How have the US administrations since 9/11 discursively
legitimised violent counterterrorism and what effects has its
practice had in Yemen?
MA Thesis Global Conflict in the Modern Era Théophile Hughes
s1912429
Supervisor: Lukas Milevski Words: 13840
Table of Contents
1) Introduction ... 3
2) Literature review/Theoretical positioning ... 4
2.1) Terrorism ... 4
2.2) Targeted Killings and Drone Warfare ... 6
3) Methodology ... 9
4) Discursively legitimising violent counterterrorism after 9/11 ... 13
4.1) The Bush Administration ... 14
4.1.1) Framing the 9/11 attacks ... 14
4.1.2) US(A) vs. “them” and the threat of terrorism ... 15
4.2) The Obama Administration ... 19
4.2.1) Terrorism and War ... 20
4.2.2) American exceptionalism and Civilisation vs. Barbarism ... 22
4.2.3) The threat of terrorism ... 24
4.3) The Trump Administration ... 26
4.3.1) Civilisation vs. Barbarism and American Exceptionalism ... 26
4.3.2) The threat of terrorism and the need to act ... 27
5) US violent counterterrorism in practice: the case of Yemen ... 29
5.1) Context of US’ military involvement in Yemen: a brief overview ... 30
5.1.1) Yemeni politics and the GWOT ... 30
5.1.2) The Saudi-led, US-supported war in Yemen ... 31
5.2) Violent US counterterrorism in Yemen since 9/11: objectives and
means ... 33
5.2.1) Objectives ... 33
5.2.2) Means ... 33
5.3) Effects of US military involvement in Yemen... 39
5.3.1) US support for the Saudi-led war vs. US counterterrorism objectives
... 39
5.3.2) Violent US counterterrorism in Yemen: a model for
counterterrorism? ... 41
5.3.3) Broader implications ... 46
6) Conclusion ... 51
7) Appendix ... 52
7.1) George W. Bush ... 52
7.2) Barrack Obama ... 53
7.3) Donald Trump ... 54
8) Bibliography... 55
1) Introduction
In the immediate aftermath of the events that took place on the 11th of September, 2001, the US administration led by George W. Bush declared the Global War on Terror (GWOT). In the name of fighting terrorism, the US has since launched two fully fledged wars, has declared using military force in 6 countries,1 has troops in combat in 14 countries2 and is currently actively involved in abetting the use of violence to “fight terror” in 80 countries.3 This essay critically engages with the legitimacy and efficacy of the use of violence to counter the incidence and prevalence of terrorism. Indeed, despite the US’ efforts, it has failed to achieve the main objectives of the GWOT, namely: making Americans safe from terrorism, preventing the incidence of terrorism, defeating specific terrorist organisations – such as Al Qaeda and the Taliban – and reducing the conditions that fuel terrorism.4 On the contrary, non-state terrorist organisations have grown as has the number of non-state terrorist attacks.5 Further, as the incidence and threat of terrorism has grown, that the US has sent over 2.5 million of its citizens into harm’s way to fight terrorism and that nearly 7000 have died as a result, the US has also failed to protect Americans from terrorism.6 Accordingly, this paper questions the extent to which the US’ use of violence has been effective at reducing terrorism. In order to do so, it compares and contrasts the language used by the US administrations since 9/11 to legitimise violent counterterrorism, with the effects of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen.
The research question this paper seeks to answer is: how have the US administrations since 9/11 discursively legitimised violent counterterrorism and what effects has its practice had in Yemen? After outlining the relevant literature and the methodology, the essay analyses how the terrorism discourses of successive US administrations justify and naturalise the notion that the use of violence is a legitimate and
1
The White House, (2016), “Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States’ Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations”, https://fas.org/man/eprint/frameworks.pdf
2 Savell, S. (2019), “This Map Shows Where in the World the U.S. Military Is Combatting Terrorism”,
Smithsonian Magazine, January 2019 https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/map-shows-places-world-where-us-military-operates-180970997/
3 ibid. 4
Bush Administration, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, pp. 11-12
5
Institute for Economics & Peace (2018), “Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the impact of terrorism”,
http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf
6 Goepner, E. (2016), “Measuring the Effectiveness of America’s War on Terror”, Parameters, 46(1), pp.
effective method to reduce terrorism. The following chapter contrasts this with the effects of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen. Finally, the paper discusses the broader implications of the Yemen case study with regards to the rift between the discursive legitimisations of violent counterterrorism and its effects in practice. The research concludes that, contrary to the official discourses, the US’ practice of violent counterterrorism has been strategically ineffective and morally condemnable.
2) Literature review/Theoretical positioning
2.1) Terrorism
The literature on the topic of terrorism is extensive and diverse. It comprises thousands of publications, leading journals and contributors from many different subject-areas within the social sciences. Terrorism literature includes discussions on – among others – the definition of terrorism,7 the different types of terrorism,8 the causes of terrorism,9 the appropriate responses to terrorism10 and the scale and scope of the terrorist threat.11 These issues are highly contentious and remain hot topics of scholarly debate.12
Terrorism literature lacks an agreed definition on the concept of terrorism as well as a cohesive theory and methodology for studying and producing knowledge about terrorism.13 Further, terrorism studies have typically been characterised by an over-reliance
7
Schmid, A. (2010), “Frameworks for conceptualising terrorism”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(2), pp. 197-221
8 Rapoport, D. (2001), “The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism”, Current History, 100(650),
pp. 419-424
9
See for example: Crenshaw, M. (1981), “The Causes of Terrorism”, Comparative Politics, 13 (4), pp. 379-399 and Bjørgo, T. (2005), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward, (Abingdon: Routledge)
10
Bjørgo, T. (2013), Strategies for Preventing Terrorism, (London: Palgrave MacMillan), Cronin, A. (2009), How
Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press); Hoffman, B. (2009), “A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration”, Terrorism
and Political Violence, 21(3), pp. 359-377
11
Mueller, J. (2005), “Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration”, International
Studies Perspectives, 6(2), pp. 208-234; Mueller, J. and Stewart, M. (2012), “The Terrorism Delusion: America’s
Overwrought Response to September 11”, International Security, 37(1), pp. 81–110
12
Ranstorp, M. (2009), “Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds),
Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), pp. 13-33; Gunning, J. (2007), “A
Case for Critical Terrorism Studies”, Government and Opposition, 42(3), pp. 363-393; Jackson, R.; Toros, H.; Jarvis, L. and Heath-Kelly, C. (2017), “Introduction: 10 years of Critical Studies on Terrorism, Critical Studies on Terrorism”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 10(2), pp. 197-202
13 Crenshaw, M. (2000), “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st century”, Political Psychology,
on secondary data, a lack of collaboration and a large proportion of one-time contributors.14 However, a recent study that investigates the persistence of these issues in terrorism studies from 2007 to 2016 found that the use of primary data has increased significantly.15 Nonetheless, collaboration remains low and most authors are one-time contributors.16
In 2007, Richard Jackson founded the Critical Studies on Terrorism (CTS) journal in virtue of the shortcomings he and other scholars identified in the literature broadly falling under the wide-encompassing label of “traditional terrorism studies” (TTS).17 CTS scholars argue that TTS literature often defends ahistorical, decontextualized and state-biased understandings of terrorism.18 Further, they argue that TTS produces and reproduces unsubstantiated claims about the causes and threat of non-state terrorism and the nature of the terrorist other.19 Indeed, CTS scholars criticise the institutional bias of much of TTS literature, as they argue that it perpetuates status-quo understandings about the causes and appropriate responses to non-state terrorism in a way that legitimises the elaboration and pursuit of violent counterterrorism policies.20 Moreover, CTS scholars are critical of the un-reflexive way in which traditional approaches label acts committed by non-state actors as “terrorism” and fail to account for the terrorist nature and effects of led or state-sponsored violence.21 Crucial to the research conducted here, CTS scholars and others have produced a significant array of studies that contest the notion that terrorism is solely the prerogative of non-state actors.22
14
Silke, A. (2003), The Road Less Travelled: Recent Trends in Terrorism Research, (London: Routledge); Ranstorp, M. (2009), “Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 15
15
Schuurman, B. (2018), “Research on Terrorism, 2007–2016: A Review of Data, Methods, and Authorship”,
Terrorism and Political Violence, pp. 1-16
16 ibid. 17
Ditrych, O. (2014), Tracing the Discourses on Terrorism, (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan), p. 114; Silke, A. (2009), “Contemporary terrorism studies: issues in research”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds),
Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 36
18
Jackson, R. (2007), “The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies”, European Political Science, 6(3), pp. 244-251
19 Jackson, R. (2009), “Knowledge, power and politics”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical
Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), pp. 66-83
20
Raphael, S. (2009), “In the service of power: Terrorism studies and US intervention in the global South”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), pp. 49-65
21
Blakeley, R. (2008), “The elephant in the room: A response to John Horgan and Michael J. Boyle”, Critical
Terrorism Studies, 1(2), pp. 151-165
22 See for example: Blakeley, R. (2009), State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South (London
Scholars do not agree on a single established definition of terrorism.23 Nonetheless, there is a general consensus that terrorism is a tactic that involves the use or threat of violence against civilians, to intimidate a wider audience in the pursuit of political objectives.24 However, important questions remain regarding the perpetrators of terrorism. In their definitions, the CIA25 and the Oxford English Dictionary26 assert that terrorist violence is perpetrated by non-state actors. However, following Jackson, this essay takes the position that it does not follow reason for a “tactic” to be solely in the remit of non-state actors.27 Jackson elaborates this argument succinctly “(g)iven that terrorism is a violent tactic in the same way that ambushes are a tactic, it makes little sense to argue that some actors (such as states) are precluded from employing the tactic of terrorism (or ambushes).”28 Similarly, Afxentiou argues the “descriptive basis for terrorism is the violent act itself, its forms and effects, rather than the actor perpetrating it.”29 Furthermore, there exists extensive documentation of the historical and continued role of states in conducting and sponsoring acts of violence aimed at intimidating and coercing civilian populations.30 Accordingly, this essay adopts the view that terrorism, as a tactic, can be and is employed by both state and non-state actors.
2.2) Targeted Killings and Drone Warfare
The use of targeted killing in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives has become common in the 21st century. Indeed, Jeremy Scahill details how in the aftermath of 9/11, certain Bush administration officials successfully sought to repeal the ban on assassinations
Books) and Gareau, F. (2004), State Terrorism and the United States: From Counterinsurgency to the War on
Terrorism, (London: Zed Books)
23 Silke, A. (2009), “Contemporary terrorism studies: issues in research”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and
Gunning, J. (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 34
24
Jackson, R. (2009), “Knowledge, power and politics”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 75
25
CIA, Definition of Terrorism, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/terrorism-faqs.html?tab=list-3
26 Oxford English Dictionary definition: “terrorism”, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/terrorism 27
Jackson, R. (2009), “Knowledge, power and politics”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical
Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 75
28 ibid. 29
Afxentiou, A. (2018), “A history of drones: moral(e) bombing and state terrorism”, Critical Studies on
Terrorism, 11(2), p. 303
30 Blakeley, R. (2007), “Bringing the State back into Terrorism Studies”, European Political Science, 6(3), pp.
228-235; Grosscup, B. (2006), Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment, (Malaysia: Strategic Information Research Development)
put forth during the Carter administration.31 One of the consequences of the acceptance of targeted killings as an official US policy in the War on Terror is the development and use of armed drones. The first drone strike in the War on Terror occurred in Afghanistan, in 2002.32 According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, the Bush administration oversaw 57 drone strikes, the Obama administration oversaw 563 strikes and the Trump administration has been carrying out drone strikes at a higher rate than the Obama administration.33
In virtue of these developments, the topic of targeted killing garnered an increase of scholarly interest in the post-9/11 era. The academic debates about the use of drones to carry out targeted killings centre around the legal, strategic and moral implications of this practice. Indeed, a great deal has been written about the use of killer drones in relation to International Human Law and International Human Rights Law.34 Many publications have also discussed the extent to which drone warfare is compatible with Just War Theory.35 However, as Rothe and Collins argue, the focus on the theoretical and legal implications of drone warfare tends to obscure the effects that these policies have on the individuals who live in the areas that are surveilled and bombarded by drones.36 They argue that attempts to provide legal justifications for drone warfare serve to legitimise human rights violations.37 Accordingly, this essay steers clear from legal debates surrounding drone warfare and focuses on the strategic and moral consequences of the use of armed drones in the context of counterterrorism.
Military and government officials have in part attributed the US’ increasing reliance on drone strikes to conduct counterterrorism to the precision and strategic value of
31
Scahill, J. (2013), Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield, (New York: Nation Books), p. 20-37
32 Sifton, J. (2017), “A Brief History of Drones”, The Nation, 7 February 2012,
https://www.thenation.com/article/brief-history-drones/
33
Purkiss, J. and Serle, J. (2017), “Obama’s covert drone war in numbers: ten times more strikes than Bush”,
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 17 January 2017
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-17/obamas-covert-drone-war-in-numbers-ten-times-more-strikes-than-bush; Ackerman, S. (2018), “Trump Ramped Up Drone Strikes in America’s Shadow Wars”, The Daily Beast, https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-ramped-up-drone-strikes-in-americas-shadow-wars
34
See Blakeley, R. (2018), “Drones, state terrorism and international law”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11(2), p. 322
35
See for example: Braun, M. and Brunstetter, D. (2013) “Rethinking the Criterion for Assessing Cia-targeted Killings: Drones, Proportionality and Jus Ad Vim”, Journal of Military Ethics, (12)4, pp. 304-324
36 Rothe, D. and Collins, V. (2014), “The Normality of Political Administration and State Violence: Casuistry,
Law, and Drones”, Critical Criminology, 22(3), pp. 373–388
37
drones.38 For example, the Obama administration’s press secretary, Jay Carney described the use of drones to carry out violent counterterrorism as “exceptionally precise, exceptionally surgical and exceptionally targeted”.39 Defenders of the use of armed drones to conduct violent counterterrorism have also argued that drones enable more rational and effective decision making.40 This argument seeks to legitimise drones as a more ethical alternative to traditional approaches to violent counterterrorism.
However, an increasing amount of literature contests the legitimisation and normalisation of drone warfare. For example, Espinoza argues convincingly against the notion that drone warfare is humane and neutral.41 Her analysis exposes the racist and orientalist underpinnings of the US’ policy and practice of drone surveillance and killing in the context of the War on Terror. Furthermore, by retracing the historical links between the development of aerial bombing as a state instrument for producing terror and current violent counterterrorism policies, others have compellingly contended that drone warfare and violent US counterterrorism more widely are modern practices of state terrorism.42
Studies on the effects of drones have been very useful for this research. Reports published by the International Human Rights and Conflict Resolutions Clinic and the Global Justice Clinic,43 Human Rights Watch44 and the Open Society Justice Initiative45 are crucial for understanding the effects of drone warfare on local populations. These reports found that drones used for counterterrorism kill many innocent civilians, are a source of terror for
38
Espinoza, M. (2018), “State terrorism: orientalism and the drone programme”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11(2), pp. 378-379
39
Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, 31 January 2012, Obama White House
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/31/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-13112
40 Allinson, J. (2015), “The Necropolitics of Drones”, International Political Sociology, 9(2), pp. 114-115 41
Espinoza, M. (2018), “State terrorism: orientalism and the drone programme”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11(2), pp. 376-393
42 Satia, P. (2014), “Drones: A History from the British Middle East”, Humanity: An International Journal of
Human Rights, Humanitarianism and Development, 5 (1), pp. 1-31; Afxentiou, A. (2018), “A history of drones:
moral(e) bombing and state terrorism”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11(2), pp. 301-320; Blakeley, R. (2018), “Drones, state terrorism and international law”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 11(2), pp. 321-341; Grosscup, B. (2006), Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment, (Malaysia: Strategic Information Research Development)
43 Cavallero, J.; Sonnenberg, S.; and Knuckey, S. (2012), Living under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to
Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan, (Stanford: International Human Rights and Conflict Resolutions
Clinic); (New York: Global Justice Clinic)
44 Human Rights Watch, (2013), "Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda”: The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in
Yemen
45
the locals, generate hatred towards the US government and are fundamentally counterproductive as they fuel support and recruiting for anti-US militants. This thesis contributes to this literature by looking into the effects of drone warfare and other forms of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen and comparing these with the presidential discourses used to legitimise violent counterterrorism.
3) Methodology
The overarching research question is: how have the US administrations since 9/11 discursively legitimised violent counterterrorism and what effects has its practice had in Yemen? This question can be separated into the two following questions: how have the US administrations since 9/11 discursively legitimised violent counterterrorism? What effects has violent US counterterrorism had in Yemen? This thesis dedicates a chapter to each of the two questions.
One way that humans use language is to produce understanding and understandings typically govern deliberated action.46 The official leaders of democratic states are individuals elected by a population to govern over a delimited national territory. Therefore, an investigation into the actions of democratic states requires an investigation into the language used to legitimise and provide a rationale or “grid of intelligibility” for these actions.47 Indeed, it is through the use of linguistic constructions – discourse – that state representatives can describe, frame and justify the political projects they seek to carry out.48 The aim of critical discourse analysis (CDA) is to describe the relation between political, social and discursive practices.49 Therefore, CDA can be used to analyse how foreign policies are legitimised and portrayed as proper whereas others are dismissed and excluded.50
46 Hall, S. (1997), “Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse”, in S. Hall (eds.), Representation: cultural
representations and signifying practices, p. 72
47
Milliken, J. (1999), “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods”,
European Journal of International Relations, 5(2), pp. 225-254
48
ibid., p. 236
49
Jackson, R. (2009), “Knowledge, power and politics”, in Jackson, R.; Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical
Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 67
50 Milliken, J. (1999), “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods”,
Moreover, CDA provides a theoretical basis for assessing the implications of adopting one mode of representation over another.51
Scholars concerned with the analysis of political discourse place emphasis on the intricate relation between power and knowledge.52 As language, through discourse, creates “knowledge” about the world and that different social groups hold different interests regarding the depiction of social reality, the creation of meaning in the public sphere is politically contested as different groups seek to establish their “truth” over the “truths” of others.53 Accordingly, many analytical works have described how those with the most power tend to play a larger role in framing and thus creating socio-political reality than those with less power.54 Hence, CDAs of terrorism discourse focus primarily on the discourses produced by different types of elites, due to their predominant role in the production and dissemination of “knowledge” about terrorism and counterterrorism.
Scholars have analysed the dominant discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism from many different angles. CDAs of terrorism discourse vary in the types of discourse they analyse and the particular focus of their analysis. Analyses of terrorism discourse typically assess the texts produced by mainstream media outlets,55 leading academics,56 state representatives57 or all of these at once.58 The focus of these studies varies. For example,
51
Campbell, D. (1993), Politics Without Principles: Sovereignity, Ethics and the Narratives of the Gulf War, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 7-8
52 See for example: Van Dijk, T. (2008), Discourse and Power, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) and Nola, R.
(1998), “Knowledge, discourse, power and genealogy in Foucault”, Critical Review of International Social and
Political Philosophy, 1(2), pp. 109-154
53
Hodges, A. and Nilep, C. (2007), Discourse, war and terrorism, p. 2
54 See for example: Foucault, M. (1969), L’Archéologie du Savoir, (Paris: Editions Gallimard); Gramsci, A. (1971),
Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds. Hoare, Q. and Smith, G., (New York: International Publishers Co.)
and Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. (1989), Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, (New York: Pantheon Books)
55
Silberstein, S. (2002), War of Words: Language, Politics and 9/11, (London: Routledge)
56
Schmid, A. and Jongman, A. (1988), Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data
Bases, Theories, and Literature, (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company); Jackson, R. (2009), “The
Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments”, Political
Studies Review, 7(2), pp. 171-184
57 Lazar, A. and Lazar M. (2004), “The discourse of the New World Order: ‘out-casting’ the double face of
threat”, Discourse and Society, 15(2-3), pp. 223-242; Jackson, R. (2006), “Genealogy, Ideology, and Counter-Terrorism: Writing wars on terrorism from Ronald Raegan to George W. Bush Jr”, Studies in Language and
Capitalism, 1(1), pp. 163-193
58 Jackson, R. (2005), Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism, (Manchester:
scholars have analysed how the use of binaries,59 legal jargon60 or ideological evocation61 depict terrorism and counterterrorism.
This thesis contributes to the literature by analysing and comparing the language used by the W. Bush, Obama and Trump administrations to legitimise violent counterterrorism. Presidential discourses shape national identity, give meaning to situations and provide justifications for policy decisions.62 Accordingly, Miliken notes that there is an ethical aspect involved in analysing how a discourse naturalises and legitimises certain policies and practices.63 Indeed, this process denaturalises discourses and the policies they legitimise, opening them to critical scrutiny and destabilisation.64 The aim of the discourse analysis conducted here is not to criticise the discursive framings used to legitimise violent counterterrorism,65 rather, it is to reveal how US presidents since 9/11 have discursively legitimised violent counterterrorism. By analysing how violent counterterrorism policies are discursively legitimised and contrasting this with the effects of the practice of violent counterterrorism in Yemen, this thesis contributes to the literature on discourse analysis by underlining the rift between the positive justifications for violence and the negative effects of its practice, in the context of US counterterrorism.
Therefore, in order to answer the first part of the research question, the first chapter analyses how the W. Bush, Obama and Trump administrations discursively legitimised the use of violent counterterrorism. It compares their terrorism and counterterrorism discourses and demonstrates their reliance on similar myths and narratives about the threat of terrorism, the terrorist other and the US’ role in the world. This part also highlights the main discursive differences between the administrations in their respective legitimisations of violent counterterrorism. To carry out this analysis, the first part uses the existing
59
Coe, K.; Domke, D.; Graham, E.; Lockett John, S.; Pickard, V. (2004), “No Shades of Gray: The Binary Discourse of George W. Bush and an Echoing Press”, Journal of Communication, 54(2), pp. 234-252
60 Birdsall, A. (2018), “Drone Warfare in Counterterrorism and Normative Change: US Policy and the Politics of
International Law”, Global Society, 32(3), pp. 241-262
61
Barnett, M. (2016), “American Exceptionalism and the Construction of the War on Terror: An Analysis of Counterterrorism Policies Under Clinton, Bush and Obama”, Working Paper Series, Syracuse University, pp. 1-29
62
Esch, J. (2010), “Legitimising the “War on Terror”: Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric”, Political
Psychology, 31(3), pp. 357-391
63
Milliken, J. (1999), “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods”,
European Journal of International Relations, 5(2), p. 236
64 ibid.
65 That is done elsewhere, see for example: Jackson, R. (2005) “Security, Democracy, and the Rhetoric of
literature on the discursive legitimisation of violent counterterrorism of post-9/11 US administrations as well as presidential speeches and quotes from administration officials. These include: Bush’s key speeches on terrorism and counterterrorism in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, central counterterrorism speeches from Obama’s presidency, and a wide array of Trump’s public addresses from the 2016 campaign and his ongoing presidency. The source of the presidential speeches is the University of California, Santa Barbara’s “American Presidency Project”.66 Links to the transcripts of the cited speeches are in the appendix.
To answer the second part of the research question, this paper investigates the causal links between the US’ military involvement in Yemen, the incidence of terrorism and the influence and strength of non-state terrorist groups in the country. In order to achieve this, the second part begins by outlining the context of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen, the official objectives and means of the US’ military involvement in Yemen from 9/11 to March 2019 and contrasts these with the observable effects. Given the diversity of the contributing actors and factors to the situation in Yemen, it is difficult to precisely evaluate the manner and extent to which US involvement affects the characteristics and actions of non-state terrorist groups. However, with reference to reports on non-state terrorist groups as well as studies that compile many local testimonies, it is possible to identify general trends and draw conclusions about the effects of violent US counterterrorism in Yemen.
The materials used to assess the effects of the US’ military involvement in Yemen are a selection of interviews, academic papers, NGO reports, media reports and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s (TBIJ hereafter) database on reported US operations in Yemen. The research is limited by the opaqueness of US operations in Yemen. Indeed, as violent US counterterrorism in Yemen is covert, the US government does not publish a comprehensive summary of all of its actions. However, TBIJ frequently updates its data, conducts its own verifications and investigations, is transparent about its reporting and uses corroborating
66 University of California, Santa Barbara, The American Presidency Project,
sources to supplement its data.67 Accordingly, it is a trustworthy source of information on covert US military activity. Hence, this thesis relies on TBIJ’s database as its main source of descriptive information about the US’ covert operations in Yemen.
Seawright and Gerring note that selecting a typical case that represents a broader set of cases can produce insights into a wider phenomenon.68 Accordingly, as the US’ reliance on airstrikes – from warplanes and armed drones – and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) raids to carry out its counterterrorism operations in Yemen is characteristic of its practice of violent counterterrorism elsewhere, the conclusions drawn by the analysis conducted in the second part can provide insights into the effects of violent US counterterrorism beyond the case of Yemen. However, as the US carries out violent counterterrorism operations to differing degrees and in different contexts around the world, the conclusions drawn from the analysis of US counterterrorism in Yemen should not be uncritically used to surmise all of the outcomes of violent US counterterrorism everywhere. Nonetheless, this paper argues that certain analyses – such as: the use of armed drones to surveil and bombard suspected terrorists tends to terrorise local populations – can and should be understood as extending beyond the case of Yemen.
4) Discursively legitimising violent counterterrorism after 9/11
Although there are differences between the terrorism discourses of the Bush, Obama and Trump (BOT) administrations, these discourses all present violent counterterrorism as an appropriate, necessary, strategically effective and morally righteous method for reducing the threat and incidence of terrorism. Further, the BOT administrations’ legitimisations of violent counterterrorism rely on the same core narratives of the “War on Terror”. The first consists of a series of binaries and political myths that make up the “us vs. them” narrative and the second narrative is that terrorism poses a grave and imminent threat to the US and its allies. Although this paper focuses on the counterterrorism discourses of the BOT administrations, the core narratives that make up
67
Cavallero, J.; Sonnenberg, S.; and Knuckey, S. (2012), Living under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to
Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan, (Stanford: International Human Rights and Conflict Resolutions
Clinic); (New York: Global Justice Clinic), pp. 53-54
68 Seawright, J. and Gerring, J. (2008), “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of
the US’ War on Terror discourse predate 9/11.69 Indeed, the “War on Terror” quip and the key features of the discourse originate from the Raegan administration.70 The Clinton and Bush Sr. administrations used similar rhetoric to justify their use of violent counterterrorism.71 However, in order to achieve analytical depth in the space available, the focus here is on the post-9/11 legitimisation of violent counterterrorism.
4.1) The Bush Administration
4.1.1) Framing the 9/11 attacks
The day of the 9/11 attacks, then US president George W. Bush declared that the United States had been a victim of a terrorist attack. In the days following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration astutely bifurcated from framing the attacks as “despicable acts of terror” to an “act of war”.72 This made the subsequent declaration of a “war on terror” a natural and logical step to make. Thus, framing the attacks as an act of war discursively legitimises violent counterterrorism as appropriate and necessary.
Portraying 9/11 as an “assault on America” and “a national tragedy” enabled the Bush administration to instil and reify a public sense of victimhood.73 This is not to deny that the events were tragic, but for the interest of this research, it is important to highlight that the particular framing was used to legitimise and normalise the US’ pursuit of violent policies in the aftermath of the attacks. Indeed, by discursively victimising the US and its citizens, the Bush administration was able to blame “the terrorists” for the violence that the US unleashed in response to the 9/11 attacks. This rhetorical justification is perfectly captured in then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s assertion:
We did not start the war; the terrorists started it when they attacked the United States, murdering more than 5,000 innocent Americans (…) So let there be no doubt;
69
Winkler, C. (2006), In the Name of Terrorism, Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War II Era, (Albany: State University of New York Press)
70
Jackson, R. (2006), “Genealogy, Ideology, and Counter-Terrorism: Writing wars on terrorism from Ronald Raegan to George W. Bush Jr”, Studies in Language and Capitalism, 1(1), pp. 163-193
71 Tsui, C. (2012), “The Myth of George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy Revolution”, E-International Relations, 2
December 2012, https://www.e-ir.info/2012/12/02/the-myth-of-george-w-bushs-foreign-policy-revolution-reagan-clinton-and-the-continuity-of-the-war-on-terror/
72 Jackson, R. (2005), “Security, Democracy, and the Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism”, Democracy and Security,
1(2), p. 150
73
responsibility for every single casualty in this war, be they innocent Afghans or innocent Americans, rests at the feet of Taliban and al Qaeda.74
This portrayal of America as the irreproachable victim of horrific violence morally repudiates any blame the US may have to share either for the attack itself or for the violent response that the framings of the attacks legitimised. Further, this framing serves to discursively legitimise violent counterterrorism as appropriate, necessary and morally righteous.
4.1.2) US(A) vs. “them” and the threat of terrorism
Foreign policy and the portrayal of enemies are important elements of a state’s – and by extension, a population’s – discursive self-identification. The use of war discourse to produce and solidify a positive self-identity in opposition to a demonised other is an old and recurring phenomenon.75 Accordingly, the portrayal of the “good” self at war against the “bad” other is a central element of the Bush administration’s justification for the use of violence.
The Bush administration discursively situated the 9/11 attacks into pre-existing myths about the US and its historical role in the world. Bottici observes that myths are used to construct simplified representations of the world wherein a community identifies itself and can ascribe significance to political and social events.76 In the aftermath of 9/11, the events were located within the myth of American exceptionalism and the meta-narrative of “Civilisation vs. Barbarism”.77 Barnett notes that “American exceptionalism represents three unique but complementary ideas that America is God’s “chosen nation,” has a unique mission to spread its values, and is a force of good against evil.”78 Hence, an important part of the myth of American exceptionalism rests on the notion that America has a “calling”, a
74
Rumsfeld, D. (2001), “Text: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld”, The Washington Post, 29 October 2001,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/rumsfeldtext_102901.html?noredirect=on
75
Graham, P.; Keenan, T. and Dowd, A. (2004), “A call to arms at the End of History: A discourse-historical analysis of George W. Bush’s declaration of war on terror”, Discourse & Society, 15(2-3), pp. 199-221
76
Bottici, C. (2007), A Philosophy of Political Myth, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 201-245
77
Esch, J. (2010), “Legitimising the “War on Terror”: Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric”, Political
Psychology, 31(3), pp. 357-391
78 Barnett, M. (2016), “American Exceptionalism and the Construction of the War on Terror: An Analysis of
duty to act to defend its values: freedom, democracy and justice.79 The Bush administration tapped into this myth in its portrayal of the historic duty that 9/11 placed on America’s shoulders.
Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom -- the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time -- now depends on us. Our nation -- this generation -- will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. (20 September 2001) (emphasis added)
By situating 9/11 within the myth of American Exceptionalism, the Bush administration legitimised the GWOT as being part of America’s supposed historic moral duty to protect “the advance of human freedom”. Moreover, the assertion that the US “will not fail” in its mission legitimises violent counterterrorism as a strategically effective method for pursuing the objectives of the GWOT.
The Bush administration also used myth of Civilisation vs. Barbarism extensively to legitimise violent counterterrorism:
This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. (20 September 2001)
The civilized world is rallying to America's side. They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. And you know what -- we're not going to allow it. (20 September 2001)
By discursively portraying the GWOT as being part of a momentous struggle between civilisation and barbarism, the Bush administration legitimised violent counterterrorism as a necessary and morally righteous response to the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, an implication of the above quotes is that if the US failed to respond in a decisive way, the entire “civilized world” would suffer the calamitous consequences.
79
Jackson notes that a subplot to the “Civilisation vs Barbarism” meta-narrative is the “good” vs “evil” narrative.80 The Bush administration relied heavily on this binary to discursively legitimise the use of violence to defend the “good” self against the “evil” other.
Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. (11 September 2001) (emphasis added) Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil (11 September 2001) (emphasis added)
Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature, and we responded with the best of America (11 September 2001) (emphasis added)
These characterisations of the terrorist other are directly opposed to the Bush administration’s positive self-representation:
Americans are generous and kind, resourceful and brave (14 September 2001) One month after great suffering and sorrow, America is strong and determined and generous (11 October 2001)
Americans are the most generous people on Earth (12 October 2001)
The Bush administration’s discourse dehumanises the terrorist other and reduces this threatening other to a fundamentally evil and morally corrupt caricature.81 Jackson notes that Bush officials routinely referred to terrorists as “evil doers”, “the evil ones” who “embrace death”.82
The terrorists’ only influence is violence, and their only agenda is death. (24 May 2004)
According to this discourse, terrorist acts are the reflection of their assumed inherently evil nature. Furthermore, Jackson notes how on numerous occasions, Bush administration officials used medical language to depict the terrorist other as a perverse impurity. “The terrorists” were described as “parasites”, “a scourge” and “cancer”.83 Jackson
80
Jackson, R. (2005) “Security, Democracy, and the Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism”, Democracy and Security, 1(2), p. 151
81 ibid. p. 153 82 ibid.; ibid. p. 162 83
observes that this essentialisation to evil and dehumanisation disqualifies “the terrorists” as moral beings. It implies the need to treat “the scourge terrorism” in a ruthless way.84 Therefore, the discourse legitimises the use of violence to defeat this fundamentally evil and threatening other as necessary, morally virtuous and urgent.
Furthermore, evilification of the terrorist other depoliticises the 9/11 attackers and legitimises violent counterterrorism as strategically effective. In the aftermath of 9/11, then leader of Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, stated that the attacks were a reaction to the US’ role in Palestinian oppression and its military presence in Islamic holy lands.85 However, the Bush administration made no reference to the potential political motivations behind the attacks. Instead, the Bush administration preferred to depict the attackers as irrational, freedom-hating, evil enemies that cannot be negotiated with.
[T]hose who embrace death to cause the death of the innocent, cannot be ignored, cannot be appeased. They must be fought. (20 October 2001)
By depicting “the terrorists” as evil, depoliticised and irrational individuals who “must be fought”, President W. Bush presented violence as the only feasible way of confronting the threat of terrorism. Accordingly, this discursive portrayal of the terrorist other legitimises violent counterterrorism as necessary, morally righteous and strategically effective.
In the build up to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration repeatedly claimed that terrorists were seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction that could potentially enable them to carry out catastrophic attacks, killing millions.86 Indeed, backed up by academics,87 Bush officials claimed that 21st century terrorism was a new type of terrorism. So-called “religious terrorists” were discursively portrayed as particularly irrational and violent.88 Accordingly, the “new” terrorism narrative presented Al Qaeda and
84
ibid.
85 Howarth, J. (2005), Messages To The World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, (Fairfield: Verso), p. 107 86
Kramer, C. and Michalowski, R. (2005) “War, Aggression and State Crime: A Criminological Analysis of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq”. The British Journal of Criminology 45 (4). (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 449
87
Spencer, A. (2016), “New Versus Old Terrorism”, in Jackson, R. (eds), Routledge Handbook of Critical
Terrorism Studies (London: Routledge), pp. 269-290
88 Gunning, J. and Toros, H. (2009), “Exploring a critical theory approach to terrorism studies”, in Jackson, R.;
Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds), Critical Terrorism Studies: a new research agenda (Abingdon: Routledge), p. 90
its affiliates as an exceptionally threatening and uncompromising enemy. Consequently, the use of violent counterterrorism to eliminate this extraordinary threat was discursively legitimised as appropriate, necessary, strategically effective and morally righteous.
In sum, the Bush administration’s framing of the events that took place on 9/11 as well as the portrayal of an evil, irrational and extremely threatening terrorist other at war with civilisation and American values enabled it to discursively legitimise violent counterterrorism and the GWOT as appropriate, necessary, strategically effective and morally righteous. This essay now turns to analysing how the Obama administration legitimised the use of violent counterterrorism. It argues that although there are some apparent changes in the discourse, the Obama administration’s legitimisation of violent counterterrorism rests upon the same central features of the Bush administration’s War on Terror discourse.
4.2) The Obama Administration
Barrack Obama took office on the 20th of January, 2009. His election generated a wave of hope and enthusiasm for many of those who opposed the large-scale military operations of the Bush administration. For many political commentators and voters, his election signalled a decisive rupture in the discourse and practice of the War on Terror.89 Obama distanced himself from the Bush administration’s terrorism discourse by placing emphasis on “targeted strikes” in “the war against Al Qaeda and its affiliates” rather than using the language of the “global war on terror”.90
[W]e must define our effort not as a boundless “global war on terror,” but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America (23 May 2013)
Obama’s discourse also stressed that some of the Bush administration’s policies, such as the use of torture and imprisoning suspected terrorists in Guantanamo bay, were counterproductive in the battle for “hearts and minds”. Obama officially prohibited US state
89
Jackson, R. (2011), “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama”, International Politics, 48(2-3), p. 390
90 The Washington Times, “White House: 'War on terrorism' is over”, 6 August 2009,
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/06/white-house-war-terrorism-over/?fbclid=IwAR2UJo21QKjVv7BRx7x2-NJih3Y-lNmMjLYJFZ-da1wvmwLLq2tDd5tcIW4
actors from using torture and sought to close Guantanamo Bay.91 The Obama administration also used legal discourse to legitimise violent counterterrorism far more than the Bush administration.92 However, in accordance with the Bush administration, the Obama administration discursively legitimised violent counterterrorism as appropriate, necessary, strategically effective and morally righteous. Like the Bush administration’s, this discourse rested upon the core narratives about the threat of terrorism, the terrorist other and America’s role in the world.93
4.2.1) Terrorism and War
Like president Bush, president Obama used the discourse of war in relation to terrorism.
Our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred. (Obama, 20 January 2009)
We are indeed at war with al Qaeda and its affiliates. (Obama, 21 May 2009)
Al Qaeda terrorists and their affiliates are at war with the United States, and those that we capture – like other prisoners of war – must be prevented from attacking us again. (…) we must hold individuals to keep them from carrying out an act of war. (Obama, 21 May 2009)
We are at war with people who have perverted Islam. (15 February 2015)
In the context of war, the use of retaliatory violence appears legitimate. Thus, by asserting that the US is at war with Al Qaeda, Obama legitimises the continuation of violent counterterrorism. Moreover, Obama’s description of “the terrorists” as a “network of violence and hatred”, like the Bush administration’s discourse, dehumanises the terrorist other and presents violent counterterrorism as necessary and strategically effective. Indeed, violent and coercive approaches to counterterrorism appear appropriate as it seems unlikely that a violent and hateful enemy would negotiate. Moreover, “hatred” is an
91 Starr-Deelan, D. (2014), Presidential Policies on Terrorism: From Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama, (New
York: Palgrave MacMillan), p. 160
92
Ellison, E. (2013), “A Critical Discourse Analysis of President Barrack Obama’s War on Terrorism”, Dissertation Human Rights Masters UCL
93 Jackson, R. (2011), “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of) change in US
extreme emotion that implies the irrational and hence, uncompromising nature of “the enemy”.
Our troops have fought bravely against a ruthless enemy. (27 March 2009)
Its leadership has been decimated. Dozens of terrorist leaders have been killed. (6 December 2016)
Here, Obama’s use of the adjective “ruthless” implies that the terrorists lack basic human traits such as compassion and empathy. These rhetorical techniques stimulate antagonism and minimise the interlocutor’s sympathy for the terrorist other. Therefore, as in Bush’s counterterrorism discourse, the Obama administration uses the language of war in relation to terrorism and dehumanises the terrorist other in a way that naturalises and legitimises violent counterterrorism as necessary and appropriate.
Obama’s mantra on the necessity to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda also fits into this warring narrative.
[W]e have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That is the goal that must be achieved. That is a cause that could not be more just. And to the terrorists who oppose us, my message is the same: We will defeat you. (Obama, 27 March 2009) (emphasis added)
Our military and counterterrorism professionals have relentlessly pursued terrorist networks overseas -- disrupting safe havens in several different countries, killing Osama bin Laden, and decimating al Qaeda’s leadership. (6 December 2015)
Indeed, the aim is not to find a non-violent way to resolve the conflict between the opposed factions, it is to destroy and decimate “the enemy”. Given the asserted violent and hateful nature of “the terrorists”, Obama’s discourse presents their defeat through military means as “a cause that could not be more just”. Typical of Obama’s counterterrorism discourse, the use of violence to defeat “the enemy” is associated with the notion of justice, and by extension, moral duty.
Similarly to the Bush administration, the Obama administration morally admonishes itself from the deaths of innocents in Afghanistan. More broadly, it places blame for the GWOT on the shoulders of the 9/11 attackers.
I remind everybody, the United States of America did not choose to fight a war in Afghanistan. (Obama, 27 March 2009)
[O]n January 20th, I will become the first President of the United States to serve two full terms during a time of war. Now, we did not choose this fight, but once it came to us, the world saw the measure of our resolve. (6 December 2016)
Asserting that the US went to war out of necessity portrays war and violence as legitimate and inevitable responses to terrorism. It naturalises the use of violence in reaction to terrorist incidents. This discourse also echoes the notion that US foreign policy prior to the 9/11 attacks played no role in motivating the attacks. Indeed, if the US did not choose to invade Afghanistan because it did not choose to be attacked, how can one argue that the US’ foreign policy choices played any role in the 9/11 attacks? This discourse, like the Bush administration’s, portrays the US as a resolute victim whose moral duty was to wage violent counterterrorism in response to the attacks it suffered.
4.2.2) American exceptionalism and Civilisation vs. Barbarism
The myth of American exceptionalism plays a prominent role in how Obama grounds his justification for violent counterterrorism in the notions of justice and duty. As in the Bush administration, Obama’s terrorism discourse builds American identity in opposition to the terrorist other.
[W]e will use all elements of our national power to defeat al Qaeda, and to defend America, our allies, and all who seek a better future. Because the United States of America stands for peace and security, justice and opportunity. That is who we are, and that is what history calls on us to do once more. (27 March 2009)
[P]eople who have no scruples and would willingly and gladly kill innocents. Al Qaeda is not constrained by a constitution. Many of our adversaries are not constrained by a belief in freedom of speech, or representation in court, or rule of law. (20 April 2009)
[T]errorists offer the injustice of disorder and destruction (…) a hateful ideology. (21 May 2009)
[W]e need not sacrifice our security for our values. That, after all, is the unique genius of America. That’s what makes the United States of America different as a nation. (21 May 2009)
[L]et’s make sure we never forget what makes us exceptional. Let’s not forget that freedom is more powerful than fear (6 December 2015)
Obama uses rhetorical oppositions to situate the US’ fight against terrorism within the narrative of the historic and epic struggle between the “good guys” and the “bad guys”. Indeed, according to the discourse, terrorists represent “injustice”, “disorder”, “destruction”, “fear” and a “hateful ideology” whilst the US stands for “freedom”, “peace and security, justice and opportunity.” The quote on Al Qaeda’s lack of constraints exemplifies the way in which Obama glorifies the US in contrast with the blood-thirsty “enemy”. Further, this positive self-representation and negative other-representation is reminiscent of the Civilisation vs. Barbarism meta-narrative as Obama contrasts America’s values, constitution and legal constraints – discursive signifiers of the US’ status as a “civilised nation” – to “the terrorists’” lack thereof. Indeed, Obama describes the terrorists other as “an enemy that heeds no borders or laws of war”.94 By inscribing the administration’s war against Al Qaeda within the myth of American exceptionalism and the meta-narrative of Civilisation vs. Barbarism, Obama presents the use of “all elements of our national power” – including military force – to defeat Al Qaeda as a morally righteous and necessary venture that is consistent with the US’ historical role of defending and promoting its values.
Here are further examples of Obama’s discursive portrayal of the US' historic duty, ability and commitment to defend its values on a global scale:
[A]s we stand at this crossroads of history, the eyes of all people in all nations are once again upon us – watching to see what we do with this moment; waiting for us to lead. (24 February 2009)
But this is not simply an American problem (…) The safety of people around the
94
world is at stake. (27 March 2009)
[P]art of what makes us, I think, still a beacon to the world, is that we are willing to hold true to our ideals even when it’s hard, not just when it’s easy. (29 April 2009) American leadership has always been elevated by our ability to connect with people’s hopes, and not simply their fears. (23 May 2013)
I believe that the United States military can achieve any mission; that we are, and must remain, the strongest fighting force the world has ever known. (6 December 2016)
Although Obama does not explicitly use the language of good vs. evil, his use of the myth of American exceptionalism and allusions to the narrative of Civilisation vs. Barbarism to legitimise counter-violence and the continuation of the GWOT are broadly consistent with the Bush administration’s.
4.2.3) The threat of terrorism
In line with the discourse of the Bush administration, Obama’s portrayal of the terrorist threat legitimises violent counterterrorism as necessary, morally virtuous and appropriate. Obama embraced the “new” terrorism thesis promulgated by the Bush administration and highlighted the risk of the potential use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists.
[T]he challenges of a new and dangerous world. Today’s dangers are different, though no less grave. The power to destroy life on a catastrophic scale now risks falling into the hands of terrorists. (15 July 2008)
Now, we worry – most of all – about a rogue state or nuclear scientist transferring the world’s deadliest weapons to the world’s most dangerous people: terrorists who won’t think twice about killing themselves and hundreds of thousands in Tel Aviv or Moscow, in London or New York. (15 July 2008)
[T]errorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can (…) an enemy that heeds no borders or laws of war. (27 March 2009)
Right now, in distant training camps and in crowded cities, there are people plotting to take American lives. That will be the case a year from now, five years from now,
and – in all probability – 10 years from now. (21 May 2009)
[T]he terror and extremism that threatens our world’s stability. (25 May 2009) These quotes further exemplify how “the enemy” is dehumanised and demonised in Obama’s terrorism discourse via the same rhetorical techniques used by the Bush administration. Further, the threat of terrorism is depicted in a way that presents the need for immediate and significant action as necessary and urgent.
Jackson notes how despite there being no international terrorist attacks on American soil since 9/11 and the studies indicating that the terrorist threat is overblown,95 Obama did not seek to reduce the perceived threat of terrorism during his first election campaign and throughout his first term.96 On the contrary, Obama initially reiterated the Bush administration’s discourse about the scale and scope of terrorist threat. However, during his second term, Obama softened his depiction of the terrorist threat.
We have to take these threats seriously, and do all that we can to confront them. But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11. (23 May 2013)
Today’s terrorists can kill innocent people, but they don't pose an existential threat to our nation, and we must not make the mistake of elevating them as if they do. (6 December 2016)
Nonetheless, Obama’s discourse on and practice of counterterrorism affirmed that the threat posed by terrorism was great enough to legitimise a global assassination programme and the continuation of the GWOT. In sum, although the Obama administration signalled a departure from certain elements of the Bush administration’s discourse and practice of counterterrorism, notably with regards to Guantanamo Bay and US personnel’s use of torture, its legitimisation of violent counterterrorism was largely consistent with that of its predecessor. Indeed, in line with the Bush administration, the Obama administration legitimised the use of violent counterterrorism as appropriate, necessary, strategically effective and morally righteous through its depiction of the terrorist threat, dehumanisation
95
Mueller, J. (2006), Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats,
and Why We Believe Them, (New York: The Free Press)
96 Jackson, R. (2011), “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of) change in US
of the terrorist other and by situating the War on Terror within the myth of American exceptionalism and the meta-narrative of Civilisation vs. Barbarism. This paper now turns to analysing how the Trump administration has sought to legitimise its use of violent counterterrorism thus far.
4.3) The Trump Administration
When Trump won the presidential election in November 2016, the discourse and practice of the post 9/11 War on Terror was a decade and a half old. It had become – and remains – an integral part of mainstream discussions about security and foreign policy. As aforementioned, the “War on Terror” discourse was built on discursive pillars erected before 9/11 and has consistently served to legitimise the use of violent counterterrorism.97
During the election campaign, Trump sought to politically capitalise on the subject of terrorism and American hostility towards the terrorist other. He repeatedly criticised Obama’s avoidance of the term “radical Islamic terrorism”,98 argued that torture be reintroduced as a method for gathering intelligence99 and suggested that along with the terrorists, the families of terrorists should also be killed.100 Although his tone was different from Obama’s cautious and legalist approach to discussing terrorism and counterterrorism, Trump’s terrorism discourse relies on many of the same rhetorical tropes used by both the Obama and Bush administrations.
4.3.1) Civilisation vs. Barbarism and American Exceptionalism
Bartolucci’s analysis of over 600 Trump speeches offers a revealing insight into these similarities.101 Just as his predecessors, Trump defined American identity positively, contrasting it with his negative representation of the terrorist other. Indeed, Trump refers to the terrorist other as “vicious”, “vile”, “barbaric”, “savage”, “evil”, “horrible, horrible
97
See footnotes 69 and 70
98
Engel, P. (2016), “Trump releases statement on Orlando attack: Obama 'should step down'”, Business
Insider, 12 June 2016, https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-obama-resign-radical-islamic-terrorism-2016-
6?international=true&r=US&IR=T&fbclid=IwAR0d9_qomc0u6fMUyno44wMnKnI6YrrmTRxFzrtaSXrTGI-vAG2JmPHkeGk
99 Diamond, J. (2015), “Trump on torture: 'We have to beat the savages'”, CNN, 6 March 2016
https://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/06/politics/donald-trump-torture
100
LoBianco, T. (2015), “Donald Trump on terrorists: 'Take out their families'”, CNN, 3 December 2015,
https://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/donald-trump-terrorists-families/
101 Bartolucci, V. (2018), “The Discourse on Terrorism of Donald Trump” in Kowalski, J. (eds), Reading Donald
enemies.”102 This other is opposed to the American self that Trump describes as “innocent, generous, brave, good-working people, freedom’s lovers and defenders, and determined and resolved.”103 Like Bush, Trump repeatedly refers to the terrorist other as “evil”. As aforementioned, this discursively legitimises violent counterterrorism as necessary and morally righteous.
In accordance with his predecessors, Trump inscribes the GWOT in the myth of American exceptionalism and far more explicitly than Obama, in the narrative of Civilisation vs. Barbarism.
We will reinforce old alliances and form new ones, and unite the civilized world against radical Islamic terrorism, which we will eradicate completely from the face of the world. (20 January 2017)
Today, billions of faces are now looking at us, waiting for us to act on the great question of our time. Will we be indifferent in the presence of evil? (21 May 2017) It was a barbaric and vicious attack upon civilization. [in reference to the 2017 Manchester bombings] (25 May 2017)
Terrorists are engaged in a war against civilization (…) Civilization is at a precipice (26 May 2017)
[T]o join the community of responsible nations in our fight against common enemies and in defense of civilization itself. (6 July 2017)
Trump consistently portrays terrorists and terrorism in opposition to civilisation and depicts the US as its defender. In accordance with the Bush and Obama administrations, he uses the language of war in relation to terrorism. This is combined with the dehumanisation and evilification of the terrorist other and the assertion that terrorism poses an existential threat to civilisation itself. These discursive framings legitimise violent counterterrorism as necessary, strategically effective, morally commendable and historically desirable.
4.3.2) The threat of terrorism and the need to act
In a rift from Obama’s later discourse but in accordance with the Bush
102 ibid. p. 134 103
