Folk moral objectivism

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University of Groningen

Folk moral objectivism

Zijlstra, Lieuwe

DOI:

10.33612/diss.109876462

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Publication date:

2019

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Zijlstra, L. (2019). Folk moral objectivism. University of Groningen. https://doi.org/10.33612/diss.109876462

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FOLK MORAL

OBJECTIVISM

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FOLK MOR

AL OB

JEC

TIVISM

PhD

Thes

is

to o

btain the degr

ee of PhD at the U ni ver sity of Gr oning en a nd Ghen t U ni ver sity ( do ub le-degr ee )

on the authority of the

Rector M agni ficus P rof . dr . C. W ijmeng a ( U ni ver sity of Gr oning en ) a nd Rector P rof . dr . R. Va n de W alle ( Ghen t U ni ver sity ) and in accor da nce with the decision b y the Co lleg e of De ans

This thesis will be de

fended in p ub lic on Th ur sd ay 19 December 2019 at 09.00 ho ur s by

Lieu

w

e Zij

lstr

a

born on 28 A pril 1983 in H oog eza nd-Sa ppemeer 1

Fo

lk

M

or

al

O

bj

ec

tiv

ism

PhD The sis to o bta in th e d eg re e o f P hD o f th e Un iv er sit y o f Gr on in ge n on the a ut hor ity of th e Re cto r M ag nif ic us P ro f. C. W ijm en ga an d i n acco rd an ce w ith th e d ec is io n b y th e C olle ge o f D ea ns an d to obt ain the de gr ee of PhD of G he nt U ni ve rs ity on the a ut hor ity of Re cto r P ro f. R. V an d e W all e an d i n acco rd an ce w ith th e d ec is io n b y th e C olle ge o f D ea ns Do ub le P hD de gr ee Th is th es is w ill b e d ef en de d i n p ub lic o n Th ur sd ay 1 9 D ec em be r 2 01 9 a t 0 9.0 0 hour s by

Lieuw

e Zijlstra

bor n on 28 A pr il 1983 in H oo ge za nd -Sa ppe m ee r, T he N eth erl an ds

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Su per visor s Pr of . F .A. Hindrik s Pr of . J. Verp laetse Co -s up er visor Dr . H. W .A. E ver s Assessmen t c ommit tee pr of . G . Bj örnsson Pr of . F . M or tier Pr of . B . S tr eumer Pr of . M.M.S .K. Sie Dr . K. R euter Spr ead y our wings a nd fly a w ay Fl y a w ay , fa r a w ay Pull y our se lf tog ether Cause y ou know y ou s ho uld do bet ter That ’s because y ou ’re a fr ee ma n Queen ( written by J ohn De ac on) - 1977

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VII

TABLE OF C

ONTENT

S

ACK N O WL ED GEMENT S X PREF ACE XI INTR O D U CTI O N 1 1. D O ES EMP IRI CA L RES EA RCH D EB U N K F O LK M O R AL O BJ ECTIVIS M? 7 INTR O D U CTI O N 8 1. F O LK M O RA L O BJECTIVIS M 9 2. P SY CH O LO G ICA L RES EA RCH O N F O LK MET AETHI CS 11 2.1. The ver y b eginning of empirical r ese ar ch on fo lk metaethic s 12 2.2. A nove l exp erimen tal methodo logy: t ruth-apt

ness & disagr

eemen t 14 2.3 A di ffer en t exp erimen tal design to o btain hig h c on st ruct v alidity 18 3. IMP LICIT A N D EXP LICIT M O RA L O BJECTIVIS M 23 CO N CL U SIO N 26 2. F O LK M O R AL O BJ ECTIVIS M A N D IT S MEAS U REMENT 29 1. INTR O D U CTI O N 30 2. B EY O N D P ER CEIVED O BJECTIVITY 32 2.1. Objecti vity a s a mu lti-dimen sional c on st ruct 32 2.2 The pr edicti ve p ower of fo lk mor al o bjecti vism 34 2.3 The p syc ho logical distincti veness of mor al a ttitudes 35 3. THE P RES ENT RES EA RCH 37 4. S TU DY 1: D EVEL O PMENT O F THE MEAS U REMENT SCA LE 38 4.1 M ethod 39 4.1.1 P articipan ts 39 4.1.2 M aterial s and Pr oc ed ur e 39 4.1.3 Explor ator y F actor A nal ysis 41 4.2 Discu ssion 43 5. S TU DY 2: A CO N FIRMA TO RY F ACT O R A N AL YS IS O F THE THREE-F ACT O R S TR U CT U RE 45 5.1 M ethod 46 5.1.1 P articipan ts 46 5.1.2 M aterial s and Pr oc ed ur e 46 5.1.3 Con firma tor y F actor A nal ysis 46 5.2 Discu ssion 47

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VIII IX 6. S TU DY 3: F IRS T V AL ID ATI O N S TU DY 47 6.1 M ethod 48 6.1.1 P articipan ts 48 6.1.2 M aterial s and Pr oc ed ur e 49 6.2 R esu lts 49 6.3 Discu ssion 50 7. S TU DY 4: S ECO N D VA LID ATI O N S TU DY 52 7.1. M ethod s 53 7.1.1 P articipan ts 53 7.1.2 M aterial s and Pr oc ed ur e 53 7.2 R esu lts 55 7.3 Discu ssion 60 8. S TU DY 5: WIL LIN GN ES S TO HA RM 62 8.1 M ethod s 64 8.1.1 P articipan ts 64 8.1.2 M aterial s and pr oc ed ur e 64 8.2 R esu lts 66 8.3 Discu ssion 68 9. G EN ER AL D ISC U SS IO N 69 9.1 R ela tion ship to pr eviou s r ese ar ch on p er cei ve d o bjecti vity 70 9.2 R ela tion to other r ese ar ch in social p syc ho logy 72 10. CO N CL U SIO N 72 3. A RE P EO PL E IMP LICITL Y M O R AL O BJ ECTIVIS TS? 75 1. A RE P EO PL E IMP LICITL Y M O RA L O BJECTIVIS TS? 76 1.1 E noc h’s T ests 78 2.1 T est 1: J ok es 79 2.2. T

est 2: The phenomeno

logy of disagr eemen t 81 2.3. T est 3: The c oun terf actual question 82 3. EXP ERIMENT 82 3.1. M ethod s 83 3.1.1. P articipan ts 83 3.1.2. M aterial s and Pr oc ed ur e 84 3.1.3. R esu lts 85 2.2. Discu ssion 88 4. CO N CL U SIO N 89 AP PEN D IX 1: A TTENTI O N CHECKS 90 AP PEN D IX 2: RES U LTS F IRS T S U RVE Y EXP ERIMENT 91 AP PEN D IX 3: THE P HEN O MEN O LO GY O F D IS AG REEMENT 93 AP PEN D IX 4: THE CO U NTERF ACT UA L Q U ES TI O N 94 4. D O P EO PL E B EL IE VE IN O BJ ECTIVE M O R AL P RO GRES S, K N O WL ED GE, AN D ERR O R ? 97 1. INTR O D U CTI O N 98 2. THE P RES ENT RES EA RCH 101 2.1 M ethod 102 2.1.1 P articipan ts 102 2.1.2 M aterial s and pr oc ed ur e 102 2.1.3 S ta temen ts 105 2.3 R esu lts 106 2.3.1 S ta tistical h yp

otheses and anal

ytical st ra tegy 106 2.3.2 Descripti ves 107 2.3.3 T esting H yp othesis 1: M or al pr ogr ess 109 2.3.4 T esting H yp othesis 2: M or al knowle dg e 110 2.3.5 T esting H yp othesis 3: M or al err or 111 2.3.6 H yp

othesis tests with su

bjecti ve ca teg oriza tion s 112 3. D ISC U SS IO N 113 4. CO N CL U SIO N 114 CO N CL U SIO N 117 AP PEN D IX A: H O W N O T T O A RG U E A BO U T IS /O U GHT IN FEREN CES IN THE C O GN ITIVE SCIEN CES 123 1. INTR O D U CTI O N 123 2. KE Y CO N CEP TS 123 3. MIN D THE G AP 125 4. A D EB ATE S HA CKL ED 127 SA MENV AT TIN G 131 CU RRI CU LU M VIT AE 139 BIB LIO GR AP HY 141

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X XI

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

S

The rese arc h pr esen ted in this PhD thesis is cond ucted on the basis of a do u-ble degr ee con tr act bet w een Ghen t U ni ver sity and the U ni ver sity of Gr onin -gen. At Ghen t U ni ver sity , this rese arc h w as cond ucted as pa rt of the FW O -pr o-ject “M easuring M or al Re lati vism ”. All of the sur ve y ex perimen ts are funded by the Rese arc h Fo und ation Fl ander s (FW O ) – pr oject nr . G .0683.13N . As pa rt of this pr oject, a pa per writ ten by Katinka Quin te lier and me w as pub lis hed in 2014 in Fr on tier s in Psyc ho logy titled “H ow (no t) to argu e abo ut is/ ou gh t in -fer

ences in the cogniti

ve sciences” . This pa per ca n be f ound in A ppendix A.

PREF

ACE

If I had to iden tif y a cen tr al theme to describe the period in w hic h I wr ote this PhD thesis then it w ould be one abo ut cr ossing bor der s a nd cha nging places . In a liter al sense , all the w or k that I ha ve done to com plete this PhD thesis (i. e. running sur ve y ex perimen ts , writing pa per s, meeting with ad visor s or co -au -thor s, at tending w or ks ho ps , submit ting pa per s to jo urnals , a nd so for th ) w as done in Ghen t, Gr oning en, Ro tter da m, N ew H av en, Bu ffalo , N ew Yor k, Gr az, Boc hum, and numer ous other places . Pa rts of this thesis w er e ev en writ ten in Kr alendijk (Bonair e) and be hind the steering w hee l of a tru ck (of co ur se , w hile pa rk ed in a loading doc k!) . During this time , I cha ng ed m y home ad -dr ess se ven times . Ther e is also a meta phorical sense in w hic h this thesis cr ossed bor der s. The rese arc h that is pa rt of this thesis is in ter disci plina ry in natur e. I in ves -tig ated an em pirical claim that pla ys a ro le in philoso phical theories and I em plo yed rese arc h methodo logies typicall y used by social scien tists . In the pr ocess , I tried to tr ans late philoso phical assum ptions in to em pirical hypo th -eses and I assessed the philoso phical signi fica nce of em pirical findings . In or der to get this w or k done pr oper ly, I stu died philoso phical liter atur e in me -taethics , psy cho logical and socio logical theories on mor al val ues and be ha v-ior , a nd I consulted liter atur e on statistical methodo log y to ap pr opriate ly run the necessa ry statistical anal yses . M or eov er , I consulted with philoso pher s, socio logists , psy cho logists , statisticia ns and ma ny other s fr om a ra ng e of dif -fer en t disci plines . This thesis co uld no t ha ve been com pleted, how ev er , if ther e had no t peo -ple w ho w er e willing to sha re their know led ge and skills , w ho ad vised me on how to write academic pa per s or how to run statistical anal yses corr ectl y, or w ho he lped me or ga nize and coor dinate ev er ything necessa ry for m y sta ys abr oad or f or the do ub le degr ee con tr act bet w een Gr oning en a nd Ghen t. One of the peo ple w ho deser ve a special men tion is Jos hua Kno be w ho so gen -ero us ly s pe nt tim e t uto rin g m e d ur in g m y s tay at Ya le U niv ers ity . H e p ro vid ed

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XII XIII me with the op por tunity to be a visiting assista nt in rese arc h and he gener ous -ly sp en t ti m e t o h el p m e w or k ou t s ur vey ex pe rim en ts, ge ttin g t o k no w ot he rs in th e r es ea rc h fi eld , a nd ad vis in g m e o n h ow to w rit e a ca de m ic p ap ers . I am also ver y gr ate ful for the su ppor t of m y pr omo tor s and ad visor s, Ja n Verp laetse and Katinka Quin te lier in Ghen t, Fr ank Hindrik s, Daa n Ev er s, and Ba rt Str eumer in Gr oning en. The y made it possib le for me to w or k in bo th places and the y ad vised me on all as pects of this PhD thesis . This thesis has im pr ov ed consider ab ly as a result of their commen ts , ad vice , recommen -dations , a nd by the discussions that w e had abo ut metaethics , ex perimen -tal philoso ph y, and the re lations hi p bet w een bo th. I w ould also lik e to tha nk Thomas Pö lzler and Jaco b Dijk str a. It re all y w as a ple asur e to w or k tog ether with them on de ve lo ping rese arc h on mor al pr ogr ess , know led ge and err or (Cha pter 4) a nd I le arned a lo t fr om them. W ith reg ard to all the coor dination and or ga nization of this pr oject, I a m ver y gr ate ful for the su ppor t pr ovided by Kate lijne Ver stic he l a nd M arg a Hids . Ther e w as a lo t of w or k in vo lved in arr anging the di ffer en t sta ys abr oad, run -ning ex perimen ts and arr anging funding, and making it possib le for this pr o-ject to tak e place in Gr oning en, Ghen t, and N ew H av en. Kate lijne and M arg a put a lo t of time and eff or t in arr anging these things and al w ay s did so in good spirit. I a m gr ate ful f or that. During m y PhD rese arc h I also recei ved a lo t of su ppor t fr om m y pa r-en ts and I a m obvio us ly ver y gr ate ful for that. The su ppor t that the y pr ovid -ed made m y lif e and w or k m uc h easier , m uc h mor e comf or tab le , a nd mor e ple asur ab le . I also ha ve ple asa nt memories of their visits to eac h of the places that I s pen t a long er a mo un t of time in ( Gr oning en, Ghen t, N ew H av en ). In the past ye ars I ha ve no t onl y de ve lo ped m yse lf in an academic sense but it w as also ver y m uc h a per sonal jo urne y. I a m gr ate ful for the friends hi p and su ppor t of De bor a W eerma n, Joring el den H oedt, Ka ri Whee ler -R eed, Nic k Sta gna ro , a nd Ry an M ay s. To Joring el, I w ould lik e to ex pr ess m y gr ati -tu de for his friends hi p (a nd all the extr eme ly ple asa nt and fun momen ts in the past ye ars ) a nd for the fact that he has al w ay s been a tru e be lie ver in w hat I a m ca pab le of doing (at le ast fr om his per specti ve!) . I sha re ma ny in ter ests with Joring el, es peciall y those that mak e lif e so m uc h in ter esting, w hic h in -clu des philoso ph y, m usic, liter atur e, film, ar t, and comed y, and Joring el is the one w ho no ted the re le va nce of the song Spr ead your Wing s b y Qu een in re lation to this thesis (see qu ote abov e). I a m gr ate ful to De bor a for her jo yo us spirit and her patience and ca re in the past ye ars and for the ple asa nt mem -ories in Gr oning en, Ghen t, N ew H av en, Bonair e, and ma ny other places . T o Ka ri, I w ould lik e to ex pr ess m y gr atitu de for su ppor ting me w hile doing m y PhD rese arc h, for the elabor ate con ver sations that w e had abo ut the ma ny me aningf ul and jo yf ul things in lif e, and for her lasting friends hi p. I a m ex -tr eme ly gr ate ful for the fact that she tir eless ly su ppor ted me in times w hen lif e w as to ug h. M or eov er , I will al w ay s be amazed by her ex ce ptional abilities to put in to w or ds those things that are ver y di ffi cult to per cei ve and/ or to ex -pr ess ver ball y. I a m also gr ate ful to Nic k Sta gna ro and Ry an M ay s f or making me fee l w elcome in N ew H av en and for the ma ny ple asur ab le momen ts that w e ex perienced in N ew H av en and in Ro tter da m/ Amster da m during their vis -its . F inall y, I a m gr ate ful for the su ppor t of fe llow PhD stu den ts in Gr oning en, Ghen t, and Yale . I w ould es peciall y lik e to tha nk Sti pe Pa nd žić for being one of m y pa ra nym phs a nd f or his friends hi p in the past y ea rs. This jo urne y has come to an end but I loo k for w ard to be en ro ute tow ard something ne w w her e I ca n build on the w or k that I ha ve done as pa rt of this PhD .

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1 2

INTRODUC

TION

When it comes to the stu dy of huma n mor ality , p hiloso pher s mak e a distinc -tion bet w een normati ve ethics , a pp lied ethics , a nd metaethics . Theories in normati ve ethics focus on fir st-or der qu estions abo ut w hat actions are mor -all y rig ht or wr ong and good or bad. Theories in ap plied ethics concern the pr actical ap plication of ethical theories to re al-lif e cir cumsta nces and sce -na rios . Theories in metaethics , on the other ha nd, aim at ex plaining w hat mor ality fund amen tall y is . F or insta nce , the y concern the con ten t of mor al conce pts , the re lations hi p bet w een mor al re asons and being mo tiv ated to act mor all y, w hether ther e are mor al pr oper ties and w hat kind of en tity the y are , and w hether or no t mor al o bjecti vism is tru e. This PhD thesis pr esen ts an in vestig ation in to the qu estion of w hether an assum ption oft en made by metaethicists is tru e, na me ly the thesis of “f olk mor al objecti vism ” (FM O ). FM O is an em pirical thesis abo ut the natur e of or -dina ry mor al disco ur se and tho ug ht. Accor ding to this thesis , peo ple be lie ve that mor al sen tences are objecti ve ly tru e or false . T o wit, that mor al objec -tivism is tru e. M or e speci ficall y, the thesis describes peo ple as be lie ving that mor al sen tences are tru e or false inde penden tly of an y indi vid ual ’s subjecti ve at titu des and an y pa rticul ar cultur al per specti ve . The argumen ts that philos -op her s pr ovide for FM O oft en come in the form of descri ptions of or dina ry mor al disco ur se and ap pe als to in tuitions . Des pite the fact that this is an em -pirical claim that ca n be tested, philoso pher s ra re ly use em pirical methodo l-og y to test w hether FM O is tru e. The qu estion of w hether or no t FM O is tru e is im por ta nt for theories in metaethics . F ir st, philoso pher s acti ve ly tr y to accommod ate FM O in their me -taethical theories . Second, some philoso pher s claim that the truth of FM O mak es some metaethical theories mor e plausib le (i. e. mor al re alism ) a nd oth

-er metaethical theories less p

lausib le (i. e. mor al a ntir ealism ). In recen t ye ars , psy cho logists and ex perimen tal philoso pher s ha ve sta rted to in vestig ate FM O em piricall y (Nic ho ls 2004; Good win & Da rle y 2008, 2010, 2012; Pö lzler & W rig ht un pub lis hed; Sa rkissia n, Pa rk, Tien, W rig ht & Kno be 2011; W rig ht, Cullen & M cWhite 2011) . In exta nt stu dies , peo ple tr eat ma ny mor al sen tences as if those sen tences are subjecti ve ly tru e or false or neither tru e nor false . M or eov er , as I discuss extensi ve ly be low , ther e are no pa rtic -ipa nts in those stu dies w ho consisten tly tr eat mor al sen tences as objecti ve ly tru e or false . Gi ven the lar ge su ppor t that FM O recei ves fr om philoso pher s and their eff or t to accommod ate FM O in their theories , these findings are rema rkab le a nd in need of ex pla nation. The main rese arc h qu estion of this PhD thesis is , ther efor e, w hether or no t FM O is tru e. A subsidia ry rese arc h qu estion concerns the best w ay of me asuring FM O. In this PhD ma nuscri pt yo u will find an in vestig ation in to bo th qu estions a nd ten tati ve a nsw er s. In Cha pter 1, I r evie w existing rese arc h on fo lk metaethics and I e val uate w hether or no t the y pr ovide evidence for or ag ainst FM O. M y in vestig ation re ve als that it is no t c le ar w hether the y pr ovide gen uine evidence . The fir st re ason for this is that ma ny me asur es do no t dir ectl y or no t ex clusi ve ly me as -ur e w hat is re le va nt for FM O. The second re ason is that ther e is a distinction bet w een im plicit and ex plicit metaethical commitmen ts . F or insta nce , peo -ple ma y ex plicitl y be lie ve , a nd ver ball y ex pr ess , that mor ality is re lati ve . A t the sa me time , it is possib le that the y im plicitl y be lie ve , a nd act accor ding ly, as if ther e are objecti ve mor al facts . Consequ en tly , im plicit and ex plicit meta -ethical commitmen ts ca n di ver ge . I argu e that some philoso pher s claim that FM O ap plies to im plicit commitmen ts and that it is no t cle ar w hat type of commitmen t is me asur ed b y existing r ese arc h on f olk metaethics . In Cha pter 2 I pr esen t r ese arc h in w hic h I in vestig ate w hether an exist -ing psy cho logical constru ct, w hic h is used in em pirical rese arc h as an indi -cator of fo lk mor al objecti vism, me asur es mor al objecti vism ver sus non-ob -jecti vism or also re lated metaethical vie w s. M or e speci ficall y, I in vestig ated w hether peo ple’ s in tuitions abo ut mor al truth are best me asur ed on a sing le dimension of mor al objecti vism (i. e. per cei ved objecti vity ) v er sus non-objec -tivism or w hether ther e are m ulti ple psy cho logical dimensions that under lie

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3 4 peo ple’ s in tuitions . If ther e are di ffer en t dimensions , is this re lated to peo -ple’ s scor es on to ler ance me asur es? For insta nce , altho ug h philoso phicall y distinct vie w s, it is psy cho logicall y possib le that peo ple’ s in tuitions abo ut the objecti vity of mor al ju dgmen ts are on a sing le dimension with mor al abso lut -ism and op posed to re lati vism. If so , it ma y be tru e that hig her scor es on ob -jecti vism/ abso lutism decr ease peo ple’ s to ler ance tow ard other s a nd that low -er scor es (i. e., ha ving in tuitions abo ut re lati vism ) incr ease peo ple’ s to ler ance . H ow ev er , it is also possib le that, psy cho logicall y spe aking, objecti vism and abso lutism are tw o distinct dimensions and that in tuitions abo ut re lati vism op pose the former and no t the lat ter , or vice ver sa. If so , this also raises ne w qu estions abo ut the r elations hi p with to ler ance . Existing rese arc h has shown that ther e are lar ge di ffer ences in peo ple’ s ju dgmen ts abo ut the objecti vity of mor al ju dgmen ts , bo th bet w een di ffer en t indi vid uals and bet w een di ffer en t mor al statemen ts . M y results str ong ly su g-gest that peo ple’ s in tuitions abo ut mor al truth are indeed m ultidimensional and that eac h dimension, w hic h I ha ve termed Inde penden t T ruth, U ni ver sal Truth, and Di vine Truth, ha ve di ffer en t re lations hi ps with to ler ance and a willingness to ha rm me asur e. In C ha pte r 3 I a rg ue th at i t is n ot c lea r w he th er m ea su re m en t in str um en ts used in existing rese arc h me asur e im plicit or ex plicit commitmen ts . I ther e-fo re p re se nt an in ve stig ati on sp ec ifi ca lly fo cu sin g o n p eo ple ’s i mp lic it c om -m itm en ts. Th e r ea so n f or th is in ve stig ati on is tw ofo ld . F irs t, F M O m igh t b e abo ut im plicit commitmen ts , w hic h some philoso pher s su gg est is the case . Second, ther e is re ason to think that pr evio us rese arc h mostl y me asur ed ex -pli cit co m m itm en ts. If th is is tru e, th e l arg e d iff ere nc es th at w e o bs er ve in pe op le’s ju dg m en ts a bo ut th e t ru th an d f als ity o f m or al ju dg m en ts m igh t n ot be re le va nt for our assessmen t of FM O. For tunate ly, Enoc h (2014) has de ve l-op ed th re e t es ts, w hic h h e u se s a s in tu itio n p um ps , w hic h i n h is v iew sh ou ld sh ow th at pe op le are im pli cit ly co m m itte d t o m or al ob jec tiv ism ev en if th ey ex pli cit ly d en y t his . I u se th os e t es ts a s m ate ria l fo r a su rv ey ex pe rim en t to te st wh eth er p eo ple in de ed re sp on d i n a w ay th at E no ch exp ec ts. T he re su lts sh ow th at f or ea ch of th e t ho ug ht ex pe rim en ts s ep ara tel y, t he m ajo rit y o f p eo ple d o re sp on d a s if F M O is tr ue . H ow ev er, w he n p eopl e’s re sp on se s a re co m bin ed , this becomes less cle ar. N ev er the less , this rese arc h pr ovides some su ppor t for th e id ea th at p eo ple ar e im pli cit ly c om m itte d t o m or al o bje cti vis m . To ob tain mor e insig ht in to peo ple’ s metaethical commitmen ts , I ex plor e in Cha pter 4 alternati ve w ay s of me asuring FM O (in co llabor ation with Thom -as Pö lzler and Jaco b Dijk str a) . P re vio us rese arc h in vestig ated w hether or no t peo ple be lie ve that mor al ju dgmen ts are objecti ve ly tru e or false and w hether or no t the y be lie ve that at most one pa rty ca n be corr ect in a mor al disa -gr eemen t. If FM O is tru e, how ev er , peo ple will also be lie ve in the possibility of mor al pr ogr ess , know led ge , a nd err or (or so w e argu e). W e ther efor e de -signed a sur ve y ex perimen t to in vestig ate w hether this is indeed the case . Our pa rtici pa nts res ponded, bo th abstr actl y and for concr ete cases , to qu estions abo ut mor al pr ogr ess , know led ge , a nd err or , in the domains of mor ality , sci -ence , per sonal pr efer ences , a nd social con ven tions . W e assumed that peo ple be lie ve that scien tifi c statemen ts are objecti ve -ly tru e or false . W e also assumed that peo ple do no t be lie ve that statemen ts abo ut per sonal pr efer ences or social con ven tions are objecti ve ly tru e or false . Our results show that w hen peo ple are as ked abstr actl y, and also w hen as ked to ju dg e concr ete cases , the y pr ovide res ponses that su gg est that the y be lie ve scien tifi c statemen ts are objecti ve ly tru e or false . W ith reg ard to mor ality , how ev er , peo ple’ s res ponses are , ov er all, mor e com pa rab le to their res pons -es to per sonal pr efer ences or con ven tions . Consequ en tly , the results of this stu dy do no t pr ovide e vidence f or FM O. Ov er all, m y rese arc h re ve als that w e sho uld be ca re ful in in terpr eting em -pirical results as evidence ag ainst FM O. Fir st, pr evio us stu dies that claim to pr ovide su ppor t for fo lk mor al objecti vism do no t al w ay s me asur e w hat is re le va nt for FM O. Second, the stu dies in this thesis do no t pr ovide uni vocal evidence for it. Thir d, an ultimate ver dict requir es a thor ou gh in vestig ation of the distinction bet w een im plicit and ex plicit commitmen ts . This thesis tak es the fir st ste p to me asuring im plicit commitmen ts , a gain witho ut pr oviding

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5 uni vocal su ppor t for FM O. Th us , in spite of initial op timism, I conc lu de that the jur y is still out. If FM O is indeed tru e, this is no t immediate ly obvio us if w e loo k at em pirical d ata.

1.

DOES EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

DEBUNK F

OLK MOR

AL OB

JEC

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7

8

CHAP

TER 1

DOES EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DEBUNK F

OLK MOR

AL OB

JEC

TIVISM?

OLK MOR AL OB JEC TIVISM? CHAP TER 1

Abstr

ac

t

A pr ev alen t assum ption among philoso pher s is that peo ple are mor al objec -tivists , w hic h I r efer to as the thesis of fo lk mor al objecti vism (FM O ). Recen t psy cho logical rese arc h ap pe ars to shed do ub t on FM O. For insta nce , ev en tho ug h peo ple seem to tr eat some mor al statemen ts as objecti ve ly tru e or false , the y tr eat other mor al statemen ts as subjecti ve ly tru e or false , or ev en as neither tru e nor false . M or eov er , ther e seem to be lar ge di ffer ences be -tw een di ffer en t indi vid uals with reg ard to the objecti vity that the y at trib ute to mor ality . In this pa per I in vestig ate w hether the findings of psy cho logical rese arc h pr ovide evidence that show s that FM O is tru e or false . M y anal ysis re ve als , fi rstl y, that ma ny of the em pirical me asur es that are used in psy cho -logical rese arc h do no t dir ectl y per tain to FM O. Secondl y, those me asur es that seem to per tain to FM O ma y elicit ex plicit commitmen ts . A ccor ding to some philoso pher s, how ev er , FM O concerns peo ple’ s im plicit commitmen ts . I conc lu de that the thesis of fo lk mor al objecti vism is no t (y et) de bunk ed by existing r ese arc h. Ke yw or ds: F olk mor al o bjecti vism, constru ct v alidity , im plicit, ex plicit

In

tr

od

uc

tion

Some philoso pher s be lie ve that ther e are objecti ve ly tru e mor al ju dgmen ts (Brink 1984; Gib ba rd 1992; Railton 1996; Smith 1994; Stur geon 1985) and oth -er s do no t (A yer 1936; H are 1954; Blac kb urn; 1984; H arma n 1975; Str eumer 2017) . Des pite the di ffer ences among philoso pher s abo ut w hether or no t mor al objecti vism is tru e, most of them sha re the assum ption that lay peo -ple be lie ve in mor al objecti vism (Brink 1984; Brink 1989; M ac kie 1977; Shaf -er -La nd au 2003; Smith 1994) . M or eov er , most philoso pher s be lie ve that this is something that metaethical theories sho uld accommod ate . In this pa per , I will re fer to the assum ption that or dina ry peo ple are commit ted to mor al objecti vism as ‘ the thesis of f olk mor al o bjecti vism ’ (FM O ). Psy cho logists and ex perimen tal philoso pher s ha ve recen tly sta rted to em piricall y in vestig ate fo lk metaethics and the results of those stu dies ap pe ar to mak e it less lik ely that FM O is tru e. Altho ug h peo ple gener all y tr eat mor al statemen ts mor e objecti ve ly tha n ju dgmen ts abo ut mat ter s of taste or social con ven tions (Good win and Da rle y 2008) , the y do no t tr eat mor al statemen ts as objecti ve ly as factual statemen ts , w hic h are or dina ril y consider ed as be -longing to a domain that is cha racteristicall y objecti ve (Good win and Da rle y 2008; W rig ht, Gr andje an & M cWhite 2013) . M or e striking ly, ther e are lar ge di ffer ences bet w een di ffer en t peo ple in the objecti vity the y at trib ute to mor al issu es; and peo ple tr eat cer tain mor al issu es objecti ve ly and other mor al is -su es non-objecti ve ly (Good win & Da rle y 2008, 2010, 2012; W rig ht, M cWhite & Gr andje an 2013; W rig ht, Gr andje an & M cWhite 2013; Zijlstr a, 2019) . Ther e is , how ev er , su ffi cien t r eason no t to tak e these stu dies at face val ue . Fir st, ma ny me asur es that are used do no t dir ectl y me asur e fo lk mor al ob -jecti vity . Second, ther e is a di ffer ence bet w een being ex plicitl y or im plicitl y commit ted to mor al objecti vism (Zijlstr a, un pub lis hed) . And it ma y be that onl y the l at

ter type of commitmen

t is r ele va nt f or FM O. To show that this is the case , I will discuss some of the ke y findings of psy -cho logical rese arc h on fo lk metaethics and argu e w hy the y neither su ppor t nor undermine FM O. The pa per is or ga nized as fo llow s. In section 1, I discuss

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9

10

CHAP

TER 1

OLK MOR

AL OB

JEC

TIVISM?

OLK MOR AL OB JEC TIVISM? CHAP TER 1 What is cru cial is that these philoso pher s su gg est that peo ple think that mor al sen tences are tru e or false inde penden tly of w hate ver subjecti ve res ponses the y ha ve

. I will term this criterion ‘

Inde pendence’ . M or eov er , peo ple a re described as be lie ving that those w ho ha ve di ffer en t mor al vie w s are mis -tak en. M or e speci ficall y, that onl y one pa rty to a mor al disa gr eemen t ca n be corr ect (Jac kson 2000, Smith 1994, Str eumer 2018) . I will call this criterion ‘Ex clusion ’. An assum ption that is usuall y le ft im plicit is that, if one mor al be lie f is objecti ve ly tru e or false , then other mor al be lie fs are also objecti ve ly tru e or false . Pa rfi t qu

estions this assum

ption:

W

e s

ho

uld no

t assume that the o

bjecti vity of Ethics m ust be all-or -no thing. Ther e ma y be a pa rt of mor ality that is o bjecti ve . In describing this pa rt, our claims ma y be tru e. When w e consider this pa rt of mor ality , or these mor al qu estions , w e ma y find the U ni fied Theor y that w ould remov e our disa gr eemen ts . Ther e ma y be other qu estions abo ut w hic h w e shall ne ver agr ee . Ther e ma y be no tru e answ er s to these qu es -tions . Since objecti vity need no t be all-or -no thing, mor al sce ptics ma y be pa rtl y rig ht. These qu estions ma y be subjecti ve . (Pa rfi t, 1984, p . 452) Consequ en tly , Pa rfi t be lie ves that the thesis of mor al objecti vism does no t necessa ril y im ply that all mor al claims are objecti ve ly tru e or false . Inste ad, it is possib le that some mor al statemen ts are objecti ve ly tru e or false and other s are subjecti ve ly tru e or false . I t is possib le that the sa me a pp lies f or the commitmen ts of the f olk. P eo ple ma y be lie

ve that some mor

al c laims a re objecti ve ly tru e or false and other s a re no t. Some philoso pher s a nd psy cho lo -gists , how ev er , be lie ve that w hat w e mig ht call ‘the unif ormity assum ption ’ is pa rt of FM O (Good win & Da rle y 2008; Pö lzler 2018; Pö lzler & W rig ht, un -pub lis hed; Sinno tt-Armstr ong 2009) . On this in terpr etation, a vio lation of the unif ormity assum ption pr ovides evidence ag ainst FM O (Good win & Da rle y 2008; P ölzler 2018; P ölzler & W rig ht, un pub lis hed; Sinno tt-Armstr ong 2009) . w hy philoso pher s be lie ve that the FM O assum ption is tru e. On the basis of these re asons , I de ve lo p thr ee criteria of fo lk mor al objecti vity . In section 2, I discuss psy cho logical rese arc h and I em plo y the thr ee criteria in or der to assess w hether or no t this rese arc h pr ovides evidence in fa vo ur of FM O. I argu e that it does no t. In section 3, I argu e that it is possib le to be a mor al objecti vist in tw o distinct w ay s, na me ly im plicitl y and ex plicitl y, and that ex -isting psy cho logical rese arc h has mostl y me asur ed ex plicit commitmen ts . It is ther efor e still possib le that peo ple are mor al objecti vists , na me ly im plicitl y. 1. F olk M or al O bjec tivism M an y philoso pher s assume that peo ple are mor al objecti vists and that this is something metaethical theories sho uld accommod ate (Brink, 1989; Cuneo , 2007; Finl ay , 2007; Nic ho ls , 2004) . F or ex am ple , Brink (1984) writes that “[I]n mor al de liber ation and argumen t w e se arc h for answ er s to mor al qu estions , answ er s w hose corr ectness w e assume to be inde penden t of our me ans of arri ving at them ” (Brink, 1989, p . 11) . In his boo k, Brink also c

laims that peo

-ple per cei ve mor al claims as asser tions that ca n be objecti ve ly tru e or false , that the y be lie ve that some peo ple are bet ter at gr as ping objecti ve mor al facts tha n other s, and that the y be lie ve that objecti ve mor al pr ogr ess is possib le . In the ra re case that peo ple do res pond as an tir ealists , this is du e to a cogniti ve pr ocess that led them to be lie ve that the re alists’ commitmen ts are un tenab le (Brink, 1989, p . 23) . This fits w ell with w

hat Smith (1994) writes abo

ut how w e ( that is , or dina ry peo ple ) think abo ut mor ality: W e seem to think mor al qu estions ha ve corr ect answ er s; that the corr ect answ er s are made corr ect by objecti ve mor al facts; that mor al facts are w ho lly determined by cir cumsta nces and that, by eng aging in mor al con -ver sation and argumen t, w e ca n discov er w hat these objecti ve mor al facts determined b y the cir cumsta nces a re . ( Smith, 1994, p . 6)

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11

12

CHAP

TER 1

OLK MOR

AL OB

JEC

TIVISM?

OLK MOR AL OB JEC TIVISM? CHAP TER 1 FM O. In the next section I will argu e that des pite a w ealth of in ter esting re -sults , ther e are tw o im por ta nt re asons w hy w e ca nno t y et in terpr et those re -sults as pr oviding c le ar e vidence f or or a gainst FM O. 2.1. The v er y b eginning o f empiric al r ese ar ch on f olk met aet hic s An ea rly p sy ch olo gic al stu dy in to th e q ue stio n o f w he th er p eo ple ar e m or al ob jec tiv ist s h as b ee n c on du cte d b y N ich ols (2 00 4). N ich ols ex plo re d p eo ple ’s vie w s of di ffer en t kinds of disa gr eemen ts (mor al, con ven tional, factual) . In the mor al disa gr eemen t scena rio , pa rtici pa nts w er e pr esen ted with the fo llowing: Jo hn and Fr ed are member s of di ffer en t cultur es , a nd the y are in an ar-gumen t. Jo hn sa ys “It ’s oka y to hit peo ple just because yo u fee l lik e it, ” and Fr ed sa ys “N o, it is no t o ka y to hit peo ple just because yo u fee l lik e it. ” Jo hn then sa ys “Loo k yo u are wr ong. Ev er yone I know agr ees that it’s oka y to do that. ” F red res ponds , “Oh no , y ou are the one w ho is mistak en. Ev er yone I know a gr ees that it ’s no t o ka y to do that. (Nic ho ls , 2004, p . 9) Subsequ en tly , pa rtici pa nts w er e as ked w hic h of the fo llowing answ er op tions best c ha

racterized their vie

w s: - It is oka y to hit peo ple just because yo u fee l lik e it, so Jo hn is rig ht and Fr ed is wr ong. - It is no t o ka y to hit peo ple just because yo u fee l lik e it, so Fr ed is rig ht and J ohn is wr ong. - Ther e is no fact of the mat ter abo ut unquali fied claims lik e “It ’s oka y to hit peo ple just because yo u fee l lik e it. ” Di ffer en t cultur es be lie ve di ffer -en t things , a nd it is no t abso lute ly tru e or false that it’s oka y to hit peo ple just because y ou f ee l lik e it. (Nic ho ls , 2004, p . 9-10) Nic ho ls assumes that se lecting the fir st or second answ er op tion re flects a commitmen t to mor al objecti vism. This is because se lecting the fir st or sec -In m y discussion of psy cho logical rese arc h on fo lk metaethics in the next sec -tion I will use these thr ee criteria to ev al uate the evidence for or ag ainst FM O. W e ha ve , then, the f ollowing cor e criteria f or FM O: Inde pendenc e: P eo ple be lie ve that mor al sen tences are tru e or false in -de penden tly of a ny one’ s subjecti ve r eactions or at titu des Ex clu sion: P eo ple be lie ve that onl y one pa rty in a mor al disa gr eemen t ca n be corr ect U nif ormit y: Inde pendence a nd Ex clusion ho ld f or all mor al be lie fs Inde pendence and Ex clusion are bo th necessa ry for FM O. The y are reject -ed by peo ple w ho are mor al subjecti vists (mor al sen tences are tru e or false in vir tu e of the existence of subjecti ve facts ), by nihilists and err or theorists (ther e are no tru e mor al sen tences ), a nd by non-cogniti vists (mor al sen tences are neither tru e nor false 1 ). In lig ht of the fact that it is con tested w hether or no t a vio lation of U nif ormity is a vio lation of FM O, I will ev al uate U nif ormity in lig ht of em pirical rese arc h, but le av e it to m y re ader to decide on its im -por ta nce . 2. P sy cho logic al R ese ar ch on F olk M etaethics In m y ev al uation of FM O on the basis of Inde pendence , Ex clusion, and U ni -formity , I will tak e speci fic em pirical stu dies as poin t of de pa rtur e. I will sta rt with discussing rese arc h by Nic ho ls (2004) , w hic h is the fir st em pirical stu dy that ex plicitl y tak es FM O as poin t of de pa rtur e. Subsequ en tly , I will discuss the results of rese arc h using truth-a ptness and disa gr eemen t tas ks , w hic h ha ve been de ve lo ped by Good win and Da rle y (2008, 2012) and ha ve become sta nd ard tests in this fie ld of rese arc h. Finall y, I will discuss rese arc h by Pö l-zler and W rig ht (un pub lis hed) w ho used truth-a ptness and disa gr eemen t tas ks but also in tr od uced additional me asur emen t instrumen ts to me asur e 1 Some non-cogniti vists endor

se minimalist theories of truth. Minimalism does allow

non-cogniti vists to sa y that mor al c laims a re truth-a pt.

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13

14

CHAP

TER 1

OLK MOR

AL OB

JEC

TIVISM?

OLK MOR AL OB JEC TIVISM? CHAP TER 1 w e will need to ev al uate a ra ng e of di ffer en t stu dies and in vestig ate it fr om di ffer en t a ng les . M or eov er , the me asur emen t instrumen t used by Nic ho ls mig ht be fla w ed in that pa rtici pa nts in terpr et it in a w ay that has no be aring on FM O. For in -sta nce , it is no t en tir ely cle ar w hether or no t peo ple’ s res ponses to the fir st and second answ er op tion me asur e w hat is re le va nt for FM O (i. e. na me ly w hether or no t the y be lie ve ther e are objecti ve ly tru e or false mor al ju dg -men ts ) or inste ad mer ely re flects peo ple’ s normati ve vie w s (i. e. w hether or no t it is oka y to hit someone because yo u fee l lik e it) . I f it is the lat ter , the res ponses of pa rtici pa nts pr ovide no e vidence f or or a gainst FM O. Also , the mor al ex am ple that Nic ho ls (2004) uses as in put for the scena rio is fair ly extr aor dina ry. I conjectur e that peo ple will ra re ly, if ev er , consider mor al cases that concern the issu e of w hether or no t it is oka y to hit someone because the y fee l lik e it. The extr aor dina riness of this case ma y ind uce peo -ple to pr ovide a res ponse that does no t r efl ect how the y or dina ril y res pond to mor al disa gr eemen ts . Of co ur se , one co uld also argu e that su ch bor der line cases are es peciall y re le va nt for ev al uating FM O. Indeed, philoso pher s oft en use quite radical ex am ples to test their in tuitions . In fact, the scena rio used by Nic ho ls (2004) con tains dir ect and sense less ha rm, w hic h mak es it sur -prising that some peo ple do no t ex pr ess their disa ppr ov al. Consequ en tly , w e need to ev al uate additional rese arc h findings on fo lk metaethics be for e w e ca n come to a conc lusi ve assessmen t of w hether or no t FM O is tru e. 2.2. A no ve l e xp erimen tal met hod olo gy: t rut h-apt ne ss & disagr eemen t In this section I will sta rt by discussing rese arc h by Good win and Da rle y (2008) . Good win and Da rle y w er e the fir st to administer a truth-a ptness and disa gr eemen t tas k, w hic h prima facie seem to me asur e Inde pendence and Ex -clusion. For the truth-a ptness tas k, pa rtici pa nts w er e pr esen ted with a ra ng e of statemen ts fr om eac h of the domains and the y w er e then as ked w hether those statemen ts are tru e or false or w hether the y are opinions or at titu des inste ad. The op tions “T ru e” and “F alse” are me an t to me asur e Inde pendence ond answ er op tion im plies that ther e is a corr ect res ponse to the mor al disa -gr eemen t. M or eov er , Nic ho ls pr esumab ly assumes that peo ple w ho se lect the fir st or second answ er op tion den y the thir d answ er op tion. The thir d answ er op tion con tains the ide a that ther e are no abso lute facts that ca n arbitr ate mor al disa gr eemen ts , w hic h is a rejection of bo th Inde pendence (because ther e are no objecti ve ly tru e or false mor al sen tences ) and Ex clusion (be -cause bo th pa rties ca n be corr ect) 2 . If Nic ho ls’ in terpr etation of the res pons -es of his pa rtici pa nts is corr ect, the fir st and second answ er op tion me asur es Inde pendence a nd Ex clusion a nd the thir d a nsw er denies bo th. The results of his fir st stu dy show that 17 out of 40 pa rtici pa nts res pond that ther e is no fact of the mat ter abo ut hit ting someone because yo u fee l lik e it. 3 In a second stu dy , 9 out of 40 pa rtici pa nts res ponded that ther e is no fact of the mat ter abo ut the mor al statemen t in vo lving hit ting peo ple because yo u fee l lik e it. In a di ffer en t stu dy , Nic ho ls used a scena rio in vo lving aliens fr om a di ffer en t p lanet w ho be lie ve that it is ok to tor tur e pu ppies for the fun of it. In this case , 15 out of 40 pa rtici pa nts res ponded that ther e is no fact of the mat ter abo ut the statemen ts in vo lving tor turing pu ppies for fun. Consequ en t-ly, bet w een 23% and 43% of pa rtici pa nts in Nic ho ls’ rese arc h res pond in w ay s that are in tension with Inde pendence and Ex clusion, and bet w een 57% and 77% r es pond in accor da nce with bo th criteria. Consequ en tly , some peo ple seem to be lie ve that ther e are no objecti ve mor al facts that ca n arbitr ate mor al disa gr eemen ts and other s seem to be -lie ve ther e are . If FM O is tru e, it is surprising to find that a sizab le minority of peo ple res ponds that ther e are no objecti ve mor al facts . A t the sa me time , it is also tru e that a majority of peo ple does res pond in a w ay that corr es ponds to FM O. Of co ur se , w e sho uld no t base our assessmen t of FM O onl y on the rese arc h by Nic ho ls (2004) . In or der to assess an em pirical thesis lik e FM O, 2 I assume her e that non-p hiloso pher s in terpr et the term ‘ abso lute ly ’ in Nic ho ls’ stu dy as being ro ug hl y simil

ar to how I use the term ‘

objecti ve ly ’ in this pa per . 3 Nic ho

ls also tested how pa

rtici

pa

nts r

es

pond to factual statemen

ts (i. e. w hether the e ar th is flat) a nd ex clu ded pa rtici pa nts w ho be lie ve that ther

e is no fact of the mat

ter abo ut su ch statemen ts . S triking ly, r es pecti ve ly 3, 6, a nd 12 pa rtici pa nts f or the fir st thr ee stu dies res

ponded that ther

e is no fact of the mat

ter abo ut the flat-ea rth scena rio .

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15

16

CHAP

TER 1

OLK MOR

AL OB

JEC

TIVISM?

OLK MOR AL OB JEC TIVISM? CHAP TER 1 At fir st sig ht, this seems to be a str aig htf or w ard me asur e of Ex clusion and ther efor e of FM O. I will con tin ue m y ev al uation as if this is indeed the case , but I will r aise do ub ts abo ut this assum ption be low . Good win and Da rle y use a com posite scor e of bo th the truth-a ptness and disa gr eemen t tas k in their pr esen tation of results . The com posite scor e has thr ee di ffer en t categ ories: Full y objecti ve , in termediate ly objecti ve , a nd le ast objecti ve . If pa rtici pa nts per cei ved a mor al statemen t to be tru e or false and reg arded that at most one per son ca n be corr ect in a mor al disa gr eemen t, this w as labe lled as full y objecti ve and ap plies to 50% of the cases . If pa rtici pa nts rated a mor al statemen t as tru e or false or reg arded that at most one per son ca n be corr ect in a disa gr eemen t abo ut the statemen t, this w as labe lled as in termediate ly objecti ve , w hic h ap plies to 28% of the cases . I f pa rtici pa nts denied that a mor al statemen t ca n be tru e or false and the y allow ed for the possibilities that bo th pa rties ca n be corr ect, this w as labe lled as the le ast objecti ve r es ponse , w hic h a pp

lies to 11% of the cases

.4 What do Good win and Da rle y’s results im ply for FM O? It seems that peo -ple do no t consisten tly tr eat mor al statemen ts in a w ay that corr es ponds to In -de pendence or mor al disa gr eemen ts in a w ay that corr es ponds to Ex clusion. H ence , w e obser ve that peo ple do no t tr eat mor al statemen ts in w ay s that corr es pond to these criteria. M or eov er , w e obser ve that ther e are lar ge indi -vid ual di ffer ences and that peo ple’ s r es ponses str ong ly di ffer based on mor al con ten t. Ther e are no indi vid uals w ho consisten tly tr eat mor al statemen ts in a w ay that corr es ponds to Inde pendence and Ex clusion. Ther e are also no mor al statemen ts that are consisten tly tr eated in a w ay that corr es ponds to bo th criteria. What w e obser ve inste ad is that peo ple tr eat some mor al be lie fs as tru e or false in accor da nce with Inde pendence and Ex clusion but no t the w ho le set of mor al be lie fs . H ence , U nif ormity does no t a pp ly to how peo ple tr eat mor al statemen ts . The signi fica nce of this obser vation for FM O de pends on w hether yo u be lie ve that the unif ormity assum ption is tru e or false . If yo u be lie ve that the unif ormity assum ption is tru e then these findings ap pe ar to 4 In a no

ther 11% of the cases pa

rtici pa nts se lected the a nsw er o ption “Other

”in the case of a

mor al disa gr eemen t, a nd those r es ponses co uld ther efor e no t be categ orized. w hile the op tion “o pinions or at titu des” are in terpr eted as a rejection of Inde -pendence . F or now , I will assume that this is corr ect. H ow ev er , be low I will

return to this issu

e. The results on the truth-a ptness me asur e show that, on av er ag e, the six cases re pr esen ting factual statemen ts are eac h ov er w he lming ly rated as tru e or false (>90%) . This is w hat w e w ould ex pect fr om a domain that is cha rac -teristicall y objecti ve (i. e. the domain of scien tifi c facts ). This is no t w hat w e obser ve for the mor al cases . The nine di ffer en t mor al cases w er e on av er ag e rated onl y in 38% of the cases as tru e or false . S triking ly, this is almost simil ar to how pa rtici pa nts tr eat con ven tional mat ter s (45%) . U nsurprising ly, mat -ter s of taste w er e no t at all per cei ved as tru e or false (7%) . M ost striking ly, peo ple’ s scor es on the truth-a ptness me asur e va ry str ong -ly on the basis of the con ten t of the mor al statemen t at issu e. For ex am ple , statemen ts abo ut ra ndoml y shoo ting other peo ple on the str eet or abo ut che ating on an ex am are res pecti ve ly ju dg ed in 68% and 54% of the cases as tru e or false . S tatemen ts in vo lving donating to cha rity (36%) , assisting in the de ath of a terminall y ill friend (8%) , perf orming stem ce ll rese arc h (2%) , a nd abor tion (2%) , a re no t at all ju dg ed as tru e or false but are per cei ved as opin -ion or at titu des inste ad. In the second phase of the ex perimen t pa rtici pa nts w er e requ ested to re -spond to mor al disa gr eemen ts . Pa rtici pa nts w er e pr esen ted with tw o state -men ts the y str ong ly agr eed or disa gr eed with in the truth-a ptness tas k. The y w er e then to ld that someone else in the stu dy disa gr eed str ong ly with them abo ut the con ten t of the statemen t. Subsequ en tly , pa rtici pa nts w er e as ked to choose fr om the f ollowing o ptions: (1) The o ther per son is sur ely mistak en (2) I t is possib le that neither y ou nor the o ther per son is mistak en (3) I t co uld be that y ou a re mistak en, a nd the o ther per son is corr ect (4) Other

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18

CHAP

TER 1

OLK MOR

AL OB

JEC

TIVISM?

OLK MOR AL OB JEC TIVISM? CHAP TER 1 m ay in tro du ce a co nfo un de r v ari ab le (se e a lso P ölz ler , 2 01 8). It m ay in du ce pa rti cip an ts to in ter pr et th is qu es tio n a s b ein g a bo ut ho w ce rta in th ey fe el ab ou t th eir re sp on se s. M or eo ve r, i n t he d isa gre em en t ta sk u se d b y G oo dw in an d D ar ley (2 00 8), th e b ac kg ro un ds o f th e p ar tie s in vo lve d i n t he m or al dis -ag re em en t a re rou gh ly p re se nte d a s b ein g s im ila r to th at o f th e p ar tic ip an ts.5 H ow ev er, th is m ea ns th at w e c an no t a sse ss w he th er o r n ot pa rti cip an ts j ud ge in ac co rd an ce w ith E xc lu sio n b ec au se th ey ar e m or al o bje cti vis ts o r fo r s om e oth er re as on . In de ed , a cu ltu ra l re lat ivi st c an re sp on d t ha t a t m os t o ne p ar ty i s co rre ct b ec au se th ey as su m e t ha t th e p ar tie s in vo lve d s ha re th eir ow n c ult ur al ba ck gro un d ( Sa rk iss ian et al. 20 12 ). M or eo ve r, P ölz ler (2 01 8) n oti ce s th at t his me asur e also fails to acco un t of the possibility that peo ple mig ht be non-cog -nit ivi sts , w hic h m ea ns th at t he y b eli ev e t ha t m or al j ud gm en ts a re ex pr es sio ns of em oti on s o r s en tim en ts. N on -co gn itiv ist s d o n ot th in k t ha t it is p os sib le t o be corr ect or to be mistak en in a mor al disa gr eemen t6 . C on se qu en tly , th ere is n o a ns w er o pti on th at th ey ca n s ele ct. In lig ht of th es e c on sid era tio ns , th e dis ag re em en t ta sk as u se d b y G oo dw in an d D arl ey (2 00 8) d oe s n ot s tric tly m ea su re E xc lu sio n a nd p ro vid es n o e vid en ce fo r o r a ga in st F M O. 2.3 A di ffer en t e xp erimen tal d esign t o o bt ain hig h c on st ru ct v alidity In w hat fo llow s, I will discuss rese arc h by Pö lzler and W rig ht. The y tak e sig -ni fica nt methodo logical ste ps to ensur e that rese arc h on fo lk metaethics is hig h in constru ct validity and av oids the pr ob lems inher en t in me asur emen t instrumen ts used in pr evio us rese arc h. H ow ev er , I will argu e that on closer ins pection, di ffer en t pr ob lems emer ge . As I in terpr et Pö lzler and W rig ht, tw o assum ptions under lie their basic ap pr oac h. Fir st, in or der to av oid misunder sta nding or di ffer en t in terpr eta -tions of metaethical conce pts , P ölzler and W rig ht mak e the thesis of FM O as ex plicit as possib le . Secondl y, Pö lzler and W rig ht mak e the answ er op tions , 5

Participants are informed that another participant of the study disagrees with them about the content of

a moral statement. It is likely that participants therefore assume that this participant is roughly similar

to them. 6 W ith the ex ce ption of quasi-r ealists w ho do allow this (B lac kb urn, 1984, 1993) .

show that peo

ple vio late U nif ormity a nd that FM O is false . I f y ou be lie ve that the unif ormity assum ption is false , it is possib le to in terpr et these findings as su ppor t for FM O. That is , peo ple ap pe ar to tr eat some mor al statemen ts in accor da nce with Inde pendence and Ex clusion and per ha ps that is su ffi cien t for FM O to be tru e. H ow ev er , does the truth-a ptness tas k gen uine ly me asur e Inde pendence and does the disa gr eemen t tas k me asur e Ex clusion? As I wr ote abov e, the truth-a ptness me asur e seems prima facie to per tain to Inde pendence . Y et, this becomes less ap pa ren t on a closer ex amination. For the truth-a ptness tas k to me asur e Inde pendence , for insta nce , pa rtici pa nts sho uld in terpr et eac h of the answ er op tions as I described them abov e, na me ly “T ru e” and “F alse” as objecti ve ly tru e or false and “o pinion or at titu de” as re pr esen ting su bjecti ve o pinions or at titu des . H ow ev er, th es e a ns w er op tio ns ar e a m big uo us . F or ex am ple , th e f ac t th at a m or al sta tem en t is tr ea ted as “T ru e” or “F als e” do es n ot m ea n t ha t p eo ple be lie ve th at th e s tat em en t is o bje cti ve ly tru e o r f als e. It is als o p os sib le th at the y be lie ve that it is subjecti ve ly tru e or false . M or eov er , pa rtici pa nts w ho se -lect the op tion “F alse” ma y do so because the y be lie ve ther e are no tru e mor -al sta tem en ts (se e a lso P ölz ler , 2 01 8). F in all y, t he fa ct th at pa rtic ip an ts se lec t th e o pti on “o pin io n o r a ttit ud e” do es n ot ne ce ssa rily p ro vid e e vid en ce ag ain st FM O. I nd ee d, b oth op in io ns an d t he co nte nt o f a ttit ud es ca n b e o bje cti ve ly t ru e or fa lse . T ha t is , s om eo ne m ay b eli ev e t ha t th e s tat em en t ‘a bo rtio n i s m or all y w ro ng ’ is an op in io n a nd ye t o bje cti ve ly t ru e (o r fa lse ). T he re as on , fo r in sta nc e, w hy th is p ers on n ev er th ele ss do es n ot se lec t “ Tr ue ” o r “ Fa lse ” is b ec au se s/h e is ca re ful abo ut ex pr essing his or her mor al vie w s to other s. Consequ en tly , re -se arc h t ha t u se d t his p ar tic ula r fo rm ula tio n o f th e t ru th -ap tn es s m ea su re m ay ha ve in ad ve rte ntl y in tro du ce d am big uit y (G oo dw in & D arl ey, 2 00 8; W rig ht, Gr andje an & M cWhite 2013; W rig ht, M cWhite & Gr andje an, 2014) . It i s a lso u nc lea r w he th er o r n ot th e d isa gre em en t ta sk d ire ctl y p er tai ns to Ex clusion. The re ason is that the use of the term “sur ely ” in the fir st an -sw er o pti on a nd th e p hr as e “ It co uld b e t ha t… ” i n th e t hir d a ns w er o pti on

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19

20

CHAP

TER 1

OLK MOR

AL OB

JEC

TIVISM?

OLK MOR AL OB JEC TIVISM? CHAP TER 1 res ponses as fa voring mor al objecti vism w hile peo ple ma y actuall y be mor al subjecti vists . That is , peo ple w ho are cultur al re lati vists , a nd reject FM O, ma y ap pe ar to res pond in accor da nce with Ex clusion, and hence seem to su ppor t FM O, in cases w her e the pa rties to the disa gr eemen t be long to the sa me cul -tur e as the y do . Str ik in gly , 9 2% of p ar tic ip an ts d en y t ha t a t m os t o ne p ar ty c an b e c or re ct. H en ce , th e v as t m ajo rit y o f p eo ple re jec t E xc lu sio n. G ive n t ha t th is i s a d ire ct me asur e of Ex clusion and one that ex clu des the possibility that peo ple are m or al s ub jec tiv ist s, t his re su lt a pp ea rs t o p ro vid e d ire ct e vid en ce ag ain st F M O. For the concr ete disa gr eemen t me asur e, pa rtici pa nts w er e as ked to con -sider eac h statemen t that the y classi fied as mor al and to then ev al uate a disa -gr eemen t bet w een tw o peo ple fr om the sa me cultur e. Those w ho res ponded in accor da nce with Ex clusion then res ponded to a fo llow -u p qu estion. For this tas k, w e simil arl y obser ve that on av er ag e 92% of pa rtici pa nts res pond in a w ay that fits with Ex clusion and this ther efor e also ap pe ars to pr ovide evidence a gainst FM O. What abo ut the results on thr ee additional abstr act tas ks that the author s administer ed? Do the y simil arl y pr ovide evidence ag ainst FM O? For an ab -str act theor y tas k, pa rtici pa nts re ad a descri ption of the thr ee main qu estions that determine one’ s position in the mor al re alism/ an ti-r ealism de bate , na me -ly “Do mor al sen tences in tend to state mor al facts?” , “ If yes , do these facts exist?” , “And if yes , a re the y inde penden t fr om w hat an ybod y think s abo ut them?” For the answ er op tions , pa rtici pa nts w er e pr ovided with a ra ng e of descri ptions of di ffer en t metaethical theories su ch as re alism, di vine com -ma nd theor y, cultur al re lati vism, indi vid ual subjecti vism, err or theor y, and non-cogniti vism. The rationale be hind using these tas ks , as described abov e, seems to be based on the assum ption that the constru ct validity of rese arc h is im pr ov ed if pa rtici pa nts res pond to qu estions that con tain as maximall y accur ate descri ptions of mor al o bjecti vism. and the di ffer en t types of rejections of FM O, as ex plicit as possib le . W ith this aim in mind, Pö lzler and W rig ht decided to pa rtl y re plicate pr evio us re -se arc h, na me ly by administering bo th abstr act and concr ete truth-a ptness and disa gr eemen t tas ks but in su ch a w ay that issu es of constru ct validity are av oided. M or eov er , the y de ve lo p thr ee additional me asur emen t instrumen ts , na me ly an abstr act theor y tas k, meta phor tas k, and com pa rison tas k. This w as done to ca ptur e peo ple’ s metaethical in tuitions mor e com pr ehensi ve ly tha n pr evio us r ese arc h has done . For the abstr act truth-a ptness tas k, pa rtici pa nts re ad a descri ption of w hat mak es sen tences truth-a pt and no t truth-a pt. The y w er e subsequ en tly as ked w hether truth-a ptness ap plies to mor al statemen ts or no t. 73% of pa r-tici pa nts indicated that statemen ts are truth-a pt. For the concr ete truth-a pt-ness tas k, pa rtici pa nts ju dg ed di ffer en t mor al statemen ts and the y w er e then as ked to ju dg e for eac h of those statemen ts if those statemen ts are truth-a pt or no t. On av er ag e, in 76% of the cases pa rtici pa nts ju dg ed those sen tences to be truth-a pt. Consequ en tly , peo ple are lar ge ly inc lined to be lie ve that mor al statemen ts are truth-a pt. Gi ven that truth-a ptness does no t dir ectl y per tain to Inde pendence , this does no t pr ovide evidence in fa vor FM O. H ow ev er , truth-a ptness is a pr econdition for mor al objecti vism and the results her e at le ast su gg est that peo ple , w ho ha ve been elabor ate ly inf ormed abo ut w hat truth-a ptness en tails , r es pond that the y be lie ve that mor al sen tences are tru e or false . Fo r t he a bs tra ct dis ag re em en t m ea su re , p ar tic ip an ts re ad a d es cri pti on of a d isa gre em en t b etw ee n m em be rs of th e s am e c ult ur e. Th ey w ere th en pr es en ted w ith d iff ere nt in ter pr eta tio ns o f th at dis ag re em en t e ac h o f w hic h co rre sp on ds to d iff ere nt m eta eth ica l v iew s. O ne in ter pr eta tio n, fo r in sta nc e, is that one of the pa rties is rig ht and the other per son is wr ong, w hic h is a de -sc rip tio n o f w ha t E xc lu sio n e nta ils . P ar tic ip an ts w ho p ro vid ed a r es po ns e t ha t on e o f th e p ar tie s is co rre ct a nd th e o th er p ers on is w ro ng w ere su bs eq ue ntl y pr es en ted w ith a m or al d isa gre em en t b etw ee n p ar tie s f ro m d iff ere nt cu ltu re s (a lso se e S ark iss ian et al. 20 12 ). T his is to av oid th e p ro ble m of m isin ter pr eti ng

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22

CHAP

TER 1

OLK MOR

AL OB

JEC

TIVISM?

OLK MOR AL OB JEC TIVISM? CHAP TER 1 By using this descri ption, this tas k onl y me asur es Inde pendence insofa r pa r-tici pa nts be lie ve that mor al facts are lik e scien tifi c facts . That is , someone w ho be lie ves that mor al sen tences ca n be tru e or false in an objecti ve w ay but does no t be lie ve that the y are a mat ter of em pirical discov er y ma y no t se lect this op tion. If so , it is no t c le ar w hether this tas k me asur es FM O. For the meta phor tas k, onl y 13% of pa rtici pa nts se lected the meta phor that fits with mor al re alism. This seems to be a str ong rejection of mor al objecti vism but it de pends on w hether peo ple be lie ve mor al facts a re lik e scien tifi c facts . Finall y, pa rtici pa nts res ponded to an abstr act com pa rison tas k. In this tas k, pa rtici pa nts re ad di ffer en t descri ptions of mor ality in com pa rison to other domains . W ith reg ard to mor ality , the com pa rison w as made with sci -ence or mathematics and ag ain a re fer ence w as made to discov ering mor al facts . As with the pr evio us me asur e, neg ati ve answ er s do no t ha ve to en tail that FM O is false . This de pends on w hether peo ple be lie ve that mor al truth ca n be discov er ed lik e scien tifi c truth. The results show that 10% of pa rtici -pa nts se lect the a nsw er o

ption that corr

es ponds to mor al r ealism. In shor t, at the sta rt of this section I r ema rk ed that the next logical ste p for rese arc h in to fo lk metaethics w as to constru ct stu dies with hig h constru ct validity . P ölzler and W rig ht aimed at ha ving me asur emen t instrumen ts with hig h constru ct validity . Their ap pr oac h w as to av oid pr ob lems inher en t to pr evio us rese arc h and to be theor eticall y ex plicit abo ut FM O and the di ffer en t metaethical vie w s that r eject FM O. What does this elabor ate in vestig ation te ll us abo ut FM O? Fir st, the results su gg est that most peo ple be lie ve that mor al sen tences are truth-a pt. This does no t me an that peo ple su ppor t Inde pendence , because the y ca n be lie ve mor al sen tences are subjecti ve ly tru e. Second, peo ple ov er w he lming ly reject Ex clu -sion bo th in the concr ete and in the abstr act disa gr eemen t tas k. This ap pe ars to be str ong evidence ag ainst FM O. Thir d, w hen as ked to ev al uate di ffer en t descri ptions of mor ality (i. e. the Theor y tas k), onl y 20% of pa rtici pa nts se lect an op tion that corr es ponds to FM O. This also ap pe ars to pr ovide str ong evi -dence a gainst FM O. For ex am ple , the descri ption of mor al r ealism w as as f ollow s, W he n a p ers on sa ys th at s om eth in g is m or all y r igh t o r w ro ng , g oo d o r b ad , etc. she in tends to state a fact. Su ch facts exist – and the y are inde pen -de nt fro m w ha t a ny bo dy th in ks ab ou t th em . F or ex am ple , a n a cti on th at is m or all y w ro ng is w ro ng n o m att er w ha t a ny on e t hin ks . S o i t w ou ld sti ll be wr ong ev en if yo u yo ur se lf, or the majority of the member s of yo ur cul -tur e, tho ug ht that it is no t mor all y wr ong. (P ölzler & W rig ht, un pub lis hed) The results show , striking ly, that onl y 20% of pa rtici pa nts se lect this op tion. The vast majority , 80% of pa rtici pa nts , se lect an op tion that con flicts with Inde pendence . Consequ en tly , the results on the theor y tas k also ap pe ar to pr ovide e vidence a gainst FM O. What abo ut the results on a meta phor tas k? Pa rtici pa nts w er e as ked to se lect fr om a va riety of meta phor s describing di ffer en t metaethical vie w s. The y fir st r ead the f ollowing descri ption: This tas k is abo ut mor al facts . M or al facts are facts abo ut w hat is mor all y rig ht or wr ong, good or bad, vir tu ous or vicio us , a nd so on. For ex am -ple , it co uld be a mor al fact that it is (or is no t) wr ong to br eak pr omises , or that the U S has (or does no t ha ve ) a duty to red uce their gr eenho use gas emissions . Be low mor al facts are ex plained in terms of se ver al meta -phor s. Whic h of these meta phor s seem most ap pr opriate to yo u. (P ölzler & W rig ht, un pub lis hed) The descri ption f or mor al o bjecti vism is: “M or al facts are “discov er ed ”. The y ca n be discov er ed in the sa me w ay in w hic h w e discov er other facts abo ut the objecti ve w or ld ”. (P ölzler & W rig ht, un pub lis hed)