Freud, Arendt and the neoliberal subject: the problem of contingency.

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FREUD, ARENDT AND THE NEOLIBERAL SUBJECT: THE

PROBLEM OF CONTINGENCY

Thesis Master’s in Philosophy

University of Amsterdam

Gonzalo Pérez Santonja; 12348767

Thesis Supervisor: Liesbeth Schoonheim

Second Reader: Karen Vintges

Date of Submission: 25-06-2019

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Introduction

There is hardly any doubt that neoliberalism is the dominant system of our times. Over the last decades, we have witnessed not only its spread across the self-called western countries but also its expansion around the rest of the globe. The more immediate, tangible characteristics of this system include the privatization of the public sector and the consequent reduction of the state, free flow of capital and labor, and the internationalization of finance capitalism. However, neoliberalism is a complex phenomenon with deeper implications. As thinkers like Foucault have argued, it is not only defined as a set of economic policies but implies a specific type of rationality that understands all aspects of life in economic terms. This rationality aims at taking over every sphere of life, at becoming the only law that governs all spaces of individual and public life. The inevitable danger of this spread is the possible disappearance or transformation of other, necessary fields of human life like the political or the public sphere.

In this thesis, I will attempt to show how the type of subject that this rationality creates is strongly associated with narratives such as those of complete independence, omnipotence, the praise of the family over the political and a linear conception of history. In sum, I attempt to show how neoliberalism neglects contingency and uncertainty. In order to elaborate a critique of these tendencies, I will draw on the thought of two authors: Hannah Arendt and Sigmund Freud.

But, why compare these two authors for this specific purpose, besides my personal interest in them? This thesis was conceived under the intuition that both authors, despite their differences, had similar projects: to recuperate the notion of contingency and ‘diagnose' certain tendencies in human beings that strive towards its negation in favor of the notion of a completely independent, self-sufficient, omnipotent subject. This is precisely the kind of subject that neoliberalism praises. Ultimately, the aim of this thesis is, therefore, to critique the neoliberal subject and show different alternatives that Arendt and Freud offer for accepting contingency, that revolve around the notion of storytelling.

Additionally, contemporary philosophical debates have recently stressed the necessity of finding practices and theoretical alternatives to the spread of the neoliberal mentality. Recent examples of this trend include Wendy Brown’s Undoing the Demos (2015) and Chandler’s and Reed’s The Neoliberal Subject: Resilience, Adaptation and Vulnerability (2016). I believe rescuing the thought of Freud and Arendt for this purpose can offer a new, useful perspective to this problem.

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4 The main question we are trying to answer in this thesis is how we can offer an alternative to neoliberal practices and rationalities that recuperates the political space and acknowledges contingency through the works of Hannah Arendt and Sigmund Freud. Other sub-questions that arise from this initial inquiry are: What kind of subject is derived from the neoliberal rationality? How can this subject be understood compared to historical or general human tendencies described by Arendt and Freud, that is, how new it really is? How do storytelling practices help form bonds between human beings, and how does this counteract the advancement of neoliberalism?

Sigmund Freud challenges the notion of a self-controlled, "narcissistic" subject, using his concepts of the unconscious and the fundamental impotency against nature. He proposes practices of storytelling, both inside and outside the clinic, to form bonds that move beyond the family and are based on trust. He is the subject of the first chapter of my thesis. On the other hand, Hannah Arendt, with her conceptions of action and who-ness, reflects the uncertainty of human affairs and our dependency on others. She describes mechanisms to avoid this contingency that include the replacement of action, historical fallacies and the elimination of plurality through the government of one man. As a solution for accepting this contingency, she proposes storytelling and an impartial account of history. Her ideas will be explained in the second chapter.

In my view, Arendt and Freud proceed similarly: they first challenge the notion of an independent autonomous subject, then they elaborate on the mechanisms that are commonly used to avoid contingency and uncertainty, and finally, they offer practices of storytelling as a solution to our lack of control. I will then apply their critiques to the neoliberal subject, described by Foucault and others as an individual in full rational control of his life, understood always in economic terms. Using Arendt and Freud I will argue that some of the characteristics of the neoliberal subject are not as new and belong to a wider trend that can be traced back to Antiquity, that storytelling can serve as an adequate solution to counteract neoliberal practices, and that it is necessary to contemplate spaces like the unconscious of action as spaces of resistance. These arguments will be developed in the third and final chapter.

The methodology used in this thesis, as will be observed, consists of the study and theoretical review of fundamental texts by Arendt and Freud, aided by the study of secondary literature and additional contributions by other authors.

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5 Pronouns used and clarifications

With regard to the use of pronouns, I have decided to alter between feminine and masculine, hoping that there is a fairly equal distribution.

On the other hand, I believe it is important to give a definition of contingency, for the word will be used a lot along this project. We will use the term contingency to express two different but related notions. The first one, perhaps the most traditional, states that something is contingent when it is subject to change and variation, when there is no necessary reason why it is that way. Contingency in this sense is opposed to necessity or the idea that something must be the way it is and cannot be any other way. It implies that the qualities of something are not fixed and could very well be different from what they are. In a second interpretation of the term, which can be understood as a consequence of the first one applied to the political realm, contingency implies a lack of control over something that affects us. When we say that the existence of the unconscious is a factor of contingency, this is precisely what we mean.

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CHAPTER 1: Sigmund Freud: the unconscious and the challenge to

sovereignty.

My intention in this chapter to offer a political and philosophical reading of Freud based on what he terms “blows to human narcissism”1_{, moments in which scientific discoveries shatter} the aspirations of humankind. In order to do this, I first will explain some key Freudian concepts from a political perspective, analyzing how the platonic theory of the soul can be applied to understand Freud's thinking. After that, I will highlight two of these "blows", understood as political phenomena: 1) the loss of self-sovereignty implied by the discovery of the unconscious and 2) the irremediable impotency over natural forces and death. The individual tries to jump over these two difficulties: the first one, by psychological means of evasion and resistances; the second one by the omnipotence of thought and religion. This chapter will conclude with the solutions that Freud offers to incorporate contingency to life, based on scientific resignation, Judaism, a non-linear conception of history, storytelling and bonds based on aim-inhibited instincts.

1.1: The first blow to narcissism. Dealing with contingency in the self.

In his text titled “A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis” (1917), Freud explains that there have been three major scientific events that have culminated in “blows to the narcissism of humanity” 2_{. Firstly, the Copernican turn, that displaces human being as the center of the universe;} secondly, Darwin’s theory of evolution, that eliminates the distance between human rationality and animal irrationality. Thirdly, we find Freud’s discovery of the unconscious. When in the individual there is a part that is abstracted to consciousness, the I “has power limitations in his own house” 3_{, she is not in full possession of her own self. Before developing the implications of this} idea and the ways human beings try to evade this reality, it is important to frame Freud as a political thinker.

1_{Freud, “ A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis” in Complete Works, p. 3611.} 2_Ibid.

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7 Freud as a political thinker

In this section, I will argue that the political tradition in which Freud can be framed is one of the convergences between the government of the self and the government of the city. As it is known, this conception appeared for the first time in the works of Plato, who established a correspondence between the parts of the soul and the kinds of citizens4_{. According to him, three} different types of citizens (governors, warriors and artisans) correspond to three types of soul (rational, irascible and concupiscible). The types of soul, and thus the kinds of citizens, are interdependent: there cannot be true harmony if one of them is missing. In his Republic,justice occurs when each part of the soul correctly sticks to its role, in the individual and in the polis, and does not exceed or extrapolates its function. For example, the individual must master the appetitive side of his soul through reasoning and ardor, to keep the appetitive part from undertaking “to slave and rule over the classes which is not fitting that it should, and not overturn, the entire life of all”.5 Good government is based on a principle of harmony according to which each part of the self acts accordingly with its function and does not try to silence or overrule any of the others.

In order to analyze how Freud’s ideas can be understood using this conception of government, it is convenient to start detailing his first approach to the psyche in his famous

Interpretation of dreams (1900). Freud intends here to investigate the psychic apparatus by

studying its different parts. He observes that most of our memories, that have an important weight in the formation of our identity, are fundamentally unconscious6. During dreams, we can observe elements from our memory arise which we would normally not be aware of. Through the study of dream formation, Freud concludes that there are at least two psychic instances: one named

unconscious, from which the desires that produce dreams arise, that always remains out of the

reach of consciousness; and a second critic one, called preconscious, that evaluates what comes to the fore of our consciousness.

The critical instance “directs our waking life and determines our voluntary, conscious actions”7_{. It is, therefore, a sort of executive power of the self}8_{. It is called preconscious, since} what is in it can easily become conscious. It is important to note that Freud conceives

4

Plato, The Republic: 441c. 5_{Ibid, 442b.}

6_{Sigmund Freud, “Interpretation of Dreams”, in Complete Works, p. 972} 7

Ibid., p. 973 8

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8 consciousness not as an instance: instead, it is like an organ with the ability to perceive things that arise from the unconscious and the preconscious systems. Whatever is in the preconscious system has the quality of being able to become conscious, it is virtually perceived by consciousness . One easy example would be the multiplication table: even though we are not conscious of it constantly, we can easily access it. The second instance, the unconscious, over which censorship is exercised, is out of reach for consciousness, we can only hint at its presence by dreams and other similar manifestations.

Freud will add new instances later in his thought to explain phenomena like guilt or aggressiveness. In a chronological way, from birth to adulthood, Freud explains that in the first period of life, the individual is all unconscious. Freud renames this instance as the id, and he holds that it is where our most basic instincts can be found: the life instinct, that produces libido, and the death drive, that produces aggressive behavior. These instincts constantly seek immediate satisfaction in the id, where there is no space and time. Freud concludes that common logic rules do not apply to the unconscious, which can be justly called the “Realm of the Illogical”9.

After prolonged exposure to the outside world, it becomes necessary that a portion of the

id transforms itself to be protected from the dangers of reality. The pleasure principle of the

instincts must adapt to external circumstances: there are instinctive desires which, if satisfied, could potentially be very dangerous for the survival of the individual. One example of this would be the hungry child that brings every object to his mouth regardless of the consequences. With the forced inhibition of the instincts, a new instance appears, with the name of ego or self, whose task is to mediate between the id and reality. As opposed to the id, the ego is conscious of space and time. Its primary function is to exercise the reality principle. It also handles the motor impulses of the human body, which is why it is commonly associated with the will. Heir of the preconscious, it is the active principle that directs our lives, the executive power of the self.

The ego censors the desires of the id, postponing them or turning them into non-dangerous and society friendly forms. It is thanks to this inhibition that human beings are capable of reorganizing instinctual energy into what Freud terms "aim-inhibited instincts" 10_{, in a process} called sublimation. Non-erotic love, responsible for friendship and lasting relationships between human beings, is a product of sublimation. Therefore, the existence of the ego marks an

9_{Sigmund Freud, An outline of Psycho-analysis. The standard edition, p. 4h3} 10

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9 evolutionary step, that permits us to engage in higher endeavors, and not just in the mere gratification of the instincts.

Later on, and due to the paternal influence in childhood, a new instance is formed through the interiorization of authority: the superego. This part is associated with what we commonly call “conscience”, and is primarily responsible for the feeling of guilt. It also has the purpose of maintaining physical and mental integrity, since it works as an enemy to the instincts and has interiorized the notion that following a series of rules grants rewards, and not following them, punishments.

In his theory of different psychic instances of the individual, Freud refers to them as “provinces” and “ regions”11_{. Inside the psychic systems, certain laws apply. Provinces might enter} in conflict with one another; a region of the mind can try to conquer another one and impose its law, as if a nation would try to conquer another one and impose its new rule over the conquered territory12. In between the regions of the psychic apparatus, there are frontiers and guardians, and Freud refers to the preconscious as the "guardian of our mental health" 13. Neurosis appears when two regions are confronted with each other, when there is a sort of inner civil war14. The psychoanalytic task seeks to reinforce the ego to lessen the suffering that comes from the two other instances of the patients, and when this is attempted, one finds "resistances". We can appreciate here echoes of the platonic theory on the different kinds of souls, since the conflict is produced when one instance exceeds its functions and tries to rule over another one. The proliferation of political language and metaphors in the works of Freud strongly suggests a political interpretation of his thought.

In this context, the incorporation of the unconscious goes beyond platonic theory. As political theorist Javier Roiz highlights, the introduction of the unconscious represents the acknowledgment of a section of ourselves that we cannot control and that forms an essential part of us. The interventions of the psychoanalyst can be understood as external interventions to governments, something similar to when a country intervenes another one using the promotion of democracy as justification15_{. Definitely, as Freud claims, the discovery of the unconscious breaks}

11

Sigmund Freud, “Moses and monotheism”, in Complete Works p. 4919 12_{Sigmund Freud, An outline of Psycho-analysis. The standard edition, p. 50} 13_{Sigmund Freud, “Interpretation of Dreams”, in Complete Works, p.573} 14

Sigmund Freud, An outline of Psycho-analysis. The standard edition, p. 5 15

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10 the traditional equivalence between what is conscious and what is psychic, departing from all previous disciplines, including philosophy16.

Mechanisms against the contingency of the self

This lack of control over the self caused by the unconscious represents a frustration for the individual, that will try to remedy her impotency through different mechanisms and fantasies. It is important to clarify that these defenses or resistances are not formed voluntarily in the majority of occasions and that the psychoanalytic method’s primary objective is to reveal them and make them conscious. The question that we are trying to answer, then, is as follows: how does the conscious self , that constantly seeks adaptation to the world through the reality principle and control over the psychic states, deals with such an uncontrollable and unstable founding as the unconscious?

It is important to highlight that we are referring to the primary source of anguish in the human condition. The ego fights against the loss of power caused by both the superego and the id, but the struggle against the latter is what causes the formation of the ego and it happens much before since it represents a fight against genetically inherited impulses confronted with reality. While the objective of psychoanalysis is to subjugate the unconscious to the conscious, to help the

ego in its fight against the id17, this duty is only aimed at curing neurosis and it can never be fully carried out: the control can never be complete, since unconscious life, including sleep, is necessary and inevitable.

The self establishes several mechanisms to deal with the unconscious and the potential dangers that arise from it. Freud enumerates on one occasion three of them: consciousness censorship, the reality test and moral conscience 18. The third one is more associated with the

superego, but has the same purpose as the other two: to stop the drives of the unconscious. Both

censorship and the reality test serve us to guide us correctly in the world and to forget unconscious processes that stay alive in very demanding ways. One of the biggest sources of suffering is desire, that the self has to administrate and deviate in order to keep its physical integrity and the connection with reality.

16_{Sigmund Freud. “The resistances of psychoanalysis” in Complete Works, p. 4125} 17_{Sigmund Freud.. “The unconscious” in Complete Works, p. 2991}

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11 At the same time, the self can also repress parts of the unconscious through censorship, which later, in particularly moving periods, like adolescence, can arise in the form of neurotic symptoms19. Freud understands that instincts must be satisfied periodically in an orderly and appropriate way, even though he advises against the complete release of all instincts as a norm. In addition, for the therapy process, the patient must adopt a relaxed posture, close his eyes and renounce the censorship that his critical instance exercises to communicate to the analyst all thoughts. The action of letting representations and ideas appear without a conscious filter is an attempt to open the gates to a psychic instance that might have the answer to the question of why certain obsessive or neurotic states appear. Freud already intuits that this liberation is given in dormant and artistic states20_.

Even though the unconscious has a childish and regressive connotation, Freud is far from considering this inner province to be completely negative. In a sense, he agrees with the platonic concept of justice: there must be interdependence, even though one part of us is simply ungovernable, we still need it and cannot do away with it. On several occasions, he warns us of the danger that the other great instance that pressures the ego, the superego, is too harsh on the unconscious. The superego falls under the temptation of ignoring the desires of the id, and acquires an illusion of omnipotence over the ego21.

Eli Zaretsky argues in fact that Freud viewed the discovery of the unconscious as something eminently positive, a “conceptual breakthrough”, the discovery of a faculty that lies outside of the perception of the senses22. In this sense, Freud saw it as an improvement on

Geistigkeit (a German word that combines spirituality with intellectuality)23, similar to the Kantian transcendental subject. The analogy between the unconscious and Kant’s idea was exemplified many times in the work of Freud, when he claims that the knowledge we can get about the unconscious from the images of dreams is as incomplete as the knowledge we can obtain about the real world from the senses24_.

19_{Sigmund Freud. An outline of Psycho-analysis. The standard edition, p. 36} 20_{Sigmund Freud, “Interpretation of dreams” in Complete Works, p. 605}

21_{Sigmund Freud, “Civilization and its discontents”, in Complete Works, p. 4530} 22

Zaretsky, Eli. Political Freud. A History., p. 86. 23

Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Freud’s Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable, p.112 24_{Sigmund Freud, “Interpretation of Dreams”, in Complete Works, p. 1038}

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12 Conclusion

Therefore, we find a certain ambivalence in Freud’s position with respect to the unconscious. On the one hand, it is a source of desires capable of causing suffering and anxiety. If it completely takes over our lives, we would find ourselves in a childish state, where we would not tolerate any postponement of our desires. We would harbor a feeling of omnipotence, lacking the Kantian principle of reality, that frames experience into space and time. That would leave us at mercy of potentially annihilating desires. On the other hand, the unconscious is responsible for our correct psychical functioning, it is relevant to artistic states and is a valuable part of our lives that we will never fully comprehend . Its discovery represented a shift from sensory experience to abstract thought, progress in the spirituality of humanity. By taking it into consideration, we are able to understand what happens to us as species, if we ignore its presence, there are more chances of suffering and making others suffer.

A great part of Freud’s work aims at describing the different expressions of discomfort caused by this “blow to narcissism”, which in political terms can be understood as a renunciation of the sovereignty of the self. One of the essences of neurosis is precisely the inability to accept the presence of an uncontrollable part of us, that has so much importance for aspects like sexuality or sleep. Different mechanisms try to ignore, dominate or eliminate this instability. In the fight between the id and the self we find the base for primordial anxiety we feel the moment we are bon, and need to survive despite our most primitive desires and our inabilities to understand and deal with reality. The answer to how human beings can console themselves from this primitive anxiety, that will involve storytelling and aim-inhibited instincts, will be detailed in the last section of this chapter.

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1.2 The second blow to narcissism. Against omnipotence of thought in

the face of the inevitable.

If the first blow to narcissism (or sovereignty) was related to the government of the individual, the second blow is related to big scale politics and the essence of life in common. In

Civilization and its discontents (1930) , Freud identifies three sources of human suffering: body

decay, omnipotent forces of the external world and our relations with other human beings25. We can note that both body decay and pain caused by external forces ultimately have the same source, nature. The last of the sources is mostly a result of the incapacity to handle correctly our instinctual energy, which can result in narcissism (libido turned into the individual) or aggressiveness towards others.

What Freud calls culture or civilization has the twofold purpose of mitigating the sources of suffering that come from nature and from others. To limit the pain human beings cause each other it establishes an obliged renunciation to the instincts, that commonly takes the shape of ethical norms and regulations. For protection against nature, it creates infrastructures and researches the cure for diseases. However, both of these evils are not effectively eradicated. Excessive renunciation of instincts creates new sufferings. The id, home of the instincts, struggles when encountering social norms and morality. On the other hand, despite our efforts, death and a good part of physical suffering have prevailed in time. Freud seems fairly optimistic with regard to improving society so that instincts are managed in a more satisfactory way, and believes that human-caused suffering can be eradicated someday. However, with regard to evils that come from the forces of nature, he claims that they are inevitable, since "our organism, that is a part of it (nature) will always be perishable and limited in its capacity for adaptation and performance" 26.

The reason for this difference is that, even if we manage to eliminate sufferings that affect human beings because of their life in society, the limitations of nature would keep hindering them27. In a very Hobbesian note, Freud believes that in this “state of nature” a tyrant will necessarily appear, but life in isolation would be ultimately impossible due to the necessity for

25_{Freud, “Civilization and its discontents” in Complete Works, p. 4475} 26

Ibid., p. 4484

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14 protection. Therefore, the essential reason why human beings are political in the first place is their condition of impotence against the physical world which forces them to unite and work together.

With regard to the limitations of nature, one of Freud’s central thesis is that human beings tend to reject their condition of fundamental impotency against natural forces and create alternative realities based on fictional causality. In The Future of an Illusion (1927), the author analyzes religion as an intricate fantastic response to impotency. In the first stages of humanity, cultures tend to humanize natural forces, so they can exercise control over them: “if death itself is no longer something spontaneous, but the crime of an evil will, if nature is populated by beings similar to us, we will feel more tranquil in the midst of the uncanny” 28_{. Soon after, they deify natural forces,} in order to influence nature for their own good and reconcile human beings with death and suffering. As part of this deification, predestination or providence appear as a way to give meaning to life in the presence of death. Accordingly, religion enunciates that "everything that happens (…) is the fulfillment of the purposes of superior intelligence (…) which conducts everything towards the good" 29.

Through the deification of natural forces, human beings satisfy themselves thinking that fatalities are the product of superior intelligence, and that death is just a gateway to infinite painless existence. Accordingly, a certain conception of the world and of history based on necessity appears, taking often the shape of providence, and relieving human beings from the uncertainty of their affairs. According to Freud, this attitude is both reminiscent of childhood and characteristic of primitive societies. When, in the first months of life, a baby is hungry because she lacks her mom, she tends to create a fantastic reality that alleviates her temporary state of suffering, hallucinating a breast30 . This substitution is part of what Freud calls “omnipotence of thought”, by which mental relations are mistaken for real ones due to a desire for a different reality.

The deification of natural forces also responds to an ancient human tendency of looking for a protective father to explain the mysteries and fatalities of existence. In Totem and Taboo (1913), Freud elaborates a theory about primitive human beings that would explain this tendency towards religious justification of suffering, that has prevailed to present day. According to Freud, in some moment of prehistory, human beings were organized into hordes, dominated by a man

28_{Ibid., p.2974 (Complete Works, p.4428)} 29_{Ibid., p.2976. (Complete Works, p.4431)}

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15 with all the power; but at some point, his sons conspired against him and killed him. Following that death came an egalitarian society that distributed power, the creation of morality by giving up the satisfaction of destructive and sexual instincts, and two impulses that were recorded in the human psyche: killing the father and feeling the need for his protection and dominance. Since, according to Freud’s theory of the collective unconscious, human beings inherit traumas genetically and collectively, every human being has inherited these traits, and they can be restarted at any time, reenacted when circumstances are prone to it. In conclusion, religion is a creation of culture that aims at mitigating suffering through fantastic and omnipotent solutions to a condition of fundamental impotency against natural forces with the figure of a protective father; it establishes a certain narrative about the affairs of the world and the individual that is based on predestination and necessity.

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1.3 Solutions: accepting contingency.

In this last section, we will treat the different solutions that Freud offers to accept life's contingency both on a macro level of society and on the level of the individual psyche. We will start by analyzing Freud's answer to the dangers of the forces of nature and the mystery of death. Freud criticized religion and advocated for scientific resignation, with special consideration for Judaism. Through his last book, Moses and Monotheism (1939), he conceived a notion of history focused on trauma that departs from necessity and linear models, taking contingency into account. Then we will deal with the emphasis that Freud gives to narration and story-telling, essential to the psychoanalytic task. We will see how Freud creates a new kind of science based on the ear, progress in spirituality, and the construction of a common narrative through words. We will explore the role of the concept of love and friendship as a possibility for dealing with the contingency of human affairs and securing lasting institutions and bonds.

Science, Judaism and a non-linear conception of history

In contrast to childish attitudes such as religion or omnipotence of thought, Freud praises the acceptance of reality in favor of “renouncing unachievable desires” 31_{. In his scientific vision} of the world, psychoanalysis is one more impartial science, like physics or calculus. This

aversion to the omnipotence of thought is not strange given that science replaces imaginary causal connections with demonstrable ones based on experience. Freud holds that infantilism must be overcome through science, which empowers us and shows us reality as it is: "as for the great necessities of Fate, against which there is no help, they will learn to endure them with resignation"32.

However, Freud seems to be particularly interested in the response that one religion gives to the problem of our physical contingency and the mystery of death. In his last work, Moses and

Monotheism (1939), Freud explores the origin of Judaism and its singularities. Freud concludes

that primitive Judaism is marked by a rejection of omnipotence of thought: magic, life after death, and the representation of images are strictly forbidden, and there is a strict separation between

31

Sigmund Freud, “The future of an illusion” Complete Works, p. 4448 32

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17 human and divine realms. Most importantly, this book is the clearest approach by Freud with respect to history.

Zaretsky’s interpretation of it dwells precisely on the idea that Freud was wondering how to keep certain improvements of the Geistigkeit, like the Hebrew overcoming of the senses or psychoanalysis33_{. Indeed, Zaretsky holds that Freud was looking into the history of Judaism to} comprehend the history of psychoanalysis. He identified with Moses as they were running a similar project: not only trying to give an answer to the human condition of impotency that did not rely on the omnipotence of thought, but also to go beyond sensory knowledge towards abstract thought. The way that both attempted this was through the substitution of images by words: "Moses emancipated the Jews from the graven images of Egypt; Freud may have seen himself as emancipating humanity from dream images"34_.

For Freud, Christianism implied a regression in spirituality and a return to the omnipotence of thought. Notions of a god-human, the afterlife or image representations were part of a return to the senses and to an inability to accept physical contingency. Similarly, he was concerned about the future of the discoveries of psychoanalysis, seeing that due to the rise of Nazism its practice was being destroyed where it originated. Worried about the idea that improvements of humanity were forgotten and replaced, Freud draws a conception of history that departed from predestination and the ideal of the constant progress of humanity to incorporate the idea of regression. This conception of history emphasized the importance of hidden traumas in the collective unconscious that could provoke regression into previous stages of humanity.

Even though we have mentioned certain characteristics of Freud’s thought that resonate well with the Enlightenment tradition, like the creation of abstract entities that form the subject, here Freud departs from the hegemonic notion of history. Freud exposes the history of the Jews in five stages that Zaretsky sums up :

In the first the Jews are presented with the monotheistic idea of God, which affords freedom from subordination to the senses and in that way deepens the inner world of the Hebrews; in the second they experience a sense of chosenness, of possessing a special treasure that raises them above those who are still immured in sensory and empirical knowledge; in the third they struggle with guilt at not being able to live up

33_{Zaretsky, Political Freud, p. 82} 34_{Ibid., p. 87}

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18 to the new ethical ideals associated with having a conscience and being a chosen people; in the fourth they are tempted to abandon their difficult standards and revert to the sensuous polytheism of the Egyptians as well as to the mother gods of the ancient Near East (and according to Freud, they kill Moses) ; and in the fifth they rediscover the original monotheistic message.35_s

This progression enhances the power of traumas to shape collective life, as Felman observes: “Freud thus shows how historical traumatic energy can be the motive-force of society, of culture, of tradition, and of history itself.”36_{Human beings have latent states that can be restarted, woken} up, when evoked by outside circumstances or reenactments of a trauma. The trauma that always gets repeated, in the story of the Jews, as well in the story of humanity, is originated in the event of the murder of the primal father, where moral duties were imposed for the first time and a feeling of both nostalgy and guilt took over the masses.

The installment of ethics was a renounce of the instincts in favor of abstract thought, it was based on the developing of language and the overcoming of the senses and the instincts. The collectiveness of this trauma precisely implies that “history, like trauma, is never simply one's own, that history is precisely the way we are implicated in each other's traumas”37_{. Freud’s concern} was that the advancements made over our sensorial nature were lost and never “rediscovered”, his preoccupation arose out of the fragile situation of psychoanalysis in Europe. He believed that history is not based on predictable human beings, it is rather subject to collective (individual, group, or of a determined culture) states of mind and lingers on the way human beings deal collectively with their traumas. The way Derrida expresses this conception of history is by using the metaphors of an archive and phantoms to refer to the collective unconscious and to the recurring nature of traumas.

This last book can be thus understood as having two objectives: 1) define Judaism as a response to physical contingency that enhances abstract concepts over the senses and does not fall into omnipotence of thought and 2) to draw a non-linear conception of history in accordance with human traumas and latent states, where improvements in Geistigkeit can be lost. Freud criticizes human being for thinking she has control over natural forces and believing in a substitute reality,

35_{Zaretsky, Political Freud, p.84} 36

Felman, The juridical unconscious: trials and traumas in the twentieth century. p. 174. 37

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19 and yet theorizes about a collective intangible unconscious where traumas dwell and strata of the human mind lie ready to be awoken again, a contradiction Derrida observes38. Nevertheless, he praises the improvement in Geistigkeit and the rejection of the supernatural that both Judaism and the science of psychoanalysis have in common. His solution to impotency relies then on abstract entities formed according to "real" experiences, and not fantastic substitution aimed at overcoming our physical limitations in a narcissistic way. Accordingly, he sketches a notion of history that is not of linear progress, but rather of latent states that can be waken up, and traumas which shape the ways we relate to each other.

Storytelling: a solution for the contingency of the self

Now we will turn to describe the solution that Freud offers to the problem of lack of sovereignty in the government of the self. In this final part I will argue that through storytelling and aim-inhibited instincts, Freud believed that we can establish lasting relationships and bonds with others that help bear with the instability at the core of ourselves.

The importance of narration is key from the beginning of Freud’s work. As Reeder points out , “everything in psychoanalytical work takes place within the framework of a narrating activity” 39_{. Already in Interpretation of Dreams, we can appreciate that therapeutic action starts} with the psychoanalyst listening closely to the way the patient narrates his problems. This narration must be as loyal and uninhibited as possible: the patient must adopt a comfortable position and let thoughts flow avoiding as much as possible the action of the censor instance40. The first phase of therapy, which will serve as the basis for the treatment, is the mere narration of a story. The duty of the psychoanalyst is to give coherence to this story, in order to reinforce the ego and its reality principle against the incursions of the unconscious.

For that purpose, the psychoanalyst must not settle with listening to the story that the patient consciously narrates; she must be aware of unconscious manifestations and of the censorship that the patient might impose on herself, consciously or unconsciously. For that reason, the analyst must have adequate knowledge of how the unconscious works, knowing the

38_{Derrida, Archive fever. A Freudian impression, p. 94: Freud rejected believing “in the virtual existence of the}

spectral space he nevertheless takes into account”. This contradiction between being a scientist and believing in instances of the mind that are not perceivable lies at the core of Freud’s work.

39_{J. Reeder, "Freud's narrative. from case history to life story." In International Forum of Psychoanalysis, vol. 1, no.}

1, p. 51

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20 significance of certain symbols. In addition, she must pay attention to resistances that the patient might develop during the treatment which can include adverse feelings against the analyst or voluntary amnesia41. The analyst must know how to translate physical symptoms into words, and that the success of the treatment depends largely on his narrative abilities: “the psychoanalytic treatment appears as an interchange of words between patient and analyst” 42_{. We could say then} with Elizabeth Wright, that psychoanalysis ultimately tries to find a narrative that looks “for the workings of a rhetoric seen as analogous to the mechanisms of the psyche” 43_.

In order to further explore the importance of narrativity, we must also recall Freud’s conception of aim-inhibited instincts and trust as the cement of social relations. We mentioned before that Freud believed that the first impulse towards life in common was the protection against natural forces. However, Freud claimed that “necessity alone, the advantages of work in common, will not hold (human beings) together”44_{. Human beings are able to sublimate their instincts, and} in fact, the greatest products of culture, as well as the most lasting bonds between human beings, exist due to the "aim-inhibited" erotic drive, commonly known as non-erotic love, that is directed away from the members of the family.

Regarding this topic, Alphandary highlights one important consequence of sublimation. Aim-inhibited instinct products like love and friendship ultimately push human beings to engage in strictly public behavior, to “extend outside the family and create new bonds with people who before were strangers”45_{. The nature of these new bonds, unlike those of erotic love, is} non-exclusive and , most importantly, lasting. Freud’s conception of trust lies at the core of this aim-inhibited instinctual drive. A pact between human beings always implies the belief in a world constructed in common against potentially destructive personal instincts. But the belief in the power of words to accomplish this agreement is fundamentally a leap of faith, as Freud knows well, and is often defeated by the forces that arise out of a traumatized archive.

The importance of trust is key for bond-making and storytelling, and can be exemplified in the therapeutical experience. Freud believed that the teachings of psychoanalysis must be believed under a precondition of trust in the other person; one can always be skeptical, to accept it means

41_{Sigmund Freud. An outline of Psycho-analysis. The standard edition P. 60.}

42_{Sigmund Freud, “Introductory Lectures on psychoanalysis”, in Complete Works , p.31351} 43_{Elizabeth Wright, Psychoanalytic Criticism: Theory in Practice, p. 6}

44_{Alphandary, Love and Worldliness in Psychoanalysis in the Work of Hannah Arendt, p. 232.} 45_{Ibid., p. 229,}

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21 to enter a pact not based on visual confirmation. This pact relies on the fact "that the lecturer ha(s) no conceivable motive for assuring you of the reality of something he himself did not think real"46. Therefore, before the first renunciation of sensory perception, we find the idea on initial trust in the other. This trust is inevitably built within the realm of language and under a narrative form. Significantly, after any instinctual renunciation and/or sensory perception, there always emerges a covenant based on the word. This happens in the story of the primordial father, with the origin of morality, in the Hebraic religion, with the God-given ethical rules, and in psychoanalysis, through narration and mutual confidence in unseen entities and schemas.

But one might argue that this relation of trust, at least in the therapy session, is not marked by equality, but by a hierarchical disposition. In contrast to this idea, authors like Antonino Ferro have attempted to go beyond the hierarchical superior positioning that is commonly associated with the figure of the psychoanalyst. In his 2006 book titled Psychoanalysis as Therapy and

Storytelling , Ferro overviews the relevant literature on the subject and draws a conception of the

narrative space created between analyst and patient that presents them as co-narrators of a field, in which “neither of whom (them) is a ‘strong’ holder of any preconstituted truths”47_.

Ferro regards this space in between, which he calls the field, as the “matrix of possible stories”48_{, formed by co-narration and co-construction. Proceeding this way, the classical emphasis} on interpretation in Freudian theory is displaced towards the idea of "narrative co-transformation". Of course, the analyst must still be differentiated from the patient, (there must be a guide in the therapeutical process). But the emotional state of the analyst and his narrative settings must be taken into account, for each session is unique and depends on this world created by both of them. The result of such a conception of narration takes into account "unpredictable openings" and necessary “closing of senses” in the work of therapy. Ferro’s interpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis emphasizes the importance of the lack of a strong hierarchy between the patient and the analyst for the construction of a common narrative.

46_{Sigmund Freud, “Introductory Lectures on psychoanalysis”, in Complete Works, p.3132} 47_{Antonino Ferro, Psychoanalysis as therapy and storytelling. Routledge;, p. 1.}

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22

Conclusion

The emphasis on narration and the word expresses well the novelty of this method that Freud hoped could take human beings one step further in the trust in one another . With his concept of aim-inhibited instincts, he moves beyond the thought of society being a mere response to natural forces. The psychoanalytic relationship between the patient and the doctor illustrates well the possibilities of storytelling for adapting to the contingency of life in common. Together, patient and doctor construct, through words, a story that accounts for the contingent and unsettling fact that there is both an unconscious side of us and the need for another person. Therapy is a way to reconcile with a kind of existence that does not respond to classical principles of logic, that lies at the bottom of each one of us and that should not be ignored or misunderstood. It is also a way to construct a world in common with another person based on trust and a renounce to the instincts.

Through the word, which always implies an increase in Geistigkeit, human being manages to save her situation of impotency produced by her exposure to trauma, and to form lasting bonds with one another. In other words, they manage to appease that primordial anxiety that is a consequence of the possibility of having a world of their own formed the moment it collides with the external reality. Ultimately, that which saves human beings is language, and expression of trust between human beings. The beliefs of Sigmund Freud cannot be understood without this reverence towards words and human trust as a solution to that bit of “unconquerable nature”49_{that lurks} behind every individual: “by means of words a man can make his fellow happy or bring him to despair” 50_.

49_{Zaretsky, Political Freud, p. 187.}

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23

CHAPTER 2: Hannah Arendt and overcoming the traditional rejection of

action

In this chapter, we are not going to dwell on the considerations that Arendt might have had about the work of Sigmund Freud. We can know from her texts, for example, that she would reject his theory of instincts. Arendt not only believed that violence does not correspond to any natural foundation51_,_{but she also did not take much time to speak about the nature of love, which she} considered an eminently private matter. Moreover, it is very likely that she felt aversion towards the concept of the unconscious. The implications of the existence of an archaic inheritance that is phylogenetically transmitted in a collective way, point towards suppression of the uniqueness of each individual in favor of a series of essentialist outlines that seek to explain “human conduct” from a scientific point of view.

We will also not go into speculations over personal motives that frequently lie behind an aversion to psychoanalysis, often conceived as an intruder in a too delicate and intimate field. It is true that it is likely that Arendt, a reserved person and with notable traumas (among them the most influential of all in psychoanalytic theory, the death of the father at a very young age) would probably reject this method before even considering it as valid knowledge. In this regard, Julia Kristeva refers, using psychoanalyst terminology, to Arendt’s “defenses” 52_.

The following chapter will not try to elaborate a critique of psychoanalytic postulates based on Arendt’s comments (which were scarce) or personal life circumstances. Instead, this text attempts to portray an approach to Arendt from the perspective of philosophy and political theory that will help relate the two in the following chapter. It will show that Arendt deals with some of the topics that Freud focuses on, which gravitate around an important questioning of the notion of human sovereignty and the always recurrent fantasy of the possibility of complete, omnipotent independency.

For that purpose, I will first explain some terms that Arendt uses throughout her work, in order to provide a valid context to develop my argument. I will use secondary literature as well and her key texts to explain her conceptions of action, plurality, who-ness and freedom. Secondly, I will explain the ways in which human beings have tried through a variety of mechanisms to

51_{Arendt, On violence, p.43}

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24 surpass the inherent lack of control over who they are and the inevitable dependence on others. In the context of the two different traditions that Arendt deals with, antiquity and modernity, I will distinguish five attempts to eradicate contingency: 1) the fallacy of historical necessity and philosophies of history; 2) the substitution of action for fabrication and household logics; 3) the praise for an independent, omnipotent model of a dominator for the government of human beings; 4) the installment of labor as priority of the government and 5) the developing of economics and statistics. Finally, I will argue that the most relevant solution Arendt gives to this inherent risk of human affairs is built upon the concept of storytelling, a way to reconcile action and thought and human beings with contingency.

2.1: Action, plurality, who-ness and freedom in Arendtian context.

In this section, I will focus on how essentially contingent characteristics of action support the notion of a dependent subject that is not in control of his lie, and needs the presence of others to reveal his uniqueness and comprehend reality. For that purpose, I will give an account of Arendt's notions of action, plurality, uniqueness or who-ness and freedom. I will also argue that the core of Arendt’s conception of action should be understood as a phenomenological account of the world, formed by many individual perspectives through a plurality that is not merely given or static, but that must be actualized.

Arendt’s notion of action is perhaps the most original and relevant characteristic of her thought, since it contains her crucial understandings of plurality and freedom that base her conception of the political. Arendt famously divides vita activa into three activities: labor, work and action. Labor concerns the biological processes that maintain life, which is the basic condition for it. It entails reproductive and consumptive tasks tied to necessity. Work refers to the group of activities that create an “artificial world of things”,53_{by which human beings build and maintain a} world of things for their use and enjoyment. The human condition of work is, therefore, worldliness. Action is the activity that, although it cannot evade the physical world, does not need it, for it is given by the human condition of plurality. Through action human beings disclose who

53_{Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 7}

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25 they are, affirm the reality of the world, actualize their capacity for freedom and endow their existence with meaning54.

These three categories of vita activa should not be understood, however, as mere descriptions of concrete activities or as completely separate from each other. Instead of being rigid categorizations that account for specific actions, they should be understood as modes of being, as ways in which human beings engage with the world. Therefore, and drawing from Heidegger's ideas, these are ontological instead of ontic categories; they disclose or constitute being in different ways, and the "human condition is not the same as human nature"55_{. Labor, work and action are} also not completely independent from each other, as Arendt recalls with the example of economics, noting that the sphere of action is bound to appear where human beings engage in relations with each other56_.

According to Arendt, natality is the condition for action. As opposed to death, that is an equalizer57, natality is the “central political category”58, because it makes human beings different in the first place. Not only natality gives human beings their natural difference, but also makes them "beginners", initiators of something . Therefore, action is grounded in our birth, a beginning that "is not the same as the beginning of the world" because it implies the appearance of someone "who is a beginner himself"59.

For Arendt, plurality relies on the fact that human beings are both equal and distinct at the same time, in what she calls the paradoxical plurality of unique beings60. They are similar in the sense that they share a set of biological needs and abilities. But human beings have some differences that go beyond their similarities, for if not “signs and sounds to communicate immediate, identical needs and wants would be enough ”61. This is why, as Aristotle famously pointed out, citizens of the polis are not only concerned with living, but also with living well62. In

order to clarify exactly what Arendt means by her notions of uniqueness and plurality, I believe it

54_{D’Entrèves, The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt, pp.64-100} 55_{Arendt, The Human Condition, p.9-10}

56_{Ibid, p. 185} 57

Gottsegen, The political thought of Hannah Arendt, p. 25 58_{Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 9}

59_{Ibid., p. 177} 60 Ibid, p. 176 61 Ibid. 62_{Aristotle, Politics, 1525b8}

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26 is helpful to start with the distinction made by Loidolt between otherness, distinctness, and

uniqueness.

The fundamental difference between human beings should not be understood in terms of

otherness , the necessary distinction of something from everything else, the principle by which we

inevitably direct our understanding of the world. It should also not be understood as distinctness, which “emerges from the variations of organic life”63_{. It should be understood as uniqueness, the} capacity to “express this distinction and distinguish (one)self, to communicate (one)self and not merely something” 64_{. Plurality, therefore, is not something merely given, the physical} consequence of the fact of natality. The uniqueness that each person has and that forms plurality requires an actualization through speech in the presence of others. Therefore, the same way that action is the realization of the human condition of natality, speech is the realization of the human condition of plurality65.

This uniqueness, or who-ness, is essential to Arendtian plurality. It is opposed to the

what-ness, which comprises qualities that we can potentially share with other human beings, like talents

or biological traits . However, when we try to reveal who we are to the world consciously and hoping to control the outcome of what we express, we encounter a fundamental difficulty to do so. The problem we are faced with is related to the space where action occurs, which has been described as a "second in between"66 and is formed by the "web of human relationships". This space for action is created in speaking and acting among human beings; it constitutes a second reality that transcends the objective, tangible one, formed by different points of view of the world and diverse ways to appear in it, through speech and action, in "sheer togetherness"67. It is, therefore, an epistemological/ontological category, formed by the intersubjectivity of human beings: actors, with their points of view and actions, construct a world together.

This public space of appearance, where different points of view help form an inter-subjective world, has been described as “anarchic”68_{. That is because, in a very phenomenological} note, Arendt believes that who one is should not be considered in terms of essence, but as a

63_{Loidolt, "Hannah Arendt’s conception of actualized plurality." In Phenomenology of Sociality, p. 2} 64

Arendt, The Human Condition,p. 176 65_{Ibid, p.8}

66_{Loidolt, "Hannah Arendt’s conception of actualized plurality." In Phenomenology of Sociality, p.8} 67

Arendt, The Human Condition , p. 180 68

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27 question of appearance before others. In fact, who-ness remains hidden from the person himself, and can only be exposed in the web of human relationships. The question of how we appear to the world is, therefore, essentially beyond our control. This implies that the self does not have sovereignty over revealing who she is, she is not the writer of her own story, and needs others to find out and actualize this uniqueness . As Loidolt puts it, "instead of the rather unsupported claim that we are unique simply because we belong to the human species, uniqueness is the result of an active encounter of singular accesses in the plural, by speaking with one another and by acting together"69_{. Our who-ness is like the daimon, a god-like Greek mythical figure that accompanies} each one of us since birth and that is only revealed to others.70

What makes the web of human relations anarchic is the fact that it is filled with other human beings, capable of action and reaction. This makes it impossible to predict what the outcome of an action will be. The self is only capable of expressing the intentions behind his action: he is not the owner of it, because the moment it steps into the intersubjective public space it can generate unpredictable and probably unintended reactions. This implies that, at least partially, one is not fully responsible for the consequences of his actions.

Arendt considers this inherent contingency of the web of human relationships the risk to pay for real freedom, which is, therefore, only given in the presence of others. The Arendtian notion of freedom differs explicitly from the popular conception of it, that claims freedom is the ability to fulfill the purposes of the will without any restraint in the private sphere. As Trevor Tchir concludes: “ freedom (…) is not a question of a subjective disposition of the will, or the successful active actualization of that will, but it is rather grounded within a particular existential disposition within a shared world marked by contingency”71. In this space of appearances is also where power takes place, and, therefore, whoever lacks this presence is not only powerless, but fundamentally “out of the sight of others”72_{. Arendt, who argues against the disappearance of the} public space in the modern world, believes that the presence of others could help us actualize a part of our life in which we experience “public happiness”73_.

69_{Loidolt, "Hannah Arendt’s conception of actualized plurality." In Phenomenology of Sociality, p.4} 70_{Arendt, The Human Condition, p.179}

71_{Trevor Tchir, “Daimon appearances in Arendt’s Account of Disclosive Action” in Hannah Arendt's Theory of}

Political Action: Daimonic Disclosure of the ‘Who' p. 4

72_{Arendt, On revolution, p. 69} 73_{Ibid., p.124}

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28 In conclusion, natality and plurality ground action and speech, that only occur in a space formed by others where the self does not have control over revealing his unique who-ness. Plurality is not merely given, but must be actualized through speech, a form of action that distinguishes us from one another, and that is ultimately grounded (like all action) on the capacity human beings have of being beginners, initiators of something new, unexpected and unpredictable. The space that is formed in between us is essential to our conception of reality, for "without a space of appearance and without trusting in action and speech as a mode of being together, neither the reality of one's self, of one's own identity, nor the reality of the surrounding world can be established beyond doubt"74_.

2.2: Ways to elude action: Arendt’s diagnosis.

We have seen how Arendt believes that if human beings want to be free, they must accept certain risks or contingency inherent to human relations. It is impossible to predict what the consequences of an action will be, or their effect on other human beings: if we act, we must assume that we do not have control over the results. In addition to this, once it has happened, action is irrevocable. As opposed to the future, "the past is not open for potentiality"75, it cannot be altered. Arendt summarizes the “triple frustration of action”, as follows: 1) It cannot be predicted; 2) It is irrevocable; 3) It is not carried out by one single actor, which means that its author is ultimately anonymous76.

One of the strongest assertions in the work of Arendt is that human beings have tried through a variety of mechanisms to surpass the inherent lack of control over who they are and the inevitable dependence on others. I will distinguish five attempts to eradicate contingency and plurality: 1) the fallacy of historical necessity and philosophies of history; 2) the substitution of action for fabrication and family logics; 3) the support for an independent, omnipotent human being as a dominator ; 4) the victory of labor as priority of the government and 5) the developing of economics and statistics. The first three mechanisms can be traced at least to antiquity, although

74

Arendt, quoted in Loidolt, "Hannah Arendt’s conception of actualized plurality." In Phenomenology of Sociality, p.8

75

Arendt, “Truth and Politics”, in Between Past and Future, p.580 76

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29 they can be certainly still given in modern times, while the last two developed during the modern era.

One of the first mechanisms that human beings use to deal with the fragility of action marked by the anonymous character of history and the lack of control over revealing who they are is the creation of a superior being or logic that qualifies as the author of history. Through this fantasy, real history becomes fictional, since it has an author, and individuals become actors playing pre-established role. This ultimately makes them easy to define and predictable. In these cases, actors can believe they do not have control over their actions, but instead of realizing that their who-ness depends on other people, they assume that their life stories are subject to necessary omnipotent dynamics, and they just do not know about them.

There exists a wide range of examples that testify to this trend. In its oldest form, it is manifested as a god with a divine plan, but in its more modern versions it can also take the form of the "interest of class", the survival of the fittest or the ideal of the constant progress of humanity. Philosophies of history are among the most recent shape this remedy takes. When they subscribe a dialectics of thesis and counter thesis, or when they see in the distribution of resources the motor of history, they often "overlook the inevitability with which men disclose themselves as subjects, as distinct and unique persons"77, as well as the instability and lack of prediction of human action. Whenever individuals start believing that their actions follow a necessary historical dynamic, they gain historical conscience, and they start seeing the present and the future as just another "past" that has not been developed yet, in which their roles are already written. In religious terms, the idea of predestination is a very dominant manifestation of this trend. As shown in Origins of

Totalitarianism, the fallacy of historical necessity could lead to disastrous consequences, not only

because it redeems the responsibility of individual actions, but also because it can eventually lead to totalitarian regimes justifying atrocities appealing to necessary laws of history or of nature78_.

The second remedy concerns the substitution of the realm of action by other principles, such as fabrication or the logic of the family. Arendt dates this back to the Greek polis and the way politics were conceived by Plato. According to Arendt, philosophers have traditionally leaned towards rejecting freedom in favor of necessity. Indeed, Plato tried to solve the problem of dependency to reveal the who-ness by isolating himself from the rest of the citizens, convinced

77

Ibid. p.183 78

Freud, Arendt and the neoliberal subject: the problem of contingency.