Happiness maximization: A theoretical and practical analysis of the pursuance
of happiness as the ethical-political goal in public policy.
Stijn Vos
A thesis presented for the Master of Science degree Political Theory
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Supervisor: Dr. Afsoun Afsahi Second reader: Dr. Anne Loeber
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Table of contents
1 Introduction ... 3
2 Utilitarianism ... 7
3 Ultimate end norms ... 10
4 Happiness maximization ... 13
5 Objections to conceptualization and moral provability ... 15
6 Objections to the utilitarian principle in public policy ... 19
7 Happiness policy in reality: The case of Schagen... 26
8 Methods and interviewees ... 27
9 Results ... 29
10 Discussion ... 34
11 Conclusion ... 41
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1 Introduction
The idea that the state should pursue citizen happiness through its policies has been widely discussed in political theory. Philosophers like J.S. Mill, Kant, Bentham, Aristotle and others all wrote about the concept of happiness, what it means and what role the state should have in the pursuit of happiness for its citizens. Recent developments in the social sciences have resulted in happiness mostly being given the operational definition of “subjective well-being” (Diener et al. 2009: 2). Through using this definition, the subjective nature of happiness is acknowledged. It refers to one’s cognitive judgement of satisfaction, and to an evaluation of emotions (Diener 1984). However, not all scholars abide by this definition, as some still express more prescriptive conceptualizations. In which case scholars define happiness as being the feeling that is evoked when some other thing is accomplished. For instance “self-determination” (Deci & Ryan 2000) or a combination of factors that constitute “psychological well-being” (Ryff & Keyes 1995).1 Thus, it would be inaccurate to claim that there is consensus on the matter. For the purpose of this thesis it suffices to understand happiness as subjective well-being, though the issue of conceptualization will be further addressed later.
More recently, an actual “happiness movement” has emerged throughout the world (Musikanski 2014: 55). India and the United Arab Emirates currently have a ministry of happiness (Telegraph 2016, Aljazeera 2016) and the United Kingdom has adopted the Bhutanese idea of using a Gross National Happiness (GHN) index similarly to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) metrics (Musikanski 2014: 55). All of this might be seen as an effort to defer focus from economic interests to a more comprehensive conception of well-being, or perhaps as a distraction from governmental flaws. Regardless of normative judgement, happiness is becoming more present in public policy.
1 The definition given by Ryff & Keyes is too extensive to fully describe here, but in broad terms it states
that psychological well-being, or happiness, is a scale based on the presence of six different factors in an individual. Namely: Self-acceptance, environmental mastery, positive relations, purpose in life, personal growth and autonomy (Ryff & Keyes 1995: 721).
4 The idea that citizen happiness should be not only present, but the main goal in public policy has also gained popularity (Veenhoven 2004, 2010, Layard 2006, Ng & Ho 2006). Public policy might be understood as “anything a government chooses to do or not to do” (Dye, 1972: 2) Some municipal governments in the Netherlands have adopted a form of happiness policy and have restructured their public agenda to increase happiness amongst citizens. The first to do this was the municipality of Schagen, which drew on the work of Veenhoven and the Erasmus University of Rotterdam in its transition to become a “happiness-municipality”. They have embraced the view that the purpose of government is to positively affect citizen happiness, and intend to aim all public policy on the increase of aggregate citizen happiness (Gemeente Schagen 2017). They have claimed happiness to be the most “essential task” of government (NOS 2017), and are actively making sure that all of their policies contribute to this ideal.
Several other larger municipalities, such as Tilburg and Breda, have followed this model. Currently, thirteen municipalities have stated they wish to contribute to their citizens
happiness, and this number is growing steadily (Eenvandaag 2018).2 Not all of them adopted
an equally extensive view as can be found in Schagen, but all accept the notion that government can and should positively affect citizen happiness. They have all stated that the purpose of government is to contribute to the happiness of citizens.
In practice, to claim the purpose of government as being the improvement of citizen happiness means that the implementation of public policy is dependent on whether it positively affects this. If it does not contribute to the overall happiness of the citizens, no actions are taken, only actions that do contribute are considered good. It judges actions on their outcome, the effect on aggregate happiness and claims happiness as the most important moral norm in society. This is in essence the utilitarian principle; an action should not be judged by its
2 A study dating November 2018 states the following municipalities have adopted a public policy that
focuses on happiness: Schagen, Tiel, Almelo, Drimmelen, Etten-Leur, Breda, Tilburg, Peel en Maas, Beesel, Roerdalen, Mechelen (Gulpen-Wittem), and Vaals. In total, approximately 750.000 people live in these municipalities.
5 intention, but by the outcome, or utility of its consequences. The utility being human happiness or pleasure (Bentham 1789). The quality of public policy can therefore be measured by its ability to improve aggregate citizen happiness.
Recently, this ideal has become more present in political theory. Most noticeably Veenhoven describes how happiness can and should be a practicable goal for government and argues that the ultimate goal of government should be “happiness maximization” (Veenhoven 2004, 2010). This means to pursue happiness as the highest goal for government, on the basis of the utilitarian principle. Support for this idea has grown as a result of extensive research on the topic of happiness within the fields of psychology, economics and sociology (Duncan 2010: 3). It relies strongly on the measurability of aggregate citizen happiness, and the notion that this number can be influenced by government.
While there is theoretical support for the implementation of happiness maximization policies, the value of the utilitarian principle in public policy is controversial, and it remains questionable whether it ought to be put to use. Historically, it has faced both pragmatic and moral objections. It is argued that a utilitarian ideal could negatively affect the position of minority groups and that it lacks normative content (Ibid. 9-16). Furthermore, there are concerns regarding the measurability and predictability of happiness. Thus, it is contested on both moral issues as well as its practical application.
Regardless, the municipality of Schagen, and others, have implemented this utilitarian ideal of happiness maximization into their policies. Due to its contested nature, it is important that the true implications of this policy are investigated at both a theoretical as well as a practical level. While much of the theoretical groundwork has been done, to analyze a practical setting has only become possible recently with the implementation of happiness maximization in these municipalities. Furthermore, much of the theoretical groundwork for happiness maximization has been done by the same few proponents. A critical theoretical view might thus be of value.
6 In essence, it is still not clear whether happiness maximization is something that we should want in public policy. Because, there is a lack of research on a practical level, as well as a lack of critical insights on a theoretical one.
In this paper I will provide these two missing links, which ultimately leads to a normative argument on the pursuance of happiness as the ethical-political goal in public policy.
I will examine whether happiness maximization should be pursued by the government.If not, I
will propose an alternative approach. This will require thedelineation and further development of the objections against happiness maximization. Subsequently, it can be analysed if and how these manifest in the case of the municipality of Schagen. The latter will be done through the use of qualitative interviews with the main actors regarding the happiness policy in the municipality of Schagen. This municipality was chosen as it was the first municipality to adopt these ideas and to implement them the furthest. Additionally, it was accessible in terms of getting to interview the main actors.
The thesis is then structured as follows: Firstly, the theoretical framework regarding the use of happiness in public policy is outlined. This consists of an explanation of utilitarianism, “ultimate end norms” and happiness maximization. Secondly, I argue that there are two fundamental impossibilities regarding the use of happiness maximization in public policy, namely that of conceptualization and moral provability. Furthermore, that there are several other moral and pragmatic objections to be made against happiness maximization. Thirdly, there follows a description of the case of Schagen, the interview subjects and the methodology. Fourthly, the results of the interviews are described. Fifthly, these results are analyzed in light of the earlier concluded theoretical objections, to subsequently come to a normative judgement regarding the use of happiness maximization in public policy. Additionally, I will provide an alternative approach to happiness in public policy. One that does not rely on the utilitarian
7 principle, which I propose should be named “happiness mainstreaming”. Finally, I present an overall conclusion to the research question and its results.
2 Utilitarianism
The use of happiness in public policy as can be found amongst the Dutch municipalities is of
utilitarian nature. The utilitarian philosophy was first presented by Jeremy Bentham, or
arguably Epicurus (Scarre 1994). It serves as an answer to questions of morality and human nature, and therefore government responsibility and purpose. Bentham claims that happiness should be considered the most important moral norm, as all that is experienced by humans is either pain or pleasure, good or bad. He calls this the principle of utility (Bentham 1789: 6). The combination of pleasures constitute individual happiness, and pains constitute misery. The utilitarian conception of human nature says that all humans pursue happiness instead of misery. Furthermore, Bentham argues that all actions are ultimately aimed at obtaining this happiness, and that therefore they should be judged according to their ability to do so (Ibid. 7). He explicitly mentions all actions, as governmental action can be measured according to the same standards. One can give normative judgement over these actions by virtue of their accordance to the principle of utility. Additionally, actions that do increase happiness ought to be done. In other words, on the basis of the principle of utility there exists a certain responsibility or moral duty to act in a way that causes happiness instead of misery.
Bentham distinguishes between different sources of either pain or pleasure, which he names sanctions, namely: Physical, political, moral and religious (Bentham 1789: 20). This distinction shows that the proposed governmental responsibility to pursue citizen happiness does not extend over all aspects of individual lives. Bentham, rightfully so, does not overestimate the potential influence of government in citizen happiness. A government might affect the political or physical sanctions of an individual, but there are moral and religious spheres in which there can hardly be any influence by the government.
8 These four sources of sanctions all direct human behavior towards whatever bring them most pleasure, and there is no distinct hierarchical structure between them. Where we can make a hierarchical distinction is between the different sanctions themselves. Not every pain is equally impactful to one’s overall experience of misery, and this is also accurate regarding pleasures. According to Bentham, the value of any pleasure or pain is dependent on its intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty and its nearness or remoteness (Ibid. 22). In short, a sanction is valued highest when it feels intense, lasts long, is certain and happens immediately or the near future. While individuals might not consciously examine these different factors, they do decide between different actions based on these characteristics of the sanctions they receive.
Bentham’s description of how humans choose their action based on different forms of pain and pleasure often faces scrutiny on its account of human nature. It is not only possible to attribute normative judgement to one’s actions when it either causes pleasure or pain, it is human nature to act in a way that causes pleasure. He paints a hedonistic picture of human nature, where one’s behavior can be predicted as it will always be in service of receiving pleasure.3 Critics argue that Bentham presents an image of human nature that is no more than that of animals. To describe humans as such; constantly seeking short term and intense pleasure, is indeed somewhat simplistic. Admittedly, it would require knowledge about what specific forms of pain and pleasure are in order to argue the fact that they are no better than that of animals, as later made apparent by Mill.
John Stuart Mill responds to these critics of Bentham’s human nature by stating that instead, they are the ones presenting an animalistic view of human nature. Because, by arguing what they do, they claim that the desires of humans do not differ from those of animals. Additionally, if one does believe that humans have an elevated sense of pleasure and pain in
3 Bentham’s view is hedonistic as it proposes that individuals always maximize pleasure and minimize
pain. It differs from preference utilitarianism which is concerned with fulfilling desires. Mill is presented by some as a preference utilitarianist, though this is debatable as he clearly expresses hedonistic perspectives as well.
9 comparison to that of animals, their objection to Bentham’s conception of human nature is no longer valid (Mill 1861: 5). In other words, claiming that humans pursue pleasure and avoid pain does not say anything about the complexity or nobility of that specific pursuit, and this strongly devaluates the human nature objection. As Mill explains, the pleasures of humans are not limited to physical sensations, but can rely on a highly noble morality, or for instance the pursuit of good for an entire society. Fulfilling these higher desires is more valuable than being able to fulfill all desires, if these desires are of a lower faculty. Mill shows this by arguing that no human would prefer to be changed into an animal with merely these lower desires, even if they are all fulfilled. Only in the unhappiest positions would one ever consider this to be a valid option. Even when an animal can more easily fulfill all of his desires he is not happier than a human, he is only content (Ibid. 6). Happiness to Mill comes from the exploration of these higher desires: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.” (Ibid.).
The utilitarian perspective should thus not be disregarded because of its conception of human nature being simplistic, as it does allow for complexity and nobility of human desires. One can argue that humans pursue pleasure without further developing what these pleasures are. A government that wishes to facilitate these pleasure however might find this difficult as they are diverse, subjective and complex. In conclusion, the utilitarian conception of human nature states that humans pursue pleasure and avoid pain, and what these pleasures and pains are specifically is not explicitly defined. Thus, further developing what the pursuit of happiness means in practice is necessary. Additionally, what should be considered higher desires and if everyone possesses them are questions that remain unanswered. Furthermore, there not being much to argue against the utilitarian conception of human nature does not mean the utilitarian morality is without flaw. The pursuance of happiness by individuals does not directly translate to a moral obligation for government to help them achieve this. As will be made apparent later
10 in this paper, this utilitarian idea of morality can be scrutinized on its sometimes counterintuitive moral judgement, especially in minority issues. Employing a utilitarian interpretation of government would therefore face many objections.
3 Ultimate end norms
What is it that the government needs to do for its citizens? In a liberal democracy, which is arguably most concerned this question, there are several responsibilities that are generally assigned to the government. Examples of these are concepts such as safety, freedom or equality as being a moral guideline to public policy and governmental action in general. These norms are considered to be good, and it is generally accepted that a government is supposed to pursue them. There might however also be one norm that is deemed to be “the reference to and for the
sake of which all other things are desirable” (Mill 1861: 7). In this case, one of these moral
norms is supposed to be that which should be pursued overall, as the entire purpose of government or even life in general. Within the utilitarian philosophy, happiness is viewed as such a norm. For this reason it would be beneficial to review the nature of these moral norms and their position in public policy.
The question of what norm should be most important is called the question of ultimate end (Ibid. 3). It is the question of what it is that we ultimately live for, and thus what a government should perceive to be their highest goal. Only moral norms that do not find their validity in a higher form of morality might function as an answer to this question. For instance, “democracy” or “not being imprisoned” could not be an answer to the question of ultimate end, as they derive their moral worth from equality and freedom respectively. I propose that the norms that might function as an ultimate end themselves should be called ultimate end norms. These norms are final causes, or goals at which all others must be aimed. The term ultimate end norm is based on the character of the norm, namely that it represents a moral norm which is the basis for why other things are good, and that this depends on moral reasoning
11 (Bentham 1789: 20). Thus, it is not the case that a moral norm can only be an ultimate end norm if a government explicitly pursues it as the highest goal, in that case it simply becomes an “ultimate end goal” instead of a norm. Because, some states might value one more than the other, or have a different interpretation of what it means to be for instance just or equal, but the character of the norm is unaltered. A government could choose which ultimate end norm they should pursue as an ultimate end goal. Alternatively, they might choose to not pursue one over the others.
The nature of these norms; that they do not claim morality on the basis of other norms, leads to some difficulties. While instinctively these norms might seem good, there is nothing that supports this instinct but intuition and feelings. It is sometimes claimed that the positive nature of norms such as these can be derived from a moral believe in the intrinsic equality of humans, and any interference to these norms would require the believe that humans are not equal (Dahl 2008: 62). Because, when all humans are intrinsically equal, they are all deserving of equality, safety and freedom. Because, this equality makes it so that no individual could legitimately rule over another. However, one cannot prove equality to be good, similar to any other ultimate moral norm (Mill 1861: 3), and some other moral norms do not comply to the idea of equality per se. Thus, in the case of happiness one cannot present proof of it being good, even if this is instinctively the case. This makes for a difficult situation, as it is not possible to argue for happiness as an ultimate end goal without referring to some form of morality to guide the answer. Jeremy Bentham acknowledges the inability to prove this norm validity, but does not think of it as an issue: “- because something that is used to prove everything else can’t itself
be proved; a chain of proofs must start somewhere. To give such a proof is as impossible as it is needless.” (Bentham 1789: 8). Or in Mill’s words: “Whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof.”
12 Bentham and Mill argue that this lack of proof should not be considered an issue, as generally these norms are still valued highly. Most of the time, these concepts are relatively uncontested, nobody would rationally argue against equality or justice, even if their conception of what it means is skewered. My claim is however, that there is a great chance of conflict when ultimate end norms compete with each other in order to decide on an ultimate end goal. When the question of government responsibility is focused on finding a single ideal to pursue, it is inevitably faced with different understandings of what it should be. Whereas normally this could be discussed using rationale, as shown before there can be no correct answer to this question, and therefore debate will be fruitless. There is effectively no objective measure to distinguish between the value of these different ultimate end norms. How does one for instance compare justice and happiness when only one can be the ultimate end goal for government. Though this might seem hypothetical, claiming happiness to be the ultimate end goal of government already contests other theories of social decision-making, such as Sen’s theory of capabilities4 or Rawls’s “justice as fairness” (Duncan 2010: 13).5 To claim an ultimate end goal such as happiness means to hierarchically order other norms such as freedom and equality under it. Making it so that these norms become a function of the greater good, namely happiness.
Thus, the issue is not that when we agree that the purpose of government is happiness the others can no longer be positively valued, it is that others become instrumental to the one norm. Additionally, others may be sacrificed in order to positively affect the one ultimate norm. In conformance to this, a government may decide to decrease freedom or equality if it positively affects happiness, if happiness is considered to be the ultimate end goal for government. This
4 Though there is a place for happiness in the capabilities approach, Sen’s claim is that it is not citizen
happiness that ought to be ultimately pursued by government, it is merely a natural outcome of functioning’s. Instead, government should pursue the expansion of capabilities for its citizens (Sen 1993).
5 The Rawlsian “justice as fairness” should be understood as a theory of justice within a liberal society,
and not necessarily as an argument for justice as an ultimate end goal. However, it legitimizes power on the basis of government acting in a just way, and claims justice to be the highest standard of social institutions (Wenar: 2017). To pursue happiness as an ultimate end norm would reduce justice to a mere instrumental role, and thus conflict with Rawls’ interpretation of social decision-making.
13 is regardless of the fact that other norms might be valued highly as well, they would still be hierarchically positioned under happiness.
Conclusively, these moral norms might at first glance seem harmless, in reality those who use these norms as guidelines to public policy are doing so without proof of their value. Governments that claim to have established happiness as being that what government should ultimately pursue are thus acting on subjective interpretation. Not only is it impossible for them to prove the positive nature of happiness as a moral norm, they also cannot claim moral ultimacy without opposing established theories of justice and social decision-making.
4 Happiness maximization
Happiness maximization is the practical implementation of the previous two perspectives; that happiness ought to be the ultimate end goal for government, and that it is achieved through employing the utilitarian principle in social-decision making. Its validity rests on the believe that happiness is the greatest good in society, though as has been made clear this cannot be proven. For proponents of happiness maximization however, this is seemingly self-evident.
For proponents of happiness maximization, happiness is in a sense pre-political. It is not an ideological claim, neither is it a concept of the political left or right. Instead, the utilitarian claim of morality is a moral obligation for all governments, regardless of political preference. This means that happiness maximization should not be viewed as a mere option for governments. Instead, it becomes a moral obligation and a measurement for good government. Subsequently, this might also convenience governmental legitimacy debates. Because, when a government maximizes the fulfillment of life’s most important moral norm it is legitimate and otherwise it is not.
In order accurately fulfill this norm, proponents of happiness maximization employ methodology through which happiness is quantified so that it may become a numerical variable that can be actively shaped. Veenhoven conceptualizes happiness as “subjective well-being”,
14 or a combination of the individual inner-life abilities and the external living conditions (Veenhoven 2004: 5). Happiness is thus best defined as an overall measure of well-being or satisfaction of life as a whole (Ibid. 6). According to Veenhoven, this definition contrasts other conceptions of happiness that either rely on just the livability of the environment, or the life-ability of individuals, which is what Veenhoven believes to be the caplife-ability approach by Sen (1993).
If one wishes to then measure happiness in individuals, it should relate to this definition, the satisfaction of life as a whole. This can be done by using self-reporting surveys, simply asking someone: “How satisfied are you currently with your life as a whole?” (Ibid 7). This can give an accurate representation of happiness within certain societal groups or specific regions, and can be used for comparative studies. Additionally, longitudinal studies can analyze the growth or decrease of aggregate happiness. A government can then attempt to maximize this growth by identifying the contributing factors, again by using self-reporting surveys (Gemeente Schagen 2017: 49), and implementing policies that positively contribute to these factors and subsequently the happiness of citizens. Contrastingly, if an action by government would not contribute to the overall happiness of the citizens, it would not be a right action. If the choice falls between two actions that both positively contribute to happiness, the action that contributes the most ought to be done.
Following Bentham, one should not overestimate the governmental influence in individual happiness. To pursue happiness maximization does not mean that a government is responsible for all aspects of one’s happiness. A government cannot realistically prevent its citizens from becoming unhappy due to factors outside of the governments influence. However, studies have shown that there are many determinants for happiness that do fall within the governments area of influence (Burger & Veenhoven 2017: 10), and therefore it ought to be possible for government to positively affect this. As it is key to firstly identify the relevant
15 determinants, a bottom-up approach is necessary. Government should first know what makes their citizens happy before they are able to pursue an increase in this happiness. The practical implications of this type of administration will be made clear further in this paper, where I describe the case of Schagen. First, I examine the theoretical objections to pursuing happiness as the ethical-political goal in public policy.
5 Objections to conceptualization and moral provability
To employ happiness maximization in public policy fundamentally leads to two impossibilities, namely that of conceptualization and moral ultimacy. The first can best be illustrated by utilizing the work of Veenhoven, though his quandary is not unique to him only. Veenhoven fails to define happiness, and merely shifts the question of definition to a different concept.
From “happiness”, he goes to “subjective well-being”, to subsequently arrive at “satisfaction”
and finally “enjoyment”. In his earlier work, “Conditions of Happiness” (Veenhoven 1984), he defines happiness as: “An attitude towards one’s own life” (Ibid. 24), and thus one can add the word “attitude” to the list of metonyms used to describe happiness. As a result, the concept of happiness has not been further conceptualized, its meaning has only been spread across a number of different concepts. Instead of knowing what happiness means, we have only learned which other concepts refer to the same thing that happiness refers to.
Furthermore, this definition is not what is commonly understood to be happiness (Ng 1996: 6). Happiness is commonly understood as an emotion or feeling, and not a consideration of the entirety of life. Seemingly, Veenhoven shows how happiness can be conveniently operationalized, and not how it is to be conceptualized. Surprisingly, he then claims that happiness is a well-defined concept, even though he participated in no conceptualization whatsoever. Instead, happiness is a concept that can only be defined by employing other ill-defined and subjective descriptions of feelings, leading to a circular definition of happiness itself. This is not caused by mistakes made by Veenhoven, but simply and inevitable result of
16 attempting to conceptualise individual feelings or experiences. How does one define “anger” for example, without relying on different concepts that mean the same? Emotional concepts such as happiness are inevitably metaphorical and metonymic by nature (Kövecses 2014).
In this light, happiness differs from other moral norms as it does not have any objective component. If one considers equality or freedom for instance, there is a subjective experience, but it can be conceptualized without employing feelings or experience. For example; a definition of freedom such as “freedom as non-interference” (Berlin 2017) allows one to distinguish a clear objective standard, that does not require the conceptualizing of emotions or individual judgement by the subjects. Additionally, one can discuss these concepts without normative judgement, whereas happiness maintains an inherent normativity. Veenhoven does attempt to eliminate the emotional aspect of his conceptualization and presents the definition:
“The degree to which an individual judges the overall quality of his life-as-a-whole favourably”
(Veenhoven 1984: 22), but this definition and his motivation is misleading. The idea that happiness is something that ought to be consciously judged by an individual is at least odd, since inherently, happiness relates to an emotion or feeling and is not a rational consideration.
Consequently, this leads Veenhoven to conclude that children or “mentally retarded
people”, in his words, can neither be happy or unhappy, as they would be unable to accurately
judge their quality of life as a whole (Ibid. 23). While instinctively, they are most certainly able to be either happy or unhappy, as their emotions are not experienced fundamentally different. To argue a difference between individuals on the basis of disability is not only counter-intuitive, it is discriminatory and undermines the strives that have been made in the emancipation and acceptance of different disabilities in society. It is especially harmful since Veenhoven argues that happiness is or ought to be the ultimate end goal for government and individuals alike. Thus, an inability to be happy would erase the significance of living. However, it is counterproductive to further this debate, as the initial claim that disabled people or children
17 cannot be happy should not be accepted. Instead, it would be appropriate to examine whether any person is able to accurately judge their well-being. Veenhoven argues that they can, as they are able to recognize their own emotions and thoughts (Burger & Veenhoven 2017: 3). But again, the conception of happiness as supported by Veenhoven gives no mention of emotions, so this argumentation falls short.
Furthermore, happiness in this definition is not a current state, but more so an evaluation of past, present and expected future experiences. Veenhoven thus transforms the concept of happiness from a simple emotion that all humans may experience to an all-encompassing judgement of one’s entire life. I would argue then, that it is at least doubtful that Veenhoven is still speaking of happiness at all. Happiness is in the definition used by proponents of maximization a very broad concept that may relate to all aspects of one’s life. The impossibility of conceptualizing happiness either leads to a metonymic description, or an operationalization in place of a conception. At most, this operationalized definition of happiness might serve as a proxy for utility, as supported by Frey and Stutzer (2002: 405). In this case one has not accurately conceptualized happiness, but merely the metric that might be used to represent it. It is then doubtful that this representation is accurate, as there still is no clear conception of happiness and its relation to the proxy. Therefore, it can not be said that this proxy actually measures happiness.
As shown by Duncan (2010), the process of conceptualization is further inconvenienced, by the dissimilarity between different conceptions of different scholars. Some are based merely on positive feelings, where others refer to this idea of rational judgement. Layard for example, defines happiness simply as feeling good and enjoying life (Layard 2005: 12). Others recognize a negative component, and call it a ratio of positive to negative feelings (Myers 2004: 522). Other scholars employ the term subjective well-being. I would argue that neither of these definition overcome the impossibility as presented before, as they still rely on metonymic or
18 metaphorical descriptions. This is again characterized by the use of the words “feelings”, “enjoyment” or “well-being”. As a result, the concept of happiness, while well understood instinctively by individuals, remains ill-suited for use in public policy.
Not only conceptualising happiness amounts to a circular argumentation, its moral relationship to public policy does as well. As has been established before, there is a lack of proof for the positive nature of such norms. This is caused by the fact that they do not base their morality on other norms, as they are the end norm. Subsequently, this leads to the second impossibility, namely that of moral provability. As there is no proof for the positive value of these norms, there is also no proof that they ought to be pursued by a government. Instead, again only a circular and tautological argument can be made, as it can merely be said that happiness should be pursued because it is good, and it is good because it makes people happy. Thus, even if we objectively agree to a definition of happiness that is somehow not tautological and circular, or metaphorical and metonymic, it is still not subsequently concluded that it ought to be the ethical guide for government.
As has been made clear earlier, the use of ultimate end norms in public policy is problematic when unproven norms have to compete with each other. When happiness is hierarchically placed above other moral norms, there is much opportunity for conflict. How would a government act if it seemed to be the case that a restriction of individual freedom leads to higher aggregate amounts of citizen happiness? What if a very unequal distribution of wealth has this effect? Then suddenly, it is no longer obvious that happiness ought to be the ultimate moral goal, and worth sacrificing other norms for. Thus, while the lack of proof was not necessarily an issue before, it is in the case of using a single moral norm as the ultimate guide for government policies. Again, this is the case with happiness maximization policies. Lastly, the utilitarian principle that is present when implementing happiness maximization policies faces additional objections, which will be made apparent in the next section.
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6 Objections to the utilitarian principle in public policy
Historically, the utilitarian philosophy has continuously been faced with the same objections. These objections might be divided in to two different categories. The first being pragmatic objections where it is often argued that happiness cannot be measured objectively, and that the utility of action cannot be predicted beforehand. Second, moral objections raise questions to whether happiness should be the defining moral principal, and is critical of the position of minorities in this philosophy. In this section, both sets of objections shall be outlined and further developed.
The first step in analyzing the issues with happiness maximization is further developing the moral objections to utilitarianism and happiness maximization. Duncan (2010) introduces this with three moral objections. In short, these are; first, happiness is not an umbrella term for all objective living standards. The fact that one is happy does not mean he is not malnourished, addicted to drugs or illiterate (Duncan 2010: 10). Second, the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people does not eliminate- or might even be sought through means that produce misery for a minority group (Ibid). Third, happiness as the pivotal goal allows one to justify bad habits or behavior when it makes the individual happy, as it lacks normative content (Ibid). In the next paragraphs, I shall further develop these three objections, after which I add a fourth and a fifth moral objection. The fourth being that the maximization of happiness necessarily utilizes an objective view of happiness, and thus narrows the meaning of happiness to that expressed by the government. This leads to an inadvertent decrease in individual choice. Fifth, that happiness might be viewed as a subjective individual characteristic, and that maximizing it for all individuals means a decrease in the heterogeneity or diversity of individual personalities.
The fact that happiness is not an umbrella term for all objective living standards means that to maximize happiness does not solve other societal or individual issues. In fact, if one
20 were to follow the utilitarian principle, the only determinant of good is the effect of an action on utility. Thus, it would not matter if other objective living standards were ill-achieved. Government can be judged solely on its ability to maximize happiness. However, as these living standards can be assumed to positively contribute to the aggregate citizen happiness, it would still be purposeful for a government to also pursue these. Even more so, government ought to do this as the actions that contribute to happiness are those that should be taken. It is thus a misinterpretation to argue that a government concerned with citizen happiness would not be with citizen health or literacy for instance. Still, there might be some validity in this objection, as it could be the case that the further development of some other objective living standard does not contribute to the overall happiness of citizens. Or that a decrease in a different living standard might positively benefit aggregate happiness. This might especially be relevant when considering the relationship between economic well-being and happiness, as exemplified by the so called “Easterlin paradox” (Easterlin 1974). In short, it says that economic growth does not cause further development of aggregate happiness. A government that maximizes happiness could then conclude that to pursue further economic growth might not be valuable, once a certain standard has been met.
The “minority-majority” objection states that the pursuance of the greatest amount of happiness for the largest amount of people could lead to a system that disregards the positions of the already marginalized, minority groups. Because, when measuring an aggregate level of happiness in a country, to benefit a large proportion of the population would influence this number more than it would when only a small fraction of the people is made happy. Thus, decision making will always be biased towards the majority. Even more so, happiness of the majority might be sought through means that cause misery for the minority. In principle, the utilitarian morality says that any action is permissible if it contributes to the aggregate amount of happiness. Therefore, it would be accepted to make a small group of people unhappy, if it
21 were to make a larger group of people happy. Obviously, this might lead to actions that could undermine our general understanding of what is good, or more explicitly what has been established to be human rights.
What might be stated in defense, is that to increase the happiness of especially these marginalized groups will benefit the aggregate amount of happiness the most, as there is most profit to be made. Furthermore, it is known that citizens of countries that respect human rights are on average happier (Diener & Seligman 2004: 5). This would mean that governments are both inclined to facilitate minorities in their needs, as well as admit to the standard treatment of their citizens according to the established human rights if they wish to maximize happiness. This seems to be sufficient in order to counter this objection in the case of long-term public policy and governing philosophy, but in the case of individual decision making there could still arise minority-majority issues. If a decision needs to be made that negatively affects one group but positively affects another, where neither group is considered marginalized, and one group is larger than the other, the decision would still always benefit the larger group. A government may pursue everyone’s happiness in their broad understanding of public policy, but single decisions and actions would still benefit the majority, since in that instance to benefit the majority would positively affect the aggregate citizen happiness the most.
The fact that happiness lacks normative content means that it does not specify what it ought to be that makes a person happy. Therefore, a person could justify all sorts of bad habits on the account of that it makes him or her happier. For instance, what if someone argues that taking drugs or gambling away their savings causes them happiness? Should a government then support their desires and facilitate this? A reasonable morality would not argue in favor of this. Instead, what could be argued in favor of happiness maximization and utilitarianism in general is that it does not simply tell one to act on impulsive and short term feelings of happiness. As presented before when examining the historical utilitarian perspective, the desires of humans
22 might be noble and complex, and this should be taken into account by government. Though humans can become happy by fulfilling their more animalistic needs, they are inherently a more evolved species that becomes happy by exploring their more elevated desires. Therefore, instead of facilitating these short term desires, they should help in pursuing the more long term and complex desires, since these benefit the aggregate happiness most overall.
This would however mean that a government partly ought to decide for its citizens what it is that makes them happy. As fundamentally what they would be doing is preventing citizens to act upon their most primal desires and pursue a more long-term and elevated goal. This might be considered paternalistic or even authoritarian. Additionally, not all long-term or complex desires are positive by nature. For instance, it could be that accumulation of wealth, by any means necessary, is one’s most elevated and complex desire, and what ultimately makes them happy. Because it is not always the case that only the most primal desires are misguided, the lack of normative content could still be problematic. Conclusively, the diversity of variables that make people happy can be problematic, as it is not predetermined that these variables are positive by nature, even if happiness is.
This diversity must also be considered a most valuable thing. A society could not function without heterogenous desires, neither would it be pleasant to live in. In order to effectively maximize happiness, I would argue that it at least requires the homogenization of some desires by a government. If not, this would mean that in its policies a government needs to target each’s individual desires fully. This cannot be done, and therefore there needs to be some standardization on what can be considered to be happiness, and what is allowed to be employed to achieve it. To use the example as given in the previous paragraph, it would not be morally accepted for a government to allow a citizen to pursue happiness through crime and using drugs, even if it was what truly made them happy. Thus, in pursuing the maximization of
23 happiness the government is restricting the meaning of the word happiness, and with it the heterogeneity of desires and ambitions in society.
Though in this example, it could be that these desires cause more unhappiness in its externalities than it does happiness for the individual, this does not always need to be the case. As shall also be seen in the next section when the case of Schagen is described, to target aggregate happiness means to distinguish some important factors that contribute positively to it. It does not mean that a government will be able to determine all factors that contribute to one’s individual happiness, as these are too varied amongst individuals that it would not be possible to do so. Thus, the meaning of happiness and what is allowed to be employed to achieve it is restricted to that which the government believes it to be. Partly because to act upon some desires is viewed as morally deplorable, and others are too niche to be of influence to the totality of aggregate citizen happiness. These desires may therefore not be pursued, or at least will not be facilitated by the government. Conclusively this restricts individual choice and the plurality of experienced desires by normalizing some over others.
One can obviously become more happy or less happy over time, but it is at any moment an important characteristic of the individual. It predicts one’s attitude, social and political participation (Lyubomirksy et al. 2005, Diener & Tay 2017, Barker & Martin 2011), and is generally part of one’s personality. In essence, happiness as it is experienced by individuals is part of their subjective characteristics. People differ in how they experience and emanate happiness similarly to how they experience anger, sadness or fear. To maximize happiness means to homogenize these characteristics, so that all may experience it in the same way. There are two possible issues with this, the first being that it supposes some personalities to be more evolved or better than others. If you experience and emanate happiness as intensely positive, than that is a good characteristic. To be more modest in this expression is wrong, and one should be changed to meet the positively appreciated one. Secondly, this change negatively affects the
24 diverse society as we know and value now. It might be beneficial for society as a whole to see heterogeneity in individual characteristics and how one experiences happiness and other emotions is a large part of this. To then maximize happiness would mean a decrease in perspectives, motivations and character.
As articulated before, in addition to these moral objections there are pragmatic objections that might be offered against the use of the utilitarian principle in public policy. The fundamental issues of conceptualization and moral provability, as well as the moral objections to the utilitarian principle in public policy should be kept in mind while reading this section. Because, the empirical work on happiness might seem predominantly robust, its robustness rests on unstable foundations.
When considering the maximization of happiness by a government, measurability and predictability are the two primary issues. Regarding measurability, it is often argued that governments would not be able to measure the aggregate amount of happiness in society, as its definition is not operational (Veenhoven 2010: 6). Admittedly, the measurability of the concept that empirical scholars employ as being happiness, or the happiness proxy, is seemingly robust, and one can employ the use of self-reporting surveys in order to obtain an aggregate measurement. This measurement may be quantified and used to compare between different states, regions or over a period of time. Without considering the impossibility of conceptualization this would arguably suffice.
The second issue, that of predictability, is the concern that while one might be able to establish the amount of happiness in a society at a point in time, it is still unknown how this number has come about. In other words, the factors contributing to happiness are still unknown. As a result, it would be impossible for a government to increase citizen happiness. Because, they do not know what actions would positively affect this. As they are unable to reliably predict how their actions will affect happiness, there would be no viable option to maximize it in
25 society. Thus, happiness might be non-manufacturable. Happiness research however has shown several conditions for happiness, both external and internal, in spheres that might be open to governmental influence (Ibid. 9). Externally, the government might advance one’s living conditions. Internally, education might foster personal characteristics that benefit happiness indirectly. Thus, it is possible to measure happiness and for a government to influence this metric. However, this does not mean that it is possible to maximize happiness.
While knowing the contributing factors to happiness might be helpful, it is still unknown whether these factors are those which contributes the most. The predictability of happiness only extends to being either positive or negative, but not to the maximization of this positivity. Following the utilitarian principle, the action that contributes the most is the one that ought to be carried out, and this is viable when comparing actions that positively affect happiness with those that negatively affect happiness. When comparing different actions that both cause happiness this becomes more difficult, and it remains impossible to determine what action causes the maximization of happiness.
A government might strive to increase happiness as much as possible, and this might be understood by some as maximization. However, it is not, as it does not conform to the utilitarian principle of morality. Instead, it simply conforms to the idea that a government ought to act in a way that is positive for their citizens. In utilitarianist thought, this is not morally right. For it to be right it does not only have to affect citizens positively, it needs to affect them in the most positive way possible. As a result, the practical interpretation of the utilitarian principle would not conform to its own understanding of morality. Therefore, when a government acts in a way that is described by proponents of happiness maximization, they are acting immoral according to their own principles. This makes it questionable whether those actions should be viewed as legitimate.
26 In conclusion, in the previous two sections I have supplied several objections to the use of happiness maximization policy, which can be hierarchically ordered on the basis of consequence or concern. First, two most fundamental objections: The impossibility of conceptualizing happiness and the impossibility of moral provability. Second, five moral objections to maximizing happiness: Happiness does not overarch all objective living standards, the "minority-majority objection", happiness lacks normative content, maximizing happiness restricts individual choice by narrowing the definition of happiness and what might be employed to achieve it, and finally, maximizing happiness decreases the heterogeneity of personalities in society. Third, a pragmatic objection: Even while employing empirical research to measure and positively affect happiness, it can still not be maximized in accordance to the utilitarian principle as it can not be known effectively what would cause the most happiness.
7 Happiness policy in reality: The case of Schagen
The municipality of Schagen is a medium-sized municipality in the province of Noord-Holland, which houses approximately 45.000 people. Half of these people live in the city of Schagen, while the other half live in one of the 29 smaller townships within the boundaries of the municipality. These townships do not have individual governmental organization, but all fall under the municipal government of Schagen.
The citizens of Schagen are relatively wealthy, though the average income is not substantially higher than it is in the entirety of the Netherlands, there are few people in the lowest income groups or on welfare. Additionally, there is a high number of native Dutch in the municipality, and a relatively high percentage of elders (Gemeente Schagen 2018). Thus, the municipality is populated by predominantly white, average to above-average income people, of which a relatively large group is older than 50.
In local politics, the Christian Democratic Party CDA is most dominant, and they have obtained 10 out of 29 seats on the municipal council in 2018. The second largest parties are the
27 conservative-liberal party VVD and the Seniors Party. Only six seats are taken by the traditional left-wing parties. The other seats are divided by smaller local parties.
The implementation of happiness policies began in 2016, after a study was conducted that analyzed the happiness metrics in the municipality. This consisted of a survey amongst 1517 people that were 18 years or older within the municipality (EHERO 2016: 3). As a result, 12 factors that either positively or negatively affect the happiness of specifically the citizens of
Schagen were identified (Ibid. 31).6 For each of these 12 factors, a positive policy formulation
was made (Gemeente Schagen 2017: 49). Subsequently, the municipal government made steps so that every new policy that was implemented needlingly contributed to at least one of these 12 indicators.
8 Methods and interviewees
For this research, it was most applicable to employ the use of in-depth interviews with the most important actors regarding the happiness policy in the municipality of Schagen. Although much is available within different written sources, in order to obtain the most accurate, recent and in-depth information of the municipal policy it was best to obtain additional information through these semi-structured interviews. This allowed for an approach that firstly obtained a broad explanation of the municipals views, and that secondly was able to directly present municipal actors with possible objections to their policies. Subsequently, these actors were able to validate whether the objections manifested in practice. Furthermore, interviewing different actors made sure that a comprehensive view of both the philosophy behind the policies and the everyday influence of the happiness policies is formed. For this purpose, the interviews targeted both political and civil service actors, namely; the mayor: Marjan van Kampen. The municipal
6 These twelve indicators are: Unemployment, loneliness, social participation, civil connectedness, social
security, trust in the municipality, being proud of one’s place of residence, satisfaction with one’s relationships, quality of the public spaces, to collaborate with one’s neighbors, the relationship between the municipal government and the citizens and sports facilities.
28 secretary: Nico Swellengrebel. The policy advisor on happiness: Nancy Peeters. And the party leader of a local party: Merieke Bredewold, who initiated the happiness policies through the municipal council.
The interviews, that roughly lasted an hour, took place on three separate dates throughout May 2019 at the city hall in Schagen. They were recorded and transcribed and will be published by request. The questions that were asked were loosely based on a written questionnaire, that resulted from the literary study previously done. Both from the written sources as published by the municipality themselves, as well as academic work on happiness policies and utilitarianism. During the course of the different interviews however, many new insights presented themselves, and therefore the questions often differed from what was drafted beforehand.
The interviewees were selected on the basis of their affinity with the subject of happiness policies, and their official roles within the municipal government. The mayor, as the head of the municipal executives, oversees all governance and the quality of the policy making process. Additionally, she manages the internal cohesion of the different actors regarding the municipal policies. In sum, she would be able to give a clear explanation on what the implementation of happiness policies has meant for the municipality, why this was done and how this has affected the daily activities of municipal actors. The municipal secretary, or the managing director of the municipality, guides the public service apparatus. He has a direct influence on the daily operations of the municipality, and would directly be able to explain how the idea of happiness affects decision making for civil servants. As made clear in publications by the municipality, the policy advisor on happiness has great affinity with the topic of happiness in public policy and would be able to substantiate the municipals decision to implement a form of happiness policy. Furthermore, she would be able to help understand the motivation or philosophy behind it. Likewise, the leader of the local party that initiated the idea of pursuing happiness through
29 the municipal policies also has specific motivations on why this was done. Altogether, to interview these subjects has resulted in a comprehensive view of both the philosophy behind the implementation of happiness policies for the municipality of Schagen, as well as how it has affected the daily operations of the public service.
The main concern with validity in this research was ultimately that of subjectivity of the interviewees. In the cases of the mayor, the municipal secretary and the policy advisor on happiness, they might have been incentivized or positively biased towards the municipal policies. The leader of the local party that initiated the political support for happiness policy is no longer part of the coalition, and as a member of the opposition would be more likely to negatively communicate on the current policies. Fundamentally, it was known before the interviews that all four interviewees consider the idea of happiness in public policy positively, as this could be derived from previous publications by the municipality. This possible bias was taken into consideration when conducting the interviews, and should also be when examining the results. However, most questions did remain clear of normative judgement regarding the municipal policies, as the intention was not to judge the municipality on the effectiveness of their activities. Instead, questions were asked that would help understand the philosophy behind their policies, and from there it can be deducted whether the theoretical objections that were articulated beforehand could manifest.
9 Results
Schagen mainly follows Veenhoven in his conceptualization, who provided an operational definition of happiness. This conceptualization is used to measure municipal happiness and to give direction to policies. In the interviews however, the difficulties of conceptualizing became apparent and there was no sign of consensus on what happiness meant exactly. Even more so, the individual respondents had difficulties defining what happiness meant for them. For the municipality, the operational definition as presented by Veenhoven and others was most
30 important, as it was operational. Happiness is in practice thus defined as “The degree to which
an individual judges the overall quality of his life-as-a-whole favourably”. This definition was
used in the survey research through which the 12 factors that contribute to citizen happiness were established. This is most likely the case because it is the only operational definition and not necessarily because the officials felt that it represented happiness the best way possible.
All respondents emphasized the importance of measurability, and argued that it was essential if happiness were to be used in public policy. To pursue happiness without having an operational definition would not be possible. However, in their use of the word happiness throughout the interviews it became clear that for each individually it was mostly understood as an emotion or a feeling. The respondents were aware of this indistinctness in conceptualizing. Additionally, the municipality is often faced with indifference or skepticism regarding the happiness policies, which might partly be explained by conceptual fuzziness. However, to use the term happiness evokes an emotional responds from both public officials as well as citizens. While it is a controversial concept and there is lack of conceptualization, the municipality argues that this might prove beneficial in getting both officials and citizens to engage with this idea. For now, an attitude change could only be found amongst officials, as they had become more aware of the fact that the municipality ought to act on account of its citizens. Amongst citizens there remains a predominantly skeptical attitude.
The happiness policies in Schagen were centered around the believe that to contribute to the happiness of citizens ought to be considered the highest purpose of government. Fundamentally, the happiness policies are a response to questions of governmental responsibility and purpose. The municipal secretary, Swellengrebel, describes how the idea for using happiness as the main goal for municipal policy came from a consideration of “the good life.” He claimed that a good life is one in which someone is happy, and thus this should extend to the government as well. Therefore, the goal for any government should be to facilitate
31 happiness for its citizens. Happiness for the municipality of Schagen is the ultimate end goal, and all policies ought to contribute to achieving this. Subsequently, all policies need to contribute to one of the 12 factors. According to Swellengrebel, this contribution is not a choice. Any government inevitably affects the living environment and happiness of the individual, as it coordinates things that citizens could not, and thus this influence should be positive by nature. Especially when this influence takes place in spheres that citizens cannot affect directly as it is organized by the government. This for him constitutes the moral obligation to facilitate happiness as best as possible, as citizens have no choice than to be influenced by their municipality.
Van Kampen, Swellengrebel and Bredewold agreed to the idea that one could measure the quality of a government on the basis of their contribution to the happiness of citizens. Which is a logical step from the notion that the purpose of government is to pursue citizen happiness. Peeters did not agree with this idea, as she questioned the measurability of a governmental contribution. One cannot know for sure how much the government has contributed to the aggregate amount of happiness in a society. Instead, the government should focus on improving the 12 contributing factors to happiness that were established before. By doing so, she claimed, the municipality effectively contributes to the citizen happiness, but the aggregate number that results from this is less important. The other interviewees were less concerned with this issue, but did consider the influence by a government to this aggregate number to be limited.
Additionally, all interviewees mentioned the instrumental effects of happiness and how they might be beneficial, though they gave some different interpretations of their importance. For Swellengrebel and Peeters, the instrumental effects of happiness were relatively unimportant, while for the other two interviewees they are considered an important positive contribution by happiness policies. This difference might be explained by the fact that these political actors, Bredewold and Van Kampen, were more inclined to value the positive
32 externalities higher, also because they might be employed when communicating with citizens. However, there was a consensus that the intrinsic value of happiness was most important.
The respondents did not agree completely with the idea that all decision making should be done according to the idea of “the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people”, or the utilitarian principle. Instead, there are many limitations for a government to apply this principle, and other norms should still be valued and held high. It is unclear what these limitations are precisely, but Schagen does not look solely to happiness and still considers other norms to be important. Therefore, future decisions might be different from what they would have been if this principle was applied without concern. But this has not been the case so far. It is unclear what the municipality will do when a trade-off between these norms takes place, but according to them this is not something that can be found in practice, as other norms such as freedom and equality all have a positive relationship with happiness.
The respondents did not claim happiness to overarch all objective living standards. They admitted that while someone might be happy, they might not be fulfilled in other things such as health or income. This idea was met with four different comments: First, the municipality is not and will never be able to facilitate all objective living standards for all citizens, and thus this should not be viewed as unique to a system of happiness maximization. Some things, such as health, can simply not be guaranteed. Second, these other living standards are not disregarded completely in the pursuance of happiness. They will still be analyzed and used in policy. This is possible because; third, other objective living standards have positive causal relations with happiness. If someone becomes healthier they will also become happier. Therefore improving these other standards can still be used in making policy. Fourth, the conceptualization used in the empirical research that was used to obtain the 12 factors allowed for a broad understanding of happiness. This is the operational conception as provided by Veenhoven, which allows
33 respondents to judge the entirety of their lives, and thus other objective living standards may be taken into account.
When asked about the possibility of minority groups being disadvantaged by happiness maximization policies, the respondents gave several different explanations on why this is not an issue in practice. First and foremost, it was argued that there are hardly any instances in which the municipality needs to decide between the interests of a larger group and those of a smaller group. Instead, they deal mostly with questions of technicality. It is never a question of “who to make happy”, instead it is one of “how to make everyone happy”. Though when there were instances of decision making that disadvantaged a group of people, the consideration was never on the basis of quantity. Instead, it is then the municipalities’ responsibility to find a solution that was best for all parties involved. In practice this means compensating those negatively affected by a decision. Municipal decision making should thus not be viewed as a zero-sum game. Marginalized groups should instead be considered the ones that benefit the most from the happiness maximization policies. Because, as they are less happy than privileged individuals, they can also gain more from the municipal policies. Thus, the municipality can even specifically target these groups if they wish to improve the aggregate citizen happiness. Additionally, when establishing the 12 factors it was made clear that the factors that had the strongest positive relationship to happiness were also the ones lacking in the individuals that were least happy. This means that it was not the case that unhappy individuals had alternative desires that could not be fulfilled, they were simply less satisfied with the factors that others were satisfied with.
The normative content of happiness was shown to be unclear, at least in the experience of citizens. Namely because, the officials were sometimes faced with comments by citizens in which they appealed for different things on the account that it would positively affect their happiness. While instead, these things had very little to do with happiness. Still, the citizens felt
