The adoption of the responsibility to protect from the perspective of regime theory and norm-dynamics

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MASTER THESIS

The adoption of the Responsibility to Protect from

the Perspective of Regime Theory and

Norm-Dynamics

An Analysis of the Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect by

Russia and China during the 2005 World Summit

By

Emiel WANNINGEN, BSc

Studentnumber: 3050149

RADBOUD UNIVERSITY

Nijmegen School of Management

Department of Political Science

Advisor: Prof. Dr. Bertjan Verbeek

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Political Science

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SUBMITTED: 16-08-2015

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGUR

Table 1: Similarities between theoretical frameworks...22

Table 2: Regime Matrix (Levy et al, 1995, p.272)...29

Table 3: Operationalization of hegemony...31

Table 4: comparison between the ICISS report and the Outcome Document (Sources: UN (2005a) and ICISS (2001)...47

Table 5 (copy of table 3): Operationalization of Hegemony...50

Table 6: Assessment of Hegemony. See appendix A for the data and sources...50

Y

Figure 1: The conceptual model of the dependent variable (DV) and independent variables (see hypotheses 1,2, Z1 and Z2)...17

Figure 2: A schematic overview of the combined approach of two theoretical frameworks... 23

Figure 3: The multistage rocket of norm-entrepreneurship...38

Table A 1: Assessment of Hegemony. See appendix A for the data and sources. .66 Table A 2: Indicators of hegemony for six top-ranked states. Source: European Commission, 2015; World Bank, 2014a, 2014b...66

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1. INTRODUCTION: THE ACCEPTANCE OF R2P

1.1 Introduction

The unanimous adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005 at the World Summit by almost all world leaders is according to some scholars one of the most dramatic or influential normative change of our time (Thakur & Weiss, 2009, p.23). The Responsibility to Protect rests on three equally important pillars, a) the responsibility of states to protect their population against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and incitement, b) the responsibility of the international community to assist a state with this responsibility and c) the responsibility of the international community to take action where the state fails to protect its civilians from these crimes. This differs from previous notions of humanitarian intervention by emphasizing that the primary responsibility lies with the state and the supporting role the international community can and must play, downsizing the role of armed intervention (Bellamy, 2010, p. 143). Thakur and Weiss argue that R2P is a more sophisticated and more broadly acceptable reformulation of humanitarian intervention in the sense that it redefines sovereignty as a responsibility of the state to its citizens. This means that the concept of R2P is at odds with the traditional concept of state sovereignty, because the latter emphasizes authority over capacity to protect (or in some cases: restraint by the state towards it citizens). Some even argue that the articulation of this norm is indicating a growing tendency in international law that recognizes the limits of state sovereignty in the protection of human security (Stahn, 2007, pp. 100-101). This would mean that the R2P-norm would, in extreme cases, take precedence over sovereignty in favor of human security.

Resolution 1973 of the United Nations Security Council was the first resolution passed on the basis of the responsibility to protect that explicitly authorized for the use of force for human protection against the will of a functioning state (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 825). According to these authors, this line was almost crossed two times before Libya, in Rwanda, 1994, and Somalia, 1992. Proponents argued here that there was an absence of functioning government (in the case of Somalia) or that the interim government and the army allowed it (in the case of Rwanda). A state’s sovereignty had always been a decisive factor regarding whether or not to intervene in its affairs. The Responsibility to Protect would take the protection of civilians as main guideline

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instead of sovereignty. This would mean that state sovereignty would no longer be an absolute principle and non-intervention would no longer be a guarantee for sovereign states. Instead; states would have a duty to protect their citizens and when they cannot deliver, its sovereignty would no longer be a guarantee. In other words, the R2P-norm could develop into an unprecedented invasion of state sovereignty, redefining the concept as we know it.

1.2 The adoption of R2P by Russia and China

As is illustrated by the resistance of both China and Russia to a R2P resolution in order to protect the civilians in Syria, this invasion of state sovereignty is currently not as widely accepted as some texts on the subject would suggest. Especially major powers like China and Russia, who are said to greatly value the ‘old fashioned’ sovereignty and non-intervention norms have been very critical towards the Responsibility to Protect; a norm that effectively puts conditions to be met when a state want to call itself a sovereign state as a defense against foreign intervention (Thakur & Weiss, 2009). And although there have been UN Security Council resolutions that referred to R2P after resolution 1973, these did not include any military action to be undertaken and were of a smaller category (Evans, 2014). The current discontent with R2P as a sovereignty-overruling norm arguably has to do with the mandate given by the Security Council with regard to the civil unrest in Libya and the broad interpretation NATO gave to that mandate, namely to remove the Ghadaffi-regime. But looking at the description Bellamy (2010) gives us of the Responsibility to Protect, this interpretation of R2P does not even seem farfetched. When the international community agrees that a state is not succeeding in protecting its own civilians, which is often the case in a (emerging) civil war, R2P wants the international community to act. An argument could be made that the interpretation of R2P in resolution 1973 could have been foreseen by states, which begs the question: why should a rational state agree to an international norm that could possibly undermine its own sovereignty? Even when we assume that international politics can, for a large part, be explained by constructivist notions of ideas and identity it still remains unusual that states would accept a norm from which they don't accept the – perhaps extreme – implications. For example; both Russia and China are states with a dubious reputation when it comes to the protection of human rights. Since the Responsibility to Protect puts forward a normative obligation for states to be able to protect their citizens and obligates other states to intervene when this is not

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observed; it might be expected from Russia and China to disagree with this norm1_.

These considerations lead to the following research question:

What explains the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) at the World Summit 2005 by Russia and China, states that highly value non-intervention and sovereignty?

This question is part of a much broader research question, and puzzle: What explains the acceptance of norms and rules by states who do not adhere to those values nor expect to gain either power (or wealth)? Power, wealth or ideational concerns are often used to explain state behavior; but when none of these explanans’ seem to apply there is a puzzle.

1.3 Rationalist approaches

In order to emphasize this puzzle, I will briefly contrast two of the main rationalist approaches in IR with a social constructivist one. Because the role of international norms and reasons for norm-adherence can differ, depending on the IR approach, different theories may be able to explain different phenomena in the same case. Note that it is the acceptance of the norm that is researched; the interpretation or the compliance of states are two completely different matters.

From a neorealist perspective it seems difficult to argue why a state would conform to such a norm. A state's sovereignty is one of the premises on which this international system is built and states can only function as neorealists say they do when this premise remains intact. Hathaway (2002, pp. 1944-47) argues that a neorealist account of compliance with international norms, and perhaps the same can be said about acceptance of these norms, is that this occurs because it happens to be along the chosen path of self-interest. A neorealist could argue that when powerful states are genuinely interested in adopting a certain norm, they can coerce less powerful states to comply. Adoption in this respect is hence derived from a self-interest driven strategy to expand the state’s power or capacity to survive. This makes it difficult for neorealism to explain norms referring to human rights. One could argue that states adopt these norms 1 The United States also has a reputation of being protective of its sovereignty. Notable examples include the way in which the US refuses to let their citizens be judged by the International Criminal Court. Russia and China are therefore not the only powerful states with a keen interest in protecting a classical approach to sovereignty and non-intervention. For this thesis however, these are the selected cases. See chapter 3 for a justification of the case selection.

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for instrumental reasons. But this would not make sense for every state; especially states with a – as mentioned before – dubious reputation concerning these human rights.

Even from a neoliberal point of view the interpretation of the responsibility to protect in Libya can be considered as far reaching. Neoliberalism can explain the compliance of states with international treaties and international regimes. These institutions serve the self-interest of states, sometimes by restricting the states in their actions, trading off short-term interest for long-term interests (Keohane, 1982). The human rights regime is, in contrary to regimes such as the free-trade regime, difficult to explain from this point of view (Hathaway, 2002, p. 1951) for the costs of complying with a human rights regime seem to be a lot larger than the, material, benefits. This is especially true for the acceptance of a norm that can potentially undermine the core of a states' existence. A neoliberal argument would focus, in this case, on the role of the reputational costs that could follow from non-compliance with an internationally established norm. States would value a long term reputation as state that values international law or human rights over possible negative effects that exist mostly on the short-run. This argument could also be made for new and emerging norms, as long as states are embedded in a human rights regime and are willing to uphold their long term reputation of international 'good citizen' (Hathaway, 2002, p.1950-53)

1.4 Constructivist approaches

A social constructivist approach would not look necessarily at the instrumental or rational motives for states to accept a certain norm. It would rather look at the way this norm is or is not accepted in the international community, how norm advocates make efforts to socialize other states into following a certain norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The life cycle of norms that Finnemore and Sikkink provide can be used to review how and why the responsibility to protect has been accepted by the international community and perhaps why it is, or seems, if at all, to be in a decline since the failure of taking action in Syria. In such a framework, the role of large actors such as China and Russia can be reviewed from a different angle from in rationalist theories, for they would focus – perhaps too much - on power relations and material interest. Instead, norm-emergence frameworks look at how acceptable norms are based on their content for international actors and when this norm becomes acceptable.

The two most notable states to have accepted the Responsibility to Protect 7

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are Russia and China, as permanent members of the UN Security Council and as large powers they do not have to comply to the will of, for example, the United States. The case of Syria clearly demonstrates that these two states are still strongly in favor of non-intervention over R2P. Besides researching how the general adoption of R2P came about, possibly by using the framework provided by Finnemore and Sikkink, it will be interesting to look at these two special cases of norm-adoption. Similarly, looking at the acceptance of the responsibility to protect by China and Russia from a neoliberal point of view would be interesting because it would focus on the influence of the human rights regime, a regime that might be considered more problematic then other regimes (such as free trade) for the direct benefits of it are not of material nature (Hathaway, 2002). It might also provide insight in whether and how the human rights regime has changed since the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect; Krasner (1982, pp.187-188) claims that the core of a regime changes when their principles and norms change. Has the human rights regime changed indeed?

1.5 Current developments in IR

Current literature on the responsibility to protect focuses mainly on the interpretation of the norm and how that has changed in the past years (Bellamy, 2005; 2010; Bellamy & Williams, 2011; Badescu & Weiss, 2010). This thesis aims to make a connection between the acceptance and evolution of the responsibility to protect and norm emergence and acceptance theories within a constructivist ontology. This will demonstrate how well suited certain norm-emergence frameworks are for explaining difficult cases such as these and will shed a light on how the R2P norm came into being even with potential resistance from two major powers in world politics. The neoliberal analysis of the acceptance of R2P by China and Russia would put focus on power relations and material interests.

Current conflicts in Syria and in Ukraine show that an internationally accepted norm that tells us when and whether to intervene in another states’ affairs is difficult, because often there will be a lot of conflicting interests of different (powerful) actors. These interests can range from normative concerns (we should help these suffering people) to geostrategic considerations (as could perhaps be said from the Russian move to try and help install a pro-Russian government in [parts of] Ukraine). Even if consensus proved not be difficult to reach, it still remains relevant why this was the case and how states review their decisions afterwards (For example the Libyan case). However, most often these

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motives are very mixed, making it difficult for IR scholars to prove what makes the world turn. Despite that, it still remains important to be able to explain certain courses of action by a state. Especially when the outcome of international bargaining has unexpected results from a specific theoretical angle, further inquiry into these unexpected outcomes is important. Not only for building and improving theory, but also for understanding these real-world cases and grasping why these theories might not always be adequate. The societal relevance of this thesis is that it helps enabling us to explain why states accept (human rights related) norms. Insight into why states, and especially great powers such as Russia and China, accept rules and norms - or not - layed upon them by international organizations can be valuable in order to improve these decision-making processes and help gain international organizations valuable momentum to reach their goals. This particular thesis investigates into the Responsibility to Protect and more specifically under what conditions this was adopted. Insight in these conditions may also cast light upon the validity of claims by NATO that R2P was applied within all reasonable standards in Libya (NATO, 2014); the conditions that applied during the 2005 world summit may have had influence on its outcome.

The domain of humanitarian intervention and R2P is already a difficult one in IR theory. Various branches of regime theory have been successful in explaining why a certain regime works, or not. The most prominent of these branches was the neoliberal one, to which Keohane, for example, was a major contributor. But the human rights regime where, as will later be further inquired into, the Responsibility to Protect was drafted and where it was eventually accepted is a lot more difficult to explain; for there are no (hard; wealth or power) mutual benefits to be gained from working together and cooperating. Social constructivist approaches are better in explaining why states accept (and comply with, but that is not the issue at hand) certain norms and rules that are layed upon them by the international community of states and other relevant actors. However when a state does not share the ideals underlying this norm and when the norm has no instrumental value; it becomes more difficult and there might be more mechanisms working together as both theories suggest. This is where the scientific relevance lies. This thesis will try to combine a regime-theoretical approach with the norm-emergence framework by Finnemore and Sikkink; the latter is more suitable for explaining how and why a new norm came emerging while regime theory examines what pressured or motivated the state to adopt

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the new norm. Norm dynamics can explain why it was necessary for the regime to change, while regime theory focuses on how the regime operates and why states accept this change. While the research question focusses on the adoption of the norm; this cannot be explained without the emergence of it. The norm did not merely appear on the agenda.

1.6 The structure of this thesis

This thesis will be structured as follows: In chapter 2 the theoretical foundation will be laid out. Neoliberal institutionalism and the social constructivist framework by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) will be used towards explaining why states accept certain norms and a possible link between the theories will be shown. Both frameworks are commonly used for explaining why states adopt norms that are not directly to their own advantage or may otherwise constrain them. Since a neorealist framework generally does not cope well with the acceptance of norms in international relations, such a theory would merely function as a straw man; therefore this theory will not be covered. In chapter 3 the methodological framework will be further elaborated. Using process tracing, a detailed analysis will be given regarding how the adoption of the responsibility to protect was realized by several relevant international actors and what reasons states (specifically Russia and China) had for complying. Chapter 4 will be the empirical analysis. Using primary and secondary (written) sources a more in-depth analysis of how the Responsibility to Protect came to be. In the final chapter the conclusions will be drawn up.

The research will be carried out using a qualitative case study research design. With primary and secondary sources an analysis will be made regarding the process of adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, specifically zooming in on the cases of both Russia and China, but also with a general analysis of how the norm was put on the agenda, by whom and for what purpose. The UN holds a wide array of written sources with regard to this topic and there is also scientific literature. However, this scientific literature mostly focuses on the judicial implications of R2P; but there are certainly valuable sources for tracing the process of adoption. Similarly, international news outlets like the Economist, the New York Times and Foreign Policy or Foreign Affairs have online news archives with related articles.

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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: REGIME THEORY AND

NORM DYNAMICS

2.1 Introduction

This theoretical framework will be structured as follows. As has been noted in chapter 1, this thesis will aim to make a combined approach of neoliberal regime theory and Finnemore and Sikkink's norm dynamics framework. In the first section of this chapter, (neoliberal) regime theory will be elaborated and a few hypotheses will be distilled from this theory that can be used in order to explain the single case that is the subject of this thesis. Subsequently, a brief critique on this approach will be given. At this point, there will be explained why it is necessary to do this combined approach of two theories. In the second part of this chapter, the norm dynamics framework will be elaborated and the role of the norm entrepreneur will be hypothesized to be, necessarily, chronologically prior to a change in the regime.

2.2 Neoliberalism and Regime theory

Krasner’s definition of an international regime is still the one most widely used when referring to the broader scope of theories revolving around international regimes. He (1983, p.2) defines regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations

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converge in a given area of international relations.” This definition consists of a few concepts that need a brief additional elaboration: Firstly, principles should be regarded as beliefs in certain facts or causal relations. These form the foundation of the regime, because every actor needs to adhere to the same basic assumptions on which the regime is founded (Hasenclever, 1997, p.9). Secondly, norms should be seen as “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations” (Krasner, 1983, p.2). These are not always encoded, but can be seen as standards of 'good behavior' within the regime. Thirdly, rules are more specific then norms. Rules are translations of norms into concrete prescriptions for distinguishing between good and bad behavior (Hasenclever, 1997); the number of rules can vary widely with different norms. Finally, the decision-making procedures are the ways in which a collective course of action is decided upon by the members of the regime.

Krasner notes that although most regime theorists underline some basic assumptions of structural realist approaches, regimes must still be understood as being more than mere temporary arrangements but rather a structure to facilitate such agreements. Regimes imply a form of cooperation that is more than the mere following of short-term self-interest, because they encompass principles and norms. This means that not only short-term utility maximization, but also some forms of restraint should be governing the states' behavior. One of the mechanisms safeguarding this is reciprocity; this means to sacrifice one’s own short-term interests with the expectation that others will reciprocate in the future, without any contractual obligations for either party (1983, p.3).

A distinction can be made between three major approaches within regime theory. The first two can be considered rationalist theories while the third is a front-runner of modern constructivism. The first of these theories, realism, argues that power is as important in cooperation as it is in conflict. Regimes rise and fall when this serves the interests of the most powerful. The Hegemonic Stability Theory is a well-known variant of this broader range of theories; where regimes can be considered a tool for the hegemon to gain the support of other states by peaceful means (Verbeek, 2011). According to this approach, regimes rise and fall with respectively the existence and the waning of a hegemon, because only the hegemon can pressure states to comply and/or has the means to build and keep supporting the regime (Haggard & Simmons, 1987). The neoliberal (or interest-based, in Krasner’s volume; functional in Hasenclever’s volume) approach to regimes is perhaps the most influential (Hasenclever, 1997), and will be the type

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of regime theory used in order to answer this thesis’s research question. This approach emphasizes that states use regimes in order to gain mutual benefits and to realize common interests. After Hegemony by Keohane (2005) is a good example of this approach, focusing on the reduction of transaction costs and long-term cooperation. Power becomes less relevant as the regime is functioning better and better. The third approach is the cognitivist approach. This approach focused on the ‘origins of interests as perceived by states and [..] have accentuated the role of causal as well as normative ideas’ (Hasenclever, 1997, p. 5). This cognitivist approach can be regarded as a forerunner of constructivism in international relations, sharing a strong focus on the preferences of states and the dependence of this preference on what identity states assign themselves, rather than assuming clear-cut goals and a fixed state preference. Within this category, another distinction can be made between ‘weak cognitivists’ who have focused primarily on states’ interest formation – a gap in the rationalist theories of regimes and the ‘strong cognitivists’ who claim that states should be regarded as role players instead of utility maximizers, as is done in rationalist approaches; focusing more on identity. The approach mainly discussed hereafter will be the self-interest (neoliberalist) approach, because this approach can be regarded as the main-stream of international regime theory (Hasenclever, 1997) and has been the most influential. Secondly, this approach is more likely to explain successes of regimes that are not favorable towards powerful actors than the realist account; since the realists regard regimes – and specifically their outcomes – to be reflecting the state of power relations among states. At the same time, the neoliberal approach remains easier to build a model around compared to the cognitivist approach. The neoliberal approach assumes a certain degree of rationality, which implies that a states' goals are always to survive by maximizing power and wealth. These primary goals always trump more normative goals like spreading democracy and respecting human rights.

Krasner (1982, pp.187-188) makes a distinction between the principles and norms of a regime and its rules and procedures. The principles and norms are the basic defining characteristics, while the rules and procedures can change without altering the core of the regime. But when principles and norms of a regime are changed, the regime itself is changed (p. 188), because these norms and principles are the foundation of that specific kind of regime. Krasner also notes that when actual practice is becoming increasingly inconsistent with both the principles and norms as with the rules and procedures or when these become

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less coherent, the regime is weakening (p. 189).

According to Krasner, regimes can be thought of as intervening variables. Most often intervening between power and interest; between the means they have to achieve a certain goal and the desired goal. So-called Modified Structuralists (or neoliberals according to Hasenclever), such as Keohane and Stein (p. 191) see that the basic function of regimes is the coordination of state behavior towards optimal outcomes that could not have been achieved otherwise, due to non-coordination among egoistic and rational states. Regimes are therefore not relevant for zero-sum situations. Security is often a zero-sum game, contrary to economic policy; where both (or all) actors can benefit from cooperation. In other words, when a state’s individual decision making leads to sub-optimal outcomes, regimes may intervene. According to Keohane (2005) cooperation is the conformation of separate individuals through a process of negotiation (p.51). Cooperation does not exclude conflict, but it anticipates it (p.54). Similarly, conflict can be prior to cooperation; where it is not anticipated but resolved.

Keohane’s (2005) assumption is that states are rational egoists, in order to show that realist assumptions are consistent with the formation of institutionalized arrangements (p.67). Incentives to form regimes are therefore mostly dependent on the existence of shared interests. But regimes do rarely start from nothing; they do not emerge from chaos, but they are built on one another (p.79). Successes in certain regimes may encourage states to build regimes around different policy areas. Rational choice leaves room for regimes to facilitate collectively provided benefits. Besides shared benefits, hegemony can also facilitate certain types of cooperation. Keohane does not assert that hegemony is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for international cooperation (p.31), but when a state is powerful enough to force other states into compliance with a certain type or set of agreement(s) or even regime(s), that a state’s hegemony can facilitate international cooperation in areas where it would not be possible without a hegemon; for example because of a lack of (shared) benefits.

Keohane argues that a reversed Coase-theorem would be applicable to international politics; the Coase-theorem stipulates that cooperation among actors leading to pareto-optimal solutions regardless of legal liability would be possible under certain conditions: a legal framework, perfect information and zero transaction costs (pp.85-87). In order to provide better information, reduce

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transaction costs and provide some sort of legal framework, international regimes would have to be designed. Transaction costs refer to the costs associated with the negotiation of agreements and their subsequent implementation and monitoring (Hasenclever, 1997). Legal liability for states will not be fully achievable, for states value their sovereignty too much. But, regimes do deal in ‘quasi-agreements’ that help organize relationships in mutual beneficial ways. States conform to these agreements to establish and maintain stable mutual expectations and a reputation as a reliable partner (pp.88-89). Agreements are most often broken when irresponsibility arises. Governments might enter into agreements they intent to respect, but external effects can make that intention harder to uphold. Some agreements might, for instance, favor some states over others – small over large; rich over poor; developed over underdeveloped – and some states might be therefore more keen on these agreements. But for an agreement to be successful, more states than only those who would only benefit need to take part in it. Keohane’s example is that of research development sharing among states. Those states with poor research facilities will be eager to enter into such an agreement, but for the enterprise to be successful, also states that have excellent research facilities will need to participate (p.96). When this is not the case, the cooperation among states is not likely to lift off. And when it does; commitment from all cooperating partners is necessary. When agreements are broken, it weakens the regime. When the regime weakens, it ceases to be of any use.

Why do states accept and comply with the rules of international regimes? Keohane asserts that the extent of compliance in international politics should not be overstated, but it nevertheless remains puzzling why rational and solely self-interested states would comply with a rule or norm that is not in line with their ‘myopic self-interests’; their own perception of costs and benefits of alternative actions regarding one isolated issue (pp.98-99)2_{. One explanation of compliance}

with regimes, even if it goes against one’s myopic self-interest is the expenses it takes to build a regime. Keohane argues that regime building is difficult, even more so with absence of a hegemon who strongly endorses the regime. Supporting the regime, and preventing it from collapsing is the same as cooperating with the regime. In this sense, both acceptance of, and compliance to these rules can be merely instrumental; its purpose is to keep the regime together. Once a regime has been established, states may value the entire

2

Since compliance can be seen as a step further than acceptance; the reasons to comply with a rule can be regarded the same, in some instances, as reasons to merely accept a rule.

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regime too much to oppose certain issues or agreements (p.100).

Another explanation for governments to accept the rules of a regime is simply because others do so as well (Keohane, 2005, pp. 88-90). The rules in a regime do not work because there is legal liability and it is enforced by centralized authority, because that is not the case. Actors conform to quasi-agreements that organize relationship so that both benefit. These quasi-agreements do not need to be the best, it is important that all actors conform to them in order to establish stable mutual expectations. Regimes provide insight in other states reputation as a standard of behavior, helping other states to assess interests and position and in turn, improving the symmetry of information. In a scenario where states know each other’s reputation, they will have certain expectations about behavior. When these expectations are not met, because of acting in self-interest by one actor, other states may retaliate or impose sanctions, but even openly questioning one’s reputation might suffice. States do not want to risk losing the benefits of a regime, like cheaper and easier communication among states, or easier access to the negotiation of agreements (reduced transaction costs). Similarly, states do not want to waste a good reputation, for it makes the reaching mutually beneficial agreements easier (pp. 90-95). This is illustrated by Axelrod and Keohane (1985). They claim that repeating a game can change its outcomes. This is illustrated with the example of Tit-for-Tat (p.245) behavior. The first player in a reiterated game may opt to comply, but when the other's choice is to defect; the initial player will retaliate by defecting in the second round. This can lead to an infinite repeat of alternating defections. Alternatively; when cooperation is mutually beneficial, the insecurity of not knowing what the other player will do can be overcome by repeating the game. It will depend, for a large part, on both players' first moves and the degree of communication among the players. Gradually, each player will build a reputation. In order to reach a mutually beneficial outcome, each player needs a good reputation when it comes to cooperating. Therefore, states might opt to cooperate, even when cooperating in one particular issue might not benefit them directly. The perks of having a good reputation must outweigh the consequences on the short run. It might still be that strengthening the regime as a whole might benefit them in the long run.

A more rationalist approach to the question why states would accept certain rules or norms that might not necessarily be (equally) beneficial for all parties can be found in Van Kersbergen en Verbeek (1994). Disregarding that their article is on European integration and subsidiarity; one of the basic claims

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they make is that a norm – or rule, guideline – can be more easily accepted by states when formulated according to the lowest common denominator. In other words, a norm that is deliberately kept vague and inexplicit will be more easily accepted by states, because this leaves more room for debate when the norm will be implemented. This idea fits neatly into the rationalist framework of regime theory. When a state does not oppose a norm, because it is vague and there can (and will) always be debated and haggled about the interpretation, he might as well accept it, for the sake of the regime in which both the state and this new norm are embedded.

More or less the same goes for a regime that has an historical record of weak enforcement of agreements, or singular 'weak' agreements made within a generally strong regime. These 'weak' agreements are expected not to be implemented very firmly or at all. States can easily accept norms which they suspect will never be implemented. In other words: the likelihood this new norm or agreement will harm the state's interests is small, because the states expect the norm to be weakly monitored or not very firmly implemented.

2.2.1 Hypothesis derived from regime theory

This leads to the following hypotheses; (1) and (2) are the main hypotheses; (Z1) and (Z2) are intervening hypotheses. Both relationships, between hypotheses (1) and (2) and the Dependent Variable, are conditioned by the intervening hypotheses (Z1) and (Z2).

1) When a state expects to gain long-term benefits from a regime; the state is more likely to adopt3_{norms imposed by this regime.}

2) When a hegemon is a strong proponent of certain norms or agreements, it becomes more likely that these will be adopted by other states.

Z1) The more vague and inexplicit a norm is formulated, the less a state will resist its acceptance of the norm.

Z2) When states expect the enforcement of a norm to be weak, it becomes more

likely that these states will adopt this norm.

3

The adoption of a norm in this case refers to the signing of the agreement

.

17

Figure 1: The conceptual model of the dependent variable (DV) and independent variables (see hypotheses 1,2, Z1 and Z2)

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The first hypothesis covers an instrumental view on regimes. In order for states to comply with something, it needs to be beneficial. In this case, absolute benefits do also increase a state’s likelihood to comply; when considering a neoliberal account of regime theory, absolute benefits and deals that may benefit multiple partners explain why certain (often economical or financial) regimes are, and have been so successful. The second hypothesis refers indirectly to the costs of building a regime. When a regime has proved to be valuable from one state’s perspective, this state will be more tolerant towards this regime; for the costs and effort to rebuild such a regime would be too much to risk weakening it. The third hypothesis is derived from the possible role a hegemon has within a new or a changing regime. Hypothesis (Z1) and (Z2) are intervening hypotheses, which means respectively that a norms ‘vague- and inexplicit-ness’ and the expectation that the norm's implementation will be soft or its enforcement will be weak, will lower the threshold for states to adopt it, because adopting it will not have much real consequences.

2.2.2 Critique on Regime Theory

One of the main critiques on neoliberal (or functional) theories of regimes is the nature of the main argument behind the existence of regimes. It is easy to fall for the post hoc ergo propter hoc-fallacy (Hasenclever, 1997, p.40); regimes and international institutions exist for the utility they bring or the purposes they serve in international politics. This does explain why they continue to exist, but it does not explain why they start existing. In other words; it fails to explain sudden change; meaning either the initiation of a certain international institution or

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regime or a drastic change within existing institutions or regimes. The only way to counter this argument is to claim that actors within these regimes are so rational; they anticipate a regimes utility. However, as Hasenclever points out (p.40); functional theorists like Keohane simply assume actors to be as rational. Meaning that, although the model holds, there should be better explanations for sudden change rather than the purely rational anticipation of it.

To solve this issue; the change that will occur at some point needs to be explained without pointing to the utility of this subject of change after this change has occurred. In other words; why does a certain change get initiated? The theory lacks a certain catalyst. This catalyst-gap can be filled by the norm-entrepreneur.

An alternative could be to claim that a certain event or crisis is often the catalyst for regime change (Bermeo, 1990). And this might very well be the case when the interests of several key actors are at stake, for instance in a financial crisis. But for humanitarian crises, there are no major stakeholders (except for humanity itself, you could argue). Therefore it seems likely that in the domains that do not affect the direct and vital interests of the state (human rights, civil liberties, political rights) there are other stakeholders willing to act as a catalyst. These stakeholders can be agents, individuals or organized groups, with certain interests, as fits the description of the norm-entrepreneur by Finnemore and Sikkink.

In the constructivist approach to explain changes in international norms by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) they introduce international actors that can set such a change in motion. In emphasizing the agency role that

norm-entrepreneurs play (see next paragraph); while at the same time accounting for

the important role of international organizations (as platforms for these agents) they open a possibility for a functional theory of regimes and a constructivist approach to norm change to form a combined approach.

The difficulty with the theory of regimes, is that these regimes are mainly of an economic nature. Keohane’s book is full of examples within the domains of the free trade regime, the monetary regime, the oil production regime et cetera. He uses game-theoretical examples that can provide insight in why and how two actors should cooperate in order to gain mutual benefits. However, this might not be the case in non-economic types of regimes. Non-economic and non-security types of regimes (Human rights, environmental, animal rights and -welfare) are more difficult in order to achieve full compliance by states. Major stakeholders

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are often the first ones to defect in these kinds of regimes. An international ban on whaling, seal-hunting but also agreements on emission rates are often agreed upon by most states – who are not major stakeholders, but these efforts are rendered rather useless when major stakeholders do not cooperate.

2.3 Constructivism: Norm Dynamics

Not only a rationalist perspective can explain state behavior in relation to multilateral agreements and the establishment and proliferation of regimes. Especially when agreements or regimes are not about ‘who gets what’, normative or ideational concerns that states have, may also matter. Constructivism focusses more on social and relational aspects of states and their interaction (Hurd, 2008). Where rationalist theories such as realism and neoliberalism focus on material and economic power, constructivism emphasizes what social meaning these power related assets can have. The concept of sovereignty, for example, is not a fixed concept. It can change its meaning over time, depending on how actors view and treat the concept. When certain states decided foreign intervention is justified in special cases of humanitarian concerns, this concept changed (Hurd, 2008). Hurd claims that constructivist approaches of international relations have become more mainstream and rationalist approaches have adopted some of its ideas. Most notably the construction of state interests. What a state’s interests are, is based on the ideas of its leaders. While many rationalist scholars would still argue that wealth and power are always among the most paramount of these interests, constructivists claim that social relations among states, dominant ideas and historical relationships and events fundamentally shape a state’s interests (2008, pp.1-4). It remains difficult to find empirical evidence of the influence of non-material concerns of states, because words and speech acts can be used to disguise material interests (both as socially constructed and as self-evident) as ideational ones. However, this issue will be addressed in the methodological chapter.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) introduce a Norm Life Cycle. In their article, they emphasize the origin of norms, the way in which they influence certain affairs and people and the conditions that need to apply in order to be influential. A norm can be defined as a ‘standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.’ (p.891). According to them, the influence of norms must be understood as a process of three stages. Stage one is the Emergence of the norm. The second stage is the cascade, the broad acceptance, of the norm.

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Finally, in the third stage, the norm is internalized. Between stage one and two there is a tipping point. Upon reaching this point, a critical mass of relevant actors (the so-called ‘norm leaders’) has adopted the norm (p. 895). It is important to keep in mind this article speaks of international and transnational pressure on actors; domestic pressures can always play some role, but are far less important.

In the emergence of a norm, the norm entrepreneur plays a key role. This is an agent with a ‘strong notion about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community’ (p.896-898), i.e. motivated by empathy and/or altruism, calling attention to or even creating an issue using techniques such as framing. But these ‘new’ norms do not enter a normative vacuum; when norm entrepreneurs frame their norm, they will have to contest with existing and firmly embedded norms. Any effort to promote a norm will face the difficulty of contesting with a logic of appropriateness that is established by prior norms. The norm entrepreneur will have to persuade actors that the new norm is better in any way then the existing/present norm. Sometimes actors need to be persuaded that a new norm is in their interest (p. 897-899). In order to be successful in all this, these entrepreneurs need organizational platforms to facilitate the promotion of their norm. These platforms might have more than one set of issues or set of interests to promote; the agenda as well as the structure and background of an organization can also be important in the shaping of a norm. These organizations are often very specialized in a narrow field and use their specific knowledge and information in order to change the behavior of other actors (pp. 899-900). These organizations need to persuade state actors to change their perspective on what is appropriate or good.

When norm entrepreneurs are successful in persuading a ‘critical mass’ of the rightness of their norm and states are accepting the norm, it reaches a tipping point. Tipping rarely occurs before one-third of states have accepted the norm (p901); where it remains important to keep in mind that different states have a different amount of influence in promoting and spreading a norm. The ‘normative weight’ of a state and also how critical this state is for the adoption of the norm can vary from case to case.

After reaching a tipping point, a different dynamic starts (p. 902). States will start adopting the new norm even without domestic pressure to do so; a socialization process will start: states will emulate the behavior – acceptance of the norm – by their ‘heroes’; states will be praised for behavior

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that confirms the norm and states will be ridiculed for not doing so, and not accepting the norm. The identity that states ascribe to themselves is also determining for their choice to accept the norm or not. Identity shapes state behavior. With an identity, a state belongs to a certain category of states, and members are expected to abide to certain norms. When a critical mass of states with a certain identity will follow a certain norm; other states with the same identity will soon follow.

Besides socialization; legitimation is also an important factor in the wider acceptance of norms. Because no one wants to be labelled as a ‘rogue state’, states are eager for the approval of their behavior by international organizations. And states want to legitimize their behavior not only towards the international community, but also towards themselves. Identity plays a crucial role here; liberal states would want to follow norms that are marked as liberal for showing the community their liberal identity and confirming it towards themselves (p.904).

In the end, norms can be internalized by a majority of states4_{. The norm}

has cascaded so widely and deeply that there is no, or virtually none, discussion and debate about whether, how and why to apply the norm. It may come as no surprise that these ‘internalized’ norms are most powerful, because there is no debate about them anymore. However, these are not the norms most often researched in international relations, where some form of conflict is nearly always present.

Finnemore and Sikkink provide a number of hypotheses about why states would endorse a norm: States are expected to endorse new international norms when they experience domestic turmoil (p.906). In this case the adoption of a norm is mostly instrumental; used for keeping political actors in the domestic sphere under control. The domestic elites seek to (re)establish their own legitimacy by enhancing the reputation or the esteem of their state. When a state is insecure about its international reputation it is more likely to be open towards new international norms. Secondly, the norm itself may be valued by the state that adopts it. Norms that are about an uncontested ‘truth’ have therefore often more success than norms which are harder to agree on5_{. Generally, the “norms}

prohibiting the bodily harm to innocent bystanders are among those most likely

4

This third phase is not relevant for this thesis, since the main subject is norm adoption, rather than

internalization. It can, nevertheless, be useful to give an overview of the entire article by Finnemore and Sikkink.

5

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, pp. 906-907) claim that norms that are formulated more clearly and specifically are more likely to be adopted by states. Since the underlying mechanism of the opposite claim (see hypothesis [Z1]) fits the theoretical framework of regimes more neatly, this thesis only mentions this claim explicitly. The alternative hypothesis of [Z1] can off course be formulated as this abovementioned claim by Finnemore and Sikkink, but for clarity-purposes, this alternative hypothesis shall not be formulated nor tested).

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to find transnational support’ (p.908). Similarly, the linkage between a new norm and existing norms can be very important. When adjacent norms are relatively successful it becomes more likely that the new norm will be successful as well. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that when a tipping point is reached, other states will soon follow. The norm is no longer contested but broadly accepted.

2.3.1 Critique on Finnemore and Sikkink

This framework by Finnemore and Sikkink is very descriptive. This is both its strong and its weaker point. The first phase of the norm life cycle (norm-emergence) seems to be the part that is the most elaborate. Finnemore and Sikkink have written a detailed account of the role of agency in norm-emergence. However; their account of the behavior of states after the norm entrepreneurs have been promoting their desired norm lacks refinement. For example; the principal mechanic by which the agents promote norms among states is with ‘persuasion’ (p.898). To use this in order to describe the process of norm-emergence is useful; but when it comes to explaining why states opt for the promoted norm, it does not suffice to say that they were ‘convinced’ by certain agents6_{. It is therefore not enough to make the claim that when a critical mass of}

states has been persuaded a tipping point can and will be reached (p.901). The motivation for the state to opt in favor or against a norm is missing. Similarly; the principal mechanism for the further cascade of a norm is socialization. Finnemore and Sikkink claim that a term like contamination would be too passive. Instead, mechanisms such as praise, ridicule (shaming) and emulation of successful states play their part (p.902). However, this does not account for the influence of competing interests. How do concepts like socialization measure up to security and sovereignty? To what extent are states willing to sacrifice one over the other? In the last section of their article they elaborate on a few hypotheses; these appear to be explanations for states to adopt certain norms. Reasons for states to adopt norms are prominence (prominent states adopt a norm; this behavior gets emulated by others), international legitimation and for its intrinsic characteristics. These explanations are quite similar to explanations for norm adoption according to neoliberal regime theory. These explanations were 1) the perceived benefits for a state, 2) valued regime and 3) hegemony.

Finnemore and Sikkink Neoliberal Regime Theory Similarity

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My own ontological position is pivotal in this argument. The underlying assumption here is that states can have a multitude of interests which are weighed differently, but what a state believes is ‘just’ will always be inferior to major interests; summarized as power and wealth.

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Prominence Hegemony Powerful or successful state adopts a norm. Other states emulate this behavior.

International legitimation Valued regime State uses norm in order to prove loyalty to the international order

Intrinsic characteristics Perceived benefits State believes the norm is beneficial.

Table 1: Similarities between theoretical frameworks.

The table above shows and summarizes the similarities between the explaining variables in both theoretical frameworks. The main difference is the role Finnemore and Sikkink believe social structures and ideational concerns play. In neoliberal regime theory, it’s still wealth and power that matters most.

2.3.2 A combined approach

Neoliberal regime theory claims to account for structural explanations for state behavior. When a regime proves useful; states will not only allow it but comply with it. When states comply with norms or rules from international organizations they do so out of self-interest; however, self-interest can be seen from different perspectives. It is, however, not designed to explain why the rules within a regime – and therefore the regime itself - changes. When regime change needs to be explained; the norm entrepreneur can play the role of catalyst. Regime theory can still serve to explain the compliance of states with the regime. When the regime has initiated change; the regime’s utility, or a hegemon can make states comply (see hypotheses 1 and 2). The important thing is to establish when we call a certain change to be ‘initiated’. The role of the norm entrepreneur is played when the states are casting votes – or a similar stage, like reaching consensus on an issue. Therefore, it is plausible that the moment regimes are able to explain more than the framework by Finnemore and Sikkink is somewhere right after the setting of the agenda. This point will be further elaborated in the next chapter.

2.3.3 Hypotheses derived from Norm Dynamics

The hypothesis from the Finnemore and Sikkink framework:

I. In order for a new norm to arise, the presence of a norm entrepreneur, and the techniques this agent applies, is a necessary condition.

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II. When a tipping point is reached, more states will accept the prior contested norm.

In a schematic overview, this combined approach will look as follows:

Figure 2: A schematic overview of the combined approach of two theoretical frameworks.

The efforts of the norm entrepreneur explain why states consider revising the old norm; accounting for the change that regime theory is unable to explain. Neoliberal regime theory accounts for the structural reasons for states to comply with and accept this change.

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Norm has been put on agenda

Norm Dynamics (with hypothesis (I and II)

Neoliberal regime theory (with hypotheses 1, 2, Z1 and

Z2) Acceptance of new norm (regime change)

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3. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 The aim of this thesis

This thesis aims to provide an answer to the main research question: Why have both China and Russia adopted the Responsibility to Protect while both states favor non-intervention and a classical approach of sovereignty? As described in chapter two, there are two different theoretical frameworks that are expected to be suitable for this case. A neoliberal account of regime theory can account for external pressures that lead states to adopt a certain norm. The introduction of this norm to the international community, and more specifically the international

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human rights regime, as well as the preference formation by the different states can be accounted for using a constructivist framework by Finnemore and Sikkink. In this framework norms are being promoted by (independent) agents with a variety of techniques to put these on the agenda and push the process further. For an in-depth theoretical description see chapter two.

Another aim of this thesis is to combine both theoretical frameworks. The goal is not to make a test to see which framework is better at explaining why both Russia and China have accepted and adopted the Responsibility to Protect. Rather, the goal is to see whether the two frameworks can be combined and can explain more together then separately. Regime theory puts emphasis on the structural explanations as to why states accept the authority of international organizations and regimes. The norm-dynamics framework puts emphasis on the role of agency by actors that are promoting norms because of their characteristics and qualities, and not because of their instrumental value.

3.2 Methods

The research will be carried out using qualitative research methods. This is a qualitative case study research. Opting for a quantitative – large n – research design would not have made much sense, for it is central in this thesis to understand the process of the adoption of a specific norm. Since both theoretical frameworks that are applied in this thesis carry multiple independent or intervening variables, process tracing methods will be applied in order to answer the research question. This method is used to examine into the mechanisms by which the adoption of R2P has taken place. The eventual adoption of the Responsibility to Protect can be seen as an entire process where a multitude of actors and interests were important for reaching the end result.

Because this thesis inquires into why this case developed as it did and how well the neoliberal regime theory and the norm-dynamics framework can explain this, this would be the most appropriate method. Observations made in this case will not be easily comparable to observations in other cases, therefore a comparative research design would be less effective. Clear theoretical expectations and clear observations are needed in order to reject or confirm theoretical claims. Since the hypotheses all refer to conditions for which a detailed analysis of the cases will be necessary, there are plenty of clear expectations beforehand. It will be more difficult to clearly distinguish specific observations and linking these to the expectations without interference of initial

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beliefs (Mahoney, 2010, pp.125-128).

Because this thesis not only inquires into the adoption of the norm but also what this adoption means, observations about the implementation of the norm will also be of importance. For example: if a norm is adopted but never referred to or Gathered data after the adoption at the World Summit in September 2005 will be important to assess whether or not change has actually taken place within the regime. This is necessary in order to make valid claims about why states have accepted this norm, because assessing the real reach and impact of a norm might explain – or partially explain - certain actors’ initial preferences.

3.3 Validity

Within – positivist – political science research, a division can be made between two ‘cultures’ of doing research (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006): quantitative and qualitative research. Largely, quantitative researchers’ critique on qualitative research boils down to the difficulty of generalizing results gained from qualitative research. The ability to statistically prove various propositions is said to be one of the major strengths of larger-n studies. Similarly, qualitative researchers claim that their methods are betters suited to inquire into specific mechanisms in order to build theory, rather than to confirm or prove it. This thesis shall rely, as said, on the second ‘culture’ of research. This will likely mean that the results gained from this research cannot easily be generalized. The conclusions that can be drawn can only be of a nature that confirms or rejects to what extent the chosen theoretical approaches are suited to explain this specific case. However, by confirming or rejecting the hypotheses7_{, given the appropriate}

nuances, it remains possible to do further inquiry in comparable cases. When the conclusion of this thesis confirms the compatibility of both theories for explaining this particular case it remains plausible that a similar conclusion can be drawn for similar cases. At the very least, one could conclude that both theories do not exclude each other into explaining the emergence of a new norm that might change the regime.

3.4 Case selection

Since the World Summit 2005 Outcome (UN, 2005) was adopted by the entire General Assembly of the United Nations, it seems relevant to argue why the

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The hypotheses have been formulated very generally. This does not mean that a confirmed hypotheses makes general and valid claims about the extent to which the theory can be seen as an accurate description of the ‘real world’, but rather that the general statement derived from the theory is confirmed in this single case.

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adoption by Russia and China is suited for this thesis. Other states might have been as relevant. For Russia and China are not exclusively frequently opposing human rights norms proposed by the UN or other international organizations.

China has avoided intervening in other states’ affairs since 1979 and will probably continue to do so, according to Pang (2009)8_{. China has always}

challenged attempts by ‘the West’ to intervene in the affairs of other states, whether for humanitarian concerns or not. Its stance on international disputes is traditionally that these “should be solved with peaceful negotiations” (Columbia University, n.d.) and inter-state affairs are not to be solved by the international community. In the United Nations Security Council China usually abstains from voting when these issues arise. The adoption of the World Summit Outcome by the People’s Republic of China can therefore be called unusual. China, as one of the world’s most powerful and influential states and as one of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, can assumed to have been very influential in the World Summit of 2005. Based on that assumption, one could claim that the adoption of the World Summit Outcome document means that China to some extent accepts this new R2P norm. The puzzle is why China has accepted this norm.

The adoption of the World Summit Outcome document by Russia, is the second case this thesis investigates. Russia has, similar to China, often opted for a stance of non-intervention when it concerned human rights. Similar to China, Russia often uses rhetoric of international principles of sovereignty and non-intervention (Allison, 2013). Russia differs from China with the Russian stance on the protection of ‘Russian’ citizens – an extreme example may be the current affairs in eastern Ukraine and Russia’s involvement in it. But either way, Russia has rejected western notions of humanitarian intervention plenty of times and stressed the importance of principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.

Since both states are permanent members of the UN Security Council and can be assumed to be among the more influential states, they can both be regarded as deviant cases, since these states are among the most likely states to have enough influence or power to influence the decision to either add or omit the R2P clause to or from the Outcome document.9

The time span of this research will be from 2001 until early 2014. In 2001

8

The role of China as ‘investor’ in developing economies in, for example, Africa could also be seen as intervening in others’ affairs. However, this thesis investigates in intervention of military or humanitarian nature. And moreover, these attempts to increase their sphere of influence are mostly bi- or multilateral (Pang, 2009). Therefore, these practices by the Chinese will not be taken into account.

9

This means Russia and China did not necessarily have enough power to have changed the outcome; but if one or more states had; they would probably be among them.

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different notions of sovereignty entered the political arena in a report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). This commission tried to build consensus on appropriate ways to respond to human rights violations (Burke-White, 2011). This seems an appropriate moment in time to start this research, in order to trace the entire process of norm-adoption. After the adoption at the world summit, in September 2005, there will also be important events taking place. In order to see the actual effect and usage of this norm it is important to look at resolutions that have been grounded by the Responsibility to Protect. Therefore the time span of this research will carry on until early 2014, when resolutions by the United Nations Security Council, with regard to Syria, were drafted (and sometimes vetoed) on the basis of this norm.

3.5 Conceptual framework and operationalization

In order to establish whether or not a hypothesis can be confirmed or rejected it is important to distinguish between different concepts and be conceptually clear overall. In the following paragraphs, a number of key concepts will be defined and indicators will be linked to these concepts. These indicators will function as proof whether or not this concept is present.

A Norm can be defined as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). Such a norm can be encoded or it can be an implicit arrangement between actors. In either way the existence and acknowledgement of a norm can be confirmed by actors legitimizing their behavior with – implicit or explicit- reference to this norm. To make this more concrete: When states exhibit (or do not exhibit) behavior that contrasts their strategic self-interest it is likely that this is caused by an acknowledged norm. Similarly; a norm can be indicated by the disagreement around it. The adoption of a norm can be recognized either explicitly (encoded, as will be the case in this study) or implicitly. When a norm is not explicitly recognized it remains possible to prove their existence by actors referring to this norm as a justification for their behavior (or by disagreeing with it). In this case; the presence of the norm and its adoption will be proved by the way it is encoded, since there can be no disagreement on whether this norm was adopted. The way in which actors alter their behavior to act in accordance with it, or explicitly disagree with it is not relevant to prove the existence of the norm, since it’s clearly adopted in the Outcome Document. However, the behavior of states and international organizations, such as the UN Security Council, can be relevant

The adoption of the responsibility to protect from the perspective of regime theory and norm-dynamics

MASTER THESIS