Master thesis Political Science – International Relations
Jihadi Brides: What you see is what you get?
The French and Dutch media portrayal of EU female foreign fighters returning from ISIS’ Caliphate
Student: Iris de Leede Student number: 10553622 Supervisor: Dr. Dimitris Bouris Second Reader: Dr. Beste Isleyen
Research project: The EU and its neighbours: politics, policies, challenges and opportunities Date: 21st of June 2019
Acknowledgements
This project wouldn’t have been possible without the professional and kind guidance of my supervisor, Dr. Dimitris Bouris. Your feedback and support have been very valuable to me. Thank you for your belief in me, also when I was struggling with my health. I would also like to thank my second reader, Dr. Beste Isleyen, for your shared enthusiasm for this topic, for your encouragement and for being my second reader. Moreover, I would like to express my gratitude for being part of an amazing group of EU students from whom I have not only learned a lot about EU politics, but with whom I became good friends as well. Finally, I wish to thank my parents for their unconditional support and for giving me the chance to grow.
Abstract
No terrorist organization has attracted as many female foreign fighters as Islamic State. About 13% of EU foreign fighters were women. The media play a significant role in the shaping of the discourse and socio-political debate about female foreign fighters. In order to fully understand the meanings of perception theories in media discourse, this thesis argues perception theories are interrelated and should therefore be combined in scientific analysis. Accordingly, this thesis applies critical security studies, (neo-)orientalism and feminist theory to the media portrayal of European female foreign fighters in French and Dutch newspapers. Through a mixed-methods approach of critical discourse analysis and manual content
analysis, the thesis provides an in-depth understanding of the frames that are used by the media, examining their historical and societal context, the power relations involved as well as their frequency and interrelatedness. The analysis also makes comparisons between France and the Netherlands and right-leaning and left-leaning newspapers.
The thesis reveals how women become ‘hypervisible’ in this conflict, due to gendered and orientalist assumptions. When women challenge the socially constructed standards of femininity by engaging in the masculine domain of terrorism, they provoke an enhanced level of shock. Gendered assumptions mainly result in their underestimation. They challenge the orientalist dichotomy between the West and the East, which cannot explain why
liberated, European women would join an organization that is associated with suppression and barbarity. They are portrayed as ‘non-European’ and serve as a yardstick within these dichotomies. In this respect, the media desperately stick to dominant perception
frameworks through which they attempt to qualify these ‘deviating’ women and thereby sustain the socio-economic order and ideological legitimizations attached to it. The findings show a discourse that provides a fertile ground for practices of securitization that build on these deeply ingrained assumptions. The consequences can be far-reaching, not only for the female foreign fighters, but also for European Muslim communities in their entirety as well as the effectiveness of EU member state’s counter-terrorism policies.
Key words: Terrorism, female foreign fighters, Islamic State, media framing, perceptions,
List of abbreviations
CDA Critical Discourse Analysis CSS Critical Security Studies
EU European Union
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria MENA Middle East and North Africa
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe ST Securitization Theory
UNSC United Nations Security Council US United States
Table of contents
1. Introduction ... 5
2. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review ... 8
2.1 Theoretical Framework ... 8
2.1.1 Critical security studies: the perception of threat ... 8
2.1.2 (Neo-)Orientalism: the perception of Islam ... 12
2.1.3 Feminist theory and ‘gendered orientalism’: the perception of (Muslim) women .. 15
2.2 Female foreign fighters of ISIS ... 19
2.3 Female jihad: the role of women in the Caliphate ... 22
2.4 The media ... 25
3. Historical context: The case of France and the Netherlands ... 28
3.1 France: The most targeted country and the ‘French’ Islam ... 28
3.2 The Netherlands: From ‘ideal-type’ multicultural society to ‘failed integration’ of Muslims ... 33
4. Methodology ... 37
4.1 Research question ... 37
4.2 Comparative case study ... 37
4.3 The type of data and data collection ... 38
4.4 Critical discourse analysis ... 41
4.5 Content analysis ... 44
4.6 Strengths and limitations ... 46
5. Analysis: The portrayal of female foreign fighters in the French and Dutch media ... 49
5.1 Critical discourse analysis ... 49
5.1.1 The frames in theoretical and historical perspective ... 49
5.1.2 Discussion ... 63
5.2 Content analysis ... 67
5.2.1 Frequency of frames and their mutual relation ... 68
5.2.2 Comparison between the French and Dutch media ... 71
5.2.3 Comparison between left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers ... 73
6. Conclusion ... 76
Bibliography ... 79
Annexes………91
Annex I: Code book………91
1. Introduction
After the outbreak of large protests following the Arab Uprisings, which were violently suppressed by the Syrian government, a civil war broke out in Syria in 2011. Soon the civil war got fragmented into several civil groups, among which the mainly Sunni Arab terrorist organisation ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS) which adheres to a Salafi extremist ideology (Chatterjee 2016: 203). In 2014, the conflict took a different turn when ISIS
announced the foundation of its own state: the ‘Caliphate’, covering parts of Syria and Iraq. On its territory, ISIS committed crimes against humanity, including mass sexual offence and violence against women. ISIS specifically targeted several religious and ethnic minorities (Braun 2018: 315).
Apart from causing severe instability in the neighbouring region (Chatterjee 2016: 201), the war in Syria has had many consequences for Europe as well. Whilst Europe tried to cope with large amounts of Syrian refugees, it faced a series of terrorist attacks in several European countries (CAT 2017: 5). Also, since the outbreak of the war, several European citizens have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS’ jihad. France has the highest number of foreign fighters Europe. But also smaller European countries such as the Netherlands have been confronted with relatively many foreign fighters (Bakker & de Bont 2016: 837).
A significant number of them are women: around 13% of EU foreign fighters (Cook & Vale 2018: 22). In fact, no terrorist group has attracted as many (Western) foreign women as ISIS (Braun 2018: 312; Chatterjee 2016: 209; Peresin 2015: 21). Now that ISIS has been officially defeated (McKernan 2019), these European countries are confronted with the female foreign fighters’ wish to return. Currently, it is highly debated in most European countries to what extent these returnees could pose a threat (Braun 2018: 314).
Currently, most of the European female foreign fighters live in poor conditions in Kurdish refugee camps, which renders the issue more salient (Cunningham & Sadoun 2019). Also, the Syrian judicial system is considered non-existent and the Iraqi – already overloaded – penal system has lower protection of fair trial and knows one of the heaviest antiterrorism laws in the world, with the possibility of the death penalty without participation in combat.
The question of foreign detainees and their prosecution mostly concerns women, as the majority of the male foreign fighters has died in the battlefield (NCTV 2018: 5).
The increasing female involvement in terrorism adds to the importance of further research in this field (Auer et al.: 2018: 9). Within the debate sketched above, this thesis will examine the media portrayal of ISIS’ female foreign fighters from EU member states in the French and Dutch newspapers. First of all, debunking biases and assumptions can help to improve
counter-terrorism policies (Brown 2018: 3). Also, although ISIS has been physically defeated in terms of presence on the Syrian and Iraqi territories, its ideology and organization have not been extinguished (Cook & Vale 2018: 7). For this reason, it is vital to draw lessons from the experiences with this conflict in order to deal with the issue of (returning) female foreign fighters and Islamic non-state armed groups in the future. Furthermore, growing media coverage on terrorism since 9/11 has increasingly connected terrorism with Islamic culture and went hand in hand with an augmentation of Islamophobia (Berbers et al.: 2015: 799). In this sense, a thorough understanding of media coverage of European Muslim women joining ISIS is essential for the increasingly polarized social debate on Islam and Muslims in Europe. This thesis engages with the literature on foreign fighters, female terrorism and perceptions of gender, Islam and threat. The research conducted will contribute to the scientific debate in several ways. First of all, foreign fighters are an underexamined phenomenon and female terrorism or female foreign fighters even more (Davis 2017: 16; Reynolds & Hafez 2017: 22). The fact that the conflict with ISIS is relatively recent, leaves many aspects of the conflict still open for (further) research. Secondly, previous research on female terrorism often lacked comparisons amongst conflicts (Jacques & Taylor 2013: 35). This gap will be addressed in this thesis, as the literature on female terrorism in other conflicts and terrorist organizations has served as the foundation for the code book used in the content analysis.
Pursuing research on the nexus media, gender and terrorism also continues to be critical, because the media are still one of the most dominant sources of information on terrorism (Auer et al.: 2018: 14). Notably, previous research on the media portrayal of female terrorists has often been limited to only one theory of perception, whereas to fully
understand media narratives it is essential to combine several perception theories (idem: 7-8). Therefore, this gap in the literature will be addressed by providing an analysis with a more comprehensive theoretical framework drawing on critical security studies, orientalism and feminist theory. Finally, new qualitative and quantitative data will be presented,
obtained through a mixed-methods approach. This will provide a more extensive and reliable understanding of the phenomenon.
The thesis is structured as follows: first, the conceptual framework and literature review will be presented in chapter 2. Here, the three IR theories deployed will be discussed: critical security studies, orientalism and feminist theory. Then, in the third chapter, the historical context of the countries of this case study will be provided. The chapter will briefly describe the development of Islam as well as past experiences with terrorism in France and the Netherlands. In chapter 4, the methodology will be explained. It sets out the mixed-methods approach which combines critical discourse analysis with manual content analysis. The results of this analysis will be discussed in the fifth chapter, answering the research question. On the one hand, this chapter tries to explain and evaluate the frames found within the historical and theoretical context. On the other hand, the chapter provides the quantitative qualification of the results and draws comparisons between several data. Finally, the thesis will end with a conclusion in chapter 6.
2. Theoretical Framework and Literature Review
In this literature review, first the theoretical framework is provided, covering Critical Security Studies, Feminist Theory and (neo-)Orientalism. Then, the phenomena of foreign fighters, female terrorism and ISIS’ female foreign fighters will be discussed. The review will proceed with a third part, in which I will describe what the concept of ‘female jihad’ entails and the motivations and role of women in the Caliphate. Finally, the role of the media is discussed.
2.1 Theoretical Framework
Most previous research on female terrorism treated identity categories separately, mainly focussing on gendered perceptions. This approach only captures meanings to a limited extent (Auer et al.: 2018: 7-8), because it ignores intragroup differences and hierarchies within social groups (Crenshaw 1991: 1269). The concept of ‘intersectionality’ (Crenshaw 1989) emphasizes the need to account for multiple grounds and convergence of identities in the study of the construction of the social world (Crenshaw 1991: 1245, 1275).
Inspired by this reasoning, several IR theories on perceptions will be discussed below. I concluded that perceptions of threat (Brown 2011), gender (Davis 2017; Sjoberg 2018) and Islam (Gentry & Sjoberg 2015; Loken & Zelenz 2017) play a significant role in media framing of female terrorism. The IR theories have common origins in (neo-)Marxism, critical theory, constructivism, post-colonialism and post-structuralism (Browning & McDonald 2011: 237-238). They are also a reaction to mainstream IR theories that make the assumption of secularism (Nilsson 2018: 14).
2.1.1 Critical security studies: the perception of threat
The post-positivist ‘critical’ approaches to security, Securitization Theory (ST, Copenhagen School) and Critical Security Studies (CSS, Welsh School) radically challenged traditional IR approaches which questioned the ‘objective’ threats that were ‘out there’ in the real world (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 4-5; Steans 2006: 67). Instead, both emphasized the
socially constructed nature of security and draw on the idea of language as a means to turn political issues into security issues (Browning & McDonald 2011: 237-238). An issue becomes a security issue because it is presented as an existential threat and accepted by the public as such, irrespectively of whether it concerns a ‘real’ threat. An issue then moves from the field of politics to the field of security. Politics take place within the boundaries of democratic debate and rule of law, whereas this ‘securitization’ lifts the issue ‘above politics’, or turns it into ‘panic politics’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 21-23; 27; 34).
Through this process of ‘securitization’, the matter is often addressed with urgency and secrecy in an un-democratic and un-creative way (Browning & McDonald 2011: 241, 246). Moreover, exceptional political measures are justified, even violations of fundamental rights or actions beyond the existing rule of law (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 76-78; Weaver & Wilde 1998: 24-26). This liberty-security trade-off – often under the false labelling of terrorist phenomena as ‘new’ – is something that is questioned by critical approaches (Jackson et al.: 2011: 233-235, 243-244). The threat can lose its exceptional status through a process of normalization (idem: 70). So, securitization consists of an interaction between ‘normalisation’ and ‘exception’ (Mavelli 2013: 180).
Critical approaches point to the normative preferences inherent in security choices that states make and the political implications thereof. The way that is dealt with a security issue is always a political choice, because a threat is something hypothetical in the future. Threats should thus not be arbitrarily defined beforehand as most salient (Waever & Wilde 1998: 26; 32). Particular understandings and practices of security bring about ‘winners and losers’ and therefore, the common view of terrorism as an existential threat that demands enormous countermeasures is questioned (Jackson et al.: 2011: 241).
Security should not be viewed as simply about preparing against military threats. It is a way of defending common ways of life (Klein 1997: 362; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 82). A threat can be military, but also economic, environmental or social (Waever & Wilde 1998: 22-23). In this sense, concepts of security are closely related to conceptions of identity and community (Browning & McDonald 2011: 249). Exacerbated by globalization, these are shaped by the positioning the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ around common values, resulting in
exclusion or violence (Jackson et al.: 2011: 68-70; Krause & Williams 1997: xiv-xv). The
securitization through a speech act is facilitated if the threat is already generally perceived as threatening, has historically negative connotations or if the securitizing actor holds a
position of authority, though not necessarily officially (Weaver & Wilde 1998: 33; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 79).
A first important difference between the two approaches is that ST takes social and power relationships as a given, to have turned into immutable structures. Contrarily, CSS calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins. CSS acknowledges the possibility of progress by shifting towards a different socio-political order (Krause & Williams 1997: xi ; Waever & Wilde 1998: 35). In this regard, ST calls for ‘desecuritization’: shifting issues from the security into the political sphere. According to CSS founder Booth, important issues then might lose political salience (2007: 169). ST views security politics as pernicious, whereas CSS does not really view this as problematic but pleads for a different understanding and
emancipation (Browning & McDonald 2011: 242, 247).
CSS offers an explanation of this ‘progress’. Booth wrote “emancipation, theoretically, is security” (1991: 319). Security could be achieved through structural transformations to improve social justice and reduce inequalities (Booth 2005: 182). Yet, this was criticized to be a broad, vague and overly ambitious proposition, aiming to address all the areas of ‘threat’ (Burke 2007: 8) and it is questionable to what extent goals of emancipation should fall in the security domain (Browning & McDonald, 2011: 242). In his later work, Booth slightly
redefined his definition of ‘emancipation’ (idem: 247) as a set of processes or attitudes rather than an end-state (Booth 2007: 112). Still, CSS is criticized for its failure to replace discredited certainties with new ones (Krause & Williams 1997: xv).
Also, in opposition to ST, CSS considers the essence of security to be variable across time and space. Security politics can have different effects at different times and places, due to the changing nature of notions of identity (Browning & McDonald 2011: 242, 249; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 85). Nevertheless, CSS is sometimes criticized for not taking into account sufficiently the varied social, historical and political contexts in which security is
historical background and by complementing CSS with (neo-)orientalism and feminism, which significantly contributed to this debate (Burke 2007: 5).
A third difference is that the CSS considers both the threat and its object, who or what is being secured, to be socially constructed (Krause & Williams 1997: 9). Here, ST is limited to collective units rather than individuals (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2010: 82). CSS builds on the idea of human security, that has shifted from the state to the human being. The state should be viewed as a means, not an end of security (Booth 2007: 182). Lastly, contrary to ST, CSS refutes actors of securitization and expresses normative judgement. CSS does engage with the question what actual security threats are instead of those presented by the elites (Waever & Wilde 1998: 35).
The securitization of Islam is closely related to the assumption of European secularism. The modernization of Europe would have resulted in the separation of religion and politics. Islam is perceived as threat, because contrary to Christianity, it is perceived as an all-encompassing system of belief that regulates both the private and public sphere (Mavelli 2013: 161-162). Speech acts that securitize Islam easily gain support, because they build upon a historically consolidated discursive realm. Moreover, although Islam is not singled out as the target of ‘exceptional measures’, Muslims are often the primary group affected by them (idem: 166). Furthermore, despite that Islam is almost never directly linked to threat in discourse, this connection is made indirectly by evoking Islam in discourses on terrorism. Here, Islamic fundamentalists are still considered part of the Islamic mainstream. A distinction is made between ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’. The ‘good Muslims’ cannot oppose the Western values and Western foreign politics, otherwise they are immediately considered to be
terrorists (idem: 165). This seems to touch upon a thin line in the foreign fighters debate: when are foreign fighters considered to be ‘freedom fighters’ and when do they get labelled ‘terrorists’ (Ramadan 2010: 24)? In this regard, conversion, religious practices, marriage to a Muslim men, but also the possession of a European passport become securitized as signifiers of religious fanaticism or threat. The entirely covering Islamic dress renders invisible to the public and is therefore perceived as even more dangerous (Brown 2011: 710-711; 714-715).
2.1.2 (Neo-)Orientalism: the perception of Islam
Inspired by the Foucauldian theory of discourse and power (Kerboua 2016: 9), Said revealed that discourse on the Middle East and Islam is coloured by the political, economic and intellectual situation in which it arises (Said 1997: Ivii). EU member states and the United States (US) look at the Middle East through a Western-centric lens that distorts the reality of those places and the people living there. Said calls this lens ‘Orientalism’. Orientalism is based on the idea of a division between the East or ‘Orient’ and the West or ‘Occident’ (Said 1997: 4). Orientalist discourse is generally expressed by opposing “us” vs. “them”, assuming both sides are homogenous and can be defined in extremes of threat and peacefulness (idem: 78). Notably, “them” is associated with Arab people, Middle Eastern countries and Islam.
Orientalism goes beyond mere representations. It’s about knowledge production. Those who produce knowledge about the Orient are always subjective and serve to maintain or
legitimize Western hegemony, colonial rule and intervention (Said 1997: 24-25, 30; Kara 2017: 3023-3024). Roughly three waves of orientalism can be distinguished: European orientalism during the colonial era was followed by American orientalism during the Cold War and finally transformed into neo-orientalism after the 9/11 attacks.
European orientalism developed during the 18th and 19th century. The Middle East attracted
the attention of European countries, mostly France and Britain, because of its geopolitical significance for trade ways (Kara 2017: 3030). The Europeans studied the Oriental literature and languages in order to ensure their colonial rule. The knowledge about the oriental ‘other’ created by academics, politicians, government officials, institutions and artists served the interest of Western power structures (Kara 2017: 3021-3023; Kerboua 2016: 10-11, 18; Said 2003: 39-40). In discourse of this first type, the West is assumed to be superior and the East is associated with inferiority, backwardness and exoticness (Kerboua 2016: 21; Said 1997: 4). Also, it is assumed that the Arabic ‘other’ is more ruled by the natural urges of the body than the thoughts of the mind (Richardson 2004: 19).
American orientalism developed during the Cold War. American state officials and
academics started to view the Middle East as an important region, because of economic and security considerations, but also to protect the US’ capitalist ideology in the struggle against the communist Soviet Union (Kerboua 2016: 16). Whilst filling the gaps caused by the slow withdrawal of Great-Britain from its empire, the US inherited European orientalist thought (Little 2002: 3, 309; Rotter 2000: 1205). The Iranian revolution announced a new ‘Islamic’ order, which intensified fear of Islam in the US (Said 1997: 5-7). Also oil, terrorism and the war in Afghanistan that made Islam enter the consciousness of the US in these years (idem: 16).
Yet, the US’ lack of colonial past makes American orientalism much more based on
abstractions and more dehumanized. Contrary to the Europeans, the Americans denied the importance of studying orientalist literature and language. Furthermore, the unconditional alliance with Israel would render binary characterizations more extreme and politicized. Israel was viewed as the Middle East’s ‘only democracy’ and ‘staunch ally’ of the US which had to be defended against Islam. In this type of orientalism, the orient is associated with violence and anxiety for Islam emerges (Kerboua 2016: 18-21; Said 1997: 34).
As Islam moved even closer to the centre of world politics, Said’s ‘Orientalism’ from 1978 is more present than ever. The problem to which Said drew attention is still not resolved (Gran 2013: 27). Especially 9/11 and the so-called “War on Terror” confirmed its presence, which led to a transformation of the concept into ‘neo-orientalism’ (Khalid 2011: 15). Said pointed out that in discourse “Islam” is always pitted against “the West” – not Christianity – because the assumption is that the West has surpassed the stage of religion, whereas the East is still in the stage of religion, primitivity and backwardness (1997: 10). Here, Islam would form an impediment to progress in the Arab world (Halliday 1993: 152). This dichotomy of Islam vs. the West forms the basis for large set of variations: Europe vs. Islam, France vs. Islam and so on (Said 1997: 10-12).
Moreover, this assumption of secularity brings about the perception that expressions of religion in the public sphere must be the result of coercion or rebellion against the Western values (Brown 2015: 304). In this regard, Yilmaz notes how Western women joining ISIS are
framed in the form of a seeming paradox: why would women that enjoy liberties and rights in the ‘modern’ and ‘progressive’ West choose to live under the ‘barbarian’ and ‘backward’ domination of ISIS? A question that is not posed with respect to eastern women joining ISIS (2017: 33).
Since the 1990s Islam became generally associated with threat to state security (Said 1997: 57) and with, an often exacerbated, more brutal form of terrorism (Gentry & Sjoberg 2015: 123-124; Kerboua 2016: 22). In neo-orientalism, Islam and Muslims are constructed as a social and existential threat to the Western world and civilization. Some neo-orientalists hold Islam as inherently undemocratic (Kerboua 2016: 8). Samuel Huntington expressed neo-orientalism most extremely: the clash of civilizations between the Western and Arab-Islamic world would be the main source of conflict after the Cold War (1993: 22, 34-35). The most hostile expression of this idea is Islamophobia (Kerboua 2016: 8). This has been highly criticized for not reflecting neither empirical nor historical reality, for being one-sided, racist and for having actually intensified or created hostility between the West and Islam (Berman 2003; Fox 2005; Mungiu-Pippidi & Mindruta 2002; Said 2001).
As a consequence of (neo-)orientalist constructions, intervention in the Arab world is justified. As famously expressed by Spivak: “White men are saving brown women from brown men”, assuming that Middle Eastern women need to be rescued and are submissive as opposed to liberated Western women (Loken & Zelenz 2017: 49). Other prejudices are that Muslims are incapable of learning, that Muslim men are more violent (‘barbaric’), controlling and hypersexualized than Western men and that all Muslims are religious fundamentalists (Gentry & Sjoberg 2015: 123). Furthermore, (neo-)orientalist constructions cause discrimination of Muslims living in European countries. In particular violence against Muslim women wearing a fully covering dress (Brown 2015: 299). It pertains restricting legislation touching Muslim minorities in European countries (Terman 2017: 491).
Said’s work was published during a period of academic shift, moving away from liberalism (Gran 2013: 24). It is agreed upon that Said’s work subsumed the earlier academic debates on the Middle East and preluded a new one (Halliday 1993: 148). Orientalism called into
debate about the relationship between scholarship and power. It challenged the altruïsm and benevolence of Western power, which led to quite some criticism. Said was even called an Islamic fundamentalist and anti-American (Spencer 2013: 164-165, 168).
Martin Kramer (2007), Bernard Lewis (1982) and Ibn Warraq (2007) expressed these extreme criticisms, yet none of them engages with the substance of the debate. They lack theoretical and empirical substantiation and mainly challenge Said’s work on ideological and political grounds (Kerboua 2016: 13-14; Spencer 2013: 164-166). According to Said, these criticisms underline the actuality and the persistent unwillingness to discuss the problems of orientalism (1985: 2). More substantiated criticisms were identified by Bryce, who stated orientalism ignores the Ottoman legacy in Europe’s history and the presence of Muslims in Europe (2013: 99). Whilst arguing against the homogenous perceptions of the Orient, it has been claimed Said is in fact treating the West as a homogenous entity himself (Halliday 1993: 161). Secondly, Said would challenge the legitimacy of scholars, state officials and artists in interpreting the Orient, but fails to provide a solution for alternative study approaches (Irwin 2006: 300). Furthermore, he has been accused of picking favourable examples or giving erroneous, oversimplified descriptions of historical events (idem: 282, 298). Finally, Said would have ignored the prestige enjoyed by German orientalism despite the German lack of colonies (idem: 127).
2.1.3 Feminist theory and ‘gendered orientalism’: the perception of (Muslim) women Feminist theory emerged during the 1990s and pointed out that gender issues are deeply embedded in what is conventionally taken to be the ‘mainstream’ concerns of the discipline. Previously, IR had been a highly masculine field of study, dominated by neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism (Steans 2006: 1-2). Cynthia Enloe raised the classic question: “where are the women?” (1989: 3-4). She redefined the ‘personal’ as ‘international’, by showing how the lives of relatively invisible women are critical for our understanding of the world (Enloe 1989: 193-194; Narain 2017: 425).
First of all, it is critical to elaborate on the definition of ‘gender’ and ‘sex’, which are often used interchangeably. ‘Gender’ does not refer to what women and men are biologically, but
to the ideological and discursive relations that exist between men and women (Steans 2006: 7-8). Several brands of feminist theory evolved in different arena’s. Liberal feminists believe gender equality can be reached by removing legal hurdles and thus take ‘reality’ as a given. Opposingly, feminist constructivism understands ‘gender’ as a social construction that shapes individual identities and contains a structural power relation. Here, gender functions as a discourse, as a system of meanings through metaphors and dichotomies (Cohn 2013: 4, 7, 11). Feminist theory studies how these societal gender norms affect women’s agency, which can be defined as “the ability to make informed and active choices” (Sjoberg & Gentry 2008: 6).
Identities are thus socially constructed because they are associated with biological sex, which leads to the distinction of ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ (Jackson et al.: 2011: 76). In all societies and cultures, certain emotional and psychological characteristics are held to be essentially ‘feminine’ or ‘masculine’ (Steans 2006: 8). Feminism challenges dominant definitions of the ‘woman’ and the unequal power hierarchies that are created through these binaries (Gentry & Sjoberg 2015: 120; Steans 2006: 8). Masculinity is associated with rationality, courage, violence, war and protection. In opposition, feminism is associated with emotions, innocence, passivity, non-violence and peace. Moreover, masculinity is
consistently valued above that what is associated with femininity (Cohn 2013: 11-12). As Naaman wrote: “When women opt to fight alongside men, they challenge the dichotomy of woman as victim/man as defender” (2007: 935).
Feminist studies engaged in security debates, because gender is ignored by mainstream IR approaches and even by critical security studies (Blanchard 2003: 1292). Its first goal was to tackle the invisibility and supposed irrelevance of women in security politics. Moreover, feminism challenges the assumption of the state as the protector of women as well as the presumed connection between women and peace. Here, it aims to show how women have actively played their part in human warfare (idem: 1290; 1300). Terrorism is particularly viewed to be a male phenomenon and therefore the media often downplay or ignore
women that are involved. An important goal is therefore to overcome biases, as stereotypes about women’s role in political violence persist (Gentry & Sjoberg 2015: 126; Sjoberg 2018:
Exactly because male violence can be moralized as a structured practice, namely war, it can be depersonalized or idealized. Yet, as women are associated with peace, female violence is perceived as an anomaly. Therefore, female perpetrators of violence are often
overpersonalized and labelled uncontrollable and vindictive (Blanchard 2003: 1300). Ignoring how gender shapes power dynamics actually hinders our understanding of female terrorism and effective counter-terrorism policies (Davis 2017: 13). Moreover, it ignores the fact that a community within which a terrorist act is committed and responded to is structured by hierarchy and gender (Gentry & Sjoberg 2015: 125). Finally, gender shapes ‘war stories’ that legitimize certain political agendas domestically as well as abroad (Brown 2015: 298-299). The perception of the ‘Muslim woman’ is a particular one, closely related to post-colonialism and orientalism. Given the prominent role of women in imperial relationships, it is rather surprising that the gender does not get adequate attention in Said’s work (De Groot 2013: 192-193). Building on this criticism, ‘gendered orientalism’ emerged (Charrad 2011: 419-420). A starting point here is the claim that feminist knowledge premised on western women’s experiences cannot be universalized. Therefore, cultural contexts in post-colonial societies should be taken into account. This brand of feminist theory challenges amongst others the myth that these women need protection and that they are subjugated (Narain 2017: 424).
In fact, women have been in the centre of colonial binaries: both colonizers and colonized regularly invoked women as markers of difference. “Our culture is different than yours” often translates to “Our women are different from yours” (Charrad 2011: 422). Western colonial powers legitimized their missions with the objective to free ‘oppressed’ women from their traditional ways of life (Terman 2017: 490). Opposingly, feminism is strongly associated with Western hegemony in the Middle East. Most women’s movements in the Middle East therefore choose to differentiate themselves from Western feminism (Charrad 2011: 425).
In orientalist descriptions of women, references to veiling practices can have several
meanings. Traditionally, the veil was an expression of local culture and status, but during the colonial rule it turned into a politically charged object intertwined with gender and colonial power relations. First of all, the veil became a symbol for a sexual, exotic fantasy: the ‘other’ could be desired and symbolized seduction. Secondly, the veil played a role in the exercise of colonial power: government intervention over veiling was used to emphasize the power difference between the colonizers and the colonized and the prohibition of veiling sought to ‘modernize’ the native groups (De Groot 2013: 204-205). Here, removing the veil symbolizes liberation (Brown 2011: 714). In protest, the colonized chose to do the opposite of the colonized powers (Charrad 2011: 429). So, the veil marks a difference of belonging, distancing the one who wears it from European identity (Brown 2011: 709).
Finally, the veil was associated with oppression: the women were perceived to be forced by their repressive husbands to adhere to this ‘backward custom’ (De Groot 2013: 204-205). Not only Muslim men, but also Muslim societies are perceived to be distinctly misogynistic: inherently sexist and discriminative against women (Terman 2017: 491). The veil is viewed as a fundamental violation of women’s rights, showing how Muslim woman are victims of Islam and Muslim men (Brown 2011: 714-715). In this way, the ‘oppression’ of women served as the foundation for colonial powers to claim cultural superiority and thus as a moral
justification for colonial rule (Charrad 2011: 419).
This idea is still present today. The treatment of women still serves as a standard-bearer for progress and modernization (Sjoberg & Gentry 2016: 26). The veil or burqa has become symbol in the West for the non-European ‘other’ which must be excluded. Also, the ‘subordinated’ Muslim woman is opposed to the liberated, Western woman who is
educated, modern, has control over her own body and choices (Khalid 2011: 21-22; Terman 2017: 501). More than women in general, Muslim women are considered to have no agency at all: neither personal, nor political (Sjoberg & Gentry 2016: 26). Islam and Muslim women are taken to be a singular and heterogenous notion. This ignores the historically changing role of women within Islam and the different ways Muslims can interpret and practice their faith (Charrad 2011: 420).
2.2 Female foreign fighters of ISIS
Foreign fighters are defined by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as: “Individuals who travel to a state other than their states of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training” (UNSC 2014: 4-5). In literature, religious or ideological motives are added: “non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil war whose motivation is ideological or religious rather than financial” (Malet 2013: 9; Peresin 2015: 23; Reynolds & Hafez 2017: 2-3).
The phenomenon of foreign fighters has been documented over the past two and a half centuries, going back to the Papal Zouaves of the 1860s defending the pope in Rome or foreign fighters fighting against the Spanish nationalists of Franco in the 1930s (Bakker & de Bont 2016: 839). However, the engagement of foreign fighters in terrorist activities abroad emerged in the 1980s (Braun 2018: 312). Since the beginning of this century, the first jihadi foreign fighters appeared, travelling to Kashmir, Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya and Somalia (Bakker & de Bont 2016: 839). Belgium Muriel Degauque was the first female foreign fighter who conducted a suicide attack for Al Qaeda in 2005 (Von Knop 2007: 403).
Women are increasingly engaged in terrorism, including in conservative Islamic terrorist organizations (Davis 2017: 137; Spencer 2016: 74). They are used to surprise and cause anxiety as they receive a disproportionate amount of media attention (Davis 2017: 1). However, female terrorist acts are generally viewed as rare, deviant and not on their own initiative (Sjoberg & Gentry 2016: 23). These types of assumptions about female violence date back to the Greek mythology, Machiavelli, World War II and Marxist-Leninist
revolutionary groups (Sjoberg & Gentry 2008: 8-9). Nevertheless, women as tactical operatives is now a common feature of terrorist organizations (Davis 2017: 137). The definition of ‘terrorism’ is still debated, but according to several examinations four elements appear most frequently in the literature: the use of violence, with a political purpose, the psychological effect and lastly, perpetrated against civilians. ‘Terrorism’ will therefore be defined as: “a type of violent struggle that purposely utilizes or threatens to
utilize violence against civilians, in order to create fear and anxiety for the sake of political goals” (Davis 2017: 7; Yarchi 2014: 675). Notably, the debated understanding of ‘terrorism’ makes it a value-laden term receptive to practices of ‘othering’ (Gentry & Sjoberg 2015: 120).
The terrorist organization ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS) was established in 1999 under the name ‘Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad’. In June 2014, announced the foundation of the ‘Caliphate’ covering parts of Syria and North-West Iraq. Al Qaeda then officially
distanced itself from ISIS (Bjorgum 2016: 92). The territory of the proclaimed Caliphate would at its peak control a population of 11 million people spread over 100,000 km2 of land (Cook & Vale 2018: 7). The group attracted foreign fighters from all over the world. The flow of European foreign fighters joining ISIS heavily increased from 2012 onwards (Bakker & de Bont 2016: 839-840). Notably, the amount of (Western) women that joined is
unprecedented compared to other terrorist organizations (Braun 2018: 312; Chatterjee 2016: 209; Peresin 2015: 21). They call themselves muhājirīn: ‘female migrants joining the land of Islam’ (Bjorgum 2016: 92). Their journey is called hijra: ‘departing from a land of fear to a land of safety’ (Peresin 2015: 34).
From the total of ISIS’ European foreign fighters between April 2013 and June 2018, 13% (4761) were women (Cook & Vale 2018: 22). The majority comes from Western or Scandinavian countries (Bures 2018: 7). It was estimated that over 80 women from the Netherlands (approximately 30%) and 200 women from France travelled to the Caliphate since 2012 (de Leede 2018: 2; OSCE 2018: 64). France has the highest absolute amount in Europe, the Netherlands the highest proportional amount (Cook & Vale 2018: 22). It is clear that age is a significant factor in the recruitment of women: their average age is 21 years and 30% of European female foreign fighters is of minor age (Cook & Vale 2018: 23; Ennaji 2016: 551; Reynolds & Hafez 2017: 22).
Since mid-2015 ISIS suffered financial and territorial losses, which caused the return of many foreign fighters to their countries of origin. This raised concerns that these returnees – possibly radicalized, frustrated or traumatized – might pose a security threat. In 2016,
harder for women than men to leave the Caliphate (Cook & Vale 2018: 46-47). Nevertheless, most women survive their stay, whereas nearly all of those that have been reported death are male (Bakker & de Bont 2016: 842). It is feared that these returnees might strengthen local networks as they often received weapon training or obtained bombmaking skills (UNSC 2018: 7). Most foreign fighters are indeed recruited through local networks, in which women and their activities on social media are of critical importance (Davis 2017: 127-128; Reynolds & Hafez 2017: 2).
Furthermore, returnees might be instructed to commit an attack. Returnees – including women – have been linked to recent terrorist attacks in several EU countries and their attacks are more effective than those of non-returnees (Braun 2018: 321; European Council 2017: 4; Hegghammer 2013: 11; Reynolds & Hafez 2017: 21). The amount is so far limited (CAT 2017: 2),1 but it usually takes a couple of years before returnees commit attacks (Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security 2018: 12). 1 in 4 jihadist terrorists that committed a
domestic attack since 9/11 was a returnee (Hegghammer 2013: 5).2 Foreign fighter
experience is one of the strongest predicters we have for domestic attacks (idem: 10). The OSCE concluded that state responses, particularly in an early stage, revealed fallacious gendered assumptions. Initially, many countries did for example not prosecute returning female foreign fighters, whilst males were (2018: 64-65).
1 10.6% of the returnees in France and only 3% in the Netherlands planned or committed an attack between
2013-2016.
2.3 Female jihad: the role of women in the Caliphate
Many authors argue that women are drawn to ISIS by the same motivations as men, such as a search for identity, adventure, a sense of religious duty, to help “fellow Muslims” build and live in the Caliphate, the prospect of a clean slate and expressing feelings of social exclusion and alienation in the country of origin (Davis 2017: 130; de Leede 2018: 8). Their main driver however, is religious ideology or political call (Loken & Zelenz 2017: 45). Literature is divided on the question whether there are additional gender specific motivations, but so far there seems little convincing evidence. Radicalization seems to be overall a largely gender-neutral, complex process that is caused by a combination of individual or group factors and
processes that can be economic, political and social (Davis 2017: 40). Nevertheless, there is a tendency to treat them as unique in their motivations (idem: 48).
Jihad generally translates to “struggle”. A distinction can be made between inner jihad and external jihad. The inner jihad holds the obligation for every Muslim to resist temptations. Groups such as ISIS claim to be an expression of the external jihad: armed struggle against those who threaten Islam or the unity of the Islamic rule. They return to a puritanical and literalist understanding of Islam found in Salafism (de Leede 2018: 2-3). Many foreign fighters consider hijra to be a religious duty under external jihad (Loken & Zelenz 2017: 64). Women and men are presumed to have an equal obligation to jihad. Similarities can be found between the roles women fulfil within Islamic non-state armed groups (Cohn 2013: 162-165). The female jihad is a particular interpretation of the ideological act of jihad for women. The division of tasks between men and women serves a strategic goal, which means both roles are equally important for the survival of the group and should be understood as complementary. Women are therefore not supposed to deviate from their role by carrying out tasks of the male jihad. Ambiguity exists within Islamic non-state armed groups about whether women can participate in combat (Von Knop 2007: 397, 411).
Von Knop distinguished three waves of women’s participation in jihad within Al-Qaeda. ISIS is no exception this type of progression of women within Islamic non-state armed groups (Winter 2015: 5). In the first wave, their role is limited to the private sphere where they have the task to support their husbands, give birth to the “next generation of fighters” and raise them with Islamic values (Von Knop 2007: 411). In a manifest of ISIS on the role of women in the Caliphate, women are described as inherently “sedentary” and dedicated to the “divine duty of motherhood” (Winter 2015: 6-7, 18). According to Loken and Zelenz, marriage serves an ideological purpose for female foreign fighters. They would consider it to be their
expression of jihad (2017: 59).
With the second wave, they take on the tasks of fundraising, recruitment and the role of morality police (Von Knop 2007: 411). They can also work as doctors, nurses or religious teachers (Peresin & Cervone 2015: 500). Nationality is a clear determinant in the division of roles for women in the Caliphate. Almost all ISIS’ female recruiters were from western countries (Spencer 2016: 96). A significant occupation of the women in this regard concerned the all-female Al-Khansaa and Umm Al-Rayan brigade, where for the majority Western women functioned as an ultra-oppressive public police force, committing serious violence against other women (Cook & Vale 2018: 28; Ennaji 2016: 550; Spencer 2016: 83-84; Yilmaz 2017: 27).
Finally, with the third wave, they join the combat as fighters (Von Knop 2007: 411). This is generally allowed when the position of the group is deteriorating or female combatants are a tactical need due to a lack of men. Furthermore, when women take up arms, this is used to shame men for not being able to protect them. It is thus used as a means to incite more men to join (Brunner 2005: 41; Winter & Margolin 2017: 25). It is clear that women never fulfil a leadership role in these types of groups (Davis 2017: 130). Within ISIS, women’s participation was initially limited to the first and second wave. According to most authors, there is
insufficient evidence that ISIS used women in combat, contrary to its predecessor Al-Qaeda (Cohn 2013: 165; Peresin 2015: 23).
Women’s participation in combat was however not precluded by ISIS in its manifest (Winter 2015: 22). Also, all women received weapon training in the Caliphate (Peresin 2015: 32). Winter describes a shift during the summer of 2017, when women were for the first time encouraged to get ready to take up arms in the propaganda magazine Rumiyah, other
magazines followed. This change of official position on women was also illustrated by a video ISIS published in February 2018, showing female combatants (2018: 10-11). Due to territorial collapse, ISIS would have been pushed to rethink the female role (Winter & Margolin 2017: 25). In the final stages of the battles of Mosul, 38 women would have committed suicide attacks, but this has not been sufficiently confirmed and concerns an exception (Al Shamary 2017). By all means, the contribution of women in ISIS is critical and should not be
2.4 The media
Terrorism constitutes a major part of the daily news coverage. The media are also the main vehicle through which citizens obtain information about terrorism. They largely shape the social construction of terrorism and the political and societal debate and can legitimize certain measures to address the issue. Put shortly, the media help to both produce knowledge and fear in this context (Berbers et al.: 2016: 800; Da Silva & Crilley 2016: 2-4). Reporting on terrorism has become more frequent. In the past, it was only in the news after an attack. Now, terrorism is given a platform much more often and terrorists themselves have become a legitimate media source to present their arguments (Yarchi 2014: 676). The media are more than simply a platform in which various actors can engage with each other. They are participants in a debate, because they set agendas and frame issues by choosing which voices are being heard and which are given credibility (Delcour & Hustinx 2017: 266). Meaning is created through an interaction between the media and its readers. That is to say: newspapers construct the society and identity of their readers, but also
construct themselves in relationship to them with to keep them attached (Baker et al.: 2013: 6).
The influence of the media on public opinion has been substantiated by various
examinations. It has been found for example that readers tend to accept explanations of the media of sex differences as being scientifically valid (Brescoll & LaFrance 2004). Another example is that negative portrayal of asylum seekers by the media had a direct and immediate effect on reader’s assumptions about them (Lido et al.: 2006).
Several groups can benefit from media coverage on terrorism. Firstly, political actors can reach certain audiences in order to gain electoral support. Secondly, media outlets
themselves have an interest in large revenues and high numbers of readers (Jackson et al.: 2011: 53). In the world of today, in which we receive loads of information, a message will only get our attention if it is dramatic, aberrant or personalized. Lastly, the media can be used by terrorist organizations which have found female terrorist to be a fruitful means to get attention and cause anxiety (De Graaf 2012: 14-15).
The study of news frames is useful because it encourages us to understand media
representations as choices rather than neutral or objective representations. News frames can be defined as: “the interpretative structures [or packages] that journalists employ to help their audiences locate an event within a broader context of historical, political, social and normative dynamics” (Jackson et al.: 2011: 54). It is a process of selection in which certain aspects will be prioritized at the expense of others. Also, it contains the magnifying or shrinking of elements, giving some of them more salience. Frames have cognitive and evaluative effects on their audiences. The cognitive effect is that frames encourage particular readings to qualify an event in terms of causal explanation. The evaluative dimension of a frame encourages audiences to adopt a particular moral interpretation or justifies a particular treatment.
When a narrative is regularly repeated by prominent discursive powers, it can become embedded within social and political life and gain widespread currency as the truth. It will become a ‘common sense’ explanation of what has occurred and as a consequence, certain policies become viewed as necessary in response. Furthermore, these narratives help to shape social identities by opposing the ‘self’ to the ‘others’ that should be rejected. In this process, critical voices and alternatives are excluded (Jackson et al.: 2011: 54-56; Yarchi 2014: 675). Frames have more resonance in a society when they fit into the cultural themes of a country. Also, the more a story is focussed on an individual, the harder the responses the reader considers to be legitimate. Journalists are mostly not aware of the ideological components in their writing, which is called ‘frame-blindness’ (Berbers et al.: 2015: 800). In this way, the media can securitize certain issues, legitimizing far-reaching responses. The media often ignore or downplay women’s roles in conflict, despite their active
contributions (Enloe 1989: 3). The media often favour simplified representations of complex issues. Particularly because it is hard to explain why women deviate from cultural and traditional roles or why cruel terrorist attacks take place, stereotypical explanations are seized to create a feeling of control and to legitimize all means against it (De Graaf 2012: 16; Nacos 2005: 437). Throughout history, female violence challenging gender hierarchies was feared to destabilize societies and these fears expressed across time and culture in
downgrading them (Sjoberg & Gentry 2008: 8). It can lead to complete underestimation (De Graaf 2012: 16).
Nevertheless, the media sensationalize female terrorism and thus give disproportionate attention to the topic. In fact, women would receive approximately eight times more media attention than men for perpetrating similar terrorist acts (Bloom 2011: 7). Referring to the specific case of ISIS, Sjoberg even concluded the “hypervisibility” of women in this conflict (2018: 296). According to Loken and Zelenz this is the case because so many Western women from gender-equitable societies joined ISIS, which also disrupts the ‘emancipation’ narratives that support intervention and international security (2017: 49). The specific media frames found in previous research to portray women in conflict and terrorism are explained and operationalized in the code book (appendix I).
3. Historical context: The case of France and the Netherlands
This chapter will provide a description of the historical context. This is particularly useful for the historical discourse analysis conducted. It will sketch the developments of Islam,
Muslims and experiences with terrorism in France and the Netherlands.
The first section discusses the factors that played a significant role in France: the French colonial past, the concept of laïcité within the French republican state system, the French military involvement in conflicts abroad and France’s frequent experiences with terrorist attacks. The second section will describe the Dutch colonial past, the origins of the Dutch Muslim community, the shift from the pillar system to secularism, and lastly, the change in political approach from ‘equal pluralism’ to more restrictive policies.
3.1 France: The most targeted country and the ‘French’ Islam
The first wave of Muslim migrants to France started around 1910 which consisted of colonial guest workers and soldiers serving in World War I. A second wave of labour migrants was actively recruited in the 1960s to solve the post-World War II labour shortage. Most of them came from Algeria and the Maghreb more broadly. They were encouraged to maintain their own culture and religion – though only privately or hidden – as it was considered to
smoothen their return. However, many of them have stayed permanently and during the 1970s their family members moved to France as well (Fetzer & Soper 2005: 63-64; Maussen 2009: 68, 87, 119). Until the early 1970s, Islam stayed a quite ‘hidden’ religion and many failing efforts were undertaken to exclude or deport migrants (Fetzer & Soper 2005: 62-65). Ever since however, France has the largest Muslim population of Europe in absolute as well as relative terms (Pew Research Centre 2017: 4).
Through its colonial ties, France has been and is to this day a present political player in the Middle East and Africa. Its colonial past has endowed France with a proximity and
understanding of the Muslim world, more than other European countries (Bindner 2018: 5). Already during the Ottoman Empire, France was the first to establish ties with the region by
sending its ambassador to Istanbul in 1535. It claimed to serve as ‘Europe’s window to the Islamic world’ (Landry 2013: 59).
The first French Mediterranean colony was Algeria, conquered by France in 1830 (Fetzer & Soper 2005: 63). During its colonial rule in Algeria, France attempted to create a “French Islam” that was considered loyal in the sense that it wouldn’t challenge the French colonial rule. In order to secure this, the French government at the time decided not to apply the separation of state and religion that was established by law in 1905. The Islamic authorities in the colonies functioned as intermediaries between the colonial rulers and the colonized subjects. When the revolts against the French colonial rule started in the mid-1950s, this was not explained by the French as a claim for political rights, but as the expression of Muslim barbarity (Anagnostopoulou 2012: 78-79). The Algerian War of Independence soon turned into a horrific civil war that was characterized by terrorism, torture and counterterror. The leading guerrilla group, the Front Libération Nationale (FLN) used Islamic rhetoric to justify its terrorist attacks, which caused increasing fear for Islam amongst the French (Fetzer & Soper 2005: 64).
The idea of a “French Islam” has been leading in French policies covering Islam and Muslims in France upon today (Maussen 2009: 63, 139). As a counterforce, France’s former colonies have closely influenced the development of Islam within France as well. In this way, Islam in France has been in a constant process of redefinition and several versions of Islam
competed. The Paris Mosque became a symbol of this process. It was used as an instrument by both the French and Algerian government to exercise influence on the development of Islam in France (idem: 75).
Another important element shaping Islam in France is the concept of laïcité, which was introduced by law in 1905 and is considered to be a cornerstone of the French republican state system. This concept ensures the separation of state and religion and is applied strictly by the French government. It has led to laws prohibiting face coverings, limited religious expression in public schools, no government funding for Islamic schools and in some cases the impediment of efforts to construct mosques (Bindner 2018: 6; Fetzer & Soper 2005: 62-63). The French application of secularism can be featured as “assertive secularism” in which
the state seeks to exclude religion from the public sphere and confine it to the private domain (Kuru 2009: 8). Here, the existence of an ‘ancien régime’ in the French history is of crucial importance. The type of secularism France has today, emerged in reaction to the monarchy and hegemonic religion France had known for centuries (idem: 231).
Nevertheless, the question of the legitimate role of religion in French life and the meaning of the concept of laïcité was highly debated during the establishment of the secularity law and still is today (Fetzer & Soper 2005: 71). The actual meaning of laïcité is explained in several ways and has changed over time. Today, it has increasingly come to mean that religious neutrality is not only a requirement for the state, but also for individuals, including those that are not employed by the state. In this sense, the so-called ‘strict laïcité’ is currently the most supported version (Fredette 2017: 103). More importantly, it should be noted that the French ‘secular’ public sphere that is considered to be at the core of the French republic and its values, is actually largely unarticulated (Selby 2012: 7).
Within this debate, the headscarf and highly contested hijab became a symbol of the confrontation between Islam and the French values (Maussen 2009: 259). Initially, the Muslim-other was given a specific symbolic place in the republican debates on secularism. Over time however, France has known several ‘Islamic veil affairs’ (‘l’affaire du voile’) through which the French Muslims became a subject of debate on its own right (Nilsson 2018: 79). The first affair emerged when three girls wearing veils were excluded from a school in 1989, which released societal discussions on the oppression of Muslim women and the incompatibility of Islam with the value of equality between the sexes (idem: 46-48, 106). Equality between the sexes is considered to be an offspring of the French laïcité (Mavelli 2013: 172). Already during the French colonial rule, the headscarf was used as a means to distinguish between the colonizers and the native inhabitants. The ban on the headscarf was assumed to make the native population “fully French” (Nilsson 2018: 34).
Gradually, the veil transformed into a symbol of mounting Islamism and fundamentalist threat. In this way, the ban on the headscarf became the French state’s response to its new ‘enemies’ (idem: 32). The affairs peaked with the prohibition of the headscarf in public
debate was feminism as a cornerstone of French society. An idealized model of French femininity (‘Marriannes d’aujourd’hui’) emerged which should be endeavoured for Muslim women. They were considered to be in need of liberation. Here, emancipation was
measured by women’s way of dressing. Lipstick and jeans were associated with the external world and freedom, whereas the veil was associated with the household and oppression. In this way, feminism and women’s emancipation became linked with and opposed to Islam (Kemp 2009: 23; Nilsson 2018: 63).
France was the first European country to be confronted with radical Islam and terrorism in the 1990s and during the Algerian civil war (Haddad & Balz 2008: 216). Currently, France is the most targeted country of the Western world with a series of large attacks committed by extremists who claim to act in the name of Islam. Amongst others: the attacks on the
headquarters of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, which symbolized an attack on the freedom of expression. In November that year, the largest attack on European continent took place in Paris. In total, 130 people were killed and 350 wounded on several locations including during a concert in the Bataclan-theatre. Another big attack was committed finally in Nice on the holiday of 14 July which killed 86 people. A state of
emergency was declared and ended after one and a half years of criticism and protest. It had been argued in reports of several human rights bodies that it unfairly targeted French
Muslims (Fredette 2017: 101-102). Besides, France has been the ‘number one’ provider of foreign fighters of ISIS. The French returnees are considerably more involved in terrorist attacks than other European returnees (CAT 2017: 6-8). For these reasons, France has historically been a pioneer in adopting policies covering Islam, institutionalization of Islam and anti-terrorism, providing an example for many other European states (Haddad & Balz 2008: 216).
As a member of the anti-ISIS coalition, France is one of ISIS’ most important enemies (CAT 2017: 11). France has been actively involved in different international interventions in the past, such as through military involvement in Afghanistan, with peacekeepers in UNIFIL in Lebanon and with the support for Israel and the US. Jihadist recruitment quotes these examples to justify retaliation (Bindner 2018: 4). The historical event that explains the active engagement of France in the Middle-East today – particularly in Syria – is the so-called
Sykes-Picot Agreement that was signed in 1916. In this secret agreement, the fate of the Middle-East after the First World War and the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire was decided upon by the British Mark Sykes and the French Georges Picot. The aim was to clarify and safeguard the British and French rival colonial interests in the region. The design of the borders was made official through the League of Nations, that imposed mandate regimes because it considered the peoples in the Middle-East incapable of self-rule. The French mandate – which ended officially in 1943 – covered parts of Syria, Lebanon and Turkey. This agreement has been referenced to as well by ISIS in one of its propaganda videos (Bilgin 2016: 355-357).
Within France itself there has been hostility towards Muslims as well as a sentiment of exclusion and discrimination amongst the Muslim population. This expressed itself on the one side through support for the populist right-wing party Front National which often heavily attacks the Muslim community. On the other side, there have been violent protests against the French state in the big cities. The French government responded with harsh police action, but also with the establishment of education programmes in the banlieues and anti-discrimination laws (Fetzer & Soper 2005: 67-68).
3.2 The Netherlands: From ‘ideal-type’ multicultural society to ‘failed integration’ of Muslims
During the colonial rule, the Dutch Kingdom had around 40 million Muslims under its rule, all living in the Dutch East Indies (current Indonesia). Therefore, the Dutch government realized Islam was an important element for safeguarding colonial rule. Not without reason, because several historical examples illustrate the crucial roles of Islam and Muslim leaders in anti-colonial activism in the 19th century. The Dutch government appointed scientist Christian Snouck Hurgronje. He was one of the first Dutch scientists that would study Islam thoroughly and would provide the Dutch authorities with insights into ways to colonize the Muslims in the Dutch East Indies (Burhanudin 2014: 26-27). On his recommendation, the leading policy became to refrain from interference with the religious practice of Muslims, but take
immediate – if necessary military – measures to restrain the development of political Islam which was viewed by Hurgronje as a threat (idem: 32). Yet, the Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia has barely influenced policies regarding Islam in the Netherlands (Maussen 2009: 125).
Following France, the Netherlands has the second proportionally largest Muslim population in Europe, covering around 7% of the Dutch population (Pew Research Centre 2017: 4). Only a limited amount of Muslims from Indonesia moved to the Netherlands during the during the Second World War and after Indonesia gained independence in 1949 (Nielsen & Otterbeck 2015: 67). In the 1950s a small community of Moluccan Muslims came to the Netherlands (Buijs 2009: 424). A more substantial amount of Muslims came as labour
migrants from the former Dutch colony of Suriname in the 1960s (Nielsen & Otterbeck 2015: 67). During these years, the Dutch government encouraged Muslim migrants to maintain and develop their cultural identity, with the establishment of religious buildings and
language classes in the mother tongue. The idea was that this would facilitate their return to their countries of origin (Buijs 2009: 426).
However, the majority of the Dutch Muslim population consists of Moroccans and Turks, who were actively recruited in the late 1960s for industrial jobs through recruitment agreements (Nielsen & Otterbeck 2015: 68; Sözeri et al.: 2018: 4). At that time, they were
referred to as “guest workers” or as “Moroccans” or “Turks” by both politicians and the media, because they considered their stay to be temporary. Islam did not serve as a label to identify these groups and policy makers and researches were clearly not aware of the potential cultural and social problems the influx of migrants could pose (Shadid 2006: 12). Given the over-representation of Turks and Moroccans, the focus in political debate has later however often been on these two groups (Buijs 2009: 424).
Traditionally, the Dutch state has known a Christian tradition and has been characterized by the concept of pillarization (‘verzuiling’). Pillarization is “the organization of a social body along confessional or sectarian lines in a segmented polity”. The idea is to organize different ideologies and faiths in a structurally similar way (Bracke 2011: 31). This meant that four pillars structured Dutch political parties, education, printed and broadcast media,
organizations and trade unions. The four pillars covered the Roman Catholics, the Reformed and Re-reformed (Protestants and Calvinists), the humanists (secular) and finally socialist pillar (Bracke 2011: 31; Nielsen & Otterbeck 2015: 69). It was considered by the Dutch government to establish new pillars for the migrant communities, but this policy was discontinued with the whole process of secularization that started during the 20th century
(Nielsen & Otterbeck 2015: 68-69). It has been argued in historical research that the lack of an ‘Islamic pillar’ has been a major determining factor in the development of Islam as a religion in the Netherlands, but this has also been contested (Maussen 2012; Sözeri et al.: 2018: 3). All in all, the pillarization model shows how ‘managing difference’ is deeply engrained in Dutch society and forms the foundation for its characterization as a tolerant country (Bracke 2011: 32).
Secularism in the Dutch state system is understood as minimal state interference in the way religious communities manage their affairs, so less strictly applied than the French laïcité. It does not separate religion from politics for example, with both Christian and Muslim parties represented in the parliament (Sözeri et al.: 2018: 2) and the government provides funding for both religious and secular education (Maussen 2012: 341). Dutch secularism is associated with tolerance in the sense of ideological and religious diversity, but also closely related to women’s liberation and sexual freedom (Bracke 2011: 33). However, this secular separation
