Exploring perspectives on the rise of young women living alone in urban Japan

B

ACHELOR

T

HESIS

E

XPLORING PERSPECTIVES ON THE RISE OF YOUNG WOMEN LIVING

ALONE IN URBAN

J

APAN

Second Version

Author: Jana Pasker Student number: 10552472

University of Amsterdam March 2017

2

T

ABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ... 3

METHODOLOGY ... 5

MAIN DRIVERS OF THE RISE OF YOUNG SINGLE WOMEN IN JAPAN ... 8

DISCOURSES FROM DIFFERENT PARTS OF JAPANESE SOCIETY ... 17

COMPARING AND UNDERSTANDING PERSPECTIVES FROM ACADEMIC WRITING AND JAPANESE SOCIETY ... 21

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION ... 24

REFERENCES ... 27

3

I

In recent decades, since the bursting of the economic bubble in the eighties, the Japanese post-war social system has been destabilizing. This post-war social system was based on nuclear family units existing of a male breadwinner in stable life-long employment, a female caregiver and a housing ladder concluding into homeownership of a detached family house (Forrest & Hirayama, 2009; Izuhara, 2015). Every aspect of this system has been challenged in the ongoing period of economic stagnation. Japan’s welfare system that was built on the ‘enterprise society’ or kigyo shakai became prevalent during the 70s and 80s features a strong influence of institutional structures of large companies (Yoda & Harootunian, 2006: 240). Through economic pressures, Japan’s welfare system which was based on life-long employment in a single company has made way for a society featuring more flexible and less secure job opportunities for young people making dependency on a male breadwinner less realistic than it was in the post-war period of economic growth (Iwata & Miyakawa cited in Izuhara, 2015). Young women thus seek alternative life-courses from marrying a male partner whom they would be economically dependent on. There are also less opportunities to acquire homeownership through family-based mortgaged homeownership pathways (Druta, 2015; Forrest & Hirayama, 2009). Even though it is no longer easily achievable, forming male breadwinner family units and climbing the housing ladder leading to homeownership is still seen as the ideal way of achieving adulthood in mainstream society (Izuhara, 2015). However, even though the ideal persists (Cook, 2014; Nakano, 2000),young Japanese women are now delaying marriage and childbirth more often, or abstaining from these matters entirely (Rosenberger, 2007; Nakano, 2015). When compared to young men, especially young women’s life-courses have diversified from the mainstream path towards adulthood, that would for them consist of marrying a male breadwinner before the age of 30, being the main housekeeper and taking care of children (Higuchi & Ohta; Shimazaki cited in Izuhara, 2015). This paper focusses on such a group of young Japanese women, namely the growing group those who are single and live on their own. Research on this group is relevant both nationally and internationally. On a national scale, this group arguably forms a contrast against the traditional values of adulthood for Japanese women, that is mainly characterised by forming families by marriage and childbirth, which leads to various reactions from all

4

different parts of Japanese society. On an international scale, this group seems to be an example of a trend of individualisation among young people that is seen throughout different western countries (Jamieson and Simpson cited in Ronald, 2014). However, as the Japanese context is uniquely characterised by economic constraints and prevalent cultural restrictions, the rise of young singles in Japan offers an interesting contrast to similar trends in other western countries that are characterised by relative economic growth.

In this paper I will focus on the main factors that have been identified in academic literature as driving forces behind the rise of young single women living alone in urban Japan, that have been briefly introduced in this introduction, as well as the way these phenomena are seen in Japanese society through prevalent discourses. As no primary data is used as basis for the analysis and arguments that have been made in this paper, this paper lacks the ability to produce new data. However, I argue that in its objective to provide an overview of driving factors and prevalent discourses from a particular set of sources from different levels of Japanese society, it will provide useful insight into the internationally relevant trend of an increase in young single women living alone in urban Japan. Especially the insight this paper offers into the way different parts of Japanese society react to significant societal changes through discourses, that not only exist apart from each other but also influence each other and the whole of society, is arguably a valuable and unique contribution to the already existing literature on related topics. As a human geographer with a particular interest in urban cases, I give special attention to the spatial significance of the urban context in these discourses and perspectives.

The main question I will answer in this paper is: How is the rise of young single women

living alone in urban Japan understood in academic literature and through prevalent discourses in Japanese society? This paper consists of four main sections that each have a

role in answering the aforementioned research question. The first section will introduce the methodology used in the research for this paper and with that it will also provide a framework to explain the way ‘discourse’ is effectively understood and used in this paper. The second section will describe and analyse the main factors that have been understood to drive the rise of single women living alone in Japan in academic literature, divided under three different categories. These three main drivers are categorised as economic changes, changes on the housing market and lastly demographic and cultural changes. The section will also explore how these changes interact with each other and how they ultimately each can

5

be understood as driving forces behind the rise of single alone-living women in Japan in academic research on this topic. The third section will analyse the way the rise of single women in Japan and the different trends surrounding this phenomenon are understood through discourse in Japanese society from two different but related components of society. These two components that each produce and reproduce a set of discourses and values are the state, represented by examples from policies and political statements by government officials related to single women, and the media, represented by the conversation in the media surrounding popular terms of ‘makeinu’ and ‘onibaba’. While analysing these sets of discourses and values, there will be special attention to the way the rest of Japanese society arguably echoes and reinforces these prevalent discourses. The fourth section will discuss the societal changes and factors that have been used as the main perspectives in academic literature on the rise of single women living alone in Japan, as well as the prevalent discourses that have been perceived to be used by the government and media on this same topic, whilst comparing them and noting relevant similarities and contrasts in their understanding of this same topic. Finally, the paper finishes with a conclusion and discussion.

M

In this first main section of the paper I will elaborate on the methods used in this paper to answer the main research question. As this paper relies solely on secondary data from other academic sources, its main method of research used to fulfil the proposed objectives is meta-analysis of secondary data, mostly consisting of texts and statistics from academic literature. The two biggest analyses in this paper are of the main factors that are seen as the drivers behind the rise of young single women in Japan, and the perceived discourses surrounding this phenomenon from different authoritative sources in Japanese society.

The first, consisting of a meta-analysis of academic texts that are broadly relevant to the case of the rise of young single Japanese women who live alone, is done by analysing the texts for comparative perspectives and contexts the researchers have chosen to see this and various related societal changes in. After identifying three of the most common but different factors that researchers saw as the main drivers to societal change in the last few decades, especially pertaining to young people in Japanese society, they were also considered in

6

relation to each other, in order to create an understanding on how these factors evidently reinforce each other and form a driving force behind the rise of young single women living alone in Japan.

To analyse the perceived discourses in Japanese society surrounding the rise of young single women effectively, there must first be a clear theoretical and methodological basis established on the issue of ‘discourse’ that will be used in this paper. To start, a definition of ‘discourse’ must be established. For the sake of finding one that serves the objective of this paper, the general history and usage of the concept will be explored first. The word discourse itself has several meanings. In the study of language, discourse mainly refers to the use of language and speech patterns in a certain area and group of people who use the same language conventions (Pitsoe & Letseka, 2012). In academic fields of sociology and philosophy, the term discourse is generally used to refer to verbal communication and the meanings behind them within a certain group of people who have certain social norms and values in common. This latter meaning is most in accordance with the one used in this paper. In Foucault’s work, arguably characterised by social constructivism, he argues that our perceived reality and selves are constructed by discourse, that is knowledge that we accept as the truth because it is presented to us by those with a certain amount of power (Foucault cited in Pitsoe & Letseka, 2012: 24). Following Foucauldian ideas about discourse, discourses thus help to normalise the values and notions of those in power (Hook, 2001; van Dijk, 2008; Pitsoe & Letseka, 2012). Those who are in power and have the means of communicating their views to a large part of society that forms the mainstream can present their morality and meaning they give to certain matters as the generally accepted truth, thus hiding the subjectivity of these ‘truths’. This is illustrated well by a quote in Hook’s article on discourse analysis:

“Discursive rules are hence strongly linked to the exercise of power: discourse itself is

both constituted by, and ensures the reproduction of, the social system, through forms of selection, exclusion and domination (Young, 1981: 52).” (Hook, 2001)

Apart from influencing social reality, discourses can also provide insight through their reflection of social systems that are present in society (Hook, 2001). In this case, institutions that produce discourses that form the prevalent discourses in Japanese society and have a

7

certain power over the reproduction of the social system are arguably institutions like the media, including sources like television, papers and magazines, and the state. The language they use to describe certain phenomena, like in this case the rise of single young women in an urban context, is a reflection of the perspectives of certain groups of people, mostly those in power and belonging to the mainstream. In their turn, they also reproduce the social system through the formation of a certain set of values and norms found in the language that they use, spreading these norms and values to a wide audience, consisting of the mainstream population of Japan. This paper does not use discourse analysis as a research method on sets of data like interviews or literary texts, but more accurately consists of a meta-analysis of sets of discourses, values and perspectives on the increasing amount of single women living alone in Japan that have been described in other academic works. However, the approach to the concept of discourses in this paper has much in common with the approach to discourse used in discourse analysis, which is commonly based on Foucauldian and social constructivist theory (Pitsoe & Letseka, 2012; Willig, 2014). Discourse analysts don’t only see discourse as reflective or representational of values in society, but also as constructive of lived experiences and social realities (Willig cited in Stevenson, 2004; Willig, 2014). In this paper, there is a similar focus on the way discourses surrounding the rise of single women living alone in Japan shape the realities that these young women live in everyday life. However, the definition used to describe discourse in this paper will mainly serve to help find these discourses within the academic texts that will be analysed, thus focussing on terminology that represents a certain recognizable set of values. The definition of ‘discourse’ that I use in this paper is the following: A way of framing an

issue or phenomenon by using repeatedly used terminology, that is according to a consistent set of values and ideas. By exploring the ways Japanese young single women are framed in

the texts I will analyse, my aim is to offer insight in the ways these discourses are influencing the social reality of these young women, whose views they really represent and how these discourses are being reproduced. By categorising the discourses I encounter in the academic texts under what part of Japanese society their source is, namely the government or state, the media and the rest of the population of Japan, it will become clear how these discourses interact and reflect each other, as well as their possible influence on the reality of Japanese society and the lived experiences of young single women living alone in Japan.

8

M

J

In this second main section, the main societal drivers of the rise of young single women in Japan will be categorised an overview of three main trends. In academic texts on the topic of young Japanese singles or related topics such as the destabilisation of the Japanese post-war social system, newly emerging lifestyles of young people in Japan, or the changing Japanese housing market, these three changes have been most mentioned as driving forces behind societal changes such as the increasing number of single Japanese women living on their own. Apart from arguably causing this increase, these drivers are in their turn also reinforced by the rise of single Japanese women. A clear one-sided cause-effect relationship between these drivers and related societal changes is thus not present and this is not argued in this paper. To understand the discourses in Japanese society on these societal changes, these three main drivers will be discussed first to form a theoretical basis for understanding how the phenomenon of the rise of young single women in Japan has come into existence in the first place. Apart from discussing them separately, they will also be considered in relation to each other, so that it can be understood how they influence and reinforce their respective effects on society. I have categorised them in accordance to how they usually represent themselves as separate focusses in academic literature with their respective perspectives. The first main driver that will be discussed is economical change, which arguably forms the most prevalent context that is used to understand a broad set of societal changes in Japan, which is a process that has been ongoing since the late 20th century. The second main driver is the change in the Japanese housing market. Arguably strongly related to economic changes, it does provide a unique perspective on societal changes, as it especially focusses on the rise of single-person households and the processes in the housing market relating to this. The last main set of drivers discussed in this section are the changes in demography and culture, mostly entailing the decrease in childbirth in the last decades and the perceived increase in alternative lifestyles among young women differing from more traditional life courses that generally entail marriage before the age of 30, housewifery and childrearing.

9

Economic changes

One of the main perspectives, if not the most common one, in academic literature on the rise of young single women in Japan sees this phenomenon in the context of economic stagnation in the time period following the bursting of the economic bubble in the 80s. However, before this perspective became widespread in the late 90s and 00s, the main focus on women’s relation to economic trends was on inequality in the labour market. Academic texts written in this time period are per example Brinton’s early work on the subject in the end of the 80s and the begin of the 90s (Brinton, 1988; Brinton, 1989; Brinton et al., 1991). In her articles she focusses on systemic gender stratification that presents itself in multiple layers of the social system like the economic institutions of society, the family and the educational system, but she mostly elaborates the role it plays in the labour market. She argues that women are disadvantaged by the different roles for men and women in the labour market, negatively impacting their human capital development system (Brinton, 1988). To name a few examples, she argues that women are less likely to be long-term employees than men (Brinton, 1989) and that women are more likely to experience downward mobility in their career (Brinton et al., 1991). This leaves young women who live on their own and pay for their own living expenses at a disadvantage compared to their male counterparts in the present and later as security when they’re at older age. She expresses the hope that with further participation of women in the labour market, systemic discrimination of women would decrease as well (Brinton et al., 1991). Interestingly enough, the period of the economic bubble that Brinton describes in her previously mentioned works is recently viewed as a more promising period for women participating in the labour force. An example is found in Kurotani’s article on professional Japanese women who entered full-time employment in the bubble generation or baburu sedai (Kurotani, 2014):

“During the economic boom, Japan’s strong economy and the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) suddenly opened up professional opportunities for Japanese women, who had been marginalized for decades in the Japanese corporate world.” (Kurotani, 2014:

10

It could be argued that women’s participation in the labour force is rising and increasingly normalised and wanted (Brinton & Lee, 2016), as working women are more and more recognized as valuable possible consumers in the urban housing market per example (Kubo and Yui cited in Druta, 2015), thus answering Brinton’s hope for further female participation in the Japanese labour market. However, instead of continuing to trend of writing about the arguably shrinking gap between men and women in the Japanese labour market, academic writing after the bursting of the economic bubble in the late 80s and early 90s, on the same topic of the growing number of single alone living women in mostly urban Japan, shows a shift in focus to another set of economic constraints and trends that affect young women and their place in the labour and housing market. Current academic writing uses the economic stagnation that has followed the prosperous post-war period as the main context for describing economic constraints and instability as marginalising forces influencing young single working women (see per example Brinton, 2011; Ronald & Nakano, 2013; Kurotani, 2014; Ronald, 2014; Allison, 2015; Druta, 2015; Izuhara, 2015; Mirza, 2016; Ronald & Izuhara, 2016). An often mentioned example, that can also be found in the aforementioned academic texts, is the destabilisation of economic and welfare institutions that ensured stable income and life-long employment of both older and newer participants in the labour market. In texts focussing on the housing market, the same economic insecurities form limitations for women’s possible pathways into homeownership, as young single women are seen as disadvantaged in both housing and labour markets (Ronald & Nakano, 2013; Ronald & Izuhara, 2016). Many academic texts mentioning the decline and delay in marriage of young Japanese people also link this trend to economic instability, as women can be less sure to depend on a potential husband as the sole breadwinner within the household should they choose to marry (see Ronald & Nakano, 2013; Iwata & Miyakawa cited in Izuhara, 2015). The unsatisfying marriage market as a result of economic stagnation is mentioned as another factor causing the rise of ‘never-marrieds’ and single-person households. In this case, economic stagnation is seen as a cause of the rise of young singles in Japan. This forms a contrast with prevalent western discourses in academic literature that use the cultural phenomenon of individualisation as the main cause for the rise of singles in the western urban context (Jamieson and Simpson cited in Ronald, 2014). As such, current academic work related to economic and housing situations of young single women in urban Japan tends to focus on the limitations because ongoing trends that generally entail economic

11

stagnation and marginalisation of women in housing markets. In general, academic texts both from before and during the current period of economic stagnation frame young single working women in Japan as victims of a multitude of economic trends on the macro scale, who make their personal choices in a framework of limitations.

Changes in the housing market

The second main driving force of the rise of young single women living alone in Japan is the changing housing market. This perspective, when used in academic literature, focusses on household fragmentation and the rise of single-person households and the processes of the housing market relating to this process. It cannot be seen without its relation to the previously discussed economic changes, but it provides an unique focus very relevant to the topic of this paper, namely the living situation of young women who live alone, and how it can be understood with special attention to the issues surrounding housing. As observed by researcher that focus on these housing issues, the housing market changes according to the increasing single-person households, especially in urban contexts, while achieving homeownership through the usual family-based mortgaged pathways grows more and more difficult (Druta, 2015; Forrest & Hirayama, 2009). The fragmentation of family units, leading towards more individualised life-courses, is not only seen in Japan, but also in most other developed societies. In Japan, 31,2% of all households are already made up of one-person households (Ronald, 2014). In Tokyo one-person households even make up about half of all households. About 90% of households consisting of young people aged under 30 in Tokyo rent, while affordability of homeownership continues to deteriorate, dropping numbers of young people under 30 years old owning a home in 2008 to 7.5% nationwide and 7.1% in Tokyo. Homeownership is even harder to achieve for women of all ages, of whom only 7% are homeowners. In Hirayama and Izuhara’s article it is mentioned that unmarried women have only a 1 in 12 chance of achieving homeownership (2008). As ways of achieving homeownership are limited, the chances of women achieving social status as an adult, good quality housing, and financial assets that provide security in older age are also negatively impacted (Ronald & Nakano, 2013, Druta, 2015; Ronald & Izuhara, 2016). Apart from the difficulty of finding their way into the standardized life-course of marrying and enjoying homeownership and security in later life through a single-earning husband, it is also argued that women live alone as singles for other reasons, namely by choice. Being single and living

12

alone are also explained by women as a means to achieve and maintain personal freedom of choice in matters as work, possible romantic relationships, and lifestyle (Ronald and Nakano, 2013). An example of this perspective is seen in the case that Kubo and Yui present in their article (2011). They illustrate the case of the rising number of single women in their 30s and 40s living as condominium residents in central Tokyo. They argue that not all the female homeowners they describe are necessarily significantly economically successful:

“Single women who purchased the condominiums were not necessarily rich and professional workers. They chose owner-occupied residences because the monthly rent of their previous residences was so high that occasionally the monthly mortgage payment was less than, or equal to, the rent. Thus, they wanted to improve their living condition by purchasing their own house. Moreover, they must have also evaluated the facilities available in condominiums as compared to those of rental apartments (Yui, 2003), and concluded that condominiums have better provisions.” (Kubo & Yui, 2011: 10)

From their research, it is concluded that within the unique context of Tokyo there are enough opportunities to satisfy the housing needs of single women who form one-person households. Kubo and Yui argue that single women make this choice as a way of achieving independence and financial security for when they are of older age. As seen in surveys, single women contribute to 19.5% of condominium residents in central Tokyo in 2001 and 2003 (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism cited in Kubo & Yui, 2011: 7). Still, it seems hard to believe that all women have the income to be able to purchase their own home, but it seems that the unique housing market in Tokyo is at least more accommodating to single women who have a reasonably stable income and are willing to make an investment. It can be concluded from this analysis of academic texts on the subject of the housing market in relation to the growing group of Japanese women who live alone that this group is sometimes seen as a victim of restraints that limit possible pathways towards homeownership, and thus more traditional pathways towards achieving adulthood and security in later life, and is other times seen as a suitable target group for new emerging types of homeownership, like that of the condominiums in central Tokyo. However, even this type of homeownership only reinforces the single status of women who form one-person households, thus arguably also contributing to the rise of single Japanese women, especially in the urban context of Tokyo.

13

Demographic and cultural changes

The final factor that is considered of significant connection to young single women living alone in Japan is inevitably connected to the previously discussed economical shifts. (Ronald and Nakano, 2013; Ronald, 2014; Izuhara, 2015; Brinton & Lee, 2016; Nakano, 2016; Izuhara & Ronald, 2016). As many academic texts argue as mentioned before, the difficulty of achieving stable employment and owner-occupied housing has created an unsatisfying marriage market, as the nuclear family model with a sole male breadwinner becomes less realistic (Ronald and Nakano, 2013; Ronald, 2014; Izuhara, 2015; Nakano, 2016). As a result, the changing of gender roles in the labour market and in family life, as Japanese women more often need to work to sustain their livelihood, cause cultural shifts as well. As Brinton & Lee mention in their article, prevalent national ideals that imagine women as natural caregivers who are meant to function as stay-at-home wives are at odds with the rising number of women participating in the labour force (2016). This discrepancy is created by the cultural changes that changing gender roles cause. Academic texts that mention cultural and moral aspects of the phenomenon of young single women in Japan, particularly those that participate in the labour force and are economically independent, have generally focussed on gender roles imbedded in traditional culture and the disadvantages they bring for these women (see Brinton, 1988). Other than in the context of employment, gender stratification is perceived in all layers of Japan’s social reality, also including the family and the educational system. Academic texts that were written in the current ongoing period of economic stagnation after the burst of the bubble have shifted their focus to the way these gender roles are shifting and changing under the context of economic stagnation and the increasing female workforce (see Nakano, 2000; Brinton, 2011; Allison, 2015; Izuhara, 2015; Brinton & Lee, 2016; Mirza, 2016; Nakano, 2016). This phenomenon is often framed as women’s changing life courses and is often seen as a direct effect of economic stagnation as discussed under the previous topic. Together with the phenomenon of changing gender roles, terms like the ‘crisis of the family’ and dissipating ‘social thickness’, illustrate trends that move away from the traditional family and gender role model (see Allison, 2015; Brinton & Lee, 2015).

14

As less women take on the role of the housewife and form nuclear families, they suffer from increased risks as they have less of a secure support system to back them up, Allison per example argues (2015). Furthermore, it is argued that the state and market have not responded adequately to diversifying life courses and alternative roles in society that more and more women take on, causing even more loss of support from these areas for young single women in Japan (Izuhara, 2015). It seems that, in accordance with young single women being the victim of economic pressures and stagnation, which was discussed under the previous topic, young single women are generally seen as victims of their own singlehood in academic writings on the topic of shifting female roles in Japanese society. Young single women seem to be caught between fulfilling the traditional role of domestic caretakers and their limitations to actually access this normalized life course (see Nakano, 2000; Izuhara, 2015; Nakano, 2016). Statistics seem to support this view, as 89.3% of never married women still intend to marry someday in 2015, a number that has even risen in the period from the begin of this century and the period of economic stagnation, as the corresponding number in 1997 was 89.1% (IPSS, 2016). Even though 18.2% of never-married women who took the survey see being a full-time housewife as their ideal life course, only 7.5% actually intend to follow this life course, a number that has dropped drastically from about 25% since 1987, a year that falls in the period of the economic bubble. As they stay unmarried, women are described to be in a bad position, as female one-person households have poor access to improved housing conditions and property asset security (Ronald & Nakano, 2013; Izuhara, 2015; Ronald & Izuhara, 2016). Furthermore, the delay of marriage also causes unmarried women to have difficulty with being seen as a ‘proper adult’ or

ichininmae (Rosenberger, 2007). As becoming a wife and mother is seen as part of a

woman’s achievement of true adulthood, these matters are still seen as the proper life course every woman should take (Rosenberger, 2007; Nakano, 2016). Academic texts mostly frame women who don’t marry as not rejecting this traditional life course, but not being able to achieve it. An example seen in Nakano’s texts, where she focusses on women’s difficulty with negotiating marriage in three major asian cities, with Tokyo being one of them (2016). She argues that, beside problems in the marriage market, the trade-offs women must make between matters as their own education and employment and the expectations of fertility when married keep women from making the choice to marry. Even though these difficulties persist, she argues that young single women feel much pressure to marry on schedule,

15

before they are deemed too old to marry. As seen in this example, women are seen as victims of the limitations of their opportunities to marry, even though they are very much willing to get married within the ideal timeframe. The discrepancy between the idealised norm of a Japanese woman’s domestic caregiver role and the actuality of the situations of the single women who took the survey seems obvious, reflecting the perspective many academic writers have shown to take on the topic.

In public national media, there generally are two somewhat contrasting views on gender roles in the contemporary context of economic stagnation (Nakano, 2000). The media often judge the alternative identities and life courses of young single alone living Japanese women depending on if they’re perceived to be selfish, as they refuse to fulfil their natural caregiver roles, or contribute to society in a neoliberal sense, by participating in the labour force in this time of economic instability. Either the return to the post-war model of the nuclear family featuring a full-time housewife role for married women is idealised, or the social and economic contribution of the working woman is recognized and valued. Following the latter way of thinking, the individualistic notion of the responsibility to sustain and care for oneself is used to weigh the value of a single working woman’s identity (Allison, 2015). However, this notion is arguably used to obscure the increasing labour flexibility and instability that brings economic insecurity for young workers, by advocating free choice of lifestyle and responsibility (Mirza, 2016). This individualistic notion is the most applicable to urban contexts like Tokyo, as women in Tokyo are less constrained by the traditional views that place women in more rural places in the role of the domestic caregiver as a default (Rosenberger, 2007). Women in Tokyo are under less pressure to marry from their family, neighbours and peers than women from less urban regions, where marriage and the strength of the multigenerational household is emphasized. In less urban regions, women are also less exposed to information of new lifestyles, full-time job opportunities and unmarried peers which are phenomena related to the growingly prominent alternative to traditional gender roles, which are thus mostly confined to the urban context. Apart from this newly emerged individualistic perspective, an arguably more prevalent perspective on women’s gendered roles that advocates the nuclear family model, placing women in the role of a full-time housewife married to a sole breadwinning husband, remains at the forefront of mainstream ideals (Nakano, 2000). Young women who remain single beyond the generally idealised age of marriage in their late 20s are still negatively looked upon (Nakano, 2016).

16

The decline in marriage naturally also leads to a decline in childbirths in the Japanese context, as less than 2 percent of children are born outside of marriage (Ronald, 2014; Mirza, 2016). The average number of children per woman in Japan last year was 1.41, which makes for an even lower fertility rate than other post-industrial countries like the UK with a fertility rate of 1.89 and the Netherlands with 1.78 children per woman (CIA, 2016). The demographic shift, that has been mentioned in many academic texts on the topic of the rise of young single women in Japan, demonstrates a second demographic transition, which manifests itself as a decrease in marriage and fertility (Jones cited in Ronald, 2014). As the trend goes on, it forms a large concern for Japan as a nation because of its rapidly ageing population, which obviously brings a myriad of problems with it (Ronald, 2014; Brinton & Lee, 2016; Yamaguchi, 2006).

All in all, the factor of demographic and cultural changes that is illustrated in academic literature as a driving force behind the rise of Japanese single women, is also seen as an important effect of this societal change, that cannot be seen as a separate trend from the earlier discussed economic changes. In this case especially, I argue that these demographic and cultural changes of women’s gender roles in Japan and the phenomenon of the rise of young single women living alone in Japan reinforce and amplify each other.

17

D

J

This third section will analyse the way the rise of single women in Japan and the different trends surrounding this phenomenon are understood through discourse from two different but related components of Japanese society with a certain authoritative power. The definition of discourse that I will use in identifying them through meta-analysis of academic texts and statistics is the following: A way of framing an issue or phenomenon by using

repeatedly used terminology, that is according to a consistent set of values and ideas. I will

thus distinguish them by the perceived sets of values and ideas that they each represent, with examples of the terminology they use that reflects these values and ideas. The first of these two institutions that I will use to represent different perspectives from different viewpoints in Japanese society is the state or the government. I will discuss the most prominent discourses perceived to be used by this authoritative group of people by analysing examples of policies and political statements that relate to the topic of young single women living alone in Japan used in other academic works. The second institution in Japanese society with significant influence that will be discussed in this section is the media. As briefly mentioned in the previous section, there are multiple discourses to be identified that are highlighted by the media. An interesting case of two contrasting discourses, that will be used for this component as representative, is the conversation surrounding the popular terms of ‘makeinu’ or loser dog and ‘onibaba’ or demon hag. While analysing both of these sources of prevalent discourses, there will be special attention for the way in which these discourses are perceived to influence the rest of Japanese society, especially young single women, and how they are echoed and reinforced by them. The two sources are able to illustrate a fairly complete picture of the most prevalent discourses on young Japanese women living alone in Japanese society. However, it must also be mentioned that the only data this paper relies on are other academic texts on related topics. The prevalent discourses that researchers have chosen to mention in their works are thus the only used sources of information, and could thus offer only a limited scope of perspectives and discourses that are present in Japanese society. Even though this analysis arguably has its limits, it still provides insight into the perspectives of different groups of people that compose Japanese society that are of differing interest, authority and influence, but that all significantly

18

influence national discourse and ideals. With this, this paper offers significant insight into the ways prevalent discourses in Japanese society are interacting, distributed and reproduced on different levels.

Government discourse

Significant discourses in Japanese society following the period of economic stagnation are mostly spread by national media and the government and take on two forms when considering the role of young Japanese women in the labour market (Mirza, 2016). The first neoconservative discourse advocates a return to the traditional Japanese model in the pursuit social order that is characterised by a gendered division in the labour force, that entails life-long employment for married men and women quitting their jobs when married to spend all their time caring for their children and being a housewife. The second prevalent discourse can be seen as a neoliberal approach, advocating increased liberalisation of the labour market in the context of recent economic globalisation. Even though these two prevalent discourses value the role of the flexible young female worker differently, both discourses typically emphasize a return to national spirit and morality, urging women to marry and quit their jobs once they do. Government discourse typically frames single women as in need of a family to devote themselves to:

“Furthermore, some government discourse classifies single women as unstable and in need of enclosure within a family. Labeled as not-yet-married, ‘‘An unmarried person is expected in the census to comply with the prevalent marital norm at some future point in time’’.” (Hinz cited in Rosenberger, 2007: 93)

An example of a government program that follows these discourses is a tax incentive that aims to persuade women to return to the role of the housewife and out of their positions in the labour force (Bishop cited in Mirza, 2016: 24). The trends that are seen as a problem, as they contrast with the values advocated in these discourses, namely declining marriage and increasing female participation in the labour force, are thus met with denunciation and criticising by the media and the government of young people and particularly young women in Japan (Rosenberger, 2007). Perhaps because of the scale of and interest in the problems of the declining marriage and childbirth, both the government and

19

popular public media tend to frame young single women who don’t marry and bear children as the guilty party that is causing this ‘crisis of the family’, which is illustrated well with this quote from Yamaguchi’s article:

“Low birth rate is considered to be more the fault of women than men, and women are still judged in terms of their reproductive capacity. This ideology can be seen in a remark by Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro in 2001 that 'it's both wasteful and sinful for women to live beyond menopause' and that 'such useless human beings are extremely harmful for the whole planet'.” (Yamaguchi, 2006)

Illustrated in this quote is the extreme stance that not only holds women responsible for devoting themselves to childrearing, but even labels non-childbearing women as not worthy of existence, not seeing them as even possibly useful outside of this traditional role as motherhood. Perhaps these extreme views are not as widespread as the discourse that accuses women of causing problems like the decline in fertility, but it still presents an impressive case of extremity following the same general set of values, as its source is a governor with significant authoritative power. This prevalent discourse evidently places the responsibility of marrying and having children with individual women, while they fail to recognize large scale processes that make it difficult for women to achieve marriage and the capacity to care for children even if they wanted to. Following this line of thinking, successive Japanese governments have kept their focus on the normative nuclear family, with per example an increase in support for working wives within such families (Izuhara & Ronald, 2016). However, households that don’t comply to the norm, including one-person households of single young women, receive little support from the government.

These prevalent discourses that are validated by the government, an institution with authoritative power, are inevitably echoed in mainstream discourse. In Rosenberger’s article, she argues that young women have difficulty of achieving adulthood in the eyes of elders and peers, because of their delay of or decline to marriage and childrearing, unless they are very economically successful (Rosenberger, 2007). As Nakano concluded in her article, this prevalent discourse causes uncertainties about the life choices young volunteers make as they negotiate their priorities (2000). Mainstream values arguing for gendered roles in the labour market and at home thus even form a prevalent and persuasive influence to the lives

20

of young people that follow life courses that divert from the norm. Young Japanese women who live alone are also inevitably influenced by this mainstream prevalent discourse as they arguably also echo these values unto themselves and their peers.

Discourse in media

Popular media has spread the terms of makeinu and onibaba that condemn unmarried women, especially beyond the age of 30, causing the terms to even be used in everyday language. This is another example of the prevalent discourse criticising young and older single women who don’t marry and bear children, as they are being held at fault for the declining rate of marriage and childbirth (Yamaguchi, 2006). Besides the prevalent discourse that places responsibility of homemaking and childrearing with women, there is also a somewhat alternative discourse to be recognized in mostly the urban context of Tokyo. A good example of this is Sakai Junko’s book, Makeinu no Toboe, or Howl of the Loser Dog. Perhaps ironically, the term makeinu or loser dog Sakai used in a satirical tone to refer to unmarried, economically independent women was ‘misread’ and used as a negative descriptor in the prevalent discourse that condemns unmarried women (Yamaguchi, 2006). In her book, Sakai frames makeinu as highly educated and economically independent women who make the most out of their interesting and fun lives in the urban context of Tokyo, which offers cultural richness in the form of nice restaurants and similar forms of entertainment. She criticises the prevalent discourse that frames unmarried women as unhappy, because they are single and don’t have children, and that idealises the kind of ‘womanly happiness’ that is supposed to come from having kids. However, as having a high education, a very successful career and a home in a fashionable district of Tokyo is a prerequisite for being a makeinu like Sakai describes, the fun lifestyle she advocates for is actually only possible for a very limited number of single Japanese women. This arguably positivistic, individualistic stance that allows the identity of single Japanese women who live alone to be of value is only applicable to a very limited group of economically successful women living in an urban context. Young single women living per example in a more rural part of Japan are already excluded from the positive influence of this discourse, as are women with less stable incomes and part-time and temporary jobs, whose numbers are still rising in the context of economic stagnation.

21

This discourse that criticises unmarried women above a certain age that is echoed in popular media and all of mainstream society inevitably places much pressure upon young single women who live alone. It is of no surprise that it is also echoed by single women themselves, as mainstream values continue to form a persuasive influence and the ideal to marry and mainly economically depend on a future husband persists (Nakano, 2000; Izuhara, 2015; IPSS, 2016).

C

J

In this section I will offer an overview of my findings of the generally observed perspectives that have been identified in the previous sections and offer further insight into the way academic researchers and authoritative sources in Japanese society look upon the same phenomenon of the rise of young single Japanese women living alone. In this way, general similarities and contradictions of the found perspectives will become clear so that further understanding on young single women living alone in urban Japan can be achieved.

First, I would like to direct attention to the societal trend that has domineered and framed all perceived perspectives relevant to the phenomenon of the rise of young single Japanese women in the academic sources that were analysed in this paper. The economic stagnation, that follows the bursting of the bubble period of the 80s and early 90s and is still ongoing, has restructured Japanese society in such a way that it changed the way people see trends in all layers of society, including the labour market, the housing market, cultural norms and values including gender roles and significant demographic trends of marriage and childbirth rates. Understandably, the rise of young single Japanese women who live on their own is also seen as a result of this restructuring force. As it seems from the discourses that have been identified in this paper, academic writers, the Japanese media, the Japanese government and young Japanese single women themselves all see and judge the rise of young single Japanese women in the light of the economic stagnation that is experienced in all layers of Japanese society. Only perspectives from before the bursting of the bubble, as seen per example in Briton’s early work (1988; 1989; Briton et al., 1991), aren’t framed by this economic restructuring.

22

However, the way academic perspectives frame the role of young single women living alone in urban Japan differs greatly from that of the Japanese government, media and society. I argue that it can be concluded that academic writing that focusses on changing life courses of young Japanese people, including young single Japanese women, sees their role in a framework of constraints and limitations rather than in one of free choices. The role of the domineering force of economic stagnation is in this case limiting, often described as bringing economic instability and the crumbling of the post-war Japanese welfare system, which featured access to stable full-time employment, homeownership and the normalised and idealised formation of nuclear families (see Brinton, 2011; Ronald & Nakano, 2013; Kurotani, 2014; Ronald, 2014; Allison, 2015; Druta, 2015; Izuhara, 2015; Mirza, 2016; Ronald & Izuhara, 2016). An example that seems to be an exception to the rule is the rise of female homeowners of manshions or condominiums in central Tokyo, as illustrated by Kubo and Yui (2011). However, this is only the case in the unique context of relative economic stability in Tokyo by women that are mostly in their 30s and 40s. Younger single women and women outside of the specific urban context of Tokyo are still mainly seen as under pressure to marry, as the ideal of marriage and even traditional female roles of housewifery and motherhood persist, many academic writings argue (see Nakano, 2000; Izuhara, 2015; Brinton & Lee, 2016; Nakano, 2016). In contrast, national mainstream discourses in Japan, most significantly formed and reflected by national media and the government because of their authoritative power, frame the role of single Japanese women in processes like familial fragmentation and the decline in marriage and childbirth in another way. In most prevalent discourses that can be perceived on the national level, women are held accountable for the aforementioned processes (see per example Yamaguchi, 2006). They are more or less seen as active agents, in contrast to the constrained victims most academic texts will describe. Apart from the more prevalent mainstream discourse that argues for the return to traditional female roles, in which women are expected to quit their job at least for a while whilst raising their children and functioning as a housewife, there also seems to be a significant discourse from an individualistic, economically liberal standpoint, recently emerged from the current situation of economic stagnation. This alternative discourse, which is arguably exclusively applicable to urban contexts like Tokyo, would have women increasingly participating in the labour force, while also emphasizing individualistic ideals of responsibility (see Allison, 2015; Mirza, 2016). Like the conservative discourse which

23

idealises traditional gender roles, this discourse also sees women responsible and accountable for their behaviours, while seemingly ignoring systematic constraints that limit young single women’s options.

As individual findings, observations of mainstream values and statistics from surveys in academic writings that include individual aspirations and reflection of the values of young single Japanese women who live alone find, the previously described prevalent discourses are also internalised by young single Japanese women themselves. Marriage and having children is still seen by them as the ideal while staying single is seen as undesirable (Nakano, 2000; Izuhara, 2015; Brinton & Lee, 2016; Nakano, 2016; IPSS, 2016). I argue that this is a clear example of prevalent discourses having significant effects on the social reality in Japanese society. More examples of these significant effects include government policies that support women in nuclear family situations while one-person households, including those consisting of young single women, are not assisted (Izuhara & Ronald, 2016). Arguably, the will of government officials to achieve social order around their plans for the reestablishment of a prosperous national economy is reflected in policies and discourses as these. Western academic texts that have formed the basis for this paper don’t seem to have any influence on government policies, as they argue for the recognition of systematic constraints single women face, which aims to direct attention to systematic processes that follow from the context of economic stagnation, while discrediting the popular belief that frames single women as purposefully selfish as they ignore their duties as female citizens. Even as trends of increasing female labour participation, the increasing amount of single women and the destabilising of the normative nuclear family model continue, traditional ideals in the minds of Japanese mainstream society don’t seem to deteriorate consequently. This arguably shows the immense influence of prevalent discourses, most significantly produced and reproduced by the Japanese media and government, on the minds of Japanese people, including young single women who live alone in urban Japan.

24

C

To summarise the central arguments of this paper, I would like to answer the main research question that was proposed in the introduction: How is the rise of young single women living

alone in urban Japan understood in academic literature and through prevalent discourses in Japanese society? First, three different but related perspectives in academic literature on the

rise of young single women living alone in urban Japan have been distinguished, each using a major societal change as a context for understanding this phenomenon. These major societal changes are economic changes, changes in the housing market and demographic and cultural changes. Using these as perspectives, academic researchers have most often understood young single women living alone in Japan as limited by constraints that have been brought into society by economic stagnation and other societal changes that are closely related to this ongoing trend. Secondly, seemingly in contrast, discourses that were found to be produced and reproduced by the authoritative sources of the government and national media most often frame young single Japanese women as the cause of societal trends like the decline of marriage and fertility rates. Of course, significant alternative perspectives are also present on both sides. In academic writing, single women who emerge as homeowners of condominiums in central Tokyo are framed as independent agents who are in pursuit of further personal independence. In popular media, the self-described

makeinu advocate alternative life choices, characterised by lasting economic independence

and a fun contemporary urban lifestyle, different from the traditional conservative role mostly idealised in prevalent national discourse. In all of the identified understandings of the phenomenon of the rise of young single women living alone in Japan, the ongoing period of economic stagnation and restructuring that can be experienced in all layers of Japanese society has been of most importance in their framing of the issue and related issues like the increasing average age of marriage and childbearing. As far as implications for social reality in Japanese society goes, the prevalent national discourse arguably has the biggest influence in areas ranging from policy to everyday conversation and even self-reflection of young single women.

However, I do by no means want to imply that this paper offers a purely objective look into the many perspectives and discourses it has described and tried to understand, as this paper as an academic writing arguably offers its own perspective discourse, which is based

25

on a certain set of values and consists of the use of a certain set of terminologies that it uses to understand the phenomenon of young single Japanese girls living alone in urban Japan. In this sense, it is no different from the discourses and perspectives it has criticised, analysed and generalised. Using terminology like ‘prevalent discourse’, it offers a certain outlook on social realities that isn’t free of subjectivity. Furthermore, as no originally found data have been presented in this paper as it consists entirely of commentary upon secondary data, it misses the opportunity to build upon material that is free of subjective charge, with the exception perhaps of the used statistical numbers. This paper may even feed into the most commonly seen discourses that can be found in academic writing on the same topic, as it finally understands young single women who live alone in urban Japan as disadvantaged by the influences of prevalent discourses, in which they take more of a passive role than that of an active agent.

Finally, I would like to conclude with some thoughts considering the social and policy implications of prevalent discourses that have been emphasized before. following the Foucauldian theory on discourse, which was mentioned in the first section of this paper, perceived social realities should have as much of an influence on prevalent discourses as prevalent discourses have on social realities. However, I argue that in this case, prevalent discourse that idealises a traditional view of gender roles and labour divisions persists even in times of significant change in these areas. The ideals persecuted by the prevalent discourse that has been identified in this paper seem to persistently stick with people in all of Japanese society. A possible cause for this persistence is the role of those with authoritative power over discourse, namely government officials that still design policies and narratives according to the social order and norms that characterised the post-war system, which has arguably been crumbling since the end of the last century. These same discourses which consist of traditional values are again being echoed in popular media, and so these values keep being spread with a certain authoritative force. As argued before, these traditional values still influence and pressurise young single Japanese women, keeping ideals that are growingly unrealistic alive. As these ideals keep getting further away of attainable reality for young Japanese women, the judgement and value of their identities as perceived by others and themselves will be increasingly negatively impacted. To prevent this negative trend to continue, I argue that the prevalent discourse that dictates ideals that are no longer attainable has to change. Perhaps this change will naturally occur over time as a new

26

generation gradually takes over the authoritative positions of government officials and those who work in popular media, but as concluded in this paper, ideals following the same conservative notions still persist even in the minds of young Japanese people. Perhaps there should be more of a focus on changing the minds of young people, so that when the next generation takes over the positions of the old, prevalent discourse will be formed from a different set of values and interests than that it is now, namely those in accordance to the current social and economic trends Japan faces.

27

R

Allison, A. (2015) “Discounted Life: Social Time in Relationless Japan”, Boundary 2, 42(3): 129-141.

Bishop, B. (2000) “The Diversification of Employment and Women’s Work”, In: Eades, J. S., Gill, T. and Befu, H., eds., Globalization and Social Change in Contemporary Japan.

Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 93–109.

Brinton, M. C. (1988) “The Social-Institutional Bases of Gender Stratification: Japan as an Illustrative Case”, American Journal of Sociology, 94(2): 300-334.

Brinton, M. C. (1989) “Gender Stratification in Contemporary Urban Japan”, American

Sociological Review, 54(4): 549-564.

Brinton, M. C., Ngo, H. Y., Shibuya, K. (1991) “Gendered Mobility Patterns in Industrial Economies: The Case of Japan”, Social Science Quarterly, 72(4): 807-816.

Brinton, M. C. & Lee, D. J. (2016) “Gender-Role Ideology, Labor Market Institutions, and Post-industrial Fertility”, Population and Development Review, 42(3): 405–433.

CIA (2016) The World Factbook: Total Fertility Rate,

url: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2127.html

(accessed on January 10, 2017). Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency.

Cook, E. E. (2014) “Intimate expectations and practices: freeter relationships and marriage in contemporary Japan”, Asian Anthropology,13(1): 36-51.

van Dijk, T. A. (2008) Discourse and Power. Hampshire: Palgrave Mcmillan.

Druta, O. (2015) “Young adults’ pathways into homeownership in Tokyo: Shifting practices and meanings”, Houwel working paper series, working paper 10.

Forrest, R., Hirayama, Y. (2009) "The Uneven Impact of Neoliberalism on Housing Opportunities", International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 33: 998-1013. Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and punish. New York: Pantheon.

28

Higuchi, Y., Ohta, K. (2004) Josei tachi no Heisei Fukyo [Heisei Recession for Women]. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbun sha.

Hinz, C. (2004) “Women beyond the pale: Marital ‘misfits and outcasts’ among Japanese women entrepreneurs”, Women’s Studies, 33: 453–479.

Hirayama, Y. and Izuhara, M. (2008) “Women and housing assets in context of Japan’s home owning democracy”, Journal of Social Policy 37(4): 641–660.

Hook, D. (2001) Discourse, knowledge, materiality, history : Foucault and discourse analysis, url: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/953/1/DiscourseknowledgeTODAY.pdf (accessed on January 10, 2017). London: LSE Research Online.

Iwata, K. & Miyakawa, T. (2003) Ushinawareta 10 nen no shin-in ha nanika [Exploring Real Reasons Behind the Lost Decade]. Tokyo: Tokyo Keizai Shinpo sha.

Izuhara, M. (2015) “Life-course Diversity, Housing Choices and Constraints for Women of the ‘Lost’ Generation in Japan”, Housing Studies, 30(1): 60-77.

Jones, G.W. (2007) “Delayed marriage and very low fertility in Pacific Asia”, Population and

Development Review, 33(3): 453-478.

Kubo, T. & Yui, Y. (2011) "Tranformation of the Housing Market in Tokyo since the Late 1990s: House Purchases by Single Person Households", Asian and African Studies, XV(15): 3-21.

Kurotani, S. (2014) “Working Women of the Bubble Generation”. In: Capturing

Contemporary Japan: Differentiation and Uncertainty, Eds. Kawano, S., Roberts, G. S., Long, S.

O.. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press: 83-104.

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (2001) Heisei 13 nen shutoken

hakusho [White Paper on the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 2001]. Tokyo: National Printing

Bureau of Japan.

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (2003) Heisei 15 nen shutoken

hakusho [White Paper on the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 2001]. Tokyo: National Printing

29

Mirza, V. (2016) “Young Women and Social Change in Japan: Family and Marriage in a Time of Upheaval”, Japanese Studies, 36(1): 21-37.

Nakano, L. (2000) “Volunteering as a Lifestyle Choice: Negotiating Self-Identities in Japan”,

Ethnology, 39(2): 93-107.

Nakano, L. (2016) “Single Women and the Transition to Marriage in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Tokyo”, Asian Journal of Social Science, 44: 363-390.

IPSS (2016) The fifteenth Japanese National Fertility Survey in 2015: Marriage Process and

Fertility of Married Couples Attitutdes toward Marriage and Family among Japanese Singles.

Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.

Pitsoe, V. & Letseka M. (2012) “Foucault’s Discourse and Power: Implications for Instructionist Classroom Management”, Open Journal of Philosophy, 3(1): 23-28. Ronald, R. (2014) “The Remarkable Rise and Peculiar Context of Younger One-Person Households in East Asian Cities”, Centre of Urban Studies Working Paper Series, Working paper 11.

Ronald, R., Izuhara, M. (2016) “Emerging Adulthood Transitions in Japan: The Role of Marriage and Housing Careers”, Asian Journal of Social Science, 44: 391-415.

Ronald, R., Nakano, L. (2013) “Single women and housing choices in urban Japan”, Gender,

Place & Culture, 20(4): 451-469.

Rosenberger, N. (2007) “Rethinking Emerging Adulthood in Japan: Perspectives from Long-term Single Women”, Child Development Perspectives, 1(2): 92-95.

Shimazaki, N. (2008) Life Course no Shakai gaku [Sociology of the Life Course]. Tokyo: Gakubun sha.

Stevenson, C. (2004) “Theoretical and methodological approaches in discourse analysis”,

Nurse Researcher, 12(2): 17-29.

30

Willig, C. (2014) “Discourses and Discourse Analysis”. In: Flick, U., Scott, W., Metzler, K., eds.,

The SAGE Handbook Of Qualitative Data Analysis. London: SAGE Publications, 341-353.

Yamaguchi, T. (2006) “'Loser Dogs' and 'Demon Hags': Single Women in Japan and the Birth Rate”, Social Science Japan Journal, 9(1): 109-114.

Yoda, T., Harootunian, H. (2006) Japan After Japan: Social and Cultural Life from the

Recessionary 1990s to the Present. Durham: Duke University Press.

Young, R. (1981) Untying the text: a post-structural anthology. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Yui, Y. (2003) “Daitoshi ni okeru shinguru josei no manshon kōnyū to sono haikei [Housing Purchase by Single Women in Tokyo]”, Kikan Chirigaku [Quarterly Journal of Geography], 55: 143-161.

31

O

VERVIEW OF CHANGES FOR

2

_VERSION

-Redefined the research question. -Redefined the structure of the thesis. -Shortened the introduction.

-Separate section for methods.

-Separated analysis of main drivers behind the rise of single women living alone in Japan from the analysis of main discourses observed in Japanese society on the same topic. -Broke down the different aspects/drivers into economic, housing, demographic/cultural.

Content of thesis

-Tried framing a more clear approach this paper uses to ‘discourse’ used in analysis.

-Avoided using topics or concepts like ‘neoliberal discourse’ and ‘conservative discourse’ and ‘traditional gender roles’ without sufficient definition or conceptualising.

-Avoided using repetitive arguments.

-Put more focus on the aspects of urban and housing topics.

Layout

-Bigger font. -Larger spacing.