Graduate School of Social Sciences
Master Political Science: European Union in a Global Order
Research Project: The EU and its Immediate Neighbours:
practices of policy-making and policies in practice
Master thesis:
What does Frontex sell?
The rapid evolution of an EU agency in a state of crisis.
Implications for policy and research.
Submitted by: Filippos Metaxas Angeletatos / Student number: 11126841
Supervisor: Dr. A. (Andrey) Demidov
AMSTERDAM
June 2016
Contents
Abbreviations 2
Abstract 3
1. Introduction 4
1.1 Aim and relevance of research 4
1.2 Research questions 6
1.3 Definition of terms 6
1.4 Thesis structure 7
2. Literature review as Theory 7
2.1 Categorization of the literature on Frontex 8 2.2 Two overarching debates on Frontex 10 2.3 Frontex in the EU’s institutional galaxy 12 2.3.1 New perspectives on EU agencies 13 2.3.2 The rationale behind the creation of Frontex 15 2.4 EU agencies vis-à-vis their principals 16 2.5 Frontex and its principals: a puzzling relationship 18
2.6 Summary 19
3. Methodology and research design 20
4. Frontex from within 21
4.1 Frontex as constructed by its principals 22
4.2 New competences 24
4.2.1 The case of hotspots 24
4.2.2 The case of Search and Rescue operations 26
4.2.3 A matter of interpretation 29
4.2.4 A new information hub 31
4.3 Institutional autonomy 31
4.3.1 Budget increase 32
4.3.2 The right to intervene as a non-factor 32
4.3.3 Identified problems 34
4.4 System transformation 37
5. Conclusions 41
References 44
Appendix 1 – Interview Questions 48
Abbreviations
AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice EASO European Asylum Support Service
EBCGA European Border and Coast Guard Agency EEAS European External Action Service
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy EUROPOL European Police Office
EUROSUR European Border Surveillance System EURTF European Union Regional Task Force FRA European Agency for Fundamental Rights
FRONTEX European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
IBM Integrated Border Management
IRA Independent Regulatory Agency
JHA Area of Justice and Home Affairs RABIT Rapid Border Intervention Team SAR Search and Rescue Operations
SCIFA Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum
Abstract
The 2015 migration flows to the EU developed into a major crisis. The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex), obtained the largest operational reinforcement and publicity that an EU agency ever had, in order to assist the member states. Building on the wider literature on EU agencies, this thesis is asking if EU agencies expand their competences and autonomy vis-à-vis their principals in periods of crisis and, thus, contribute to system transformation in the EU through their alignment with the supranational elements of the Union and in particular the European Commission. Ethnographic research has been deployed to depict the construction of Frontex by officials working for the agency. The main finding of the research is in line with the expectation found in the literature that Frontex unofficially expands its competences. However, the empirical data does not indicate that this expansion is correlated to a growth of institutional autonomy that challenges national sovereignty in border management. Furthermore, the crisis as an unusual setting for the study of EU agencies has facilitated the expansion of the agency to new fields of activity but it has not changed the balances among Frontex and its principals. Frontex largely retains the same institutional behaviour. Finally, this thesis suggests that future research designs should take into account the emergence of a rather fragmented agency.
1. Introduction
[…]We are a central agency now. Nobody knew Frontex before. When I was telling my friends that I work for Frontex they were asking me, what does it sell?[…]1
The institutional evolution of Frontex before and after the 2015 migration crisis is condensed in these words of an official working for the agency. 2015 has been a landmark for the European Union (hereafter: EU) and the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (hereafter: Frontex). The largest migration flow in Europe since the end of World War II resulted in more than 1,5 million persons crossing the external borders of the EU (European Commission 2015). Migration management in the Mediterranean smoldered under the surface as a potential problem after the eruption of the Arab Spring. However, it was in 2015 when unprecedented flows of migrants and refugees (hereafter: migrants) began to arrive from the Middle East and North Africa region.
The main migration route to the EU was in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece could not manage the flows and ensure regularity in the Schengen zone, so it turned for help to the EU which faced a complex problem. On the one hand, the humanitarian crisis and the failure of the EU’s asylum system resulted in a barrage of negative publicity for the EU. Hundreds of people were losing their lives in ‘’European’’ waters and those saved from death were often hosted in shelters that did not meet minimal human rights standards. On the other hand, the idea of a borderless Europe, one of the milestones of European integration, was questioned; for the first time, the Schengen system backtracked to partially closed or fenced borders, occasionally guarded by armies; public opinion and several governments demanded a more strict European policy that would stop the uncontrolled influx of migrants crossing the borders. Except for Frontex, the EU did not have effective policy tools to provide solutions.
1.1 Aim and relevance of research
This thesis is concerned with analysing the institutional development of Frontex in the light of the 2015 migration crisis that resulted in the operational expansion of the agency in terms of budget and personnel. Frontex is a relatively new EU agency with a very rapid evolution. It is considered to be the agency with the most accelerated increase of recourses
and personnel the last years, even before the Arab Spring (Pollak and Slominski 2009: 904). It was created in 2004 as a bureaucratic agency and its purpose was to coordinate border management practices in the EU. Its competences were in constant redefinition even before the current crisis; its mandate has been modified three times in eleven years (2007, 2011, 2013) and a proposal for the creation of a ‘’new’’ Frontex is being discussed. Notably, border management and migration are concepts that go in tandem with crisis management, in terms of mandate modifications. Notwithstanding the intense migration flows in the Mediterranean since 2004, it was the crisis of 2015 that made Frontex a widely known institution. The agency remains the only EU mechanism that can be used as a response to border management deficiencies, albeit to a limited extent.
It can be safely assumed that Frontex’s institutional gravity is even more important after the 2015 crisis. Similarly, it can be expected that the crisis altered the operational scope of the agency. However, the literature on EU agencies does not account for the institutional development of EU agencies in a state of emergency, when governments cannot provide solutions and, thus, turn to the EU for help. What happens when these agencies operate outside their typical regulatory bureaucratic nexus with an upgraded role, as an EU response to a major crisis? Except for EU agencies related to monetary and financial regulation in the Eurozone crisis, there are few contributions that take into account the variable of crisis.
My initial interest to study Frontex derives from its involvement in a very sensitive area for national sovereignty. Borders define philosophically the Westphalian state (Wolff 2009: 120) and the EU treaty sets limits to the involvement of supranational institutions in this policy field. Frontex is simultaneously a typical bureaucratic structure of the European administrative space and the only operational agency that Brussels can use in periods of crisis. This dual role is a very puzzling one; Frontex assists member states in the area of border guarding, which is one of the basic organizational principals for the existence of sovereignty in the Westphalian sense; it is a community agency that receives political guidance from the Commission, while being strictly controlled by the member states operationally (idem: 44). Following the wider debate on the supranational or intergovernmental nature of the EU system, Frontex can also indicate the effects of a crisis in the system’s core. Frontex’s continuous balancing between the European Commission and the member states, many of whom have quite divergent expectations from Frontex, could further illuminate this debate. Namely, how Frontex contributes to the transformation of the EU system. Hence, its recent quantitative expansion could be the foundation of a qualitative one. According to the
literature, this qualitative expansion can be practically understood as a more autonomous agency, with more competences at the expense of national sovereignty.
1.2 Research questions
The overarching question of the thesis relates to the effects of a crisis on EU agencies and their wider institutional setting. Measuring these effects requires identifying how certain practices are exercised. The mapping of the literature on Frontex and EU regulatory agencies provides the basic assumptions about Frontex’s potential development. The literature indicates that the agency constantly expands its competences in new areas, a development that subsequently facilitates the official recognition of these new competences through regulation modifications. Also, that the agency rationally seeks to enhance its autonomy, similarly to what other EU agencies do. Finally, that the Commission has a considerable unofficial influence in Frontex’s structure. The main linkages between the two sets of the literature lead to the hypothesis that Frontex might use the state of emergency in the EU in two ways. First, it could seize upon the opportunity to expand its competences. Second, it could strengthen its autonomy because of the discordance between the member states and the Commission, as well as Greece’s inability to secure the Schengen zone. Therefore, the main research question is the following:
How Frontex reacted to its role in the 2015 crisis, in terms of acquiring new competences and enhancing its autonomy, at the expense of national sovereignty?
This thesis deploys an interpretative method to answer the research question. Interviews with Frontex officials have been used to provide empirical data about the evolution of the agency amid the recent migration crisis and Frontex’s upgraded role. According to the research findings, Frontex has assumed new de facto competences because of the crisis, however, the interviews do not provide evidence about a rationally expanding agency that seeks more autonomy from its principals. On the contrary, it can be assumed that the crisis has created a bigger but more fragmented agency, in which the supranational and intergovernmental influences are represented by the difference between bureaucrats and seconded national officials.
1.3 Definition of terms
In the text, several focal terms appear in most chapters. To avoid confusion, the Commission’s proposal concerns the proposal for the creation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter: EBCGA) (European Commission 2015). The term integrated
border management (IBM) or border management, in the context of which the EU regulates and coordinates the policies of member states, has only recently been officially defined by the Commission:
Integrated border management goes beyond border control performed solely at the external border. It includes measures in third countries, measures with neighbouring third countries, and measures within the area of free movement, including return of irregular migrants from the EU to their countries of origin. Proper border management is also supported by a number of elements such as strong and regular risk analysis, improved inter-agency cooperation and the use of state-of-the-art technology (idem: 4)
Finally, the migration crisis in Greece and the EU is admitted by all European institutions in their official discourse and policy documents. It resulted in the rapid expansion of Frontex. Hence, I consider it a justified term to describe the context in which Frontex and other actors operated in 2015. This does not mean that the label of crisis is a neutral term, merely related to the management of unexpected events (Pallister-Wilkins 2016). The socio-political origins of crisis are a wider and vital discussion for the research, albeit, beyond the immediate scope of this thesis.
1.4 Thesis structure
In the following chapter, the theoretical foundations of this thesis are analysed. The main assumptions and the research question derive from the literature on Frontex and EU agencies. In chapter 3, I summarize the type of data that I collected and how they were interpreted. The main findings of this research are presented in chapter 4, where quotes from the interviews are followed by preliminary conclusions. This chapter concerns the construction of Frontex from within and how people who work for Frontex answered questions in semi-structured interviews. Finally, chapter 5 elaborates on the wider implications of the findings, how they contribute to the existing body of literature and, finally, suggests inputs for future research.
2. Literature review as theory
[…]The agency has evolved tremendously. Imagine that, in the beginning, Frontex was 38 people gathered in a room, starring at each other… discussing what they
could do, without an internal operational plan.[…]For the first two years Frontex was operating only with external contractors.[…]When Frontex received orders for its first mission, in Christmas 2005, it had no budget! We had limited experience, mainly from land operations… we acquired technical know-how over time.[…]In the first operation, not even a single officer was provided to Frontex from the member states. In the second operation, only one officer from Austria appeared.[…]2
From this quote, taken from an interview with a Frontex official, it is apparent that Frontex for a period remained a non-factor in border management. The contrast of the operations assumed in the following years is striking. The last operation in the Aegean Sea approximated a thousand persons on duty. What does Frontex’s actual expansion mean for its institutional identity? In the first place, the review of the literature identifies the central issues of the topic and generates linkages between them. Secondarily, it aims at identifying controversies, gaps and unaddressed questions regarding Frontex (Creswell 2014). This chapter demonstrates how the literature is used to formulate the research question and the main hypothesis about Frontex’s behaviour in a crisis.
2.1 Categorization of the literature on Frontex
Frontex has a multidimensional importance for the study of the EU due to the fact that it falls into the realm of cross-pillarization, an academic term that describes the constant interaction between actors in different policy areas in search for balance, after the treaty of Maastricht (Pawlak 2009: 28, 32-34; Wolff 2009). According to Pawlak, cross-pillarization is not a neutral phenomenon, on the contrary, it has institutional losers and winners. From its outset, Frontex became an institution that can hardly fit in a specific policy field. Its dual character is comprised of a regulatory and an operational function (Rijpma 2016: 11). Intergovernmental and community influences coexist in Frontex and are represented by its contradictory roles of securitization and risk analysis respectively (Neal 2009: 346-351). Additionally, Frontex gradually became a pivotal agency in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), which in turn influences the formulation of the EU’s foreign policy, after the inauguration of the European Neighbourhood Policy (hereafter: ENP) (Pawlak 2009: 34-35; Trauner and Carrapiço 2012). Frontex has become a rapidly ‘’evolving EU foreign policy
actor’’ (Trauner 2016). Therefore, the literature extends to areas beyond the obviously relative concepts of border management and sovereignty.
The literature on Frontex can be categorized into three main streams (Smetana 2013: 8-9). First, the democratic stream contests the accountability, legitimacy and transparency of Frontex as an independent regulatory agency (hereafter: IRA) within the institutional complex of the EU (Pandit 2012; Perkowski 2012; Pollak and Slominski 2009; Vaughan-Williams 2008). Frontex is a non-elected institution but decision-making powers have been delegated to it. Various scholars question the legitimacy of policy-making and (the lack of) democratic foundations when the delegation of powers to non-elected bodies affects crucial areas of social activity in the EU. This problem has been recognized officially after the so-called Meroni doctrine that sets certain limits to the delegation of executive powers to EU agencies (Chiti 2009: 1404).
Second, the human rights stream criticizes the actions of Frontex from a legal perspective and in particular violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms in the name of security, as well as the loose interpretation of EU law when conducting operations (Hadjimatheou and Lynch 2016; Papastavridis 2010; Rijpma 2010; Slominski 2013). This literature strand rather stems from the binary character of border guarding, namely the difference between the protection of human lives (humanitarian dimension) and the protection of borders as the main organizational principle of sovereign states (Pallister-Wilkins 2015). Frontex’s questionable compliance with international and EU law, as well as individual liberties, is a very common theme in the literature. Violations of human rights provide case-studies that question the actions of Frontex from a legal perspective. This approach on Frontex is not directly relevant to this thesis. Nevertheless, it illustrates the allegations about an agency that does more than what it is meant to do.
Finally, the integration stream investigates the role of Frontex in the area of freedom, security, and justice (AFSJ), one of the most prominent fields of European integration regarding the harmonization of national policies. However, the more the Union’s integration is developed, the more it collides with national competences in various policy fields. The thesis is informed by this part of the literature. It questions how Frontex’s potential acquisition of new competences and its autonomy enhancement can be understood in the framework of a triangular relationship with the intergovernmental and supranational structures of the Union. The case of a rapidly enlarged agency, such as Frontex in the light of the 2015 migration crisis, could provide new data.
The integration stream remains a rather undeveloped one in the literature about Frontex, considering the role of the agency in a policy sector where national sovereignty is often exclusive and legally unchallenged (Mungianu 2013: 362-64). Due to the national prerogatives, the EU has introduced the widely used concepts of solidarity, responsibility (burden-sharing) and efficiency (Wolff 2009: 123). In theory, the proper implementation of these three values by member states would enhance harmonization of border management across the EU, without challenging national sovereignty directly (Smetana 2013). Frontex’s creation did not secure solidarity or diminish national interests until now (Perkowski 2012: 17).
Moreover, the collision of the integration process with established conceptions about sovereignty, positions Frontex into the agencification literature (Carrera and Hertog 2016; Wolff and Schout 2013). Agencification is considered as one of the two methods to delimit public (national) authority and then exercise it within and beyond the borders of nation-states, the second one being globalization (Scholten and Van Rijsbergen 2014). For this reason, the literature review includes mainly articles about the EU’s regulatory agencies.
2.2 Two overarching debates on Frontex
All the aforementioned perspectives in the literature position Frontex, explicitly or implicitly, in the wider debate on the intergovernmental or supranational nature of the EU. Frontex provides a case-study for the evolution of the EU if the latest developments in institutional balances and policies are taken into account. However, a complementary perspective is to understand what the agency’s practices mean. Two remarks in the literature are of great importance for the current research. On the one hand, Frontex’s competences have been redefined in the past and the legal framework around them is flexible on this matter. Therefore, following Majone’s (1997) argument, formal duties of EU agencies are not the only indicators of their influence. On the other hand, it can be argued that Frontex rationally pursues a more autonomous role, although, the literature mainly provides the strategy of a bureaucratic approach to enhance its autonomy. This approach is rather contradictory to the concept of crisis as a facilitator of a more autonomous role, considering that this thesis is studying Frontex outside its bureaucratic setting.
More explicitly, the first overarching debate about Frontex indicates that the agency’s competences are in constant change and redefinition and have actually expanded to areas not expected or officially defined, even before its acquired importance amid the latest migration crisis (Carrera et al. 2013: 342). Reid-Henry (2013) questions whether Frontex’s legal and
normative framework is respected by the agency itself. In his article, security and migration obscure the geopolitical rationalities embedded in the creation of the agency, hence, Frontex can be perceived as a policy experiment. He argues that border practices are actually addressing much more than borders. Jeandesboz underlines the legal issues raised by this development, especially in the case of Frontex which is an agency that operates in many policy fields. It seems that already in 2008 the proposed ex post modifications of Frontex’s regulation were designed to validate activities assumed de facto by the agency (Jeandesboz 2008: 11-12).
Modifications in the agency’s regulation and its mandate are cases of particular interest in order to assess if Frontex could develop independent executive powers in the future (Rijpma 2010). The migration crisis and the proposal of the Commission is a suitable framework to test the validity of the aforementioned arguments since Frontex was presented as the solution to a deficient system of border management. Does Frontex expand into gray areas and constantly redefine its mandate? As a result, apart from the legislative dimension of its operations, research should include potential de facto competences of Frontex, established by practices.
It is necessary to mention that despite the limitations imposed to the delegation of powers by the Meroni doctrine of 1958, EU legislators have had difficulties in identifying the legal basis of EU agencies in detail. The result is a recent complex legal phenomenon called ‘’implied powers’’ of EU agencies, namely, powers exercised de facto. Moreover, the reinterpretation of the Meroni doctrine by the Court of the EU in several cases has gradually created a second relevant concept that appertains to the ’’institutional inventiveness’’ of community bodies. In general, the redefinition of the legal foundations of EU agencies is not necessarily a unified process solely guided by the Meroni doctrine. It can also resemble a series of individual legal cases that redefine intra-EU power relations in a more creative way (Chiti 2009: 1422-424; Scholten and Van Rijsbergen 2014: 1236-40, 1249-51).
The second overarching debate in the literature is that, given the fact that Frontex might operate outside its mandate, it could also act rationally in order to enhance its institutional autonomy. It is argued that other regulatory agencies, such as the European Medicines Agency, have become highly influential and are indeed the de facto decision-makers in their field (Dehousse 2008). By the same token, Frontex can be understood as the supervisor of the European Border Surveillance System (hereafter: Eurosur) (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015: 457-459). In other words, agencies might develop their own interests (Magnette 2005: 11). Kelemen (2002: 92-95) distinguishes two forms of institutional drifts
that can happen when an agency develops interests different that those of its principals. The political drift concerns future holders of public authority which can give a different direction to the agency. The bureaucratic drift concerns the possibility that an EU agency might develop different interests than those of its principals. The hypothesis that Frontex rationally develops its autonomy or even executive powers relates more to the latter form of drift.
The interesting point here is the strategies that the agency might use for this purpose, are not completely relevant to the framework of an emergency situation. Existing studies indicate that Frontex deploys a bureaucratic approach to promote a more autonomous role. Given the fact that this thesis elaborates also on the effects of the migration crisis, a part of the literature (Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins 2014; Reid-Henry 2013; Neal 2009) describes Frontex also as a technocratic structure, in a way that weakens the securitization paradigm as an explanatory factor for its creation and evolution. Securitization according to Neal (idem: 335) is the identification or construction of security issues and threats for the mobilization of public opinion behind policies of dubious legitimacy in normal conditions. Carrera et al. (2013) and Reid-Henry (2013) correlate Frontex’s bureaucratic and depoliticized approach to the poorly defined operational duties of Frontex. This strategy facilitates operations that otherwise collide with the use of coercive means and national sovereignty.
Another strategy is avoiding exposure to criticism by adopting a low-profile that holds national authorities responsible for any law violations in operations since Frontex is officially an auxiliary force. Similarly, sea operations allow Frontex to be active outside its legal boundaries and to avoid criticism (Carrera et al. 2013: 353-54). In a more recent study, Rijpma and Vermeulen (2015: 468) depict Frontex in a different way by arguing that the agency shifts and broadens its focus from operational cooperation in order to become an intelligence actor. Nevertheless, they argue that Frontex expands its mandate and, moreover, by examining the case of Eurosur, it can influence member states as a rational actor that pursues its own interests within the EU system (idem: 457-459).
2.3 Frontex in the EU’s institutional galaxy
One of the most remarkable developments in the EU for political scientists is the proliferation of the independent, or regulatory, agencies that comprise the European administrative space (Curtin 2007; Scholten and Van Rijsbergen 2014). This section provides explanations about Frontex’s creation by its principals and, in particular, why the form of an EU agency has been chosen. The conditions of Frontex’s creation could matter for the way the agency is functioning today (Ekelund 2014). Frontex might not be the typical case of a
regulatory EU agency because member states have reasons to closely supervise its activities and to set certain limits on its legal authority (Wolff 2009). Nevertheless, a method to understand Frontex is to review the wider literature on EU agencies. The fact that the literature focusing on Frontex is not extensively covering all aspects of its activity is an additional reason to position the agency in the greater picture of the EU structure and to study the latter holistically. The importance of the wider institutional environment and the linkages of EU agencies to each other and to their principals are a sine non qua to understand better institutions such as Frontex (Kreppel 2011; Naurin and Rasmussen 2011).
2.3.1 New theoretical perspectives on EU agencies
The EU is not an ordinary, nor unitary, international actor. Moreover, it is a complex and constantly developing system. Standard theories of integration cannot fully explain the creation, change and operation of EU institutions (Jupille and Caporaso 1999). As a result, new models have been developed to explain the complexity of the EU. Three stands of literature emerge as explanatory frameworks and have been used to inform the theoretical review of the current research.
Firstly, the study of bureaucratic politics spotlights the internal preferences and behaviours of non-elected actors and individuals (Georgakakis 2010; Kelemen 2002; Vanhoonacker et al. 2010). In short, of particular interest is the assumption that bureaucrats are engaged in turf wars between them (Bach et al. 2016; Pawlak 2009: 29), therefore they could rationally pursue a more autonomous role. Additionally, bureaucratic bodies tend to defend their institutional territory and are able to identify the grey areas that are open to political interpretation, a condition that appears often in EU institutions due to the many compromises needed prior to their creation.
Secondly, new institutionalism is a broad category in the literature that acknowledges the augmented importance of institutions in the EU system. It provides divergent explanations about the behaviour of institutions (Jupille and Caporaso 1999; Pollack 2005). These explanations can be linked to exogenously or endogenously given preferences or socialization through belonging to the same cause and working environment. However, different branches of institutionalism are not necessarily producing conflictual conclusions when combined, despite the obvious divide between sociological institutionalism and the rational variants (Ekelund 2014). For example Wolff (2009) explains the development of an external dimension in the EU’s JHA in the Mediterranean by using a combination of historical legacies
(path dependency) and rational preferences of member states. Frontex in this case-study is embedded in such a combination of historical and rational-choice institutionalism.
Finally, principal-agent models have been used to explain political relations and interactions when power is delegated from one actor (principal) to another actor (agent). Given the fact that regulatory agencies cover the full spectrum of EU policy sectors, this model has been deployed to support the hypothesis that EU agencies, such as the EEAS, can exploit divergences among their principals to enhance their autonomy (Furness 2013). Nevertheless, the EU is a complex political system with different actors, that have proper loyalties, interests and resources; the more EU agencies are created, the more difficult it becomes for principal-agent models to fully explain the interactions among the numerous institutions. An unbroken chain of power delegation from European citizens to EU policy-making does not exist; likewise, it is not always clear whose principal’s powers are delegated. It follows that the validity of principal-agent models has been considerably diminished by institutional changes in the EU (Chiti 2009: 1401; Curtin: 524-529; Maher et al. 2009; Scholten and Van Rijsbergen 2014: 1232-33). The difficult application of parsimonious principal-agency models is exemplified by the case of Frontex. It has the particular characteristic to be involved in different policy domains, in which different principals influence its structure unevenly (Wolff 2009). The established authority of the Council and the political guidance of the Commission are often conflictual influences; both actors envisioned a considerably different agency back in 2002 when the discussion for the creation of the agency appeared in policy documents for the first time (Perkowski 2012).
Consequently, multiprincipal models have been developed to explain the delegation of power in the EU (Dehousse 2008). For example, how can the role of the Commission be explained in the case of Frontex? Is it an agent of states that classic principal-agent analysis predicates? Is it rather a mediator or a second principal? Research on Frontex could illuminate the role of its principals as well. It should at least reflect on their preferences. One of the shortfalls of classic principal-agent models is that internal EU competitions are not taken into account. Dehousse provides the explanation that during the second wave of agencies in the 1990’s, their creation revealed the competitions and tensions between the member states and the Commission; in particular, the discordance among the former about the increased size and role of the latter.
An additional crucial remark is that the EU has deliberately created such a complex anti-hegemonic system to avoid concentration of power, thus an attempt to clearly define a unique principal in the EU is futile. According to some scholars, principals in the EU are not
primarily concerned to control agents per se but to avoid their ‘’capture’’ by other principals (idem: 795-96). This approach provides an alternative understanding regarding the behaviour of the Commission and the Council on the institutional evolution of Frontex. The public discussion of the proposal of the Commission on December 2015 and the amendments of the Council is the most relevant case to test this argument.
2.3.2 The rationale behind the creation of Frontex
Member states had several options, although, they opted to create an independent agency to develop their cooperation on border management. The context of the creation of so many new institutions in the EU cannot be ignored. In the sense that the EU has experienced a series of transboundary crises, such as the migration crisis, which can only be dealt beyond national borders, IRAs are the main EU response (Boin et al. 2014) However, why the form of an agency was selected and why is Frontex needed? Six main reasons for the creation of EU agencies are identified in the academic literature (Dehouse 2008; Leonard 2009; Magnette 2005). Unlike some EU agencies, Frontex has not genuine decision-making powers (Chiti 2009: 1404). Wolff (2009: 133) describes it more as a monitoring agency than a regulatory one. Its most important function is the coordination of national policies on border management. Leonard (2009) argues that four interrelated developments contributed to Frontex’s creation. The terrorist attacks in the USA (2001) and Europe (2004, 2005) were correlated to the prominence of migration as an emerging concern in the EU since the 1990’s. Additionally, the creation of Frontex coincided symbolically with the enlargement of 2004 and the inauguration of the ENP by providing the framework for a common management of the new borders. Finally, the introduction of the co-decision procedure meant that the European Parliament was about to be involved more in the creation of the new agency (Leonard 2009; Perkowski 2012), something that member states wanted to avoid. A more pragmatic perspective for the creation of Frontex underlines the gravity of the humanitarian dimension of migration in the Mediterranean. The Commission and the Council can easily deflect criticism to a depoliticized agency and thus avoid additional pressure when people lose their life in the sea. Frontex obstructs the arrival of migrants in the EU and thus it relieves member states (Rijpma 2010: 2).
Before the creation of Frontex, the EU attempted to provide a solution within the field of comitology, through the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum
(SCIFA and SCIFA+). However, it soon became evident that this structure was not functional. Frontex was created amid the third wave of IRAs in the EU, as a Community Agency
(Jeandesboz 2008). The EU had no official definition of what an agency is (Leonard 2009). The basic distinction is between Community agencies and those in the second and third pillar (pre-2009). The latter remain under the authority of the Council. Community agencies are distinguished between regulatory ones assigned with broader tasks, like Frontex, and executive ones with designated tasks. Leonard (2009: 373) uses Majone’s definition for an agency as “an omnibus label to describe a variety of organizations which perform functions of a governmental nature, and which generally exist outside of the normal departmental framework of government”. Giandomenico Majone introduced a crucial perspective for research; that to assess the power of EU agencies, research should not be focused on formal duties but to their strength to produce and implement the EU policy, especially through the control of information (Majone 1997), hence Frontex’s relation with its principals is of paramount importance.
2.4 EU agencies vis-à-vis their principals
In the case of Frontex, capturing the rationale behind the creation of so many IRAs, is important for the theoretical problem of agency. From a multiprincipal point of view, does Frontex indicate the supranational nature of power delegation, or is it an alternative pathway for member states to cement the intergovernmental establishment in the Union? Would it shift the balance between national and supranational structures in border management? The influence of its principals indicates its role in the transformation of the EU system.
Following Majone’s argument that an agency’s power is not only defined by its official duties, it is important to elaborate on the Commission’s influence. The tendency in the literature is to overstate the affiliation of EU agencies to the Commission, compared to the governments or the Council. In fact, their connection to the EU environment is so strong that EU agencies are obliged to operate as mini-Commissions (Egeberg et. al. 2014; Schout and Pereyra 2011). A channel of information management is created, with the Commission and Frontex having privileged access.
A common argument in the literature of regulatory governance underlines the possibility that the Commission might be keen to delegate its powers so that it can achieve greater legitimacy for its actions (Gilardi 2002). Or, more simply, it delegates powers to agencies because it wants to discard its administrative role and focus on developing a political one (Curtin 2007: 524). The literature emphasizing on the regulatory nature of the EU system is not the only approach. Governance in the EU is rather more complex and can hardly be explained by a single approach (Knill and Lenschow 2005). Although network governance is
presented as an alternative to regulatory governance, it is argued (Boin et al. 2014; Egeberg et al. 2014; Levi-Faur 2011) that the latter is overtaking or influencing the structures of the former by agencification or institutionalization of networks. In short, is the network governance model of the EU complemented by the more governmental or ‘’lead- agency’’ model but with the power concentrated in Brussels and not in national capitals? Egeberg et al. (2014) argue that empirically this fact is verified by the tendency of the Commissioners to consider themselves as ‘’parents’’ and not partners vis-a-vis the agencies falling under their competence.
A different argument about the creation of IRAs, related to the Commission, is that past delegation in a policy area has to be taken into account to assess the role of each institution. From this viewpoint, the Commission is reluctant to delegate powers or to create IRAs, when it has already significant powers in a policy field (Chiti 2009: 1432-33; Kelemen 2002; Thatcher 2011). Contrariwise, when its competences are limited, the Commission is keen to the introduction of an IRA and to the indirect expansion of its role in a policy area. Naurin and Rasmussen (2011) argue that institutional modifications can be used by the Commission for this purpose. Considering that the area of border management is predominantly controlled by governments, the assumption about Frontex is that the Commission pursues a policy that strengthens the role of Frontex, in the sense that this role contributes to the balance of competences between community and intergovernmental structures.
From their part, member states have obvious reasons to supervise the activities of regulatory agencies and to use them for their interests. According to Wolff (2009: 147-48) states use the cross-pillar nature of IBM to mitigate the influence of the Commission and a less integrationist approach prevails in JHA. Steindler (2015) argues that after the treaty of Lisbon two developments affected decisively the evolution of Frontex considering the role of states. On the one hand, the Commission and other community structures assumed a more central role on external security. On the other hand, the migration crisis erupted shortly after the implementation of the treaty. Member states confronted the need to address a two-pronged problem. First, to deal with the humanitarian dimension of migration. Second, to retain their influence in this policy field and to check the boosted competences of community structures. According to this explanation, the alternative channel for member states to pursue their interests are IRAs such as Frontex. Here, Frontex is described as a ‘‘tool’’ that acts on behalf of states and does the ‘’dirty job’’ in a way that reduces the exposure of governments in solving migration problems. In any case, the most prominent argument about EU agencies is
that the powers delegated to them in most cases were previously exercised by governments (Dehousse 2008), so the main assumption is that in the long term the Commission could be the institutional winner in the case of Frontex as well.
2.5 Frontex and its principals: a puzzling relationship
After its creation, Frontex has been a case in studies focused on the nature of EU institutions and in particular the focal dichotomy between institution autonomy and institution accountability (Rittberger and Wonka 2011). It is assumed that the less interfering the principals are, the more effective the agent can be, although this approach downgrades the social accountability of agencies. The dominant discourse is that an agency needs flexibility and autonomy in order to be effective (Carrera et al. 2013). Frontex’s dependency on states for equipment, personnel and approval of operations is a strong argument for its limited autonomy. It operates within an intergovernmental nexus which preserves the legal prerogatives of states. Frontex is primarily safeguarding and evaluating the Schengen zone, a system with clear intergovernmental origins; even the acquisition of co-owned vehicles and simple equipment by Frontex can raise serious legal problems for operations (Rijpma 2016: 16-17). However, other scholars (Egeberg and Trondal 2011; Egeberg and Trondal 2016; Mungianu 2013) claim that the structure of Frontex is unofficially more dependent on the Commission in governance terms.
The account of agency is undoubtedly a focal issue for the study of Frontex. Does Frontex have its own rational quest as an IRA? According to Neal (2009: 346), Frontex ‘’can no longer be considered simply as a policy outcome alone, for it is perhaps now a tool or even an agent that may be able to act in its own right’’. Agents matter in the sense that they have privileged access to crucial information that provides them with an advantage vis-à-vis their principals (Pollack 2003: 26-27). Similarly, Chiti (2009: 1405-407) argues that EU agencies with regulatory and instrumental powers can have a deeper influence in decision-making. Nonetheless, even scholars who acknowledge the rational behaviour of agents, call for a meticulous approach. The behaviour of IRAs is rather context-bound to particular institutional conditions and can have divergent motivations, from external regulation to inherent interests (Ackrill et al. 2013). Empirical evidence indicates that EU agencies are fully aware of their institutional environment and are exploiting any divergence or inconclusiveness between their principals in order to obtain more autonomy (Furness 2013; Delreux and Kerremans 2010).
By asking who is influencing more the structure of Frontex, I actually ask simultaneously how independent Frontex is. Moreover, independent of whom (Christensen and Nielsen 2010)? The definition of independence is an example of a context-bound concept. In the case of Frontex, its independence would merely mean that the management board has authority to decide about the priorities of the agency or to pursue its expansion. However, the principal who decides the appointment of executives in IRAs is not necessarily the determinant who defines the independence of the agent. Appointment method by the principal is not automatically related to the formal independence of the agent (Hanretty and Koop 2013).
For the composition of the management board of Frontex, the crucial detail is to define from which principals could the board be independent. Egeberg and Trondal (2011) argue that in organizational terms EU agencies are more independent than expected and thus contribute to system transformation. On the one hand, the members of the Commission who participate in management boards are much more prepared to be involved in discussions, compared to the relatively ill-prepared members who represent governments. On the other hand, meetings are normally rare and organized opposition to the head of the agency is unlikely to happen. The affiliation of EU agencies to EU-level officials and in particular those of the Commission means that practically what matters for the independence of IRAs is their autonomy from intergovernmental components of the EU system and not their autonomy in general (Egeberg et al. 2014).
2.6 Summary
In brief, the literature review illustrates the puzzling nature of the agency in terms of its dual role and the influence of its principals. This chapter helps to the formulation of the research question, notwithstanding the limited contributions in some areas. Especially the role of Frontex in the integrational dimension of the EU project is a promising field for additional contributions. Developments being introduced in the context of the crisis could shed light on new practices deployed by Frontex, or changes in the institutional balances among the agency and its principals. Concerning the research question, the literature argues that Frontex’s competences are poorly defined and they expand (2.1). Also, that the agency could have greater influence than what its competences reveal and it deploys strategies to enhance its autonomy (2.2). The research findings on Frontex’s behaviour could shed light on Frontex’s position vis-à-vis its principals (2.3 and 2.4) and the degree of its autonomy (2.5). All these
aspects require further research and this thesis has opted to interpret the opinion of Frontex officials.
3. Methodology and research design
The literature review has been the research lens before and after the collection of data. It informed the formulation of research and interview questions. This thesis adopts a qualitative methodology based on interviews and on the interpretation of the meaning of the data, in particular, what Frontex officials think about their job. Ethnographic research appertains to the study of professional groups from their own system of meanings. Fieldwork (interviews) is the most important ethnographic method for the collection of primary data (Creswell 2014; Fetterman 2008).
It is important to consider the temporal setting of the research. All the respondents mentioned that the crisis is over, thus, they were interviewed while having a more holistic perception of the situation. The originality of the primary data is mitigated, on the one hand, by the subjective understanding of the meanings given to the three focal concepts of the research by the respondents and, on the other hand, by the indirect way of its acquisition. The greatest limitation of this research is its greatest contribution as well. The relatively small number of interviews for an interpretative research is counterbalanced by the difficulty to extract original data from security-related institutions, especially in a period of high publicity.
Regarding the collection of data, the discussion of the empirical findings in chapter 4 and the conclusions in chapter 5 are based on interviews conducted in May 2015 in Athens, Greece. Three interviews (one telephone interview) with Frontex personnel comprise the main body of the research. Each interviewee answered between 11 and 18 questions. The interviews were designed to be semi-structured; the standard questions are related to the concepts of mandate transcendence (assuming de facto competences), the institutional autonomy of Frontex and the relations with the Commission and member states (mainly Greece). The sections of the interviews that resembled a free discussion were mostly focused on the achievements of the agency. Linguistically, in the more structured part of the interviews, the answers were rather cautious and frugal compared to the part that resembled a free conversation. It turned out that significant data for this research was acquired through free conversation.
The interviews were conducted under the condition of anonymity. Frontex is a security related agency and people working in the agency handle information that concerns national security, as well as personal data. Furthermore, the agency has been a target of criticism by NGO’s and European institutions, such as the European Parliament (Perkowski 2012). Therefore, the identification of each respondent relates only to the following description. Respondents 2 and 3 have operational, bureaucratic and executive experience, also in Greece, while respondent 1 talked from a bureaucratic point of view. Respondent 4 is an expert without a professional connection to Frontex; since the objective of the research was to elaborate on how Frontex understands what it does from within, the discussion with respondent 4 is only marginally reflected.
The interview questions (appendix 1) are related to the three main concepts of the thesis, Frontex’s competences, autonomy and contribution in system transformation. More specifically, in the interviews, some answers extend to more than one concept. What Frontex does (competences) was discussed in questions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10; accordingly, the concept of autonomy in questions 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12; Frontex’s relationship with its principals in questions 3, 5, 7, 8, 11. Additionally, the respondents were fostered to reflect on the concept of crisis in questions 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13. Given the fact that the interviews were semi-structured, some of the main findings emerged from other questions (section 4.2).
4. Frontex from within
This chapter discusses the main findings of the research. Initially, the current perception of Frontex by its principals is summarized in section 4.1. In sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, the main findings of the interviews are presented. Quotes from the interviews are used to illustrate what the respondents believe about their activities in their own words. The quotes are followed by paragraphs in which the relevant data for this research is distinguished and preliminary conclusions are deduced. The division of sections in this chapter corresponds to the main arguments in the literature that the thesis examines.
In particular, section 4.2 elaborates on what the respondents replied about the development of new competences by Frontex. Section 4.3 focuses on the independence of the agency. It was not possible to discuss this issue extensively with the respondents, so questions about the Commission’s proposal were used to widen the scope of the conversations. The proposal introduces the right of Frontex to intervene without consulting member states.
Finally, the influence of the Commission and the member states on the agency, as well as the institutional allegiances of Frontex, are discussed in section 4.4. The sequence of these three sections is not accidental; what Frontex does informs the discussion about its autonomy and consequently provides the background of the relationship with its principals.
4.1 Frontex as constructed by its principals
Before the main findings, this section summarizes the most current developments that concern the construction of Frontex by its principals. Namely, how the Commission and the Council publically express their opinion about the future of Frontex. The main reflection is the Commission’s proposal that introduces the need for a new upgraded border agency. The Council typically represents the member states, however, it is apparent that the latter have rather divergent expectations about Frontex and its future. The debate on the proposal and the Council’s amendments is not yet reflected in the academic literature, except for three short articles (Carrera and Hertog 2016; Peers 2016; Rijpma 2016).
The first salient remark about the Commission is that even before the creation of Frontex, all its proposals attempted to provide executive powers to Frontex. The latest proposal goes even further; it recommends the creation of a new agency, the EBCGA. The most important innovations are, first, Frontex’s enhanced monitoring and supervisory role; second, a rapid reserve pool of border guards and technical equipment; third, the right to intervene ‘’where deficiencies persist or where a Member State is under significant migratory pressure putting in peril the Schengen area and national action is not forthcoming or not enough’’; fourth, a new approach on Coast Guard surveillance; fifth, the EBCGA will be able to send personnel and launch operations outside the EU in third countries, in cooperation with their authorities; finally, a series of other ideas in the proposal; a stronger role in the return of third country nationals; cross-border crime and terrorism prevention; systematic biometric checks of EU citizens at the external borders of the Union.
Notwithstanding the Council’s amendments, the gravity of these proposals should not be overemphasized (Carrera and Hertog 2016; Rijpma 2016). First, the proposal rather creates a Frontex+, not a new agency. The dependence of the new agency on state border guards seconded for the agency’s operations is actually reinforced. Second, the proposal does not address the deficiencies on the domestic level. It avoids interference in the core of national systems and their key weaknesses. In reality, the new agency will be enhanced with inoperative competences, considering its working environment. The Commission’s influence has limited importance for the autonomy of the agency, in the sense that the
intergovernmental limitations remain formidable. Previous modifications (2007, 2011, 2013) of the agency’s regulation did not reduce these limitations (Rijpma 2016: 11-13). Carrera and Hertog (2016: 12) claim that ‘’the EBCG would take too narrow a focus to emergency situations, instead of ensuring EU standards’’. It seems that the proposal and the right of Frontex to intervene has been designed especially for situations of crisis and specific deficient domestic systems, such as the Greek and the Italian. In overall the proposal does not envision a truly European agency and all the structural shortcomings of Frontex remain unaddressed. Thus, it can be argued that the Commission is not challenging directly the sovereignty of states and it does not delegate executive powers to the EBCGA (Rijpma 2016: 27).
The proposal can be approached from different angles regarding the role of the crisis in its formulation. On the one hand, Rijpma (idem: 32) argues that the proposal is not merely an emergency measure but rather a step towards the Europeanization of border management. On the other hand, the Commission, to my understanding, depicts border management crises as an ad hoc framework for an EBCGA’s augmented role, especially through its powers in risk analysis and assessment. Solidarity in the second case resembles a ‘’sovereignty-reducing penalty’’ for states with deficient border management systems (De Bruycker 2016). Regardless of the Commission’s aspirations, these proposals never had any chance to be accepted in whole by the Council. A Frontex expert (respondent 4) gave a more strategic explanation about the Commission’s proposals for the creation of a European Border Agency since 2002.
[…]The Commission puts many things on the table. Their perspective is a long-term one, you can call it macropolitics.[…]Their short-term objective is to test the reactions, to see how far they can go with these ideas, that is the reason why they bring them back every time. It has a logic of federalization.[…]3
Based on the analysis of professor Steve Peers (2016), important amendments proposed by the Commission have been deleted or replaced by the Council. For example, the right of Frontex to intervene has been preserved by the Council itself. Also, the amended text indicates the Council’s will to transfer powers from Frontex’s executive director to a more politicized management board (Rijpma 2016: 27-28). On the other hand, the Commission attempts to upgrade the availability of the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs). Since
2011, these teams can be assembled in emergency situations and the member states are obliged to contribute; moreover, the duration of a RABIT is not specified. Thus, a structure that has been created primarily for emergency situations can be upgraded to a permanent status; this indicates that the effects of crisis management could have wider implications for the clout of community structures in border management.
4.2 New competences
[…]Frontex is the only law enforcement agency with so many competences worldwide. Officials from the USA, in a training visit, were surprized by the number of our duties. We have many competences despite the control of states.[…]4
The issue of Frontex’s new competences was approached indirectly in the interviews. The respondents were cautious to talk about that because it concerns classified information. Especially question 10 (appendix 1) has not been replied by any of the respondents in a direct way. All the respondents repeated what Frontex is (not) allowed to do. Notwithstanding the difficulty to discuss about competences which are not included in its mandate, three cases of particular interest have emerged in the interviews.
4.2.1 The case of hotspots
The first case in the interviews that reflects the tendency of Frontex to acquire new competences, is validating some of the literature’s assumptions in chapter 2. The temporal framework of crisis also emerges as a salient variable. Respondent 1 stated that the latest RABIT in the Aegean Sea is ‘’the biggest operation ever, with 1000 persons on the ground’’. More specifically, it seems that Frontex is assuming additional responsibilities when a difficult situation needs to be resolved. Nonetheless, it does so by exceeding its mandate in cooperation with Greek authorities, not independently. The data does not indicate a devised strategy to develop new competences. The example that respondents use pertains to the management of migrants who stay in hotspots. The term hotspot is poorly defined as locations ‘characterized by specific and disproportionate migratory pressure, consisting of mixed migratory flows, which are largely linked to the smuggling of migrants, and where the Member State concerned might request support and assistance to better cope with the migratory pressure’ (Rijpma 2016: 19). Hotspots are actually the name of those camps
created in Greece and Italy to host migrants temporarily. They resemble a guarded area where migrants remain until a decision is made about their fate; they can either be granted asylum, or have to return to their country of origin. Respondent 2 introduced the duties undertaken by Frontex in hotspots:
[…](Q)uestion: Regarding your operations, in the previous months when the migration flows were higher, did you have to operate outside your official mandate? Or it does not happen?
(A)nswer: I think that sometimes we are reaching the borders of what is in the operation plan and I think it is good to talk about it then but especially about what is happening now.[….]The hotspots on those islands are full, really full and I think because those camps are so full we have a safety issue right now. Sometimes migrants are fighting with each other and especially the Syrian people feel good because they will get asylum after all and of course other nationalities do not like that. Sometimes you can see that there is a lot of pressure on Greek authorities on those islands to cope with this problem. Sometimes we really have to advise them and tell them it is better to do it this way because it will be a better way to solve this problem and sometimes you go a bit further than your mandate. It is like you coach the Greek authorities but sometimes it is just a big advice, just do it this way because then you will see something else. Sometimes they (the Greek authorities) feel angry about that because they feel the responsibility and they have to make the decisions.
Q: You feel the tension in these cases, that you should not cross the limits of your mandate?
A: Yes but I think tension is good and communicating with each other, not to play games. It is good to take a decision on the island than waiting what Frontex in Warsaw wants or what they want in Athens. Sometimes you need a Greek decision and you cannot afford to wait for a week. So yes, that’s problem but it is ok.[…]5
Although there is no data that indicates a designed intention to acquire new competences, in this quote Frontex is obliged to do so due to an emergency situation. Howbeit, it remains a de facto transcendence of the mandate as an additional duty. These situations create problems and collisions with Greek authorities. An interesting point raised by
respondent 3 is relevant here. The answer to question 9 (appendix 1) reveals the peculiar nature of the interaction between the members of Frontex mission and Greek authorities in a period of crisis and changes. Respondent 3 argued that:
[…]It is an exaggeration. They (Greek border guards) do not believe it themselves that we (Frontex) are here as an auxiliary force. For some reason, they have their own ideas. They have to be more confident about their own mission and themselves[…]There are minor incidents of misunderstandings and arguments because of excessive zeal. These incidents are rare, individual.[…]6
Therefore, Frontex can also be perceived as a threat by local Greek authorities. The quotes indicate mistrust towards Frontex and its role, albeit this conclusion cannot be generalized. Respondents 2 and 3 clearly mention that Greek authorities do not always cooperate with Frontex in an ideal manner. Problems in the hotspots that could have been resolved through better communication and unofficial division of labour, develop to arguments. An arguable hypothesis is that when Frontex does more than what is officially expected, this is probably magnified as an event by Greek officers, who then react to that. Respondent 2 claimed that the ability to resolve minor problems without consulting the agency’s headquarters in Warsaw or national officials in Athens, is possible when needed:
[…]It is good to take a decision on the island than waiting what Frontex in Warsaw wants or what they want in Athens.[…]7
Frontex did so in the aforementioned example. These solutions can be achieved in a short period of time, while orders from Athens or Warsaw could arrive late. Presumably, those Greek and Frontex teams that manage to cooperate without tensions and mistrust could establish an unofficial division of labour that is not prescribed by the operation plan. Notably, this division of labour has been established despite the discomfort of Greek authorities in the aforementioned case. However, this phenomenon rather eventuates due to emergency situations according to the interviews.
4.2.2 The case of Search and Rescue Operations
6 Anonymous interview conducted with respondent 3, Athens(Greece), 25.5.2016 7 Anonymous interview conducted with respondent 2, Athens(Greece), 20.5.2016
The second case that demonstrates the tendency of Frontex to assume more than what is prescribed in its mandate, reveals the broad range of activities undertaken by the agency. Search and Rescue Operations (hereafter: SAR) at the peak of the 2015 crisis have been one of the most prominent duties of Frontex. In the initial stages of this research, I was not aware of their importance. In reality, the core regulatory function of Frontex in border management is now complemented by an important operational duty. Respondent 1 talked about it in a much different way, compared to other duties of Frontex. Therefore, a relevant question was included in the next interviews.
[…]Q: Is Frontex obliged to move outside its official mandate sometimes? I mean when you have to?
A: We are now conducting the biggest Search and Rescue operation in the world, last month (April) we saved 20.000 people at sea. It is amazing! It is not our main function. We are very proud for this.[…]We are hitten by both sides (member states and NGOs)… still it is not in our mandate but we save people. Our operation is the biggest in the world.[…] 8
Respondent 2 confirmed that Frontex officials are aware of the importance of SAR. It is evident that it emerges as an additional duty that is exercised de facto:
[…]Q: Last week I spoke to a Frontex official who was very enthusiastic because[…]Frontex is also becoming one of the big SAR institutions worldwide.[…]Is this the case?
A: I think because of Frontex and our support the last year less people die.[…]We did not want people to drown and it is much safer right now. We have a lot of assets in the sea.
Q: But officially it is not among your main duties.
A: No, the first thing is that we have to protect the external borders of Europe and do document control, registration, look in our systems and we have to help European countries. Of course problems like this with migrants drowning every day, it is good to put it in our mandate as well.[…]9
8 Anonymous telephone interview conducted with respondent 1, 10.5.2016 9 Anonymous interview conducted with respondent 2, Athens(Greece), 20.5.2016
