From Civil War to Human Development
How the UN has contributed to Human Development in the Democratic Republicof Congo
Tessa Boumans, 10797998
Bachelor Thesis – The Politics of Development Teacher: Dhr. Dr. S. Krapohl
Word count: 9.638 8 February 2018
Index
1. Introduction ... 4
2. The conflict trap and poverty trap theory ... 6
2.1. The effects of the conflict trap on human development ... 6
2.2. How to escape the conflict trap ... 7
2.3. From the conflict trap to the poverty trap ... 9
2.4. How to escape the poverty trap ... 10
3. Methodology ... 12
3.1. A single case study of the DRC ... 12
3.2. Human Development Index (HDI) ... 13
4. Analysis ... 15
4.1. Introduction to the DRC conflict ... 15
4.2. What the UN is doing to help the DRC escape the conflict trap ... 17
4.2.1. Why is the DRC stuck in a conflict trap? ... 17
4.2.2. Escaping the conflict trap: aid, regulating natural resources and military intervention ... 18
4.3. What the UN is doing to help the DRC escape the poverty trap ... 21
4.3.1. Why is the DRC stuck in a poverty trap? ... 21
4.3.2. How did the UN help the DRC escape the poverty trap? ... 23
5. Conclusion ... 27
1. Introduction
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is suffering from the deadliest war in the world since the end of World War II (Faubert 2006: 6; International Rescue Committee 2007). Moreover, half of all deaths are children (The Guardian 2008), the country has been named “the rape capital of the world” (Brown 2012), and in March 2017, two UN experts were brutally killed (Amnesty International 2017). These horrors are a consequence of the continuous conflict that struck the country from the start of its existence. Being taunted by civil war ever since its independence from Belgium in 1960; the DRC is no stranger to extreme violence and the violation of human rights.
The conflict today finds its roots in the Anti-Kabila Rebellion that started in August 1998. The inauguration of president Laurent Kabila in 1997 caused for a lot of resistance and divided the country in pro- and anti- Kabila groups (Ndikumana and Emizet 2005: 76-77). After Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001, he was succeeded by his son Joseph, who had to take charge of a country that was torn by rebels, foreign forces and an economy that was in total disarray (Idem: 77). Even though an official peace treaty was signed in 2002, the conflict and its consequences still endure (Faubert 2006; Soderlund et al. 2013).
Although civil war usually devastates a country and its human development (Collier et al. 2003), the DRC has made notable steps on the Human Development Index (HDI). The index today has even far exceeded the pre-war situation (see figure 1). The HDI measures a countries humanitarian development as an accumulation of three factors: Gross Domestic Income (GDI) per
capita, education and life expectancy (UNDP 2018b). Because of the intensity of the DRC conflict, it is highly unlikely that the DRC has been able to develop on these issues; but it did. How was this made possible?
When a country is as underdeveloped as the DRC, it is not very likely that major changes can come from within (Collier et al. 2003; Faubert 2006; Sachs 2015). This is because the DRC is trapped in a vicious cycle of conflict and poverty, which disables it from kicking off human development. Therefore, external aid is necessary to create an environment Figure 1: HDI of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 1990-2015 (UN 2017a)
where a country can begin to develop (Pronk 2001; Wolfensohn et al. 2002; Stiglitz 2002; Cungu and Swinnen 2003; Sachs 2015). This idea of international support is the founding principle of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were implemented by the UN in 2000. The MDGs exist of eight goals that aim to improve human development, and they were set for a period of fifteen years (UN 2017b).
Remarkably, the timeframe of the MDGs complies with the HDI take-off of the DRC. It is because of this parity, together with the previously mentioned starting point that external influences can help a country develop, that I hypothesize that the positive growth of the HDI in the DRC since 2000 is caused by concrete efforts of the UN, which are based on the principles of the MDGs. In order to support this argument, I will first set out and link the two theories about the conflict trap and the poverty trap. Then, I will account for my methodology and delve deeper into the workings of the HDI. Finally, I will apply these insights to the case of the DRC in order to answer the following research question: ‘how did the UN contribute to the Human Development of the DRC during the period 2000-2015?’
Answering this question is important, because it creates a deeper understanding of the relation between conflict and human development in the DRC, as well as the influence and effectiveness of UN programs. In turn, it contributes to deeper insight in solutions for other countries as well. Moreover, it is needless to say that there is an urgency to resolve the drastic underdevelopment of the DRC, considering how many victims it still makes every day. With this research, I aim to modestly contribute to this goal by collecting and connecting the UN efforts. Additionally, the massive expenditure of UN programs (e.g. the UNDP budget alone in the 2006-2015 period comes close to the grand total of $900 million (UNDP 2018d)) asks for a critical review of its effectiveness and impact. Until now, the scientific field has lacked research that specifically combines both the poverty trap and conflict trap theories with the case of the DRC in relation to the UN programs since the implementation of the MDGs.
2. The conflict trap and poverty trap theory
In order to understand how the DRC has been able to develop under such dire circumstances, theory is needed that can explain how the DRC is affected by its civil war as well as its general underdevelopment. It is important to understand that civil war and poverty are not just separate influencers on a countries human development; they also affect and reinforce each other. Therefore, this paragraph will explore both the conflict trap theory and the poverty trap theory and connect them to each other. This will provide a wider framework of analyses, that fits the particular case of the DRC by addressing both its conspicuous underdevelopment as well as its unique conflict. I will first elaborate on the effect that civil war has on a countries human development. Then, I explain how diverse and tailored measures are needed to help a country escape conflict. Finally, I will make the same two assessments for the poverty trap. 2.1. The effects of the conflict trap on human development
Civil war and human development are strongly connected in a vicious cycle: underdevelopment fuels civil war, but in turn civil war also undermines human development. This downwards spiral is the basic principle of the conflict trap (Collier et al 2003: 1). Understanding the conflict trap is pivotal when analyzing the case of the DRC, because the civil war is deeply embedded in the DRC’s society, structures and institutions.
The impact of civil war goes far beyond the sheer negative effect on a country’s economy. Along with its destructive characteristics, civil war also creates a system where leaders and institutions become invested in violence. To put it bluntly: although most people become victims of the conflict, some people are profiting from it. Even though these profits are rarely an incentive to start a civil war, the wish to maintain profits can have a substantial impact on the duration of the war. This is because the ones that are benefitting from violence are unlikely to be the ones that will invest in resolving the conflict (Idem: 4).
Another factor in play – which is especially relevant for the case of the DRC, considering the dire state of its economy and its dependence on natural resources (Ndikumana and Emizet 2005: 8) - is that countries with underdeveloped economies and a high dependency on natural resources are less likely to establish institutions that improve human development (Idem: 5). This particular aspect of civil war, along with the previously mentioned aspect of investments in violence, are two critical factors when it comes to the impact of the war on society. Not only can profits from war and natural resources extend the duration of a civil war (Bleaney and Dimico 2011; Collier et al. 2004), it affects the system in
such a way that its negative effects endure even after the conflict is resolved (Koubi 2005: 78; Chen et al. 2008: 71; Davies 2008; Hegre et al. 2011: 2; Collier et al. 2003: 3).
In the model of Collier et al. (2003), the effects of civil war are described as a three-leveled model, which translates into the metaphor of three rings. The inner ring of the conflict trap refers to the direct effect of the conflict on civilians within the country in the areas of displacement, mortality and poverty (Eck and Hultman 2007). These areas are not separate from each other, but affect and reinforce each other (Collier et al. 2003: 1-2; Hegre et al 2011: 7). For example, Collier et al. state that when someone is displaced to an area where they become more susceptible for certain diseases, the mortality rate increases. With a second example, they explain how poverty increases during a conflict, whereas the end of a conflict does not automatically lead to reduced poverty. These two examples show that a country can be trapped in the negative effects of civil war both during and after its occurrence.
The second ring of the conflict trap encompasses the effects of civil war on neighboring countries. Think for example of refugees that spread diseases such as malaria, or neighboring economies that are affected by refugees or economically. Collier et al. state that the costs of a civil war for neighboring countries combined can lead up to be as high as the costs for the ‘civil-war-country’ itself. They describe civil war as a “regional public bad” (Collier et al. 2003: 2; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006).
The third ring focusses on the global effects of civil war. Globally, civil war has an immense effect of the transportation of drugs (worldwide, 95 percent of hard drugs are produced in countries that suffer from civil war), and via refugees civil war can drive the spread of diseases such as AIDS. Also, terrorist organizations can exploit fragile states for their resources, like Al Qaeda generated diamond profits in Sierra Leone (Idem: 3). These levels of impact reflect the need for both individual states, as well as the international community, to help a country to resolve its internal conflict.
2.2. How to escape the conflict trap
When a country is as heavily affected by civil war as the DRC, the first step towards human development is dealing with the conflict trap. Because there is no one-size-fits-all solution for the conflict trap (Westerkamp et al. 2009: 10), Collier et al (2003). distinguish between several classes of risk, in order to determine what solutions would fit best in a particular case. The first class has a relatively low risk of war. This class contains middle-income countries and low-income countries that are on track towards becoming middle-income. The second
class has a higher risk of war and exists of countries that are low-income. For these countries, igniting development would reduce the risk of war. The third class contains countries that are already in conflict. In this case, international interventions are usually not very effective, but depriving rebel groups of their resources is. The final class contains countries that are in their first decade after war. The risk for these countries to fall back into conflict is very high (Hegre et al. 2011 2-3; Collier et al. 2003: 6; Collier et al. 2008; Quinn et al. 2007; Walter 2004). In order to avoid this, external military peacekeeping and large aid programs can contribute to peace. In combination with national policy reforms, this could eventually free a country from its conflict trap (Collier et al. 2003: 6-8).
It is important to note that no single intervention is able to resolve civil wars instantly. In order to be successful, there need to be multiple, complimentary measures that accumulate (Collier et al 2003: 7). Especially for post-conflict countries a flexible management approach is required (Faubert 2006: 4). Both the national government as well as the international communities have the responsibility to introduce these projects (Collier et al. 2003: 7).
With this in mind, there are three sorts of interventions possible that have a chance of being successful. The first intervention is aid. Aid is particularly successful in post-conflict situations (Idem: 9-10). The second type of intervention that could be successful is aimed at natural resources. Although natural resources can be a large source of income, they have historically been tied to fueling conflict, weak governance and economic decline. Therefore, natural resources should be regulated in such a way that rebel organizations cannot exploit them (Collier et al. 2003: 9-10; Burnley 2011: 7). Moreover, a dependency on natural resources makes a country vulnerable to price shocks. The international community should provide a better buffer for these shocks. Finally, countries that depend on natural resources should invest their revenues more efficiently and prevent it from falling into corrupt hands (ibid.) According to the Monterrey consensus, both developed and underdeveloped have a responsibility of resolving the troubles with natural resources (UN 2003a; Collier et al. 2003: 9-10). The third type of intervention is military intervention. Generally, high national military spending increases risk rather than decreases it. In order to convince countries that they should reduce military spending, international institutions should take on the role of mediator. On top of that, external military intervention can be of great importance for peace in the first decade after the conflict. This is because it can create a safe and steady environment that allows external aid to do its job (Collier et al. 2003: 9-10).
2.3. From the conflict trap to the poverty trap
As stated before; in order to establish sustainable human development, conflict should be addressed alongside humanitarian development in concrete areas. These issues go hand in hand, as poverty is one of the main structural drivers for conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006), especially in the DRC, where underdevelopment and conflict go hand in hand in a negative spiral. The conflict trap theory already touches upon some conditions for international intervention to be effective, but in order to establish a more comprehensive framework the poverty trap theory is needed. Together with the conflict trap, the poverty trap theorizes how a country such as the DRC can escape its downwards spiral of misery. This section starts by giving a short overview of the history of development thinking, which serves as an introduction for understanding how and why modern development thinking came to be and how modern international relations were established. With this foundation in mind, I continue by laying out the basic principles of the poverty trap theory.
Modern day economic growth started in the period 1750-1850 during the Industrial Revolution. Before this period, most of the world was relatively poor, lived of the land and inequality was moderate compared to modern days. For certain countries, the Industrial Revolution caused a peak in GDP per capita. This development spread from Great Britain, to Western Europe, to the US and Canada, and finally to Australia and New Zealand. However, the growth was limited to these states, whereas the rest of the world was mostly left behind (Crafts and Venables 2003: 326-331; Sachs 2015: 148-149).
A new phase started when imperialism occurred. The now dominant Europe started to conquer other parts of the world, particularly in Africa, Asia and the Middle-East (Rist 2008: 47:68; Sachs 2015: 149-150). For colonized countries, the European domination was an even larger setback for their development and international inequality increased even further. This was because the European colonizers were mostly interested in extracting resources and exploiting the colonized countries, rather than in creating economic or social development for the colonized country (Parenti 1995; Sachs 2015: 149-150).
The end of World War II also meant the end of imperial rule. One after the other, formerly colonized countries gained their independence. They were now free to invest in infrastructure and lay the foundation for their industrial development, which in turn attracted investors. Along with the technological innovations of that time, poor countries started to develop like never before, with the prime example of China’s staggering economic growth. But again, this growth was not for everyone. Some countries are stuck in a poverty trap that
prevents them from catching up with the rest of the world (Sachs 2015: 171-174; Azariadis and Stachurski 2005: 297). It was at this point in time that development thinkers started to think about how to create a chance for all low-income countries to transition towards middle-income countries (Sachs 2015: 171-174).
Later, in the 1990s, the focus shifted from an economic approach to a more holistic approach. From now on, a countries development was no longer measured by looking solely at economic development, but there emerged a more people centered perspective (UNDP 2018a). In line with this more humanitarian way of thinking, the HDI methodology was created. This methodology does not only take the economic picture into account, but also whether someone lives a long and healthy life and whether someone is knowledgeable (UNDP 2018b). Because the HDI includes more factors into it equation and is more comprehensive than the economic approach, I chose to use a humanitarian approach for this case study rather than an economic one. I will further elaborate on the workings of the HDI in paragraph 3.2.
2.4. How to escape the poverty trap
The unequal growth that succeeded the Industrial Revolution has specifically affected sub-Saharan Africa and countries in Southeast Asia, where many states still find themselves trapped in poverty. One of the main developmental theorists of this time, Jeffrey Sachs, argues that escaping poverty will not come naturally to these states; it requires deliberate local, national and global efforts (Hulme and Fukudu-Parr 2009: 3; Sachs 2015: 301-302). In order to explain the developmental path of a country, Sachs uses the metaphor of a ladder. Underdeveloped countries need help to reach the so called “bottom rung” of the development ladder. As soon as they reach this first step, they will be capable of further developing themselves and will no longer need external aid (Sachs 2015: 301-302).
At this time however, many countries have not yet been able to meet the requirements of this bottom rung. To illustrate: when China represents the positive end of the developmental spectrum, sub-Saharan Africa represents the negative end. As a matter of fact, the poverty rate in this region actually declined rather than improved during the 1980s-1990s. Fortunately, this took a turn around the year 2000, which is the same time the MDGs were implemented. There is strong evidence that the MDGs can contribute to resolving the poverty trap, because they can advance the implementation of concrete policies that aim to overcome the obstacles that prevent countries from developing. This does not only require efforts from within a country, but also asks for strong cooperation with the rest of the world. Overall, the
MDGs represent a successful step towards the goal of global ending poverty (Hulme and Fukudu-Parr 2009; Aryeetey et al. 2012; Sachs 2015: 304-307).
The first step towards this concrete international cooperation took place in September 2000, with the official establishment of the MDGs by 160 heads of states. They committed themselves to honor the new “great global goals: universal human rights, peace and security, economic development, environmental sustainability, and the drastic reduction of extreme poverty” (Sachs 2015: 287). This translated in a set of eight concrete goals: eradicate extreme poverty, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, establish global partnership for development (UN 2017b). These topics are not separated from each other: they are all linked and reinforce each other (Sachs 2015: 276).
3. Methodology
3.1. A single case study of the DRC
In the field of political science, case studies are notorious for being ambiguous. However, they are a necessary supplement to quantitative research and help us understand why something is happening (Gerring 2004: 341-342). For the case of the DRC, this is especially relevant. Based on the conflict trap theory by Collier et al., it is very unlikely that the DRC has experience any significant human development whilst being affected by civil war. However, the HDI seems to propose otherwise (see figure 1). This paradoxal relationship gives reason to use a case study design, because it can unveil the causal mechanism that lies behind this unlikely correlation.
When examining the covariation between ‘conflict’ and ‘human development in the DRC’, there are multiple research designs possible. In order to pick the most applicable design, I used the table of Gerring (see table 1). This table shows what sort of case study fits certain kinds of research. In this case, the spatial variation is limited to one unit: the DRC. This is because the DRC is a unique case when you consider the magnitude of its civil war and its unlikely human development under these circumstances. This makes the DRC a critical case. Also, there is in fact temporal variation since the development occurs over time. This means the proper case study for this research would be the design of case study I; observing covariation in a single unit diachronically (Gerring 2004: 343). One benefit of this method compared to within or across unit case studies, is that the research unit is more easier delineated and less complex to distinguish (Idem: 344). Finally, specifically for the case of the DRC a case study is also more practical, because statistical data of human security in the DRC is often scarce (Faubert 2006: 5).
Table 1: Research Designs: A Covariational Typology (Gerring 2004: 343)
In spite of the usefulness of this methodology, it also has some limitations that should be acknowledged. First of all, single unit case study analyses have been criticized for lacking methodological tenacity (Maoz 2002: 164-165). This is partly due to the supposed relative lack of systematic methodological guidelines (Yin 2009:14-15).
The second issue that arises is that a single unit case - or qualitative studies overall for that matter - has a validation problem, because it is hard to replicate and one can question a
researchers’ objectivity. However, it is questionable whether pure objectivity exists even in qualitative studies, given that where and how data is produced can also affect results (Berg and Lune 2010: 340).
The final and most important critique is that of external validity. Of course, it is hard to make generalizing claims after studying just one case. However, this is less of a problem when the goal of the research is to explain a certain phenomenon (Eckstein 1975: 134). Moreover, the goal of single case studies is not so much theory testing, but more theory building (Gerring 2004: 350). To increase external validity, one could propose that cases should be selected randomly. However, when the goal is creating a deeper insight in a phenomenon, it is exceptionally useful to examine the cases that are atypical or extreme, which makes random selection otiose (Flyvbjerg 2006). Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that especially because of the atypical character of the chosen case, one should watch out for overgeneralization (Bennett and Elman 2006: 460-463).
3.2. Human Development Index (HDI)
The HDI measures three key components of human development: having a decent standard of living, having a long and healthy life and being knowledgeable (UNDP 2018b). These three components are measured in different ways. ‘Health’ is measured by looking at ‘life expectancy at birth’, ‘education’ is measured by looking at the ‘mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25’ and by looking at ‘expected years of schooling for children of school entering age’. ‘Standard of living’ is assessed by ‘gross national income per capita’. For a more structured overview of how the HDI is composed, see figure 2.
Figure 2: Human Development Index and its components (UNDP 2018b)
Although the HDI is a widely used indicator for human development, it fails to establish a fully comprehensive picture of a countries human development. For methodological purposes, it shows a simplified version of what human development is about. A more extensive tool would also include inequality, poverty, human security, empowerment,
gender disparity, etc. Therefore, I use the HDI in this paper solely as a general indicator of human development, whilst further assessing human development in the DRC by also taking into account the other human development issues that are represented in the MDGs.
4. Analysis
This section starts by introducing the DRC conflict, in order to give a clear picture of its background. This is important in order to understand the interventions that followed, which aimed to resolve the conflict and its impacts. Then, concrete measures of the UN to help the DRC escape the conflict trap and the poverty trap are set out and analyzed.
4.1. Introduction to the DRC conflict
The DRC became independent from Belgian colonization in 1960, which was the onset of many civil wars to come. Because reviewing each of these conflicts separately would take up too much space for this analysis, this paragraph discusses the most important parallel characteristics between these wars. First of all, the overall low incomes and low economic growth enabled rebellious groups to organize themselves at a relative low cost, and has at the same time undermined the government’s ability to fight back. A second characteristic is that the wars have all been restricted to certain areas due to ethnic antagonism, which prevented the conflicts from spreading. Thirdly, the country’s resource dependency has played a significant role in each of the wars. Partly because of the DRC’s dependency an sich, but even more because of the geographical concentration of the resources (see figure 3) and their uneven distribution between ethnic groups. Fourthly, the government’s ability to fight the rebellions has overall been dependent on external backing, rather than on its own competence. And lastly, the wars in the 1990s have mainly been the result of discriminative laws that
promoted nationalism and the enormous inflow of Rwandan Hutu refugees in the eastern parts of the country (Ndikumana and Emizet 2005: 63). In summary, the wars generally find their roots in the political exclusion of certain groups by political elites, which caused rebels to mobilize (Kisangani 2012). Finally, it is important to note that although the wars have been mostly situated in the east, this has affected the human security of all Congolese over the past decades (Faubert 2006: 6).
The most recent war started in 1998 and is commonly referred to as the ‘Anti-Kabila Rebellion’ or the ‘Second Congo War’. Laurent Kabila had come into power in 1997 after he led a rebellion that overthrew former President Mobutu (UN 2018e). The rebellion against Kabila was an accumulation of several issues, but there were two matters that gave the final push. For one, Kabila introduced laws and policies that favored people from his native province Katanga and people from Rwandan descent, which angered his proponents. Later, he would end the former military cooperation with Rwanda and Uganda and demanded that all foreign forces would leave the DRC. This caused Rwanda and Uganda to support the rebellion which contributed to its eventual outbreak (Ndikumana and Emizet 2005: 76-77).
After Laurent Kabila’s assassination in January 2001, his son Joseph Kabila took over the baton. He arranged for peace negotiations, which led to the signing of a peace agreement in 2002 that ended the civil war on paper. The DRC now had a multiparty government and the organization of democratic elections started (Soderlund et al. 2013). From 2003 till 2006, the Transnational Government was given the task to unify the country and organize the elections. These elections, which were the first democratic elections in forty years, were won by Joseph Kabila (Eastern Congo Initiative 2018).
Although the war had officially ended in 2002, peace in the DRC is still hard to find. Not only is the country still taunted by violence, mass violations of human rights, and a corrupt system (Faubert 2006: 6-9), it has also been struck by a major Ebola outbreak in 2007 (BBC 2018), and is widely affected by AIDS (UN Aids 2016). In 2008, the government aimed for a new attempt of peace with the signing of a new peace act that aimed to end the conflict in the eastern region of the DRC. Unfortunately, the quiet would only last until April when fighting started once again and thousands of people were displaced as a consequence. In 2011, Kabila was elected for another term and although his second term officially ended in 2016 (D’Onofrio 2016), new elections are not being held until December 2018 (BBC 2018).
4.2. What the UN is doing to help the DRC escape the conflict trap
This paragraph first assesses why the DRC is stuck in a conflict trap. Then, it defines what category of the conflict trap the DRC can be placed in, after which the suitable conditions for improvement are attributed. Accordingly, the involvement of the UN is analyzed via three types of intervention that could be successful for the case of the DRC: aid, the regulation of natural resources and external military intervention.
4.2.1. Why is the DRC stuck in a conflict trap?
Before I establish what can be done to release the DRC from its conflict trap and the UN’s share in this solution, it is important to first determine whether the DRC actually has been trapped in conflict or not during the period 2000-2015. After all; official peace was established in 2002 and again in 2008, so in what way is the DRC still dealing with a conflict trap?
Paradoxically, the recent enactments of the two peace treaties are in fact a first indicator that the DRC is stuck in a conflict trap. Although the treaties stand for the initiation of peace, they also indicate that there is a conflict that needs to be dealt with. Another indication that the DRC is stuck in a conflict trap is a rather obvious one; namely the numerous civil wars that it dealt with ever since its independence. Between 1960 and 2010, the DRC has experienced seventeen civil wars (based on a quantitative definition of civil war that is based on ‘duration’ and ‘death toll’) (Kinsangani 2012). Given the common characteristics of previous wars in the DRC, the danger of conflict still looms, as parallel circumstances are still apparent in the country. Along with many other indications that civil war is imminent, there is one factor that has threatened security throughout the DRC’s entire history: the political exclusion of certain groups. The elite, which entails mostly the government and its political opposition, are essentially acting out of self-interest which angers the population (Shepherd 2016).
The recent peace treaties, the amount of wars in the recent past, and the politics of exclusion are the first, yet superficial, indicators that the DRC is stuck in a conflict trap. A more detailed assessment according to the model of Collier et al. is needed to establish the severity of this trap and its risk of conflict. This assessment was executed by Ndikumana and Emizet, who came with the following findings.
Overall, the DRC has a high risk of civil war compared to other countries in the region. This is because of their “lower values for per capita income, income growth […], and peace duration, whereas it has higher values for the share of primary commodities in total
exports, ethnic fractionalization, population, and geographic dispersion of the populations, implying a higher risk of civil war.” (Ndikumana and Emizet 2005: 80).
Besides from the factors that are covered by the model, dependency on resources is also of pivotal importance for the conflict in the DRC (Burnley 2011: 7-8). More specifically, the regional concentration of minerals has made the DRC even more vulnerable to conflict (Ndikumana and Emizet 2005: 80). Another factor that makes the DRC vulnerable to conflict has been the long-term erosion of the government’s authority and capacity (Faubert 2006: 6). Because the risk of war is very high, the DRC should wary for trigger factors that make civil war break out. In the past, trigger factors have been the sudden and massive influx of refugees from Rwanda or for example nationality laws that favored certain ethnic groups (Ndikumana and Emizet 2005: 9).
4.2.2. Escaping the conflict trap: aid, regulating natural resources and military intervention
In order to find a fitting solution for the DRC’s conflict trap, it is necessary to determine in what class of risk (as described by Collier et al.) the DRC belongs to. Because of the official peace agreement of 2002, the DRC belongs to the fourth class of risk, which embodies countries that are recently out of war. The main objective for the DRC is therefore to prevent them from falling back into conflict. This requires large aid programs and external military interventions, along with national policy reforms. Moreover, there is a need for multiple, complimentary and accumulative measures, from the DRC’s national government as well as the international community. Overall, there are three types of measures that can help the DRC escape its conflict trap: aid, the regulation of natural resources and military intervention.
With regard to aid, the UN has several programs running in the DRC, which focus both on development as well as security. The prime UN branch that takes on an aiding role with regard to the DRC conflict is the UNDP, which is elaborated on in the following part. The other programs that are aimed at human development, as well as the UNDP efforts that focus more directly on poverty reduction, are elaborated on in §4.3.2. Table 2 gives an overview of the UNDP’s main projects that aim specifically at the conflict in the DRC and the according expenditures. These programs, especially the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), helped to create and stabilize
institutions (Faubert 2006: 24-25; UNDP 2006: 33). Appropriately, the UNDP has taken into account the diverse situations of the DRC
Table 2: UNDP Projects in Support of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process (Faubert 2006: 24)
regions, and has provided different approaches for the eastern and western parts of the country. For example, in the western parts, most programs focused on economic reform and poverty reduction, whereas the programs in the east mostly focused on humanitarian interventions (Faubert 2006: 15; IFAD 2018a, b, c, d). Furthermore, the UNDP has linked several projects to each other, and executed peace talks alongside humanitarian and socioeconomic projects, which contributed to its effectiveness (Faubert 2006: 15-18).
The DRC war is a clear example of how natural resources can affect conflict. The DRC is loaded with resources such gold, diamonds, coltan and other minerals (HCSS 2013: 60). Not only were these resources one of the reasons the war began, the war was also funded and maintained by the exploitation of natural resources (Burnley 2011; Global Witness 2009). Moreover, once this system of exploitation had manifested itself, a war economy was set up. The parties who benefitted from this war economy had little incentives to contribute to ending the war. Some of these major parties that are involved in the exploitation of natural resources are: rebel groups, neighboring countries Rwanda and Uganda, the DRC government via the taxation of state companies, and foreign (Western) banks (Ndikumana and Emizet 2005: 77-79; Samset 2002). In order to combat the illegal exploitation of resources, especially by Rwanda and Uganda, the UN conducted an investigation in 2000 which confirmed that natural resources in the DRC helped to fund weapons for armed groups, force populations to displace, contributed to the violations of human rights and fuel the conflict (Faubert 2006: 7). Based on these findings, the UN recommended that the Security Council enforce sanctions (UN 2001).
In spite of these sanctions, a new UN report announced in 2003 that the illegal exploitation of natural resources still remained a problem, as it served as the main funding for armed groups involved in the conflict (UN 2003b). As a response, the ‘Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth’ recommended to all international companies who trade with the DRC to become more transparent about their transactions; under the guise of “publish what you pay” (UN 2003c). Moreover, the panel also recommended a more efficient border control, as well as dismantling big state-owned mineral resource companies. Also, better integration of new armed forces was needed and a natural resource fund should be effectuated that would ensure that the profits from natural resources would end up with the civilians rather than the armed forces (ibid.).
In 2009, UN habitat together with UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) started to implement a program in the eastern DRC to resolve land-related conflicts, which are strongly tied with the presence of natural resources. With this program,
the UN takes on a mediation role and aims to build capacity for actors involved in the land-related conflicts and creating stability, whilst trying to take into account the DRC’s diversity, ethnic composition and traditions. In 2011, the UN had resolved 402 out of 1984 cases via mediation (UN 2018d). Nevertheless, in that same year the UN security council still noted that there was an urgent need to end illegal exploitation of natural resources, which is also referred to in the expansion of the mandate of the military peace mission in 2011.
The UN military peacekeeping mission ‘MONUC’ (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) started in 1999 after the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed (UN 2018a; Faubert 2006: 17) and is the largest UN military mission so far (Faubert 2006: 17; Vogel 2013; BBC 2017). The role of MONUC and its mandate has changed considerably over time. For example, the mission was renamed MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in 2010, because the conflict in the DRC had entered a new phase that required more drastic measures, which needed to be reflected in the mission (BBC 2018; UN 2018a). This section will explore the efforts of MONUC and MONUSCO to establish peace and stability in the DRC, and how this contributed to an environment that allowed for human development.
Initially, MONUC was establish in 1999 to observe the ceasefire that was agreed upon by the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe (UN 2018e). MONUC was also mandated to assist other UN agencies, related agencies and non-governmental organizations with humanitarian action, with specific focus on vulnerable groups such as women, children and child soldiers. Moreover, MONUC could protect its personnel and civilians that are threatened by physical violence (UN 2018g). Nevertheless, it initially was not granted the power it needed to properly enforce what it was set up to (Dix et al. 2010: 11). Later, the more robust character of MONUC, which took shape in 2004, has resulted in significant improvements in the security of the Eastern DRC (Faubert 2006: 8).
In 2006 the first democratic elections in almost half a century were organized, which the UN contributed greatly to (Faubert 2006: 22-23). After these elections, MONUC stayed present in the DRC and aimed to build the capacity of the political and military institutions, as well as the rule of law. Moreover, MONUC now also gained the mandate to resolve the conflicts that were still ongoing in the eastern parts of the country (UN 2018e). Finally, MONUC contributed to the strengthening of the capacity of the judicial and correctional system (ibid.).
In 2010 MONUC was renamed MONUSCO. Along with its change of name came an expanded mandate that prioritized the active protection of civilians, humanitarian staff and
human rights defenders that are under the direct threat of violence (UN 2018g), and had the task of depriving illegal armed groups of their provisions (UN 2018g). MONUSCO also supported the DRC government in its efforts to stabilize the country and create peace (UN 2018e). In 2012, the Security Council Resolution 2053 stressed the need to address land-related conflicts, inter alia the displacement of people and fights over natural resources, which is a huge factor and underlying cause of the conflict (UN 2018h).
In 2013, a specialized ‘intervention brigade’ was set up to strengthen the mission. It was responsible for neutralizing armed groups and reducing threat to civilians and state authority (UN 2018f). The UN peacekeeping mission has achieved significant successes in the DRC, as it has contributed to the general stabilization in many regions of the country. Nevertheless, the eastern provinces are still terrorized by conflict and the violation of human rights (UN 2018f).
Since 2014, it is the wish of the Security Council to downgrade the number of soldiers for MONUSCO and start developing an exit strategy (UN 2018f). However, this idea is not universally agreed upon. According to Faubert (2006: 14), downsizing the peace mission could cause renewed instability, fragmentation and a set-back for the achievements and the investments of the international community so far. In spite of the plans to cease the mission in the DRC, MONUSCO’s mandate has been expanded for another year in March 2017, so for now the MONUSCO boots will remain on the ground (UN 2018f).
4.3. What the UN is doing to help the DRC escape the poverty trap
First, this paragraph assesses why the DRC is stuck in a poverty trap, after which the UN efforts to help the DRC escape this trap are layed out.
4.3.1. Why is the DRC stuck in a poverty trap?
Like many other African states, the DRC lost their independence to European imperialism in the 18th century. Regaining that independence was nearly impossible, due to the material dominance of their colonizer, the systematic production-based relations of colonial capitalism, and the ideology of white supremacy (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 13). It was in 1885 that King Leopold II of Belgium appropriated the then called ‘Congo Free State’ to himself (Pakenham 1992: 253-255). Because of the excessive violence against- and exploitation of the Congolese people, the Belgian government was forced by the international community to take over control in 1908, which was the beginning of the ‘Belgian Congo’ era (Idem: 588-589).
Although the shift from Leopold to the Belgian Government was a humanitarian improvement, the Belgian rule still remained exploitative and oppressive (Stengers 2005). Politicically, Belgium directly involved the Congo in the two world wars (van Reybrouck 2014; Strachan 2001; Killingray 2012). Economically, Belgium’s main goal was to exploit the Congo for its resources and labor. Consequently, this also meant that the Belgians enhanced the infrastructure by constructing railways (Gondola 2002: 85). On a societal level, the Belgians made impressive developments in the area of education and health care in the Congo (Klingman 1994; de Maere d’Aertrycke et al. 2011). Nevertheless, there was also severe racial segregation where white people were perceived as superior (Turner 2007: 29). After the Belgian rule, which lasted until 1960 (Pakenham 1992: 588-589), Mobutu took over and reigned until he was overthrown by Kabila in 1997 (UN 2018e). Because of the corrupt and authoritarian rule of Mobutu, the DRC (or Zaire as it was called at the time), was suspended from receiving most international aid (Faubert 2006: 6).
This background of colonization is a first indication of a poverty trap, as it illustrates how the DRC was dominated by European countries that overall halted them in their development due to exploitation and oppression. Moreover, the reign of Mobutu shut the DRC off from international investments and aid until the 1990s. On top of this history, GDP figures show that there is no doubt the DRC is stuck in a poverty trap. It has clearly not been able to catch up with the economic growth that many other countries did experience, with China as the prime example. To illustrate; in 1980, the GDP per capita of China was little under $200, whereas the GDP per capita of the DRC was almost $550 (World Bank 2018). Compare this to 2016 and China has caught up by excess, with an GDP per capita of more than $8.100 compared to a meager GDP per capita of $405 in the DRC (see figure 4).
4.3.2. How did the UN help the DRC escape the poverty trap?
In order to help the DRC escape the poverty trap, external intervention is necessary. Because human development issues are strongly connected, it is important to take into account all efforts of the UN in these areas, rather than focusing only on specific poverty reduction programs. The UN has multiple programs and agencies that are active in the DRC. This section discusses the most relevant of these agencies and their efforts to increase the human development of the DRC.
As stated before, when it comes to the issue of aid the UNDP has been of great significance in helping the DRC escape its conflict trap and its poverty trap. First of all, the UNDP has contributed greatly to the re-engagement of international funds, as well as the Bretton Woods Institutions (Faubert 2006: 3-15; Dix et al. 2010: 12). Moreover, from 2003 onwards the UNDP actively supported the government through its transition period, by helping the government set goals, supporting the government in its capacity building and its efforts to involve the international community to support the DRC, for instance with the establishment of the ‘Minimum Partnership Programme for Transition and Recovery’ in 2004 (Faubert 2006: 16-17) and created a Post-Conflict Unit that made the UNDP programs more visible, which in turn attracted more donors and investors (Faubert 2006: 3; Dix et al. 2010: 42-43).
Along with these efforts, the UNDP also started to work closely together with MONUC since the end of 2004 and was one of the key actors in the development of a plan for the post-electoral chapter (Faubert 2006: 3; Dix et al. 2010: 3). The visibility of MONUC and the UNDP and their successes (for example the gradual return of economic activity and a more secure eastern DRC) has led to the support of DRC civilians (Faubert 2006: 14). All and all, the UNDP investments in the DRC is by far the largest in all of Africa (Faubert 2006: 17). In 2013 the total of UNDP projects exceeded $80 billion (UNDP 2017).
However, one side note should be added to this number, which is illustrated in figure 5. As the figure shows, the UNDP expenditures since 2005 mostly focused on democratic governance, rather than MDG
and poverty projects or post-conflict developments. This is not necessarily a problem, since the expenditure in both of these areas also increased.
Nevertheless, the focus on democratic governance overshadows the other areas of development, which meant less attention to capacity building, good governance and corruption (Faubert 2006: 12). For further research, it would be interesting to see what the effects of democratic governance has on the MDGs and the Post-Conflict development.
The UNDP efforts can be divided into three units: The Poverty Reduction Unit (PRU), The Post-Conflict Unit (PCU) and The Governance Unit (GU). The PRU is the most traditional branch, and responsible for the execution of MDG projects. The most important projects of this unit involve community development projects in western provinces, HIV/AIDS projects, tuberculosis and malaria projects, and a program to protect biodiversity. The first PRU projects date back to the 1990s, and over time had to adapt to the new situation regarding the conflict in the DRC. The PCU was created in 2001 and contributed to the visibility of post-conflict programs and attracted many foreign investments for the DRC’s security. Because of its effectiveness, the same model has been replicated in other African countries. Finally, the GU brings together the core services of the UNDP and MONUC in relation to government management, for instance during the transition period with the preparations for the new elections (Faubert 2006: 20-21).
Overall, the UNDP contribution can be reviewed as follows. First of all, in spite of its great successes in involving the international community in the development of the DRC, its success could have been greater if the UN had coordinated better between political negotiations and its humanitarian goals. Secondly, the UNDP became more effective due to the innovative management decisions from the UN that better connected several UN programs. Thirdly, the UNDP profited from the established team that managed gender-issues. Fourthly, the UNDP opened new offices in several provinces, which could contribute to the flexibility of the organization, provided that the offices get authority and responsibility. Otherwise, they risk becoming yet another bureaucratic layer. Fifthly, the UNDP has become more operational due to the close cooperation with NGOs, although the UNDP’s own regulations sometimes restrain the effectiveness of the partnerships. Finally, the overall effectiveness of the UNDP could be improved if financial reports were processed more quickly (Idem: 4).
Although the UNDP is the largest UN agency currently active in the DRC, there are several other programs that have contributed to its human development. First of all, there is the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). The FAO focusses on
three areas in the DRC: improving food security, manage natural resources and resilience against climate change. In its own way, the FAO can help contribute to peace via food
production and strengthening agriculture within vulnerable communities. The FAO states that food security can prevent a country from falling back into conflict. They focus their support on rural communities, ex-combatants, women and youngsters. The FAO has a dual approach: strengthening the livelihoods of civilians as well as strengthening national capacities to provide food security. In turn, increased stability and social cohesion is a step towards sustainable peace and development (FAO 2015).
A third organization that has had a significant impact is the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Over 476.000 households have benefitted from in total seven IFAD programs in the DRC since its first appearance in 1980. The four most relevant projects have started since 2004. The two operations that started in 2004 and 2005 are now completed. Both projects were situated in northern provinces; the 2004 project focused on the Equateur Province, whereas the 2005 program focused on the Orientale province. Both projects aimed to create sustainable livelihoods for the poor rural people (IFAD 2018a; IFAD 2018b). The 2005 project expanded their focus group with young and elderly people and households that are run by women. The 2005 project also gave attention to natural resource management capabilities (IFAD 2018b).
There are two relevant projects that are still active today, which started in 2008 and 2012. The 2008 program was located in the east. Its focus was on rehabilitating the agricultural production and to open up the markets. Its approach especially considers the regions violent background and expands the original focus groups with small-scale farmers, victims of sexual violence, demobilized soldiers, displaced people and people who live with disabilities or HIV/AIDS (IFAD 2018c). The 2012 program is located in the western Kinshasa province. This project aims to expand crop production, in order to supply the urban markets as well as support communities with their efforts to organize productive agriculture. The focus groups for this project are unions and farmers organizations and financial and market actors (IFAD 2018d).
Fourthly, there is the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). UNOPS acts as an operation division of the UN and supports the implementation of peace building, humanitarian and development projects in the DRC. They have been present in the DRC since 1999. UNOPS mainly focusses on building infrastructure, disaster risk management, water and sanitation facilities, and emergency human assistance (UNOPS 2018). The organization also provides technical support to MONUSCO and has mitigated the threat of explosive hazards, which has contributed to safety (ibid.)
A fifth UN organization that is involved with the DRC is the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Although UNESCO has also benefitted the environment in the DRC and the protection of certain cultural sites from exploitation (UNESCO 2018a), with regard to a more humanitarian view UNESCO has mostly been relevant in the area of education. Before 2000, the education demand was much higher than the supply. Fifty percent of children who had primary school age were not enrolled. This was caused by a lack of infrastructure and teaching staff, as well as a shortage of money from the parents (Mumpasi and Pitshandenge 2003: 6). Nevertheless, the DRC has made significant improvements since, as the primary school completion rate has increased from 29% in 2002 to 70% in 2014 (Global Partnership for Education 2018). This because of the high priority Kabila has given to the improvement of education (UNESCO 2018b). During this quest for better education, UNESCO has provided the DRC government with technical support and the input of experts (Dikay 2016).
To combat the violence and inequality against women, the UN Women division has several programs in the DRC that focus on: ending violence against women, supporting the government in its gender-responsive planning and budgeting and help the Ministry of Gender implement its National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, help women gain political leadership and participation and finally empower women economically and female entrepreneurship (UN Women 2018).
The UN AIDS program has significantly helped the DRC in preventing and treating aids. Moreover, the initiative has addressed the stigma around the disease as well as around sexual violence (UN AIDS 2018a). Moreover, the UN Aids program has closely worked together with the DRC government and has helped attract external funds (UN AIDS 2018b).
With 2.2 million people being displaced within the country and over 550.000 refugees who have fled the country (NRC 2017), the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has had their hands full. The UNHCR is omnipresent in the DRC, with fifteen offices and 24 refugee camps, they aim to provide security and development via education and healthcare (UNHCR 2018). With the possible future scaling down of MONUSCO, the UNHCR might get more work if more people are displaced (Refworld 2017). Additionally, the UN Habitat program is focused on creating a better environment in the big cities of the DRC, which is especially important with the influx of refugees (UN Habitat 2018).
Finally, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has contributed to development in the DRC by focusing on several aspects. First of all, UNICEF has improved child survival via better health facilities and especially via vaccination. Secondly, UNICEF
has helped create better access to clean water and sanitation, assisted in the universal access to education for children, protect children from violence and exploitation, as well as help children be properly registered. Finally, UNICEF has made efforts to improve children’s rights on an institutional level and create emergency protection for victims of war, disaster or displacement (UNICEF 2018).
5. Conclusion
All and all, it is clear that the DRC is stuck in a conflict trap and a poverty trap. These traps are inherently linked to each other and mutually reinforcing, which prevent the country from developing. Against this backdrop, it would appear to be against all odds that the DRC has been able to make substantive human development, especially in the areas of education and life expectancy; but it did. According to the literature on the conflict trap and poverty trap, external intervention is an important factor for the development of a trapped country. Because the HDI started to improve from 2000 onward, the same year that the UN established the MDGs which aimed at supporting underdeveloped countries in eight human development areas, I hypothesize that the UN has contributed to the DRC’s pathway towards escaping its traps and has therefore been one of the contributors to the DRC’s human development.
The theory shows that in order to escape the fourth class of the conflict trap – which the DRC is in – external aid, military intervention, and management of resources is needed. The UN contributes to these factors in several ways. First of all, the UNDP plays a large role in providing aid for the DRC, taking into account the diverse regions of the country as well as the connection between different projects. Furthermore, the UNDP has closely worked together with the UN military mission MONUC (later MONUSCO), which helped the programs be more complementary and effective. Although the military mission has not always had the proper mandate, it has overall contributed directly to the safety of the Congolese people and has created a better environment for aid to be more effective. With regard to the regulation of natural resources, the UN has played a more mediating role. Although this is compliant with the necessary actions to help a country escape the conflict trap, in the case of the DRC it showed that more direct action was needed to be effective, which is why measurements were undertaken in 2011 with the new mandate of MONUSCO.
In order to help the DRC escape its poverty trap, one of the necessary steps is international aid. Compliant to the MDG framework, the UN has set up multiple agencies in the DRC that directly aim to overcome several issues in the DRC that prevent it from
escaping the poverty trap. The biggest UN branch that is active in the DRC is the UNDP, which has not only directly benefitted the DRC in the areas of poverty reduction, post-conflict and governance, but has also attracted other international investments. Besides from the UNDP, there are also UN agencies that focus on more specific areas of concern, such as the FAO, IFAD, UNOPS, UNESCO, UN Women, UN AIDS, UNHCR, UN Habitat and UNICEF.
This paper has collected and structured the undertakings of the UN to help the DRC escape the poverty and conflict trap and the UN’s contribution to the DRC’s overall human development. It has shown that the UN has made enormous investments in the DRC’s human development and addressed a broad spectrum of human development issues. Because of its range of diverse yet accumulative projects, the UN has been able to address many different humanitarian issues. This is not only important for the solution of a single issue, but contributes due to their interconnectedness to several issues at a time. Although the DRC is still far from perfect when it comes to human development, the UN has made extensive efforts towards improvement in the 2000-2015 period. However, this massive UN intervention also demands a critical insight in the performance of its projects, in order to optimize their effect. Especially because the DRC is, in spite of its recent development, still suffering. Therefore, further research is needed in order to create a more detailed picture of the effectiveness of each program.
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