance of concepts like empathy4_{, tolerance}5_{or civility}6_{for agonism;} concepts that seem in line with these principles.

3.3.3 The process

By applying these principles to a political decision-making process in an agonistic context, this process would ideally go through four stages according to Latour: perplexity, consultation, hierarchization and institutionalization. This section will deal with them separately

Perplexity refers to the phase in which it is investigated how new propositions or ideas that are candidates for existence can rise up or best be detected, made visible or gotten to talk. This phase

1_{Manin, Political Deliberation, pp. 47-48}

2_{Lynn A. Staeheli (2010) “Political geography: democracy and the disorderly public.” In; Progress in Human}

Geography, 34:1, pp. 70-73

3_{Rhonda Zaharna & Nur Uysal (2015) “Going for the jugular in public diplomacy: How adversarial} publics using social media are challenging state legitimacy.” In: Public Relations Review, 42, p. 113 4_{Leah S. Horowitz (2012) “Toward empathic agonism: conflicting vulnerabilities in urban wetland} governance.” In: Environment and Planning A, 45, pp. 2344-2361

5_{Betto van Waarden (2017) “Teaching for Toleration in Pluralist Liberal Democracies.” In: Democracy &}

Education, 25:1, pp. 1-12

(26)

is necessary for opening up spaces in which previously unheard voices can be heard. Having such spaces provides the decision-making process with external validity.

Consultation is the phase in which all propositions and ideas are measured for their effect on the habits of the others in the process. In this phase it is decided which propositions and ideas are relevant for the further decision-making process. It is also the phase in which all entities can get fully acquainted with new political identities.

Hierarchization is the phase in which different propositions and ideas are contrasted with each other. Alliances are made and it becomes clear which propositions are the most powerful through a system of ranking and valuing. Necessary for this phase is transparent dialogue and a legitimate, trustworthy mechanism for ranking the different ideas that came out of the perplexity and

consultation phases.

Institutionalization is the phase in which the propositions and ideas that turned out to be the most powerful are stabilized. It closes the decision-making process. However, it is important to note that once institutionalization has been reached, the process immediately goes back to

perplexity again. It should be possible to immediately question the closure of the decision-making process again.

The combined set of contextual premises, principles and the process delivers the following model (see figure 1 on next page).

(27)

Figure 1: The (ANT)agonistic democratic decision-making framework1_{, note that the concept ‘nonhumans’ frequently occurs}

in this figure. For practical reasons, this thesis decided not to explain this concept since it is extremely complex. Instead, this thesis has used ‘the environment’ to refer to the same, despite the fact that this doesn’t fully cover the same meaning.

This agonistic model will be used to analyse the case of BM. By applying the contextual premises, process principles and four stages of decision-making to this case, we will be able to research the agonistic character of the case. However, before that, the next chapter will first research the history of the Lebanese political system to give more insight in the hegemonic force of sectarianism that is behind it, and show its non-democratic nature. If the case of BM shows advancements in the agonistic model compared to the dominant political system in Lebanon, this means that we can speak of a process of democratization.

(28)

4. Hegemony in Lebanon: elite-led sectarianism

At its most basic level sectarianism is the integration of religious communities into the state to such an extent that religious divides become the defining characteristic of the political, economic and social fabric of a society. Lebanon recognizes eighteen religious communities amongst which the Sunni (27%), Shia (27%), Maronite Christians (21%) and Druze (5.6%) are the most

influential.1_{Traditionally the Christians – Maronites but also many other denominations like for} instance the Greek Orthodox – were the largest and most powerful sect in Lebanon. Their power was reflected in the National Pact of 1948 which saw the most powerful position in society, the president, being allocated to a Maronite Christian. However, Moaddel et al. show how during the course of the 20th_{century the size of the Muslim sects grew in both number and power. They} show how the Ta’if agreement levelled the power between Sunni’s and Christians by transferring some critical tasks from the president to the prime-minister, who had to be a Sunni.

Consequently they show how after the Israeli invasion of 2006 the Shia – who traditionally had been a marginalized sect in Lebanese society – in the form of Hezbollah also claimed their position within the system. As such Moaddel et al. conclude that political power in Lebanon has been levelled amongst the Sunni, Shia and Christians since 2006.2

Hence the most prominent political roles are allocated by religion: the speaker of parliament has to be a Shia, the prime-minister a Sunni and the president a Maronite Christian. Also the system includes corresponding sectarian quota for the allocation of all public positions and sectarian interests have been the primary logic behind the construction of electoral districts.3_Boekelo shows that in addition to these politico-juridical dimensions, sectarianism also refers to some sort of culture that plagues the Lebanese in which they always run the risk of relapsing into a “rally around the religious flag, failing to recognize mutual interests and belonging”. As such Boekelo defines sectarianism as both a political reality and a language. A language that forms the primary

1_{The most recent statistics come from the CIA World Factbook and were collected in 2012 (URL:} https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html, accessed on: 09-01-2018) 2_{Mansoor Moaddel, Jean Kors & Johan Gärde (2012) “Sectarianism and Counter-Sectarianism in} Lebanon.” In: Population Studies Center Research Report, 12:757, pp. 1-32

3_{Nora Stel & Wim Naudé (2013) “Public-Private Entanglement: Entrepeneurship in a Hybrid Political} Order, the Case of Lebanon.” IZA Discussion Paper, No. 7795, p. 8

Bassel Salloukh (2006) “The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: Elections in Postwar Lebanon.” In: Canadian Journal of Political Science, 39:3, pp. 635-655

(29)

point of reference in people’s understanding of themselves and the world around them. 1_{As such} sectarianism is the dominant logic behind institutions and practices in Lebanese society, making it a hegemonic order.

In the following this thesis will first turn to the history of sectarianism. Second we will look more in-depth at the working of sectarianism today. This part will analyse the politico-juridical

dimension and show how the Lebanese consociational democracy enforces sectarianism. The third section will shed light on the cultural dimension and show how sectarianism indeed serves as a primary point of reference for many Lebanese.

4.1 The origins of sectarianism

This part mainly relies on the book the Culture of Sectarianism by Ussama Makdisi.2_{His book is} predominantly a critique on the contention that sectarianism is a primordial, antimodern feature of Lebanese society. Instead he claims that the current form of sectarianism that defines

Lebanese society has its origins in the middle of the nineteenth century. He claims that it was a result of the struggle by the elites in Mount Lebanon to preserve their power in the face of modernity. Such a claim is in line with Mouffe’s contention that any hegemonic order is a man-made creation and we will deal with his argument more extensively below. However, for practical reasons it is not possible to deal with all the nuances of Makdisi’s work. Only the part of his argument that is relevant for this research will be outlined; the fact that sectarianism developed as a tool for the elites to preserve their power.3

Makdisi shows that in the middle of the nineteenth century several forces were at play in Mount Lebanon that can – at least to a significant extent – all be interpreted as consequences of

modernity. The Ottoman empire, which ruled over Mount Lebanon, found itself in a growing internal crisis. Its power was waning, whilst empires like that of Britain and France were getting stronger and stronger. In an attempt to solve the crisis, the Ottomans embarked on a series of modernizing reforms called the Tanzimat. According to Makdisi, the Tanzimat were aimed at mitigating nationalist and separatist passions by stressing the need for civil rights and equality for

1_{Marten Boekelo (2016) Of Citizens and Ordinary Men. Enschede: Ipskamp Printing, p. 6}

2_{Ussama Makdisi (2000) The Culture of Sectarianism. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California} Press

3_{For a detailed understanding of the developments in Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century, I} recommend reading Makdisi’s book.

(30)

all under the Ottoman state. The idea was that this would create an Ottoman subjecthood and stabilize the state. 1_{However, in Mount Lebanon the elites saw such a reform as a threat to their} power. To counter this threat they sought support from Britain and France, who were more than eager to increase their influence in the region. The French allied with the Christians based on a shared Christianity. The English allied with the Druze not on a religious basis – since Druze are more closely associated with Islam than with Christianity – but simply because they wanted to establish a similar position as the French.2

These alliances along the lines of religious sects, increased sectarian awareness. This awareness was relatively new, because in the traditional Ottoman empire, social order was established through lines of notability rather than religion.3_{Due to this growing culture of sectarianism, a} simple land dispute in 1841 escalated in large scale sectarian violence between Druze and Christians. In the consequent peacetalks led by the Ottomans and Europeans, the elites of both Druze and Christians tried to legitimate their claim to power by demonizing the other sect.4_This created an image of irreconcilable conflict between the two religions, to such an extent that the Europeans proposed a plan of partition. The Ottomans opposed it because they thought that such an institutionalization of the new sectarian reality could only cause more damage. But testimony to their waning power they eventually had to give in to the plan of the Europeans.5 With this partition of the sects, sectarianism now became institutionalized.

At the same time the increasingly politicized common people, inspired by the promises of the Tanzimat and ideas of social equality and representation, started to resist what they by now had come to regard as the unjust claims to power of the elite.6_{In 1858 this led to a rebellion by} Christian commoners. The elites were stunned. It had never occurred to the local, European and Ottoman reformers that their modernizing language would provide for a subaltern understanding of the Tanzimat.7_{In the new partitioned reality, this quest for social equality was framed as a} quest for social equality for Christian commoners. Giving an explicit sectarian dimension to the

1_{Makdisi, The Culture, p. 3} 2_{ibid., p. 61} 3_{ibid., p. 42-45} 4_{ibid., p. 75-78} 5_{ibid., p. 78-80} 6_{ibid., p. 101} 7_{ibid., p. 105}

(31)

rebellion. As such also this rebellion soon escalated into even larger scale sectarian violence between Druze and Christian commoners.1

Out of fear for their position, both Druze and Christian elites came together to formulate a strategy. Whereas in traditional society such association between the elites of different sects would have been interpreted as a positive sign of brotherhood, in the new reality of partition in Mount Lebanon this was increasingly becoming synonymous with betrayal. Makdisi explains that this change in meaning mainly “illustrated a popular participation in politics that conflated the defence of reform with the salvation of ‘the’ Christian community. It shifted, in other words, the basis of loyalty away from a notable family toward an imagined political sectarian community.”2 The conflict between Druze and Christian commoners evolved into a full-scale civil war.

Meanwhile the elites of both sides tried to control the conflict. Something they only managed to do after an Ottoman decree in 1860 that ordered the elites of both sides to draw up a peace agreement. The decree was predicated on a discourse which claimed that the sectarian, primordial savagery of the commoners could only be contained by the rationality and civility associated with the elites. In other words, the Ottomans expressed their faith in the elites of Mount Lebanon as the only ones rational, civil or modern enough to contain the savage rebellion of the

commoners.3_{In 1860 the elites came to a peace-agreement based on the principle of letting} bygones be bygones. Framing the revolt as a surge of primordial passions, the elites reclaimed their position in society portraying this move as one back to normality. Makdisi claims that by doing so “the elites of Mount Lebanon conspired to write the ahali [commoners] out of history,” because they didn’t recognize the legitimate, modern claims to social equality that these

commoners had also made.4_{Through harsh policies by the Ottomans this new peace agreement} was enforced.

As such, although sectarianism had been a means for the elites of Mount Lebanon to enter modernity, this same elite constructed a discourse of primordialism, savagery and violence around sectarianism that justified their role as protectors of their community. On the one hand they produced and reproduced sectarian divides through their ardent defence of being the leaders

1_{ibid., pp. 108-114} 2_{ibid., p. 115} 3_{ibid., pp. 140-145} 4_{ibid., p. 144}

(32)

of their sect. But on the other hand, they legitimated this leadership on the basis of a strong condemnation of what these sectarian divides could lead to. They created a sense that the elite was needed in order to safeguard their sects from the evils of sectarian violence. Therefore, the culture of sectarianism that they themselves had created around 1840, gave them the right to power because by 1860 they were seen as the only ones able to defend Mount Lebanon from the violent passions that came to be associated with sectarianism.

4.2 Sectarianism in the 20th century

Consequently, in a different article, Makdisi shows that ever since, this culture of sectarianism has been maintained.1_{When Mount Lebanon became part of the French Mandate in 1920 that} initially comprised Lebanon and Syria, but shortly thereafter only Lebanon, the issue became how to forge a Lebanese nation-state. Whereas a nationalism should be based on a certain notion of the people, in the artificial state-to-be of Lebanon the social order was still defined by elite politics and rivalries. As a result, this need for a Lebanese nationalism eventually resulted in the 1943 National Pact which was essentially another elite power-sharing agreement. This pact, according to Makdisi, was “a result of elite compromises, [and] essentially legitimated a system of patronage and a division of spoils among the elites of the new nation-state, thus betraying the inability to locate a genuinely national base.”2_{The discourse that the elites used to legitimize this} pact was that a certain sectarian balance was to be upheld.3_{Again, sectarianism served to keep the} power of elites intact.

Since the new Lebanese state and National Pact did nothing in improving the political position of the commoners, Makdisi continues, the civil war that broke out in 1975 can for a significant part be interpreted as a repudiation of the social hierarchy by the commoners. Makdisi conceptualizes sectarianism during the civil war as popular and sect-transcending and claims that militia politics were, in part, popular gratification at the expense of national elitism. However, it were the elites again who got together to end the civil war by signing the Taif agreement in 1989. Since then, post-war politics has again created an image of the Lebanese elite-led state as inclusive, stable and

1_{Ussama Makdisi (1996) “Reconstructing the Nation-State: The Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon.”} In: Middle East Report, no. 200, pp. 23-26+30

2_{Makdisi, Reconstructing, p. 25} 3_{ibid., pp. 25-26}

(33)

democratic, as opposed to the ‘premodern’ loyalties of religion that are seen as exclusionary, undemocratic and disordered and supposedly led to the atrocities of the civil war.1

To summarize Makdisi’s argument: sectarianism has served as a legitimation of elite leadership in two ways. On the one hand it has produced and maintained a division in the country that enables the elites of each community to take on a leadership role within their sect. On the other hand, the discourse around that same sectarianism has justified those same elites as leaders since they are the supposed protection between the Lebanese people and their violent, sectarian passions. Moreover, what he also shows is that the possibilities for common people to uphold their freedom and rights of human justice and self-development have been minimal in this sectarian system.

However, Makdisi’s work seems to stop with the civil war. By looking at both a politico-juridical and a cultural aspect of current Lebanese society, we will see that sectarianism remains to serve a similar function nowadays.

4.3 Sectarianism today

The first section will show that Lebanese political institutions ensure privileges and property for the elites, whilst they are at the same time being governed by sectarian logic. In other words, sectarianism justifies an institutional framework that is highly supportive of powerful elites. The second section will show how the constant danger of political violence permeates the everyday life of Lebanese people. This creates a lived reality in which many Lebanese perceive of themselves as constant victims of sectarian violence. However, because of a mix of state-led amnesia and popular remembrance of past political violence, this feeling of victimization entrenches people in their sectarian identity. As such the current political culture in Lebanon supports the elite discourse around sectarianism. All in all this chapter will conclude that the culture of sectarianism as defined by Makdisi, is still very much alive in the 21st_century.

1_{ibid., p. 26}