Titel: Strategies on Westernisation in Poland and Ukraine: NATO and EU enlargement in Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism
Naam: Marten Kooistra Studentnummer: 10003063
Email: mkooistravhoesen@gmail.com Opleiding: Politicologie
Afstudeerrichting: Internationale Betrekkingen Scriptiebegeleider: dr. S.J. Simon
Second reader: dr. J.A. Jeandesboz Inleverdatum: 28 januari, 2015
Thesis: Critical Security Studies Marten Kooistra 10003063 8380 words
Strategies on Westernisation in Poland and Ukraine
NATO and EU enlargement in Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism
1: Introduction
The past 25 years have been a rollercoaster ride for power politics in Europe. The USSR, the mighty nemesis of the west, collapsed and took communism down with it. Where once the Soviet Union and its satellites were, only smaller nations remained. Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltics appeared as independent states. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary quickly became democratic and tried to Westernise. In the decade that followed, both NATO and the EU expanded eastwards, while Russia elected an unknown former KGB-operative as their president. Everything remained quiet on the Eastern front, until a Ukrainian civil uprising ousted their president after he failed to sign a trade agreement with the European Union. Russia, who saw its ally in one of the last remaining non-Westernised neighbours disappear, reacted swiftly. First, the Crimean peninsula was annexed. Second, Ukrainians in the pro-Russian east revolted against the “illegitimate coup” in Kyiv and declared independence. Now, almost a year later, civil war is still a reality in Europe. Sanctions been imposed, cities have been shelled and aircraft been shot down . Many, just or unjust, claim that the Cold War has returned. But how did it get here? People are quick to point out that Russia feels surrounded by NATO and EU countries, where once the Warsaw Pact and the USSR reigned. Although this seems a reasonable claim, it merits more research.
This paper tries to uncover the strategies that the West deployed regarding Eastern Europe. Is it true that the Americans and Europeans tried to paint Russia into a corner, or did the enlargement of institutions just reflex a post-Cold War sentiment in Europe? Answers to these questions tell us more about the current Ukrainian conflict and how it came to be. It could also illuminate the driving paradigms within the most important European and Western institutions.
2: Methods
2.1 Research question
The overarching question that this paper tries to answer is What have been the strategies of the West towards the former Warsaw Pact after the fall of Communism? This paper takes two major Western international organisations, NATO and the EU, and analyses their strategies towards the former Eastern Bloc. Two Eastern European
countries will be used as exemplary countries: Poland and Ukraine. Three major paradigms in the international relations will be used to gauge the nature of these strategies. The actions and goals of strategies can be dissected and analysed, using these three paradigms as tools. That way, we can clearly see the differences in approaches towards different countries by different institutions.
This chapter will continue to discuss the following: the key terminology, the two institutions, the two exemplary cases, the three paradigms and the data and its analysis.
2.2 Terminology
The term strategy is a core concept in this research, and understanding its meaning is essential to this research. Military thinker Carl von Clausewitz describes strategy as “the employment of battles to gain the end of the War” , 1
whereas military writer B. H. Lidell Hart refers to strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy” . A more 2 neutral definition from the Oxford Dictionary is “ Aplan of action designed to achieve a long-term or overall aim” . 3 These three different definitions have two things in common: goals and actions. All stress the actions undertaken to achieve a set goal or protect an interest. Or, in other words, strategy is a thought out series of actions taken in order to achieve a set goal or protect an interest. So, when we analyse strategy, we need to focus on a) the actions undertaken in its name and b) the ambitions and reasons that drive those actions.
Another frequently used term is ‘The West’. In this article, it refers to those countries that make up and control the EU and NATO. Westernisation in that sense is the inclusion of non-Western states, in this case former Communist Eastern Europe, into the EU and NATO.
2.3 NATO and EU
The European Union and the North American Treaty Organisation are two of the worlds most well known and influential organisations. They are especially relevant
1 Von Clausewitz, C. (2004). On war. Digireads. com Publishing. 2 Liddell Hart, B. H. Strategy London:Faber, 1967 (2nd rev ed.) p. 321
in this research for a number of reasons. First, they are exclusively located on europe and north america. As such, they are exclusively Western organisations. The United Nations and the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe, for example, are organisations that cover a much larger part of the globe. As such, they are much more diverse and less clear voiced. The second reason follows clearly from the first. One of the reasons Eastern European nations wanted to join the EU and NATO was because these organisations embodied the West . Third, the4
EU and NATO are inherently strategic themselves. NATO is a product of the cold war, created to balance the USSR and its allies. The EU is a more versatile organisation, covering economic, monetary, cultural and political affairs. However, its origin, the European Coal and Steel Community, was an attempt to make war between Germany and France impossible . 5
This research focuses on the actions and ambitions of these two organisations, even though we must not forget that both consist of individual countries. Both organisations are democratic enough that we can look at the result of their combined efforts, without fundamentally misjudging the efforts and interests of individual members. Even more so, both organisations combined consist of over 30 members, of which the smaller nation’s foreign policies are dominated by the memberships to either organisation. As such, looking at NATO and the EU is more efficient and relevant than looking at the members themselves would be.
2.4 The Cases of Poland and Ukraine
As stated earlier, this paper will take two countries as case studies. Each of these stands example to another distinct type of post-communist Eastern European country. This distinction is made on the basis of general foreign policy choices, but most clearly by their memberships of significant international organisations.
The first group, represented by Poland, describes the group of countries that have become relatively quickly and successfully parts of the West. This group consists of Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, Romania,
4 Rupnik, J. (2000). Eastern Europe: the international context. Journal of Democracy, 11(2), 115-129
pages 121-4.
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Eastern Germany (now Germany) and Albania. All these countries are members of both NATO and the EU, for the exception of Albania, who is only a NATO member. Poland is chosen to be the exemplary case study of this group. It was one of the first countries in this group to join NATO and the EU and its size makes it more significant than the other, smaller states.
The second group, represented by Ukraine, exists of those countries that do not have been successfully Westernised. Within this group, two subgroups can be identified. The first one contains nations that have not been Westernised, but have tried to distance themselves from Russia. This subgroup consists of a number of former Yugoslavian countries (Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo6 and Macedonia) and Georgia , but by far the most prominent country in this category is7 Ukraine (which is currently a very literal battle ground state for Eastern and Western hemispheres). The other subgroup consists of countries that have not been Westernised because they have chosen to align themselves with Russia. This, somewhat vague, interpretations of foreign policy preferences can be quantified with membership of institutions. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia has succeeded in setting up a system of different international governmental organisations that focus of trade, military or political cooperation in what used to be the USSR and its sphere of influence. These include the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Union State. The EEU and the ECU are organisations that include some former USSR nations that (plan to) work together more closely on economic issues. The CSTO is a military alliance, consisting of some former USSR members. The CIS is the organisation for the former USSR members, but does not include all member states, as some states left to focus on alignment with the West. The Union State is a bilateral supranational entity that ties Belarus and Russia together. Members of these five organisations include Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, the Central Eurasian states and Russia itself.
6 If recognised as an independent state
Ukraine is chosen to represent this group as a whole, because it shows features of both groups. Although it is not a member of any of the aforementioned five organisations, it was a founding member of the CIS. In 2008, the Ukrainian minister of foreign affairs, Vladimir Ogryzko stated that Ukraine was only participating with the CIS, but not an actual member . Following the 2014 conflict 8
with Russia, Ukraine had completely withdrawn from the organisation . In other9 words, Ukraine is familiar with both subgroups. Its ambitions to join NATO and especially the EU (which brought revolution, civil war and invasion) makes it by far the most interesting case in this group.
2.5 Realism, Institutionalism and Constructivism
Realism can be best understood by the following four rules . The first rule is that 10 there is an anarchy in which states, and only states, make their own rules. No overarching organisation, no law and no treaty can ultimately compel nations to do things or not. That is the prerogative of states, and solely states. We must see the existence of international organisations and such not as the cause of certain states actions, but the opposite. Organisations and treaties exist because they are the result of states decisions. States comply with these organisations because it is in their interests as well. The second rule: states have the ability to use force. This either to protects its interests defensively (from invasion) or more aggressively (with interventions, for example). As such, this rule is all about being able to compel others to do certain things a state wants them to. The third rule: the fundamental goal of a state is its continuing existence and the protection of its sovereignty. This is the first priority of a state and dominates every strategy it might have. The fourth rule: states think strategically and rationally about the use of the second rule to maintain the third rule in the framework of the first rule. Or in other words, states think rationally about the use and threat of force (either by
8 Website Global Security, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
(www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/cis.htm)
9 Eremenko, A. (2014) Ukraine Leaving CIS Shoots Down Kremlin's Imperial Ambitions. The Moscow
Times, May 27th, 2014
themselves or used by others) in order to protect its vital national interests in an international anarchy of states.
That there is an anarchy, in which no organisation can act as a government over governments, does not mean that we should ignore the existence of international organisations entirely. The existence of organisations, their rules and their actions are the result of the states that operate them. Institutions are created to use power and protect interests via a different medium. Or, as Mearsheimer puts it, “institutions are essentially arenas for acting out power relationships"4.
This means that we must see NATO and EU, and their actions as shadows of their operators. For NATO this is clearly the United States, by far its most powerful member. In the realists sense, NATO is the embodiment of American hegemonic power in its European sphere of influence. When we look at the EU in the same manner, we see that its a manifestation of the interests of its members. Its most powerful members (Germany, France) lead the organisation, whilst other members have joined because they see that their nation would be a more powerful actor as a part of a larger union. If the policies of NATO and or the EU are based on realist conversions, we’ll see that they are motivated out of protection of national interests as well as the institutionalisation of power.
The most common opposition to realism comes from the liberals. Liberalism within international relations is mostly build on the premise that international cooperation is mutually beneficial instead of a struggle between states. Individuals, thinking rationally, will conclude that working together is the best method for progress . Liberalism contains multiple different thoughts, some of which are11 more relevant to this research than others.
First of all, the idea of interdependence. This is a fairly simple notion, stating that people and countries in modern times are inescapably influenced by what happens in other places or to other people. Especially international trade, a fundamental part of every modern economy, creates a world in which actors depend on other actors. And then we have institutional liberalism. This view asserts that the creation of mutual-beneficial organisations are promote
11 Jackson, R., & Sørensen, G. (2012). Introduction to international relations: theories and approaches.
cooperation between actors (albeit states or individuals). In doing so, institutions are able to overcome the distrust that is characterised by the aforementioned anarchy of states11.
This results in the following line of thinking. Actors tend to do what is best for them. Liberals, who generally argue that individuals are able to reason rationally, can come to a calculated decision on how to achieve whatever is best. The core liberal thought is that, since no actor can reach its full potential by only operating autarkical. Actors will begin to cooperate. The best way to do so in an international sphere, is to create institutions and agreements. Liberals do not necessarily disagree with realists on the existence of the anarchy of states. However, they do believe that the anarchy of states can be overcome when states commit themselves to their cooperation thought institutions. This because it creates an environment in which actors share information, learn more about each other and become more connected with each others well being. By doing so, the anarchy of states, were all struggle for survival, is replaced by a system in which actor cooperate because it benefits themselves. As cooperation increases, organisations become more important and evolve from a platform for states to actors in their own right. Simply put, institutional liberalism sees win-win situations where realists see zero-sum games . 12
Constructivists in international relations stress the importance of identity of a state to understand its relations with other states. One must understand the history, culture and values of a state to understand why in acts a certain way in international relations. “The perception of friends and enemies, in-groups and outgroups, fairness and justice all become key determinant of a state’s behaviour” , in the words of Anne-Marie Slaughter 12. Although the actions of a state can still be very
rational and calculated, we see that states behave much more in a way that is in line with their identity, culture and history. An example of this would be if Denmark would want to join the EU because the EU is an embodiment of the values and norms that appeal to the Danish national identity. Whereas Switzerland would not apply for membership, because it would be against its identity of neutrality and
12 Slaughter, A. M. (2011 ) International Relations, Principal Theories. Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
independence. Both countries decide whether or not to join based on what they feel suits with their character and identity.
2.6 Data and Analysis
In this research both primary and secondary sources will be analysed, including defence white papers, strategic documents, analysis of think tanks, official government letters and correspondence of US senators. White papers and strategic documents are the publicly available findings regarding the setting of strategic goals and expectations for the next years. In analysing the goals and actions of actors, strategic documents are a valuable source of information. The backbone of this research, however, is the academic literature on the topics of NATO and EU enlargement. Academic sources analyse events and actors in a much more detailed and explicit manner, whereas strategic documents tend to leave things unsaid for diplomacy’s sake.
We need to know what strategy is to analyse it. Earlier in this paper, we established that strategy consists of goals regarding national interests, and the actions that follow from them. So, when we analyse the EU and NATO, we need to establish their motives and goals to enlarge eastward, and the actions that result from this. The most important strategic actions are the enlargement of both NATO and the EU. As such, the analysis of actions will mostly focus on which country gets which membership in opposition to other countries. This means that most analytical energy is focused on the strategic goals. To fully understand these, we should also include the reasons for these goals. Goals only matter because they are the expression of certain motivations. So, it is essential not only to know what the EU and NATO want, but why they want it. Academic sources and opinion articles supply a large amount of discussion on reasons why to expand and why not to expand. Both will be taken into account, as to get a clearer picture of the strategic goals. Strategic documents give an interesting look into the strategic goals and actions, but usually fail to explain what the core motivations are.
3.0 Study Case Poland 3.1 Poland
Before dissecting the Westerns strategies on Poland, we must understand three things about the Polish case. First, as soon as communism fell, Poland wanted to “return to Europe ” . Which meant that its top priority was Westernisation. This13
meant two things: the consolidation of democracy and membership of the EU and NATO. The latter of the two was key, because the EU and NATO were seen as institutionalization of Westernisation. Membership of these organisations was synonymous for being a Western nation 4. Second, membership of the EU was seen
as essential for three reasons. It would be an economic boost, it would help consolidate democracy and it would be a way to strengthen diplomatic and peaceful relationships with Germany4. Third, Poland saw NATO membership as essential to
maintain independent from Russian influence4.
3.2 EU
The EU has always been an important advocate of democracy. It is an absolute prerequisite for membership14 and any perceived deterioration of democratic values can lead to harsh criticism, as is the case with Viktor Orban’s Hungary 15 16 . Expanding the European Union in order to consolidate the new born democracies fits very well into the EU’s commitment to democracy and peace. However, as Helene Sjursen notes, democracy on itself is not enough to explain expansion. Sjursen states that the EU expands because it sees Poland as an inherent part of Europe, and as such can be admitted to the EU on cultural and geographical grounds. The importance of democracy within this narrative is that democracy is seen as a characteristic of the European identity that the EU associates itself with . 17
13 Schimmelfennig, F. (2001). The community trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the Eastern
enlargement of the European Union. International organization, 55(01), 47-80.
14 Website European Commission, Enlargement Policy.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm
15 Media freedom under threat in Hungary, Kroes says. Euractiv.com, januari 8th, 2015
16 Feher, M. (2013) European Parliament Adopts Report Criticizing State of Hungary’s Democracy. Wall
Street Journal, July 3rd, 2013
17 Sjursen, H. (2002). Why expand?: The question of legitimacy and justification in the EU’s enlargement
Another important reason for the enlargement of the EU would be the economic benefits. By opening up the Eastern European market, consisting of almost 40 million Polish consumers, the EU could greatly benefit from trade. It would diversify the European economy and make sure that European companies moving to the relatively cheap Poland would remain in Europe. One the other hand, the unified market and the free movement of labour has resulted in Eurosceptic sentiments for lower class workers in the West of the EU. The European Commission states that “enlargement is a mutually beneficial process for the EU and its new members ”, and claims that the enlargement results in an “increased population of the EU single market by 75 million inhabitants, to over 490 million in total, brings a wealth of trade and investment opportunities ”, which is a win for the Western nations . 18
However, research dating back to 2001 claims that “ only a relative majority of 44% of the population is in favour of taking in new members; 35% are against. The scepticism even seems to be increasing as the prospect of enlargement takes on more concrete shape” . So, enlargement was not particularly popular amongst the19
general electorate. However, it did still enjoy the support of more people than it was opposed by it. The most cited reason for Western Europeans to oppose enlargement is the influx of cheap labour that Westerners have to compete with. Analysts say that labour immigration will be limited, citing the addition of Spain and Portugal in 1980’s as examples . 20
The most interesting remark regarding the economics of enlargement comes from Franz Neueder, a senior official at the German Ministry of Finance, and the head of the EU enlargement section of that ministry. He states that
“Enlargement was and is a political goal with priority, of value ‘in itself‘ for both Europe and Germany. It was always an undisputed issue in the Federal Government. The question of enlargement was never ‘if’ but rather ‘how’ and ‘when’” . 21
18 Website European Commission, The economics of enlargement.
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/enlargement/economics/index_en.htm
19 Böttcher, B. & Schularick, M. (2001) Public opinion – stumbling block for enlargement? EU
Enlargement Monitor Deutsche Bank Research
20 Ian Black (2001) Rich EU citizens oppose enlargement. The Guardian, 30 April 2001 21 Neueder, F. (2003). Costs and benefits of EU enlargement. Intereconomics,38(4), 190195.
Neueder’s statement sounds almost fatalist, as if enlargement was inevitable. Keeping this in mind, we can argue two things about the European leadership that controlled the enlargement agenda. First, the Eastern European countries simply belonged into Europe on the grounds that they are European. This would show that there was a very strong constructivist view on Eastern Europe. Second, the European leadership was so persuaded by the liberal-economic argument, that they did not see not enlarging as an economically viable alternative. It is important to note that Neueder works for the German government. Germany, bordering Poland, would be the first to benefit from trade with Poland. The proximity to Poland, and the long history both countries share, also makes it very likely that constructivist arguments prevailed.
3.3 NATO
Akin to the EU, NATO sees their enlargement as a way to help consolidate democracy, as stated by the Clinton administration . Although NATO is often seen 22 as an alliance to protect its member states, its preamble states that:
“[NATO members are] determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” . 23
This statement is a clear justification for Poland's membership. However, opponents to enlargement have pointed out that the democratisation motive for NATO expansion does not make sense. Democratisation is a case for the European Union, whereas NATO only concerns themselves with territorial integrity and national security. That NATO, in its own words, safeguards democracy does not mean that it helps consolidate it 22. More than that, Dan Reiter noticed that NATO
members Greece and Turkey have shown to be bad examples of consolidated
22 Dean, J. et al (1997) The Debate Over NATO Expansion. Arms Control Today.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_09/nato
democracies. Founding member Portugal was even a dictatorship at the moment it joined NATO . 24
The second reason to include Poland in NATO refers to the security benefits. The 1998 National Security Strategy refers to Poland as an addition that: 25
‘’.. will make the Alliance stronger while helping to enlarge Europe's zone of democratic stability. (...) They will strengthen NATO through the addition of military resources, strategic depth and the prospect of greater stability in Europe's central region. Our Alliance with them will improve our ability to protect and advance our interests in the transatlantic area and contribute to our security in the years to come” . 26
The argument here can be summarised as ‘bigger is better’ in regards to NATO membership. The larger and inclusive NATO is, the safer and securer both Europe and the United States are. This argument is very simple and is deeply rooted in the nature of the defence alliance: protection. The Clinton administration clearly sees the addition of Poland as a way to NATO to be more effective in what it wants to accomplish. But, what does it want to accomplish, why does it need to be stronger? The 1998 National Security Strategy names five threats to American interests. First, regional and state-centred threats. Only North-Korea, Iran and Iraq are mentioned my name. Second, transnational threats, which include organised crime, terrorism and drugs. Third, the spread of dangerous technologies, which refers to nuclear proliferation. Fourth, foreign intelligence collection, refers to espionage. And last, failed states, which create humanitarian crises and regional instability26. But, how could Poland play a role in any of these? Polish membership
of NATO does not help in dealing with Iran or Iraq, nor does it prevent any state (including Poland) from becoming a failed state. Even more so, organised crime, espionage and nuclear proliferation are not cases that NATO is concerned with. We must arrive to the conclusion that the value of Poland as a NATO member arrives from something that is not explicitly mentioned by the United States.
24 Reiter, D. (2001). Why NATO enlargement does not spread democracy.International Security, 25(4),
41-67. pages 58-9
25 The official American defence white paper, published roughly every few years. 26 National Security Strategy 1998. National Security Strategy Archive, October 1st, 1998
This brings us to the third explanation. The expansion of NATO into former USSR territory can be understood as an enlargement and institutionalisation of the American sphere of influence . In this sense, NATO enlargement is the27
consolidation of the American victory over Russia by adding the former Russian satellites to American satellites in order to contain Russia when it is still weak. We can see this argument more clearly when we look at the arguments against enlargement first.
The most significant opposition to NATO enlargement came in the form of an open letter to president Clinton in 1997. This letter, signed by more than forty former senators, cabinet secretaries, ambassadors and other national security related officials called on the president to postpone the enlargement of NATO. One of their arguments was that the enlargement would create a new division between those Western and Eastern states. The writers claim that the unprotected Eastern nations would be more prone to instability as a result of being kept out. A counterargument has been voiced very clearly by the Clinton Administration, stating that states in the region understand that the distinction between those invited and not invited for membership is based on various objective factors 22. That
means that everyone can become a member, as long as they meet the necessary requirements. But even more than this counterargument, is the fact that arbitrary lines between members and non-members will persist regardless if Poland joins or not. If Poland joins, than Ukraine feels left out. If Ukraine joins, than Georgia feels left out. Using the logic of the senators themselves, by extending the membership to more countries, less countries would be outsiders and thus unstable.
Rubensteins argument against enlargement has to do with the balance of powers within NATO itself. By enlarging to the east, the balance of member states can be shifted, effecting American power negatively. “ NATO enlargement cannot help but transform Germany from a dependent marchland into the geopolitical lodestone of Europe”28, to quote Rubinstein. By moving NATO to the east, Germany would become the centre of European power, the spider in the centre of the web. This, Rubinstein fears, would challenge American dominance. We can look at this
27 Rauchhaus, R. W. (2000). Explaining NATO enlargement. Contemporary Security Policy, 21(2), 190-1. 28 Rubinstein, A. Z. (1999). NATO enlargement vs. American interests. Orbis,42(1), 44
argument from two perspectives: in its own time and in from ours. At the time, the United States and Europe had, apparently, enough confidence that NATO would live up to its unofficial motto “ to keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in”. The argument, seen from our time seems a case of German-paranoia. Although Germany is indeed the strongest country in the continent, it has been dubbed the reluctant hegemon 29 30 31, , . Yes, it is the leader of
Europe, but it doesn't seem to want to. In addition to this, Germany feels very uncomfortable with the use of military force, leading to the situation that any military action will lean more on the US-UK-France axis than it does anything else. Altogether, the argument that German hegemony is a reason for non-expansion is not very convincing.
But perhaps the best reason not to enlarge is Russia. The open letter to president Clinton used the deterioration of the relationship with Russia. Caused by NATO expansion eastward, would be very harmful. Russia is very vocally against NATO expansion, and would see expansion probably as a threat to its national security. It would also undermine the weak democratic forces that are present in Russia16. Some even say that if democracy is the major motivation for NATO to
expand, Russian democracy should be its primary goal 22. The clearest reason not to
rush expansion comes from Mandelbaum, who likens it to the failure of Versailles. Expansion would be risky because it is viewed as “illegitimate because it has been imposed over Russian opposition, even as Germany considered the post-World War 1 settlement an illegitimate dictated peace” .32 We can debate whether or not Russia's democracy would have been more successful without the NATO expansion. By the time that Poland became a NATO member, Vladimir Putin had already emerged as the crown prince of Russia . Linked to the argument of Russian concern regarding 33 NATO, is the argument that increasing enlargement makes the defence of NATO
29 The reluctant hegemon, The Economist. june 15th, 2013
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21579140-germany-now-dominant-country-europe-ne eds-rethink-way-it-sees-itself-and
30 Wolf, M. (2014) Europe’s lonely and reluctant hegemon. The Financial Times. 31 De Wijs, S. (2014) Germany, Still the Reluctant Hegemon. Carnegie Europe.
32 Mandelbaum, M. (1995). Preserving the new peace: The case against NATO expansion. Foreign
Affairs, 9-13.page 12
33 Yeltsin redraws political map. BBC News. 10 August, 1999
harder, not easier. Poland in itself only borders Russia at Kaliningrad, and enjoys Belarus and Ukraine as a buffer against Russia. However, the Baltics do not have this luxury. As former USSR-states, the Westernisation of the Baltics has been a particularly hard blow for Moscow. The Baltics, though from a constructivist perspective certainly western, and deserving of a NATO membership card, would leave “Russia implacably hostile” . The small Baltic nations are virtually34
indefensible. Any troops defending the trio would be pushed into the Baltic Sea by incoming Russian forces.
Yet, the arguments against enlargement have not been convincing. The most compelling argument, also the most frequently mentioned, is the result it might have on the relation with Russia. Although there is strong evidence that Russia might react aggressively against enlargement, NATO pushed forward with it. There are two reasons for this. First, Russia was weak and not really a threat to Poland at that moment in time. Second, however weak it might have been then, NATO policy makers acted against Russia, instead of despite of Russia. Russia has always been an incredibly powerful behemoth in the east of Europe, fearing for it is just as sensible as fearing for a powerful Germany. Enlargement was a tool to make sure that Russia could not dominate countries like Poland anymore.
To stress the importance of enlargement, and of containing Russia in the process, we can rely on the argument made by James Kurth. Kurth imagines a situation in which the West does not enlarge NATO. He imagines that we end up with a Poland similar to Sweden (political neutral, socioeconomic Western with a strong military in order to keep threats at bay), whereas the smaller Eastern European states would end up “Finlandised”(de jure neutral, but so close to Russia that it was well into its sphere of influence) and the Baltics would end up as Poland was during the Cold War (a satellite state under de facto Moscovian control) 28. It
would be fair to prefer a Westernised Eastern Europe with a contained (though angry) Russia, instead of a marginally friendly Russia that would remain dominant in throughout Eastern Europe.
3.4 Poland conclusion
The European Union, as shown by Neueder, was motivated by constructivist and liberal paradigms. The constructivist paradigm argues that the enlargement of the European Union would be built on the groundwork of shared identity, culture and values. With Poland, this is certainly the case. With the embracement of liberal democracy, a market economy, a strong willpower to become member of the EU and a historical background as a European power, Poland had all the reasons for constructivists to join. Liberals, stressing international cooperation for mutual beneficial results, had also a strong argument to include Poland. Economically speaking, Poland would be a welcome addition to the EU. Although the Polish economy was not the strongest yet, Poland anno 2015 is a modern industrial economy with a consumer market of over 40 million consumers. Neueder’s statement tells us that these reasons were enough for Germany, which is one of the most influential members of the European Union. There does not seem to be a convincing realist motivation for the EU to enlarge. This probably because relationalism is characterised by struggle and competing powers. With Russia weak and retreated behind Belarus and Ukraine, there was no power that could play the role of adversary to the EU. There appeared to be a general consensus amongst European members states about the fate of Poland, seeing as there have not been significant internal struggles revolving around enlargement. The agreed upon Copenhagen rules, which outline the prerequisites of EU membership, made sure that existing EU members had control and consensus over the influx of new members.
NATO argues that its enlargement is constructivist based. It wants to help consolidate democracy in Poland via Atlantic cooperation. But democratic consolidation is hardly a NATO task, and the organisation has cooperated with undemocratic regimes in the past. It seems more fitting to an organisation thats build around territorial protection to maintain a realist world view. This seems to be confirmed when the Clinton administration claims that enlargement would make NATO safer. The anti-enlargement movement also uses realist rhetoric to convince the president that enlargement would be a mistake. It would create a situation in which Russia would feel threatened and lose any progress it would
have made to become a Western nation itself. But despite this risk, NATO proceeded with enlargement. This because NATO was doing what it had always done: containing the Russian threat. The USSR might have collapsed, and Russia might be weak, but that does not mean that Russia had become a friend. The willingness of Poland to be a part of the Western world in combination with the weakness of Moscow created perfect circumstances to make sure that Russia could not dominate Europe as it once had.
4. Case Study Ukraine 4.1 Ukraine
To understand the Western strategies towards Ukraine, we must first make three observations. First, Russia has always been an incredibly influential neighbour to Ukraine. So much so, that according to Alexander Tomyl, “Ukraine cannot be understood in isolation from Russia ” . Centuries of Russification, policies aimed at35 implementing Russian values and language, have resulted in a divided country. The Western half of Ukraine tends to vote for more pro-Western parties and its inhabitants speak predominantly Ukrainian, whereas the Eastern Ukraine favours speaking Russian and pro-Russian parties 36 37. This division has a profound effect on almost every part of society, from world views to the quality of hospitals . In 38 addition to this, it seems that the division does not fade with time . This political 39
and cultural split makes it hard to create a coherent policy towards membership of either NATO or the EU. A good example of this is former prime-minister Tymoshenko who stated that “The European project has not been completed as yet. It
35 Motyl, A. J. (1993). Dilemmas of independence: Ukraine after totalitarianism(pp. 49-50). New York:
Council on foreign relations Press.
36 Website CNN, a divided Ukraine. March 3rd, 2014
(edition.cnn.com/interactive/2014/02/world/ukraine-divided/)
37 Website Vox, Everything You Need to Know About the Ukraine Crisis. September 3rd, 2014.
(www.vox.com/cards/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know/i-hear-that-ukraine-is-divided-between-eas t-and-west-can-you-explain)
38 Pilyavsky, A. I., Aaronson, W. E., Bernet, P. M., Rosko, M. D., Valdmanis, V. G., & Golubchikov, M. V.
(2006). East–west: does it make a difference to hospital efficiencies in Ukraine?. Health Economics,
15(11), 1173-1186.
39 Kubicek, P. (2000). Regional polarisation in Ukraine: Public opinion, voting and legislative behaviour.
has not been completed because there is no full-fledged participation of Ukraine “ . Her40
successor, President Yanukovych, has failed to sign a common market agreement with the EU and opted to sign an agreement with Russia. An act that resulted in a pro-European revolt, the ousting of Yanukovych and a civil war in the Donbass region. As far as its membership with NATO is concerned, the same inconsistency applies. In a 2007 article, John Kriendler notes that there is a wide array of obstacles between Ukraine and membership applications, including fundamental different views within the government, a lack of support from the general population to join NATO, a lack of reform and increasingly widening cleavages in Ukrainian politics . Even though this observation is eight years old, it does not41 appear to be outdated.
4.2 NATO
The relationship between Ukraine and NATO began in 1994 when Ukraine entered the NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. The PfP is a network of countries that is created in order to maintain relations between individual nations and NATO . 42
This was followed with the signing of the Charter of Distinctive Partnership in 1997, which further expanded the framework of NATO-Ukrainian cooperation . 43
The 2004 Orange Revolution, a large revolt in reaction to large scale voting fraud, brought the pro-Western Yushchenko to power. Yushchenko, together with Prime-Minister Tymoshenko, were very clear in their ambition to become a NATO member. However, in a 2008 summit, NATO decided that it would not let Ukraine enter the Membership Action Plan, which would be another step closer to NATO membership . In 2010, Viktor Yanukovych entered presidential office and the44
NATO relation stagnated. Although all agreements stayed in place, tone changed
40 Website UNIAN. Tymoshenko: European project not finished because Ukraine is not there
(http://www.unian.info/world/229293-tymoshenko-european-project-not-finished-because-ukraine-is-n ot-there.html)
41 Kriendler, J. (2007). Ukrainian Membership in NATO: Benefits, Costs and Challenges. George C.
Marshall Center APO AE 09053 European Center for Security Studies
42Website NATO. The Partnership for Peace Programme.
(www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50349.htm)
43Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine. July,
9th, 1997. (www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25457.htm?selectedLocale=en)
44Taylor, A. (2014) That Time Ukraine Tried to Join NATO - and NATO Said No. Washington Post,
radically. Yanukovych claimed that Ukraine had, at least in that moment of time, no intention of become a part of NATO . Yanukovych also successfully pushed for a 45 non-aligned status of Ukraine . After Yanukovych fled the country during the 46
Euromaiden revolts in 2013, the Ukrainian interim government kept the non-aligned status . However, the quickly escalating unrest, civil war and47
eventually invasion resulted in the abandoning of the non-aligned status. NATO membership became a foreign policy priority for the Ukrainian government in 2014
.
48
NATO seems to be divided on a membership of Ukraine. President George W. Bush and then-presidential candidate Barack Obama where very positive regarding Ukrainian membership. However, France and Germany managed to block the inclusion of Ukraine into the membership action plan out of concern for the power balance in Europe regarding Russia 44. This tells us what the single most important
factor for NATO in Ukraine is: Russia. The aforementioned 1997 letter from senators to president Clinton gives a number of reasons why enlargement could seriously hurt American and NATO security. Although this letter was written with Poland, and not Ukraine in mind, it translates very well. First, expansion into the east will be perceived as a threat by Russia. This will hurt cooperation between NATO and Russia, as well strengthen anti-Western and anti-democratic movements in the process. The Euromaiden revolt is a very good case to show that , indeed, venturing into Ukraine will antagonise Russia. Perhaps would a NATO membership lead to an even more aggressive response from Moscow. Not only because NATO is a military instead of an economic alliance, but also because the Euromaiden revolts was sparked by a trade agreement, not membership. In an article in Foreign Policy, John Mearsheimer points out that the discussion on NATO membership for Georgia led to a Russian invasion of the Caucasus nation in 2008.
45 Website Global Security. Yanukovych opens door to Russian navy keeping base in Ukraine.
Febuary13th, 2010.
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/ukraine/2010/ukraine-100213-rianovosti02.htm)
46Pop, V. (2010) Ukraine Drops NATO Membership Bid. EUObserver, June 4th, 2010.
47 Website Interfax Ukraine. Deschytsia states new government of Ukraine has no intention to join
NATO. March 29th, 2014 (http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/198372.html)
48Website Radio Free Europe - Radio Liberty. New Ukraine Coalition Agreed, Sets NATO As Priority.
Mearsheimer maintains that NATO membership for Ukraine will be perceived as a grave threat to Russia's own security. Mearsheimer recalls that Vladimir Putin, in conversation with George Bush, had stated that Ukraine “would cease to exist ” if it were to become a NATO member . 49
Second, by expanding to far east, NATO’s credibility could waver. In other words, NATO membership of Ukraine means that Ukraine would be defended by NATO in the event of a violation of its territorial sovereignty. However, Ukraine has a 2000 kilometre long direct border with Russia, which mostly consists of plains. This means that the Russo-Ukrainian border is fairly undefendable in case of an invasion. By allowing Ukraine to become a member, Russia would be antagonised, while NATO would lose its credibility. This would make it only the more likely that Russia would violate the Ukrainian border.
With these ideas in mind, it is not weird that NATO never really pushed forward with Ukrainian membership of NATO.
4.3 The EU
The European Union has to deal with many of the aforementioned problems in Ukraine. The division between east and west, political instability and a large Russian influence. As with the political attitude towards NATO membership, political attitude towards EU membership has change greatly, depending on who is in charge in Kyiv. The difference between the EU and NATO is that Ukraine is more important for the former than for the latter. According to Coy, Matlack, and Meyer, the United States still has its hands full with crises in the Middle East (not to mention the Asian pivot) . Ukraine, and the diplomatic problems it produces, has50 a more profound effect on Brussels than it does Washington. But if Ukraine is such a problem, why even bother?
The European interests in Ukraine are fivefold. First, the European Union wants a stable and economically open neighbourhood. The 2003 European Security Strategy, drafted by the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security
49 Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That
Provoked Putin. Foreign Aff., 93, 77.
50Coy, P. et al. (2014) The New Great Game: Why Ukraine Matters to So Many Other Nations.
Policy, Javier Solana, is the only document that can be seen as a defence white paper on European level. The strategy mostly talks about international crime and terrorism and the strategies to combat those. The document does talk about the countries that border the EU, which include Ukraine . The European Security51
Strategy states that:
“It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations. (...) The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements [in the regions bordering the European Union]. The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform. (...) We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there” . 52
Basically, the document notes that countries as the Ukraine can be a threat if they become unstable. One of the primary foreign policy tasks of the European Union is, therefore, to stabilise those bordering countries by projecting European soft power (extending economic benefits and political cooperation are mentioned).
Second, trade. The Union stands a lot to win if it succeeds in at least partly integrating the Ukrainian economy in Europe. Although Ukraine has a poor business climate, and is only responsible for roughly 1% of European exports, it still has value as a trade partner. There is a lot of growth possible in the Ukrainian economy. Ukrainian farmland is amongst the most fertile in the continent while its market consists of 45 million consumers . 53
Third, gas and energy. Ukraine is home to the single most important gas infrastructure from Russia to Europe. But it isn't just transportation of gas through
51 Although the European Security Strategy dates from 2003, a year before the European enlargement
of 2004, it is aware of the imminent enlargement.
52 Solana, J. (2003). A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy. op. cit.
53 Shumylo-Tapiola, O. (2013) Why Does Ukraine Matter to the EU? Carnegie Europe, April 16,th 2013
Ukraine. Ukraine is rich in gas itself, although its extraction is still under development. Aside from this, Ukraine is also a major electricity producer for other EU members53.
Fourth, Russia. It seems clear, both for European and Russian observers, that the spheres of influences of both actors meet in Ukraine. An article published by the think tank Carnegie Europe states that “the EU looks as if it is competing with Moscow for spheres of influence ”, while it stresses that the EU has no interests in playing politics with Moscow53. The Russian foreign affairs journal Global Affairs
states that the ”European family does not really care about Ukraine. It is pretending that it is thinking about Ukraine but it is Russia that it keeps in mind ” . The Carnegie Europe54
report claims that a pro-Russian Ukraine might not pose a security threat, but an economic opportunity lost.
Fifth, some (most prominently Poland) see Ukraine as a nation that is culturally part of Europe. The same return to Europe -sentiment that the Polish people felt for EU membership, they feel for Ukrainian membership of the EU. A 1990 declaration signed by both nations stressed their political and cultural ties, agreed that both nations would respect each other’s borders and minorities and that Poland would help Ukraine with participating in European organisations and processes . 55
Despite these interests, the EU was not very concerned with Ukraine until 2004. First, it had the biggest enlargement to date in 2004, adding Poland and nine other countries53. Further enlargement towards Ukraine was, at that moment in
time, not on the agenda. On the other hand, the 2004 enlargement included Poland, which could push for Ukrainian alignment with the EU from within the EU itself. A policy that it has maintained until recently . Second, the 2004 Orange 56
Revolution saw Ukrainians rebel against electoral fraud and successfully demand that the pro-Western candidate took power. Before this, Ukrainian politics was seen as much too pro-Russian53.
54 Baunov, A. (2013) Why Europe does not need Ukraine without Russia. Russia in Global Affairs,
December 6th, 2013
55 Burant, S. R. (1993). International relations in a regional context: Poland and its eastern
Neighbours—Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine. Europe‐Asia Studies, 45(3), 395-418.
56Sobczyk, M. & Wasilewski, P. (2014) Poland's New Premier Signals Shift in Ukraine Policy. The Wall
But it seems that the willingness to grant Ukraine membership status does not align with the rhetoric of the EU, or with the Ukrainian expectations of inclusion . 57
According to Shumylo-Tapiola, the EU member states disagree on the status of Ukraine, and therefore common foreign policy on Ukraine is hard. Shumylo-Tapiola suggest that there are two distinct groups. The first, primarily led by Poland, push for more cooperation with Ukraine. The group sees the historical and cultural ties with Ukraine, as well as the potential of the Ukrainian economy, as grounds to sign more accords with Kyiv. In doing so, it hopes to give a clearer perspective on EU membership and as such motivate Ukraine to reform quicker. But with Yanukovych in power, enthusiasm and commitment to the EU seemed to have vanished. One half of this group wanted to see a sign of interest from Ukraine, before it continued to offer further agreements and cooperation. The other half of the group argued that without a perspective on EU membership, Ukraine could turn to Russia and leave the EU’s orbit for good53.
The second group, primarily led by more Western European countries, felt less inclined to deal with Ukraine. It did not share the historical and cultural ties with Ukraine as Poland did, and it was generally more concerned with Ukraine living up to all necessary preconditions before being considered for further cooperation and agreement53. In addition to this, some Western European
countries that are more dependent on Russian gas influx, seem to be reluctant to get involved with Ukraine, fearing for their gas supply . 58
4.4 Ukraine Conclusion
The stories regarding strategies on Ukraine are stories of division themselves. Not only is Ukraine itself divided between east and west, but both NATO and the EU are torn as well.
In NATO, Germany and France had previously blocked the Ukrainian participation in the membership action plan. This veto basically made sure that
57Appel, H. (2014) EU accession and the Ukraine crisis. OpenDemocracy, September 25th, 2014 58Demirjian, K. (2014) European leaders step up rhetoric against Russia as Ukraine urges tougher
Ukraine, which at that moment was almost aggressively seeking NATO membership, would not be able to take an important step towards that membership. Mearsheimer spots the second group, which he identifies as liberals. According to him , the Clinton administration and its successors, were under the impression that the realist paradigm had fell with communism. NATO could expand without setting off alarms at the Kremlin, purely because NATO and Russia did not pose threats to one another anymore.
Meanwhile, Europe was divided by those countries that saw Ukraine as a viable candidate of the EU. Where the EU had both constructivist and liberal motivations to give Poland EU membership, so had Poland both constructivist and liberal motivations to push for Ukrainian membership. However, these two paradigms did not work for those countries on the more Western half of the continent. Countries like France and Germany are too far from Ukraine to be sufficiently persuaded by constructivist arguments. A liberal motivation, build on arguments on economic benefits, was also not enough to fully convince countries like Germany who are focussed on maintaining at least marginally friendly relations with Russia in order to safeguard its influx of gas.
5. Conclusion.
It seems that NATO and the EU have their very own paradigms that bring them to the same strategies. NATO thinks predominantly in a realist paradigm. It does bring some constructivist arguments forward, but these are hardly convincing. NATO enlarged eastbound when Russia was still weak after its collapse. By welcoming Poland and other Central-Eastern European countries in NATO, the organisation could make sure that the region would be dominated by the Russians anymore. This silent containment stopped at the Ukrainian border. The Ukrainians are notoriously divided on almost every important foreign policy issue, their political leadership is instable and most of all, they are simply too close to Russia to make NATO membership a credible defence. It would be an invitation for Russia to call NATO’s bluff. A year ago, in 2014, we saw how Russia reacted to a popular uprising against a pro-Russian president. The threat of Ukraine becoming a NATO
member state would have resulted in an even more aggressive demonstration of Russian power in the region.
The EU does not seem to be affected by realism at all. The strategy to include Poland, and perhaps Ukraine, seems to be built on two pillars. One pillar, the constructivist one, maintains that Europe can only expand to places that are ‘European’ enough. They need to be liberal democracies that have a cultural and historical connection to other EU members and the European continent itself. The second pillar, the liberal one, maintains the importance (and benefits) of economics and free trade. It seems that the European Union is keen on expanding in such a manner that it can trade easier (due to open borders and a common currency) and enter new consumer markets. Poland was a clear case for both liberal and constructivist arguments. Ukraine, however, was a bit trickier. The Poles, which share a lot of cultural and historical elements with Ukraine, had always been an ardent supporter of European membership. Being close in proximity to Ukraine also helped in making a liberal argument. EU members that lied more to the West of the continent do not seem to share Poland’s enthusiasm. First, they see Ukraine as half Russian (which is not incorrect, seeing Ukraine's demographics) and as thus not sufficiently European. Second, some European nations depend on Russian gas imports. By allowing Ukraine to become a part of the EU, it would fear for its energy supply.
In the end, perhaps the most significant finding is that the EU and NATO are very different organisations that have ended up in the same places. Both embraced Poland while keeping Ukraine in limbo, albeit for different reasons. NATO, historically build to contain Russia, did not depart from this role. It performed its tasks only stealthier, expanding in order to bring democracy and fight international crime (as the United States would argue). The European Union also stayed true to its roots: constructivism (in the form of a pan-European identity) and liberalism (in the form of an interconnected economy that would transform enemies to allies).
If Ukraine were ever to become a member of NATO or the EU, it would be for very different reasons. The Europeans would first have to be convinced that Ukraine (especially Eastern Ukraine) has an European identity. The country would
have to show that both its economy and democracy are healthy and less corrupt as well. For NATO, Ukraine could only become a member if Russia had become too weak to pose a serious threat to Ukrainian territorial integrity. Both scenarios seem incredibly unlikely on the short run, except when Ukraine was to split in one European half, and one Russian half. However, the question is if it is worth tearing apart a country in the name of Westernisation.
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