Local ownership in the architecture and governance
patterns of Transnational Advocacy Networks
An in-‐depth empirical analysis of the peacebuilding and
conflict prevention network GPPAC
Master’s thesis Political Science: International Relations
by Marieke Peeters
Marieke Peeters – 10175784 | Msc Political Science: International Relations Transnational Advocacy | Thesis supervisor: Dr. Conny Roggeband
Second Reader: Dr. Benno Netelenbos Date: 23rd of June, 2017
Word count: 18.226 words
Cover image: Website GPPAC (2017)
Preface
Before you lies my thesis, the basis of which is an in-‐depth research into a Transnational Advocacy Network concerning the place of local ownership. It has been written in the past five months to fulfill the graduation requirements of the University of Amsterdam as part of the master Political Science: International Relations.
I am particularly thankful to Conny Roggeband for her supervision and comments. Additionally, I would like to my interviewees for taking the time to answer my questions. I also would like to thank my fellow students, parents, sister and friends for their feedback and support. Finally, my gratitude goes to the second reader, Benno Netelenbos, for taking the time to read this research.
I hope you enjoy your reading. Marieke Peeters Amsterdam, June 23, 2017
Abstract
This thesis demonstrates how the architecture and governance patterns of Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs), an important (new) type of actors in global politics, establish a place for local ownership within such a network. The concept of local ownership is practically wide accepted, but remains controversial theoretically. Practically, it is believed to contribute to effectiveness and sustainability, especially with regards to peacebuilding. However, it remains underexposed how local ownership should be conducted in a world with increasing transnational dimensions and complicated multi-‐level relationships. On the one hand, this thesis aims to illustrate how TANs can contribute to a place for local ownership. On the other hand the study demonstrates several challenges and three paradoxes that arise from doing so. These paradoxes consist of the already theorized unity-‐diversity Paradox by Saz-‐ Carranza and two additions thereby: the inclusion-‐independence paradox and the funding paradox. Finally, the study contributes by illustrating how the architecture and governance patterns of TANs can help overcome these challenges, changing dynamics and complicated paradoxes.
Table of contents
Preface
3
Abstract
4
Table of contents
5-‐6
List of Abbreviations
7
Introduction
8-‐11
Academic and societal relevance 8-‐9 Research question and concise methodology 10-‐11
Chapter 1 Theoretical framework
12-‐21
1.0 Literature review 12-‐20 1.1 Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) 12-‐14 1.2 The architecture and governance patterns of TANs 14-‐15 1.3 Local ownership in the architecture and governance 15-‐20 patterns of TANs
1.4 My contribution to existing literature 20-‐21 Research question and sub-‐questions 21
Chapter 2 Methodology
22-‐31
2.1 A case study: general 22-‐23 2.2 Case selection: GPPAC 24-‐25 2.3 Research strategy: 25-‐29
Network analysis, zooming in, data collection and analysis methods
Documents, interviews and content analysis
Chapter 3 Analysis Part I -‐ Local ownership in the
32-‐44
architecture and governance patterns of GPPAC
3.1 Local ownership in the architecture of GPPAC 33-‐39 3.2 Local ownership in the governance patterns of GPPAC 39-‐44
Chapter 4 Analysis part II -‐ Three paradoxes
45-‐55
related to local ownership in TANs
4.1 The unity-‐diversity paradox and power distribution 45-‐48 4.2 The inclusion-‐independence paradox 49-‐51 4.3 The funding paradox 51-‐55
Case evaluation
56
Chapter 5 Conclusions
57-‐60
Reference list
61-‐63
Appendices
63-‐65
List of Abbreviations
CMC Computer Mediated Communication CSO Civil Society Organization
EU European Union
GPPAC Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict GS Global Secretariat
IID Initiatives for International Dialogue IO International Organization
ISG International Steering Group NGO Non-‐Governmental Organization
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RLO Regional Liaison Officer RR Regional Representative RS Regional Secretariat
TAN Transnational Advocacy Network UN United Nations
Local ownership in the architecture and governance
patterns of Transnational Advocacy Networks
An in-‐depth empirical analysis of the peacebuilding and
conflict prevention network GPPAC
Introduction
‘’Every practitioner that is involved in the construction of a peace process in any place should also be feeling a member of the whole construction of conditions for peace in the global level’’ (Interview 2017: Appendix D).
The excerpt above – spoken by an interviewee of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) -‐ indicates the development of local conflicts and the ramifications on a global level. This development leads to transnational movements and protests for dealing with these new transnational dynamics. On the one hand this might empower the local movements, yet on the other hand it poses a risk of losing standing and local ownership. This broadening and deepening of cross-‐border (citizen) action raises questions with regard to ownership, accountability and power dynamics in new transnational social movements, networks and organizations (Batliwala 2002: 395). The
emergence of such movements and networks in combination with an increased belief in the importance of involvement of local actors brings rise to tensions between the global and local. These tensions can mean ineffectiveness and even unintentional outcomes where the local actors find themselves in an even more difficult position than before (Batliwala 2002: 395-‐400). Contrarily, the movements and networks might form a solution to this tension between the different levels, depending on how the ‘glocal’ is organized within the movement or network. Therefore it is important to better understand the (power) dynamics
and interaction between local and transnational aspects in the context of local conflicts and regions.
This transnational aspect of local conflicts and problems has led to a new type of actors and interactions in the field: Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs). A TAN is broadly defined as ‘a specific form of transnational networks that are distinguished by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation’ (Keck & Sikkink 2014: 1). The place of TANs and how they interact with governments and International Organizations (IOs) within the international system has been the focus of a significant amount of research (Keck & Sikkink 2014; Tarrow 2005). However, the architecture and governance patterns that shape the internal dynamics of TANs have been left underexposed. Additionally, local actors are often part of TANs as well. Observing an increased belief in the effectiveness of local ownership recently (Arensman et al. 2016: 1), it is important to investigate how the internal dynamics of TANs contribute therein. Especially because advocacy is meant to improve people’s lives, it comes down to those local people that are involved. Naturally it is therefore of great importance to understand how TANs establish a place for their local members within the network. This means I will illustrate how the architecture and accompanying governance patterns of TANs explain the place of local ownership within those networks.
Local ownership in itself is a concept that has been studied and discussed extensively over the past years (Booth 2012; Zaum 2012). And even though in practice it seems to have become an acknowledged goal of many organizations and networks, it remains a complex and controversial theoretical concept (Donais 2009; Richmond 2012; Reich 2006). Scholars cannot seem to agree on the value of local ownership and what place it should have within networks or organizations. With this thesis I hope to contribute to this debate and take a more positive perspective on the concept, while simultaneously staying critical by demonstrating certain contradicting aspects of attempts to establish local ownership. The rise of the emergence and importance of TANs add another new perspective to this matter. Even though TANs are still a relatively new concept, they seem to play an important role when it comes to local ownership. Existing research with regard to TANs and local ownership focuses on the effectiveness thereof (Arensman et al. 2016), but a deeper understanding of how the
architecture and governance patterns of the TAN contributes to this effectiveness is left underexposed. In order to contribute to closing this gap in the literature an explorative case study into a TAN will help us to obtain a better understanding of how the architecture and governance patterns of TANs contribute to the place of local ownership within that network.
Logically this brings me to the following research question:
How is local ownership of members established in the architecture and governance patterns of Transnational Advocacy Networks?
This thesis will be structured in the following way. The next section of this introduction will shortly introduce the theoretical debates that are relevant for this research. Additionally, I will present the case that I chose in order to illustrate how the architecture and governance patterns of TANs establish local ownership in such networks.
In Chapter 1, the theoretical framework, I will provide an overview of existing theories and elaborate on the corresponding theoretical debates. Additionally, a discussion of the following relevant theoretical concepts will be provided: TANs, architecture, (organizational) governance patterns, and more specifically the role of local ownership and power (distribution) within these aspects of TANs. There will also be special attention for the concepts of accountability and inclusiveness seeing that they are an important part of TANs when it comes to local ownership (Arensman et al. 2016).
Next, I will elaborate on the methodology in Chapter 2 to illustrate how I will investigate local ownership in TANs. This chapter will touch upon my case selection, research strategy including data collection and analysis methods, and the limitations of this research.
The conflict prevention and peacebuilding network GPPAC serves as a case for this research. The network is well-‐known for its focus on local ownership. Arensman et al. researched the effectiveness of local ownership therein and illustrated if and how local ownership translates into effective advocacy. They focused specifically on the concepts of identity, accountability and advocacy substance (Arensman et al. 2016: 4). However, they left underexposed how this
local ownership was actually realized in (other aspects of) the architecture and governance patterns of GPPAC. Therefore I will illustrate how GPPAC establishes a place for local ownership in order to gain a better understanding of how local ownership is embedded in the architecture and governance patterns of TANs.
After having set up my analysis in the aforementioned way, the core of my thesis will take shape as follows. In Chapter 3 I utilize documents (provided by GPPAC) and seven in-‐depth interviews to demonstrate how local ownership is established in the architecture and governance patterns of TANs. I will provide an overview of important aspects such as the structure, decision-‐making process and funding system that contribute to establishing a place for local ownership within the network. Following this, in Chapter 4, I will elaborate on certain challenges and paradoxes that can arise from the place of local ownership in TANs. I build further on the already theorized unity-‐diversity paradox (Saz-‐ Carranza 2012), and contribute by a paradoxical addition to this this theory: the inclusion-‐independence paradox. Consequently, a third paradox derived from my findings, which will form the final part of my analysis: the funding paradox. In my conclusion I will discuss the theoretical implications and recommendations by means of a short overview of the most important findings, while also illustrating my societal and academic contribution.
Chapter 1 Theoretical framework
In this chapter I will discuss the theoretical debates and concepts that inform this research. In the first section of this chapter I will elaborate on the concept of TANs more generally, starting with Keck & Sikkink’s (2014) definition and complemented by other scholarship’s opinions. Following this I address the conceptualization of architecture and governance patterns that form the internal dynamics of TANs by means of the theories by Shawki (2011), Brown et al. (2012) and Carpenter et al. (2014). The core part of this chapter consists of an elaborate discussion of the concept local ownership. I will link this concept to power (distribution) and the concepts related to the architecture and governance patterns such as structure, accountability, inclusion, independence and the donor-‐receiver relationship. I will pay special attention to decision-‐ making processes, in particular with regard to issue-‐ and frame adoption and agenda-‐setting. Finally, I will give a concise overview of how I will use these existing theories and introduce my research question and sub-‐questions.
1.1 Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs)
Even though states remain (the most) important actors in most national and international conflicts, many non-‐state actors that are part of transnational networks interact with each other, states and international organizations on this level as well. These non-‐state actors are gaining increased influence in transnational politics. Transnational networks mainly play a critical role in creating new global policies and standards, and monitoring and enforcing those standards (Carpenter et al. 2014: 450). Transnational networks that are ‘distinguished by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation’ are called Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) (Keck and Sikkink 2014: 1). This definition implies that TANs are significant both domestically and transnationally by building links between actors in civil societies, states, and international organizations. The second part of this definition suggests that TANs are inter-‐organizational, goal-‐directed networks that pursue changes in policies, practices and behavior (Saz-‐Carranza 2012: 3-‐ 14). These networks navigate their members’ diversity in terms of geographic
location, cultural and social differences, capacity and resources, while also pursuing a collective purpose, identity and strategy (Arensman et al. 2016: 3; Saz-‐Carranza 2012: 3-‐14). TANs consist of a variety of different actors -‐ international and domestic NGOs, local social movements, foundations, the media, churches, trade unions, intellectuals, parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations and part of branches of governments -‐ but for the aim of this research the main focus will be on local and domestic organizations and regional parts of networks (Keck & Sikkink 2014: 9). This actually means that this research will go deeper into Saz-‐Carranza’s unity-‐ diversity paradox regarding the efforts of TANs to navigate these local, cultural differences, capacity and resources while also pursuing their collective purpose (Saz-‐Carranza 2012: 3-‐14). Regarding the first part of this claim I will focus on how TANs make place for local members in the network, deal with their input, differences, capacity and resources to incorporate their input in the network. Consequently, when this is combined with the collective purpose of the network tensions can possibly arise in these types of network: the transnational dilemma (Wong 2012: 54). Wong argues that, by looking at the organizational structure and roles and practices of advocates, political salience within an organization reflect the distribution and use of power within that organization. In other words, how the organization is structured and how the advocates behave explains the agenda-‐setting of the organization and therefore tells us something about the power distribution within that network (Wong 2012: 54). Thus, this means that I will contribute to this theory by explaining how the architecture and governance patterns of TANs explain the place of local ownership, and consequently the effects on power distribution in those TANs as well.
In TANs that are concerned with peacebuilding and conflict prevention there is a special focus on the individual/local actors, because of their belief in the effectiveness of local ownership of peace processes. There is a common understanding that any peace process not embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to fail (Donais 2009: 3). Thus, it is particularly interesting to see whether the unity-‐diversity paradox also, or even especially, applies to these types of TANs. Therefore the analysis and results of this thesis will mainly apply to TANs that are involved in peacebuilding and/or emphasize local ownership as an inherent part of their policy. This means that I assume that certain TANs, in
this case GPPAC, (aim to) have a local ownership aspect in their policy. I will explore this by illustrating how in its architecture and governance patterns local actors are involved in the process and to what extent they actually are the owners of the network. This brings me to the next part of this theoretical framework: elaborating on what I understand under the architecture and governance patterns of TANs.
1.2 The architecture and governance patterns of TANs
Even though the general interactions and tactics of TANs are well researched by among others Keck and Sikkink (Keck & Sikkink 1998: 16; Keck & Sikkink 2014), a deeper understanding of their internal dynamics is still absent. In this research I will look at TANs as (organizational) structures that have internal dynamics, relationships and processes. A network in this setting is not a static, unchangeable actor, but an organizational structure that changes (Shawki 2011). Carpenter already argued for a need for studies of advocacy networks to take networks as structures more seriously. It has rarely been studied how relationships within networks shape political outcomes and therefore there is a need for closer examination of the network structures and the effects this has on actors and issues within that network (Carpenter et al. 2014: 267). To research the internal dynamics, relationships and structure of a network or organization means in a sense to look at the architecture of such networks or organizations. The architecture thus contains more then the structure of a network, it also concerns the mission and vision and the accountability principles. Architecture basically contains everything that forms the foundation of a network. In addition to this, all these aspects play a role in the interactions between different actors within a network. A concept that relates to this is the organizational governance of a network or organization. Brown et al. refer to organizational governance as decisions about ‘’big issues’’ (such as missions, strategies, or accountabilities) that shape how the organization defines its objectives and affects its stakeholders (Brown et al. 2012: 1098). Research into organizational governance thus involves questions about mission, strategies, distributions of power and responsibility, and dealing with issues of legitimacy and accountability. Even though the concept by Brown et al. concerns international advocacy NGOs, thus not specifically TANs, Brown et al.’s concept suits the aim of
this research as well. Namely to look at the decisions TANs make with regard to the interaction with local actors within their network. In this thesis organizational governance is thus part of the architecture of a network.
This architecture leads to certain patterns of governance: the aforementioned processes. It differs per TAN what these processes contain, but one can think of decision-‐making or communication processes. It must be said however that architecture does not necessarily lead to governance patterns, but that it can also be the other way around. Meaning that certain processes and interaction influence the architecture of the network. In this sense it is not merely a structuralist approach I follow, but a TAN’s agency and structure are seen as equally and mutually influential (Wendt 1987). It is my assumption that both the architecture and governance patterns of TANs play an important role in embedding local ownership and in the following section and Chapter 3 I will elaborate on this and illustrate how it plays out.
1.3 Local ownership in the architecture and governance patterns of
TANs
The architecture and governance patterns of TANs still comprehend a large part of analyzing the internal dynamics of TANs. Seeing that the aim of this research is to obtain a deeper understanding of how TANs establish a place for local ownership within their network I will focus on the part of the architecture and governance patterns that concern local input and members. Valuing local input (home-‐grown solutions to conflict and locally driven partnerships) within the governance of a transnational organization or network is in this research labeled as ‘local ownership’ (Arensman et al. 2016: 1-‐2). Another way of defining local ownership, that links more to the decision-‐making of organizations and networks, is ‘to what extent local actors both design and implement political processes’ (Donais 2009: 3). Relating to this, it is important to mention that there can be two logics of local ownership when it comes to TANs in particular. The first logic regards the fact that TANs advocate local ownership in the messages they send, thus the solutions that they bring for problems contain the message to include local actors in the (peace) process. The second logic concerns the policy and structure of the network itself, meaning that it is the network’s aim to involve their local members in the process as much as possible in order to make
them owner of the network (Interview 2017: Appendix A). For this research both of these logics are of relevance, seeing that it combines the mission and vision with the structure of a network; both are part of the architecture of a network. Historically, when talking about ‘ownership’ it meant a form of inclusive, participatory consensus-‐building. Nowadays, this is still partly applicable, but it is also recognized that different actors may have different agendas and priorities (Arensman et al. 2016: 3). The concept (local) ownership thus implies the importance of other concepts such as inclusion and independence; the possibility to be part of the governance, be owner of the decision-‐making process of a network (inclusion) and at the same time being able to advocate for your own agenda and priorities, and consequently choosing when to act under the ‘network label’ and when not (independence). Additionally, Arensman et al. argue that accountability processes are also crucial when looking at ownership. Accountability in this setting can be understood as ‘a process of being held responsible and taking responsibility for actions and performance at multiple levels’. In networks and cases of shared ownership this often means mutual and multi-‐layered accountability (Arensman et al. 2016: 5). This brings us back to the relevance of looking at the architecture, and thereby how accountability, inclusion and independence is arranged within TANs that emphasize the value of local ownership.
In general local ownership received a lot of support over the last years. It has been argued that local ownership results in sustainable development and supports effectiveness (Arensman et al. 2016: 1; Organization for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD): 2008). However, the concept of local ownership remains controversial. Challenges that emerge mostly concern the complicated donor-‐receiver relationship when it comes to NGOs. I will therefore elaborate more on this matter theoretically seeing that my research discovered an extra dimension to this theory, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Because of a noticeable trend where donors move from flexible core funding arrangements towards project-‐based funding (Wallace et al. 2006; Interviews 2017: Appendices A, D) tensions and challenges arise for the receivers of this funding with regard to their position. A considerable amount of literature has been written about this donor-‐receiver relationship and the challenges it brings.
In this concise theoretical section I will discuss the most relevant findings of those theories with regard to this research and illustrate how these findings and theories relate to the concept of TANs that emphasize the value of local ownership.
The critical notes regarding the negative side of local ownership in NGOs mostly concern the tensions with the funding-‐system. However, scholars seem to be divided about this matter. I will therefore shortly illustrate those different views in this theoretical debate. Reich (2006) argues that even though there seems to be wide political consensus about the value of local ownership, it poses great challenges in its practical implementation. She even argues that the demand for local ownership is counterproductive if it is seen as a project objective, and it cannot, given the current structures of international cooperation, seriously be implemented. Reich also argues that, given the binary division between donors and recipients, the focus should be on the nature of that relationship. That is where the power is not shared and the equality of the partners may or may not be realized (Reich 2006: 3-‐4). Richmond goes further discussing the problems of local ownership in the sense that he claims it is used to legitimize the role of internationals in post-‐conflict settings. His argument prevails that states and IOs being donors for NGOs, even if they seem to advocate local ownership, still leads to an ambiguous relationship and not in the advantage of the actual local actors that are involved (Richmond 2012). Parks also acknowledges these problems of donor funding for NGOs, and even argues that it affects advocacy NGOs especially. He argues that because of the political nature of advocacy work, these NGOs must maintain a reputation for independence and legitimacy if they are to be influential and effective in the political process (Parks 2008: 213). This illustrates the relevance of discovering how these arguments hold in case of a network that consists for a big part of advocacy NGOs.
On the more optimistic side of the debate Elbers and Arts (2011) illustrate what donor conditions are problematic for (Southern) NGOs, but also what strategies those NGOs conduct to manage those conditions. Elbers and Arts argue that relationships between (private) donor agencies and (Southern) NGOs are characterized by resource dependence, often resulting in power asymmetries. Additionally, while donor conditions are often motivated by improving effectiveness and efficiency, they may have the opposite effect in practice
because of conditions that don’t go well together with the principles of local ownership. Although these power asymmetries cannot, according to them, be denied in the field of development assistance, their theory is useful in a sense that it illustrates how these challenges can be tackled (Elbers & Arts 2011: 713-‐ 716). Elbers and Arts illustrate that NGOs conduct four strategic responses to the conflicting donor conditions:
I Avoiding the interaction with the stakeholders II Influencing the content of institutional pressures
III Buffering themselves against unavoidable institutional pressures IV Portraying themselves in positive light in front of stakeholders (Elbers & Arts 2011 723-‐724).
The previous theories concerned NGOs, however my research indicates that becoming part of a TAN solves several of the aforementioned challenges for NGOs, and adds a few other, next to an empowerment of some of the strategic responses developed by Elbers and Arts, solutions for a network of NGOs to manage these challenges. The special aspect of the global parts of a TAN being both receiver and donor makes the issues around the funding system even more complicated, but in a sense can also be the solution to several challenges that were raised in this section. It is therefore very useful to obtain a deeper understanding of this complex identity of TANs that value local ownership with regard to the funding system and donor-‐receiver relationship.
As mentioned before, looking at the architecture, governance patterns and local ownership also relates to certain power and positioning issues: a possible hierarchy within TANs, something that has not been the focus of research yet so far. However, existing literature does address the influence of local partners. Elbers and Schulpen map the influence of local partners in aid agencies and reveal the processes underlying decision-‐making outcomes (Elbers & Schulpen 2011). Their research is relevant for my thesis because it focuses on the same dynamics: the interaction between local actors and the agency they work with(in). Their main finding illustrates that institutional rules regulate per topic the extent in which partners can participate in the decision-‐making (Elbers & Schulpen 2011: 14). For the aim of this research I translate ‘institutional rules’ to ‘organizational rules’ because a TAN is not per se an institution, but it relates
to the organizational architecture seeing that they both regard the structure and organization of some type of organization or network. In sum, this thesis will, among other things, test whether organizational rules of TANs thus regulate per topic the extent in which local actors can participate in the decision-‐making. This means that I will investigate what in the architecture and governance patterns explains the extent to which members can participate in the decision-‐making of the TAN, and whether this is always the same or differs per topic or issue.
My research is an interesting contribution to the research of Elbers and Schulpen (2011) in a few ways. First of all, the renewed focus on TANs instead of partnerships builds further on the theory of Elbers and Schulpen. One might even say that the relationships within TANs could also be labeled as partnerships, but there is a difference since the local actors are part of the network, they are within the TAN, and not just working with them. Secondly, the focus of Elbers and Schulpen goes in one direction, from local partners to the agency. In this thesis I will also look at how the TAN involves the local actors, thus the other way around. Thirdly, Elbers and Schulpen focus on influence of local actors in their research. I take a different perspective on this matter seeing that I focus on how the global and regional parts of TANs deal with local members. It is less about actual influence, seeing that I will not look at outcomes, and more about power distribution and positioning. Additionally, Elbers and Schulpen inspired me to focus on certain aspects of the decision-‐making process: access to the decision-‐making process, opportunity to set the agenda and making actual decisions regarding the governance of the network (Elbers & Schulpen 2011: 7-‐9). However, in order to go deeper into the place of local input in TANs I contributory look more specifically at issue-‐ and framework adoption. To focus on these aspects of decision-‐making will then allow me to investigate to a certain extent the (decision-‐making) power distribution, as Bachrach and Baratz argued: ‘To investigate influence in decision-‐making and agenda-‐setting is to conceptualize power’ (Bachrach & Baratz 1962: 947-‐952). The concept of power (distribution) and thus a focus on the decision-‐making process is of relevance for this thesis because of the possible tension of local ownership with the power distribution within the network. Furthermore, looking at how issues are adopted in TANs is also of great relevance seeing that recent research has shown that NGO actors’ influence often is reduced to less relevant issues. Dany claims that
more diverse views from the broader NGO community often become neglected, mainly because of external structures and internal structural dynamics (Dany 2014: 419, 433). Seeing that a TAN that values local ownership, especially GPPAC according to its policy, is all about facilitating that these views and issues are heard on a global scale as well it would be interesting to see whether Dany’s theory also applies to TANs, or that possibly, TANs are in a way a (structural) solution to this problem and therefore explain the reason why local NGOs become part of TANs.
1.4 My contribution to the existing literature
To analyze how TANs establish a place for local ownership is of course a big question, which I need to specify more in order to contribute to this gap in existing literature and gain a deeper understanding of these dynamics. Consequently, I will look at how local ownership is embedded in the architecture and governance patterns of TANs. This also allows me to illustrate how local ownership and power distribution are related to the architecture and governance patterns of a network.
As illustrated in the section above local ownership remains controversial and complex, which only increases the relevance of a deeper understanding how it is actually embedded and promoted in TANs. Because of this complexity and possible relationship with power distribution it can, logically, also lead to challenges and paradoxes from embedding local ownership in the architecture and governance patterns of a TAN. This is something I will discuss more extensively in the second part of my analysis (Chapter 4).
Thus, after discussing the theoretical concepts and relationships among them I have illustrated that there is a lot to learn about the more specific architectural aspects and governance patterns of TANs with regard to the place of local ownership. I will build upon existing literature that discussed TANs more generally, a conceptualization of architecture and (organizational) governance patterns, and a theoretical debate about local ownership. By means of a specific focus on the decision-‐making process, including access, issue-‐ and frame adoption, agenda-‐setting and ability to make decisions I will illustrate how these aspects play an important role in establishing local ownership within TANs and
the possible relation to the power distribution. Taking the existing literature into account it should be logical that my contribution leads to the following research question:
How is local ownership of members established in the architecture and governance patterns of Transnational Advocacy Networks?
The following sub-‐questions are of importance in order to answer the main research question of this thesis:
-‐How are TANs designed as to incorporate input of local members into becoming part of the network?
-‐ How does the structure of the network play a role in this? (The role distribution, the different bodies and levels of the network?)
-‐ How do mission and vision of the network play a role in this? -‐ How does the accountability distribution play a role in this?
-‐ How do perceptions about these aspects explain the role/importance of local ownership?
-‐How do governance patterns of a TAN play a role in incorporating local input in the network?
-‐How does the decision-‐making process play a role in this? -‐How do communication processes play a role in this? -‐How does the funding system play a role in this?
-‐ How does local ownership in TANs relate to the power distribution within that TAN, and is there a possible tension?
Chapter 2 Methodology
In this chapter I will discuss the methodology that I utilize in order to investigate the place of local ownership in the architecture and governance patterns of TANs.
This thesis concerns an empirical research by means of a case study. In the first section of this chapter I will illustrate the relevance of a case study in general and how this relates to my research, before discussing my case selection. Accordingly, I will elaborate on my research strategy in which qualitative research methods are used to collect and analyze data in this case study. For the data collection and analysis I use triangulation of methods: network-‐analysis, document/content analysis, and interviews.
Collecting the data goes hand in hand with analyzing it in my case, which means that I make use of the grounded theory methodology. This means that there is continuous interplay between analysis and data collection. Additionally, it also means that I am theory building. This signifies that there are certain theories that form the foundation for this research, but theory may be generated from the data or those theories might be elaborated and modified as coming data influences this (Strauss & Corbin 1994).
2.1 A case study: general
Because there has not been much research into this topic yet, it is useful to use an in-‐depth qualitative research, to gain a deeper understanding of how local input is incorporated in TANs, how TANs deal with local problems, conflicts and actors and what the place of local ownership really is. A single case-‐study allows me to conduct an in-‐depth exploration of the internal dynamics of TANs.
A case study is often understood as ‘an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units’ (Gerring 2004: 341). With a unit Gerring means ‘a relatively bounded phenomenon’. In short this means that the aim is to both understand what is specific about a certain phenomenon and what
is general about it (Gerring 2004: 341-‐345). This definition is widely used and also applicable to the type of research in this thesis.
Case studies have been criticized extensively in the past, for example because the goal of research has to be to develop general knowledge and with case studies it is hard to generalize (Flyvberg 2004: 421). However, nowadays the method of case study is solidly situated (Gerring 2004: 341) and the advantages are clearer. First of all, even if a case is difficult to generalize, that does not mean that concrete, practical (context-‐dependent) knowledge is less valuable then general knowledge. Secondly, it is possible to generalize on the basis of an individual case, in similar contexts that is (Flyvberg 2004: 421). Case studies are also diverse in the sense that they are mostly used for theory generation and refining, but can also be used for theory testing (Flyvberg 2004: 421). Additionally, a case study provides the researcher with more in-‐depth knowledge, which is preferable if the field is not yet fully theorized and crucial interactions have not been explained (Gerring 2004: 348). This being said, it is necessary to be aware of the external validity/generalizability and internal validity of the research and therefore make sure that the data supports the theoretical arguments that are tested or generated and to what extent this claim can be generalized and what the limits are of this.
Now that the general relevance of a case study is discussed I will illustrate how I use this in order to answer my research question.
Thus, I will look at one specific TAN and investigate how their architecture and governance patterns explain the place of local ownership. This means that I will investigate how the TAN contributes to the incorporation of local actors and input in the TAN.
It has to be noted here that to label a TAN as one case, as one unit is slightly controversial seeing that a TAN consists of a significant amount of smaller units. However, we can still see a TAN as a ‘relatively bounded phenomenon’ and seeing that I narrow down my focus to specific parts of the TAN (structure, region, governance etc.) it still is a ‘within-‐unit’ case study (Gerring 2004: 343).
