Digitally managed labour : a labour process approach of delivery platforms

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Digitally managed labour

A labour process approach of delivery platforms

Author: Vincent Cornelis Valentin Scuric

UvA ID: 10187626

First supervisor: Dr. Johan J. de Deken Second supervisor: Dr. Marco Biasi Submitted July 2018

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Foreword:

I would like to thank first and foremost the persons which were kind enough to let me interview them. They helped me not only by answering my questions but were kind and supportive enough to also direct me to other potential interviewees. In addition I would like to thank my supervisor for his invaluable tips and patience as well as convincing me to do this master track by his conducting of the course Arbeid, Zorg en Sociale Zekerheid in my Sociology bachelor. I also thank my second supervisor for rekindling my interest in Marx through his course Advanced Labour Law which helped to form the main theoretical parts of this thesis. A special thanks to all my friends who were forced into labour market discussions by me. And finally my love goes out to my family and girlfriend who always showed interest and gave me support during my writing periods in a foreign country.

Abstract:

This thesis analyses platform work in the meal delivery sector by using a labour process approach. Focussing on the tasks, the design and especially the re-design of the labour process through alterations and modifications of the digital infrastructure by platform firms gave an accurate overview of how labour-power is used, controlled and coordinated in a partially digitalised labour process. The research for this thesis was conducted in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and Milan, Italy. The research was aimed at two companies operating on both countries, Foodora and Deliveroo. By looking at labour practises and conditions and how these have changed over time a demonstration is given of how platforms are used to improve labour process efficiency. Special attention is given to the labour relationship under which riders of both companies in both countries are performing their work. The binary divide between employment and self-employment models are taken into account and critically analysed by ascertaining the subordinate position of riders within the platformed meal delivery labour process.

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1. Introduction

This thesis analyses the influence of platform work on the labour relationship. The expectation is that this thesis will offer a contribution to the understanding and theoretical development of what has been termed the platform economy (Kenny & Zysman 2016). It will do this by focussing on the use of platforms as digital infrastructures by commercial food delivery firms (Srnicek 2017). How meal delivery firms have organised the labour process in the delivery sector of the platform economy will have an effect on the construction of the labour relationship that is being used to perform services and create goods (Braverman 1974). These relationships are not devoid of influences from national labour market regulations however since this type platform work is location-based (Coase 1992; Huws 2014). How do platform firms use platform labour in a regulated national context and is this different to ‘normal’ firms? In other terms, what makes the labour relationship between labour suppliers and platform firms unique? These are some of the question which are going to answered in this thesis.

The platform food delivery sectors have gained a lot of media attention concerning labour issues (Reuters 2017; Basso 2018; Lieman 2018b; Wouters 2018). The sector has become a battlefield in which competition between international firms has driven innovation in the use of technological applications as well as altering and re-designing the use of labour by the platform firms. The use of ‘lean’ business models by these platform firms are a common phenomenon within the platform economy (Srnicek 2017: 75). Lean platforming has influenced a lot of aspects in the labour process needed to complete the food service from click to table. Workers provide the essential assets such as bikes, mopeds, phones and internet connections. The platforms view themselves as digital markets in which supply and demand can find each other, enabling entrepreneurship (Lieman 2018b). But there are riders who do not feel like entrepreneurs but rather feel exploited (Reuters 2017; Wouters 2018). How do the new forms of work fit into regulated labour relationships such as the employment and self-employment models? Should the creation of newly regulated forms of employment be used to provide a solution to this labour market problem so as to not ‘stifle’ innovation and bring labour legislations up the 21st_{century standards (Rassman 2014; Mandagere 2017)?}

Before looking at new forms of regulation an analysis regarding how labour functions within these sectors might serve to (de-)legitimise the use of new forms of flexible work arrangements. Analysing the labour process in this sector and how it relates to the construction of a labour relationship between platform workers and platform firms might better inform a discussion regarding labour rights in the platform economy. Are we witnessing the creation of a new labour model or are we just seeing a new model of avoiding labour regulations (Forde et al. 2017: 24)?

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That is why the following research question is chosen to help guide the thesis:

“How is the labour relationship influenced under location-based delivery platform work”

What is understood as the labour relationship will be approached from a sociological perspective. This perspective will be supported by theories which explain the labour relationship as a specific kind of social relationship (Weber 1978). One that is related to the labour process under capitalism (Marx 1887; Braverman 1974). How does the digitalisation of parts of the labour process infrastructure impact labour relationships (Srnicek 2017)?

The differentiation according to self-employed and employed statuses within the labour market is based on the amount of control that is exercised on those who perform the labour (Deakin 2006; Rosioru 2014; Gramano & Del Conte 2018). According to some the direction and control, traditionally exercised by managers, is becoming opaque in the platform economy. Clever app functions such as user reviews and automation of management tasks are said to shroud the subordinate relationship of workers to the platform firms (Aloisi 2016; Killerhof et al. 2017: 26). The works of Weber (1978), Braverman (1974) and more recently Sennett (2009) all discuss techniques for controlling the labour process by incentivising workers. Can these techniques be found in the platform work?

The labour relationship between platform firms and workers does not get created in a vacuum. The relationships are connected to the increased ‘flexibility’ or ‘casualisation’ of European labour markets (Crouch 2004; Streeck 2015). This connection makes it hard to find accurate data regarding the total impact of digitalisation of work on the economy since it is hard to differentiate platform workers from other employed and self-employed workers (Degryse 2016: 9, 35). To better understand the labour relationship in the digital economy qualitative research can be used to analyse how the labour relationship is constructed in a digital labour process. In the case of this thesis the digitalised labour process within the food delivery sector is chosen for analysis. This sector is necessarily tied to a local context since the main services and commodities provided in this sector are locally ‘rooted’ by their own characteristics as spatially ‘fixed jobs’ (Sennett 1999: 136-137; Huws 2014: 49).

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2. The theoretical framework

There are four parts to this chapter. Firstly, the use of the labour relationship as a main theoretical concept in this thesis will be introduced. The purpose of this first part is to create a theoretical foundation that shows how social relationships are structured under capitalist production processes as a relationship of economic exchange (Marx 1887; Weber 1978). This comes down to a social relationship in which dependence on the market and subordination to the labour process can guide social interactions between those managing the labour process and those who are exchanging their labour-power (Braverman 1974; Spencer 2000). This is where the second part of the theoretical framework will shift to take a closer look at the ways in which labour is managed. How is labour efficiently extracted in order to enhance the production output? For this analysis we will look at management schemes that exercise control through worker self-interest on the one hand and indirect compulsions for work on the other (Weber 1978; Sennett 2009). The third part will concern the structure under which the production process is occurring. The exchange of labour-power does not happen in a vacuum, institutional arrangements also play an important role. This is what will be discussed in the third part. In a society where the selling of labour-power is the core logic of

production, the regulation of employment contracts can play a prominent role in decreasing the dependency on the market. However regulations are not uniform in their protection every type of relationship, a differentiation can be made between those employed and those who are self-employed (Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999; Streeck 2005: 265). However, each type has their own internal logic which divides them and regulates them according to that same logic (Davidov 2005: 58; Korpi 2006: 174; Razzolini 2010: 289). In the last part of this framework the emergence of platform capitalism will be discussed. The main objective here is to describe and categorise different aspects of the platform economy (Huws 2014; Srnicek 2017).

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2.1 Social relationships of exchange between capital and labour

2.1.1 The permeation of capitalism

Within capitalistic societies social relationship are created between labour sellers and capital owners through manner in which they use each other to produce goods and services. The dependent position of labour1_{in a capitalist society stems from a legal perspective which views the selling of} labour-power as a commodity. Not unlike how one would sell goods such as a car or a pack of rice. Marx’s critique on viewing labour-power as a commodity will be used as a starting point for analysing the power relations between employers and employees (1887). The ‘act of doing labour’ is not sold as a commodity in terms of units of cars or rice, but in terms of labour-power. Labour-power is the functioning of labour in a production process. In other words, labour-power is the notion of applying labour in a pre-determined way which is not necessarily envisioned by the labourer providing the labour-power. The difference between using labour-power and any other kinds of power2_{to achieve} production is the fact that the ones who provide labour-power are part of a society in which each member owns a portion of the total available labour-power of that society (Braverman 1974:51). The price at which labour-power is sold is the cost to produce and reproduce the labourer. In a society solely based on market logic3_{the price of labour-power comes down to the income that is} needed for a labourer and those who depend on the labourer to survive (Braverman 1974: 279-282). The price setting of labour-power in such a society is comparable to the price-setting of production machines being valued in terms of producing power and reproducing cost of the machine (Ibid: 121, 379-380). An argument can be made that labour has the advantage over machines since it has the opportunity to retrain in other skills. That means other ways in which the individual labour-power of a labourer can function in a different production process. If this were true this makes the labourer able to take advantage of shortages in specific labour market segments. Yet such retraining does not come close to the ability of capital to pass through a ‘phase of liquidity’, which is the selling of assets and the reinvesting in other assets. After capital has liquified and re-ossified into another segment of the market it can again start to generate a return on invest (Offe 1985: 19). This is the reason why

1_{Labour here is meant to indicate the group of people in society who are relying on selling their labour-power,}

the ability to do work, in the labour market (Marx 1887).

2_{Like electricity, animals, steam etc.}

3_{Such a society based in pure market logic has never truly existed since there have always been some social}

relationships which remain outside the realm of market logic, such as family relations or communalist arrangements for providing subsistence such as tax leniency by feudal lords or church poor relief (Esping-Andersen 1990: 37).

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those who own capital can more easily take advantage of opportunities in a liberal market economy than those who can only sell their labour-power.4

The pricing of labour-power depends on market conditions which influence the cost of reproducing the labourer. This means that the labourer itself becomes part of the market and its oscillations. If the price of subsistence goes up then wages need to accompany this rise in order for the labourer to keep selling its labour-power. The price balancing between labour-power and subsistence-cost is not instant, labour is usually bought after it has been used.5_{Labourers cannot withhold labour-power nor} can they re-skill fast enough to meet different kinds of labour-power demands. They are dependent on continually selling their labour-power to survive. This is different for capital since it can withhold produced commodities from the market or ‘flow through a phase of liquidity’ into other market segments to maintain or increase profit6_{(Marx 1887: 446).}

This in effect creates an unequal position during the agreement phase since labour-power has to be sold. Capital on the other hand can decide if the price is right according to the current market conditions. This idea of labour being different than other commodities which are bought and sold served as a justification of infringing on the freedom of contract principle. Inherent in this principle is the idea that parties signing a contract are (legally) equals.7_{See for instance the Dutch parliamentary} documentation on legislating the labour contract:

“The work which is offered on the market by the worker can be called a commodity, although one with a specific character. Every other kind of commodity can be stored for a long or short time without losing quantity or quality. Only with work this is impossible. It can never be left untouched while at the same time be partially wasted. (…) Apart from this argument, which describes the unfavourable position of the worker to the employer, another rises which state that those who rely on their labours for survival, in general, have no other recourse” (Bles 1907: 2, trans. v.s.)

So how did the society become so entangled within market logic? To answer this question the construction of social relationships of exchange within capitalism will be explored through the works

4_{Offe remarks here that suppliers of labour will need support to get (re-)training either through political means}

or otherwise (1985: 19). This ties into the dependent position of labour suppliers who are reliant on selling their labour-power for survival which will be explained shortly hereafter.

5_{For instance, most salaries are paid at the end of the month while the labour-power has already been used.}

The paying of salaries ‘after the fact’ act as a short-term loan in that sense. The same is true for piece-work which is paying for production after the labour-power has been fixated into a good or rendered service that has already potentially produced a profit.

6_{A labourer cannot produce more labour-power through entrepreneurial expansion if there is a demand since}

the labourer is the commodity he or she is selling.

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of Weber and Marx (1978; 1887). Specifically, their arguments that support the importance of historical development that have led to the capitalist mode of production with its own value driven logic that affects social relationships (Giddens 1970: 300-301).

Weber has written an insightful chapter on the creation of social relationships by actions:

‘Sociological categories of Economic Action’ in his book ‘Economy and Society’ (1978). In this chapter Weber discusses economic divisions of labour in societies and lays the groundwork for a division between people that is always observable in any production process, the actions performed can always be divided between those performing labour and those managing it (Ibid.: 114). A production process is not characterised as ‘capitalist’ by itself. It is instead characterised by the goal of

production. Under a capitalist mode of production the goal of producing is in its most essential form the creation of wealth through capital investment in order to increase the initially invested capital (Marx 1887: 27; Weber 1992: 17).

Weber argued that industrial production is intertwined with technological innovation of machines and technical organisation of labour.8_{The technological innovation of mechanized production} combined with the factory model of technical organisation increased the need for rationalisation, standardisation and concentration of production. This form of industrial manufacturing created increased chances for higher profits but also increased risks if the enterprise was ‘eliminated’ (Weber 1978: 152-153).

It is this rationalisation process of production described by Weber which can be joined with Marx’s critique on viewing labour-power as a commodity. The process of rationalisation within the capitalist production mode and the compulsion within society to sell and buy labour-power both approach the influence that capitalism has on the creation and reproduction of social relationships of exchange (Birnbaum 1953: 136-137). In other words, the act of selling and buying of labour-power is subjected to the same rationalisation process. The social relationships which are formed in order to exchange labour-power must therefore also be rationalised in order to remain competitive within the capitalist mode of production.

2.1.2 The labour process, separating hands and heads

So what are observable capitalist tendencies within the capitalist mode of production that influence social relationships? Harry Braverman introduced the field of labour process studies through his book

8_{Simply put, technical organisation of labour is the way in which the work is organised. A factory building in}

which lines of labourers operate in tandem to create a product is a form of technical organisation. Sending raw materials to households for partial manufacture and which are later gathered and further processed in a different location (each household representing in effect a different line in the whole production process) is also a form of technical organisation.

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Labor and Monopoly Capital, the degradation of work in the twentieth century (Braverman 1974; Huws 2014: 94). In this book he re-introduced a perspective that Marx had provided on the ‘material production process’ which Braverman re-defined as the labour process (Braverman 1974: 21). In simplistic terms a labour process is the joining of imagination and execution in order to create a good or service (Marx 1887: 127; Braverman 1974: 46). The unit of analysis in the labour process method is the task (Braverman 1974: 75). What the capitalist mode of production does is separate the process of imagination9_{from the process of execution. Prior to this mode both processes were combined into} a single person (Ibid.: 125-126). Braverman views the restructuring of the work processes and impact of those changes through a labour-side perspective. This means the perspective is antagonistic in terms of who and for what purpose the deconstruction and reconstruction of the labour process is initiated (Huws 2014: 94). Nevertheless, Braverman emphasises the efficiency gains which are

accomplished through innovative restructuring of the labour process (Braverman 1974: 63). The ways in which production is organised, and under what conditions, affects the tasks created and prescribes the labour type needed for a specific task. The labour process under capitalism relies on constant evolving of the technical organisation just as much as the use of technological advancements in order to make certain that wealth creation remains optimal. Weber observed this is done by rationalising every part of production (1978). All processes in the entire chain of production need to be broken down into multiple steps in order to achieve better efficiency and cost-effectiveness of production (Braverman 1974: 72).

The rationale behind breaking down the production process is reducing costs of labour through a simplifying process. In economic terms, if more people are able to perform the action this means the supply of labour gets larger which reduces wages. The only hurdle that needs to be overtaken is the cost of the craftsman who embodies all the actions within his own person (Ibid.: 81). The embodied production ability of craftsmen which is both imagination and execution works as a bargaining chip in a market economy with free labour. The breaking down of the production process has economic consequences for craftsmen embodying the craft which is being simplified. The power base of the craftsmen stemming from his knowledge and skill will be rendered useless once it has been taken apart and rearranged in a more simplified form. This forces them to join the other labourers

9_{Braverman uses varying terminology to describe the separation between design and execution of a labour}

process. The term imagination as opposed to conception is used since this is more closely related to how Marx himself described the separation by using the analogy of the spider and the bee who do not erect their webs and hives in their imagination like an human architect does with his buildings (Marx 1887: 127).

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performing the simple labour or reskill into something else at their own cost and the cost of those who depend on their income10_{(Braverman 1974: 81; Marx 1887: 244).}

2.1.3 Subordination of labour to the changing labour process

Returning to Weber, he observed that industrial production brings together technological innovation and technical organisation (Weber 1978: 152-153). But he also observed that there are those in the labour production process who are managing labour and those who need to be managed (Ibid.: 114). Once production has been centralised and labour-power brought together to form different tasks of production, the management of workers becomes necessary (Braverman 1974: 65-66). However we are living in a society in which labour is formally ‘free’ to engage and disengage in contractual relationships (Weber 1978: 127-128; Deakin 2009: 44). Under such a system of formal freedom the contractual conditions under which labour is exchanged becomes important for controlling the labour process.

The simplest way to control labour through contractual agreement is giving a piece-rate

compensation for labour. In that way what is paid for is the work that is executed, a wage is given for a certain lump of labour. The labourer is unable to slack off since this would not benefit the labourer in the same way as when an hourly wage was agreed to (Gibbons 1987). However, in such a system of piece-rates in a putting-out model a problem arises concerning the amount of production that is possible in a day. That knowledge remains somewhat hidden for the users of labour-power. In addition piece-work does not guarantee that a certain amount of work gets done in a certain time-frame. Piece-rate systems, also known as putting-out systems, were initially very common in pre- and early industrial times. But their unreliability was not very compatible with the capitalist mode of production. Controlling and organising production in a rational and predicable manner could produce greater output efficiency (Braverman 1974: 61-63; Finkin 2016: 611).

Therefore hourly wages would seem to be a better indicator of how much work will be done and in what timeframe. However, now a new problem arises. Under an hourly wage system the question to be answered in a contractual relationship is: ‘how much work is to be done within a certain

timeframe?’. Since both parties are formally free and have entered into a contract this does not mean they have achieved continuous and complete agreement, the social relationship remains subject to change (Offe 1985). Trying to define what needs to be done in a day is hard since

employers commonly needed to rely on labourer information regarding how much could be done in a

10_{Or at the cost of the community if we recall the remark by Offe that suppliers of labour will need some form}

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day (Gibbons 1987).11_{To control for the adequate extraction of labour-power within the agreed} timeframe a manager is needed. What is created now is a subordinate relationship between the employee and the one managing the use of labour-power in the labour process (Braverman 1974: 69). To better explain this need for management in the labour process the management theory of Taylorism will be used.

During the end of the 19th_{century a well-established production method was Taylorism named after} Frederick W. Taylor an American engineer (Taylor 1914). Between the concepts of labour process management and Taylorism exist common themes since they both analyse the production process through the same unit of observation, the task. The difference between Taylorism and the labour process theory is the social dimension which is explored by the labour process theory. In other words the management theory is concerned with the economic value while the labour process theory of Braverman tries to answer the question ‘how does this affect society?’ (Huws 2014: 94). Another term for Taylorism which captures the micro perspective for analysing the labour process is ‘scientific management’. The aim of scientific management is to increase efficiency through analysis of the physical motions and behaviours of labourers in order to eliminate unnecessary actions and/or interactions (Braverman 1974: 12). In order to achieve better efficiency careful observation of the labour process is needed. Once observation yields an enhanced technique to produce, or a more efficient deployment of labour, control over labour becomes crucial. In other words, controlling labour to execute the tasks exactly as imagined becomes crucial. This is captured in the principle of subordination between employee and employer.

Managing the labour-power through a relationship of subordination becomes especially necessary when hourly-rates or piece-rates of wage change. This can happen due to technological innovations or technical organisation improvements to the labour process. The implementation of such changes is considered the prerogative of capital (Offe 1985). It is in effect the ‘re-imagining’ part of the capitalist mode of production. The ability to re-design production segments can create unrest in the firm’s labour force. The problem arises when a worker gets paid less or the same while production output increases due to a re-design of the labour process. This creates friction in the relationship between management and employees since the worth of labour in terms of specific production units is lowered because more output is created with the same amount of labour-power.

To compensate for this effect that lowers the worth of labour suppliers could start to preform sub-optimal in order to raise the worth of labour artificially. This phenomenon is best captured by the Tayloristic concept of soldiering. The concept relates to ‘the marking of time’ or the deliberate

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underachieving done by employees (Braverman 1974: 97-99). The concept of soldiering has two elements to it. The individual or natural soldiering is linked to the natural instinct of people to avoid too strenuous rates of work. Weber also notes that a man has a natural tendency to only strive to earn as much as is needed to survive (1992: 24). Systematic soldiering which occurs in groups of employees is linked to a collective conspiracy performed by employees. The conspiracy being that employers are purposefully kept in the dark regarding the attainable output (Braverman: 98). The underlying reasoning for this conspiracy is connected to a theory that states there is a finite amount of labour available in the economy, the “lump of labour”-theory. By not performing at the highest efficiency it is easier to find jobs for workers since the labour demand is kept ‘artificially’ high (Salimath & Jones 2011: 88).

Soldiering is effective because employers are mostly reliant on information given by workers regarding labour productivity in order to set wages (Gibbons 1987: 415). Due to the increased

digitalisation of the labour processes, independent and automatic information gathering of data from the labour process can influence the effectiveness of soldiering. Taylor however did not wait for digitalisation and also saw the information dependency problem of employers. His approach relied on continuous managerial oversight and scientific observation of individual parts of the labour process in order to lift the information asymmetry regarding possible labour-power productivity. That is why Taylorism ascribes the utmost importance to individual task setting both to minimise ‘collective conspiracy’ as well as to improve the exercise of control. The exercising of control through management would increase productivity the most (Braverman 1974: 100; Locke 1982: 17). This method of production enhancement is summed up into the scientific management theory through three principles (Braverman 1974: 112-119):

1. Dissociation of the labour process from the skills of the workers, less general knowledge is needed

2. Separation of conception from execution, brain work removed from the shop-floor to planning

3. Use of this monopoly over knowledge to control each step of the labour process and its mode of execution

The Tayloristic justification for the control that management holds over labour is tied into the rationale of wage labour. A worker is not paid for their productivity but their ability to “follow orders”. In other words, wages are not paid for specific work but for doing a ‘task’ that the employer has set for the employee (Boddewyn 1961: 105-106). The retention of the employers prerogative to re-design the labour process can thus be justified in the rational of wage labour. The production

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process, as such, is capitalist since this is in essence what the alienation of labour entails. Another terminology of the alienation of labour is ‘the separation of hands and minds’ which functions as an incursion on the autonomy and control over the labour process belonging to the craftsman

(Braverman 1974: 126; Paxton 2011: 77-78). This is the main point that labour process theory tries to make, in a capitalist society the aim of capital is to decrease costs of labour by reorganising the labour processes to create tasks which simplify production and reduce the need for decision-making (Adler 2007: 1314).

The operation of the capitalist mode of production relies on the control over the process. In other words, the freedom to create and reform the process as well as the freedom of exercising complete control over the labour-power to be supplied to the process. That is what makes the process unique to previous modes of production.12_{In this mode of production the labourer is at a disadvantage since} bargaining power favours the employer due to the special commodity status of labour.

2.2 Controlling labour-forces

In the previous paragraph the importance of control over labour-power was mentioned in relation to efficiency gains. On the one hand there is the control in terms of re-designing the labour process in which labourers are deployed, on the other hand there is the control over the execution of a design. Weber notes that there are two ways to control for the execution of a work process, self-interest or compulsion (1978: 150). An example of direct compulsion would be threating with physical force. Direct compulsion is not that relevant in our case for obvious reasons which is why it will not be developed further here13_{. Indirect compulsion is connected to the possibility of adverse effects on} income when the performance of labour is unsatisfactory of the one deploying it. Self-interest is, according to Weber, the most interesting way to create control over labour in market based economies (ibid.: 150-151). Self-interest mechanisms are related to individual rewards or the creation of an identity which values qualitative production (Friedman 1977; Willmott 1993; Sennett 2009: 28). Indirect compulsion to work has two sides to it. First of all, it is connected to social policy since the indirect compulsion to work is related to income precariousness which is basically

unemployment. Social policies can alleviate some concerns regarding income (in)stability but this will

12_{A previous mode of production would be the guild systems in which imagination and execution were still}

fused into a single person. Further detailed mention on this topic goes beyond the objective of this thesis. For the interested reader consult Marx (1887), Weber (1978), Veneziani (1986) and Sennett (2009).

13_{Physical violence and death, as faced by those in slavery (Hopkins 1993; Brunt 1998: 141), are more extreme}

outcomes of the exercise of power in order to achieve control. Modern variants of such labour relationships can still be found in migrant trafficking and exploitation (O’Connel Davidson 2011). See also Weber on the subject of ‘unfree labour’ performed by slaves or serfs (1978: 127, 132-135).

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be discussed in paragraph 2.3 regarding regulated employment. Secondly, indirect compulsion to work due to looming unemployment creates opportunities for organising output discipline through self-conditioning (Foucault 1982; Standing 2011: 155). This form of control becomes more important due to the proliferation of recording of data and digitalisation of the labour process (The Economist 2018).

2.2.1 Control through self-interest

Weber links self-interest mostly to wage rewards for output enhancement (Weber 1978:150-151). Taylor also emphasizes monetary incentives to induce a ‘good days work’. However, before wage incentives schemes can be created accurately the first job of management is decide what the labour-power is worth. This ‘rate fixing’ is done by evaluating the optimum output in a particular labour process (Wren 2011: 14). Taylor shows the effect of monetary incentives to the labour process through the example of a pig-iron handler. In short, the output of a day’s handling of pig-iron was 12,5 tons. Taylor calculated that with the correct amounts of rest and work time the tonnage should be 47,5 tons per day if the worker had a particular aptitude for handling physical labour. He selected such a worker and offered a 60% increase in wage per day (while the productivity increased 380%). The only condition was that the worker had to follow the orders of the foreman exactly without backtalk (Braverman 1974: 105; Zufflo 2011: 27). This type of control has been described as ‘simple control’ of labour through a taskmaster figure (Bolton 2005: 30). Taylor himself criticised firms using his technique of scientific management solely to increase output without the increase of rewards for the employees. The newly fixed wage rate for a ‘good days work’ was cut as low as the (un- or under-regulated) labour market allowed which caused structural competitive pressures for other firms to cut wages as well (Braverman 1974: 107, also see again para. 2.1.2). It must not be forgotten that employers are also trapped in a competition for efficiency in a capitalist society (Marx 1887). Taylorism stressed the importance of individualising tasks and creating monopolies on knowledge thus turning individual workers into ‘cogs’. The production process under Fordism uses the same technique of task setting but relied on automatization of interdependent manufacturing processes by combining skilled and unskilled tasks, most notably through assembly lines. In order to combat problems of control over the labour process Ford used the ‘five-dollar-day’ incentive scheme to double the pay of workers who conformed to the firm interests and laboured well (Clark 1992). In essence, this was a bonus system to coax employees to act in the interest of the firm by creating a wage bonus scheme to do so.

While direct monetary incentives do tend to increase work-efficiency (Locke 1982), these are not the only measures with which to create individual self-interest for the employee. The individual

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competition Sennett mentions resembles the monetary incentive scheme but is also focussed on individual career rewards (2009:35). An employee advancing through the hierarchical ranks gives that employee a bigger share of the wealth through higher wages but also a symbolic reward of higher status (Willmott 1993). The wages relate to monetary rewards but the symbolic reward relates to identity.14_{Sennett is very critical regarding the current state of career advancement in western} society. His critique is founded on structural changes influencing the internal wage distribution. Increasingly, the distribution favours high executives, high-skilled employees and younger workers. These trends effect the efficiency of a self-interest technique based on career rewards since these require loyalty and retraining efforts on the part of the firm (Sennett 2009: 35).15_{These structural} changes would make self-interest schemes based on career rewards less and less attractive. For the community based method of self-interest Sennett uses an example of Japanese managers at Toyota, Subaru and Sony production plants. They exercised total quality control by getting their ‘hands dirty’ on the shop floor and encouraging worker involvement in the labour process by promoting critique and initiative. This created collective goals linked to a superior product creation (Ibid.: 31). By including the workers in the organising of the labour process they retained influence to correct inefficiency, if they could imagine ways to improve the tasks these ideas were taken

seriously.

A similar example is given by Friedman who recounts the use of worker-wellbeing schemes by Volvo to attract more employees in Sweden which was at the time a near full-employment economy. Production processes were ‘humanised’ by creating small teams in charge of completing tasks together instead of individualised tasks. This is what Friedman called the ‘Responsible autonomy type’ of managerial control in which labourers are given status, authority and responsibility in order to create shared goals between workers and their firm (1977: 46, 49; Bolton 2005: 31).

This idea of sharing goals has a link with the previously mentioned career method of creating self-interest. The difference between the two is in the collaborative element and the belonging to a (work) community (Sennett 2009: 30-31). Going back to the central aim of scientific management which is the separation of hands and heads, this example shows that a strict separation is not necessary in every labour process. As has been explained previously, labour process theory tries to point out that capitalism incentivises simplicity and ‘worker-decision-less’ production processes. The examples of the Japanese managers and the Volvo’s worker-wellbeing scheme are in direct

14_{For more on the symbolic reward and the ‘fetishism of identity’ see Knights & Willmott 1989 and Willmott}

1993.

15_{Please note here the similarity of this critique with the critique by Taylor on the use of his method in un- or}

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opposition to the theorised outcome. This is where critique on the Braverman’s labour process theory are pinned on. Yet the explanations that labour process theory offers still remain useful due to the nature of the specific type platform work which is researched. More on the subject of academic critique and the negation of that critique for this thesis will be explained in the methodology section of this thesis.

2.2.2 Control through compulsion

Apart for methods to induce self-interest, indirect compulsion to do work is ever present in labour relationships and can be actively manipulated. As has been mentioned earlier, indirect compulsion is the fear of negative effects to income due to bad work-results (Weber 1978: 150). It could be argued that indirect compulsion is just another form of self-interest since it is in the interest a labourer not to lose or endanger their income. Yet the self-interest methods based on individual rewards or identity creation are induced by management and need to be actively created. Indirect compulsion is a direct consequence of the necessity for those without capital to sell their labour as a means of, at least, sufficient income for subsistence (Spencer 2000: 236; see also para. 2.1).

This fear stems from the power of employers to dismiss employees or to discontinue employment contracts for self-employed persons. The use of the word power here is deliberate since this type of control is often linked to the theories of Foucault, especially his describing of the panopticon-effect (Foucault 1977: 202-203; Sewell & Wilkinson 1992; Grey 1994; Bolton 2005:38). The central principle of this form of control is that the subject, or the controlled, will impose self-control if the subject ‘believes’ she/he is being monitored. In this way power ‘itself’ is used as a way of organising the labour process:

“what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions […].” (Foucault 1982: 789) Using ‘panopticon techniques’ can have the benefit of creating self-disciplined workers as well as creating insight into the most minute aspects of worker behaviour and thus enables intervention (Grey 1994: 479). The saliency to digital work infrastructures that are able to record all kinds of data should not be lost on the reader.

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2.3 Regulating labour relationships

2.3.1. The binary divide

A labour relationship seen through the lens of the law is a legal relationship of which two types can be distinguished. These are the employee and the self-employed16_{. This distinction forms a ‘binary} divide’ in the labour relationships where there are clear legal distinctions which are mutually exclusive (Deakin 2009: 48; Rosioru 2014; Gramano & Del Conte 2018: 2). In reality such a clear distinction between employees and self-employed cannot be made easily in every practical case. There is growing use of so-called non-standard employment contracts in Europe which can include self-employment but can also take other forms. Other types of non-standard employment include temporary employment, on-call work and multi-party employment also called agency work (ILO 2016: 8, 52-54). Using one of the myriad of contractual possibilities has specific implications in any individual exchange relation between labour and capital. Therefore this thesis will focus on the binary divide in a theoretical17_{sense between those employed and those who are self-employed} (Deakin 2006; Rosioru 2014; Gramano & Del Conte 2018). This will be done by viewing the employed and self-employed types of relations in the labour market as ‘ideal types’ (Weber 1949: 42).18

The origin of the binary divide in continental Europe accompanies the creation of social security systems in the late 19th_{and early 20}th_{century (Deakin 2006; Gramano & Del Conte 2018). Labour} legislation was used as an instrument to better reflect social needs and protection of blue collar workers within the contractual relationship vis-à-vis their employers (Streeck 2005: 265; Pedersini & Coletto 2010: 15; Razzolini 2010: 268; Rosioru 2014: 280). It does this by forcefully entering

individual agreements of labour exchange by comparing nationally set conditions of employment relationships with the written agreement and the reality of the exchange. In practise this means that in a judge will verify if the labour contract ‘on paper’ actually matches the behaviour of both parties and their relationship (Davidov 2005: 58; Razzolini 2010: 289).

In labour law theory it is considered a given that inequality of negotiation power exists between the employer and employee (Veneziani 1986: 62; Bouwens et. al. 2013: 15-25). By looking at the instrument that is used to reach an agreement, as well as the socio-economic positions of both

16_{Terms such as freelancing or contracting are also used to denote an employment relationship which is}

different to that of an subordinate employee.

17_{The term ‘theoretical’ is added here to signify the difficulty of using the binary divide to differentiate}

different ‘types’ of labour relationships in labour markets across Europe (Rosioru 2014: 281). For a more detailed description national contexts regarding labour market regulation see Pedersini & Coletto 2010.

18_{As a warning to those who are not very versed in legal terminology, in the following some concepts of law}

are used. Using the employed and self-employed ideal types creates a natural comparison with the legal terms since the generic legal interpretation also uses ideal types of the concept most notably in the European Court of Justice case FNV Kunsten which will be mentioned in more detail later in this paragraph.

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parties, the underlying reason for state intervention can be made clear. The instrument that is used is the contract. The legal rationale of the contract however is unable to effectively represent social and economic reality (Rosenfeld 1984).

“The source of (…) universal status rights of citizenship is a lawmaking and law-enforcing liberal state (…). Law enforcing and contract enforcing mechanisms are needed as exogenous prerequisites to get the liberal game started. But once it has started, a second type of

problem emerges, that of enabling people to stay in the game.” (Offe 2003: 448) The employment relationship takes its form in a private contract.19_{Continental European legal} systems consider private contracts to be concluded between formally equal persons.20_{This is the} ‘default’ outset of any contract stemming from the legal principle of ‘freedom of contract’ (Deakin 2009: 44). Weber describes absolute freedom of contract as:

“(the, v.s.) complete absence of substantive regulation of consumption, production, and prices, or any other form of regulation which limit freedom of contract or specify conditions of exchange. This may be called substantive freedom of contract.” (Weber 1978: 162)

What is problematic about the principle is that it does not take into account the special nature of labour as a commodity and how it is used in capitalist production.21_{The principle of freedom of} contract was developed in a period of history were legal rights were not self-evident. The ability to claim freedom of contract meant that every person could enter into a contract based on equality before the law regardless of their social position. In that sense, the freedom of contract can be seen as a civil right which is unalienable from an individual (Rosenfeld 1984; Veneziani 1986). However, this civil right is a ‘negative right’ in the sense that it protects individuals without (too much) effort

19_{A private contract is an agreement between two entities (usually people or a person and a company) of}

which none is a state using or promising to use any state power. This relates to the formal legal equality principle of both parties involved. A contract creates an abstract and generalized relationship between two entities in order to create a market in which uniformity of conduct can be reached. Such a uniformity of conduct eases the market interactions between strangers and creates legal recourse should the contract not be honoured (Rosenfeld 1984: 812). See also Weber (1978: 637) for an expanded explanation regarding the link between market ethics and the impersonality of market relations.

20_{The concept of the freedom of contract is inspired by the ideology of individualism as developed by John}

Locke (Rosenfeld 1984: 777-778). The concept of the natural equality of man became dominant after the French revolution and was incorporated into legislation (Tocqueville 1859: 19). See also Weber (1978: 865) on the popularity and dispersion of the 1804 French Code Civil as a product of rational legislation free of any ‘non-juristic elements’ and possessing ‘an extraordinary lucidity’ and ‘precise intelligibility’.

21_{In economic terms, the labour market is a non-clearing market (Earl & Sakova 2000). Or at least, it should not}

be a market which clears since this would mean prices could adjust in such a way that people cannot gain adequate income to support themselves which in turn would endanger human life, or in economic terms ‘supply’ (Smith 2007: 57). The clearing of the labour market is foiled through law but also other institutions can constrain the actions of labour market actors such as those connected to family-structures (Esping-Andersen 1999; Regini 2000) see para. 3.3.2.

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from the state (Nieuwenhuis et al. 2017). But in the case of the capitalistic labour market the freedom of contract as a civil right can used to deny social protection. Since the individual is able to formally self-protect from a bad deal and prepare for any social unfortune by using market

insurances (Marshall 1950: 33). Labour contracts governed solely by the freedom of contract principle are inept in catching the whole of the socio-economic context surrounding a transaction. The contract abstracts the social relationship which causes it to lose details but it does make it more easy to create rights and obligations (Rosenfeld 1984).

To give an example of how formal the abstraction would work out in reality, let us perform a thought experiment. Let’s assume that labour suppliers active in the market are indeed the shrewdest negotiators and equal to the labour demanders in every way. In that case they will have ‘contracted’ in such a manner which would make exploitation of their labour-power impossible, how would this look like? Answering this question turns the focus of the problem of labour as a commodity from the labour side to the capitalist side. Instead of the inability of labour to act independently in markets, the argument here focusses on the undesirability in the capitalist mode of production for labourers to be completely equal in terms of power. In other words, in such a world capitalists are only able to buy a definite amount of labour which it cannot easily exploit. Rather they would like to exchange a temporary ownership of labour-power, not unlike renting an object, that gives them more freedom in how to use it (Marx 1887: 122).

If the exchange of labour would be fully defined and stipulated in a contract this would create a situation in which both parties know exactly what they are giving and receiving (Offe 1985: 20). Such an exact stipulation of a labour exchange, if honoured prudently, would end in inefficiency and nullify the rent-seeking mechanism of capitalist production. This has to do with the loss of control over designing and re-designing the labour process. In other words, in such an exchange there is no ‘relationship’ but only a spot-transaction between supplier and receiver of labour-power. For example, a labour contract is concluded in which the labourer performs a specified quantity of specific actions for a certain wage. When technological or organisational innovation enables

production time to be decreased or new tasks to be performed or modified this does not cut labour costs for the duration of the contract (Ibid.: 21-22). The agreement is fixed on a certain amount of actions performed using specific technological tools and is carried out under a specific technical organisation. To make immediate use of innovation it is preferable to keep the task(s) which are contracted for abstract so the employer can modify the labour process on an ad hoc basis. It is in that sense that the functioning of labourers and machines differ in a labour process as adaptable22_and

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static respectively. Having a labour contract in which the tasks are not narrowly specified thus creates a bandwidth in which broad needs of labour can be provided. Such a contract is exploitative when it is insufficiently regulated. It is exploitative since the benefits to capital gains of flexible availability labour-power is not equally shared between parties but rather claimed as the ‘right of management’ (Offe 1985: 22; Rubery et al. 2016: 246). Again this goes back to the explanation given by Taylor regarding the question “What is bought with wages?”. Wages don not represent employee productivity but obedience (Boddewyn 1961: 105-106). It is here that the difference between employed and self-employed comes to the surface.

Paragraph 2.1 has already established that labour has a subordinate and dependent relationship with capital and hinges on effective managerial control in a capitalist mode of production in order to reproduce and increase capital gains (Marx 1887; Weber 1978). Through discussing Braverman’s labour process approach the tendency of capitalist production to simplify production processes has been explained. Nevertheless, in para. 2.2 the examples of the Japanese managers and Volvo worker-wellbeing schemes showed that labour simplification is not the only way in which production

processes can be organised. Why this is could have a multitude of reasons. In the Volvo case, capturing labour supply by enticing employees with well-being schemes in a near full-employment labour market was the primary driver (Friedman 1977: 46). For the case of the Japanese managers Sennett contends that the ideology regarding ‘getting good work done’ can play a part in organising the labour process (2009: 32). Another reason why it would be advantageous to relinquish some control over segments of the labour process and put them outside the firm-structure could relate to shifting entrepreneurial risk to labour (Fonseca & Utrera 2005: 3-4; Fuchs 2011: 727; Clegg 2012: 254-255). Self-employed individuals are, legally speaking, viewed as able to carry such risks since they are able to operate with a certain amount of autonomy in the labour market (Biasi 2018; Pedersini & Coletto 2010: 47). The European Court of Justice views the status of ‘worker’ within EU law by defining that such a person is not a self-employed persons by naming characteristics which are necessarily connected to self-employment status:

“It follows that the status of ‘worker’ within the meaning of EU law is not affected by the fact that a person has been hired as a self-employed person under national law, for tax,

administrative or organisational reasons, as long as that persons acts under the direction of his employer as regards, in particular, his freedom to choose the time, place and content of his work, does not share in the employer’s commercial risks, and, for the duration of that

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relationship, forms an integral part of that employer’s undertaking, so forming an economic unit with that undertaking ”23

Self-employment as type of labour relationship thus has a difference in its internal logic compared to employment (Korpi 2006: 174). It can be argued that self-employment is therefore also regulated by stipulating what it is not. Wages are not being paid for obediently carrying out tasks but for a task that is completed while retaining the freedom in choosing time, content and place while being outside the firm framework of the employer which creates the opportunity to sell to multiple parties (Alt 2018: 5-6). Viewed in this manner, the problem of ‘quasi self-employment’ is a problem of a legal perspective clouding reality (Aloisi 2016). The shifting of entrepreneurial risk due to the labourer being a self-employed person while at the same time the labourer is a subordinate actor within the labour process makes them a ‘quasi self-employed’-person. The receiver of the labour-power has the best of both worlds in such cases, less employment risks while retaining labour-power control. The binary view on self-employment versus subordinate employment is under pressure. Labour processes have become flexible and decentralised (Sennett 1998: 22; Ruebry et al. 2016; Srnicek 2017). Problems in identifying the labour relationship are arising because the classic control schemes of managers directing an employee are disappearing or are transformed in contemporary labour processes due to digitalising work (Aloisi 2016; Finkin 2016; The Economist 2018). Some solutions which are brought up concern the reclassification or rearrangement of the ‘internal logic’ that surrounds self-employment. The rearrangement of internal logic is focussed on granting certain rights to self-employed individuals which are ‘traditionally’ linked to employment. The main goal of this rearrangement is to reduce social risks for those self-employed which do not fit the ideal typical role of the autonomous independent entrepreneurial labourers. Examples of proposals for

rearrangement of the internal logic are granting certain collective bargaining rights, applying statutory minimum wages to self-employment contracts24_{, statutory limited liability insurance for} self-employed individuals (Rassman 2014) or mandatory participation in public pension schemes for certain types of self-employed individuals (Pedersini 2002). These are institutional solutions which interfere in the freedom of contract and thus resemble the functioning of labour law as forcefully entering any labour relationship. The question here become, is this really the creation of a new type of labour relationship that solves a real social problem? Or is this simply the degradation of labour rights for certain groups within society who work in flexible but dependent positions within the economy (Forde et al. 2017: 24)? Another question which might answer the previous ones would be

23_{ECJ 2 December 2014, C-413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v. Staat der Nederlanden.} 24_{See Dutch ‘Revision Act for the Act on minimum wages’ dated 29 March 2017 [link:}

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to ask would be who benefits the most from the legalisation of these ‘new’ types of labour relationships?

2.3.2 Institutional arrangements and the labour exchange

As has been mentioned, indirect compulsion to deliver good work stems from a fear of losing or endangering income. This fear can be reclassified as running a social risk of becoming unemployed or earning less income. Social risks can be negated through state action, in the case of unemployment through unemployment insurances which may affect the influence that social risks have on individual risk avoiding behaviour (Overbye 1998: 256). Income insecurity in general can be alleviated through institutional arrangements which can cover social and economic risks (Esping-Andersen 1999). Going back to the concept of control, indirect compulsion is based on the existence of a power relationship. In the employer-employee power relationship the ability to fire an employee can get regulated through employment protection legislation (EPL). Specific measures of EPL are unfair dismissal protection, economic lay-off restrictions, compulsory severance pay, notice periods for dismissal and public administrative authorisation for firing (Boeri et al. 2000: 326). Apart from influencing the power relation between employer and employee EPL makes adjusting the labour force by the employer more difficult, strenuous and/or more costly (Fonseca & Utrera 2005: 3-4). Using EPL policy can create inflexible labour supply. European inflexible labour markets policy is increasingly subjected to policy adjustments in favour flexible labour markets. Most notably, efforts by the European Union point in this direction in order to achieve economic growth (Offe 2003: 454; Scharpf 2009; Streeck 2015: 156-157). This is also reflected in member-state labour market policy which increasingly promotes flexibility in labour markets (Eichhorst et al. 2017). Italy and the

Netherlands are no exceptions considering some of their 2015 labour legislation changes through the Jobs Act and the Act Work and Security respectively (Bouwens 2014; Fana et al. 2015; Kazepov & Ranci 2017).

Using EPL to create numerically inflexible labour supply touches on the temporal facet of labour relationships. This facet is connected to short-term or long-term market interactions. The extremes of both ends of the temporal spectrum of employment are an indefinite and open-ended relationship and a contractually defined ‘fixed’ job. Technical organisation of the production process can modify tasks to favour indefinite, one-off jobs or an intermediate form25_{of labour exchange. Demand for} certain types of skilled or unskilled labour are the result of the job designs which, taken all together, constitute the labour process (Osterman 1982; Stone 1993). ‘Job designing’ can be seen as another way of referring to the breaking down of the production process into small steps and thus creating a

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new production process (see 2.1.2). Designing jobs has constraints that go beyond economic and technical considerations. Institutional constraints such as unions and governmental regulation through laws and social policy also influence job design (Osterman 1987: 49; Stone 1993: 357). In other words, the production process which is possible is also based on institutional arrangements which govern economic exchange (Coase 1992)26_{. Institutional arrangements can be created in many} ways such as collective action, tripartite or dual corporate policy bodies (social partners), networks of stake holders or state action (Regini 2000). This thesis will focus on social policy defined by Esping-Andersen as collective political action (1999: 33).

Labour market legislation and welfare trends

The expansion of labour law and social security regimes started at the beginning of the 20th_century, important actors in instigating this process were collective bodies of workers claiming rights and protections27_{(Rosioru 2014: 280). The manufacturing techniques at that time were based on} large-scale industrial production based on scientific management (Taylorism) (Clark 1992). In para. 3.3 Fordism and the five-dollar-day incentive plan was mentioned which related mostly to the labour process. However, the concept of Fordism also gives reference to the institutional arrangements that coincided with the time period. The productive strategy and the institutional arrangements are linked to the economic ideology of the Keynesian welfare state. The Keynesian welfare state strives for full-employment by regulating collective bargaining28_{in a closed market economy}29_{where Fordist} economies of scale can easily adjust production to meet increasing the demand of the labour market

26_{A good example of a theory which is based on this premise is ‘the legal origin theory’ which states that the}

legal rules that are in place affect economic performance through supporting or hindering market formation and property protection or taxation (Deakin 2009: 36). Formulated in this manner, the theory is an economic one since it looks only at economic performance. In this thesis we are more interested in the redistribution function of legal rules which alleviate inherent power asymmetries between labour and capital.

27_{Please note that regulation of collective bargaining is not further developed in this thesis. While it is}

important to note the contributions of collective bargaining and collective action to labour market institutions, especially employment legislation, it would goes beyond the scope of this thesis in terms of research object. Though it is true that trade unions as political actors can influence law-making (Streeck & Hassel 2003), their influence in contemporary Europe has come under pressure (Palier & Thelen 2010; Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman 2013; Harvey 2014: 91-92). This means that for the purposes of this research trade union influence on platform labour is not relevant since the aim is to analyse the labour process in platform capitalism. This is not to say that trade unions could be significant actors in the future.

28_{Regulation of collective bargaining helps to preserve a balance in the negotiation power on both sides of the}

‘industrial coin’.

29_{In order to control the effect that increased spending has on domestic demand. Closed here needs to be}

interpreted in a flexible manner, the ‘closing’ of a market economy can be somewhat achieved by using a unique currency. This creates the ability for national governments to somewhat control the worth of the national coin and devalue it compared to other currencies in order to drive employment by making wages cheaper compared to wages in other currencies.

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due to policies that aim to increase public and private spending (Jessop 1996: 167-168; Streeck 2015: 164-165).

Figure 1: Visual representation of the Keynesian welfare state strategy

While there had been forms of labour market regulations stemming from social policy predating the onset of Fordism (Veneziani 1986; Deakin 2005) a comprehensive system of welfare and labour legislation formed in the beginning of the 20th_{century and was solidified in the period of the 1960’s} (Allard 2005; Crouch 2004: 79, 82; Streeck 2015). Risks were collectively pooled and covered in a social system (Esping-Andersen 1999: 33). This was a change in the purely liberal market idea of labour solely as a commodity towards a more conservatist-socialist ideal. This transition aspired to create a system based on welfare-statism, a political compromise due to the lacking strength of the socialist movement. The problem for some socialists with this system was its limited reach in the entirety of the labour market focussing first on collectivised worker groups and not on those truly vulnerable groups in the labour force. In the 1950’s and 1960’s30_{social policy focusses on providing} entitlements. These entitlements were aimed at providing a basic level of poverty protection, a minimal floor of living standards (Esping-Andersen 1990: 42, 44-46). Employment legislation at the same time complimented the labour process of large-scale manufacturing firms which organised jobs in internal labour markets. This included hierarchical ladders of advancement and in-work firm-specific training for new positions. This type of employment strategy thus created incentives for both employer and employee to commit to long-term employment31_{(Stone 1993: 363-365; 2006: 79-80).}

30_{A blind spot here is reserved for the second world war period in which ‘free’ labour markets were disrupted.}

In the case of Nazi Germany they were transformed by hyper-corporatist policy into generating production for the war effort (Esping-Andersen 1990: 40-41).

31_{Keep in mind the Volvo example in para. 2.2.1 in which a strained labour supply due to full labour market}

employment also incentivised long-term commitments, full-employment is the main goal of Keynesian economics.

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Harvey notes that the evolution of social policy after the 1960’s is consistent with the dominant orthodoxy of the time which was Keynesian economics focussing on demand-side manipulation of the labour market. He also notes the shift to supply-side manipulation policies that followed under ‘monetarist’ theories (2014: 101; see also Streeck 20015: 58-58). The ability to create labour relationships based in a regulated labour market which increasingly allows and promotes the use of flexible labour relationships can be seen as a policy change in risk allocation. In the 1970’s there came an end to the macro-economic politics of Keynesianism. The reason for its demise are varied but Crouch notes: aggregate demand drop32_{, technological innovations in product manufacturing,} globalised competition which all influenced the wave of unemployment and bankruptcy (2004: 32). These developments caused debate regarding social labour market policies, particularly in the European Union causing a shift towards monetarist policy also identified with the ideology of neo-liberalism (Ashiagbor 2001: 312; Riesenhuber 2012: 19). This meant that European governments were increasingly advised to cut public spending on welfare or limiting the access to it, which most governments eventually did (Streeck 2015: 166-167). Also within the industrial relations, negotiation of flexible work arrangements first began to appear after the 1970’s and were focussed on functional flexibility, that is flexible work arrangements within the firm33_{(Stone 2006: 81; Streeck 2009: 6-8 ).} Flexibility that concerned the firms labour force size started after internal flexibility was enabled. This numerical flexibility started to create a ‘secondary labour market’ in which non-standard work contracts were predominant. Another term for this phenomenon is the ‘insider-outsider’ concept. This relates to the existence of a core and non-core labour forces in the labour market and is

connected to asserting political power through partisanship policy influencing (Rueda 2005; Palier & Thelen 2010). The rise in flexible labour arrangement was expected to create income insecurity. The main counter to this insecurity in terms of policy was to increase ‘employability’ of the labour force through (re-)training and life-long learning34_{. Governmental policies in the 1990’s, the EU 2000 Lisbon} summit and the refocusing of the EU Lisbon agreement in 2005, increasingly promoted policies herded together under the general heading of ‘flexicurity’ (Wilthagen & Tros 2004; Hastings & Heyes 2016). What is stated here is a gross simplification of the historical trends in labour market policy. However, it does help to set the stage for our next paragraph concerning the emergence of the platform economy (Srnicek 2017).

32_{The oil-crises caused western economies much economic hardship in terms of unemployment and}

bankruptcies (Fuchs 2004).

33_{The ability to repurpose individual labourers within the firm into different jobs.}

34_{Note here what was said regarding labour as a commodity and the disadvantages it has compared to capital}

Digitally managed labour : a labour process approach of delivery platforms