Civil-military relations in peace operations:
A complicated relationship in need of refinement
Giacomo Castorina Calì
(10630279)
MSc Thesis
June 2019
University of Amsterdam, Graduate School of Social Sciences
Conflict Resolution and Governance
Supervisor: Dr. Polly Pallister-Wilkins
Abstract
Due to the changing nature of conflicts the activities of militaries, IOs, and NGOs involved in peace operations have increasingly overlapped in recent decades. In light of this, states and various organisations have been promoting cooperation between these actors, where possible, as a crucial element for the success of peace operations and have called in general for the improvement of civil-military relations (CIMIR). Despite this increased focus on CIMIR, relations between military and civilian actors involved in peace operations remain complicated due to the different
organisational cultures, structures and practices that these organisations have and how these can change in different contexts.
The present thesis investigates the perceptions of military and NGO personnel on CIMIR by conducting a qualitative interview study and analysing the results using theories on inter-organisational relations. From the findings of this thesis it emerged that overall, all respondents saw a value in the management and improvement of CIMIR. Respondents however described numerous substantial challenges that hinder CIMIR and come in the way of their improvement. Thus, from the findings of this thesis it became evident that while everyone sees a value in the improvement of CIMIR, there is still a need of refinement of what they are and how they can change in different contexts. Despite of these issues however, all of the respondents identified possibilities to increase mutual understanding between civilian and military actors and thus overall improve CIMIR.
Keywords
Civil-military relations; Peace operations; NGOs; Dutch Defence Forces; Inter-organisational relations.
Abbreviations
AU African Union
CIMIC Civil-military cooperation
CIMIR Civil-military relations
CMCoord Civil-military coordination
CMI Civil-military interactions
CSO Civil society organisation
DDF Dutch Defence Forces
EU European Union
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IO International organisation
IOR Inter-organisational relations
MoD Ministry of Defence
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-governmental organisation
RDT Resource-dependence theory
SSI Semi-structured interview
UN United Nations
UNOCHA United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Table of contents
1. Introduction _______________________________________________________________ 1 1.1. The evolution of conflicts ___________________________________________________ 1 1.2. The evolution of peace operations ____________________________________________ 2 1.3. The increased focus on civil-military relations ___________________________________ 3 2. Literature review ___________________________________________________________ 4 2.1. The actors in peace operations __________________ Fout! Bladwijzer niet gedefinieerd.
2.2. Contextualising CIMIR _____________________________________________________ 6 2.3. The effect of organisational differences ________________________________________ 8 2.4. Different conceptions of CIMIR ______________________________________________ 9 2.5. Militaries and humanitarians: a complicated relationship __________________________ 11 3. Theoretical framework ______________________________________________________ 13 3.1. IOR in the field of global politics _____________________________________________ 14 3.2. The convergence of IOR theories ___________________________________________ 14 3.3. An ‘organisational fields’ approach __________________________________________ 17 4. Methodology _____________________________________________________________ 18 4.1. Research design ________________________________________________________ 18 4.2. Ethics _________________________________________________________________ 21 4.3. Limitations _____________________________________________________________ 22 5. Results and analysis _______________________________________________________ 22 5.1. General perceptions on CIMIR ______________________________________________ 24 5.1.1. CIMIR as a best practice ________________________________________________ 24 5.1.2. CIMIR as means to an end _______________________________________________ 24 5.1.3. CIMIR in the organisational field of peace operations: complex and context dependent 25 5.1.4. The personal nature of CIMIR ____________________________________________ 27 5.2. Challenges identified _____________________________________________________ 28 5.2.1. Divergent organisational cultures and structures ______________________________ 28 5.2.1.1. Between military and civilian actors ______________________________________ 28 5.2.1.2. Between different militaries and different civilian actors _______________________ 30 5.2.1.3. Within individual organisations __________________________________________ 31 5.2.2. Stereotypes of the ‘other’ ________________________________________________ 33 5.2.3. Personal relationships and trust ___________________________________________ 35 5.2.4. ‘Turf battles’ __________________________________________________________ 36 5.3. Possibilities to improve CIMIR ______________________________________________ 39 5.3.1. Increase mutual understanding ___________________________________________ 39 5.3.2. Reduce the negative impact of rotations ____________________________________ 40 6. Conclusion _______________________________________________________________ 41 Bibliography _________________________________________________________________ 45
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1. Introduction
1.1. The evolution of conflict
In recent decades violent conflicts have evolved and undergone significant changes, reflecting developments in the global political and economic landscape. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar system as a mode of global governance, the international arena has become increasingly multipolar since the early 1990s. This has in turn affected the way violent conflicts arise, the way they develop, the way they are fought, as well as the way they are – or are not – resolved (Frerks et al., 2006; van der Lijn et al., 2014).
While each conflict is unique with regards to its origins and to the socio-political context in which it arises and develops, certain trends and patterns can be identified as characterising most contemporary conflicts. Overall, there has been a sharp decline since the 1970s in interstate conflicts coupled with a comparative rise in intrastate wars (Dupuy & Rustad, 2018). With regards to their causes, contemporary conflicts can rarely be reduced to a single root issue and are instead the result of various interrelated factors such as ethnic tensions, unequal distribution of resources and power in a given society, as well as state failure and the consequent clashes between polity and population. Due to these issues and as they usually originate within state borders, contemporary conflicts have been typified by the proliferation of non-state actors such as rebel groups alongside more traditional state and semi-state actors. This in turn has led to a rise in asymmetric modes of warfare, the shifting of the battlefield to densely populated areas, and the consequent increase in civilian casualties proportionally to combatant ones (Frerks et al., 2006; de Zeeuw, 2001; Duyvesteyn & Angstrom, 2005; van der Lijn et al., 2014; Williams, 2012).
All of the issues described above highlight the variety of factors that influence contemporary conflicts and how these are highly interrelated. Because of this, contemporary conflicts tend to be protracted over time, as the variety of issues at play and their interconnectedness make for a complex constellation of factors that can make conflicts hard to resolve, or ‘intractable’. This in turn has led numerous scholars and field workers to label these conflicts as ‘complex emergencies’ (Burgess & Burgess, 2003; Frerks et al., 2006; van der Lijn et al., 2014).
As is evident from the description of modern wars presented above, while each conflict is unique in its nature, there are certain trends that have become more prevalent compared to the past and in all contemporary conflicts military and societal issues are highly interrelated. Because of this, a purely military resolution to conflicts will not in most cases lead to sustainable peace. In order to resolve contemporary conflicts, societal issues have to therefore be addressed alongside military ones, marking a nexus between peace and development that has been widely recognised by scholars and practitioners in the field (Frerks et al., 2006; van der Lijn et al., 2014).
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1.2. The evolution of peace operations
In order to adapt to the changing nature of conflict and as a result of the end of the Cold War, peace operations transformed significantly in the 1990s and in the 2000s. With the end of the Cold War, the number of peace operations being authorised by the Security council increased significantly. Additionally, the aforementioned evolution of conflicts, the need to address deeply rooted societal issues, and the dire conditions faced by civilian populations in conflict-affected countries pushed the UN to adopt more substantial mandates in its peace operations from the mid-1990s onwards (Frerks et al., 2006; van der Lijn et al., 2014). This effectively resulted in the transitioning from traditional peacekeeping operations to multidimensional peacebuilding operations. Peacekeepers were thus given additional tasks such as the stabilisation and democratization of countries affected by conflict, the support of and cooperation with civilian actors involved in peacebuilding, as well as the monitoring of human rights alongside traditional peacekeeping tasks (Doyle & Sambanis, 2005; Franke, 2006; Frerks et al., 2006; Jarstad, 2016, Ryan, 2013; van der Lijn et al., 2014).
The new standard of action for peace operations within the UN was laid out in ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1992), in which the former Secretary-General described the new peacebuilding framework as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). In this report, Boutros-Ghali called for increased cooperation between the different actors involved in peacebuilding, such as military, developmental, and humanitarian actors. The new peacebuilding framework of action was then further delineated in the ‘Agenda for Democratisation’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1996), in the ‘Brahimi Report’ (United Nations, 2000) and in the ‘Framework for cooperation in Peacebuilding’ (United Nations, 2001). These reports highlight how fruitful cooperation between the military and civilian actors, such as humanitarian and peacebuilding organisations, is seen within the UN as essential for the success of peace operations. Additionally, through the creation of Chapter VII operations, peace-enforcement units were allowed to be deployed under the authorization of the Security Council, therefore without the need of authorization from local governments. These units could be deployed to enforce peace agreements and protect civilians as well as humanitarian and developmental organisations in the field (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Frerks et al., 2006; Franke, 2006; Jarstad, 2016; United Nations, 2000; van der Lijn et al., 2014).
Alongside UN peace operations, there have been a number of ‘humanitarian military interventions’ started in foreign countries by states or coalitions unilaterally. These interventions have been justified by those engaging in them by appealing to the need to uphold the human rights of distant populations. Numerous scholars have however criticised this framing and portrayed it as a way to ‘sell’ operations undertaken to pursue strategic security or economic interests to the public. The lines between the different kinds of operations have become increasingly blurred as a result of
3 different operations coexisting alongside one another, sometimes even in the same country (Egnell, 2008; Seybolt, 2008; Tschirgi, 2013; Weiss, 2015).
1.3. The increased focus on civil-military relations
In response to the changing nature of peace operations and to the UN’s call for increased civil-military cooperation in these operations, militaries around the world have started taking up humanitarian tasks as well as developing their own guidelines on how coordination or cooperation between the military and civilian actors should take place. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have also been increasingly developing ways to manage their relations with international militaries. The relationship between these actors can however be complicated due to differing agendas, organisational structures and cultures, as well as modi operandi (Franke, 2006; Frerks et al., 2006; Rietjens, 2008a). Additionally, the aforementioned blurring of the lines between different kinds of peace operations further complicates this relationship as goals, practices, and interactions can change significantly based on the specific mandate of militaries and their role in a conflict (Frerks et al., 2006; Weiss, 2015). Furthermore, scholars as well as humanitarian organisations have expressed concerns over how the process of ‘militarization’ of humanitarianism has led to the compromising of traditional humanitarian principles and to the integration of humanitarianism within broader security agendas (Lopez et al., 2015; McCormack & Gilbert, 2018). Scholars have also argued that this has in turn led since the early 2000s to a rise in attacks against humanitarian organisations and aid workers. For these scholars the compromising of the humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality led to a blurring of the differences between soldiers and aid workers and therefore made humanitarians ‘legitimate’ targets in the eyes of groups opposing foreign military intervention (Abiew, 2012).
These issues will be further elaborated in the literature review, however it is evident that civil-military relations (CIMIR) in peace operations are a highly contentious field both within academia as well as within international organisations (IOs) and NGOs. Despite of this, their improvement keeps being promoted as a ‘best practice’ by IOs, militaries, and some NGOs. While CIMIR are designed and promoted at headquarters level however, they take place at the field level where significant agency and responsibility is placed on practitioners to form relations with one another (Biermann, & Koops, 2017; Frerks et al., 2006; Rietjens, 2008a). Because of this, it is crucial to understand how practitioners in the field perceive the relationship between these actors, what the challenges they face in managing CIMIR are, and whether they identify possibilities to improve these relations. This could in turn shed some further light on CIMIR in complex peace operations, their implications, and finally help to see whether this highly regarded practice within the UN could be somehow improved. In line with this, the present thesis will seek to answer the following central research question: How do practitioners from the military and NGOs perceive CIMIR in complex
4 peace operations? To answer this question, the following sub-questions will be addressed in this thesis:
- What are the general perceptions of military and NGO personnel on CIMIR?
- What are the challenges described by these practitioners and decision-makers in the establishment and improvement of CIMIR?
- What possibilities to improve CIMIR in complex peace operations do these practitioners and decision-makers identify?
In order to answer these questions, a qualitative interview study with respondents from the Dutch Defence Forces (DDF) and various NGOs was carried out. The choice of a qualitative interview study was based on the fact that not much research has been carried out on CIMIR combining theory with empirical data from the field (Franke, 2017). As previously stated however CIMIR unfold in the field level and thus assessing the perceptions of practitioners is crucial in any analysis of these relations. The lack of empirical studies on the topic thus represents a research gap which this thesis seeks to address. The findings from the interviews were analysed using theories on inter-organisational relations (IOR) and compared to official policy documents to allow for a multi-level analysis. IOR scholars have argued that, as International Relations scholars engaged in the study of IOR later compared to other fields, there is a lack of studies focusing on the relations between different actors in global politics. When these studies have been carried out, they have mostly focused on the same type of organisations – such as IOs – or only on forms of cooperation, thus neglecting forms of rivalry. Additionally, according to these scholars, not much research has been carried out combining IOR theories and empirical data by carrying out a multi-level analysis, which also represents a research gap (Biermann & Koops, 2017; Franke, 2017). The present thesis seeks to address these gaps in the literature by analysing relations between different types of organisations as taking place on a spectrum ranging from cooperation to competition, comparing policy documents with the findings from the interviews and analysing them combining concepts from various IOR theories.
The present thesis is structured as follows: in the next chapter a literature review of scholarly articles as well as policy documents on CIMIR is presented and analysed. In Chapter 3, the theoretical framework consisting of various IOR theories is discussed. In Chapter 4, the research design and methodology of this thesis are presented alongside ethical implications and the limitations of such a design. In Chapter 5, the findings are presented and analysed using IOR theories. Finally, in the conclusion, the findings are summarised and related to literature on CIMIR. Additionally, the research questions are answered and implications for further research are presented.
5 As stated in the introduction, given the evolution of conflicts and peace operations, states and international organisations have been stressing the need for a ‘comprehensive approach’ in the efforts to resolve contemporary conflicts. Such an approach entails the combination of both military and civilian methods in resolving conflicts and requires a mutual understanding between the actors involved, communication, as well as the integration – where possible – of the different approaches (Franke, 2006; Frerks et al., 2006; Rietjens, 2008a). In order to respond to the complexities of contemporary conflicts and in line with the new focus on the comprehensive approach, militaries and international organisations globally have been increasingly focusing on CIMIR and delineating their doctrines and policies with regards to that. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), civil-military interaction (CMI), civil-military coordination (CMCoord), as well as CIMIR have all been used within these doctrines to describe the interfacing of civilian and military actors in response to crises. The various definitions are a result of the different perspectives, goals, and expectations with regards to this interfacing that the actors involved have (Frerks et al., 2006; Franke, 2006; Rietjens, 2008a; Rietjens, 2008b). For the purpose of clarity, in this thesis the term civil-military relations and its abbreviation (CIMIR) is used as it encompasses all the different forms of interaction between military and civilian actors. In order to further clarify the different approaches to and interpretations of CIMIR, the different actors involved in the response to contemporary conflicts are presented hereafter.
2.1. The actors in peace operations
Despite the amount of criticism the UN receives, it is still regarded as the most legitimate and widely recognised actor in the response to contemporary conflicts. While there is a considerable variety of actors involved in peace operations, the UN is the most visible and the most relevant politically. When a mission is mandated by the Security Council, this gives that mission legitimacy and it provides a legal basis for the presence of military and civilian actors. Through its various institutions, the UN has the goal of promoting global peace and security. Due to the different interests of the Permanent 5 (P5) states within the Security Council however, it is not always able to do so (Newman, 2013; Seybolt, 2008; Tschirgi, 2013). Other than the UN, other international and regional organisations such as the EU, the AU, and NATO can also be involved in the response to contemporary conflicts. These organisations can provide diplomatic, logistical, financial, or military assistance to the efforts to bring about sustainable peace. Each of these organisations has their own strategic and security objectives, which can hinder cooperation and the overall effectiveness of missions (Newman, 2013; Rietjens, 2008a; Tschirgi, 2013).
International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) play a substantial role in the response to contemporary conflicts. These organisations can undertake a wide range of activities in peace operations. Some INGOs are humanitarian, providing medical care as well as food and other basic necessities to those in dire need of relief. Other organisations are developmental, undertaking
6 more state- and peace-building tasks in the response to conflicts. INGOs can also be multi-mandate, combining humanitarian and developmental tasks. Some INGOs take funding from states and international organisations, while others seek to remain independent from any external influence and therefore depend on donations to carry out their operations (Newman, 2013; Rietjens, 2008a). Alongside INGOs, local NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs) also play a significant role in responding to contemporary conflicts by undertaking similar tasks to those carried out by INGOs. These actors can have a vital role in the resolution of conflicts as they possess local knowledge and understanding of the population, which often makes them better positioned to know what is needed to bring about sustainable peace. The amount of local and international NGOs and CSOs has increased over time and to this day there are thousands of organisations with differing and sometimes conflicting mandates. This in turn has made coordination between them difficult (Frerks et al., 2006; Jarstad, 2016; Newman, 2013; Rietjens, 2008a).
In attempts to resolve conflicts, the host government plays a crucial role. In contemporary wars the government is usually a party to the conflict, is faced with the failing of state institutions, and is not inclusive of all groups within its society. In order to achieve sustainable peace however, it is widely recognised that there is a need for functioning and inclusive state institutions. Because of this, the host government has to be involved in any attempts to build peace and that is why the work of many IOs and NGOs is aimed at strengthening state institutions, rendering them more inclusive, and providing the basic services that the state is failing to provide (Newman, 2013; Rietjens, 2008a).
International militaries are in most cases the largest component of peace operations. They can act under the mandate of IOs – such as the UN, the EU, NATO, or others –, under invitation of the host government in bi- or multi-lateral agreements, or intervene unilaterally in countries where deemed necessary due to violations of human rights or strategic considerations. Militaries are not all alike, and the objectives and roles of militaries change significantly based on whether they are mandated by an organisation, invited by the host government, or intervene unilaterally in a country. Consequently, the way they relate to civilian actors, and especially the way civilian actors relate to them, also changes significantly based on this (Franke, 2006; Newman, 2013; Rietjens, 2008a; Seybolt, 2008). Even militaries acting under the same mission or alliance can have differing resources, organisational cultures, modi operandi, as well as understandings of the same mandate and can therefore behave differently in efforts to resolve conflicts. Additionally, even within the same military, differences in position, socio-economic background, age, and gender can all affect the attitudes and the approaches of individual soldiers or battalions. It is therefore necessary to steer away from considerations of ‘the military’ as a monolithic unitary actor (Ruffa, 2014; Rietjens, 2008a).
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2.2. Contextualising CIMIR
In peace operations, as there are numerous actors involved, there is a need to better manage their relationships in order to avoid having different actors competing with one another, carrying out the same tasks ineffectively, and therefore failing to address the fundamental needs of the population. The sheer number of actors involved can make however achieving a comprehensive approach and some extent of coordination problematic. This is especially the case between militaries and civilian actors, such as IOs, NGOs and CSOs (Franke, 2006; Newman 2013; Rietjens, 2008a; UNOCHA, 2015). The need to better manage CIMIR has been an increasingly discussed topic both within academic and decision-making circles within states and organisations. This is due to the fact that military and civilian actors have increasingly come into contact with one another in peace operations and the fact that their activities have started to overlap more. Because of this, some basic level of understanding between the actors and of coordination where possible has been framed as a precondition for peace operations to succeed (Egnell, 2008; Frerks et al., 2006; Franke, 2006; Rietjens 2008a).
Certain authors (Franke, 2006) and organisations (NATO, 2003) have in the past implied that cooperation between military and civilian actors should always be possible as these actors share the common goal of achieving peace and ensuring the well-being of the people. This claim is however a simplification of the issue, as different states and organisations can have varying interpretations of what peace is, what kind of peace is desirable – whether it is inclusive or not for example –, and have differing objectives dependant on national and organisational interests. States’, and therefore militaries’, national interests regarding international security can in fact differ significantly from the interests of the UN and even more from those of humanitarian organisations, who have as their sole objective to assist those in need regardless of their political affiliations and of whether their assistance helps the overall security objectives of states (Frerks et al., 2006; Newman, 2013; Rietjens, 2008a; Tschirgi, 2013).
Differences in types of operations, in mandates, and in objectives therefore heavily influence the nature of the relationships that civilian actors will form with militaries. Other than these differences, contingency factors such as the socio-economic context in the field, the nature of the conflict and the actors involved in it, or the operational environment in general also determine what kinds of relationships can be formed between military and civilian actors without compromising principles and mandates (NATO, 2018; Rietjens, 2008a; UNOCHA, 2015). Based on these factors, following an extensive analysis of how they might influence organisational principles and objectives, actors can choose to form a relationship with the ‘other’. The types of relationships that can be formed have been categorized by both the UN and NATO on a spectrum that ranges from mere coexistence to cooperation. Coexistence refers to civilian and military actors operating in the same environment without having any direct form of interaction. Civilian actors might choose a
8 coexistence strategy when the military is a party to the conflict or when it is deemed to be dangerous to associate with the military. If this is not the case, however, civilian and military actors can choose to consult one another. Through consultation, actors can find out the opinions of others or seek their advice (NATO, 2018; UNOCHA, 2015). If actors then take those opinions and integrate them into their operations in order to avoid interfering with one another, they are forming a relationship of deconfliction. Actors can then take a further step by synchronising their activities, operating under joint policies, or exchanging information in order to increase efficiency, thereby forming a relationship of coordination. If actors see it fit to have an even closer relationship, they can work in close cooperation. This implies an association of the different actors, joint planning, and the carrying out of activities in support of one another. Cooperation does not imply losing autonomy, but it signifies a willingness to operate alongside one another. Civilian actors are often reluctant to cooperate closely with the military. They might only choose to do so in response to natural disasters or in conflicts where the military has the role of keeping the peace, as in these contexts the military is not a party to a conflict and cooperating with them would not imply a breach of neutrality (NATO, 2018; UNOCHA, 2015).
Civilian actors might take any of these forms when relating to the military, and it is crucial for the military to respect the independence and autonomy of civilian actors. The military additionally, if requested, should only provide support that matches what is being demanded from civilian actors, without imposing anything on them (NATO, 2018; Rietjens, 2008a). At the same time, it is important for civilian actors to understand that in extreme conditions it might be necessary for the military to carry out some humanitarian or developmental tasks when no other option is available. The military has in fact unique capabilities in the rapid mobilisation of large amount of resources. In cases where immediate action is required the UN system can sometimes take too long, and a military response might be the only way to reach certain populations and address their basic needs in a timely manner. In these contexts however there has to be a substantial analysis of what this practice might imply and the consequences that might arise from it. Militaries are in fact known to be poor aid workers as they lack the training, expertise, and policy framework to address the needs of a population in a way that is sensitive to local realities. Because of this, military involvement in humanitarian activities should only be done as a last resort, and militaries should respect the primacy of humanitarian actors in this field (Egnell, 2008; Rietjens, 2008a; Seybolt, 2008; UNOCHA, 2015).
2.3. The effect of organisational differences
As mentioned previously, the management of CIMIR can be complicated due to differing agendas, organisational structures and cultures, as well as modi operandi that civilian and military actors tend to have. Militaries are usually extremely hierarchical institutions that place a high value on structure, discipline, command, and authority, operating in a top-down manner. They place
9 significant focus on logistics and repetitive trainings in order to be able to operate in all kinds of environments independently. They also usually rely on coercive means to achieve their objectives, which are mandated by their state’s government and are therefore based on national interests (Franke, 2006; Rietjens, 2008a). Civilian actors, especially NGOs, on the other hand have a more horizontal structure. They operate in a bottom-up manner, placing significant decision-making power on those involved first-hand in operations, who can revise practices based on experiences from the field. They are more process-oriented than the military and they rely on persuasive means to achieve their objectives, which are designed independently or in accordance with donor interests (Franke, 2006; Rietjens, 2008a). A lack of awareness of these differences in organisational structures and cultures can lead practitioners from both sides to fail to understand the other actors involved in peace operations, thus worsening CIMIR and rendering efforts to achieve some basic level of coordination futile. This lack of understanding can also lead practitioners to create myths and stereotypes about the ‘other’, with military personnel often being labelled as insensitive, controlling people brainlessly following orders and NGO personnel often being branded as ‘tree-huggers’, uncoordinated, and hippies. These stereotypes can have a significantly detrimental effect on CIMIR management (Rietjens, 2008a).
A further barrier to constructive CIMIR is posed by the different timeframes along which military and civilian actors operate. Civilian actors are usually in the field for years or decades, often arriving before a crisis is declared and staying after it has ended. Militaries on the other hand are deployed in response to a crisis, ideally to resolve it in short timeframes. Because of this, civilian and military actors can fall out of synchrony (Rietjens, 2008a). Times of deployment are also an issue, as the military deploys its personnel from four to six months at a time, while civilian actors usually deploy their personnel for around a year. This creates frustration amongst both groups, as it does not allow for a focus on long-term issues and it creates a lack of continuity in the activities being carried out and in the interorganisational relations being built (Rietjens, 2008a).
Relations are further complicated by the fact that the actors involved have different definitions of CIMIR and what should be achieved through these (Franke, 2006; Newman 2013; Rietjens, 2008a). While the term CIMIR is used in this thesis, the definitions used by other organisations are presented hereafter in order to understand the different positions and interpretations that certain actors have with regards to CIMIR.
2.4. Different conceptions of CIMIR
NATO uses both the concepts of CIMIC and of CMI for its interpretation of CIMIR. Initially, it only adopted the term CIMIC, which it defined as: “The coordination and cooperation in support of the mission between the NATO commander and civil population including national and local authorities as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies” (NATO, 2003). This definition clearly defines CIMIR as a practice to help the military force achieve its
10 objectives, with the potential to legitimise military deployments and to gain the support of the local population. Such a definition therefore stems from a purely military interpretation of CIMIR that disregards the interests, principles, and goals of civilian organisations, especially humanitarian ones (Rietjens, 2008a). Because of this, and in response to experiences in Afghanistan and other missions, NATO revised its conception of CIMIC, defining it as “a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of CMI with diverse non-military actors” (NATO, 2018). Additionally, alongside CIMIC it added the concept of CMI, defining it as:
“a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, thereby mutually increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises” (NATO, 2018). The revision of the definition of CIMIC and the addition of CMI signify, at least on paper, an increased understanding by NATO of the different actors involved in CIMIR, their different goals, and the fact that CIMIR are not merely an instrument to support the military and legitimise its presence in a given area. This was also confirmed within NATO documents by a recognition that interactions between military and civilian actors can take different forms in the field based on context, the role of the military, and the mandate of different organisations. Additionally, there was also a recognition in the same documents that militaries must respect the autonomy of civilian actors and their primacy in the provision of aid as well as services and invite said actors to do the same with regards to the military and its role in the provision of security. While the revised definitions are a step forwards towards understanding the complexities surrounding CIMIR, within these new documents CIMIC and CMI are still conceived in certain paragraphs as a way to achieve military objectives, to support the force, and to increase acceptance of military presence. (CCOE, 2019; NATO, 2018; Zaborowski, 2017).
The contradictory conceptions of CIMIR within NATO documents can make the concept ambiguous for military personnel. The ambiguity of CIMIR can be further worsened in peace operations by the fact that the UN mandate is often the result of compromise in the Security Council and because of this certain aspects remain vaguely defined. The combination of these factors makes it so that military involvement in humanitarian activities, and its relations with civilian actors in general, are often left open to the interpretation of practitioners at the lower levels of the military (Rietjens, 2008a). Because of this, the establishment of CIMIR is often dependant on compatible personality traits and the building of trust between practitioners in the field. This in turn makes it so that soldiers, battalions, militaries, and even missions all approach CIMIR differently and without any form of consistency, making IOR dependant on who’s deployed at a given moment. Given the fast rotations of the military, this can also result in the inefficient repetition of efforts, in a lack of institutional memory with regards to CIMIR, as well as in the abrupt termination
11 of relationships when military personnel have to return home. While the personal nature of CIMIR can be helpful with regards to the overcoming of institutional stigmas, overall it creates a lack of clarity that results in civilian actors not knowing what to expect from military personnel, therefore potentially worsening CIMIR and the overall effectiveness of peace operations (Rietjens et al., 2007; Rietjens, 2008a).
In contrast to NATO, the UN uses the term CMCoord to refer to CIMIR, and it defines it as:
“the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from cooperation to co-existence. Coordination is a shared field facilitated by liaison and common training” (UNOCHA, 2015).
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), a body established by the UN General Assembly to manage coordination in humanitarian assistance between various UN and non-UN actors, further stressed the UN’s conception of CMCoord, stating that:
“All humanitarian action, including civil-military coordination for humanitarian purposes in complex emergencies, must be in accordance with the overriding core principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. [ ] Any civil-military coordination must serve the prime humanitarian principle of humanity - i.e. human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found” (IASC, 2004).
It is clear from both the UN’s and the IASC’s conception of CMCoord in humanitarian action, that for the UN CIMIR have to always be carried out in a way that upholds the humanitarian principles, and that humanitarian and military action have to be kept clearly distinct from one another, especially with regards to militaries that are parties to a conflict. If the NATO definitions of CIMIR can be seen as having a military bias, the UN definition can be seen as having a humanitarian bias. While it is true that the humanitarian principles should always be upheld in humanitarian action, it is not always easy to maintain clear distinction between military and civilian actors in contexts where the military, as a last resort, has to take on humanitarian activities to meet the basic needs of populations in short timeframes or when it has to rescue humanitarians under attack in the field (Frerks et al., 2006; IASC, 2004; UNOCHA, 2015). It is in fact vital for civilian actors – both humanitarian and developmental – to operate in an environment of relative security in order for them to carry out their tasks effectively. In contemporary conflicts and highly volatile contexts, the only way to establish a basic level of security is often through military operations. Failing to recognise this can lead to misunderstandings between the actors involved, the worsening of CIMIR, and therefore in the reduced effectiveness of peace operations (Rietjens, 2008a).
2.5. Militaries and humanitarians: a complicated relationship
The bringing together of military and humanitarian actors is one of the major challenges in managing CIMIR and achieving some form of coordination. These actors are in fact polar
12 opposites on the spectrum of actors involved in peace operations with regards to their organisational cultures, their modi operandi, and their principles. Other than the aforementioned differences, humanitarian organisations also have the need to abide to and uphold the humanitarian principles, which define humanitarian action and are meant to guide it in all contexts (Frerks et al., 2006). These are the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Humanity refers to the imperative of humanitarian action to address human need wherever it is found and to ensure respect for human beings. Impartiality refers to the fact that humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, making no discrimination based on race, gender, nationality, or any other factors. Neutrality refers to the fact that humanitarian actors must not take part in hostilities or side with any of the parties to a conflict. Finally, independence refers to the fact that humanitarian action must be carried out free from any political, economic, or military influences. For humanitarian actors cooperating with the military is therefore not always possible, especially in cases where a military is a party to a conflict, as it might be interpreted as a breach of their principles (Frerks et al., 2006; UNOCHA, 2015).
Some scholars and humanitarian practitioners have argued that concepts such as CIMIC and the military’s carrying out of humanitarian activities are in contrast to the humanitarian principles and are blurring the lines between the military and humanitarians (Abiew, 2012; Egnell, 2008). These criticisms intensified after Colin Powell’s remarks in 2001 when talking about Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan:
“I am serious about making sure we have the best relationship with the NGOs who are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team. [We are] all committed to the same singular purpose to help every man and woman in the world who is in need, who is hungry, who is without hope, to help every one of them fill a belly, get a roof over their heads, educating their children, have hope” (Powell, 2001).
While Colin Powell’s remarks can be seen as being an effort to emphasize the new focus on CIMIR in peace and stabilisation operations, they have a clear military bias. Numerous scholars and NGO personnel strongly criticised his comments, as they made NGOs part of the US’s combat team, part of a military invasion, and therefore caused them to lose their impartiality and neutrality (Abiew, 2012; Brauman, 2012). While humanitarian NGOs often need to coordinate with the military in fragile environments for logistical and security reasons, they also need to maintain impartiality in conflict settings in order to be able to bring relief to all people in need, regardless of their affiliations in a conflict. By cooperating with the military, humanitarian organisations might lose their neutrality in the eyes of the local population. This in turn might reduce the portions of the local population they have access to and effectively make them ‘legitimate’ targets for those armed groups who oppose foreign military presence (Abiew, 2012; Brauman, 2012). Various scholars have argued that because of this there has been a rise in the attacks carried out against aid workers (Abiew, 2012; Fast, 2010). While these claims have been rejected by certain scholars,
13 some stating that there is a lack of reliable and comparable data to claim that ‘humanitarianism is under attack’ (Fast, 2010), others claiming that the rise in attacks against aid workers is simply due to their increased presence on the field (Brauman, 2012), it is evident that civil-military cooperation is a highly contentious issue both within academia as well as within IOs and NGOs.
Amongst scholars of humanitarianism and practitioners within humanitarian NGOs a debate has emerged on CIMIR and on whether these organisations should be cooperating with the military at all. Scholars as well as humanitarian organisations have expressed concerns over how the processes of ‘militarization’ of humanitarianism and ‘politicization’ of aid has led to the compromising of traditional humanitarian principles and to the integration of humanitarianism within broader security agendas, where humanitarian motives are used to legitimise military deployments and the use of violence (Abiew, 2012; Lopez et al., 2015; McCormack & Gilbert, 2018).
Humanitarians, especially the ‘purists’ or ‘principled’ ones, have been critiqued however for being naïve towards the political implications and consequences of their activities. Certain scholars have asserted that it is impossible for aid to be apolitical, as the relief of human suffering is inherently a political choice already. Additionally, they argue that the provision of aid can benefit rebel groups and combatants as much as it does the population, and that in order to gain acceptance humanitarians often play into the plans of these groups, something that humanitarian NGOs have been reluctant to admit in the past (Lopez et al., 2015; Seybolt, 2008). Because of this, these scholars argue, it would be best for humanitarian NGOs to become more political in nature, have political goals alongside the classic humanitarian ones, and deal openly with the political implications of their actions in order to avoid possible unintended consequences deriving from blindly providing humanitarian aid without any consideration of what doing so might imply (Seybolt, 2008).
These considerations prompted some organisations to adopt a more pragmatic approach to their principles, trying to balance their upholding with considerations for the political consequences of humanitarian action. These organisations therefore place large decision-making power with regards to the engagement in CIMIR directly with practitioners in the field (Frerks et al., 2006; Fast 2007). Other organisations have instead responded by adopting a ‘purist’ approach, stating that it is necessary for humanitarian NGOs to uphold and promote the humanitarian principles even more strongly than before in conflicts. For these NGOs, only this way they can separate their action from that of developmental and military actors and therefore protect the ‘humanitarian space’ that allows them to address human need regardless of location and political affiliation (Frerks et al., 2006; Fast, 2007; Fast et al., 2013). Additionally, purists stress the importance of adhering to humanitarian principles in their everyday practices. This is the case because the perception that the local population and local armed groups have of humanitarian organisations can be influenced by how an organisation operates in the field, where it locates its offices, as well as other factors.
14 These perceptions in turn determine whether organisations are able to gain access to all parts of the populations and their overall level of security, as having a Western ideology or being associated with foreign militaries can make NGOs legitimate targets in the eyes of rebel groups (Autesserre, 2014; Fast et al., 2013).
All of the issues described in this section highlight how complex the relationship between the military and civilian actors in peace operations can be. Because of this, and as significant responsibility is place at the field, there is a need to better understand how the practitioners involved in peace operations perceive CIMIR and how their interactions and mutual understanding could be improved.
3. Theoretical framework
In the following section a theoretical framework combining various theories on IOR is presented. Given the aforementioned complex environment in which CIMIR take place and the different dynamics at play within it, theories on IOR can offer an insightful frame through which to analyse the empirical data presented further in this thesis. Additionally, a combination of various strands of IOR theories can allow to analyse different aspects and dynamics of CIMIR, thus broadening the frame and allowing for a more comprehensive approach in the analysis of data.
3.1. IOR in the field of global politics
In fields such as Economics and Business, Sociology, and Psychology, already in the 1960s scholars started focusing on IOR and developing theories to analyse the nature, trends, motives, and effects of IOR development, management, and disruption (Franke, 2017). Given the proliferation of IOs and NGOs as well as the increased interconnectedness between them and various state and non-state actors, scholars and policy makers have been attempting to better comprehend the dynamics at play in the interactions between these actors. Because of this, since the early 2000s IR scholars have been increasingly applying IOR theories to the study of global politics, seeking for new ways to manage and improve relations between various actors in the international arena (Biermann & Koops, 2017; Franke, 2017).
Despite this increased focus on IOR, most IR studies on the topic have been characterised by significant limitations. Oftentimes these studies have focused on organisations as unitary actors, therefore overlooking the role of member states, individuals, and internal bargaining in determining organisational behaviour. Numerous studies have additionally analysed IOR by focusing on the top level of organisations, the headquarters. As previously mentioned however significant responsibility and challenges in IOR are placed at the field level, and studies lacking this outlook are bound to present an incomplete picture. Studies of IOR in global politics have also been mostly theoretical and lacking an empirical basis, therefore not keeping up with the pace of developments in practice (Biermann & Koops, 2017; Egger, 2013). Finally, studies have generally focused on forms of
15 cooperation, therefore neglecting rivalry, competition, and conflict. These forms of IOR are more prevalent than what is sometimes presented in the literature and because of this, studies analysing IOR should be carried out as openly as possible and without reducing relations to preferred sets of categories (Biermann & Koops, 2017; Franke 2017). Attempting to address these limitations and in order not to reduce the complexity of CIMIR, various strands of IOR theories are combined to form the theoretical framework of this thesis.
3.2. The convergence of IOR theories
IOR can be primarily defined as the: “the interaction between two or more organizations. They take place in various configurations, ranging from dyads and triads to organizational fields and networks” (Biermann & Koops, 2017, p. 3). IOR can be shaped differently and organisations can choose to form a relationship of cooperation, collusion, coercion, competition, or full-on conflict. All of these types of relations can additionally take different forms in practice based on contextual factors (Biermann & Koops, 2017; Egger, 2013).
Originally, theories on IOR were either purely rationalist or purely constructivist. Constructivist theories stress the importance of beliefs, norms, and values in the forming, developing, and disrupting of IOR. Issues such as organisational cultures, legitimacy, and trust are thus pivotal to constructivist analyses of IOR. Rationalist theories focus instead on how necessity and resource dependency shape considerations of efficiency and effectiveness by organisations, who are thus considered to engage in IOR only based on the fulfilling of needs and after a cost-benefit analysis of what doing so might imply (Biermann & Koops, 2017; Lipson, 2017). While both sets of theories offer valuable frames of analysis, purely rationalist or constructivist approaches are bound to reduce the complexity and the multiplicity of factors affecting IOR, particularly in the field of global politics. Because of this, rationalist and constructivist theories of IOR have been increasingly converging, as academics borrowed concepts from neighbouring fields to create more comprehensive frameworks of analysis. Additionally, numerous scholars have argued that in order to better understand IOR in global politics – a complex field characterised by a multiplicity of actors, interests, and levels of analysis –, integrating a variety of theories and combining rationalist and constructivist approaches might prove most effective (Biermann & Koops, 2017; Lipson, 2017). Neo-institutionalism was developed in the wake of this convergence of theories, by including certain rationalist concepts within the more traditionally constructivist theory of institutionalism. The latter focused on the role of ‘institutions’ – those shared norms, beliefs, and practices considered most legitimate within a given field – in influencing organisational behaviour, and stressed this as the most important factor. While Neo-institutionalism still sees values and beliefs as having the most influence on organisational behaviour, it also includes material considerations in its inquiry, thus allowing for an analysis of both ideological and rational elements of an organisation’s behaviour and its engagement in IOR (Egger, 2013; Franke & Koch, 2017). Neo-institutionalism is
16 based upon the premise that organisations are highly dependent on their external environment and on other organisations within it for both political and material resources, and will thus adapt their internal structure as well as their modus operandi to said environment (Lipson, 2017). The most influential push in this regard is still perceived to be that of ‘institutions’. According to neo-institutionalists these will be adopted by most organisations within the same field following a ‘logic of appropriateness’, a process of organisational convergence labelled ‘isomorphism’. This conception however significantly reduces the agency of organisations to adapt to their environment. In order to address this limitation, and as social and cultural pressures may be inconsistent with the realities of operations in the field, neo-institutionalist theorists have argued that organisations may resort to a process of ‘decoupling’ their practices from ideology. By doing so, organisations can allow themselves more room for manoeuvring between socially accepted norms at an organisational level and practical necessities at the operational level, thus following a ‘logic of consequences’ (Franke, 2017; Lipson, 2005). While this might increase effectiveness for organisations operating in complex and ambivalent environments, it might also make it impossible to institutionalise improvements in the management of IOR. Decoupling could potentially improve IOR amongst organisations with conflicting organisational cultures, as through this process cultural differences can be set aside for practical issues. However, decoupling could also make it so that organisational calls and pledges to improve cooperation in a given field are not followed in practice (Franke, 2017; Lipson, 2005).
Resource-dependence theory (RDT) stems instead from a more rationalist approach to IOR. RDT is based on the assumption that organisations operate within insecure environments and that they are in need of resources. These can be material – such as financial, human, and logistical resources –, or immaterial – such as legitimacy or information –. According to RDT, organisations will only engage in IOR in order to acquire resources from others. IOR are thus conceived as being “about the achievement of goals that organisations cannot accomplish alone” (Franke, 2017). When these resources are perceived as being important, for example if organisations cannot operate without them, this exchange creates a situation of dependence between organisations. If an organisation is the only one to have access to a certain resource, and can therefore control and regulate access to and use of said resource, it can exert significant power over other organisations wishing to access it (Biermann & Harsch, 2017; Franke, 2017). If the organisations involved in a certain environment instead do not control all of the resources needed to achieve their objectives, this can create an interdependence between them, thus linking multiple organisations with each other in different ways and to differing degrees of dependence. This creates a highly uncertain environment where organisations and decision-makers have to consider the actions of multiple other actors that could influence their access to resources and therefore their effectiveness. This is especially the case in an environment characterised by highly specialised organisations, such as that of complex peace operations (Biermann & Harsch, 2017; Franke, 2017). Because of this
17 context of dependence and the following power dynamics that exchange of resources can create in an unstable and insecure environment, organisations have to balance their choice to engage in IOR to acquire resources against a potential loss of autonomy. Because of this, organisations usually prefer engaging in balanced exchanges of resources, or ‘win-win’ situations. If an organisation perceives that it is too dependent on another organisation for resources, and thus too subject to its power, this can lead to a process of ‘autonomisation’. By doing so the dependent organisation will distance itself from its counterpart, either by looking for alternative ways to obtain resources or by ceasing its activities in a given environment (Biermann & Koops, 2017; Franke, 2017).
While Neo-institutionalism and RDT originally stemmed from contrasting schools of thought, they have been increasingly converging towards one another, and a combination of both might prove most appropriate in analysing IOR in complex environments. Both conceive organisations as being part of ‘open systems’, thus as being highly intertwined with one another and with their environment, which is characterised by multiple actors at different levels. Both theories additionally perceive organisations as being constrained by this environment as well as by a need of resources (Biermann & Koops, 2017; Franke & Koch, 2017; Knoke & Chen, 2008).
3.3. An ‘organisational fields’ approach
Given this shared conception of the international arena as an open system, elements of both theories can be combined to analyse IOR as taking place within the ‘organisational field’ of peace operations. Organisational fields have often been defined as a multitude of organisations who, adhering to shared meaning systems or due to common or complementary goals, interact frequently with one another. In complex environments characterised by a multitude of actors and interests, fields can be conceived as constantly shifting, with organisations entering and exiting fields based on context. Organisations thus form different formal and informal networks within organisational fields based on goals, interests, ideology, and need of resources. Organisational fields can thus simultaneously be a stage for cooperation and competition amongst organisations, who can be in need of resources from other organisations while simultaneously having conflicting goals or organisational cultures (Lipson, 2003; Knoke & Chen, 2008; Wooten & Sacco, 2017). One of the limitations that an organisational fields approach to IOR had in its initial conceptions was that it left little agency to organisations, who were seen as being heavily influenced by socially accepted norms within their field. Norms can however be interpreted and ‘translated’ differently by organisations in the same field (Wooten & Sacco, 2017). Combining organisational fields theory with insights from RDT – such as material considerations and ‘autonomisation’ – as well as insights from Neo-institutionalism – such as ‘isomorphism’ and ‘decoupling’ – can however partially resolve these limitations. These can further be addressed by including in the analysis the constructivist concept of differentiation, according to which organisations seek to “advance a discourse that
18 distinguishes them and demarcates them clearly from other organizations” (Biermann & Koops, 2017, p. 23). This is a strategy that can be used by organisations to stay relevant and maintain their reputation in a given field where they are competing for material resources as well as legitimacy with other organisations. Additionally, by doing so they may seek to affirm their legitimacy in contexts where they believe that other organisations are entering into their own domain. In highly specialised fields, organisations undertaking activities originally carried out by others can in fact lead to ‘turf battles’ and rivalry between these actors, who will thus resort to differentiation strategies to maintain their legitimacy and relevance in said fields (Biermann & Koops, 2017; Franke, 2017).
Conceptualising organisational fields as constantly shifting and being shaped by the emergence of various formal and informal networks also allows to grasp the complexity of modern peace operations. IOs, NGOs, states, militaries, and other actors can be seen as operating within the organisational field of peace operations, however the type of peace operation and the specific contextual characteristics in the field can influence their behaviour and what types of formal or informal networks they form with one another. Because of the complexity in the ‘field’ of modern peace operations and the variety of actors involved in it, scholars have been calling for more research to study the relations between the different actors combining multiple IOR theories (Biermann & Koop, 2017; Lipson, 2017).
Within this framework, organisations involved in complex peace operations can be seen as taking a ‘pragmatist’ or ‘contingency’ approach in their behaviour and engagement in IOR, combining ideological considerations of appropriateness and legitimacy with more material concerns on access to and use of resources in their quest for relevance and effectiveness (Franke, 2017; Lipson, 2017). In doing so, organisations are however limited by various factors such as lack of adequate information, internal conflict and bargaining between members of the organisation, lack of trust between practitioners in the field, as well as perceptions on organisations’ legitimacy by other actors in the field (Knoke & Chen, 2008; Lipson, 2017). As a consequence of these limitations, it is crucial to carry out a multi-level analysis of IOR in complex peace operations in order to grasp the different dynamics at play between actors in this field. Thus, an in-depth analysis of IOR in global politics has to include a focus on individuals, states, the dynamics within and between organisations, as well as the environment in which they operate (Biermann & Koop, 2017).
4. Methodology
4.1. Research design
In order to answer the research questions and make sense of the complex field of CIMIR in peace operations, the multiple and sometimes conflicting definitions of the concept, as well as the different positions and interests of the various organisations involved in this interfacing, the present
19 thesis has been developed following the research design of a qualitative interview study. For this purpose, semi-structured interviews (SSIs) of around an hour were carried out with policy advisors and practitioners from the Dutch Defence Forces (DDF), the Dutch Ministry of Defence (MoD), as well as humanitarian and developmental NGOs. All of the interviews were carried out in the Netherlands, either in military barracks, NGO headquarters, or on university campus.
A total of seven interviews were carried out with respondents from the DDF and MoD. Six respondents came from different levels and branches within the DDF, while one was a political advisor to the MoD. A combination of these interviews, given the different levels and branches the respondents came from, allowed me to gain substantial insights into the different positions and conceptions of CIMIR within the Dutch military. These respondents were found and selected thanks to help from a senior officer of the Dutch CIMIC platoon who came to give a guest lecture in one of my master’s courses. He helped me find respondents for a project in January and was also willing to help for the thesis, thus solving the problem of access to military and foreign policy institutions identified by certain scholars (Gusterson, 1997; Kuus, 2012).
A total of four interviews were carried out with respondents from NGOs. Organisations were chosen based on accessibility as well as on mandate, in order to ensure diversity in this regard. Respondents were found by contacting practitioners and decision-makers that came to give guest lectures in one of my master’s courses. Thanks to them, and through a ‘snowballing’ method, I was able to interview two people working in a large humanitarian INGO, one person working at a large developmental INGO, and one person working at a large multi-mandate INGO. While the sample of respondents from NGOs is smaller than the sample of those from the military, the fact that I was able to find respondents from three different types of organisations and that they all came from large organisations involved in operations across the globe allowed me to still gain significant insights into the different positions of NGOs with regards to CIMIR.
With regards to methods, SSIs combine both open- and close-ended questions, allowing for follow-up questions as well. These types of interviews are ideal for the discussion of complex issues and they are suited for the analysis of issues at different level of organisations, from management and policy advisors to field workers (Adams, 2015). The aim of such a design is to explore in depth what the respondents’ perceptions on CIMIR in peace and stabilisation operations are, what the challenges they identify and face in establishing CIMIR are, and whether they feel there are possibilities to improve these relations or not. The interviews were structured as a combination of narrative interviews and question-driven interviews. They began, after a brief introduction where respondents introduced themselves and talked about their personal and professional background, in the form of a narrative interview. Here, respondents described in detail a case in which they were involved that showed how CIMIR unfold in these settings, the challenges that arise from this interfacing, the strategies used to cope with these challenges, and how the respondents perceive
20 CIMIR in general. After this first narrative part, the interviews then moved to a more question-driven approach. In this second part, respondents answered a series of more general questions on CIMIR, on their organisations, as well as on their everyday routines and activities. By combining narrative and question-driven interviews it was possible to go into detail on their perceptions and experiences thanks to the narrative part while at the same time being able to generalise about their positions, activities, and organisations thanks to the question-driven part. Additionally, by having similar questions for everyone in the question-driven part it was possible to more easily compare the answers of different respondents, drawing common themes. I chose to start with the narrative part as, based on experiences from previous projects in which I had to conduct interviews, it is easier for respondents to go from specific details to abstract concepts than it is for them to go the other way around.
In order to analyse the data from the SSIs, a theoretical framework combining various theories on IOR was designed. Various scholars of IOR have argued that in order to analyse IOR taking place in complex environments, such as CIMIR in peace operations, a combination of diverse IOR theories will prove most effective (Biermann & Koops, 2017; Lipson, 2017). Because of this, concepts from various strands of IOR theories were combined in the theoretical framework in order to account for both rational and ideological considerations made by organisations engaging in IOR. Such a framework will also allow to analyse the different levels at which CIMIR are both conceived and enacted. This multi-level analysis will be further carried out by comparing how the perceptions of respondents on CIMIR compare to the policy documents by the UN and NATO on the topic, which were presented in the literature review. NATO documents were selected as these serve as guidelines for how the DDF conceive and enact CIMIR, while UN documents were selected as it is the most relevant institution that attempts to coordinate efforts from various NGOs through bodies such as UNOCHA and UNDP.
The purpose of such a theoretical framework is not to develop a ‘grand theory’ of IOR in peace operations, but rather to build a comprehensive framework to use in the analysis of the empirical data to help grasp the different dynamics and complexities at play within CIMIR in peace operations. Thus, the theoretical framework will not be tested, but used in an explanatory manner to analyse data and answer the research questions.
Already half a century ago, Laura Nader (1972) highlighted the need for anthropologists and social scientists in general to ‘study up’. This was a call for researchers to study those institutions which exert power over large amounts of people and influence their lives in order to educate the population on the functionings of these institutions. Nader however highlighted how access to these organisations can be difficult to obtain, something confirmed by scholars after her. Because of the difficulties in gaining access to these organisations and the different mechanisms at play when researching them compared to other social systems, Nader and scholars developing her
21 theories suggested that there might be a need to move away from conventional anthropological methods to a more interdisciplinary approach between the social sciences. A combination of interviews with people from these organisations, to find out their perceptions, and an analysis of policy documents, to find out the preferred public image of organisations, thus was presented as more appropriate for the task (Gusterson, 1997; Kuus, 2012; Nader, 1972).
Nader, as well as numerous scholars after her, later revisited her theories in order to make clear that hers was not a call to only study up, but to study ‘up, down, and sideways simultaneously’ (Nader, 2008). The importance of studying up was therefore reiterated but only through linking the of organisations, their actions, and their relations with other actors to processes of change that affect vast amounts of people. Such research could then link the ‘highest’ levels of society to the ‘lowest’ through an analysis of causes and effects in relation to trends in the production and distribution of power and resources (Nader, 2008; Bowman, 2015). Because of this, the term ‘studying through’ was coined to signify the analysis of how power interconnects different actors, organisations, and discourses through time and space in order to understand the consequences of said relations (Bowman, 2015).
Such an approach of ‘studying through’ therefore appears to be suited for the researching of a topic like CIMIR, as such a research implies the analysis of different powerful organisations, the way they relate to one another, as well as the way these organisations and their interactions affect the lives of people in conflict-affected countries. CIMIR are additionally conceived and enacted in multiple and complex ways, which renders traditional research designs even more unsuited to the analysis of the topic. Vicki Squire (2012) has called for scholars to ‘attune to mess’ when researching such complex issues, as carrying out research using fixed questions and testing hypotheses through a conventional design can fail to grasp the complexities of the research object and therefore oversimplify it. Because of this, the research of complex issues has to be carried out in an open manner, revisiting questions based on theory as well as empirics as the research progresses. Doing so allows for different conceptions, interpretations, ambiguities in the discourses and practices surrounding the issue to surface. Such a research design therefore implies a close relationship between theory and empirics, which are constantly revised throughout the research process (Squire, 2012). This open research design which ‘attunes to mess’ was used in the research carried out for this thesis, as it allowed for different conceptions, interpretations, and enactments of CIMIR to emerge alongside the different and complex interactions of the actors involved in them. Carrying out SSIs, analysing the data through an ‘open’ explanatory theoretical framework, and relating it to official policy documents seems to be the most suited methodology based on the aforementioned theories on research designs.
