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Peaceful Power Politics: The Influence of Political Culture
on Japan’s China Policy
By Anthony Kleibergen
B.A International Relations/International Organization
University of Groningen, 2014
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of MSc Political Science – International Relations
University of Amsterdam
Supervisor: Dr. Julia Bader, PhD.
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Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction ... 3
Chapter 2 Literature Review ... 6
Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework ... 11
Chapter 4 Methodology and Data ... 17
Chapter 5 Theoretical Expectations ... 19
Chapter 6 Empirical Analysis: Diplomatic Blue Books ... 28
Chapter 7 Empirical Analysis: The National Security Strategy ... 33
Chapter 8 Conclusion and Discussion ... 39
Bibliography ... 42
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Chapter 1 Introduction
One of the great empirical puzzles in IR is the discrepancy between the economic and political power of certain large countries, and their relatively passive foreign policy. Despite their wealth, large populations, and political stature, Japan and Germany, for instance, have taken a backseat position in international politics ever since 1945. Although they joined multilateral institutions, contribute to global governance and provide development aid, they have been passive actors in the realm of security and peace enforcement. Japan has a small military relative to its economic weight, and is constitutionally barred from conducting war operations except for self-defense. Indeed, its military is referred to as Japan’s Self Defense Forces, and not perceived to be a military like those of other states. Japan has only partaken in peacekeeping operations, but played relatively minor roles by not
participating in combative tasks. 1 In addition, Japan has ruled out the development of nuclear weapons, prohibited arms exports, and limited defense spending to 1% of GDP. By the same token, Germany limited the size of its military and has been very reluctant to participate in peace
enforcement and security operations. After much internal debate, Germany decided to play a role in the 1999 Kosovo and 2001 Afghanistan campaigns, but refused to join operations in the 2003 war in Iraq, and 2011 air campaign against Libya’s Muammar Ghaddafi. Large countries like the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, on the other hand, developed sophisticated militaries and frequently engaged in combat tasks and the maintenance of security. Therefore it seems not all powerful and economically advanced states pursue the same foreign policies, or seek a prominent role on the world stage.
These restrained policies challenge mainstream theoretical assumptions about the role of powerful states on the world stage. Neorealism, for instance, assumes that great powers with hegemonic ambitions seek to expand their militaries and play a dominant political role. This framework, however, is insufficient to explain the cases of Germany and Japan. John Duffield, for instance, showed that Germany’s policy behavior did not match the Realist expectations associated with Germany’s power position in Europe because it has a anti-militaristic domestic political culture which highly shapes its foreign policy. 2 Other authors, like Peter Katzenstein and Thomas Berger have argued that a similar culture exists in modern Japan. Thus, it seems that other, non-systemic factors like culture can provide important explanations for the foreign policy directions of certain countries. To further examine this possibility, this thesis investigates the foreign policy motives of Japan in a particular area; namely its China strategy. The economic and political rise of China would have profound effects on the distribution of power in Asia, and according to Neorealism, leads
1 Akitoshi Miyashita, ‘’Where Do Norms Come From? Foundations of Japan’s Postwar Pacifism’’, pp. 99-102. 2 John Duffield, ‘‘Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism’’, International Organization, vol.53(4), 1999, pp. 774-775.
4 neighboring countries like Japan to follow policies to counter its ascendance. These could include the building of a strong military, development of nuclear weapons, alliance formation or bandwagoning. This has not happened, however, as Japan pursued a seemingly anti-militaristic course and relied on the US for its security. It seems that political cultures that are anti-militaristic and passive by nature could lead to a very different strategy that defies Realist expectations. To solve the empirical puzzle of the importance of political culture this thesis will try to answer the question whether this factor is a crucial explanatory factor in Japan’s China policy.
To demonstrate the relevance of political culture, I juxtapose the domestic explanation against Realism, an IR theory that focuses on structural factors in the international system that drive state behavior. I have chosen Realism, and Neorealism in particular, because it is a dominant theory in academic discussions and discourse on IR in Asia and the rise of China, and focus on the external systemic factors. Essentially, in my research I attempt to compare the role of internal cultural factors with Neorealism, and weigh the relative importance. In this domestic explanation I focus on the political culture of Japan’s government. In order to apply political culture to the foreign policy domain, I have used a framework developed by John Duffield, consisting of several important
dimensions of political culture in the foreign policy domain. These dimensions indicate which aspects of foreign policymaking are determined by political culture. Duffield identified these as 1) world views, 2) definitions of the national interest, 3) perception of national role, 4) identity and emotional attachment, 5) norms and values regarding policy making. To subsequently test the values for these measures, I examined secondary literature that describes the features for each of these dimensions in Japan. That way, I generated expectations and predictions regarding political culture that are suitable for testing in empirical materials. In order to identify whether these variables are indeed present in Japan’s government, and how important they are relative to Neorealist interpretations, I have analyzed Japan’s Diplomatic Blue Books from 2005 until 2014, and the 2013 National Security Strategy. These documents provide a wide overview of Japan’s foreign and security strategies, with both general outlines of world politics, assessments of regional developments, Japan’s approach to global governance and development, as well as Japan’s foreign policy goals, interests and strategies. The 2013 NSS, on the other hand, specifically focuses on elements of security, which deepens the understanding of Japan’s regional strategy, and opens up possibilities for identifying the presence of possible Realist considerations. In these documents, Duffield’s dimensions were readily identifiable, and in the empirical chapter, I gave an overview of the findings for each of them, and compared them to the expectations generated by secondary literature.
My findings have indicated that political culture forms an important factor guiding Japan’s China policy, and that in the case of Japan, anti-militarism has been the main enduring factor inhibiting its military buildup and strategic posturing associated with Neorealism. However, this research also concludes that political culture cannot explain all foreign policy strategies, and that
5 structural elements still guide Japan’s China policy. Political culture, and its main feature of anti-militarism, in the case of Japan, partly explain its strategies. Japan has ascribed to a Neorealist perception of China’s rise, and has been concerned about its military buildup, territorial claims, and political prowess. Tensions have risen significantly, but economic relations have developed strongly, and Japan has emphasized its willingness to resolve disputes and establish a cooperative relationship in many fields. Most importantly, Japan has not responded in kind to China’s vast increases in defense spending, and has not significantly altered its diplomatic strategy. Although it has strengthened its alliance with the US and formed partnerships, evidence of balancing or bandwagoning against China is meagre, and it has not initiated a comparable program of rearming. This has become evident in the domains of world views, national role and emotional attachment, where Japan’s culture is applied most, whereas it is more difficult to find associated policy predictions in the domains of norms and values and the national interest. With regards to some policies, Japan has taken a stance that is better explained through Neorealism. Japan’s anti-militarism, amongst other cultural elements, forms an important explanation for its ambivalent China policy, and thus proves to be a complementary variable in analyzing foreign policy.
The organization of this thesis will systematically follow the research approach. Chapter 2 covers existing literature examining theoretical explanations for Japan’s foreign and China strategies, with a focus on the limitations of Neorealist explanations, and possible alternative frameworks. It will also, however, expose the gaps in these theories, and point to the importance of analyzing normative and cultural factors. In Chapter 3, I expand on the concept of political culture and examine Duffield’s cultural framework in the foreign policy field. In this chapter, I examine and explain the
aforementioned five cultural dimensions. In order to prepare the reader for the empirical parts, chapter 4 includes a methodological review. In the fifth chapter, I surveyed secondary literature providing the values for each dimension, and subsequently predicts what Japan’s China policy, based on political culture, will look like. In the sixth and seventh chapter, I test these predictions by closely examining the policy documents. Finally, I conclude by giving an overview of the results, theoretical
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
The essential question underlying this thesis is whether cultural explanations can serve to explain Japan’s China policy, and how important they are compared to those of Realism. The difference between the two approaches lays in the view of the international system or the domestic context as the source for foreign policy behavior. Of all IR theories, Realism focuses on systemic factors the most, and is therefore a useful framework of comparison. Moreover, Realism has a rigid and law-like view on the international system, and treats the circumstances defining the conduct of international relations as a given. The anarchic structure of the world, the lack of trust and cooperation amongst states and the resulting quest for power and security are thought to be inherent in the system. Regarding this quest, it focuses on the material factors of politics, and argues that material differences, in wealth and military prowess, are important drivers of particular behavior. Within Realism, there is little space for the domestic context of politics, whether it differs per country, culture, or whether it is constructed by human agency. Therefore, Realism can only explain patterns in international relations that conform with the basic structure of the system, and the according behavior. Forms of conduct that do not fit the eternal competition for power and security are not well explained by Realism, and thus other explanations need to be found. This behavior can take many alternative forms, and different theories provide different explanations for them.
Neorealism
As this thesis aims to juxtapose Realism with political culture, it is useful to examine the strengths and limitations of Realism, and how well it fits regarding Japan’s foreign policy. Realist theory is based on the premise that a fixed international structure determines state behavior. It carries five important assumptions about state behavior in the conduct of international relations. First, the state system is anarchic, meaning there is a lack of a global government which regulates state behavior. Second, in the absence of a global ‘regulator’, states cannot be restrained from above, and therefore cannot trust the intentions of other states. Third, the prime objective of a state is to survive, and fourth, states will develop strategies to achieve this goal. Finally, as part of this strategy, states will develop military capabilities to protect themselves or deter possible enemies. 3 Within Realism, two major schools of thought can be distinguished that: offensive and defensive realism. The distinction between these two forms a more general type within Realism, namely Neorealism. This distinction has important implications for the interpretation of Japan’s foreign policy, because it produces different expected strategies. The difference between offensive and defensive realism
3 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘’The False Promise of International Institutions’’, International Security, vol. 19(3), 1994
7 revolves around the expected strategy of states to achieve security, and fundamentally, how strongly a state should maximize its strength and power to realize this. The crucial difference between offensive and defensive realism is the expected power needed to achieve security. Offensive realists hold that states need to maximize power, whereas defensive realists assert that states rather seek security by joining coalitions with the aim of balancing other ones. Offensive realism, as Mearsheimer puts it, holds that in order to self-preserve, the ultimate goal of each state is to achieve hegemony. 4
Hegemony is of crucial importance to states because threats to security will usually arise from other states challenging the position of the aspiring hegemon. 5 In order to achieve hegemony, states will develop military capabilities to deter or challenge rival states. These capabilities are aggressive by nature, because the state will do anything it can to avoid challenges from rival powers. Mearsheimer recognizes that it is very difficult to achieve worldwide hegemony, but predicts that states will seek to become the dominant power in their region. The dark prediction of this theory holds that power-maximizing states, in their competition for hegemony, will eventually clash, and (violent) conflict will emerge.
Defensive realism holds a less pessimistic outlook, as it does not believe that states will seek to achieve hegemony or power maximization per se. They acknowledge the paramount need for security but do not believe that hegemony is the tool with which to achieve it. Rather, defensive realism asserts that states will be more cautious and adopt a balancing strategy, rather than arming oneself or seeking the help from a strong state. Kenneth Waltz, the seminal author on defensive realism, did not believe that states will always pursue aggressive strategies to either reach hegemony or deter others. He stated that the cost of aggression and expansion is often too high, and that conflict therefore is undesirable. This holds especially since conflict is caused by adopting aggressive
strategies. Instead, managing a coalition to balance others is deemed more effective, and less destructive. 6
Offensive and defensive realism offer differing expected strategies. Defensive realism will lead states to join coalitions to balance their rivals, whereas offensive realism usually predicts states will aim for hegemony. If they are not able to, they will bandwagon and join a coalition. A second option, according to Mearsheimer involves both balancing and ‘buck-passing’, a strategy which alleviates the burden of defense to another state. This is an attractive scenario because it saves costs of armaments, leaves the risk to another state, and could be wise in case the adversary is strong.
Conflicting states separated by water seem to prefer buck-passing, especially when both are roughly equally strong in terms of military prowess. 7 Jennifer Lind states that buck-passing is attractive to
4 Mearsheimer, ‘’The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’’, New York: Norton, 2001 pp. 34-35. 5 Mearsheimer, ‘’The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’’, pp. 35.
6 Kenneth Waltz, ‘’A Theory of International Politics’’, New York: McGraw Hill, 1979, pp. 126.
7 Glenn Snyder, Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security, International Security, vol. 27(1), 2002, pp. 162.
8 countries that are militarily advanced, relatively safe, and have strong allies. She believes Japan largely fits these aspects and concluded that Japan has followed a buck-passing strategy associated with Realism, because it had to make security arrangements in the face of the Cold War in Asia, and did so through its alliance with the US, relieving it from pressures of rearmament.
Mearsheimer argued that China’s rise will be accompanied by a search for hegemony which is ultimately a threat to its neighbors in the region. He states that China, like the US in 19th century, will proclaim its own ‘Monroe’ doctrine, thereby dominating East Asia and excluding influence from outside powers like the United States. 8 Although he does not expect China to conquer countries, he believes it would try to deter the US navy. This way, China would come to dominate Asia
strategically, and set regional rules. He predicts that China’s neighbors, including Japan, will form a balancing coalition to contain China and maintain the status quo. This balancing coalition will be led by the US, as this country has a network of security alliances in the region, and forms the most credible deterrent to Chinese power. As a result, the US and China’s neighbors will share the similar goal of trying to contain China by forging political alliances and bundling their military forces. Japan will perceive China as a threat, and join this balancing coalition.
Indeed, China’s increasing military capabilities, especially its naval buildup, have already caused significant concern in Japan. China’s submarine forces are able to deny foreign navies access to the Taiwan straits, and its launch of an aircraft carrier has fueled the belief China seeks to build a ‘blue water navy’, ensuring Chinese access to the greater Pacific Ocean. In addition, its claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are perceived to be part of a larger pattern of aggressive and hegemonic behavior.9 Gronning argues that, in response, Japan is aiming to balance China by improving its own naval capacities, and enhancing its military cooperation with the US since 1996, when US President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto established new defense guidelines. Jennifer Lind corroborates this by arguing that Japan has indeed joined a balancing coalition by passing the buck to the US, and built a formidable and technologically advanced Self-Defense Force, with the world’s sixth largest budget. Although Japan has periodically pursued an accommodating policy which, especially under the DPJ administration from 2009-2010, Atanassova- Cornelis argues that Japan’s policy was highly subject to changes in the security environment. Collisions with China near the Senkaku/Diaoyu revealed a deeply rooted fear of Chinese aggression, and even the moderate DPJ government went ahead to strengthen the SDF, and enhance the alliance with the US, as well as regional partnerships. 10 This analysis based, focusing on external threats and buck passing would strengthen the offensive Neorealist analysis.
8 Mearsheimer, ‘’Can China Rise Peacefully?’’, National Interest, 2014.
9 Bjorn Gronning, ‘’Japan’s Shifting Military Priorities: Counterbalancing China’s Rise’’, Asian Security, vol. 10(1), 2014, pp. 14-15.
10 Elena Atanassova-Cornelis ‘’Shifting Domestic Politics and Security Policy in Japan and Taiwan: The Search for a Balancing Strategy Between China and the US’’, Asia Pacific Review, vol. 20(1), 2013, pp. 74-75.
9 Limits to Neorealism
Although Neorealism provides clear and rigid answers regarding Japan’s foreign policy there are clear limitations to these interpretations of foreign policy making, and existing Realist literature does not adequately address them. This section will address two major observations: Japan’s
engagement with China and its anti-militarist course. First of all, it can be doubted whether Japan has consistently viewed China as a rival and potential adversary. Hughes argued that Japan has sought a dual China policy aiming to both engage the country and hedge against its rise. For decades, Japan has enjoyed strong economic relations with China, provided development aid, and cooperated in regional institutions.11 It does not deny China’s political and military rise has been a source of concern, and Japan has diplomatically sought to counter Chinese influence, but a mixed picture emerges. Jerden and Hagstrom went even further, by stating that Japan has fully facilitated China’s rise and did not pursue policies to counter it. After analyzing Japan’s policies regarding China’s core interests, they concluded that Japan adhered to the One-China policy, did not support Tibetan independence movements, and refrained from undermining the regime’s legitimacy via human rights diplomacy.12 Moreover, Japan has fully supported China’s integration into the global trade system, WTO, and regional economic institutions like APEC. In addition, it became one of China’s largest trading partners and investors. In the military and security realm, Jerden and Hagstrom argue that Japan has never expressly criticized China’s military buildup, but mainly expressed concern about its lack of transparency. On the basis of these findings, they deny that Tokyo tries to contain China, or adhere to a balancing strategy. 13 They discard the Neorealist predictions, and argue that Japan has consistently engaged and supported China’s rise.
The second argument problematizing Neorealist assertions seems to be Japan’s reluctance to apply its military in foreign relations. Neorealist authors have described Japan’s hedging strategy that includes enhanced military capabilities and increased cooperation with the US. This observation creates the image that Japan is becoming an increasingly militarized and assertive country in response to external threats. The image is misleading, however, because Japan’s policy strategies have not significantly altered in recent years. A far stronger signal than Japan’s mild response to China’s military buildup, has been its own hesitation to build a stronger military. The most fundamental challenge to Neorealist expectations is Japan’s commitment to keep military spending under 1% of its GDP. 14 In fact, throughout the 1990s, when according to Yahuda relations rapidly worsened, Japan
11 Christopher Hughes, ‘’Japan’s Response to China’s Rise: Regional Engagement, Global Containment, Dangers of Collision’’, International Affairs, vol. 85(4), 2009, pp. 854-856.
12 Bjorn Jerden and Linus Hagstrom, ‘’Rethinking Japan’s China Policy: Japan as an Accommodator in the Rise of China’’, Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 12(2), 2012, pp. 223-231.
13 Jerden and Hagstrom, ‘’Rethinking Japan’s China Policy: Japan as an Accommodator in the Rise of China’’, pp. 239-241.
10 froze its defense budget and reduced arms procurements. 15 In addition, Article 9 of the Japanese constitution states that war will be renounced as a means for settling disputes in international affairs. Japan thus seems to be influenced by an antimilitaristic tradition which has hitherto prevented it from responding assertively to balance China’s rise. Singh has argued that this passive role emerged because Japan adopted a post-war identity as a ‘peace state’, and avoided military involvement in regional and global security matters. 16 Oros stated that Japan developed an approach towards security that is rooted in an anti-militaristic identity, leading it to abandon a regular military as well as the possibility of waging foreign wars. 17 This literature indicates one should look beyond conventional paradigms in explaining policy behavior.
The inadequacy of Neorealism, but the literature that points out the limitations to Neorealism as well is not only confusing and contradictory in terms of predictions, but also often fails to explain this behavior. Mochizuki and Jerden and Hagstrom have argued that China has engaged China instead of containing it, but inadequately explain the exact reasons for this. 18 Kang argued that in the face of strategic challenges posed by China, Japan failed to rearm itself, or join a coalition aiming to contain it. In addition, he concludes that Asian states may not conform well to the Westphalian logic of balance-of-power politics because of their different history, religion, culture politics and geography.19 While this may be true, Kang does not specify or elaborate the reasons for this deviant behavior.20 In this thesis I will build on the anti-militarist findings and argue that cultural premises often left out of literature dealing with mainstream IR theories could fill this gap. Oros and Singh have pointed to Japan’s post-war identity as a ‘peace state’ or anti-militarist sentiment and provide directions about the normative and identity aspects of Japan’s policies. It can be said that Japan has been worried about the strategic implications of China’s rise and its behavior in the East Asia, but has consistently
engaged China while hedging against its rise. To achieve this, it has deepened its alliance with the US, but failed to significantly remilitarize. This would fit Lind’s buck-passing hypothesis, but Japan’s acquiescence in China’s rise and cooperative stance still poses challenges. In light of these puzzles, I further examine possible identity and culture-based explanations in the next chapter.
15 Hartwig Hummel, ‘’Japan’s Military Expenditures after the Cold War: The Realism of the Peace Dividend’’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 50(2), 1996, pp. 140-147.
16 Bhubhindar Singh, ‘’Japan’s Security Policy: From a Peace State to an International State’’, Pacific Review, vol. 21(3), 2008, pp. 311-312.
17 Andrew Oros, ‘’Japan’s Strategic Culture: Security Identity in a Fourth Modern Incarnation?’’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 35(2), 2014, pp. 230-234.
18 Mochizuki, Mike, ‘’Japan’s Shifting Strategy Towards the Rise of China’’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol.30(4-5), 2007.
19 David Kang, ‘’Getting Asia Wrong, the Need for New Analytical Frameworks’’, International Security, Vol.27(4), 2003, pp. 73-79.
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Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework
This explanatory gap may be filled by a cultural approach. Cultural variables are difficult to translate into these frameworks, and are a different way of looking at IR altogether. These variables concern the social characteristics of a particular group, and are therefore a non-systemic, focusing on
intangible aspects of statecraft. Culture provides the social and ideational component of behavior, and can therefore provide insights into the origins and imperatives of certain policy objectives. They can give an ‘inside-out’ explanation for international politics, because it involves social beliefs, attitudes and norms towards politics; in other words, the views of the population. When it comes to particular state policies, the foreign and security policies of Germany and Japan have proven to be key
conundrums to Realist theory, and important cases for applying cultural variables. Duffield has identified political culture to be an important factor in explaining Germany’s post-World War 2 security policy. The reason for his interest in cultural factors has been the inadequacy of Neorealism to explain Germany’s reluctant foreign policy compared to its status as a great power in Europe, with the world’s third largest economy. The fact that Germany never sought to expand influence or rebuild its military pointed to inhibiting domestic factors. Germany had been highly reluctant to participate in international interventions, and preferred to take action via international organizations. He identified that German politicians have had a broadly shared political culture that was strongly anti-militarist and in favor of multilateralism, leading him to conclude that this cultural component could not be neglected when researching foreign policy. Thomas Berger drew a similar conclusion in his work ‘Cultures of anti-militarism: National Security in Germany and Japan’. Like Germany, Japan pursued a low-key foreign policy and resisted building up its military commensurate with its economic growth.
These cases provide evidence there are phenomena that not only cannot be explained by Realism, but point to the importance of political culture. Duffield, in his book ‘World Power Forsaken’, has listed a number of aspects of political culture one can measure to analyze national security policy, and I am aiming to apply those to Japan’s policy regarding China. These aspects are worldviews and the interpretation of the global environment, definitions of the national interest that shape policy objectives, identity and emotional attachment, the identification of policy options, and how these options are weighed against each other, and norms and values regarding the policy conduct. 21 The sub-categories I will further research are the sub-elements of these aspects explained by
Duffield. These are the aforementioned views on the international structure and the role of the country in it, perceptions of conflict and that of other countries, in this case China.
The concept of political culture is quite elusive, and difficult to grasp. It is a term that consists of two
12 separate terms, both of which are very broad, and therefore hard to define. Politics, for instance, could refer to governance, power relationships, or the way certain actors influence others. Culture, on the other hand, could refer to habits or predispositions about the world as a whole. In the early 20th century, anthropological insights were used to describe national predispositions of countries,
culminating in the publishing of Ruth Benedict’s 1946 ‘The Chrysanthemum and the Sword’, the first comprehensive account on Japan’s national character and several studies on Russia’s national culture. 22 These studies, however, lacked scientific rigor because they were insufficiently measured or surveyed. The first researchers to formally investigate cultural attitudes regarding the constellation of the domestic political system were Almond and Verba’s 1963 ‘The Civic Culture’. In this work, they conducted a survey research to uncover the relationship between cultural attitudes and the emergence of a democratic polity. Not only did they find a rigorous way to operationalize culture, but also found a direct link between them, with civic culture as a necessary condition for democracy. 23 Thus, the outcome of a political process; the formation of a democracy, was connected with cultural attitudes regarding political life. These group attitudes seemed to play a role regarding nature of political life. As a result, the term political culture became much more common, and new methodologies to operationalize the concept were developed.
According to Duffield, political culture pertains to ‘’the subjective orientations toward and assumptions about the political world that characterize the members of a particular society’’.24 The International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences defines it as "the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system". 25 In other words, attitudes, beliefs and sentiments can be considered a ‘mind set’ that shapes or predisposes towards a particular worldview. This mind set of a community forms assumptions about the world that eventually predispose a community towards certain courses of action. These outcomes are shaped in a particular way because these attitudes define the realm of the possible and impossible regarding policy choices. 26
Political culture influences whether and how certain problems are identified, and determines the range of choices. It limits this set of options to the socially acceptable, and will not consider alternative options because they are inherently inappropriate or deviant. 27 This concerns both the
22 Lucian Pye, ‘’Political Culture Revisited’’, Political Psychology, vol. 12(3), 1991, pp. 495-496. 23 Lucian Pye, ‘’Political Culture Revisited’’, pp. 499.
24 Duffield, ‘’Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism’’, pp. 795-796. 25 Smelser and Baltes, ‘’International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences’’, Elsevier, 2001. 26David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, ‘’A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?’’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2, Jan 1979, pp. 127-128.
27 David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, ‘’A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?’’, pp .128
13 overall aims of a community, and particular policy choices. 28 Political culture, for instance,
influences both the general interest (or national interest) of a certain group, and specific courses of action that aim to advance this interest. In addition, political culture shapes the view of the political environment. Acting as a lens, political culture conditions the way this environment is interpreted, and which characteristics or events are noticed or investigated. Culture causes people to be selective regarding issue salience, and therefore it affects which issues are considered important, and how they should be understood. 29 This interpretive effect also shapes goal and policy formulation, as these are often based on an interpretation of a certain event or phenomenon.
There are three important mechanisms that undergird political culture. First, it has a cognitive component that consists of the way people form a belief, empirically and causally. Second, it has an evaluative part which comprises norms and values, and third, it has an affective part that describes a degree of emotional attachment. This has to do with the way people feel about a certain issue, and whether they care deeply, feel antipathy, or indifference. 30 As political culture pertains to the nature of politics in the eyes of a particular community, the issues and questions related to political culture closely reflect these mechanisms. Although inexhaustible, Elkins and Simeon listed several general types of beliefs that form political culture. First, related to the cognitive component, the way a community looks at world events can be based on human agency or randomness and fate. Whether a group of people believes destiny is in their own hands or in that of nature already separates some political communities from others, as some communities may attribute certain occurrences to nature, or to be explained by religion, rather than human ones. 31 Second they identify overall political aims to be another element, which reflects the evaluative part, as political aims could reflect norms, values and beliefs. Another type of assumption would relate to the membership of the political community. Who is in, and who is out of the group is related to the affective component of political culture. In order to be accepted as a member, the community has to feel some sort of attachment to the persons or entities wanting to join the community. 32This also closely relates to the perception of non-members in general. The view towards other people(s) or (political) communities and the sense of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ is a part of political culture. As will be shown later, this can be considered an issue of identity, which in itself is an important aspect of political culture.
Political culture has three other characteristics; First, it is the property of a community rather than an individual. The reason for this is the intersubjective nature of culture, as norms and values are shared amongst more than one human, and thus a community. Second, it is highly unique to a
particular community. Few, if any, are completely similar to that of another political culture. This has
2828 Duffield, ‘Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism’, pp. 771-772. 29 Ibid.
30 John Duffield, ‘’World Power Forsaken’’, pp. 23. 31 Elkins and Simeon, pp.132
14 an important implication for state behavior, as states that are in similar (material) geopolitical
positions may still have differing foreign policy strategies. Third, political cultures do not change quickly. 33 They are persistent over time, and if they change, they do so gradually. This is because political culture reflects common beliefs, and tautologically, deviant views are simply rare or non-existent. These common beliefs also represent deeper underlying social values and norms that hardly change. Finally, the process of cognitive dissonance ensures that deviant views are simply rarely, if at all, considered, and most information merely reflects or acknowledges the existing culture. The lack of deviant views, in turn, ensures that very little information is produced which defies common beliefs. 34 As a result of these processes, cultures tend to be very ‘sticky’, and hence may exert influence on policy for extended periods of time.
Political Culture and Foreign Policy
Culture in general, and political culture in particular affects national security policy and strategic behavior. Peter Katzenstein and Thomas Berger are two influential IR scholars that have examined the role of culture and norms on national security strategies. Katzenstein and others, in the book ‘The Culture of National Security’ argued that cultural factors play an important role in politics because structural (Realist) factors alone could not explain the formulation of a ‘national interest’ .35 Berger, a researcher with a particular focus on Japan, stated that Japan’s cultural anti-militarism is an essential factor in explaining its long standing policy of refusing to remilitarize. In short, political culture shapes policy strategies and cannot be disregarded as an explanatory element.
Duffield’s categorizations of political culture
Duffield devised a framework which identified how political culture affects foreign policy. These dimensions are worldviews and the interpretation of the global environment, identity and emotional attachment, definitions of the national interest, the identification of policy options and how these options are weighed against each other, and norms and ethics regarding the conduct of policy. 36 He further categorizes these elements by explaining the most important sub-elements they consist of, as summarized below:
1) Worldviews
- Interpretation of international environment (Is it anarchic or cooperative?) - What are the chances of conflict and cooperation?
- View of role the country plays on the world stage - View of other states as enemies or allies
33 Duffield, ‘’Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism’’, pp. 771-772. 34 Ibid, pp. 770-771.
35 Katzenstein, ‘’The Culture of National Security’’, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 461. 36 John Duffield ‘’World Power Forsaken’’, pp. 24-26.
15 2) Identity and emotional attachment
- Are there other countries one’s own country is particularly attached to? - What is the national identity and self-image?
3) Definitions of national interest (Does it fit into the country’s self-perception?) 4) Identification and weighing of policy options
- Why are some issues considered more important than others?
- Why are some issues identified as problems that need to be solved with a certain policy? - How are policy options selected, and what are the reasons for it?
5) Norms and values regarding policy conduct - What constitutes ethical policy?
- Does it reflect national norms and values?
First, world views refer to the way the international structure is perceived, and what role a particular country plays. The international structure is constituted by theoretical visions on how world politics works, what the most important actors are, and how the chances of cooperation and conflict are estimated. Visions on the international structure are closely related to IR theories regarding conflict and cooperation, and thus whether conflict is inevitable (Neorealism) or whether cooperation is possible (Liberalism). Whether a country sees conflict as evitable or inevitable is an important measure of the chance of cooperation. The perception of other countries as foes or allies is another measurable expression of this view towards conflict. Naturally, reflecting the variety of IR theories and models for world politics, there are other visions on the world structure that transcend the aforementioned frameworks. Communist states, for instance, have adhered to ideas of world politics reflecting Structuralism. Finally, the country’s perception of its own role on the world stage is highly important as well, because it says a lot about its vision on the international structure. If a state is concerned about the inevitability of conflict, it might seek defense arrangements or armaments, whereas states that believe in the prospect of cooperation may focus less on security matters, and on economic cooperation, institutionalism and integration instead.
Second, identity and emotional attachment affects foreign policy as identity shapes the self-image and perceived role of the country on the world stage. Identity refers to the characterization of one’s self, and the features attributed to the self. According to James Fearon, identity is a social category, meaning it represents the parameters of membership of the group, and the characteristics associated with members of that group. 37 Thus identity would be unique to a particular group, the nation, and reflect its characteristics. Regarding the perception of other states or institutions,
emotional attachment is highly important because it may determine how strongly the state feels about other entities. If there are strong feelings of enmity, resentment or mistrust, then this may cause
16 strained relations or even conflict. On the other hand, a sense of affection, camaraderie, or friendship towards another entity and may lead a country to actively search for good relations, partnerships, or even alliances and security communities. In other words, identity and feelings towards other entities influence and shape foreign policies.
Third, the formulation of overarching political goals, or the national interest is another expression of political culture in the foreign policy domain. Political goals, whether they be domestic or international, are eventually the product of political culture. Fundamentally, these goals reflect values and norms regarding the nature of politics in a country. These political norms and values shape preferences for particular policy outcomes, and the articulation of a particular national interest. This in turn influences foreign policy strategies. This may be an explanatory factor, as national interests are not the same for all polities.
Fourth, political culture affects the way policy options are explored and considered. As mentioned before, the identification of certain problems, and the importance and salience of certain issues is influenced by political culture. Thus, before a policy is examined at all, the problem
identification underlying it is already subject to a political attitude. When an issue has been identified, and considered a problem in the first place, the policymaking process is also affected, as, according to Duffield, the weighing of policy options and cost-benefit analysis is subject to political culture as well. The value attached to certain political outcomes may differ across political cultures. This is the same for the means and methods of policymaking, as these are different across cultural spectrums.
These means and methods are closely related to the final aspect of political cultural in the foreign policy realm; namely the norms and values concerning policy conduct. What constitutes as legitimate, ethical, humane or otherwise appropriate policy varies across political cultures, and is unique to the political system of each polity or country. What is considered appropriate handling of policy in one polity, may not necessarily be accepted as such in another. 38 Therefore, differing norms and values highly shape political outcomes in different polities.
Strengths and Limitations
One should be careful, however, not to use political culture as a deterministic explanation. It is only one explanation, out of many, and therefore it can only be one piece of the puzzle of explain policy behavior. Duffield, has identified several other factors that determine certain policy actions, distinguishing between the international and domestic realms. With regards to the international, he states that international structure and international institutions are highly influential, and regarding the domestic he considers material factors and national predispositions to be highly important, with
38 Ibid.
17 predispositions mainly determined by political culture. 39 Therefore, Duffield does not rule out
systemic factors, or IR theories, as he recognizes the importance of systemic factors. He
acknowledges that IR theories such as Realism are still important explanatory factors. However, he points to the limited availability of research on culture as an explanatory factor. Nevertheless, the frameworks of Duffield, Katzenstein and Berger all point to its importance.
Chapter 4 Methodology and data
In order to investigate how political culture affects Japan’s foreign policy, I relied on a two-step methodological approach which examines secondary literature and primary sources. First, I used secondary literature to identify the expected attitude of Japan’s foreign policy making elites toward these measures of political culture. This way I can get an overview of the role of political culture in Japan, with which I can devise expectations for the values for the dimensions of political culture in Japan’s foreign policy making. Second, I tested these predictions by applying it to its China policy through examining primary sources, and researching whether the predictions generated by secondary literature can be observed in the data. This ensures there is no tautological bias in the research, avoiding the trap of merely drawing conclusions from official policy positions derived from available documents. Thus, when examining Japan’s foreign policy, it is important to see whether this in fact reflects the tenets of its governments’ political culture, as categorized by Duffield. Empirically, this means that I will delve into the specific China policies of this country, and check whether these reflect cultural norms or systemic factors associated with Realism. In order to draw conclusions about the role of culture, it is important to investigate whether the parameters for political culture identified above and deduced preferences can be identified, and research whether the China policy of these states actually reflects these preferences, or rather other Realist systemic factors.
Secondary Literature
To generate theoretical expectations for Japan’s political culture in the foreign policy domain that I could subsequently test, I relied on secondary literature focusing on these cultural factors. To gather information on the cultural factors as outlined in Duffield’s model, the overview focuses on literature that concerns the aspects and their sub-categories for political culture relevant in the foreign policy realm. In the review, I listed the relevant predictions for Japan’s actual policies regarding the dimensions for political culture, for each of Duffield’s aspects. This way, I attempted to generate a complete as possible list of values generating a comprehensive outline of Japan’s political culture in the foreign policy realm. First, I described the origins and general features of this culture, and subsequently examine each theme, aiming to outline the scholarly consensus on that particular
18 dimension. After listing the values, I interpreted them to generate expected foreign policy strategies that correspond best with the cultural traits. For instance, when identifying a particular cultural norm of anti-militarism, it can be expected that this country would be hesitant to deploy its military. Moreover, I apply these values to the Sino-Japanese relationship in particular, and list the
consequences for its China policy of each variable. That way, I formulated hypotheses that can be tested in the empirical section.
Empirics
In order to investigate how strongly political culture affects foreign policy, I relied on a qualitative analysis of Japan’s China policy. To that end, I collected policy documents to gain an understanding of these policies and uncover its foundations. This is crucial, because this information may reflect the political attitudes of policy making elites as theorized by Duffield, and examined by secondary literature on Japan’s political culture. Based on methodology outlined above, notably the importance of policymaking elites, I used primary sources originating from the Japanese government. Regarding foreign policy, one has to focus on the institutions occupied with foreign policy making. Thus, when researching political culture, it is useful to investigate the beliefs, norms and attitudes of policy elites. In the domain of foreign policy making, one has to focus on the beliefs and attitudes of diplomats in order to identify the basic tenets behind foreign policy. These beliefs and approaches often reflect national experiences and history, or other cultural traits, so when explaining why the government considers these approaches important, it is important to look at national history, cultural, or other factors that explain these policy preferences, and see whether this is reflected in actual policy documents.
These documents are officially published foreign policy strategies aimed at informing the public on Japan’s overall foreign and security strategies, as well as regional, topical issues, and Sino-Japanese relations. In this research, I have analyzed the annual Diplomatic Blue Books and 2013 National Security Strategy, because these are readily accessible, and more specific documents are very difficult to obtain or classified. Nevertheless, these documents contain much information on Japan’s China policies, and are thus very useful for my analysis. Furthermore, because these
documents cover a broad number of areas and strategies, they include the motivations and background of different policy strategies, enabling a researcher to gain insights about the cultural or structural elements.
In order to research this I coded the content of the primary data into distinct themes and subthemes that reflect the nature of the policy. These themes broadly reflect cultural and structural factors. This qualitative coding method means that I identified these themes and checked if policy documents and interviews fit particular themes. At the same time, I analyzed certain quotes in the texts, and marked them in order to see whether it matched a particular theme. This means I paid
19 attention to, for instance, certain assumptions made, domestic references, normative statements, or political goals. By doing that, I can get a clear overview which text fits which theme, and which themes or subthemes within a theme seem most relevant across a number of documents and files. This method clearly demarcates the focus of analysis for each document. After analyzing all available information within each theme, I compared the information between themes and gain insights about all available information altogether. Comparing these themes allows to make a statement whether the values for domestic political culture as identified in secondary literature is reflected in these
documents, and if yes, if it fits the predictions of the literature and theory on Japan’s political culture, and how important it is relative to Realism. As the cultural and structural themes cannot easily be distilled from the material, I have analyzed all texts and searched for the presence of these themes, as well as the specific values. To that end, I focused on the aspects most relevant to Duffield’s
dimensions, as well as Sino-Japanese relations. These sections included the overall evaluation of international affairs in that year, analyses of regional developments, Sino-Japanese relations, and security and defense policies. After uncovering these themes, I focused on Japan’s China strategy in particular to examine this in light of these findings, and check whether these policy strategies matched the predictions I generated based on secondary literature.
Chapter 5 Expectations regarding Japan’s political culture
In order to find out whether political culture affects Japan’s China policy, it is necessary to examine what the existing literature tells. In this chapter, I apply Duffield’s framework and find the values for each dimension in secondary literature. I gathered expectations for each dimensions and subsequently tested these in the empirical part. Thus following Duffield’s dimensions, this section will start with an analysis of Japan’s world views and views on the international structure, and accordingly, its attitude toward conflict and cooperation, its role on the world stage, and its perception of other states. As this research is geared towards Japan’s China policy, I will investigate Japan’s perceptions of China. In the subsequent paragraphs, Duffield’s other aspects will be examined. It is important to note that not every aspect can be evaluated on the basis of secondary literature, or sometimes only partly. However, a general picture, reflecting most of the categorizations is possible to obtain.
The observations below suggest a number of findings. First, following the experience of militarism until 1945, Japan has favored a low key foreign policy under the Yoshida doctrine, and eschewed a brand of anti-militarism that does not match its status as economic superpower and political actor very well. Despite its position as the world’s 3rd largest economy, and stakeholder in the G8 and G20 forums, Japan has played a minor role on the world stage. It has favored a foreign policy that left defense matters to the US, and focused on trade and the provision of development aid. Japan preferred to lay low in matters of security, but regarding development, it has seen itself as an
20 important provider of aid and economic security. In terms of national interest, it has quite consistently views peace and prosperity as the core national aims. In recent years, however, there has been a shift from a low key foreign policy, to a more active role on the world stage to protect global commons such as security and development.
Japan’s general view on World War 2
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the origins of Japanese militarism in the 20th century, a word on the context of Japan’s attitude towards the war is imperative. This is necessary because Japan’s war experience has caused a deeply engrained sense of anti-militarism, and a tendency to lay low in foreign affairs. Its sense of victimhood led it to refocus on economic
development, and also provide aid to other developing countries.
The defining moment shaping Japan’s foreign and security policy since 1945 has been its defeat in the Second World War. The crushing defeat of the Japanese army, and the devastation of Japan’s cities by US bombing raids and the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki have profoundly shaped Japan’s views on the world as well as foreign policy. Paradoxically, and unlike Germans, however, most Japanese have felt a sense of victimhood, rather than guilt over causing the war. Berger argues that this sense of victimhood originates from the context of Western imperialism in Asia, the military regime in Japan, and the Imperial army, which used Japanese patriotism as a pretext for a destructive process of conquest. 40 He states it was commonly believed that Japan, acting as a ‘vanguard’ for the oppressed nations of Asia, sought to expel Western influence from the
continent and create a more independent Asia; an ideology referred to as Asianism. In addition, the Western oil and resource embargo leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor was seen as a humiliation in the face of ‘legitimate’ Japanese interests.
More important, however, was the development of Japan’s military dictatorship ever since the 1868 Meiji restoration. Unlike Germany, the Japanese military leadership gained power gradually through intrigues, coups, political murders, and usurpation. Berger described this as a process which took several decades, and unlike Germany, did not result from a large popular front or civil
discontent. In Germany, the sense of guilt about the origins of the Second World War is caused by a fundamental belief that all German people had a share in bringing the Nazi leadership to power. 41 It is broadly recognized that Adolf Hitler was a democratically elected leader with a popular mandate. Japanese, however, have felt less responsible for their leadership because they did not directly put this regime in charge, or have as much influence on it as the Germans did. After the Second World War,
40 Berger, ‘’From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-Militarism’’, International Security, Vol.17(4), 1993, pp. 131-136.
21 much of the civilian leadership and bureaucracy remained in place, and it was difficult to investigate which elements of the government were particularly aggressive. Thus, it has been hard to identify individual officials and bureaucrats that were particularly responsible for the conduct of the war, apart from those indicted at the Tokyo tribunal. Finally, the distinctive role of the Japanese army has also been considered a factor mitigating guilt from the Japanese people. The military was considered to be an oppressive institution in itself, responsible for many atrocities, and eventually ruining the country. Japanese people often felt their patriotism was abused by the military to unleash a war beyond their control. Germans have identified nationalism to be a root cause of the war, whereas the Japanese have not shared this conclusion. Rather, military rule and doctrine was blamed for the war.
This interpretation of Japan’s role in the Second World War, and the sense of victimhood has created a political culture that has determined Japan’s foreign and security policy ever since. The memory of oppressive military leadership has led to a national consensus that favored an anti-militarist foreign policy. According to Oros, the shock of the devastation resulting from the war and the leadership changed Japan’s identity into that of an anti-militaristic state. 42 This eventually
determined Japan’s opposition to the buildup of a military, and the use of force in international affairs. As Japan developed as a democracy after 1945, a consensus was forged amongst different political groups with differing visions on Japan’s role in the world. These factions could be broadly
distinguished in three categories, representing the left, center and right of the political spectrum. They had differing views towards the role of military, but it is important to note that this spectrum does not represent a scale of pacifism and militarism, but rather the appreciation of Japan’s past. This debate represents two differing views on the past: traditionalism and anti-traditionalism. 43
Traditionalism refers to the view that Japan is a unique civilization, with a particular form of political culture, and specific values like subservience, a focus on community, and a willingness to sacrifice oneself for their country, that should be preserved. It holds that the Western style democracy imposed on Japan in 1945 contradicts these values, and that these democratic values ought to be limited. It carries a positive view towards Japan’s pre-war system, and believes there was nothing ‘wrong’ with these values. This view on Japan’s values has important implications for the perception of Japan’s role in the war. Fundamentally, concerning the cause of the war, traditionalists believe that Japan’s cultural and political values have been an important and positive part of Japan’s history, and that the war itself was caused by the military institutions.
Anti-traditionalists, on the other hand, feel that Japan’s political and cultural values
themselves have caused the war, and carry a negative view towards these values. Masao Maruyama has argued that the subservient nature of Japan’s cultural values has enabled the rise of Japan’s
42 Oros, ‘’Japan’s Strategic Culture’’, pp. 230-232.
43 Yashuhiro Izumikawa, ‘‘Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan's Security Policy’’, International Security, vol.35(2), 2010, pp. 130-131.
22 military dictatorship. 44 After all, the Japanese did very little to protest or criticize their government. Anti-traditionalists believe that Western democracy, through a system of checks and balances, is the way to prevent cultural values from causing the rise of militarism. It favors a profound change in Japanese society away from traditional values, towards Western ones. It should be noted, however, that anti-traditionalism does not necessarily equal anti-militarism. Anti-traditionalism refers to a particular view on Japanese society, and the analysis that cultural values caused militarism. Therefore, they do not seek to disarm or arm the military, but rather seek social change through establishing Western democracy.45 By the same token, traditionalism and its lack of self-recrimination and sense of victimhood does not necessarily means it opposes disarmament. The distinction serves to
underscore the importance of the traditionalism debate alongside the militarism debate, as a determinant of Japan’s view of its role in the world, and resulting security policies.
The political factions had differences over both the role of pacifism or militarism in society and traditionalism or anti-traditionalism. The Japanese Left, consisting of the Socialist Party of Japan (JSP) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), has been the most vocal proponent of a pacifist and anti-militarist foreign policy. The Left had the most negative view of Japan’s role in the Second World War, strongly recognized and condemned Japanese atrocities and favored complete
disarmament. In addition, it leans more towards the anti-traditionalist view on Japanese society. The Right, reflecting a more traditionalist attitude, is more positive of Japan’s past and does not feel the sense of shame of the Left regarding Japan’s pre-war cultural values. It feels these values should be maintained, and that not all aspects of the Western political model are desirable. More so than the Left, it has a positive view towards patriotism and believes that Japan should not be ashamed of its past. Most importantly, regarding the anti-militarism debate, the Right opposes article 9 of the Japanese constitution stating that Japan will never use force to resolve international disputes, and outlaws the possession of offensive military forces. The Right strongly feels that Japan should once again be seen as an ordinary nation that like all other nations possesses the right to have a credible military force, rather than a Self-Defense Force. It is thus in favor of rearming and changing the mandate of its armed forces. Current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a more right leaning leader, for instance, announced in 2014 the Japanese government would interpret article 9 differently to allow for Japanese armed operations abroad.46 The Centre parties in Japan have traditionally favored a middle ground between the two. According to Berger, these parties have been enthusiastic about Western economic policy and a free market economy, but relatively silent regarding security and defense policy. It generally favored a low profile foreign policy, leaving the responsibility of Japan’s defense
44 Izumikawa, ‘‘Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan's Security Policy’’pp. 131-132.
45 Ibid.
46http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/07/02/editorials/abe-guts-article-9/#.VY0kN_mqpHw,accessed May 9
23 largely to the US. Regarding traditionalism, they have found that some aspects of Japan’s past were valuable enough to keep, whereas others were detrimental to Japan’s stability, and favored safeguards against them. 47 Eventually, the Centre parties prevailed and the compromise between all traditions has greatly influenced Japan’s post-war foreign policy. Although the dominant LDP Party reflected both right wing and centrist elements, it came to embrace the centrist policies, rather than right wing ones.
Japan’s world views
Japan’s world view, and view of the international system was strongly determined by the Yoshida doctrine, which emerged in the early 1950s as the foundation of Japan’s post-war foreign policy. The Yoshida doctrine was remarkable, in that it emerged as a product of early Cold War tensions in Asia, and persisted over time, even long after the end of the Cold War. Crucially, the Yoshida doctrine was a Centrist foreign policy doctrine which emerged as a result of a compromise between the competing political factions. The doctrine was a strategy which allied Japan with the United States to ensure Japan’s security. This allowed for Japan’s economic reconstruction, while upholding Article 9 of the constitution. Economic development became the most important domestic goal, and this meant Japan needed a protector and sound economic relations with other states. 48 Japan’s foreign policy was highly based on trade and Official Development Assistance (ODA) to build economies ties and repair Japan’s global image. Trade policy became the most important aspect of Japan’s security policy, besides the alliance with the US, as the government in 1980 stated that economic ties and development aid were crucial to global stability. 49 In addition, the Yoshida
doctrine attached great importance to a low key foreign policy, avoiding antagonistic foreign policies. David Potter argues that this strategy, in fact, served to improve Japan’s reputation, as it meant Japan would become one of the top donors to the UN. The commitment to multilateralism served to build a reputation of Japan as a country committed to international stability and cooperation.
The Yoshida doctrine had roots in Japan’s world views, but these views have been remarkably weakly articulated. Ed Bergstrom argues that Japan’s leaders have mostly been silent regarding their evaluation of the rules of international politics. 50 The international system is perceived to be complex, unclear, and therefore Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo declared in 1999 that an observant and calm approach to international politics was needed. Nevertheless, Bergstrom found that during the first decades of the Cold War, Japanese leaders perceived the world to be bipolar, divided between two ideological superpowers. The balance of power structure was perceived to be conducive to peace,
47 Berger, ‘’From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-Militarism’’, pp. 139.
48David M. Potter, in Rubio Diaz Leal, Laura, ed. China y Japon: Modernizacion Economica, Cambios Politicos y Posicionamiento Mundial, Mexico City: Editorial Castillo, 2008.
49 Potter, ibid.
50 Ed Bergstrom, ‘’The Yoshida Doctrine and the Unipolar World’’ in Hood (ed), ‘’The Politics of Modern Japan’’, New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 68.
24 and Japan felt it was difficult to change this situation, but rather adapt to it. After the Cold War, Japan recognized the world structure was no longer divided, and accepted that in the face of new
uncertainties, Japan should play a more active role on the world stage. 51 Prime Minister Hashimoto stated that Japan should not take the post-Cold War ‘Pax Americana’ for granted, but actively aim to strengthen it and contribute to global peace and stability. This outlook points to the next sub-element of world views, namely the perceived role of the country in the world
National Role
Bergstrom stated that Japan, from the early Cold War until the mid-1990s, had a stable and clearly defined role on the world stage. This role was that Japan viewed itself as contributing to peace and prosperity. In addition, it saw itself as a stabilizing force and a partner in development. Berger accordingly identified Japan’s role as that of a trading nation that focuses on the economy. 52 During the 1990s, however, this focus shifted, and Japan started to attach relatively more importance to peace than global prosperity. Bergstrom argues this is due to the onset of Japan’s economic stagnation, beginning in the 1990s. As a consequence, Japan could not afford to spend the same amount of resources to foreign development aid and cooperation, and rather focused on the domestic economy. A second change in the 1990s was the shift towards a more active role on the world stage regarding peace and stability. Japan increasingly identified itself as a ‘leader’, and focused on contributing to the UN and multilateral organizations, with the continuing aim of contributing to international peace and stability. 53 Nevertheless, the ways in which Japan seeks to achieve this have been ill-defined and vague.
In the face of an uncertain and complex world, in which Japan has to closely monitor for threats and contingencies, these developments would imply that Japan would currently be pursuing a more activist foreign policy aimed at providing global commons. Although prosperity is still an important part of Japan’s overall aims, it has an increasingly global focus towards ensuring peace. Therefore, an increased role in defense and security matters, as well as discussions on global
commons in multilateral organizations would be a logical outcome. This also means that Japan, faced with the uncertain implications of China’s rise, would pursue a more active or assertive foreign policy regarding China. The aim of this more active foreign policy would be enhanced stability in the region. National Interest
These developments also closely relate to the perception of the national interest. Like the national role, the articulation of the national interest experienced a shift after the Cold War. Until the
51 Bergstrom, ‘’The Yoshida Doctrine and the Unipolar World’’, pp. 69-71.
52 Thomas Berger, ’’Unsheathing the Sword: Germany’s and Japan’s Fractured Political-Military Cultures and the Problem of Burden Sharing’, World Affairs, vol.158(4), 1996, pp.187.
