Afghanistan
A Multi-level Conflict Analysis
Why Does The Conflict Not End?
Ellaha Abassi s0822208 Supervisor: Dr. Alastair Reed
2 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague
Content
Abstract ... 4
1 Introduction ... 5
1.1 Research Aims & Relevance ... 6
1.2 Research Question... 7
1.3 Thesis Outline ... 8
2 Context ... 9
3 Literature Study ... 12
3.1 Domestic explanations ... 12
3.1.1 Conflict & Insurgency ... 12
3.1.2 Socio-economic situation ... 16
3.1.3 Ethnicity and Tribalism ... 18
3.1.4 Good Governance ... 20
3.2 Regional explanations ... 23
3.2.1 Geopolitics ... 23
3.2.2 Regional tensions and interests ... 24
3.3 International explanations ... 27
3.3.1 Post-War Reconstruction ... 27
3.3.2 Aid dependence ... 29
3.3.3 US influence on the peace-building and peace-process ... 31
4 Research Design ... 33 4.1 Framework of analysis ... 33 4.1.1 Approach ... 33 4.1.2 Dynamics ... 34 4.2 Case Selection ... 38 4.3 Data Gathering ... 39 5 National Dynamics ... 40 5.1 Insurgency ... 40
5.1.1 The Insurgency in Afghanistan ... 40
3 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague
5.1.3 Power Struggle and ISIS ... 46
5.2 Socio-economic situation ... 47
5.3 Ethnicity & Tribalism ... 51
5.3.1 Ethnicity in contemporary Afghanistan ... 53
5.3.2 Pashtuns and Tribalism ... 55
5.4 Governance ... 57 5.4.1 Pre-2001 Governance ... 57 5.4.2 Post-2001 Governance ... 60 6 Regional dynamics ... 65 6.1 Overlapping Regions... 67 6.1.1 South Asia ... 68 6.1.2 Central Asia ... 70 6.1.3 Middle East ... 71
6.1.4 Russia and China ... 72
6.2 Overlapping complexities ... 73
7 International Dynamics ... 76
7.1 International involvement and peace-building ... 76
7.2 Aid-dependency ... 78
8 Conclusion & Discussion ... 80
4 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague
Abstract
This exploratory research investigates the factors that sustain the post-2001 conflict in Afghanistan. By applying a multi-level lens, it is examined to what extent the different indicators within national level, regional level, and international level sustain the conflict and prevent it from being ended. This study confirms that the different dynamics on three different levels all contribute to the prolonging of the conflict. These dynamics reinforce each other, and have causal links within and between each level. The Afghan conflict is multi-facet and multi-layered and many dynamics are interconnected. Analysis shows that there is not one single explanation for the continuation of the conflict, but the interconnectedness of the different dynamics on different levels. The war in Afghanistan cannot be seen as one single conflict, but many interconnected ones, involving many actors whose motivations and goals not only differ, but are often in conflict too.
5 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague
1 Introduction
Afghanistan is one of the most conflict-ridden countries in the world that displays a complex interaction of national, regional and international conflict lines that have devastated the country in the past three decades (Roy, 2015). Since 1978, Afghanistan has been a battlefield, which started with the Soviet invasion, followed by a civil war that led to the rise of the Taliban and subsequently instability and insecurity after the US invasion in 2001 (Vogelsang, 2002). The fall of the Taliban in 2001 raised high hopes among the Afghan population. After decades of war, hopes emerged that their miseries would come to an end. Unfortunately, insurgency grew stronger over the years and the central government led by Karzai, with support of the international community, did not prove to be able to move the country in the right direction (Barfield, 2012). The inauguration of Ashraf Ghani as president in 2014 and Abdullah as chief executive gave renewed hope to Afghans and the international community that a new era of effective governance was starting. A year later, however, there is disillusionment with this new government as none of the reforms have proved to be successful (Larson and Coburn, 2016: 4). The ongoing conflict in Afghanistan is to a certain extent ironic when considering that the Afghan war has been America’s longest war in its history, with nearly one trillion of dollars spent on the war (Weijer, 2013:1). This is approximately $150,000 per Afghan citizen (idem). The war has also led to the death of approximately 3,500 coalition soldiers and 92,000 Afghans (Schutte, 2016). While December 2014 officially marked the end of the NATO troops in Afghanistan, President Obama announced in October 2015 that the technical and military support to Afghanistan would continue. This means that an additional 10,000 troops will remain in Afghanistan throughout most of the next year with 5,500 to remain in the country even beyond 2016 (BBC News, 2015). The probability of positive change in the near future is however quite limited. After almost fifteen years since the invasion, Afghanistan is far from being a peaceful democratic country. The conflict is continuing and becoming more and more complex with insurgency becoming stronger and more fragmented. 2015 was the most lethal year on record since the fall of the Taliban in 2001 (icasualities.org, 2016). In addition, the economy is flagging, currency is faltering, unemployment is ravaging, and corruption is increasing. These problems have led to nearly 150,000 Afghans fleeing their country in 2015 and braving the trek to Europe.
6 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague 1.1 Research Aims & Relevance
The aim of this study is to obtain a better understanding of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. More specific, this thesis aims to analyze the dynamics that sustain the conflict and prevent it from being solved. Given the extremely complex nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, with many actors involved, the conflict needs to be analyzed on the local/national, regional and international level. Also, the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan has emerged from a combination of different related sub-conflicts. It is thus not only one singular conflict, but conflict on different spheres that are influenced by many dynamics and actors. Therefore, a multi-level analysis is necessary to indicate how the internal, regional and international factors not only sustain the conflict, but have also contributed to a more violent and complex conflict. This study is thus an exploratory research for understanding the current conflict dynamics. As noted earlier, this study will focus on the dynamics that sustain the conflict, as well as on the causal links between these dynamics. Through this approach, the complex internal, regional and international dimensions of the conflict will be sketched to provide a clear picture of the ongoing challenges Afghanistan is facing. Next to a better understanding, the insights obtained in this study might contribute to the design of improved policies and solutions for the future of Afghanistan.
Given the limited scope and time, this study does not aim to analyze the root and structural causes of the conflict, and neither to examine the failed efforts into depth. It should however be noted that the conflict in Afghanistan is extremely complicated and complex and some dynamics that sustain the conflict may be unresolved structural or root causes of the conflict. In addition, some of the failed efforts and flaws in past policies may still be factors that sustain the conflict. These dynamics will of course be taken into consideration.
Important to note is that the post-2001 conflict in Afghanistan is extensively well covered in the existing literature. Nevertheless, the question remains why and for what reasons, despite all the efforts by the international community, the conflict in Afghanistan not only continues, but also becomes more complicated. Surprisingly, despite the presence of the international community in Afghanistan for almost fifteen years, there is hardly any research about the factors that sustain the conflict and prevent it from being ended. The British, German and Norwegian governments
7 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague have published different assessment reports about the conflict in Afghanistan, but either their focus is on the root and structural causes, or they either lack discussing all the different dynamics involved. Most of these reports for example do not take the regional and international dimension of the conflict into consideration. In addition, these published conflict assessment reports on Afghanistan are outdated. The dynamics of the conflict in Afghanistan is changing day by day, and the conflict is becoming more and more complex, actors more fragmented and consequences more severe. All these developments make it critical to provide a coherent and complete overview of the dynamics that prevent the conflict from being ended. Therefore, this thesis will compensate for the lack of a comprehensible, complete, and up-to-date analysis of the dynamics that sustain the conflict in Afghanistan.
1.2 Research Question
While post-2001 Afghanistan has been known as one of the countries with the most international presence to rebuild the country and provide security, the conflict still continues and there is still no solution to end the conflict. Instead of indicating that the Afghan society is resistant to positive development, it would be better to examine what the factors are that contribute to sustaining the conflict and what the causal links are between these dynamics. I will therefore analyze the ongoing conflict and try to identify what the causal mechanisms are that sustain the conflict and prevent it from being ended. In order to reach the research objective outlined above, the following research question is identified:
What factors are sustaining the post-2001 conflict in Afghanistan?
To answer this question as complete as possible, and to take into account the role of the different factors that sustain the conflict, the research question will be examined on three levels; local/ national, regional, and international. This multi-level focus is important given the conflict’s complex nature and the causal links within and between the different levels. A clear assessment of the factors on these three levels is necessary to assess why the conflict is still continuing. It should be noted that the different factors that may contribute to the continuation of the conflict cannot be seen as single explanatory answers. The different factors are interconnected and interact within and between the different levels.
8 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague 1.3 Thesis Outline
To identify the factors that have contributed and are responsible for the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, firstly Chapter 2 will sketch the context of the conflict. This will include a brief analysis of the violent history and the current challenges the country is facing. This will be followed by an extensive literature review in Chapter 3 which will lay out and explain the scholarly answers for the continuation of the conflict. In Chapter 4 the choices for the research design will be elaborated, this will include a section on the case selection, and a section on operationalization methods, which will also include the indicators for a multi-level conflict analysis.
Chapter 5, 6, 7 will be the analysis section of this research. In Chapter 5 the local/national indicators will be analyzed to see to what extent they sustain the conflict and prevent it from being ended. The national indicators are the existence of insurgent groups, socio-economic situation, ethnicity and tribalism, and good governance. Chapter 6 will focus on the regional dimension of the conflict and will elaborate on the influence of neighboring countries, their interests, aims and rivalries, and how these regional dynamic sustains the conflict. The analysis of the international dimension will be in Chapter 7 and will include the lack of a coherent strategy among the different actors involved in Afghanistan. This section will also elaborate on the large flows of aid and its negative impacts in Afghanistan. Furthermore, included in this chapter is the influence of the United States on the Afghan government and reconciliation process with the Taliban.
Finally in Chapter 8, the main findings of this study and the answer to the research question will be presented. This chapter will also touch upon the limitations of this study, as well as recommendations for future research.
9 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague
2 Context
Violence and conflict in Afghanistan is not a new phenomenon (Barfield, 2012). Throughout its history, Afghanistan, or the region of contemporary Afghanistan, has been a battlefield. Archeological evidence suggests that urban civilization in the region of contemporary Afghanistan began around 5000 B.C. Afghanistan as a state, however, was established in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, from the Durrani Pashtun tribe. Ahmad Shah was able to build an empire that extended from Delhi to the Arabian Sea, but his empire fragmented shortly after his death in 1772 (Roy, 2015). It was in 1836 when Dost Muhammad Muhammadzai came to power and ruled at the beginning of the Great Game, this was a period of contest over the domination over Central Asia and Afghanistan between Tsarist Russia and the Empire Britain (Vogelsang, 2002). During this great power rivalry, three Afghan-Anglo wars followed, which eventually led to the independence of Afghanistan in 1919 by the Rawalpindi Treaty (Roy, 2015).
The monarchy under Amanullah Khan introduced its first constitution in 1923. Amanullah was inspired by the liberal progress that was made in Turkey, but traditional resistance to his domestic reform programs forced him to resign in 1929 (Shahrani, 1986). After his son, Habibullah Khan, Muhammad Zahir Shah came to power and reigned from 1933 till 1973 (idem). It was in 1973 that Daoud Khan overthrew the King and established the Republic of Afghanistan. Only a few years later, in 1978, Daoud was also overthrown by communist factions (Tarzi, 1991). The threat of tribal, ethnic and religious groups towards the newly installed communist regime led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (Barfield, 2012). The Soviet backed communist regimes faced a strong guerrilla-war of different Mujahedeen factions. These factions received both money and weapons from the US, Saudi-Arabia and Pakistan (Coll, 2004). In 1989 the Soviets were forced to leave Afghanistan, but it had led to the killing and disappearing of thousands of Afghans, devastated industry, infrastructure and agriculture, and millions of refugees (Hussain, 2005).
Even after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1989, the war in Afghanistan did not seem to be over. The Afghan regime was not receiving enough funds from the Soviet Union anymore, while the Mujahedeen factions were growing stronger with support of Pakistan, US, and Saudi Arabia (Coll, 2004; Meher, 2004). This eventually led to the collapse of the communist government in
10 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague Afghanistan. The years that followed are characterized by a period of domestic violence between the different Mujahedeen militia’s, outbreak of a civil war, which was followed by the take-over of the country by the Taliban in 1996 (Hussain, 2005). Afghanistan was a country forgotten by the international community, isolated and excluded, and had become a safe-haven for Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaida (Rashid, 2010). Immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration started Operation Enduring Freedom to defeat Al-Qaida and Taliban, which led to the fall of the Taliban in late 2001 (idem).
The decades of war, which started since the invasion of the Soviet troops in 1979 and was supposed to be ended with the fall of the Taliban, left Afghanistan and its population in a state despair, and it had more than 1.5 million killed (Roy, 2015). In 2001, the population of Afghanistan was about 25 million, it had a per capita income of $200, illiteracy rates of more than 85 percent, it had the world’s worst health indicators, and it was the worst place for women to be, with the widest gender inequality in the world (Roy, 2003; Roy, 2015). In addition, the decades of war had destroyed the economy, had led to 80 to 90 percent of the labor force being employed in the informal sector, and a culture of war, armed conflict, and drug trafficking. For these, and many other reasons, the transition to peace was an overwhelming challenge (Roy, 2003). The country needed to move from war to peace, from a repressive and militaristic theocracy to a democratic society with rule of law and respect for human rights (Castillo, 2008: 166-167).
The fall of the Taliban raised high hopes among the population in the beginning, and an estimated two million refugees returned back to their country (Their, 2004: 40). Unfortunately, disappointment took over in the years that followed. Economic developments and progress was hardly visible, and due to a lack of alternatives, farmers were driven again towards the growing of poppies. By mid-2007, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime presented that the country was producing 90 percent of the world’s poppy, and also converting 90 percent of it into heroine inside of Afghanistan (Castillo, 2008: 166-167). While opium was first one of the main sources of income for the Taliban, it was almost completely banned by the end of 1999. Before the US invasion in Afghanistan in the of 200, the country produced only 185 tons, while a year later in 2002 the production had increased to 2,700 tons (The Guardian, 2002).
11 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague In addition to the problems caused by poppy cultivation, there were many other challenges Afghanistan was coping with after the fall of the Taliban. The central government in Kabul lacked legitimacy and authority, corruption in the government was widespread, and many former-warlords were incorporated in the government (Roy, 2015). After the first round of the elections in 2014, there was great optimism and very little complains about the process. In the second round however, it became clear that what followed was simply an extension of the corrupt, patronage driven processes that had flourished under Karzai’s administration. In this second round between Abdullah Abdullah and Ghani there was a lot of controversy and many allegations of fraud (Larson and Coburn, 2016: 3). What followed was a long process of counting and recounting with stalemate, international intervention, and eventually a negotiated compromise between the two front-runners (idem).
This messy process in establishing a government showed that the elites would determine the distribution of political resources, regardless of the will of the people. Recognition of this fact in addition with a further slide in the economy because of the delay made the Afghan population even more frustrated about their government and the external involvement in the country (idem: 5). Nevertheless, and in spite of the elite-brokered outcome of the elections, many were still hopeful that the former World Bank technocrat and scientist Ghani, and Abdullah Abdullah with his military skills and experience, would be able to reform the country (idem: 6). Unfortunately, the government remains as ineffective as before, aid-dependent, haunted by corruption, and its legitimacy is decreasing. The lack of some positive change after the elections, and the increasing power vacuum, has led to groups competing for power and influence.
The Afghan population, the main victims of the conflict, remain in a state of frustration about their country (Asia Foundation, 2015). As the US military involvement has decreased significantly and officially will end by the end of 2017, Afghanistan’s future is becoming more insecure. This has led to many neighbors re-evaluating their strategic agenda towards Afghanistan, and the possibility of the reemergence of the Taliban. The security situation in Afghanistan has also become more complicated since ISIS is gaining momentum in Afghanistan. For these reasons, since last year many young educated Afghans have left their country and are seeking asylum in Europe (VOA News, 2016).
12 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague
3 Literature Study
Since the US invasion in late-2001 in Afghanistan, there has been a wide range of scholars and experts that have written about the conflict in this country. There is broad range of views and perceptions on how the conflict started, why it started, why it is still continuing and even solutions the problems are proposed. In this section the objective is to lay out and explain the scholarly views to why the conflict is still continuing and assess their quality. I will therefore give an overview of the most important and most-shared views on the conflict in Afghanistan, but I have distinguished these reason and explanations in three different parts. First, I will start by outlining the different opinions and views that can be seen as domestic explanations for the continuation of conflict. This will include a topic on insurgency, socio-economic situation, the complex environment of ethnicity and tribalism, and good governance. In addition to these, there is also a wide range of scholars who argue that Afghanistan’s geographical position and external interference is one of the factors that sustain the conflict and prevent it from being ended. Therefore, in the second part, I will discuss the theory of geopolitics and what the regional dynamics are and to what extent these dynamics contribute to the continuation of the conflict. In the third section the role of the international community in Afghanistan will be analyzed. The focus will primarily be on the lack of a coherent strategy and US involvement in Afghanistan, and how these factors have contributed to both the intensification and sustaining of the conflict. Given the different dynamics in play on national, regional and international level, I will conclude by proposing a multi-level conflict analysis as the most suitable approach to grasp all aspects of the conflict. This is especially important given the fact that the conflict in Afghanistan is multi-faceted and multi-layered, involves many different actors with conflicting interests, and the different dynamics are interconnected and linked and cannot be seen as singular explanations for the conflict, but instead reinforce one another.
3.1 Domestic explanations 3.1.1 Conflict & Insurgency
Conflicts are not an unusual and rare phenomenon. As has been argued by many scholars, conflict dates from the beginning of human history, and it will probably never end (Maddison, 2016; Woodhouse et al., 2015). According to Marshal and Gurr (2005), there are approximately
13 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague 20 to 40 armed conflicts of various sizes that rage around the world each year. Conflict can be either violent or non-violent, but it is often described as the coercive, violent mode of confrontation among opponents (Jeong, 2008: 3). The potential for conflicts arises when opposing interest, values, or needs tend to affect the relationship with others (Jeong 2008: 5). ‘Conflict’ has also popularly been defined as ‘a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources’ (Boulding, 1962: 5). Goals and activities become incompatible when one’s interests are threatened by the actions of another. Parties that are in conflict make attempts to prevent the other from achieving the desired objectives (Jeong, 2008:5). The relationships in conflict are often also described as an exercise of coercive power (Winter, 1973: 5). It is power that provides people with the ability to compel the other to do something, and it is the source of people’s ability to exercise control over decision making (idem). Power becomes thus an important instrument in the struggle for winning a conflict (Jeong, 2008: 6).
Brahm (2003) has described conflict as conforming to a cycle; it begins with the development of a type of tension in society and later emerges in the public domain, then the conflict escalates, which leads to de-escalation and subsequently to resolution or settlement of the conflict. The cycle is then completed by a period of ‘post-conflict reconciliation’ (Brahm 2003 in Maddison, 2016: 21). Despite the fact that this idea of a ‘cycle of conflict’ can be very useful, in reality conflict is a much more complex social phenomenon that is embedded in both social and political relationships, causing periodic ruptures, contributing to physical and structural violence, and framing and constraining political relationships. Despite the fact that these dynamics are present in all societies, they tend to have a particular force in deeply divided societies (Maddison, 2016: 21). The challenges in these deeply divided societies, such as the violent conflict, repression, and injustice are multi-layered and multi-faceted. For this reason it is hardly impossible to address which wrongs can be prioritized, and what process it should entail. In deeply divided societies, the sources of division can be multiple and may include class, caste, religion, language, race, ethnicity and clan (Guelke: 2012: 14). These divisions tend to pit one group off towards another group (idem). Also, unlike more stable societies, conflict tends to exist along a ‘well-entrenched fault line’ that contains the potential for a recurrence of violence(idem).
14 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague When it comes to the conflict in Afghanistan, many scholars have argued that he conflict is not a discrete conflict between two parties, but involves many actors and is a complex conflict system (e.g. Barfield, 2012; Rashid, 2010; Trives, 2009). The conflict between the insurgency and the government is however perceived as the most major one. But also the insurgency itself, as has been argued by Baraket et al. (2008), consists of a number of different Armed Opposition Groups (AOG), with different motives and aims. And even within these insurgent groups, they are not homogenous. An insurgency is defined as a political-military campaign by non-state actors who seek to overthrow a government through the use of often unconventional military strategies and tactics (Jones, 2008: 9). Insurgencies can also involve a wide range of tactics, which can be small-scale demonstrations or large-scale violence (Galula, 1964: 3). There are two general theories about the rise of insurgencies, grievance and greed (e.g. Saideman, 2001; Van Hanen, 1999).
The grievance theory rests upon the role of ethnic grievances in causing war, which is widely accepted in the literature on civil wars and insurgencies (e.g. Horowitz, 1985; Kaufman, 1996). This theory claims that ethnic ties are stronger, more rigid and more durable than any other ties in ordinary social or political groups. In addition to this, combatants motivated by ethnicity are more committed to their cause and are less likely to make any compromises with other groups. There is also evidence that violence is less likely to occur in relatively homogenous countries compared to countries that consist of different ethnic groups (Horowitz, 1985). The second theory on the rise of insurgency is the greed theory. This theory builds on a body of economic literature and implies that violence is an industry that generates profits from looting. This places insurgents on the same level as bandits or pirates (Jones, 2008: 13). Insurgents are thus motivated by greed and war is explained by circumstances that generate profitable opportunities, which include primary commodity exports such as food, oil, and other raw materials (Collier, 2000: 841).
Jones (2008: 8) reasons however that none of these theories caused the insurgency in Afghanistan, but instead argues that precondition for the onset of Afghanistan’s insurgency was structural. This structural cause was the collapse of the government after the fall of the Taliban regime. The Afghan government was not able to provide basic services to the people, security
15 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague forces were too weak to establish law and order and too little international forces were available to fill the gap. In this anarchic situation, the different insurgents took advantage. In addition, the primary motivation for the insurgent groups in Afghanistan was not grievance or greed, but ideology according to Jones (2008). Leaders of the insurgent groups wanted to overthrow the Afghan government and take over control to establish an Islamic government (Jones, 2008: 15). Nevertheless, Siddique (2014: 187) argues based on his field research that there are three types of Taliban fighters. The ones that are indeed motivated by ideology and are thus religiously motivated, but there are also fighters who seek revenge, and there are the survivals from the former Taliban regime. Their aim however did remain dedicated to establish a decentralized religious federation.
Many argue that, in order to end the conflict, a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, the largest insurgency, should be reached, as the Taliban are at the moment the biggest threat to the country’s security (e.g. Abbas, 2014; Biddle, 2013; Gunaratna and Woodall, 2015). Biddle (2013) has argued that the Afghan National Security Forces are incapable of securing the country, especially without foreign aid. The ANSF’s operating budget in fiscal year 2013 was $6.5 billion (twice as large as Afghan government’s federal revenue that same year). Biddle continues and states that since it is highly unlikely to oust the Taliban, the only realistic alternative to peace is a negotiated settlement (Biddle 2013 in Berlatsky, 2015). People opposing this view are stating that negotiation with the enemy is not in line with US policy, and liberals who fear losing hard-won gains for Afghan women and minorities (Curtis and Eland in Berlatsky, 2015). On the other hand, chaos without a strong central government, does not make the situation of Afghan women any better than if a settlement is reached. Despite the fact that a compromise with the Taliban is hard, any other alternative would mean sacrificing more of the gained goods (Berlatsky, 2015).
In addition, there are also doubts about the Taliban not being sincere and serious about negotiations. In 2011, the Head of the Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated by the Taliban (BBC News, 2011). Burhanuddin Rabbani was appointed as the most strategic figure given his past experience with the Mujahedeen, to lead the talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. In addition, it is often said that the Taliban are relatively in a better position
16 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague (O’Hanlon, 2009; Qassem, 2014; Van Der Lijn, 2013). They can wait out the International troops operating in Afghanistan, so why would they make any concessions? Others argue however that the Taliban are interested. Biddle (2013) states that for the Taliban there are also good reasons to explore a deal with the Afghan government. Many Afghan Taliban leaders have been living in exile in Pakistan for years, and their children are growing up as Pakistani’s, they have no access to their houses and land in Afghanistan. In addition to this, there is a deep Afghan-Pakistani rivalry, and the Taliban live constantly under the threat of being assassinated by drone-strikes (Semple, 2009). Therefore, as argued by Rashid (2010) the conflict is costly enough for the Taliban to consider a settlement.
Throughout the years since the fall of the Taliban, President Karzai made many attempts to negotiate with influential Taliban leaders. Many sources even show the willingness of these leaders to negotiate and be included in the Afghan government (Chandra, 2011; Qassem, 2014). Nevertheless, as stated by Qassem (2014: 843) given Afghanistan’s aid-dependency and its foreign policy largely influenced by the US, Afghanistan was not able to pursue any of such attempts in the first years after the invasion. This caused de-alignment of the Taliban fighters and the possibility to come back stronger (Chandra, 2011: 841). According to Qassem, the right opportunity was missed (2014: 844). Given the fact that the reconciliation process in Afghanistan was largely influenced by external actors, this topic covers both a national dimension, as well as a regional dimension with Pakistan’s and China’s involvement, and an international dimension given the involvement of the US.
3.1.2 Socio-economic situation
The socio-economic situation of a state has long been recognized to influence war, conflict, and domestic order within states (Milenkovich et al, 2014; Richmond, 2015). This notion is widely shared among politicians, the aid industry, and scholars. It is widely agreed that an underdeveloped socio-economic situation and inequality should be mitigated by governments or interventions (El Badry and Swanson, 2014). Piketty (204) for example argues that socio-economic inequality has historically caused conflict and thus has to be mitigated by the state and the international community to avoid further conflict. In addition, high levels poverty, lack of economic growth, and lack basic living conditions have scientifically been linked with conflict,
17 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague crime, and violence (El Badry and Swanson, 2014). Socio-economic inequality has often been argued to weaken the link between civil society, human rights and a rule of law, democracy, development and peacemaking (idem).
It has been stated that a major influence to future course of the country in Afghanistan is the scarcity of socio-economic development. The lack of adequate development, healthcare, high fertility rates and the growing youth population are critical variables that are linked to instability in the country and region (El-Badry and Swanson, 2014: 208). With regard to a youthful age structure, many studies have shown its impact on political regimes. It has been argued that if a population is young and jobless, support for authoritarian regimes can rise. In addition, mobilization and recruitment of especially young men by non-state actors that are capable of political and criminal violence will increase (Goldstone, 2010; Cincotta, 2009; Urdal, 2006).
Many scholars have also argued that a country with a low literacy, education and labor force participation, positive development is highly unlikely (El-Badry and Swanson, 2014: 218). The demographic and socio-economic conditions Afghanistan is coping with, such as high population growth, high birthrates, poor health care, slow economic growth, poverty, overcrowding in schools, overburdened infrastructure, depletion of environmental resources, and high unemployment rates and inequality, are without doubt major factors to the increase of political violence, and factors for sustaining the conflict (UN HDI, 2015). Today’s Afghanistan is also compared to other developing countries during the 1960s-1980s. Many demographers including Bongaarts (2006) and Sinding (2008) have written on the positive correlation between reproductive health, socio-economic development and security. Countries like Bangladesh, Cuba, and Morocco all had high birth rates and rapidly growing population which led to the policies of increased access to reproductive health. Reports have indicated that in less than 20 years after the policies were established, high levels of literacy and female empowerment and low infant mortality along with socio-economic development occurred (El-Badry and Swanson, 2014: 321).
18 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague Furthermore, economic development in post-conflict societies is an aspect that has widely been elaborated on by scholars. Milward (1984) has pointed out that the peace after World War 2 was very successful and that the main reason for this success was the astonishing expansion of economic interconnectedness among and between the people from Europe. This argument builds on the belief that if people are kept busy with economic activities, they would turn away from more violent options (Cramer and Goodhand, 2002: 888). Cramer and Goodhand (2002: 886) also argue that peace is very likely to depend on an institutionalized expansion of economic interdependence nationally and internationally and this requires effective centralized state formation. The idea that economic development will play a significant role in consolidating peace is more grounded in work by Boyce (1996), Del Castillo (2001) and Cramer (1999). The main argument remains that peace is a precondition for development, but when it comes to recently-secured peace, it is said it will remain fragile without a significant economic development (Cramer and Goodhand, 2002: 887). It is also said that in post-conflict economies often an orthodox financial sector liberalization has often facilitated market behavior that has undermined macro-economic stability and economic expansion (Addison et al., 2001).
3.1.3 Ethnicity and Tribalism
Lots of experts in the field of democracy building agree on the fact that democracy and democratic institutions are generally harder to establish and maintain when it comes to divided societies with deep cleavages when compared with homogenous countries (e.g. Lijphart, 2004; Horowitz, 1993). In addition, especially after the cold war, with the rise of internal conflicts throughout the world, many scholars argued that the real source of conflict and rebellion in divided societies was often ethnic nationalism (Connor, 1994; Gellner, 1983; Horrowitz 1985). Another point on which there is a scholarly agreement is that the problem of ethnicity or existence of other divisions is bigger in countries that are not yet democratic, fully democratic or new democracies when compared to well-established democracies (Lijphart, 2004: 97). In addition, it is these obstacles that present a major obstacle to democratization in contemporary times and leads to the continuation of conflict. One of the main reasons for the failure of democratization and ending of conflict is according to Horowitz (1993:18) the existence of
19 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague ethnic conflict. Democracy is according to him about ‘inclusion and exclusion, about access to power, about the privileges that go with inclusion and the penalties that accompany exclusion’. The author continues and adds that in divided societies, it is the ethnic identity that provides clear lines that determine who is going to be included and who not.
What has received a considerable amount of attention is the complex and uncertain environment of ethnic, tribal, sub-tribal, and geographical and religious cleavages, and how this has led to the rise of insurgency and violent conflict (Liebl, 2007; Van Der Lijn, 2013). As has been put forward, the different ethnic groups in Afghanistan have historically never cooperated very well and have also often turned against each other. In addition, warlords who have been part of the post-2001 government have maintained mono-ethnic armies inside the Afghan National Security Forces (Van Der Lijn, 2013:110). On the other hand however, it has also been argued that ethnicity is not a defining cleavage in Afghan society. No ethnic minority or leader had ever endorsed serious attempts of secession (Barfield, 2012). Also, shortly after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, different ethnic factions proclaimed their support for a unitary state, despite the fact that they disagreed on the formation of government (Barfield, 2012). Many scholars thus argue that mainly due to the confusing political and military situation, the Afghan conflict of the past decades has been often categorized as an ethnic one (Barfield, 2012; Rashid, 2000; Rieck, 1997). In addition to this, it has been argued that the past fixed social structures have now been fragmented, and ethnicity is less important cleavage than it ever used to be (Van Der Lijn, 2013: 177).
In addition to the different ethnic groups in the country, Afghanistan exists of different tribes and sub-tribes. Especially within the Pashtun ethnic group, the role of the tribe is extremely important in solving conflicts within the community (Liebl, 2007). Throughout history the different tribes have resisted any control from the central government. Siddique notes however that many tribal Pashtuns were ready for change and backed the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 2001, but Afghan government failed to adopt a coherent tribal policy. This led to the emerging of the ‘new’ Taliban in the first year after the invasion and continued to spread across the southern provinces by eliminating the tribal leadership (2014: 166).
20 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague Furthermore, the informal cultural practices of law have also led to the lack of effective authority by the central government. Experts have stated that the tribal system and the mechanisms of the Pashtunwali are one of the main reasons for the lack of government legitimacy in the country and subsequently the main problem the US and its allies face when dealing with the Pashtuns and Pashtun insurgency (Rashid, 2010; Liebl, 2007; Smith, 2009). In addition, this aspect has also led to another, more defining, cleavage in Afghanistan which is the center-periphery or rural-urban division. Rubin (2002) and Vogelsang (2002) have for example argued that throughout history the different regimes have lacked effective authority over the provinces and rural areas. These factors have been said to contribute to the prolonging of the conflict and are especially limiting any attempts of establishing good governance.
Some analysts on the other hand have argued that tribes have ceased to exist or their structure has been weakened. Gonzalez notes for example that interest in Afghanistan’s tribes is largely because of ‘an increasingly desperate political situation’. He continues and states that few anthropologists today would consider using the term ‘tribe’ as a concept for practical application’ (2005: 17). In addition, an US army assessment (2009: 24) concluded that a singular focus on tribes as a central organizational principle of Afghan society implies a need to identify leaders, institutions, and relationships that may not exist. This argument thus assumes that too much focus has been placed on tribes and tribal engagement in Afghanistan.
3.1.4 Good Governance
Doyle and Sambanis (2005) found in their study of examining 151 cases that effective governance is critical in ending internal conflicts. These authors argue that in order to be successful, the government should be able to provide security, there should be institutions based on rule of law that are capable to resolve future conflicts, and an economy that is capable of offering employment (2006: 5). Hironaka (2005) argues also that governmental capacity is an important predictor of civil conflicts. Effective bureaucratic and political systems decrease the probability of violent conflicts occurring, while on the other hand weak governance contributes to lengthier insurgencies and wars (2005: 45-51). In addition, also Fearon and Laitin (2003) have argued that financially, organizationally and politically weak governments are prone to conflicts and insurgency. Furthermore, given the high levels of violence in the aftermath of successful
21 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague peace settlements or overthrow of regimes in counties like El Salvador, Mozambique and Nicaragua for example, the continuation of some sort of violence should be expected. The main reason for this is the fact that most countries after a major regime change still do not have a monopoly over the use of violence (Cramer and Goodhand, 2002: 886).
Jones (2008: 16) argues that when a structural change occurs, such as the overthrow of a regime, this creates a condition of emerging anarchy within a state. While Waltz (1979: 88) has claimed that domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic, and thus there is no anarchy like the international system, this notion is not necessarily true for states with weak governance. In a state of emerging anarchy, the government is unable to provide essential services to the population. These states do not possess sufficient bureaucratic and institutional structures to ensure the proper functioning of government. These states also lack trained civil servants to operate schools, courts, welfare system and other aspects for social functioning of a state (Hironaka, 2005: 44). Societies with weak governance also face large amount of corruption. Corruption hampers economic growth, limits investments, disproportionally burdens the poor, and damages government legitimacy (idem). Corruption is thus the misuse of entrusted power for private gain (Jones, 2008: 17). In Afghanistan, the major cause for corruption are insufficient salaries, but also opportunism, as the police, jurists and other officials are just in a more advantageous position to extract more revenue (DFID, 2008: 12; Katzman, 2010).
It is also argued that institutions are extremely important to structuring stability, especially in societies that are ethnically not homogenous (Riphenburg, 2007: 2). Riphenburg continues and states that ‘in societies deeply divided along ethnic, regional, or religious lines, political institutions take on great importance, since they are the most prominent channel of communication between dissimilar groups’ (2007: 2). These institutions thus ease the communication channels between groups who need to talk. Furthermore, Lijphart also emphasizes on the importance of institutions and states that in countries with deep ethnic or other cleavages, power sharing is the only way that both the interests and demands of the different groups can be accommodated (2004: 96).
22 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague In addition, poor governance increases the recurrence of insurgency as the security forces lack legitimacy and are unable to establish law and order (idem). As argued by Rotberg (2006: 4), ‘failed states cannot control their peripheral regions, especially those regions occupied by out-groups. They will therefore lose authority over large sections of territory’. As the state is incapable of controlling its territory, this weakness creates opportunities for insurgent groups. This is especially true in remote areas of the country, where insurgent groups are able to establish strongholds (Hironaka, 2005: 44). The more absent central authority is, the more vulnerable the inhabitants become to other groups who wish to establish an alternative government (Wickham-Crowley, 1956: 35). The rise of the insurgency is according to many the collapse of the Taliban regime and the establishment of the Interim government that lacked authority (Rotberg, 2007; Jones, 2008). As the new Afghan government led by President Karzai was unable to provide essential services to the population, especially in rural areas, deep frustrations and resentment among the Afghan (rural) population was created (Barfield and Nojumi, 2010; Jones, 2008).
Barfield and Nojumi (2010) have argued that the governance aspect in Afghanistan is hugely misunderstood. They state that the American policy in Afghanistan has failed to draw upon the cultural and historical lessons of local governance in Afghanistan. These authors claim that it has been wrongly assumed in the years after the US invasion that a strong centralized government with formal institutions is the key to stability in Afghanistan. Despite the United States and allies (also referred to as the international community) have invested in Afghan politics, courts, army and police, government authority at especially provincial and district levels remains ineffective. The source of the problem lies according to Barfield and Nojumi (2010: 40) in equitation governance with government. Governance is by these authors defined as the manner in which communities regulate themselves to preserve social order and maintain security. Government on the other hand is the action of ruling, the continuous exercise of state authority over the population it governs. Barfield and Nojumi (2010: 41) conclude by saying that stability in Afghanistan only can be achieved if priority is given to how especially the rural population understands governance, and are thus giving a greater role in it.
23 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague 3.2 Regional explanations
3.2.1 Geopolitics
The general history of geopolitics is a very political one (Livingstone 1993 in Tuathail, 1993: 260). Geography is a practice that stems from the Western imperializing project of surveying, mapping and cataloguing the earth (Tuathail, 1993: 260). In the scholarly field, however, it is a fairly recent construction. Geopolitics in itself is thus not a very meaningful term but a historically ambiguous and unstable concept. It was in 1899 when the Swedish Rudolf Kjellen introduced the term geopolitik (Holder, 1992: 319). While there was a lot of confusion about what the term actually implied, it was stigmatized as a pseudoscience by influential intellectuals such as Hans Morgenthau during the Cold War in the early 1950s (Tuathail, 1997: 260). Several scholars have contributed to the emergence of it, but Sir Halford John Mackinder was perhaps the most influential contributors to the discussion of how geography influences the power relationships in international relations, and is the eternal factor that drives state action. Mackinder developed the ‘heartland theory’ in 1904, in which he emphasizes the control of Eurasia, also referred to as the ‘World Island’.
Mackinder’s theory concluded that with land power becoming more important (better mobility because of railroads due to the industrial revolution), land powers on the World Island had a smaller distance to travel than the sea powers that were operating on this periphery. This meant that increased mobility affected the balance of power in the favor of the World Island powers (Knutsen, 2014: 835). For this reason, Mackinder concluded, that whoever ruled the Heartland would have the possibility of ruling the world. This region was by him referred to as the ‘pivot’ of world politics, and it was inaccessible to ship and thus out of the reach of British sea power. After World War 2, the interest in this theory grew more and influenced American strategic studies, and geopolitics as grand strategy was one of the most important foundations of the West’s Cold War policy (Knutsen, 2014). Even after the Cold War, Mackinder’s theory survived and today it is being resurrected again in the wake of energy security in this region. Some even argue that the ‘Great Game’ re-emerges with important players Russia, China, Iran, Turkey and the United States (Baral ,2013; Goodson, 2014). The traditional and new dimensions of
24 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague geopolitics are combined by Nayef al-Rodhan (2012) to provide a more multidimensional view of power. In the framework of the so-called meta-geopolitics, the importance of geography is superseded by the combination of hard and soft power that states can employ to preserve and obtain power. Another contribution to the theory of geopolitics is that meta-geopolitics, despite the fact that it is also relevant for states, also applies to private and transnational entities that are playing an increasingly important role in contemporary geopolitics. Traditional and modern literature on geopolitics have emphasized on geographic influence on power relationships in international politics. Theorists have sought to demonstrate the importance of variables such as natural boundaries, access to important sea routes, control of strategically important land areas, etc. as a major influence of state behavior.
With regard to Afghanistan, the theory of geopolitics is referred to in order to sketch the complex and conflicting interests of the neighboring states, but also that of the big regional powers. Below a short summary is given on the regional dimension of Afghanistan conflict, based on existing work by experts in this field.
3.2.2 Regional tensions and interests
As has been argued by Andrew Kuchins (2012), the current reintegration of Afghanistan into the international system can be conceptualized as a ‘reconnecting of Eurasia’. Given Afghanistan’s geographic location between the four potentially wealthy but volatile and conflict-ridden regions – Central Asia, the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia – provides it with extremely important geostrategic assets. While this geographic position can be a potential economic boost and serve as a land bridge and resource provider for the regions of which it is part, it also means that many different and conflicting interests of these regions come together. Amin Saikal (2014) for example argues that despite the common economic and trade needs of these neighboring countries, their political differences and competing strategic priorities continue to undermine harmony and cooperation. Also, Cramer and Goodhand (2002: 886) argue that policy towards Afghanistan cannot treat the country as if it is an isolation ward. Instead, they argue, Afghanistan is clearly part of a ‘regional conflict complex’. This implies that strategies that are adopted by states play themselves out beyond national borders. They continue and state that ‘nation- and
25 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague state-building in one country, for instance Pakistan, may derive benefits from violence, economic interest and state disarray in another, for example Afghanistan’ (idem: 886).
These regional tensions are however not only negatively influencing the economic development and prosperity of the region as has been argued, but also largely influence the conflict in Afghanistan (Baral, 2013; Mason, 2015; Wishnick, 2014). It has often been said that the different conflicting interests of the region are fought within Afghanistan (Collins, 2014). Relationship between Afghanistan and its southern neighbor, Pakistan, has often been described as most tensed. These relationship has also escalated a few times since the early years of the Karzai administration. The core of problem between these two countries is said to be Islamabad’s double-edged approach of supporting the ‘war-on-terror’ policies that should contribute to Afghanistan’s security and stability, but at the same time backing insurgency groups like the Taliban. Pakistan’s main goal is to keep Kabul both economically and strategically dependent on Islamabad, instead of allowing Afghanistan to emerge as a regional player (Goodson, 2014). In addition to seeking strong leverage in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the US and allies, Pakistan is also seeking to deprive its regional rivals, India and to a certain extent Iran, of any significant foothold in Afghanistan. Existing literature on this subject all mention Pakistan’s important influence with regard to ending the conflict in Afghanistan, but also as a factor that sustains the conflict.
With regard to the tensed relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Abubakar Siddique argues that the stability of both countries is heavily dependent on the situation in the border area of both countries, often referred to as Pashtunistan (2014: 3). The current conflict is according to Siddique because both governments have failed to incorporate the Pashtuns into their political structures. This notion automatically raises questions about the Durand line. The Durand line was set in the late 1800s to officially mark the boundaries of British India and Afghanistan, which divided the Pashtuns in two different countries, but the country remained unstable since then, and many tribes unsuccessfully tried to unite for Pashtunistan, a nation for the Pashtuns (idem). Siddique continues and states that religious extremism is to a large degree the product of critical failures with regard to the Pashtun homeland. Siddique also argues in his book that while the early-resistance against the Soviet-backed Afghan regime in the 1980s was along tribal lines,
26 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague this changed with foreign influences and changed the traditional leadership in the re region, and paved the way for Pakistani Intelligence agencies (2014: 163).
On the other hand, to stem the tide of Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan, both India and Iran have profoundly invested in the country. The regime of mostly Shia Iran has sympathized with especially the Shia Hazara’s, one of Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities, to resent Taliban’s Wahabi extremism and repressive behavior (Destradi, 2015). Both Iran and India have backed anti-Taliban groups such as the Northern Alliance in the 1990s. Both countries also remain conscious and concerned about the possibility of the Taliban to reemerge as the dominant force in Afghanistan, and subsequently both countries are trying to secure their regional position by ensuring that Afghanistan is led by a friendly government that is not backed by Pakistan (idem). The Central Asian states, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan remain suspicious of one another and averse to any kind of regional cooperation that might enhance the position of any other country (idem). Despite the conflicting interest of Afghanistan’s neighbors it has however been argued that the continuing security problem in Afghanistan and the possibility of a failed state will have devastating effects for the region too (Saikal, 2014: 145).
In addition to the regional rivalry by Afghanistan’s direct neighbors, there is a major-power competition in the region that will most likely influence the course of the Afghan conflict. Saikal argues that while publicly China, Russia and the US have been supporting regional cooperation and stability in Afghanistan, they also have conflicting political and strategic interests that has often led them to pursue the kind of development that will maximize their individual interests (2014: 151). It is often stated that after the 2009 announcement by President Obama that the withdraw of troops would start in 2011 and end in 2014, many of these regional players have taken a different stance towards Afghanistan. Nevertheless, their conflicting interests and strategies to secure their position in the region is said to be one of the reasons for the continuation of the Afghan war (Destradi, 2015; Nojumi, 2016; Saikal, 2014).
27 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague 3.3 International explanations
3.3.1 Post-War Reconstruction
The idea of international state-building in countries that are affected by war, instability and poverty has risen tremendously in the past two decades (Verkoren and Kamphuis, 2013: 501). This increase is based on the idea that Western-style states can be built in unstable developing countries via outside interventions. Many scholars have however argued that this notion is questionable, as the Western states have come into existence in this specific form because of the context of historical and geographical circumstances, and these cannot easily be replicated elsewhere (Clapham 2002; Leander 2004). Furthermore it has been argued that developing countries are unlikely to follow the same path as the west, given the different international context then and now (Verkoren and Kamphuis, 2013: 510). Furthermore, it has been argued that today’s fixed borders, the different kind of wars, and new opportunities offered by the global economy make the comparison inappropriate (Jackson, 1990; Sorensen, 2001; Reno, 1998). Despite the questions than can be raised on the current peace-building programs in developing countries, the international community has been engaged in maintaining peace and fostering stable democratic politics in many war-torn countries since the end of the Cold War. As argued by Suhrke (2007), contemporary post-war reconstruction programs have several defining characteristics, and their aim is rarely to only reconstruct. These programs include provisions for building a transparent, effective and accountable states. In addition, especially since the 1990s, these reconstruction programs have become more and more standardized, and reflect experiences from cases that are labeled as ‘lessons learned’, ‘best practices’, and other guiding principles that are endorsed by international institutions and NGOs. Also, these reconstruction programs are models that are influenced and built upon Western experiences of liberal political development and economic growth (Suhrke, 2007: 1292).
Suhrke (2007: 1292) continues and states that the post-war reconstruction program in Afghanistan resembles a form of development model that in the 1950s and 1960s was known as ‘modernization’. A wide range of literature has focused on this aspect and it is often concluded that ‘modern’ is often equated as ‘western’. In addition, modernization was also seen as a package of ‘liberal peace’ that included economic growth, political democracy, modern attitudes
28 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague and Weberian rationality in state bureaucracies. This model is, as already pointed out above, widely used as post-conflict programs for reconstruction. The framework for ‘liberal peace’ is a wide-ranging agenda of reconstruction, reintegration and change. The underlying model of modernity is Weberian and Western and international aid agencies play an important role in designing, financing and monitoring the process (Suhrke, 2007: 1293).
Many scholars have also argued that the post-war reconstruction/modernization model entails a form of Western dominance that leaves the recipients little genuine choice (Verkoren and Kamphuis, 2013; Suhrke, 2007). In addition to this, it has also been criticized that this model does not take into account, or does leave little room for traditional practices and knowledge. Furthermore, this model has also been criticized on grounds of effectiveness and efficiency (idem). These critics conclude that this liberal peace package is unrealistic, internally contradictory, and more likely to generate new conflict rather than to sustain peace. It has been argued that sequence and gradual policy reforms should be prioritized instead of ‘proceed at all fronts at once’ (Ghani and Lockhart, 2007). Also, given the weak capacity of post-conflict states and the fragile peace call for gradualism. In today’s post-conflict reconstruction programs, international agencies have a dominant role (Weijer, 2013). Since the 1990s, with the standardized process of post-war reconstruction models, donor aid organizations and UN agencies have taken a primary responsibility for the design, financing, and monitoring of post-war reconstruction programs. While foreign assistance often is necessary to provide the resources, it does not help with internal legitimacy of the central government (Suhrke, 2007; Weijer, 2013).
Furthermore, Amin Saikal has contributed a serious amount of work on the conflicted American involvement in Afghanistan and the broader region. His analysis shows that the United States and its allies have failed to understand the reality on the ground in Afghanistan, which has resulted in a numerous amount of failures and have led to the current situation in which Afghanistan still remains stuck in bloodshed, instability and divided and incompetent government. Furthermore, as argued by Saikal (2014), the failed US strategy and tactics of counter-terrorism over any comprehensive approach of state-building, has led to the revival of insurgency and to the flourishing of corruption and patronage of the Afghan government as
29 Ellaha Abassi – MSc Crisis and Security Management Public Administration – Leiden University Campus The Hague America’s client. These have resulted in the loss of legitimacy on the part of the Afghan government and increased hostility towards the American and foreign forces (Saikal, 2014). Saikal concludes by stating that after the 2014 transition and drawdown of international troops, there is little positive role for the US, which leaves Afghanistan and its problems for the region to deal with.
3.3.2 Aid dependence
The case of Afghanistan has often been used to illustrate the negative effects that aid can have on state formation and development (Ghani 2007; Goodhand and Sedra 2010; Rubin 2002 and 2006; Suhrke 2007). In a post-war society however, moderate political parties or actors may either be marginalized, weak, or may even not exist. For this reason, it is international support is important to strengthen the position of these groups and facilitate democratization (Verkoren and Kamphuis, 2013). It should however be noted that international donors are unwilling to provide aid without conditions, and these conditions do not always relate with the most pressing needs (idem: 24). Moreover, the impact of international engagement may be obstructed interagency rivalries or donors’ ambition to demonstrate short-term results. International support may in addition foster a culture of dependence, which is very problematic as these processes need to be focused on the needs of the local people, and also driven by the people in these societies (Chandler 2004; de Zeeuw 2005; Paris 2004). In addition, International engagement is also often short-termed, which prompts donors to speed up the process of democratization and peace building (Verkoren and Kamphuis, 2013).
Khan (2005), and Verkoren and Kamphuis (2013) argue that it is not necessarily about a better connection between aid and capacity building, but that aid actually limits the possibilities for capacity building. These authors highlight how economic structures determine the political constellation, and argue that there is little point in increasing aid ‘ownership’ and investment to strengthen government bureaucracy, if economic relations don’t change. A state heavily dependent on aid is referred to as a rentier state (Verkoren and Kamphuis 2013: 502). Rentier states are according to them states that derive most of their income from external rents that are the prerogative of the state, such as for example official development assistance, instead of taxes (2013: 508). In this type of states, the government controls the rents and does not depend on the
