To Use Or Not to Use,
An explanatory study of female suicide violence
in Iraq, 2003-‐2010
Student Name: Sarra Hassouni
Program: Master International Relations, UvA
Supervisor: Dr. Seiki Tanaka
Second Reader: Dr. Ursula Daxecker
Date: June 24, 2016
Table of Contents
1.
Introduction
2.
Literature Review
2.1 Explaining suicide violence: Three levels of analysis 2.2 Female suicide violence: Identifying the gap
3.
Theoretical Framework
3.1 Approach to female suicide violence
3.2 Theoretical argument for variation in female suicide violence
3.3
Alternative Explanations: Social Enablers of Female Suicide Violence
4.
Research Design
4.1
Methodology
4.2 Case selection 4.3 Data 4.4
Operationalization
5.
Explaining female suicide violence in Iraq, 2003-‐2010
5.1 Mapping the Iraqi Insurgency
5.2 Counterinsurgency and the Awakening Movement 5.3 Female suicide violence in Iraq, 2003-‐2010
5.4 Findings
5.5 Female Suicide Violence in Iraq: Alternative explanations 5.6 Discussion
6. Conclusion
7. References
Appendix I
1. Introduction
Since the early 1980s, insurgent and terrorist groups with different ideological backgrounds have used suicide violence to coerce governments into making concessions, change policies, abandoning territories or stop negotiations (Hafez, 2006: 6). How many women are recruited and used by violent non-‐state actors has varied across time and space. The general trend, however, has been toward an increasing use of women for suicide attacks (Horowitz, 2015: 75). As figure 1 shows, female suicide violence since 1985 has occurred in waves. These waves are attributed to suicide campaigns of different insurgent groups.
Figure 1: Female suicide attacks worldwide, 1985-‐2015
The first successful female suicide bomber was Sana Mahaydali, a 17-‐year old Lebanese girl who is also known by her nickname ‘The Bride of the South’. In 1985 she was dispatched by the Syrian Socialist Party to detonate herself near some vehicles carrying Israeli soldiers in Lebanon. This attack by the ‘Bride of
the South’ not only paved the way for other Lebanese women; after a few years the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the Kurdish PKK adopted female suicide attacks as well. Within these groups, women have been responsible for respectively one third and two third of the suicide attacks (Von Knop, 2007: 398). In the early 2000s women have also played a crucial role in the Chechen resistance against Russia. Their central role in the suicide campaigns in Russia has earned them the nickname ‘Black Widows’ (Ibid.).
In terms of ideology most of the groups that have employed female suicide bombers have been leftist or nationalist-‐separatist oriented. However a surprising development has been the way in which religious insurgency and terrorist groups have recently opened the stage for female recruits, who are now increasingly involved in what once was an exclusively male-‐dominated area (Ibid.).
Still, the question remains of what makes female suicide violence special and thus relevant to study? Brunner (2005) formulates the difference between male and female bombers as follows:
“But are suicide bombings committed by women different than those committed by their fathers, husbands, sons, and brothers? No, they are not different because women despair as much as men and want to fight for the freedom of their people just as their male counterparts do. Yes, they are different because women often stand as boundary stones at the dawn of a new escalation in a conflict” (Brunner, 2005: 44).
Thus, Brunner argues that in terms of the pure act of a suicide attack, there is no difference between a man and a woman. But the increasing number of female bombers does show an alarming trend for the security environment (Brunner, 2005). Whereas studies on suicide violence, and counterinsurgency alike, have largely focused on male perpetrators, this study looks at their counterpart
To investigate why and when groups employ women for suicide missions, this thesis examines female suicide violence in Iraq between 2003 and 2010. The question central in this study is: Why do we observe female suicide violence in
Iraq and what explains its temporal and spatial variation between 2003 and 2010?
Female suicide attacks in Iraq began after the U.S.-‐led invasion of the country in 2003 and the subsequent occupation by multinational forces. Between 2003 and 2010 over fifty female suicide attacks were conducted against U.S. military forces and Iraqi targets. The war in Iraq witnessed an upsurge in attacks by female suicide bombers in 2007, with more than thirty attacks in the subsequent year. Most of the attacks executed by women took place in Diyala Province and targeted Iraqi police and security forces and Iraqi (Shia) civilians. Though Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has only claimed a minority of the attacks, U.S. military and Iraqi security sources believe that AQI has been behind most of the female suicide attacks in Iraq.
Many scholars who study female suicide violence tend to focus on the individual-‐ level motivations. Mia Bloom (2011) for instance writes on the basis of the discovered identities of female Iraqi perpetrators: “Iraqi women, like their sisters in Chechnya, appear to be motivated by the proximity to the conflict and the loss of loved ones. Many of the women who turned to violence had relatives, either civilians or militants, killed in the fighting” (Bloom, 2011: 216-‐7).
While individual-‐level explanations, like those offered by Mia Bloom, have
offered important insights within the study of female suicide violence, they fail to explain the temporal and spatial variation of the phenomenon. As Niva (2008) rightly points out, “It is highly doubtful that Iraqi women only began confronting depression or despair over lost family members, let alone conservative cultural norms, after 2007” (Niva, 2008).
Even if women may want to become actively engaged in suicide missions, the actual evolution of women’s role from supportive to active is still initiated at the organizational level (Von Knop, 2007: 400). Thus, in order to understand the scope, emergence and increase in female suicide violence, the motivations for
recruiting females at the organizational level must be explored as well. This thesis therefore uses insurgent groups as the level of analysis and seeks to
explain variation in female suicide violence in Iraq from the group’s perspective. By doing this, the thesis proposes a new theoretical argument that integrates two existing theses that explain female suicide violence. The main argument of this thesis is that a combination of the ultimate political goal thesis with the
permissibility of the operating environment thesis offers the most
comprehensive explanation for temporal and spatial variation in female suicide violence in Iraq.
By analyzing variation of female suicide bombings in the Iraqi case, this study seeks to broaden our understanding of the logic behind the use of women
bombers by insurgent groups and terrorist organizations. As Davis (2013) notes, “Understanding how, when, and why a group employs women, particularly as suicide bombers, presents a unique opportunity for counterterrorist operations.” (Davis, 2013: 288).
The thesis is structured as follows: in the next chapter an overview is presented of the main literature on suicide violence in general and female suicide violence in particular. This chapter also discusses the main gaps in the literature and how this study may complement the existing works on female suicide violence. Following the literature review, the theoretical chapter addresses the approach to female suicide violence and presents the new theoretical argument. This chapter also presents alternative arguments whose explanatory power is tested in addition to mine. After the research design chapter where methodology, case-‐ selection, data and operationalization are discussed, we move on to the empirical section. Here, the analysis of evidence and the assessment of the explanatory power of the theoretical argument are presented. In the ‘discussion’ section, the limitations to the analysis are discussed. Finally, the concluding chapter
summarizes the report and presents further policy recommendations.
2. Literature review
This chapter first describes the main theories on suicide violence and addresses how these theories have been relevant for research on female suicide violence. This section mainly serves as a review; a more specific discussion is presented in the next chapter. The second section of this chapter discusses how research on female suicide violence in general has failed to explain temporal and spatial variation and how this thesis, by proposing a new theoretical argument, may contribute to the study of female suicide violence.
2.1 Explaining suicide violence: Three levels of analysis
Although modern suicide violence began during the 1980s, when groups such as Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers started using suicide attacks, a significant
expansion in research on the phenomenon started after the attacks of September 11, 2001 (Horowitz, 2015). The relevant categories of analysis for studies on suicide violence have been (1) the individual level; (2) the group/organizational level; and (3) the societal level. While the majority of the academic research tends to focus on a single level of analysis, scholars such as Moghadam (2008) and Hafez (2006) have stressed the need and importance of integrating multiple levels of analysis. Both have developed theoretical frameworks that allow
analysis of suicide violence from multiple interdependent levels of analyses.
Individual Motivations
The line of research that focuses on the individual level has tried to determine who conducts suicide attacks. Initially it was assumed that individuals
committing suicide attacks must have been acting irrational. However, now most scholars view suicide bombings not as the result of irrational behavior, but ascribe the phenomenon to a variety of social, organizational, economic, religious and others reasons (Horowitz, 2015: 74). Still, in terms of why individuals would commit such acts, the literature leaves us with the general conclusion that
suicide bombers tend to come from very different societies, communities and situations. This makes individual-‐level generalizations regarding motivations for suicide bombers very difficult, or even impossible (Horowitz, 2015: 75).
Regarding the involvement of women in suicide attacks, this individual level has been examined the most intensively. Most of the work on female suicide
bombers has sought to reveal the motivations for women to conduct such acts. The motivations that have been ascribed to women clearly differ from those of men. As O’Rourke (2009) notes, “Women, we are told, become suicide bombers out of despair, mental illness, religiously mandated subordination to men, and a host of other factors specific to their gender” (O’Rourke, 2009: 682). Idealistic motivations, such as nationalism, religion and commitment to the cause, are less likely to be found in publications on female motivation for suicide violence (Jacques &Taylor, 2009: 507).
Organizational Motivations
The second level of analysis has focused on the incentives at the organizational or group level and addresses the question of why groups adopt suicide violence as a tactic. Models of organizational imperatives often have a realist character and have been inclined to assume the rationality of the decision made by groups to use the tactic (Horowitz, 2015: 75). The most prominent theories explaining suicide violence from the organizational level have been Robert Pape’s
‘Occupation thesis’ and Mia Bloom’s ‘Outbidding thesis’. The occupation thesis suggests that suicide attacks are primarily organizational acts of violence that are driven by the demands of strategic and tactical opportunity in the context of asymmetric welfare against foreign military occupation (Pape, 2005). The outbidding thesis suggests that groups plan, execute and publicize suicide attacks to gain political and social support (Bloom, 2005).
Still, among scholars there is disagreement about whether suicide bombing is the result of a strategic choice by a group or whether groups use it as a last resort when they cannot achieve either tactical or strategic goals in any other way (Horowitz, 2015: 75). Organizational-‐strategic explanations, referring to those
that focus on the long-‐term objectives of groups, have several limitations. The most important one is that those theories do not explain why, if the benefits of suicide attacks are so numerous, many organizations avoid their use. These explanations also fail to account for when a group is most likely to engage in suicide attacks (Moghadam, 2009: 53).
Then, as Horowitz (2015) notes, while many have attempted to explain why groups resort to the use of suicide violence, much less attention has been given to the question of why, despite its successes, the vast majority of violent non-‐ state actors, historically have not used suicide violence (Horowitz, 2015). Kalyvas & Sanchez-‐Cuenca (2005) have addressed this question regarding the absence of suicide attacks and argue that the choice to adopt suicide bombings depends in large part on the relationship to the public that would be most directly affected by the attacks. Likewise, with regard to female involvement in suicide missions, Matthew Dearing (2010), rather than examining groups that adopt female suicide bombings studied the absence of female bombers within the Afghan insurgency.
Regarding female suicide violence, organizational motivations for employing women in suicide missions have not been studied as frequently or tested systematically. Literature on group’s motivations for employing women for suicide missions refer to women’s strategic and tactical advantages compared to their male counterparts. These advantages of female perpetrators include
increased access to targets, arising less suspicion and attracting more media attention (Jacques & Taylor, 200: 509).
Societal Level
Organizations, and individuals alike, do not make decisions in a vacuum. Some researchers suggest that sustained levels of suicide missions largely or even entirely depend on strong societal support. One strand of research from the societal level of analysis focuses on how and what societal factors determine the supply side of suicide attacks. Another strand addresses how societal contexts influence or determine the adoption of suicide bombing by groups.
A significant variable for this first strand has been ‘Socio-‐Economic status’. Whereas initially it was believed that suicide operations were more likely to occur in societies that are less well of and conducted by individuals with a low socio economic status, early empirical research indicated that there was no relationship between poverty and the decision to become a suicide bomber. Nevertheless, while on the individual level poverty is unrelated to suicide bombings, it is positively related to a country producing suicide bombers (Horowitz, 2015).
Another reasonable robust finding has been the role that networks play at both local and global level in facilitating the diffusion of suicide bombing over time (Horowitz, 2015: 80). At the local level, social horizontal networks facilitate recruitment across families, friends and groups. Although religion can function as a unifying factor within the networking process, its role has not proven to be causal. At the international level, social networks have also seemed to help in the spread of suicide operations. Horowitz (2010), for instance, has shown how the large numbers of networks that groups such as Hezbollah and Al Qaeda have with other groups facilitated the diffusion of suicide bombing. This finding is consistent with Moghadam’s (2009) finding regarding the globalization of martyrdom through Salafi Jihadi Networks.
Furthermore, dependence on the public opinion is a theoretical variable that is increasingly used in explaining the adoption of suicide missions by groups. Scholars using this variable suggest that individuals and groups will use suicide attacks if they are likely to enjoy social support for this tactic (Moghadam, 2009: 53). This explanation seems to be reflected in the widespread use of suicide attacks in places such as Lebanon and Israel. Here, a cult of martyrdom has manifested itself in glorifying suicide bombers.
With regard to female suicide violence, societal factors are also often mentioned. O’Rourke (2009) for example argues that the particular character and
effectiveness of female suicide terrorism depend on the norms regulating gender behavior in the societies from which female terrorists emerge and in which they perpetrate their attacks. She then suggests that if states would transform those
norms, female suicide terrorism would lose its superior effectiveness (O’Rourke, 2009: 718). O’Rourke’s argument however stands in stark contrast to that of Matthew Dearing (2010) who instead argues that the absence of female suicide bombers in Afghanistan is the result of conservative normative gender roles in the Afghan society (Dearing, 2010).
2.2. Female suicide violence: Identifying the gap
Over the last decade there has been a substantial increase in books and articles that seek to explain the motivations for women to join armed groups or to become a martyr. Despite this increase of studies investigating the phenomenon of female suicide bombers from the individual level, there has not been a
corresponding increase in the understanding on the motivations of insurgent groups for the employment of women in suicide missions (Davis, 2013). Also, notwithstanding the surge in publications on women’s involvement in political violence, and suicide violence in particular, strong theory building by means of testing of hypothesis has remained rare (Jacques & Taylor, 2009: 500).
Due to its contemporary nature, the case of Iraq has been less studied and analyzed (Ayers, 2011: 862). Regarding female’s involvement in suicide attacks in Iraq only two academic articles have been found: one by Davis (2013) and one by Speckhard (2008). While those two studies offer useful descriptions of events and offer important insights into female suicide violence in Iraq, they do not present explanations that come with the building and testing of theories. As Jacques and Taylor (2009) note, those merely descriptive studies have led to a lack of growth in the field (Jacques & Taylor, 2009: 511). What’s more, while these two studies address the presence of female suicide violence, they fail to explain its spatial and temporal variation.
Although this study builds to some extent on the previously mentioned articles, the approach to the phenomenon differs in several ways. First, the level of analysis used in this study is the group level. Therefore, the main focus of this thesis is the potential choices with regard to female suicide attacks that are made
by the insurgent groups. Secondly, rather that merely just describing the variation in use of women in suicide missions, this thesis will test implications that derive from theories explaining suicide attacks and female suicide violence in particular. By moving forward from a description of a case to explanations of what is seen, this study seeks to contribute to the literature on female suicidal violence.
3. Theoretical Framework
This chapter presents the theoretical framework that is used in this research. This thesis tests two existing arguments that explain female suicide violence from an insurgent group’s perspective. The first argument, the ‘Ultimate political goal thesis’ stresses the ideological dimension of the insurgent group in
explaining suicide violence. The second argument, the ‘Permissibility of the operating environment thesis’ focuses on the tactical environment in which insurgent groups operate in explaining female suicide violence. While those two arguments independently cannot explain spatial1 and temporal variation in
female suicide violence in Iraq between 2003 and 2010, this thesis argues that integrating these two arguments offers the most comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon.
This chapter first explains the relevance of studying female suicide violence as a demand driven phenomenon rather than a supply driven phenomenon. Then it moves on to describing the Ultimate political goal thesis and the Permissibility of the operating environment thesis. At the end of this second section a new
theoretical argument is presented that combines these two theses. The last section presents alternative explanations of female suicide violence whose explanatory power will also be assessed. These alternative arguments focus on norms and the social context in explaining female suicide violence. At the end of this chapter a brief summary and a table of expectations based on the arguments are presented.
3.1 Approach to female suicide violence
The purpose of this research is to understand and explain the temporal and spatial variation in female suicide violence in Iraq. A strong focus on individual-‐ level motivations has been important for the study of female suicide violence. Yet, treating female suicide violence as a supply-‐driven phenomenon tells us
little about when and why female suicide attacks actually take place. This thesis argues that without organizations or groups, individuals cannot act out their violence in a sustained manner. Hence, an explanation for women’s involvement in suicide operations calls for an examination of groups that have employed female suicide bombers. By using the group’s level of analysis, this thesis treats female suicide violence as a demand-‐driven rather than a supply-‐driven
phenomenon.
Some scholars, such as Dearing (2009,2010) use a constructivist approach to study female suicide violence and argue that in order for groups to recruit and train female operatives, social approval and cultural legitimacy are required. Dearing for instance notes, “These social and cultural pressures are what instrumentalist leaders and organizations must come to grips with when harnessing and controlling social movements.” (Dearing, 2009: 21). Similarly, Victor (2003) argues that groups appear to be willing to use women only when public attitude is favorable towards this action. When those favorable social conditions are absent, it is argued that it is unlikely that women will have an active role in insurgent or terrorist groups (Jacques & Taylor, 2009: 510). However, this thesis uses a different approach to study female suicide violence. The central proposition of this thesis is that from the perspective of an insurgent group, the desirability to include women in its operations should be understood in terms of the extent to which women’s contributions are believed to advance the group’s cause (Dalton & Asal, 2011: 805). In this sense, this study uses a rationalist rather than a constructivist approach to study female suicide violence. Yet, the arguments that focus on the social context and structures in which
groups operate may also explain spatial and temporal variation. Therefore these alternative arguments are presented in this thesis and their explanatory power will be assessed as well.
3. 2. Theoretical argument for variation in female suicide violence
3.2.1 Ultimate Political Goal ThesisThe first premise that makes up the theoretical argument of this thesis focuses on the political ideological dimension of an armed group.
As Horowitz (2010) notes, due to its commitment to violent action and its existence in a constant state of war, the decision-‐making terrain of an insurgent group differs from that of a state. For insurgent and terrorist groups there are inherent incentives to adopt new tactics since every group wants to maximize its ability to deliver punishment to its target of choice. Yet, where on the one hand female suicide violence as a tactical innovation has low financial barriers, it has high organizational barriers on the other (Horowitz, 2010: 36).
Suicide violence is a risky tactic because it is intensely damaging and often involves significant civilian and bystander casualties. This type of political violence therefore constantly threatens to undermine the support of constituent populations (Piazza, 2008: 32). Yet, groups whose objective entails replacing the current government with a ‘more legitimate’ one, must demonstrate their own legitimacy and competence as an alternative to the political status quo (Ibid.). Piazza (2008) argues that suicide violence is therefore only useful for certain types of insurgent groups. He makes a distinction between three kinds of ultimate political objectives that insurgent groups can hold: (1) National Self Determination Goal; (2) Domestic Political Goal and; (3) Universalist/Abstract Goal.
The nationalist self-‐determination goal refers to the ideology of groups whose objective is to “secure a separate national homeland for their constituent population, secede and join an already existing state with whom the
insurgency/terrorist group and its constituents identify as national confederates or to secure greater cultural or political autonomy from the dominant ethnic group of the country in which they reside” (Ibid.: 34). Groups that share this ‘ultimate political goal’ include the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
The domestic political goal refers to the ideology of groups “whose objective is to secure outright regime change or substantial policy change by the current
regime under which they and their constituent population live that would result in a redistribution of political power” (Ibid.). The Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Communist Party of Nepal are groups that fall under this second category.
The universalist/abstract political goal refers to groups “who have political objectives exceeding or outside of national self-‐determination and domestic political change, that are derived from broad, ideological critiques of
contemporary politics and society and that include large-‐scale, global revolutions in thought, political order, economic organization, and social practice” (Ibid.). Groups with such an ultimate political goal can be identified by the ambitious, abstract and sometimes obscure nature of their agendas. Examples of such objectives are for instance, worldwide replacement of the capitalist system, putting an end to the U.S. Hegemony, bringing an end to the global enslavement of animals and the rejection of the secular nation-‐state and reconfiguration of the ‘Islamic World’ into a caliphate (Ibid).
Piazza argues that insurgent groups with universal or abstract political goals are more likely to employ suicide attacks than groups with discrete and concrete strategic objectives like domestic regime change, policy change or national liberation (Ibid.: 32). The reason for this is that those groups are not inhibited by the need to demonstrate to their constituents that they are a functional and legitimate replacement of the political status quo (Ibid.).
The observable implication that follows from the ultimate political goal argument is that we should observe female suicide violence with insurgent groups in Iraq that have an abstract or universal political goal.
3.2.2 Permissibility of the operating environment thesis
Whereas the previous theoretical variable focuses on the ideological dimension of the insurgency group as a factor in explaining female suicide violence, the
‘permissibility of the operating environment’ argument looks at whether a significant security dilemma exists within the conflict region.
This variable stems from Matthew Dearing’s (2010) theory on the employment of female suicide bombers. Rather than focusing on the presence of women in armed groups, Dearing analyzes the absence of female suicide attacks used by the Taliban in Afghanistan. He argues that structural inhibitors account for this lack of women joining the Taliban resistance and presents three key elements that have led to the absence of female suicide bombers in Afghanistan. These factors are first, a permissive operating environment for the Taliban that gives the insurgents room to maneuver accompanied by no shortage of recruits. Secondly, the fiercely conservative culture that restricts women to participate in society and the resistance movement; and third the absence of a history of women’s martyrdom operations (Dearing, 2010).2
Regarding the permissible operating environment, Dearing argues that female suicide violence is a tactic that depends on structural constraints on insurgent actions and mobility. He notes that when the organization’s position of safety is threatened to a certain point, it will then resort to alternative military strategies (Dearing, 2010: 1087). Using female bombers can in this sense be seen as a military innovation for insurgent groups in times when the geographic and social environment fail to provide safe havens and refuge; when external actors are inconsistent suppliers of resources and recruits; and when counterinsurgent forces are strong adversaries (Dearing, 2010). Cunningham (2003) offers a similar argument and argues that as a result of contextual pressures, groups tend to adapt to high levels of external pressure by altering their techniques and targets. Also, on an additional level, groups may innovate through including new actors or perpetrators (Cunningham, 2003: 173). Female suicide violence can in this sense be understood as an actor innovation.
2 Due to the rationalist approach of this thesis, the argument of this thesis only incorporates
Dearing’s permissibility of the operating environment argument. The explanatory power of the other two variables is tested as well in this research. They have been used as alternative arguments.
Dearing’s explanation of a permissive operating environment for female suicide attacks is useful for this research in terms of explaining the geographical and temporal variation in female suicide violence in Iraq.
The observable implication that follows from Dearing’s argument is that the less an insurgent organization finds the operational environment permissive, the more likely it will rely upon female suicide bombers as a tactic. And in general it is assumed that the more effective counterinsurgents are, the less permissible the environment is for groups to operate, thus making female suicide bombings a tactic more worthwhile in order to provide time, space and recognition (Dearing, 2010: 1084).
3.2.3. Theoretical argument
The previous two sections have described the two theoretical arguments that make up the main argument of this thesis. Both arguments cannot independently explain the spatial and temporal variation in female suicide violence. The
ultimate political goal thesis can explain why some groups resort to the use of women in suicide operations, in particular in cases when social support is low. It can also explain trends in terms of targets of suicide violence. However, it cannot explain when and where the actual female suicide attacks take place. The
permissibility of the operation environment thesis can independently explain when suicide violence is most likely to occur, but fails to explain why some groups, even in cases when the operating environment is not permissive, do not use suicide violence. In this sense, the permissibility argument fails to explain the spatial variation in female suicide violence.
The primary argument of this thesis is that while both the ultimate goal thesis and the permissibility thesis cannot independently explain female suicide violence in Iraq, when combined, however, they provide the most
comprehensive explanation for the emergence and variation of female suicide violence in Iraq. When we integrate the two arguments, we can expect to observe female suicide violence with insurgent groups pursuing an abstract or universal political goal when the environment they operate in becomes less permissive.
3.3. Alternative Explanations: Social Enablers of Female Suicide
Violence
This section of the theoretical chapter presents alternative arguments that focus on the social structures and context in explaining female suicide violence.
Some scholars point to equality in gender roles in society as an important social condition for women’s inclusion in insurgent and terrorist groups. Writing on women’s (absent) role in the Afghan insurgency, Dearing refers to the ‘enduring presence of a strict culture’ as an important factor in restricting female
participation in insurgent organizations (Dearing, 2010: 1093). Compared to other conflict regions, Afghanistan is said to have a highly conservative culture that generally requires a strict segregation of the genders and furthermore restricts female mobility (Ibid). The gender-‐equality argument suggests that, “if space is provided to women in the public sphere, it becomes easier for insurgent groups to establish a similar sphere for women in the group, especially one that involves violent political action” (Dearing, 2009: 120). This implies that the more restrictive the interpretation of women’s participation in the public sphere is, the less likely it is for insurgent groups to employ women in suicide violence.
Another social condition that has been suggested with regard to suicide violence is the presence of a martyrdom ideology. Hafez (2006) for instance notes that suicidal violence is embraced and honored when the following three conditions converge: (1) Prevailing cultural norms encompass belief systems, symbolic narratives and historical traditions that justify and celebrate martyrdom; (2) Legitimate authorities promote or acquiesce to extreme violence; and (3)
Communities feel victimized and threatened by external enemies in the course of political conflict. (Hafez, 2006: 166).
When applied to female suicidal violence, the gender inclusive culture of
martyrdom argument is concerned with whether a present martyrdom ideology
“arises as an individual, organizational and societal identity that embraces female participation” (Dearing, 2009: 126). For instance, religious allowances, or
fatwas can prescribe the inclusion of women in such circumstances (Jacques &
discourses and propaganda that venerate women as martyrs, individual women or organizations openly endorsing martyrdom, an effort to reframe the
traditional role of women in combat from one that is supportive of male actions to one that actively participates in political violence, and legitimate authority figures endorsing female martyrdom operations” (Dearing, 2009: 12).
The third alternative argument is the ‘outbidding thesis’. The outbidding thesis is concerned with competition among different insurgent/terrorist groups that are involved in the conflict. This thesis argues that groups plan, execute and
publicize suicide attacks to gain political and social support. Mia Bloom is one of the foremost advocates of this thesis of interaction between armed groups. Bloom’s hallmark case is the Second Intifada where Palestinian insurgent groups Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah found themselves rivals in the political battle for control over the Palestinian Territories (Ayers, 2008: 860). Applied to female suicide violence, the logic of the outbidding thesis suggests that when multiple groups are competing for social and political support, one or more may choose to differentiate themselves from the others by including women in frontline roles (Davis, 2013: 285). The observable implication that follows from this argument is that we should observe female suicide attacks when groups are competing for social and political support. This outbidding thesis suggests that groups will claim female suicide attacks to ensure they get ‘credits’ for their effort.
Summary and table of expectations
This chapter presented arguments that explain female suicide violence. The section started with the ultimate political goal thesis and then explained how the permissibility of the operational environment drives insurgent groups to include women in their suicide missions. The second section presented alternative arguments that focus on social environment enablers in explaining female suicide violence. Table 1 presents the observable implications derived from the arguments.
Table 1: Arguments and Observable Implications
Argument Observable implication/Expectation
Ultimate Political Goal Thesis If Piazza’s theory is correct, we should observe female suicide bombers with insurgent groups in Iraq that hold a universal/abstract political goal.
Permissibility Operating Environment Thesis
The less an insurgent organization finds the
operational environment permissible, the more likely it will rely upon female suicide bombers as a tactic.
Gender equality
The more restrictive the interpretation of women’s participation in conflict or politics is, the less likely it is for insurgent groups to employ women in suicide attacks
Gender inclusive martyrdom-‐ Ideology
The more a martyrdom-‐norm develops as an organizational and societal identity that embraces women, the higher the number of female suicide attacks
Outbidding Thesis If the outbidding thesis is true, then we should observe female suicide attacks when groups are competing for social and political support.
4. Research Design
4.1. Methodology
The purpose of this this thesis is to understand and explain the spatial and temporal variation of female suicide violence in Iraq between 2003 and 2010. The research method that has been used to study female suicide violence in Iraq is a single case study. More specifically, an explanatory single case study in which existing theoretical arguments are tested and a new theoretical argument is formed.
By using the group’s level of analysis, this thesis attempts to explain the
motivations or decision-‐making process of insurgent groups using female suicide violence. A small sample case study makes deeper analysis possible and allows one to go beyond quantitative statistical results to understand the behavioral conditions from the actors’ perspective (Zainal, 2007: 1).
Furthermore, while cross-‐national studies have frequently been used in studying suicide violence, these statistical inquiries “run the risk of “conceptual
stretching” by lumping together dissimilar cases to get a larger sample” (George & Bennet, 2005: 19). In contrast, case studies, and single case studies in
particular, allow for a higher level of validity because of the small sample (Ibid.) Also, in terms of case selection this research involves an outlier or deviant case. George & Bennett (2005) argue that case studies have a powerful advantage in terms of identifying new variables and hypotheses through the study of deviant or outlier cases (Ibid.: 20). In this case study two existing arguments have been integrated to form a more comprehensive argument for female suicide violence in Iraq.
Moreover, case studies are strong at identifying the scope conditions of theories and assessing arguments about causal necessity or sufficiency in particular cases (Ibid.25). This corresponds with the purpose of this thesis in which the focus is on whether, how and when the theoretical variables mattered, rather than assessing how much they mattered.
On the other hand, an important critique on a single case design has been that its dependency on a single unit limits the generalizability of the research compared to other research methods (Zainal, 2007: 5). Still, much can be learned from one single particular case and the findings of a single case study can be transferred to similar cases. In the case of this thesis, a new theoretical argument is presented, which can be tested in a case that is similar to Iraq, such as Nigeria, Pakistan, or Somalia were women are also started to be employed for suicide missions by Salafi jihadist groups.
4.2. Case selection
In terms of female suicidal violence, Iraq has not been the only stage for female suicide attacks. Women have been involved in suicide campaigns of several insurgent and terrorist groups. However, there are several aspects that make Iraq a unique and deviant case to study female suicide violence.
First, due to its contemporary nature, female suicide violence in Iraq has been less studied and analyzed than other cases. The usual suspects include cases such as the Palestinian, Chechen, Kurdish or Tamil Tigers cases. Female suicide violence in Iraq has also rarely been included in comparative case studies of female political violence.
Second, in terms of the quantity of female suicide incidents, Iraqi insurgent groups have surpassed the number of female perpetrators used by other groups using suicide campaigns. While before the invasion in 2003, Iraq had never witnessed female bombers, after ten years the Iraqi insurgent groups account for more than 25% of worldwide female suicide attacks (Davis, 2013).
Third, in terms of the time-‐lapse between the first male and first female suicide attack, the Iraqi case also deviates from other cases. While on average groups that use suicide violence wait 13.5 years before they employ women, in the Iraqi case this has been one month (O’Rourke, 2009; Davis, 2013).
Fourth, where in particular leftist or nationalist-‐separatist oriented insurgent groups have used female suicide violence; a surprising development has been the way in which religious armed groups, that traditionally have opposed female involvement, opened their stages for female recruits (Von Knop, 2007: 398). During the war in Iraq, Jihadist armed groups have increasingly employed women for suicide operations. This makes Iraq an important and unique case to study the operational shift of those religious groups.
4.3. Data
The data for this research were mainly derived from open source Internet searches, academic articles and books. First, to identify the cases of female suicide attacks in Iraq, the author has combined the Chicago Project On Security and Terrorism (CPOST) database on suicide terrorism and the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents. To address the absence of data, a new database was created. This created data set includes all known suicidal violence incidents in which at least one woman was involved. This list of incidents can be found in Appendix 1.
More specifically, the data collection process took place as follows: Initially this study relied on the dataset of the CPOST database. This database maintains a searchable database on all suicide attacks from 1982 through December 2015 and includes useful information about the location of the attacks, the target and weapon type and the gender and general biographical characteristics of the perpetrator (CPOST, 2016).
CPOST defines a suicide attack “as an attack in which an attacker kills himself or herself in a deliberate attempt to kill others” (CPOST, 2016). Furthermore, CPOST only includes incidents of suicidal violence when these are conducted by non-‐state actors and points to ‘suicide’ as the critical criteria for inclusion: “the attacker must kill him or herself, even if no one but the attacker dies in the attack” (CPOST, 2016).
