Known phenomenon, difficult to tackle
A comparative study on foreign fighters and their return
Master thesis
Student: Tessa Hoenselaar - 10798854 Supervisor: Dhr. Dr. J.M.J. Doomernik
Second reader: Mw. Dr. B. Isleyen June/2019
Abstract
This thesis focuses on a current policy subject in international relations: what to do with the foreign fighters who want to return from the conflict in Syria and Iraq? The phenomenon of foreign fighters is hardly new, which is why it can be useful to make a historical comparison with earlier flows of foreign fighters: what differs these foreign fighters from foreign fighters in the past? Why is there a policy crisis according to this matter? The historical comparison shows that the current flow of foreign fighters is much bigger than flows from the past. Fighters in Syria and Iraq can be seen as the fourth Jihadi wave but differ from earlier flows in the number of people and the number of nationalities. Moreover, this is the first time since the Spanish Civil War in 1936 that Western European countries have to deal with a relatively high number of foreign fighters. That is why this is the first time in years that policy, according to this matter, is necessary.
When looking at how such a policy should be shaped, it is clear that the problem lies within political interests. Scientific research has shown that it is the best solution to give these people a controlled return and guide them with rehabilitation and reintegration programs (combined with possible time in prison). There should also be a preventive focus here on themes like inclusiveness and discrimination, since these are the themes where most vulnerable foreign fighters come from. However, politicians want to show their voters 100% security by not letting anyone return. The problem here is that this will not provide 100% security but creates the possibility that foreign fighters disappear under the radar. When this happens, no one knows where they might show up again. Politicians created the fear against foreign fighters, and it is now necessary to act against the pressure of fear that they created themselves.
Table of contents
1. Introduction 4
2. Literature review 6
2.1 The concept of foreign fighters
2.2 A historical overview of foreign fighters 2.3 Laws on foreign fighters
3. Theoretical framework 18
3.1 The policy paradox of Deborah Stone 3.2 State’s interests: realism versus liberalism
4. Methodology 24
4.1 Comparison of multiple-case studies 4.2 Semi-structured interviews
4.3 Qualitative content analysis
5. Results and analyses 27
5.1 Comparison of multiple-case studies 5.2 Results from interviews
5.3 Results from qualitative content analysis
6. Conclusion 48
7. Discussion 52
8. Bibliography 53
1. Introduction
Islamic State (IS) has lost control over its so-called Caliphate, which raises the question: ‘’what to do with foreign fighters and their families?’’ The US withdrawal from Syria in December and the recent tweets of Donald Trump with his request on countries to take their fighters back have made it more urgent. The number of fighters we are dealing with remains unclear. It is argued Trump’s arguments are based on outdated information and that the number of fighters is much higher than 800 (Mehra & Paulussen, 2019).
Currently, there is a heavily contested debate around the procedure of return of foreign fighters to European homelands. Most of them were part of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. These people have, for a variety of reasons and with different (ideological)
backgrounds, joined an armed conflict abroad (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, n.d.). European countries are struggling with this return since they do not have an appropriate policy regarding these foreign fighters. In the past, the most common solution to deal with the possible return of these foreign fighters was to strip them of their citizenship. However, contemporary international law forbids removal of someone’s
citizenship if they become stateless by this measure. With this law, it is only possible to strip citizenship when someone has a second passport. This means that eventually, at least one state needs to take responsibility for the return of these foreign fighters. By revoking the citizenship of people with a second passport, the responsibility passes to different countries ‘’like a hot potato’’ (Paulussen, 2018).
It can be argued that there is a policy crisis regarding the return of foreign fighters on a national as well as an international level. As the phenomenon of foreign fighters is not new, the current policy gap is all the more striking. Many other conflicts in the past also involved (foreign) nationalities. Going back to the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s, where Lord Byron and other Britons led a transnational effort to help the local insurgents to fight oppression (Malet, 2010).
A decade later in 1936, a large number of foreign fighters was involved in the Spanish Civil War. It is interesting to see that even though this phenomenon has existed for decades, we do not seem to have the answers to policy questions on both national as well as
international level. Why is this the case? Since states need to take responsibility at some point, it is essential to create effective international and national policies regarding this topic. Multiple experts, like the Dutch professor of International Law Geert-Jan Knoops,
claim that international cooperation is needed to find a collective and effective solution (NPO Radio 1, 2019). However, how can this be shaped?
As the question of how to deal with it, foreign fighters can arguably be seen as something of all times. This is why it will be useful to research how the current flow of foreign fighters differs from earlier flows. What are the differences and similarities which can explain why creating a policy regarding this phenomenon is difficult? Moreover, what are the critical factors in the creation of an (inter)national policy regarding foreign fighters?
This thesis will explore this topic by addressing the following research question:
What can a historical comparison of foreign fighters expose to shape an adequate policy in Western Europe towards foreign fighters?
To answer this research question, there is a literature review with information on the concept of foreign fighters itself, a historical overview of foreign fighters and some existing laws concerning this matter. In the theoretical framework, some theories are discussed, which will help to understand the current policy crisis. Together with the literature review, this is the theoretical fundament which can help to explain the empirical data.
The empirical research was done via a historical comparative study of multiple-case studies: relevant conflicts with foreign fighters involved. In addition to this, semi-structured interviews were conducted with multiple experts on the subject of foreign fighters, policy development and criminal law. There was also a qualitative content analysis of mass media output and private sources coming from multiple European countries. This analysis was necessary to create an overview of the current development in state responses. The results of this empirical data are linked to specific theories within the theoretical framework, which together created a conclusive answer to the research question.
This research is relevant on the social level because these foreign fighters might need to return to their motherlands, even after having spent time in prison. There is a realistic chance that they will become part of society again, so it is highly essential that there is as much knowledge as possible to support the development of effective policy solutions. This research is relevant on the scientific level because the return of foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq is a contemporary problem in international relations, especially in the media. The scientific research field on the return of these foreign fighters is still in its infant
2. Literature review
2.1 The concept of foreign fighters
The concept of foreign fighters is not a new phenomenon; it is something of all times. Going back to 1820, one can see the role of transnational recruitment in the Greek War of
Independence (Malet, 2010). In the subsequent paragraph, there will be an overview of relevant conflicts in which foreign fighters were involved. At first, it is essential to describe what the concept of foreign fighters means: what is it, who are they and why do they go? As already mentioned in the introduction, foreign fighters can be defined as:
"individuals that have for a variety of reasons and with different (ideological) backgrounds joined an armed conflict abroad" (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague,
n.d.).
In scientific standards, this can still be seen as a vague definition, which has to do with the fact that a standard, a universal definition is absent. According to Hegghammer (2010), the reason for this is that foreign fighters fulfil a particular intermediate actor category which is lost between local rebels on the one side, and international terrorists on the other. The above definition is one of the most 'concrete' definitions that exist around this
phenomenon.
More often, foreign fighters are found in asymmetric conflicts. At least one of the actors within the battle is a non-state actor who is seen as an irregular disordered group which is outside the established order. Foreign fighters are nowadays more part of a non-state actor. An explanation for this can be found in the theory of Mary Kaldor about 'New Wars'. According to Kaldor (2009), historical conflicts were between states. Nowadays, conflicts get more privatized, and there are more non-state actors involved. According to this theory, there are more intrastate wars, which means that there are more conflicts within states instead of between states. Conflicts are also more global. States are still part of the conflict, but the global level fades the differences between what are internal and
external factors of a battle. Kaldor (2009) claims that this is typical for the global world that we currently live in. The activities the foreign fighters can fulfil, can range from guerrilla fighting, planning and carrying out terrorist attacks, media and propaganda campaigns, training and recruitment (Mendelsohn, 2011).
The word 'transnational' is a crucial concept within the understanding of the idea of foreign fighters. According to Malet (2010), foreign fighters get recruited because they are motivated by the idea that particular transnational identity is under threat. With 'new wars' which are getting more global, there is also an increase in transnational connections.
Recruits can feel a connection to this transnational identity for different reasons. The way of recruitment can be followed via a specific model:
1. Insurgencies start as the weaker party in a civil conflict, which creates the necessity of gaining outside support. This includes workforce and specialists.
2. They search for targets which are expected to identify/find a relation with the insurgents. Sometimes this creates the possibility of aid assistance from foreign
governments when states support the goal of the insurgents. In other cases, they can find support from non-state groups who identify with the ethnicity, religion or ideology of the insurgents.
3. The most receptive audiences are individuals who are active within certain institutions of the community and identify with it closely. They feel marginalized within their polity as part of a minority group. The secure social connection provides means and rationale for participation.
4. Recruiters tell potential recruits that their involvement is necessary for the survival of the collective group, which is under threat (Malet, 2010).
Historical data shows that recruitment occurs via the transnational networks of the
community, where potential recruits find more identification with the subgroups than with their wider national society. They are responsible for higher levels of violence, compared to local insurgents, and they are more successful than other rebel groups (Malet, 2010). Foreign fighters are found mostly in asymmetric conflicts where at least one side of the conflict is a non-state actor. State actors usually rely on a national army which gives them more certainty about the motivation of the soldiers compared to the motivation of foreign fighters which are there voluntarily and may want to leave when their motivation to fight dissipates (Mendelsohn, 2011).
There are certain assumptions about the characteristics of foreign fighters: most recruits are men who are in their early 20s and are first- or second-generation immigrants.
them. Older recruits can be a target because of their military experience; younger recruits can be triggered members of organizations who are connected with the distant insurgents who are the path in which recruiters get in touch with them (Malet, 2010). 'Organizations' in this sense can also be social networks where people get in touch with each other and start communicating about a specific conflict.
It is important to realize that the influence of foreign fighters is not only on the battlefield. It can be seen as a life cycle which starts at the point where they consider joining a conflict abroad, continues through the involvement in the battle and ends with actions after leaving the arena. These actions can include the contribution of recruiting others or spreading propaganda that may shape other conflicts (Mendelsohn, 2011). This final part supports the article of Bloemhof (2019) at the NOS about the current status of the Islamic State. He mentions that the fact that the Islamic State has lost its Caliphate does not mean that they are done and gone. Their warriors can use their experience and expertise, spread propaganda or can prepare actions 'under the radar' on the transnational level. Mendelsohn (2011) calls this process a 'bleed out'.
Mendelsohn (2011) mentions that the impact of foreign fighters should not be underestimated. It is not just about the people who are introduced into a particular arena or conflict; sometimes, they get the order to stay at home and prepare an attack in their home country. The impact of foreign fighters is often indirect and includes social, political and psychological elements which are not easy to measure. Policymakers need to be aware of this.
2.2 A historical overview of foreign fighters
The phenomenon of foreign fighters is hardly new. Soldiers with different backgrounds, who do not feel strongly connected to their country of origin, have been present on the
battlefield throughout human history (Mendelsohn, 2011). It is also important to mention that foreign fighters are not a typical aspect of modern-day warfare since states will always prefer to fight their battles with professional, highly trained armies instead of gathered warriors with different motivations. This is also why foreign fighters are part of a non-state actor in most cases. Looking at the history of foreign fighters, an appropriate selection of conflicts is made which fits the following timeline (the four waves of Jihad are based on the work of Sagerman (2011)):
History timeline of foreign fighters
1936-1939 1948 1979-1989 1992-1995 2003-2011 2011-…
Spanish Civil Arab-Israëli Afghan war Bosnian war Iraq war Syrian/Iraq war
war war 1st Jihadi wave 2nd Jihadi wave 3rd Jihadi wave 4th Jihadi wave
All different foreign fighter 'flows' differ from one another in two important respects: their degree of state sponsorship and their reach of international recruitment. Foreign fighters do not receive formal state support, like national armies, but do receive free assistance from federal governments. Hegghammer (2010) defines state support as a mobilization, where a government agency directly supplies foreign fighters with material sources. Strong state support can be seen in older conflicts like the Spanish Civil War and the Arab-Israëli war, but conflicts have become more privatized over the years (Hegghammer, 2010). This observation is also in line with the already mentioned theory of Kaldor (2009) about the rise of 'new war' in the modern era.
Hegghammer (201) also mentions that some conflicts can attract fighters that are more foreign than others. The number of nationalities that are part of the conflict and the distance that people travel vary considerably. A battle can attract volunteers from all over the world, where others can only rely on a handful of neighbouring countries.
2.2.1 Spanish Civil War / 1936-1939
Recently, the concept of foreign fighters has a strong connection with Muslims fighting for the Jihad, but this has not always been the case. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the communists were fighting against the rise of Fascism (extreme nationalism) in Spain. On the other side of the conflict, one could see Catholics volunteering to fight "communism" (Mendelsohn, 2011). The International Brigades (IB) was the overall name of the volunteers who came fighting at the side of the Communists. Communists parties in different countries were asked to send people to the conflict. This had to happen in secret since there were international non-intervention agreements between countries. Even though it was forbidden
with false passports, the recruits were sent to a distribution centre in Paris before going to Spain. As already mentioned, the Spanish Civil War experienced a lot of state support. Even though the IB may have been a voluntary force, parts of it experienced direct state support from the Soviet Union via the Comintern. The IB was an international partnership of
communistic parties headed by the Soviet-Union (Hegghammer, 2010).
Citizens from the United States did not even have any idea about communism but were motivated by the fight for social justice for the poor and minorities. The oppressed of the earth were united, they finally had weapons, and they ultimately could fight back. Here one can see the 'transnational identity' which is under threat: a transnational identity of oppressed, poor minorities all over the world. The IB produced around 35000-50000 recruits. They came from almost all European countries, North- and Latin-America, Africa, India and China. By far, most people came from France. The IB were storm troops, which means that they were used where offensives and hostile attacks started. This resulted in a high mortality rate among the IB recruits (Van Gennep, 1986). The side fighting for Fascism also found recruits, but these were only around 1000-1500 people. Their strategy was the same as the IB one: trying to motivate people to join the conflict by stating that a
transnational identity is under threat (Malet, 2010). Eventually, the non-intervention agreement in 1937 expanded to a prohibition on foreign fighters: European states had to forbid their citizens to fight with hostilities in Spain. After some political hindrance by the fascism side (since they strongly relied on their foreign fighters), all foreign fighters left Spain in 1938 (Van Gennep, 1986).
It is interesting to note here that the Dutch foreign fighters went to fight in the Spanish Civil War because they expected a better life with job opportunities. They were not interested in fighting Fascism as primary motivation but wanted to start building a new future in a new country. When they found themselves struggling in the war, representing the first line of attack in the storm troops (so with the highest risk of getting killed in the field) many Dutch people wanted to return to the Netherlands. When they could find a Dutch embassy, they could return to the Netherlands safely. After their arrival, their Dutch citizenship was stripped. Stripping citizenship at that time meant that people could still live in the Netherlands, but they had difficulties in establishing a life in the Netherlands. Finding a job, for example, would be problematic (Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, n.d.).
2.2.2 Arab-Israeli War/ 1948
The Arab-Israeli war was a conflict between Arab and Jewish inhabitants of the former British mandate area Palestine. After the end of the British mandate, Palestine would be divided into an independent Jewish state and an independent Arab state. Arab leaders rejected this idea, but despite that, the independent state of Israel became a reality. The battle continued between this new state and the surrounded Arab countries (Smith, 2001). A 5,000-strong Army of Salvation was created and funded by the Arab League. The Army of Salvation was an intergovernmental organization and thereby also conflict with strong state support. This army was trained and led by Iraqi and Syrian military officers, and maintained in part via salaries (Hegghammer, 2010). On the other side, the mobilization of the Jewish contingent was established by active cadres of international activists in the form of a Jewish Agency. The Jewish forces were formed via the Haganah, which was the
underground militia of the Jewish community in Palestine. There were also two smaller groups: the Irgun and LEHI. All organizations were committed to fighting for the
establishment of a Jewish state (Office of the Historian, n.d.). They enjoyed partial autonomy from states and could rely on a particular understanding of countries, which made it possible to use state-like resources and privileges.
2.2.3 Afghan War (1st Jihadi wave) / 1978 - 1992
The Afghan war is seen as the first Jihadi wave which would form the center of Al-Qaida in a later stage. This conflict was about a battle between the Afghans and the Soviets. The reason for this conflict was about defending the Muslim religion against communism. This conflict gave rise to the foreign fighters' phenomenon of our time (Hegghammer, 2010).
Hegghammer (2010) names this as the rise of a new interpretation of Islamism: populist pan-Islamism. Strategic actions by marginalized elites created a propagated alarmist discourse where there was an emphasis on external threats to the Muslim nation. These marginalized elites had access to oil money and new technologies. In addition to this, there was a lack of government oversight. This created possibilities to be ideologically influential. Abdullah Azzam can be seen as the person who made the foreign fighters' phenomenon as big as it is
countries could not live under the repression of foreign powers (van de Sompel, 2018). The norms and global networks that arose from this enabled Arab activist in the 1980s to recruit foreign fighters in the name of inter-Muslim solidarity. The combatants became brothers in arms and knew deep connectedness. This generation had a high social status and was descended from wealthy and prominent families (van de Sompel, 2018). The mobilization was private, which means that there was no direct state-support. The Afghan Arab
mobilization produced a foreign fighter movement that still exists today, which is exemplified by the ongoing presence of Al-Qaida in the region.
The ratio of foreign fighters involved in the Afghan war was significantly less than local fighting populations. The number of foreign fighters was between 5,000-20,000 people. They came from most Arab countries, Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines, United States and Europe (Hegghammer, 2010). The Arab world and Saudi-Arabia, in
particular, formed a high overrepresentation. They mostly served in humanitarian agencies, media offices, political organizations and hospitals, which means that almost none of them were directly involved in the battlefield. Their most prominent peak in participation was found when the Soviets had withdrawn, but even then, there was only a few thousand foreign fighters' part of this conflict (Mendelsohn, 2011). However, as already mentioned, the influence of foreign fighters is not only found on the battlefield. There can also be a so-called 'bleed-out' where foreign fighters start operating under the radar. This also happened after this conflict. The 'bleed out' of foreign fighters created a remarkable impact on
conflicts in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, but also on terrorism in the United States and Western-Europe. This has mostly to do with the rise of a global jihadi movement (Mendelsohn, 2011). However, this can also be the result of the impossibility of a return to home countries. These home countries stripped citizenship and made their former citizens stateless. Afghan alumni spread across the globe, at a time engaging in terrorist activities while continuing to use the guise of 'defensive mobilization' (Malet, 2010).
2.2.4 Bosnian War (2nd Jihadi wave) / 1992 - 1995
The second wave: Via the Bosnian war, the radical thoughts of Al-Qaida could reach
European soil for the first time. During this conflict, there was also a high interest in foreign fighters. Especially on the side of the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks, who were Muslims.
When Milosevic started with the ethnic cleansing of Muslims, around 1000-2000 foreign fighters within the transnational community felt the need to help their fellow Muslims and by this thought decided to become part of the conflict. They were coming from most Arab countries, the United States and Europe (Hegghammer, 2010). They formed a minimal number of the total amount of combatants. The Arab world and Saudi-Arabia, in particular, developed a high overrepresentation. These foreign fighters were generally called 'Afghan Arabs' because fighters of the previous Afghan War were searching for a new battlefield. The Bosnian civil war was seamlessly connected to this. These foreign fighters were known as very aggressive and cruel, which matches with Malet (2010) mentioning the higher
aggression within the known profile among foreign fighters. At the end of the conflict, The Dayton agreement decided that the foreign fighters had to leave within 30 days. Next, to that, the second wave stopped because the United States and England invaded in
Afghanistan after 9/11 where a lot of training camps and shelters of Al-Qaida were destroyed (van de Sompel, 2018). Most of the foreign fighters went searching for a new battle which they found in Chechnya. Many fighters who had fought in Bosnia were active in expanding the existing terroristic networks from Al-Qaida. Those same networks were eventually the networks who brought fighters to the Iraq war in 2003 and the Syrian war in 2011. The fundamental motivations for those two conflicts were created in the Afghan war and this war in Bosnia (van de Sompel, 2018).
2.2.5 Iraq war (3rd Jihadi wave) / 2003 - 2011
The third wave of Jihadi foreign fighters can be found in the war in Iraq. This conflict started with an invasion from the United States and England, intending to overthrow the
government of Saddam Hoessein. He represents the Sunni Muslims which were a majority and decided what happened within the country (on the other side, one could find the Shiite Muslims). The first two waves can be seen as an Al-Qaida generation, where the foreign fighters were highly educated and experienced much respect. This third wave was the first wave where one could find the so-called 'homegrown terrorism' (van de Sompel, 2018). This idea means that for the first-time young people who were born and raised in the West,
play its role. In the first two waves, it was more of a collective motivation instead of people getting individually motivated. A total of 4,000-5,000 foreign fighters were part of the conflict, which was again a tiny proportion of the total number of combatants. They were coming from most Arab countries, the United States, Europe and Turkey. However, the Arab world and Saudi-Arabia, in particular, formed a high overrepresentation (Hegghammer, 2010).
2.2.6 Syrian/Iraq war (4th Jihadi wave) / 2011 - …
The current Syrian/Iraq war (2011-present) is seen as a civil war which started with the goal to overthrow the government of President Assad. There were high levels of international involvement, with transnational ties playing a more significant role in this conflict. This conflict is the first conflict since the Spanish Civil War, where relatively many people from Western European countries went fighting as foreign fighters. At the highest peak, around 40,000 foreign fighters were part of the conflict. They were coming from multiple regions: The Middle-East, Maghreb, Western-Europe, former Soviet Republics, South-East Asia, the Balkans and North-America (van de Sompel, 2018). Around 5,000, Western-Europeans decided to go. Interestingly, there were relatively many people in their twenties and many women among them. Almost 3700 fighters came from only four Western European
countries: France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Belgium (The Soufan Group, 2015). Most of them decided to join the big Islamic group called 'Islamic State' (IS). At the beginning of the conflict, there was the idea that IS was at the right side in trying to overthrow Assad's government; this is why the travelling of foreign fighters to join this group was not a
problem. The real problems started after the start of the Caliphate. Terroristic attacks and violence came to the West. Many of the offenders were inspired by IS or were already returned foreign fighters. At the end of the conflict, the Caliphate has fallen apart due to multiple successful attacks by the Syrian and Iraq government. This now results in many disillusioned foreign fighters with many women and children among them (van de Sompel, 2018).
The actual start of IS can be found in Iraq after the United States left the country in 2011. The Shiite Muslims are at that point, a majority and Sunni Muslims experienced violence and suppression. In reaction to this, Al-Qaida (IS was called Al-Qaida at the
beginning) started to form militias. Young men who were motivated to join the conflict could join these militias. Next, to that, there was a growing resistance within the country according to the government of Assad. Many professionals see the capitalization of the restlessness within Syria as an essential strategic tool used to develop and grow the organization of IS. According to this, IS reached and inspired many Western young men via extending social media channels. At the same time, the Caliphate was born. IS could use military fighting knowledge coming from former high placed people of the army of Hoessein (van de Sompel, 2018).
When looking at numbers, around 80% of foreign fighters were men. In the Netherlands, one can see much more women. The average age was about 23 years old (van de Sompel, 2018). The description of characteristics of foreign fighters that Malet (2010) has given, can be linked to the research of Bakker & Grol (2015) on a small number of (potential) foreign fighters in the Netherlands who wanted to fight in the Syrian war. These people had low chances within the society according to their job opportunities. They were low-skilled and had no diplomas. They had intensive contact with the ideologically like-minded people, mostly mentioned as the "recruiters" and they had some friends, family or other relational ties with Syria. Many of them had a very "romantic" idea about the 'battlefield' where they would go. Most of them had limited contact with their families, which is why they can be seen as loners or lonely. Next, to that, they felt the need to help Muslims in need, which can be linked to 'the transnational community which is under threat' and the still-influential thoughts of Abdullah Azzam. Even though much research is fixed on a particular country, the results can be related to multiple countries (Heinke & Raudszus, 2015).
The role of foreign fighters keeps evolving. Trends in the foreign fighters' phenomenon cannot be seen separate from the development in variables such as technological environment, societal norms, political atmosphere, counter-insurgency and
counterterrorism doctrines. How the struggle is visible between the global jihadi movement and the international community led by the United States, suggests that there has been an essential transformation in the role of foreign fighters (Mendelsohn, 2011).
2.3 Laws on foreign fighters
2.3.1 'in foreign military service': an outdated term
The concept of foreign fighters is a phenomenon which is difficult to define. In the
Netherlands, there is a law around so-called 'in foreign military service'. It became necessary to evaluate this term in context with the current foreign fighters' phenomenon. People claim that the present condition is outdated since it only talks about people who will fight for another state while nowadays, the opponent can be an insurgency. The scope of the term is limited since it only talks about international conflicts between states while nowadays, many battles are not global and with competitors of a different nature. Next, to that, the outdated definition mentions that it is only punishable to become a warrior for another state when the Netherlands conflicts with that state, might get in conflict with that state or an ally of the Netherlands conflicts with that state. When this is not the case, there will be no direct
jurisdictions towards people who will go fighting within another battle. However, other legal consequences, like losing the Dutch nationality, might be a risk. As one can see, becoming a member of a terroristic organization is not a part of this (Fink, 2016).
The fact that someone becomes a warrior in a conflict is the only thing where Dutch law can connect legal consequences. The acts that are committed during the battle are mostly done under the 'umbrella' of the monopoly of violence of the state that a person is fighting for. However, it needs to be very clear that people are formally connected to a country, by fighting for the state directly or for a group that is connected to the state. This is important to justify the violence that has been used. Yet, the scope of the term differs between different laws. Criminal law, military law and the national law on Dutch citizenship all use a diverse range which is not unusual because all departments use it with a different goal. Nonetheless, this makes it challenging to use appropriately on the modern
phenomenon of foreign fighters. The question of how broadly 'in foreign military service' should be considered in the context of people fighting alongside the international coalition against IS will also depend on the political desire to find punitive measures to discourage people in one way or another or to take away opportunities to take such actions (Fink, 2016). According to this thesis, it is interesting to research how the laws, according to foreign fighters, are developing.
2.3.2 The change in stripping citizenship
The use of stripping citizenship in the past showed that this is not a favourable measure to implement. It was seen as ineffective and did not solve any problems. It mostly created institutional difficulties for people who were seen as 'strangers' to their previous society. They had to use a so-called 'stranger pass' to get out of the country, and whenever they wanted to get a new job, they had to apply for a new work permit. After the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War, the measure of stripping citizenship experienced many international critiques. In 1961, the United Nations took the initiative to create the
'Convention on the Limitation of Statelessness'. Eventually, in 1985, the new nationality law came into force. From that moment, it was only possible to strip someone's citizenship when this citizen has a second passport or can get another nationality in place (Van Gennep, 1986).
3. Theoretical framework
3.1 The policy paradox of Deborah Stone
The primary issue about the possible return of foreign fighter has to do with a specific policy crisis. In shaping an appropriate policy, politicians have to deal with so-called paradoxes. The book of Deborah Stone (1997) explains that there are many truths within a policy field. These truths can conflict with each other. She makes a comparison between 'the market' and 'the polis'. The market represents the rational side where people pursue their interests. The polis denotes the political field that thinks about the collective perspective. Stone (1997) explains multiple truths that can be dealt with when making policy. Since this thesis is about shaping policy according to the return of foreign fighters, the next paragraphs will show a selection of relevant paradoxes.
3.1.1 The paradox of freedom
The first truth can be found in the area of 'freedom'. Sometimes it is essential to limit
someone's independence, to ensure the freedom of others. The criteria for limiting freedom has to do with the possibility that someone can hurt or damage others. This damage can be psychical, economically, material, facility, psychological, spiritual and moral damage. In this case, there can be friction in two paradoxes: the freedom of speech and the freedom of multiculturalism. In a democracy, it needs to be possible for everyone to share their opinion. However, some ways of expression might hurt or damage others. Next, to that,
multiculturalism gives certain groups the right to express their culture. Yet, some types of speech can also crash with concepts of freedom like individual rights (Stone, 1997). When looking at the case of foreign fighters, there will be discussions about the freedom of these people. Since most of these people have radicalized thoughts about a particular interpretation of Islam, it can be challenging to draw boundaries on when someone is de-radicalized. What fits in the (inter)national society? What can be seen as radical and what not? In all Western countries, it is possible to express your opinion and express your culture in a certain way. However, it cannot be denied that the interpretation of Islam of these foreign fighters and the label of 'terrorism' that societies relate with it will be a challenging issue in the future to decide how these people can still express their interpretation of Islam without hurting or damaging others. Next, to that, de-radicalization programs need to make sure that these people will fit in the existing society. Within these
programs, there will also be challenges in the area of freedom of speech and multiculturalism.
3.1.2 The paradox of security/certainty
This paradox is about the complete absence of worries and fears in a political way. Security is always about a feeling which people experience in a certain way. In the scientific sense of security, this is something that can ever be measured and prevented. This measure is based on risk: the chance that something terrible will happen. So, security can be seen as political, psychological and scientific. In the political field, there are a lot of conflicts and controversies because of all different visions on security/certainty and how to reach this. Politicians can ensure security in three possible ways:
1. They can take measures to prevent the threat or danger 2. They can take measures to limit the damage
3. They can offer security to civilians, like getting fire insurance for your house
Politicians need to decrease fear by acting like they have control over the things that people are scared of. This creates a paradox: leaders need to promise to prevent things, but also need to take measures in case this prevention fails. In practice, politicians will talk in absolute terms (black-white, good-bad). They present the cause of the problem as something terrible and will declare war against this. They will work with a zero-tolerance policy.
Science will present how significant the threat is, and politicians will then decide how much risk is acceptable. The risk will be more acceptable when it comes from voluntary choices.
There is also a paradox within security: many resources and policies that are used to make security bigger, are making people less safe (Stone, 1997).
According to the subject of foreign fighters, there is much fear for terroristic attacks coming from radicalized fighters against the West. This is why politicians need to assure their voters that they will do everything they can to avoid attacks in their country: a zero-tolerance policy against foreign fighters and the terrorism that is connected to this.
3.1.3 The paradox of interests
Interests can be seen as people or organizations who are directly involved in or influenced by a particular issue. When looking at the market, Stone (1997) states that policymakers should not represent interests but create markets where people can create and pursue their interests. Interests are individual, subjective and independent. However, in the political area, there are dynamics. Politicians teach people about the existence of specific interests they should have. In other words: people let politicians decide what the interests of the population should be. Politicians represent their members, but when politicians start talking for their members, they communicate with their own words. They use the same words they have used to convince people to become members in the first place. This is an interesting paradox.
In the case of the foreign fighters' issue, one can see that there is a secure connection
between politicians and their voters. Politicians will mention the threat of possible terroristic attacks and the danger that foreign fighters are, voters will believe that these politicians can protect them, and in the end, these same politicians will talk like they represent their people while they influence the opinion of the voters by telling them what to think.
3.1.4 The paradox of power
Power here means the policy about the structure of decision-making bodies within the society. Authority and capacity are needed to act. Every choice for a particular structure can be tested via two perspectives:
1. Does this structure work to solve a specific problem? 2. Who gets the authority to think about solutions?
In democratic theory, every civilian should count equal in making policy. However, in the real-world people get selected because of their expertise. The paradox in this area is that, within a democracy, the civilians should check their government. However, via policies, the government can choose their civilians who can help them to influence what kind of policy preferences their civilians will express.
In the case of the foreign fighters, politicians will be in power to decide what eventually will happen according to the creation of policies.
Stone (1997) shows the rational paradoxes that can be found within the policy field with 'the market' as the logical model and 'the polis' as the political field where policy eventually will be shaped. She mentions that policies will never be utterly rational since 'interests in politics will always influence the polis'.
"For centuries, governing through knowledge instead of politics has been a utopian dream. Inspired by a sense that politics is messy, irrational, selfish, and shortsighted, generations of
reformers have sought to infuse politics with science." - Stone, 1997 -
By this statement, Stone (1997) means that next to the paradoxes that can be found within the process of policy decision-making, one can also find the influence of the people who need to make the final decisions and who eventually let certain policies come into power. 3.2 State's interests: realism versus liberalism
In the reaction against the possible return of foreign fighters, one can find three possible solutions according to state's relations and state's interests: not dealing with the problem, dealing with the problem individually or dealing with the problem via international
cooperation. These options can be linked to two major theories within international relations: realism and liberalism. Both theories will be discussed and connected to the foreign fighters' issues in the next two paragraphs.
3.2.1 Realism
One can see that the current state responses of home countries where the foreign fighters want to go back to, can be related to an influential theory within international relations: realism. This theory looks at the national interests of a state, and this is an essential perspective in the way that states implement their policies. The national borders are important, and there is a high importance of protecting the citizens within these borders. The own interests are an essential thing (Donnelly, 2013). In the case of returning foreign fighters in the past, states protected their citizens by stripping the citizenship of these
had to rely on possible family/friend ties. This might explain why many foreign fighters went searching for other battlefields since returning to their homelands was hard or even
impossible. Nowadays, international law is protecting citizenship by keeping statelessness as low as possible. This created the consequence for states that they cannot strip someone's citizenship when someone possesses only one nationality. It is only possible when someone has a second nationality, since they will not become stateless when one nationality is stripped. However, the problem of returning foreign fighters will then move on towards another country, which eventually fits within this theory about states only taking care of their interests. Yet, international law on the protection of statelessness is an example where one can see that international law limits the possibilities that sovereign state powers have. However, in the current case of foreign fighters and Syria and Iraq, states are not stripping citizenship but are just simply refusing to help people to return. A possibility in the future might be that they deal with their foreign fighter citizens by creating national policies
according to criminal law, de-radicalization and re-integration. Nonetheless, there is also the possibility of dealing with this problem via international cooperation. This possibility can be linked to another theory in international relations: liberalism.
3.2.2 Liberalism
As many professionals already have mentioned, according to them, it seems the best solution to look at a collective settlement with multiple countries. This way of thinking fits with another, a somewhat different theory of realism in international relations: liberalism. Liberalism can be seen as a historical perspective for realism. The internal factors of a state decide to create a policy of progress. Progress, a core concept of liberalism, can be achieved via cooperation between nations. The individual interests of a state can agree with common interests of mutual countries, which creates a harmony of interests. There can be a 'positive-sum', which means that every country will get better outcomes from the cooperation
(Dunne, 2014). Since the current approach of states individually is that they will not let the foreign fighters return, there might be the need for a different perspective. These foreign fighters want to come back and have to go back someday, since they are now in Kurdish prisons and the idea is that they will not stay there forever (NPO radio 1, 2019). When states do not decide to create their national policies and take back their citizens who went fighting
in Syria and Iraq, the perspective on international cooperation might create a better view since the current situation is logged.
4. Methodology
The goal of this thesis is to research how a comparison with earlier flows of foreign fighters can be used to shape an adequate policy in Western Europe towards foreign fighters. This analysis happens with on the one hand the organization of the (possible) return of foreign fighters, and on the other hand, a prospect on how to (partly) prevent foreign fighters from emerging in the future. The research question is an open question because there is no simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to this subject. Since the policy-shaping and state behaviour towards foreign fighters has an interpretative nature, this thesis will use a qualitative research strategy (Bryman, 2012).
This research knows a constructivist ontology because the response of different states toward foreign fighters is created by a particular social construct within international relations. The relations between countries and the events that happen across borders are not factual and the same over time. Thereby fits an interpretative epistemology. The response of states, the reaction of experts towards the problem and the way that mass-media will write about this is always subject to interpretation since experts use their knowledge which cannot ever be seen as pure factual knowledge and within the media it is still in question whether the writer has interpreted information in a certain way.
The relationship between the theory and the methodology is inductive. Based on qualitative interpretation will be investigated how the current flow of foreign fighters differs from foreign fighter flows in the past. There are no factual/measurable variables, but the interpretations can vary widely.
This research used a comparative research design via a multiple-case study. The literature review creates a historical overview of multiple conflicts in the past with a primary focus on the role of foreign fighters and the process that these foreign fighters have gone through; from the moment that they got in touch with the conflict till the moment of (possible) return. These different conflicts are compared to each other and to the current flow of foreign fighters.
Since this thesis also pursues to create policy recommendations about the phenomenon of foreign fighters, the following empirical data collection methods are used to collect as much knowledge as possible:
On the one hand, there were semi-structured interviews with experts who are doing/have done much research according to the current flow of foreign fighters. On the other hand, there was a qualitative content analysis of official documents deriving from private sources and mass media output to create an overview of the current response of Western-European countries towards foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.
4.1 Comparison of multiple case-studies
Since this thesis uses a historical comparison to create policy recommendations towards the current flow of foreign fighters, it is in the first place necessary to make this comparison. Via the information that is collected within the literature review, a comparison is made via the following themes: the number of foreign fighters, the nationality of foreign fighters, way of recruitment, motivations to go and the methods of return. A comparative design is
favourable because it will increase the possibility of theory building. It can play a crucial role in trying to see a possible understanding of causality (Bryman, 2012). Accurately, to this case, the past of foreign fighters’ flows might show a specific causal link.
4.2 Semi-structured interviews
Next, to the comparison of case-studies, there have been some interviews with Dutch experts according to the return of foreign fighters coming from Syria and Iraq. These experts are professionals in the field of state protection and terrorism, but also professionals of statutory law who can tell more about the legal possibilities in creating a response. The main goal is to understand how these experts think that this flow of foreign fighters differs from foreign fighters in the past, how they feel the approach towards these foreign fighters should be and why it still seems hard to create a policy about the phenomenon of foreign fighters, which exists for decades. Semi-structured interviews are a suitable research method here since there is enough space for interpretation and explanation. However, the interviews shape via some basic guidelines (Bryman, 2012).
The population of potential respondents are found within institutions which are specialized on the knowledge of the current flow of foreign fighters. The current surge has to do a lot with terrorism, which is why institutions like the ICCT (International Centre for
T.M.C. Asser Instituut, the Clingendael Instituut and The Hague Institute of Security and Global Affairs/Leiden University. These organizations have also been approached.
The interviews are recorded with the permission of the respondents. After that, the essential information is written in the results section. In terms of ethical accountability, all respondents are presented with fake names, and they always had the opportunity to pull back at any time of the interview. These opportunities were also told to the respondents before the interview. The interviews took place at a location that the respondents prefer (Bryman, 2012).
4.3 Media analyses
There was a qualitative content analysis of official documents deriving from private
sources and mass media output to collect data on the current situation of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. The processes through which the themes of such content analyses are
extracted is often not specified in detail. The topics are usually illustrated with brief quotations from different documents (Bryman, 2012). Dutch institutions like the ICCT and the Asser Institute are doing much independent research according to this subject. However, mass media might also show important news. These documents can contain newspapers, television programs, radio news and magazines from multiple Western countries who have written about the possible return of foreign fighters. The mass-media sources that are used are the most significant news stations within these countries. However, a language barrier might create some difficulties in using these media sources. There will be taken as much effort as possible to get information coming from multiple Western European countries.
5. Results and analyses
5.1 Comparison of multiple-case studies
In this paragraph, there will be a comparison between the different conflicts that were discussed in the literature review. There will be a focus on the following areas: the number of foreign fighters, the nationality of foreign fighters, the methods of recruitment,
motivations to go and the ways of return. 5.1.1 Number of foreign fighters
When looking at the number of foreign fighters, one can see that the first conflict of the timeline and the last conflict are the most significant conflicts. The Spanish Civil War
attracted 35000-50000 fighters on the communism side and 1000-1500 on the fascist party. The number of foreign fighters in the Syria/Iraq conflict is similar to this, with +- 40000 foreign fighters. Notable with the Syria/Iraq conflict is that this was the first conflict where a high amount of Western European people decided to join the battle: around 5000 people. In all disputes between these two conflicts, the number of foreign fighters was not notably high, and they always formed a small part of the total amount of fighters. In the Arab-Israeli war, the Army of Salvation had around 5000 fighters. The numbers of the Afghan war vary widely from 5000 to 20000. The Bosnian war only attracted around 1000-2000 people, and the Iraq war had 4000-5000 fighters from foreign countries. When looking from a historical perspective, one can see that in numbers of foreign fighters, the current Syria/Iraq conflict is the first significant global conflict since the Spanish Civil War in 1936.
5.1.2 Nationality of foreign fighters
The nationality of the foreign fighters differs per conflict. However, the first three waves of Jihad foreign fighters attracted similar nationalities. Also, because they were connected. The Spanish Civil War can be seen as a separate conflict with a specific goal: communism versus fascism. The communism side could trigger many states via their communism network (the International Brigades). Communism parties from all over the world were contacted to gain warriors in the battle. On the other side, the fascism side could find support from Catholics who mainly had the goal to fight communism instead of joining fascism.
from most Arab countries. On the other hand, one could find Jewish people coming from active cadres of international activists in the form of a Jewish Agency. There was much empathy towards these Jewish foreign fighters since their motives to join the conflict were understandable.
After that, the first Jihadi wave started to develop. During the Afghan war, the foreign fighters were coming mostly from most Arab countries. They formed a big
overrepresentation. Some foreign fighters were coming from Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines, United States and Europe. The second jihadi wave can be found in the Bosnian war, where Muslim ethnic cleansing from Milosevic triggered a relatively small number of foreign fighters to join the conflict. These foreign fighters were coming from most Arab countries, the United States and Europe. Here again, the Arab countries formed a big overrepresentation.
The third wave started at the Iraq war, where for the first time the appearance of 'homegrown terrorism' was established. 'Homegrown terrorism' meant that for the first time, people who were born and raised in the West decided to join a conflict abroad to fight against the United States and their invasion that happened there. Foreign fighters were coming from most Arab countries, the United States, Europe and Turkey.
The current conflict in Syria and Iraq is seen as the fourth wave of Jihad. Next, to the fact that this conflict is much more significant in numbers (as described in paragraph 5.1.1), the number of nationalities is also much higher than in earlier conflicts. People were coming from The Middle-East, Maghreb, Western-Europe, former Soviet Republics, South-East Asia, the Balkans and North-America. The number of foreign fighters coming from Western-Europe has never been as high as it was during this conflict.
5.1.3 Ways of recruitment
In the ways of recruitment, it is also visible that the Spanish Civil War and the Arab-Israeli war can be seen separate from the ways that people got recruited in the four Jihadi waves. Again, this makes sense since these four waves are connected.
During the Spanish Civil War, the international brigades recruited people via their communism networks 'under the radar'. This recruitment had to happen in secret since it was not desirable that foreign fighters joined the conflict. The fascism side used the same method to recruit people, even though they had a much smaller network than the
communist party. The Arab-Israeli war experienced a lot of state support on the Arab side. , and there were even paid salaries if you joined the army. On the Jewish hand, many states understood towards the motivations of Jewish people in joining the conflict. However, state support in the way that Hegghammer (2010) defines it was not the way of state support that Jewish people received.
The Afghan war created the rise of the populist pan-Islamism. Abdullah Azzam gave rise to this phenomenon. He spread the idea of 'the duty to help other Muslims in need'. Norms and global networks that arose from his concept enabled activists to recruit people in the name of 'inter-Muslim solidarity'. This way shows that there was not a direct way of recruitment, but more the rise of a global idea where people could identify with. The
Bosnian war found most of their foreign fighters coming from the Afghan war. These soldiers were a lot of foreign fighters who went searching for a new battlefield with the same
motivation to go fighting: helping other Muslims in need. They could not return to their home country since their citizenship was stripped.
As already mentioned, the global networks that were created during the Afghan war and the Bosnian war were an essential base for following conflicts and created the first appearance of 'homegrown terrorism' during the war in Iraq. People who were born and raised in the West decided to join a conflict abroad with the idea that Azzam has told many years before. The tension between the international community led by the United States and the global Jihadi movement shows that the origin and role of foreign fighters are evolving, as Mendelsohn (2011) also has mentioned.
When looking at the way of recruitment during the Syrian/Iraq conflict, it is visible that the same global networks are used to recruit people. A significant development which is essential to mention is that the world is continually globalizing, which makes distance
shorter and information flows faster. The higher speed in today's globalized world is why these global networks might have reached much more people coming from much more regions (respondent, personal communication, 15th of May 2019). People get their
information more accessible, get inspired by their social media, recruiters and other social surroundings and eventually decide to go (many times together with friends or family). The networks that were established in the first two waves are still visible; however, can be used
5.1.4 Motivations to go
In all conflicts, it visible that all foreign fighters are fighting for an ideal image and feel
connected to a transnational identity. In the Spanish Civil War, this was the idea of spreading communism or supporting fascism. However, many people felt attracted to this conflict since they wanted to represent the marginalized people from all over the world. In the Arab-Israeli war, the motivation was a more practical idea of fighting for a piece of land.
The Afghan war was the start of a political wave which can still be experienced today. The idea of populist pan-Islamism that arose during the Afghan war was also important during the second wave in Bosnia and during the third wave in Iraq. Nowadays, it is still a critical perspective which motivates people to join a conflict. However, in the current conflict in Syria/Iraq, there were also other motivations involved. This has to do with the fact that the Islamic State was the first group which was successful in creating a Caliphate. Something that Al-Qaida always has wanted, but never succeeded in establishing it (respondent,
personal communication, 29th of May 2019). The appearance of a Caliphate created ideas of an ideal state where strong supporters of pan-Islamism wanted to live in. This is why many fighters were not only fighting against the threat that fellow Muslims experienced but also went there to start living in the Caliphate.
5.1.5 Ways of return
The ways of return vary widely per conflict. This also has to do with the impact of international law in 1985 about the limitation of statelessness. Before this law, stripping citizenship was a universal rule to tackle foreign fighters. After the Spanish Civil War, all Dutch foreign fighters lost their Dutch nationality. However, the impact of losing your Dutch nationality was different from losing citizenship nowadays. These people could still live within Dutch borders and work if their employer had permission to accept them. It was mostly to do with bureaucratic difficulties (respondent, personal communication, 3rd of May 2019). Until today, these difficulties are still a reality (van Gennep, 1986).
The answer to what happened to the people who went fighting in the Arab-Israeli conflict has not been found. However, since both sides experienced state support, it makes sense if people could return to their former state if they wanted. It can also be a good possibility that people stayed there since they were fighting for their land.
After the Afghan war, many people could not return to their home country. Even though the law on limitation of statelessness was already established, it was difficult for people to return to their home countries. This created a bleed out, which Mendelsohn (2011)
previously mentioned as a risk of foreign fighters in the aftermath of a conflict. People were spreading around the globe to recruit others, to spread propaganda or started to join other terrorist activities. Many of them found a new battle in the Bosnian war.
At the end of the Bosnian war, many fighters started searching for a new battlefield again. They could find one in the conflict in Chechnya. They again became active in spreading the existing terroristic networks. Here one can see the bleed out getting bigger and bigger. What happened to the foreign fighters in Iraq is unknown, but since this conflict ended at the time that the Syrian/Iraq war started, it makes sense that these people stayed there to join this new conflict or decided to travel to Syria. What happens to the foreign fighters who are still in Syria and Iraq is still a problematic political question which this thesis hopes to create a contribution to.
5.2 Results from interviews
Multiple experts are interviewed to create a good view of the current situation of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. A total of five experts, coming from different area's shed their light on the historical differences and policy challenges. Since the interviews differ sharply from each other, and all contain beneficial information, it is necessary to discuss the most critical findings per interview, which will be discussed below. All different interview guides can be found in the appendix.
5.2.1 Interview 1 with Jan: endowed professor radicalization studies
Jan confirmed that the known profile of a foreign fighter matches the profile of the current flow. Most of the people who went to Syria and Iraq were low skilled and had a migration background. This made these people more vulnerable than others to be recruited, and they might feel more need to become part of another society. They follow an ideal image which has not always to do with a specific ideology. It can also be based on personal, political or religious ideas.
These comrades will get in touch with each other about the same information and ideas. A combination of the two will be the best recipe to use violence to reach a specific goal eventually. In the conflict in Syria and Iraq, comrades might have influenced each other via WhatsApp or other social media channels.
Different from earlier conflicts, more young people decided to join the conflict in Syria and Iraq. Also, the speed of information spread via social media is different from previous conflicts. People get in touch with others and share information about the conflict or the beauty of the Caliphate. However, Jan mentioned that real recruitment and eventually really joining the battle will always happen via face-to-face contact. Another difference can be found in the nationality of the foreign fighters:
"This is the first time that this number of people leaves Western Europe to fight in a conflict in a different part of the world. In that perspective, the current flow of foreign fighters can be
seen as a new thing."
This is one reason why there is no universal policy for foreign fighters. Jan also mentioned that the creation of a plan is difficult because there will be a need for an individual approach. All fighters need a personalized evaluation of their mental and psychical state of being, and this can vary widely. Even though this might be challenging, Jan mentions that out of a scientific perspective, you should try to let these people return and make them re-integrate back in society.
In shaping a policy, Jan mentions that you need to focus on removing the violent part of the radicalization process. It would help if you convinced people that violence is not the appropriate way of achieving their goal. You never know when someone is genuinely de-radicalized but trying to remove the violent part is a big step. Next, Jan states that you need to focus on letting people become part of society again. This focus on togetherness can also result in risk reduction. Putting the issue of discrimination higher on the political agenda can also contribute to this goal. On the national level, municipalities can focus on togetherness and minority groups. Where on the international level, the focus should be on the process of helping foreign fighters return.
5.2.2 Interview 2 with Elena: Lawyer and specialized in criminal law
Elena explained that every person who has travelled towards Syria and Iraq or has tried to do so would get prosecuted for 'attempt to be part of a terroristic organization'. It depends on evidence and explanations of whether someone gets convicted. There is a wide range of motives for why people decided to go.
"Some people did it as an impulse action; others wanted to start a new life. However, there were also people with serious plans about fighting for the Islamic State."
Elena mentions that matching these motives; there are different waves in leaving. At the beginning of the conflict, the primary reason was to fight against Assad. Later on, people got mislead via propaganda of IS and wanted to start the 'beautiful new life inside the
Caliphate'. Since people have different motives, this supports the need for an individual approach for possible returnees.
According to the subject of policy creation, the Dutch government is working on law about 'area penalization'. This penalization can make it punishable for people to travel to certain conflict areas. Since Elena wrote a recommendation about this idea, she was asked what she thinks about this new possible law.
Elena thinks this law is terrible because of multiple reasons. First, legislation should be timeless, and this measure is meant explicitly for what has happened in the last couple of years. Next, it is not necessary since Elena claims that there are enough measures available to prosecute these people. It will also be challenging since you will also impede people who want to go to an area for other reasons (like family, lawyers and journalists). Moreover, where do we set a boundary? What can be seen as a conflict area?
Elena sees the idea as typically political since politicians want to show that they do everything they can to fight terrorism. However, they do not understand that we already have many measures against terrorism.
"By this law, politicians want to show how cool they are. They want to show their voters how strict they try to fight terrorism."
There is no juridical argument which supports this idea and pressure of politicians towards ministers to create ideas like these shows that something is going wrong within the way that legislative proposals get designed.
In explanation of current measurements, Elena described the process that possible returnees would go through. They will all go to prison, and an investigation starts
immediately. An intensive hearing will be organized, phones and the internet will be investigated. In many of the cases, the police already got in touch with family. Also, the psychological condition will be investigated. This process is the same for men and women. However, women will be released relatively faster because there is the idea that most of them only had household chores and took care of the children. They will be released earlier but have to follow specific requirements. The standardized sentence for men is that they will get about six years of prison time, depending on the evidence. There is also the chance that people lose their Dutch nationality when they have a second passport. The unusual thing nowadays is that people first have to complete the entire process, before the decision is made whether they will lose their nationality, which is very counterproductive.
Elena mentions that there is a difference with history according to the loss of nationality: when you would lose your citizenship during the Spanish War, you could still live in the Netherlands. You lost stuff like voting rights but could always stay with your family. When you lose your nationality nowadays, you have to leave the country and go live somewhere else. Taking away someone's citizenship has become a more substantial measure to take during the years. Since this is the first time since the change of meaning that the
Netherlands have to deal with the possibility of stripping nationality, this might have a tremendous impact on people's lives. Elena also sees this measurement as a political statement to show 'the toughness against terrorism', while she does not believe in the effectiveness.
At the end of the interview, Elena mentions that she has issues with the way that foreign fighters get treated. The nowadays considerable measure of stripping citizenship might happen to them because they are strongly connected to terrorism, but not everyone is a terrorist. This is why an individual approach is so crucial since not everyone had the same motivations to go. The heavy approach has to do with the politicization of the juridical system. This politicization is why, according to Elena, critical factors for an effective policy should be: a good security system as long as this is not highly politicized, which it is now. By
