Satire or hard news, does not make a difference
A study about the effects of political satire on attitudes towards the refugee crisis with a
moderating effect of watching satire in line with one’s political preference or not
Cilia Meinen 10986162 Master Thesis
Graduate School of Communication
Master’s programme Communication Science L. Jacobs
28-06-19
Word count: 6509
Abstract
During the recent years, satire TV shows have increased in popularity. Especially, in the United States, several late-night shows exist that resemble news shows, but actually are a satire-based program for entertainment purposes. These late-night shows look like news shows and because of that resemblance, the audience often perceives these shows as an objective news source. The question is whether these satire shows can have an effect on individual’s attitudes and whether being exposed to a message that is in line with one’s political preference or not has an influence. This study examined these effects via conducting an online experiment, with four experimental conditions. However, no such effects were found when analyzing the results. These findings do have implications for society and for future research.
2
Introduction
During the recent years, satire TV shows have increased in popularity. Especially, in the United
States, several late-night shows exist that resemble news shows, but actually are a satire-based
program for entertainment purposes. Examples include The Late Show, Jimmy Kimmel Live,
The Daily Show and Full Frontal. However, this is exactly where it gets tricky. These late-night
shows look like news shows and because of that resemblance, the audience often perceives
these shows as an objective news source (Holbert, 2013). This may be problematic due to the
distinct goal attainment of satire. Unlike traditional news, satire shows are primarily meant to
entertain the audience instead of to inform it. The entertainment aspect has been shown to be
harmful to knowledge of particular groups of people since most of the time satire is meant to entertain and only portrays facts that fit the joke (Boukes, Boomgaarden, Moorman & de
Vreese, 2015). Still, this persuasive effect has proven to be minimal, making that individuals
would not be really misled (Holbert, 2013).
The effects of political satire on attitudes has been studied before. Prior research has shown that opinionated news can have an effect on citizens’ attitudes (Boukes, Boomgaarden,
Moorman & de Vreese, 2014; Lee, 2014). However, less research has been conducted
regarding the moderating role of political preference. Nevertheless, investigating the relationship
between satire and attitudes towards the addressed issue and the influence of political
preference is relevant. Selective exposure predicts that it is likely that citizens will gear more
towards information that is already in line with their political preference, as prior research has
shown (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009). It is therefore relevant to know whether messages that are not in line with one’s political preference can still have an
effect on citizens’ attitudes or not (Boukes et al., 2014). More interestingly, what has not been
studied in depth before, are the consequences of opinion formation when citizens are exposed
3 communication perspective, it is relevant to know how selective exposure plays a role in forming
attitudes. Disentangling the effects of being exposed to a satire message that is not in line with one’s predispositions, hence, contributes to extant knowledge by shedding more light on the
consequences of satire, suggesting its impact is conditional. The issue that is going to be
studied is the refugee crisis that burst out from spring 2015 onwards (Feldman & Borum
Chattoo, 2019). This crisis refers to issues that the European Union (EU) is dealing with right
now regarding refugees from the Middle East. It is called a crisis because the flow of refugees is
large and the European countries are divided by the way they should shelter them. The choice
for attitudes regarding the refugee crisis stems from the consideration that the issue had to be
somewhat controversial because then citizens are more likely to have an outspoken opinion
about the issue (Bischof & Rupnow, 2017). Hence, the main research question in this study is
as follows:
RQ: ‘To what extent does political satire have an influence on the attitudes of Dutch citizens
about the refugee crisis and what is the influence of political preference?’.
To test these effects, an online experiment will be conducted, with four experimental conditions.
The conditions consist of four different videos which will be left-wing satire, right-wing satire,
neutral satire and hard news. The videos will be similar to existing late-night shows which will
make it possible to reflect the results on reality.
Theoretical Framework
Political satire
Political satire is a form of political entertainment where a message about a political issue is
4 actors. They include the source of satire (the satirist), the recipient (the satiree) and the target of
the satire (the satirized). The satire is not received properly when the recipient is not in
agreement with the humor source. This means that when the satiree and the satirist are not
agreeing on the satirized, then the satire message would have less impact. Via entertainment
and humor, satire attracts attention to issues that would otherwise be ignored (Feldman &
Young, 2008). Moreover, when humor is used to bring a message about a controversial topic to
the table, people are less likely to counter-argue this message (Boukes et al., 2015; Nabi,
Moyer-Gusé & Byrne, 2007; Young, 2008).
Effects of political satire on attitudes
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), the way
individuals process information is determined by two different routes: the central route and the
peripheral route. On one hand, when individuals take the central route to process information,
they really think about the message. They consider different arguments and evaluate these in a critical way. The extent to which someone considers a message is called ‘message elaboration’,
and this can result in attitude change. On the other hand, individuals can process information by
not really thinking in depth about a message, thereby accepting or ignoring a message without
taking a critical look at it. There is no message elaboration involved as part of this route. The
ELM provides a framework for the amount of message elaboration. This theory states that, this depends on various aspects, such as individuals’ involvement in the issue or, the product or
service that is being addressed in the message. Applying this framework to political satire, it
follows that the way people process an issue is likely to have an effect on their attitude
regarding that same issue. The question remains, however, whether political satire has the
ability to influence the way individuals process the message in comparison to individuals who
were not exposed to political satire. This theory in particular is highly relevant for the purpose of
5 recent studies have tried to replicate the findings by Petty and Cacioppo (1986). Cole, Ettenson,
Reinke and Schrader (1990) have found some conflicting results. They found little support for
the theory using an experimental design. In contrast, Kitchen, Kerr, Schultz, McColl and Pals
(2014) have found that the original model was outdated, arguing that extensions are necessary
to include effects of digital media, such as the internet.
Prior research, has also shown that when satire is too complex, individuals are less likely to
process the arguments given by the satirist in a critical way (Young, 2008). Still, Nabi et al.
(2007) have found that individuals process the arguments from soft news and political
entertainment sources not as thorough as from hard news or debates. In contrast, LaMarre and
Walther (2013) have found that individuals who watched a late-night show, reflected more about
the issue addressed on the show than individuals who watched political (hard) news on the
same issue. However, individuals who watched the late-night show may think more about the
issue compared to the individuals who watched the political news. Individuals who watched the
late-night show thought less about the underlying political message than individuals who
watched the political news. Boukes et al. (2014) have shown that news that is opinionated can affect individuals’ political attitudes, but that this a mediated effect by two other factors:
presumed media influence and hostile media responses.
The findings stated above deal with the way people process messages that are sent through
satire. As the ELM prescribes, the way individuals process a message, can affect the attitude
that person will have about the message they received. Therefore, these findings above could
have some implications on the question whether political satire can have an effect on
someone’s attitude towards the issue. Importantly, it seems that opinions are not formed in a
vacuum, but that it is relevant to take into account other factors as well. One of these relevant factors are citizens’ predispositions or their preexisting attitudes.
6 Political preference and selective exposure
As explained above, Simpson (2003) states that satire works best when the satirist and the satiree agree about the satirized. This would implicate that when individuals are exposed to
satire that is not in line with their own political preference, the satire has less effect. This implies
that when individuals are exposed to a piece of satire that is not in line with their political
preference, this would have no or less effect on their attitudes towards the issue compared to
when the satire is in line with their political preference. This can be partly explained by theories
regarding selective exposure and self-selection.
From the literature on public opinion formation, we know that political preferences are a key
predictor of various political attitudes and behaviours (LaMarre, Landreville & Beam, 2009). This
has been studied with regard to political satire as well. LaMarre, Landreville and Beam (2009)
studied the American late-night show of Stephen Colbert, The Colbert Report, and have found
that both conservatives and liberals found him equally funny. No significant difference was
present between the two different political ideologies. They argue that both groups see the
humor but perceive the intended message differently. More specifically, both groups interpret
the messages in a way that is in line with their own ideology. This implies that political preference does not have an effect on people’s attitudes concerning the message since
individuals will interpret the message in such a way that it is in line with their predispositions.
Another study that supports this implication is that of Knobloch-Westerwick (2012). She has
found that when individuals were exposed to political messages that were in line with their
preexisting attitudes, their attitudes where enhanced. However, exposure to counter attitudinal
messages had no significant effects. This again suggests that being exposed to a message that is not in line with one’s political preference has no influence on their attitudes.
7 Additionally, people have a tendency to look for information that they are already interested in and/or that is in line with their predispositions. This is called the ‘selective exposure hypothesis’.
This hypothesis suggests that if individuals are allowed to choose from a wide range of
information, they will select issues and information that are already in line with their own
interests and opinions (Dvir-Gvirsman, Garrett & Tsfati, 2018). Thus, when people have a
certain political ideology they are not likely to watch a late-night that has clearly a very different political view. This could be linked to Katz’ Uses and Gratifications Theory (Griffin, 2015). This
theory suggests that individuals use media for their own needs. If individuals only consume
satire to fulfill their own needs, the chances are high that they will not consume political satire
that is not in line with their political ideology.
Iyengar and Hahn (2009) have found that when comparing the news outlets preferred by
individuals with different political ideologies, the conservatives and republicans prefer to watch
news provided by Fox News and to avoid CNN and NPR. This is completely the other way
around for democrats and liberals: They prefer news from CNN and NPR and avoid Fox News.
This is in line with the theories presented above. Likewise, Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng
(2009) have found that individuals spend significantly more time on reading political information
in line with their already existing attitudes than on political information that was not in line with
their attitudes. It is also more common that individuals only read information that is in line with
their attitudes and information of both sides, than only reading counter attitudinal information.
These studies both implicate that people gear more towards information that is already in line
with their political preference, and that information that is in line with citizens pre-existing
attitudes will also yield a stronger effect.
8 The focus of this study is on satire and the effects it has on individuals’ attitudes towards the
issue that is discussed within the satire. The issue chosen to discuss is the refugee crisis in
Europe that burst out since 2015 (Feldman & Borum Chattoo, 2019). The refugee crisis refers to
the flow of refugees that is coming from the Middle East. The issue has become controversial
because several incidents happened, like stealing and harassing, where refugees were
involved. The decision to use this issue is based on two factors. First, it is a hotly debated and
salient issue in the Netherlands at this moment and it is a controversial and sensitive topic.
Therefore, Dutch citizens are likely to have a strong opinion about the refugee crisis where, they
either want to welcome and allow refugees or they want to close the gates. Often, there is not
really a clear in between, which makes it easier to manipulate the conditions in a right-wing and
a left-wing message. Second, it is common for satirists to use controversial topics, since it is
easier to make fun of more sensitive topics (Boukes et al., 2015; Nabi, Moyer-Gusé & Byrne,
2007; Young, 2008).
Based on the findings and theories stated above, the following hypotheses can be formulated. H1: ‘Watching a piece of satire has a stronger effect on attitudes towards the refugee crisis compared to watching a piece of hard news.’
H2: ‘The effect satire has on attitudes towards the refugee crisis will be stronger when the satire is in line with one’s political preference compared to satire that is not in line with one’s
political preference.’
Method
Strategy
The study will consist of an online experiment since a causal relationship is being measured. It
9 analysis (Gravetter & Forzano, 2012). In an experiment - the internal validity is higher because
the experiment is conducted in a controlled environment. If randomization is successful and the
sample size is sufficiently high, any changes in the outcome can only be due to the stimulus.
Still, external validity may be lower because the experiment is conducted in a controlled
environment (Gravetter & Forzano, 2012), which means that it may not be a situation that
occurs in real life making generalizability across a non-experimental setting uncertain. To
maximize external validity, however, in this study an online piece of political satire is used that is
quite similar to how people consume media in real life.
Sample
The final sample consisted of 146 participants (n = 146), 26 per cent of the participants were
male and 74 per cent were female (Mage = 25.96, SDage = 8.94). Because of ethical
considerations and the fact that citizens are only entitled to vote at or above the age of 18, all
respondents had to be (older than) 18. The respondents were recruited via social media, Whatsapp and e-mail. This type of sampling is called a ‘convenience sample’ because
respondents are recruited through own contacts on social media (Boeije, ’t Hart & Hox, 2009).
This may have a negative effect on the external validity because it is likely not to be
representative of the population, shedding doubt on the generalizability of the findings
(Gravetter & Forzano, 2012). Still, since this study does not focus on the means and is not concerned with providing population statistics, but instead focuses on the differences between
the groups following exposure to a stimulus, this is arguably less problematic.
Factorial design
In this study, a 2 (exposure to satire: satire vs. hard news) x 2 (political preference: in line with
political preference vs. not in line with political preference) within-between-subjects factorial design was used. Hence, the independent variable is ‘Exposure to satire’ and the moderator is
10 ‘In line with political preference’. The variable ‘Exposure to satire’ is operationalized as being
exposed to satire or not. In this case, not being exposed to satire means being exposed to a hard news message, which was as neutral as possible. The variable ‘In line with political
preference’ means that someone is exposed to a message that is in line with their political
preference or not, which has been measured in a pre-test. In terms of messages, a distinction
has been made between a left-wing and a right-wing message. Because there are two factors
which both consist of two conditions, the experiment exists of four conditions in total (satire
left-wing, satire right-left-wing, neutral satire and hard news). The design is a mixture of a
between-subjects and a within-between-subjects design. Every respondent was only exposed to one of the four
conditions, but refugee crisis attitudes were measured twice (before and after the stimulus) and
were then compared. The choice for a between-subjects design is because this eliminates the
chance of having to deal with carry over-effects (Gravetter & Forzano, 2012). This consideration
is relevant in this study because if a participant first watches the video that is in line with their
political preference, and after watches the video that is not in line with their political preference,
could have an effect on their attitude towards the refugee crisis. This could for example be more
negative if they first watch the video that is in line with their political preference than when they
only watch the video that is not in line with their political preference. The danger with the
within-subjects element of this study is that people might be primed because the questions will be
about the immigration crisis. This could possibly cause awareness with the participants because they could start focusing on this topic and know that that is what the research is about. This
could have an influence on the results of the study. Importantly, our mixed design approach also
means that the allocation to conditions is not fully random, as this is done on the basis of their
predispositions. Still, regarding all other characteristics, there should be no differences between
the participants in the various experimental conditions.
11 For the stimuli, four different videos were used which were edited by the author specifically for
the purpose of this study. Three of these videos consisted of a satirical message about the
refugee crisis. One was more left-wing, another one was more right wing and the third video
was neutral satire. The fourth video was a hard news story about the same issue which was as
neutral as possible. The setting of these videos was exactly the same with the same host and
background, only the spoken text was slightly different, adjusted to the condition. The hard news
video was also without jokes, since that is what makes it satire or not. The written text of the
stimuli materials is included in Appendix 1.
Pilot-study
To make sure the stimuli are correctly perceived by the participants, a pilot-study was
conducted. This was done by sending out a survey which consisted of eight videos. More
specifically, there were two different versions of stimulus material, and after every video the participants were asked to answer the same three questions. The first question was ‘where
would you place this video on the political spectrum?’, where the respondents could answer
through a slider for ‘0’ to ‘100’, where ‘0’ was the most left-wing, ‘50’ was neutral and ‘100’ was
the most right-wing. The next question was ‘What genre would you assign this video to?’, where
they could choose between ‘political entertainment’, ‘late-night talk show’, ‘political satire’, ‘hard
news (daily news, objective news)’ and ‘I don’t know’. The final question was ‘To what extent would you say that this video is political satire?’, where the respondents could answer through a
slider ranging from ‘0’ to ‘100’ where ‘0’ was ‘no satire at all’ and ‘100’ was ‘purely satire’.
Thirteen participants took part in this pilot study (69.2% female, Mage = 24.15, SDage =
9.06). All respondents watched all eight videos and answered all questions. To analyze this
data, the two corresponding videos were compared to assess which of the two versions presented the better manipulation. For the variables ‘political spectrum’ and level of satire’, a
12 were intended since both variables are interval/ratio variables. For the variable ‘genre’, a chi2
-test was done to see whether the two versions differentiated, since it is a nominal variable.
From the testing, the second version (video 2) turned out to be the best perceived as
political satire. There was a significant difference on this variable for all of the satire videos, only
the hard news video was in both versions perceived as no satire. Full results regarding the tests
are included in Table 2. When looking at where on the political spectrum individuals would place
the videos, only the right-wing videos differed significantly, t (12) = -2.88, p = 0.014, CI = [-4.93;
-2.88], d = 0.800. Comparing the means of the two versions shows that the second version was
perceived as more right-wing than the first version (M1 = 53.77, SD1 = 19.90; M2 = 73.92, SD2 =
20.16). These factors combined justify the decision to use version 2 for the actual experiment.
Variable Video 1 Left Video 1 Neutral Video 1 Right Video 1 Hard News Video 2 Left Video 2 Neutral Video 2 Right Video 2 Hard News Political Spectrum 40.23(21.00) 45.77(15.92) 53.77(19.90) 43.62(12.59) 29.15(20.01) 46.54(12.10) 73.92(20.16) 47.54(8.65) Level of satire 40.92(31.39) 42.00(27.59) 39.23(29.77) 13.00(14.73) 77.92(16.14) 71.08(20.72) 78.08(20.29) 8.92(14.04) Table 1
13 Dependent variable
In this study, ‘attitude towards the refugee crisis’ was the dependent variable. This variable was
measured using a preexisting scale to secure the internal validity, since these scales are already validated. ‘Attitude towards the refugee crisis’ was measured by using a scale
consisting of fifteen items (Stephan, Ybarra & Bachman, 1999). This was measured using a
7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). One of the items was: ‘Refugees should learn to conform to the rules and norms of the Dutch society as soon as
possible after they arrive’. The items were changed accordingly to fit the specific issue of the
refugee crisis. The full list of items can be found in Appendix 2. Items were reversed scored
when necessary to create a scale where higher scores meant a more negative attitude towards
refugees. Since a pre- and post-test was done, a difference score was calculated by extracting
the score of the pre-test from the score of the post-test. A negative score means that the
attitude towards refugees has become more negative compared to the pre-test. A more positive
score means that the attitude towards refugees has become more positive. A score of zero
indicates that the attitude has remained the same. Variable
Video 1&2 Left Video 1&2 Neutral Video 1&2 Right Video 1&2 Hard News Political spectrum 0.077 0.879 0.014 0.156 Genre 0.411 0.049 0.458 0.002 Level of satire 0.005 0.015 0.003 0.138 Table 2
14 A factor analysis and a reliability analysis were conducted to evaluate whether the scale
is valid and reliable. The factor analysis with Varimax rotation showed that two components
could be compiled since there were two main components with an Eigenvalue higher than one
(Eigenvalue = 4.74; Eigenvalue= 2.31). These components explain the variance for 19.85 per
cent and 19.72 per cent. There are also two smaller components with an Eigenvalue higher than
one (Eigenvalue = 1.35; Eigenvalue = 1.11). Since these two components were just barely
higher than one, and only three items loaded on those two components in total, those three
items were excluded. From the two components, seven items loaded on one component
(Highest = .77; Lowest = .56) and the other eight items loaded on the other component (Highest = .80; Lowest = .47). Next, the reliability analysis showed that the Cronbach’s Alpha was above
.80 on both components (α = .81; α = .80), making both scales reliable. Although there were two
scales according to the factor analysis, for this study it was relevant to detect differences
between the pre- and post-test of attitude, rather than the structure of the attitude towards refugees. Therefore, both scales have been taken together. When doing that, Cronbach’s Alpha
is above .80 (α = .82), thus reliable.
Randomization and covariates
Gender, age and level of education were taken up as covariates to check whether the results
are not caused or influenced by one of these factors. Comparisons were done to check if the distribution of these factors was equal between the different experimental conditions. Gender was measured through a multiple choice question where ‘male’ was coded as ‘0’, ‘female’ was
coded as ‘1’ and ‘other’ was coded as ‘2’. Age was measured as an open question and level of
education was measured as a multiple choice question with eight options (see Appendix 2 for
the exact operationalization). The test confirmed that there were no differences on the
covariates throughout the conditions for specific sociodemographic variables. For the satire
15 age (t (58) = 0.45, p = .653, CI [-3.65; 5.78]) and level of education (chi2 (3) = 3.40, p = .333). For the political preference conditions, no significant differences were found as well in terms of
gender (chi2 (1) = 0.00, p = .964), age (t (41) = 0.03, p = .978, CI [-4.89; 5.03]), level of education (chi2 (3) = 1.41, p = .702) and political ideology (t (41) = -0.53, p = .600, CI [-16.27; 9.52]). The randomization was successful.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted online. First, participants were presented with the inform consent which describes what will be done with the participant’s data and what their rights are.
After having read this, the participant could click on the ‘I agree’ button to proceed with the
experiment. If they opted for the ‘I do not agree’ button, the participant would be led towards the
end of the survey. After agreeing to participate, the participant was led to questions about their
demographic information and background variables, which included gender, age, level of
education, internet usage, social media usage and political interest. Next, the participant had to
answer questions as part of the pre-test of their attitude toward refugees. After that, a briefing
for the video appeared where they were instructed to turn on their volume since they were about
to watch a video. The participants were told that they could go to the next page after watching
the video. After watching the video, they received the questions as part of the post-test of their
attitude toward refugees. After these questions, the manipulation checks were asked. Finally, the participant was debriefed and thanked for their participation. The full survey is taken up in
Appendix 1 to 3.
Analytical strategy
In the following section, first the results of the manipulation checks will be reported and below
that the results of the analyzed data will be displayed. Hypothesis H1 expected that watching a
16 compared to watching a piece of hard news. To test this effect, a two-way ANOVA was done. In this analysis, ‘attitude towards refugees’ was the dependent variable and ‘satire condition’ was
the independent variable.
Hypothesis H2 expected that the effect satire has on attitudes towards the refugee crisis would be stronger when the satire is in line with one’s political preference compared to satire
that is not in line with one’s political preference. To test this effect, a two-way ANOVA will be
done. In this analysis, ‘attitude towards refugees’ is the dependent variable and ‘satire condition’
will be the independent variable, ‘political preference’ will be the moderator.
Results
Manipulation checks
To make sure that respondents perceived the videos correctly, a manipulation check was
conducted. There were three questions in the survey to check this. The first question was: ‘Were you able to watch and hear the video correctly?’. This was measured by a multiple choice
question with the options ‘yes’ and ‘no’. The participants who answered ‘no’ (5 participants)
where taken out of the study since they were not exposed to the stimulus material properly. The next question was: ‘To what extent would you assign the video as political satire?’. This
question was measured with a slider ranging from ‘0’ to ‘100’, where ‘0’ was ‘no satire at all’ and
‘100’ was ‘pure satire’. The last question was: ‘Where on the political spectrum would you place
the video?’. This question was also measured with a slider ranging from ‘0’ to ‘100’, where ‘0’
was ‘left-wing’, ‘50’ was ‘neutral’ and ‘100’ was ‘right-wing’.
To test this, a t-test was conducted since both questions - ‘to what extent do you think is
was satire’ and ‘where on the political spectrum would you place this video’ - were measured on
interval/ratio level.
From Levene’s test, it was shown that the groups are equal, F (57, 56.57) = 0.62, p =
[-17 50.38; -29.87]. The satire videos were perceived as more satire-like (M = 65.72, SD = 18.41)
than the non-satire or hard news condition (M = 25.60, SD = 20.79). This means that the
manipulation has worked.
Next, from Levene’s test, it was shown that the groups are equal, F (53, 51.50) = 0.70, p
= .408. A significant difference between the two groups was found, t (53) = -2.05, p = .045, CI
[-21.14; -0.24]. The left-wing video was perceived as more left-wing (M = 47.61, SD = 21.18) and
the right-wing video was perceived as more right-wing (M = 58.30, SD = 17.16). This means that
this manipulation worked as well.
Satire
Hypothesis H1 expected that watching a piece of satire has a stronger effect on attitudes towards the refugee crisis compared to watching a piece of hard news. Levene’s test is not
significant, F (1, 110) = 0.83, p = .482. This means that the variances between the groups are
not equal. No significant effect has been found between watching satire or not and change in attitude (n = 114), F (1, 110) = 0.00, p = .960, ƞ2 = .01. This means that individuals’ attitudes do
not change more or less when watching satire (M = 0.40, SD = 3.70) or when watching hard
news (M = 0.43, SD = 2.70). This means that the hypothesis cannot be supported.
In line with political preference
Hypothesis H2 expected that the effect of satire on attitudes towards the refugee crisis will be stronger when the satire is in line with one’s political preference compared to satire that is not in line with one’s political preference. Levene’s test is not significant, F (1, 110) = 0.83, p = .482.
This means that the variances between the groups are not equal. No significant effect has been
found between watching satire or not and change in attitude and the influence of watching that is in line with one’s political preference or not (n = 114), F (1, 110) = 0.00, p = .615, ƞ2 = .01.
18 in line with one’s political preference (M = 0.57, SD = 3.72) does not have an influence on the
effect of satire on one’s attitude. This means that the hypothesis cannot be supported.
Discussion
Conclusion
The goal of this study was to investigate whether watching political satire has an effect on individuals’ attitudes regarding the refugee crisis and if watching satire that is in line with one’s
political preference or not has an influence on these effects.
The results show that whether someone is watching satire or hard news does not change the attitude towards the refugee crisis of these individuals. This finding is in contrast
with prior research (Boukes et al., 2014; LaMarre & Walther, 2013; Nabi et al., 2007; Young,
2008). As discussed earlier, the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) expects
that when watching satire, individuals would use the peripheral route to process the message
that is sent through the satire instead of the central route. This would mean that attitudes would
be formed based on emotions and without critical consideration, because satire plays in on the
emotions of its audience. The results of this study may implicate that satire does not evoke a
different way of message elaboration compared to hard news. On the other hand could the
results of this study depend on some limitations, which will be discussed below. Especially since
the results do not correspond with the prior studies it is necessary to consider these limitations. Variable
In line with pol pref
Not in line with pol pref
Satire No satire
Attitudes towards
refugee crisis 0.17(3.70) 0.57(3.72) 0.40(3.70) 0.43(2.70) Table 3
19 Moreover, there can be concluded that watching satire that is in line with one’s political
preference, or not, does not have an influence on the effects of satire on attitude. This means
that individuals who watch satire that is in line with their political preference do not show a
bigger or smaller change in attitude than individuals who watch satire that is not in line with their
political preference. As discussed before, this finding is in line with the study of LaMarre,
Landreville and Beam (2009). Their study showed that participants with different ideologies did
not differ in attitude when watching the same show. Their explanation was that individuals with
different political ideologies found the same content equally as funny, meaning that they would
process the information fitting with their preexisting attitudes. This could be an explanation for
the findings of this study as well, but there was no testing done in that area. It would be a
suggestion for future research to look into these effects more. This is partly in line with what
Knobloch-Westerwick (2012) found as well. She found no changes in attitudes when individuals
were exposed to content that was not in line with their preexisting attitudes. Looking back to the ‘selective exposure hypothesis’, it was discussed that the theory explains that when individuals
get to choose from a wide range of information, they will select topics or issues that are already
in line with their own interests and opinions (Dvir-Gvirsman, Garrett & Tsfati, 2018). Thus, when
people have a certain political ideology they are not likely to watch a late-night show that has a different political view. This could also be linked to Katz’ Uses and Gratifications Theory(Griffin,
2015). This theory also suggests that people use media for their own needs. When individuals only consume satire to fulfill their own needs, the chances will be that they will not consume
political satire that is not in line with their political ideology (Griffin, 2015). This would imply that
maybe these conditions created do not really occur in real life, which makes the generalizability
lower.
20 From the results, the conclusion is drawn that there may be no effect of political satire on
attitudes towards the refugee crisis and whether the message is in line with one’s political
preference may not have an influence on this. This has some implications for society as for
science. First of all, the results of this study implicate that watching satire or watching hard news
does not make a difference when looking at attitudes regarding the refugee crisis. So, when
satirists are looking to persuade their audiences, the findings suggest that this may not work
entirely the way the satirists plan it to work. In the case that the satirist wants to change the
attitudes of their audiences about the refugee crisis, they could be disappointed by the results.
On the other hand, for society as a whole, it may not be that bad that attitudes of citizens are not
that easily changeable, at least when talking about the refugee crisis. Would it be the case that
individuals were persuaded that easily, it would suggest that people do not really take a critical
look at a sensitive issue like the refugee crisis. As discussed above, the findings are not entirely
in line with the findings of prior research, which would suggest that there is a need to look into
this topic even further. Possibilities are that the results on both ends are a little bit more
nuanced.
Second, the results of this study do also implicate that watching satire that is in line with one’s political preference, or not, may not change citizens’ attitudes towards the refugee crisis.
This means that whether individuals get exposed to satire, the chances are low that whether
they agree with the satirist or not, does not make a difference in their attitudes, regarding
refugees at least. This means that when satirists want to enhance the attitudes towards the
refugee crisis of their audiences, for example, then they might get disappointed by the results as
well. This could be disadvantageous for the satirists, since satire is often used to, through
comedy and humor persuade people (Boukes et al., 2015; Nabi, Moyer-Gusé & Byrne, 2007;
Young, 2008). Since there is not much research done on these effects, it would be suggested
21 Limitations
The refugee crisis is a hotly debated and salient topic in the Netherlands. Therefore, citizens will
be more likely to have knowledge about the issue and there does not need to be too much
information in the survey to the point where they might get primed. This would also implicate
that most citizens will be on the same level of knowledge on this specific issue. On the other
hand, a possible limitation may be that people leave the experiment because of the
controversial topic, especially since there are going to be questions about people’s opinions
about this controversial topic (Gravetter & Forzano, 2012). Politics is a sensitive topic in general,
so this would be the case for most political topics. It is necessary to keep that in mind when
doing further research.
It should also be considered that this study did not take changeability of attitudes into
account. This could be an explanation why the attitudes of the respondents did not change
significantly. For further research it would be suggested to study the duration of media effects
with a small amount of stimuli.
The size of the sample used in this study could have had an influence on the results as well. A small sample size can lead to no generalizability to the entire population, which results in
lower external validity.
Moreover, due to the convenience-sample, highly-educated participants were over
represented. These citizens are known to be less susceptible to media effects, and could be
more involved with and better informed about politics.
Lastly, it is hard to make an accurate duplicate of a late-night talk show, especially since the materials were not developed in collaboration with real satirists. This means that it is
possible that the materials did not resemble a real late-night talk show. It would be suggested
for future research to take this into account as well.
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25
Appendix 1
Texts of stimulus materials (translation from Dutch to English)
1. Satire left-wing
Intro: And then this, refugee shelters are empty.
Video 1: NOS Journaal video is shown, talks about vacant refugee shelters in The Netherlands.
Host: So, this is what we’re dealing with. A lot of people we scared that there would be no room
to shelter refugees, but it turns out that some of the shelters are empty. Question is: what to do
with this?
Video 2: people in the streets are asked their opinions about the refugee crisis, one guy is
vague. This gives the host room to make a joke.
Host: *Sarcastic tone of voice* Exactly! What are the media even talking about, there are only about ten refugees. Last week I heard there was a girl missing but I didn’t see her either.
But anyway, how is it possible that these shelters are empty?
Video 3: Video explains that in essence The Netherlands (and other European countries) didn’t
26 Host: Yes, The Netherlands promised to adopt 6.000 refugees, but they only took 2.300. This is
like you are opening a hotel which fits 1.000 guests to only rent out ten rooms. *host acts
jokingly*
But, this is a serious issue. *clip of Dutch politician who says “I can’t believe it, this is serious’ is
inserted* *reacts to clip* Yes, calm down. The Netherlands does make room for 6.000 refugees
but only adopts one third. So I say: Mark Rutte, keep your promises!
2. Neutral satire
Intro: And then this, refugee shelters are empty.
Video 1: NOS Journaal video is shown, talks about vacant refugee shelters in The Netherlands.
Host: So, this is what we’re dealing with. A lot of people we scared that there would be no room
to shelter refugees, but it turns out that some of the shelters are empty. Question is: what to do
with this?
Video 2: people in the streets are asked their opinions about the refugee crisis, one guy is vague. This gives the host room to make a joke.
Host: *Sarcastic tone of voice* Exactly! What are the media even talking about, there are only about ten refugees. Last week I heard there was a girl missing but I didn’t see her either.
27 Video 3: Video explains that in essence The Netherlands (and other European countries) didn’t
adopt as many refugees as agreed.
Host: Yes, The Netherlands promised to adopt 6.000 refugees, but they only took 2.300. That means a lot of money is wasted on empty shelters. *Joking tone of voice* That’s like paying for
a school trip knowing you are not even going, because you’re not even going to school there!
But, this is a serious issue. *clip of Dutch politician who says “I can’t believe it, this is serious’ is
inserted* *reacts to clip* Yes, calm down. The Netherlands needs to sort out their stuff, fulfill your agreements, or don’t agree to them in the first place.
3. Satire right-wing
Intro: And then this, refugee shelters are empty.
Video 1: NOS Journaal video is shown, talks about vacant refugee shelters in The Netherlands.
Host: So, this is what we’re dealing with. A lot of people we scared that there would be no room
to shelter refugees, but it turns out that some of the shelters are empty. Question is: what to do with this?
Video 2: people in the streets are asked their opinions about the refugee crisis, one guy is
vague. This gives the host room to make a joke.
Host: *Sarcastic tone of voice* Exactly! What are the media even talking about, there are only about ten refugees. Last week I heard there was a girl missing but I didn’t see her either.
28 But anyway, how is it possible that these shelters are empty?
Video 3: Video explains that in essence The Netherlands (and other European countries) didn’t
adopt as many refugees as agreed.
Host: Yes, The Netherlands promised to adopt 6.000 refugees, but they only took 2.300. *Sarcastic tone of voice* You aren’t going to open a hotel in the far corner of Friesland that fits
1.000 people. *Host makes joke*
But, this is a serious issue. *clip of Dutch politician who says “I can’t believe it, this is serious’ is
inserted* *reacts to clip* Yes, calm down. So, The Netherlands agrees on things they don’t want
to agree on, and the taxpayer has to pay for it. And that, has to stop!
4. Hard news
Intro: Refugee shelters are empty.
Video 1: NOS Journaal video is shown, talks about vacant refugee shelters in The Netherlands.
Host: So, this is what we’re dealing with. A lot of people we scared that there would be no room
to shelter refugees, but it turns out that some of the shelters are empty. Question is: how is this
possible?
Video 3: Video explains that in essence The Netherlands (and other European countries) didn’t
29 Host: The Netherlands promised to adopt 6.000 refugees, but they only took 2.300. The press
30
Appendix 2
Measurements
Demographics
1. What is your gender?
a. Female
b. Male
c. Other
2. What is your age?
[measured in years]
3. What is your highest level of education (Dutch system)?
a. Basisonderwijs (Primary school)
b. Lager beroeps onderwijs (lbo) (Lower practical eductation)
c. Lager voortgezet onderwijs (vmbo, mavo) (Highschool, lower level)
d. Middelbaar beroepsonderwijs (mbo) (College, lower level)
e. Hoger voortgezet onderwijs (havo, vwo) (Highschool, higher level)
f. Hoger beroepsonderwijs (hbo) (College)
g. Wetenschappelijk onderwijs (wo) (University)
h. No education
Filler questions
1. To what extend are you interested in politics?
0 --- 100
Not interested at all Very interested
31 a. Never
b. Daily
c. Weekly
d. Monthly
3. How often do you use social media?
a. Never/I do not have social media accounts
b. Daily
c. Weekly
d. Monthly
Self-reported political orientation
Where on the political spectrum would you place yourself?
0 --- 100
Left Right
Attitudes pre- and posttest
Answers were recorded using a 7-point Likertscale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree).
1. Refugees should learn to conform to the rules and norms of the Dutch society as soon
as possible after they arrive.
2. The refugee crisis is undermining the Dutch culture.
3. The values and believes of refugees regarding work are basically quite similar to those
of most Dutchmen.
4. The values and beliefs of refugees regarding moral and religious issues are not
32 5. The values and believes of refugees regarding family issues and socializing children are
basically quite similar to those of most Dutchmen.
6. The values and beliefs of refugees regarding social relations are not compatible with the
beliefs and values of most Dutchmen.
7. Refugees should not have to accept Dutch ways.
8. Refugees get more from this country than they contribute.
9. The children of refugees should have the same right to attend public schools in The
Netherlands as the Dutch do.
10. The refugee crisis has increased the tax burden on Dutchmen.
11. Refugees are not displacing Dutch workers from their jobs.
12. Refugees should be eligible for the same health-care benefits received by Dutchmen.
13. Social services have become less available to Dutchmen because of the refugee crisis.
14. The quality of social services available to Dutchmen has remained the same, despite the
refugee crisis.
15. Refugees are entitled to subsidized housing or subsidized utilities (water, sewage,
electricity) as poor Dutchmen are.
Exposure checks
1. Where you able to see and hear the video correctly? a. Yes
b. No
Manipulation checks
2. To what extent would you assign the video as political satire?
0 --- 100
33 3. Where on the political spectrum would you place the video?
0 ---50--- 100
34
Appendix 3
Debriefing per condition
Condition: Satire left-wing
Debriefing
You almost reached the end of the survey. It is important to mention that the video you just
watched is not based on real facts. The video was developed specially for this experiment and
does not contain real facts or opinions. This purpose of this study was to measure the influence of political satire on one’s attitude. The video you just watched was meant to imitate a satire
piece similar to satire shows as Zondag met Lubach, with a left-wing angle.
Condition: Neutral satire
Debriefing
You almost reached the end of the survey. It is important to mention that the video you just
watched is not based on real facts. The video was developed specially for this experiment and
does not contain real facts or opinions. This purpose of this study was to measure the influence of political satire on one’s attitude. The video you just watched was meant to imitate a satire
piece similar to satire shows as Zondag met Lubach, with a neutral angle.
Condition: Satire right-wing
Debriefing
You almost reached the end of the survey. It is important to mention that the video you just
watched is not based on real facts. The video was developed specially for this experiment and
does not contain real facts or opinions. This purpose of this study was to measure the influence of political satire on one’s attitude. The video you just watched was meant to imitate a satire
35
Condition: Hard News
Debriefing
You almost reached the end of the survey. It is important to mention that the video you just
watched is not based on real facts. The video was developed specially for this experiment and
does not contain real facts or opinions. This purpose of this study was to measure the influence of political satire on one’s attitude. The video you just watched was meant to imitate a news item
