The battle for Ukraine : ethnic conflict, weak institutions and outside involvement : what are the factors that instigated the current civil war in Ukraine?

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MSc Political Science – Selective Master’s Programme International Relations

The Battle for Ukraine: Ethnic

Conflict, Weak Institutions and

Outside Involvement

What are the factors that instigated the current civil war in

Ukraine?

Supervisor: Dr. Lee J. M. Seymour Name: Stefan Cosmin Vacean Second reader: Mw. Dr. Julia Bader Student ID: 10601902

Date: 26th of June 2015 Master’s Thesis

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ABSTRACT

The Ukrainian civil war broke out in 2014. Crimea was annexed by the Russian Federation and fights in Eastern Ukraine between ethnic Russian militias and Ukrainian forces emerged. In order to understand the causes of the conflict, it is important to focus on three key aspects: ethnic conflict, state’s institutions and the role of outside powers. How these interact with each other and the way these significantly contributed to the onset of the Ukrainian civil war will be analysed throughout this research. Thus, ethnic conflict, Ukraine’s weak institutions and outside involvement by external powers are three key elements that require an attention to understand the roots of the Ukrainian crisis. The former Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych, instituted an authoritarian regime after he was elected in 2010. The decision that sparked the conflict, initially centred in Kiev, was Yanukovych’s inclination towards Russia by signing the $25 billion offer of assistance. Previously he refused to sign the Vilnius agreement, which distanced Ukraine more from the European Union, a decision that greatly displeased the ethnic Ukrainian population. Moreover, besides this decision, Yanukovych’s affiliation to the Russian minority significantly weighted to a further exacerbation of the ethnic conflict in Ukraine, a nation with a Ukrainian ethnic majority which comprises almost 77.8% of the total population of 44.3 million people (Index Mundi). Following this, outside powers involvement could be seen immediately. On the one hand, Russia sent troops and weapons in Crimea, but also in eastern Ukraine for the separatists, and on the other hand, NATO responded by relocating some of its troops from Europe more closer to the Ukrainian border. The empirical findings show both how these three factors interacted with each other and how the current civil war in Ukraine was possible to emerge.

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Introduction

The Ukrainian civil war is a disruption to the international system and a tragedy for the citizens that live within the country. Additionally, this crisis brought an economic slowdown throughout much of the region and, in particular, a considerable decline of the Russian economy, mainly due to all economic sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation by the United States (ECFR 2014). As a consequence, this nation needs a new thinking of how to reform its political system and innovative solutions in order to redress the country’s well-being. For a future stability, three key problems must be addressed: ethnic conflict, the level of development of the Ukrainian institutions and the role of external involvement. After his election in 2010, Viktor Yanukovych centred the Ukrainian political power in the hands of a small elite (Haran & Prokopchuk 2010, p. 5). The Ukrainian society was already sitting on an “ethnic” powder keg. The election of Yanukovych meant a Russian minority ruling over a Ukrainian majority. His 4-year reign caused further dissensions between these two ethnic groups, since the Ukrainian majority was ruled by a member from the smaller Russian minority. Yanukovych’s authoritarian leadership style and his affiliation to a minority group became a lethal combination. Besides Ukrainians and Russians, there are other smaller ethnic groups that were part of this incandescent equation such as the Tatar Muslims with origins and rights in Crimea. The international community acted in two ways. On the one hand, Russia deepened the crisis, and eventually causing a new one, by supporting the insurgents in Crimea. Moreover, using the military-strategic advantage offered by its naval base in Sevastopol, Russia highly influenced the outcome of the referendum that eventually led to the de facto separation of Crimea from Ukraine. Furthermore, once the separation had been made, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, sent Russian troops on the eastern border of Ukraine to support the newly declared Republics of Luhansk and Donetsk. On the other hand, the West gave its support to preserve Ukrainian sovereignty and, at the same time, NATO secured its eastern border by repositioning its troops in the Baltic States and Poland. Considering what was said before, it is of crucial importance to explore and analyse the above-mentioned key themes regarding ethnic conflict, institutions and external involvement in order to understand how complex the Ukrainian crisis is and what may be the potential solutions of this problem. Thus, the research question of this thesis is:

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In order to answer the research question, a fierce discussion on the debate on civil/interstate was is generated. This dispute is mainly based on the aspect of Russian fighters participating in the conflict. Even if at the onset of the conflict and the period that immediately followed, to draw well-supported inferences regarding a possible interstate war between Ukraine and Russia was tricky, once with the passing of time, the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine became clearer. At the beginning of the hostilities, there was no reliable data on a Russian intervention in Ukraine by the Russian military, save for bold statements and accusations from different politicians, army leaders or prominent individuals, disseminated by the media. According to Western media outlets, major newspapers or television channels1 from France, the U.K., the United States, and Germany send information that suggests Vladimir Putin had deployed Russian troops in Ukraine. On the other hand, the Russian President vehemently denies a military Russian intervention in Eastern Ukraine. He only confirms that Russian soldiers were sent to Crimea to protect the Russian majority there, but only after the annexation. But now, NATO released videos and images with the Russian troops in Ukraine (Herszenhorn 2014), even satellite images (NATO 2014) and their presence was neither confirmed or infirmed during the second round of negotiations that took place in Minsk (Crisis Group 2015). In this moment, there is not even a clear declaration of war against Russia coming from the Ukrainians. Nevertheless, when a sovereign state’s borders are breached by another state’s army, then an interstate war is possible. This thesis looks at the Ukrainian conflict as a civil war. How the Ukrainian conflict fits the parameters of a civil war will be further explained in Chapter 2.

Chapter 1: Literature review

This chapter will evaluate the contributions of existing research within the field of civil wars, with focus on social and ethnic conflicts, state’s institutions and third party intervention. Ethnicity, institutions and external involvement by outside powers are the main causes that lead to the onset of a civil war according to the current literature on civil wars. According to the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO 2008), 64% of all civil wars since 1946 were fought between different ethnic groups. Iraq, Lebanon, Uganda, Rwanda, Georgia, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Congo and Burundi are just a few examples that illustrate how ethnicity played an influential role in civil wars. Also, the level of institutional development and outside involvement may significantly increase the risk of a civil war in a certain country, especially in

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a country with a huge ethnic diversity. Illustrative historical examples where these two led to the onset of civil wars can be seen in Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Peru, Congo, Liberia, Algeria, Rwanda (Albornoz & Hauk 2011) or the two most recent cases of the Libyan and Syrian civil wars, where foreign involvement, besides the two authoritarian leaders, Muammar Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad, was a major factor for the start of the hostilities.

What the current literature lacks is to show how these three causes work together and what sort of interactions emerge from their dynamics. This paper focuses on these three key aspects because Ukraine seems to combine all these three theories and an explanation of this mixture will clarify the underlying nature of the Ukrainian civil war. The economic perspective as a major cause for the onset of a civil war, as Blattman and Miguel (Blattman & Miguel 2010) argue, will not be a point of focus in this research. Indeed, the current literature on civil wars places the economic factor as one of the most important causes at the onset of civil wars and, as Seymour and Cunningham argue, in Eastern Ukraine the conflict between Ukrainians and Russians has more economic factors than ethnic ones. Thus, the economic factor is not completely irrelevant in this context, because, undeniably, Ukraine is economically underdeveloped and the population aims for higher standards of living. The E.U. Association Agreement was an opportunity to economically evolve, among many other things, but the fact is that the ethnic factor was the dominant motif that stayed at the roots of the civil war. The focus of not concentrating the arguments on economic development and income inequality in this paper is also strengthened by the results of many surveys that took place around the Maidan protests, demonstrations that represented the beginning of the civil war. These show that people were more concerned to change the government, to come back to democracy, to distance from Russia and many other similar social and political issues, while the economic factor was not a top priority for the Ukrainians at that moment (Valdai 2014, p. 32). The ethnic factor is more relevant in this context than the economic one, because combined with Yanukovych’s authoritarian leadership style and the effects of outside involvement by external powers, the Ukrainian civil war and its underlying nature can be better understood. How are these theories interacting with each other and, as a result, how these dynamics create a hostile environment that eventually leads to the onset of a civil war? These questions are answered by reviewing the vast literature on civil wars’ causes. The first section of this literature review will look at research on social and ethnic conflict and their relationships with civil wars. Then, the role of institutions in the onset of civil wars will be examined, while the final section will look at the impact of third party interventions.

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7 1.1. Ethnicity and conflicts

There are two main reasons why 64% of all civil wars have been fought along ethnic lines, while 36% are non-ethnic conflicts. Firstly, societies are usually organized around on different lines, such as class, geography, ideology, religion and ethnicity. However, Blattman and Miguel claim that conflict usually breaks out between groups defined by ethnicity because, as Seymour and Cunningham (Seymour & Cunningham 2015) also suggest, ethnicity creates grievances, offers a great environment for mobilization and strengthens the bargaining process of the ethnic groups involved in the conflict. Secondly, ethnic civil wars do not appear to be caused by ethnicity per se, as Seymour and Cunningham argue. They claim that ethnic identities may not be the main cause of a civil war, because “the empirical findings are actually quite mixed” and even “civil wars viewed as “ethnic” or “religious” in character are fought in ways that complicate popular understandings or the role being played by such identities” (Seymour & Cunningham 2015, p. 45). So, an intrastate war is not guaranteed to break out by the simple presence of multiple ethnic groups. There may never be a conflicting situation that leads to civil war and violence is more probable to spark in multi-ethnic societies for reasons other than a group’s ethnicity. Sambanis argues that although conflicts can break down along ethnic lines, shared non-ethnic grievances appear to be an explanatory factor in ethnic and non-ethnic group rebellion (Sambanis 2001). If so, why do most civil wars divide along ethnic lines?

Self-determination movements may be a possible explanation for ethnic violence that will eventually lead to the outbreak of civil wars. How? By definition, these types of movements are ethnic in nature. As a result, ethnic clashes emerge. According to Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour (Cunningham, Bakke & Seymour 2012), groups involved in self-determination movements are more prone to resort to violence against the state, if competition increases from other ethnic groups (Cunningham, Bakke & Seymour 2012, p. 74). Smith (2000) claims that ethnic nationalism, which he defines as “the desire of an ethnic group to gain political independence from the state” (Smith 2000, p. 127) is usually what drives self-determination to emerge. This makes ethnicity an “inevitable feature of a conflict” (Smith 2000, p. 131). Moreover, Wucherpfennig et al. (2011) and Cederman et al. (2009) argue that people from ethnic minorities that live far from the capital, along remote international borders but in geographically concentrated areas, are ready to create their own state when the right conditions emerge (Denny & Walter 2014, p. 200). Ethnic exclusion and geographical location are

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therefore key drivers, according to Cederman and his colleagues. The Russians in Crimea is an illustrative example.

Another explanation why civil wars usually divide along ethnic lines is according to Collier and Hoeffler that people are more prone to rebel due to issues related to group identities or social difficulties that they had encountered throughout their lives (Collier & Hoeffler 2004). However, researchers have given alternative explanations as to why conflict breaks out within a country. Two political scientists whose opinions differ from those of Collier and Hoeffler and Laitin and Fearon, are Gurr (1993) and Reynal-Querol (2002). They focus their research on politics and how the political environment created the proper conditions for insurgencies. Gurr’s theoretical premise is that “protest and rebellion by communal groups are jointly motivated by deep-seated grievances about group status and by the situationally determined pursuit of political interests” (Gurr 1993, pp. 166-167). Gurr’s focus is on the study of ethnic minorities. He tries to explain what the reactions of ethnic minorities are when the state disadvantages or discriminates against them. His causal logic is that ethnic mobilization leads to collective violence because of ethnic grievances that emerge from loss of cultural identity and subsequent desire for political autonomy (Gurr 1993, pp. 175-176). Academics such Gates (2002) or Simpson and Macy (Simpson & Macy 2004) revealed that collective action may be generated by ethnic groups, one form of collective identity.

The previous helps illuminate the contextual role of ethnicity in the Ukrainian case. Historically speaking, two of the biggest multi-ethnic federations are the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia. Upon the break-up of these communist countries, ethnic conflicts have risen. In the past, the Soviet Union enacted centralist policies in order to keep ethnic conflicts in a frozen state. After its dissolution, there was no central authority to keep these conflicts at bay and “it is undeniable that the end of the Soviet regime released conflict potential” (Hughes & Sasse 2001, p. 2). Since then, many post-Soviet states have fought ethnic and regional wars with each other or within themselves as part of their nation and state-building processes (Hughes & Sasse, p. 2). It can be also argued that the post-communist transition process came with its disadvantages and weaknesses. A result of the break-up of the Soviet Union was the rise of Russian nationalism that led to resistance and violence in former Soviet Union territories, such as Moldova and Ukraine (Sadowski 1998). Ethridge and Handelman (Ethridge & Handelman 2004) argue that democracy and capitalism were seen as weak concepts by the newly created nations and note that people instead chose to embrace the more “fiery and edgy liberation nationalist ideologies” (Ethridge & Handelman 2004, pp. 526-527). In a multi-ethnic

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fractionalized society, the level of institutional development can potentially exacerbate tensions and lead to violence.

The previous section examined how ethnicity relates to civil war onsets and some of the ethnic problems Ukraine experienced in the past in order to shed light on its current political situation. To conclude, civil wars are not caused by ethnicity per se. It is important to look at other factors that combined with ethnic diversity may lead to ethnic grievances and eventually to the outbreak of a civil war. One example is that there are heavy institutional forces at play. The next section will therefore explore the literature that looks at the role of state’s institutions in civil wars.

1.2. The role of state’s institutions at the onset of civil wars

This section will now look at regime type and governmental institutions in particular within authoritarian states in order achieve a broader understanding as to how the society functions in such nations and why a civil war can occur. Ethnic violence is not a preordained outcome of ethnic diversity. The Netherlands and Belgium, for instance, are ethnically diverse countries, and there are substantial grievances in Belgium, but violence remains absent. A logical question, then, is to ask, what caused Ukraine to follow a different path, namely that of violence, and why did civil war break out when it did after more than two decades of relative ethnic peace? Since the presence of a hierarchical, centralized challenger party in Belgium made ethnic violence very unlikely (Daxecker 2009, p. 238), state institutions may be the answer to our question. Strong institutions do not allow ethnic grievances to emerge, whereas weak institutions create a convenient environment for ethnic grievances to emerge and further violence to occur. Before concluding that grievances emerge in the Ukrainian case, it is necessary to examine multi-ethnicity and the role of weak institutions during Yanukovych’s authoritarian regime.

Regime type and regime instability are common factors in civil war onset mentioned in the current literature. In general, the literature shows an interesting relationship between civil wars and the regimes in which they occur. When the political and governing system of a country malfunctions, political instability emerges, either toward democracy or toward autocracy or anocracy. This is commonly known as a sign and initiator of civil unrest. Political instability creates a fertile climate for civil conflict. Nevertheless, Hegre (2001) questions the relationship between political instability and conflict in anocratic regimes. They claim that

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democracies [or anocracies] are partly open yet somewhat repressive, a combination that invites protest, rebellion, and other forms of civil violence. Repression leads to grievances that induce groups to take action, and openness allows for them to organize and engage in activities against the regime” (Hegre 2001, p. 36). Fearon and Laitin (Fearon & Laitin 2003) define anocracies as “politically weak central governments” (Fearon & Laitin 2003, p. 75) with “weak local policing or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices” (Fearon & Laitin 2003, pp. 75-76) and also as regimes mixing “democratic with autocratic features” (Fearon & Laitin 2003, p. 81). They claim that the cause of conflict may be one other than instability.

Based on Theda Skocpol’s work (Skocpol 1979), many state-centric theories were developed and claimed that the risk of civil war is more prone in those nations that are governed by certain types of regimes in comparison with other nations governed by other types (Gures & Mason 2010, p. 142). For example, democracies are relatively immune to revolution. This form of government allows non-violent means of protest and leaders are subject to removal via the ballot box, which is far less risky and costly than fighting. Thus, civil wars are very unlikely to occur in such regimes. However, there is a limitation to this theory if we are to look at “new democracies”, defined as those countries founded in a transition process from authoritarianism to democracy, as Ukraine is. Mansfield and Snyder (Mansfield & Snyder 2002) find that the risk of war is higher in a country founded in a transition process than that of an autocratic regime transitioning to a partially democratic one. Moreover, they claim that the transition toward democracy is “significantly more likely to generate hostility than the transition toward autocracy” (Mansfield & Snyder 2002, p. 298). Hegre at al. argue that such nations “are susceptible to civil war, just as they are susceptible to authoritarian relapse” (Hegre 2001, p. 33). Such countries are called anocracies. Hegre et al. argue that anocracies or semi-democracies are more prone to experience civil wars than semi-democracies and authoritarian states (Hegre 2001, p. 33). In order to identify an anocracy, Polity scale is very useful. Countries that score in the middle, and according to Fearon and Laitin there are about 20%, are identified as anocracies. During Yanukovych, Ukraine was one of them.

Gleditsch and Ruggeri (Gleditsch & Ruggeri 2010) argue that “in case of irregular political leader changes within a state, a civil war onset is likely to appear” (Gleditsch & Ruggeri 2010, p. 308) The causal mechanism behind this entire argument is that leadership changes weaken the state and offer political opportunities, “where potential insurgents may mobilize and resort to violence” (Gleditsch & Ruggeri 2010, p. 308). For example, Ursula Daxecker argues that authoritarian leaders with relatively liberal initiatives may lose power if

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opposition movements have a strong organizational structure and are able to make credible commitments, commitments that shift the power from leader’s hands into a shared regime (Daxecker 2009, pp. 235-238). Gleditsch and Ruggeri conclude that “political opportunities, as measured by irregular leader changes, indeed appear to be associated with civil war onset” (Gleditsch & Ruggeri 2010, p. 308). Furthermore, leaders’ vulnerabilities to challenges limit the duration of a state leadership (Gleditsch & Ruggeri 2010, p. 308). Likewise, Fjelde and De Soysa (Fjelde & De Soysa 2009) appropriately state that “many use regime type to measure state capacity and find that semi-democratic regimes correlate with the highest risk of conflict, apparently because they combine inadequate capacity for repression with insufficient ability to accommodate opposition through institutionalized channels” (Fjelde & De Soysa 2009, p. 6).

Institutions develop over a long period of time. Ukraine has weak institutions due to a host of factors. Its history as a satellite state under Soviet rule factored in with the development of its economy before its institutions, which meant that there was no natural impetus at the grassroots-level for participatory government (Lawal & Oladunjoye 2010, p. 227). If it had liberalized its economy and legal system before its political institutions, people would have seen real economic growth and leaders would have understood the value of a fast-paced economy, which would have been a powerful force for natural democratization at a later stage.

1.3. Outside involvement

As well as ethnicity, a civil war is not caused solely by outside involvement, but it can exacerbate pre-existing tensions by aiding one side or another with weapons, organizational and military strategies, offering them an opportunity to start rebelling. This is what happens in Ukraine and, in addition to this, the already present ethnic grievances are internationalized by outside powers involvement. Third party’s actions can involve the state military, or the economy in the form of financial aid or sanctions. Third-party interventions have the potential to influence on two aspects of civil wars: duration and outcome (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joice 2008, p. 346). Beardsley (2011), Collier at al. or Kathman (2011) focus their analyses on the motivations or incentives that lead third parties to intervene in neighbouring countries affected by civil wars. Kathman argues that “relationships outside the civil war state – intervener dyad [provide the incentives to intervene] are causally associated with intervention” (Kathman 2011, p. 847). By looking at the war between Greece and Turkey from 1946 and the United States intervention, Kathman argues that sometimes a third party may intervene not

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because of the civil war, but for other reasons such as the American interest in the Balkans’ region’s stability. The dyadic connection, as Kathman suggests, between a third party and the features – economic, political, cultural and social – of the state involved in a civil war, is very relevant due to political reasons. It has an important role at decision-making level in deciding whether to intervene or not in a certain civil war state. A huge factor in this decision-making process is played by the geopolitical situation of that moment.

Collier at al. (Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom 2004) focused their research on the effects of such interventions, military or economic, in neighbouring countries. Support can be given to any party involved in the conflict – the government or the rebels. While military or economic support is most frequent, actual interventions from third parties are rarely seen. The external support is seen as a very influential factor at the onset of the civil war and a very significant one even during the conflict. External state interventions usually support one side or the other, or try to establish the proper conditions for negotiations between the belligerent parties. However, as Cunningham claims, external states have their own agenda that may lead to other scenarios and difficulties regarding civil war conflicts. The current literature on third-party intervention in civil wars describes intervention “as military and / or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces” (Kathman 2011, p. 859).

The Ukrainian civil war is a new kind of warfare – “hybrid” or “ambiguous” warfare (Apps 2014) with a great significance and many implications for Europe in general, and in particular for the E.U. – U.S. relations with the Russian Federation. Therefore, this thesis aims to add more to the discussion on civil wars by focusing on the Ukrainian conflict – a new type of civil war with significant implications to its geographic and political position at the border between the Western world and Russia. Outside involvement is not strictly military, but also diplomatic. In a major buffer state like Ukraine, with its geo-political significance, a civil war can have many forms and implications, at the regional and international level. Tanisha Fazal (2004) argues that in such situations, the only chance of survival of a buffer state is to balance, both internally and externally, between two major rivals. Still, according to her arguments, in order for a buffer state to get protection, it has to form an alliance with one of the rivals (Fazal 2004, pp. 314-315). Based on this last argument and on the fact that it is caught in the middle between the West and Russia, Ukraine was under the influence of external involvement at high degrees. Political moves from both sides inside Ukraine, but also external pressures and

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economic sanctions, played a significant part in the outbreak of the civil war and throughout it, as long as the country was split in two: pro-Europeans against pro-Russians. A major role was played by NATO and European Union expansionist policies on the one hand, and Putin’s desire to give Russia its former glory and dominance in that region, on the other. In order to achieve influence over the region, one of the many stages that Vladimir Putin has to pass is to keep Ukraine close to Russia rather to lose it in the detriment of the Western powers. The Ukrainian civil war cannot be reduced only to ethnic grievances or Yanukovych’s regime. Therefore, by analysing other factors that decisively contributed to the outbreak of this civil war, this paper will add some insights on the subject.

All three causes mentioned in this literature review relate to each other and contribute to the onset of the civil war. Ethnicity destabilizes Ukraine’s institutions, but also outside involvement is a significant factor that weakens them further. Russification and Westernization are both processes as a result of ethnicity, so the inner tensions within Ukraine, as a result of ethnic grievances created by the combination of ethnicity and weak institutions and exacerbated by the regime type, were used by outside powers to intensify the conflict even more. The E.U. and NATO expansionist policies may bring Ukraine on an upward path, but they may also result in additional grievances that further motivate rebels to fight. Putin’s desire to restore the Russian Federation to its former glory may also result in grievances for the other part of the Ukrainian population, namely the ethnic-Russians, and gives them the necessary incentives to respond to rebels, inevitably in the form of a civil war. The next section will discuss the theoretical framework and the hypotheses that will be tested.

Chapter 2: Theory and hypotheses

Previous research has shown a relationship between ethnicity, state’s institutions, outside involvement and civil wars.2_{The theoretical argument of this thesis is built around the influence}

that several independent variables have on the dependent variable, which is the Ukrainian civil war. These independent variables are ethnicity, Ukraine’s weak institutions and outside involvement (NATO and the European Union military and economic expansionist policies and Moscow’s desires to maintain dominance and control over Ukraine, and the region). Yet these explanations tend to be looked at in isolation from one another. In many civil wars, however,

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one sees the confluence of these various factors. In this section, the linkage between the three independent variables will be theoretically developed.

The matter of contention of this thesis is based on the following arguments: the first main argument is that external involvement weakened Ukraine’s institutions by putting pressure on the country to craft them in the vision of either an E.U. liberal market economy or a Russian style authoritarian regime tied to Eurasian Economic Community. Moreover, outside involvement massively contributed to the already present conflict in Ukraine and I would expect that this involvement would compound the inner tensions caused by the ethnic and social conflicts. Both the West and the East used the already present Ukrainian grievances to intensify the Ukrainians demands. As a result, they maximized the effects of those grievances in relation to the Ukrainian government and its institutions, to their own advantage, in a way to ensure the achievement of their own political goals. The main theoretical argument when it comes to third party interventions is based on the idea that domestic Ukrainian grievances were exploited in order to achieve strategic goals for the West, the European integration of Ukraine and a possible forward positioned NATO member, and, for Russia, a country much closer to Russia and a larger buffer against security-political competitors in Europe. Ukraine was seen as a pawn in a strategic geopolitical bargaining between Russia and Western powers. The second argument is that the present domestic conflict within Ukraine was exacerbated by the ethnic conflict, which also led to a further weakening of Ukraine’s institutions. On top of that, this ethic conflict was intensified by external involvement. The ruling power was assumed by minority leader Viktor Yanukovych as a result of the 2010 elections’ outcome. Immediately after the $25 billion agreement with Russia was signed, riots and demonstrations against Yanukovych began. This pro-Russian direction of Yanukovych’s government and the refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union in Vilnius a couple months before went in the opposite direction of what the average Ukrainian wished. Ukrainians felt as though their expectations were betrayed and the Euromaidan demonstrations in Kiev began. The protestors explicitly demanded Russian inclinations to stop and further attempts to join the West to be made.

This theoretical section, supported by previous literature on civil wars, will theorize how this literature is applicable to this case study. Moreover, in this section the theoretical justification for the connection between the dependent variable and the independent variables will be given.

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15 2.1. Causal logic

To conclude briefly of the literature on civil wars, it seems that ethnicity is more likely than any other group feature to explain the onset of a civil war. In some countries, certain ethnic groups are treated differently and have a different status than others, with fewer political rights or no representation on the political scene, and therefore have substantial grievances against the state. Moreover, ethnic groups can organize and mobilize faster to demand change when geographical and institutional factors allow for it. In addition, bargaining problems are easier solved by ethnic groups when they share the same kinship bonds, which means that countries whose population profiles are heterogeneous have larger obstacles to overcome initially. Ethnic diversity is not a recipe for civil war, but it makes it significantly more likely, especially when weak institutions come into the equation. The causal chain is centred on ethnic groups, and looks like this.

To start with, there is a relationship between Ukraine’s institutions and ethnic conflict. This relationship can be in both ways. Firstly, weak institutions intensified the ethnic conflict. Discriminatory governance in Ukraine’s multi-ethnic society harnessed ethnic grievances. Ukrainians were underrepresented at governmental level, because Viktor Yanukovych comes from the Russian minority group. Ukraine, still a centralised country, was ruled by the President and his political and economic elites that surrounded him. Yanukovych’s government was perceived as discriminatory because country’s institutional organization was discriminating the Ukrainian majority during his mandate. The local state administration was appointed by the President, so clearly the appointments were made with a high degree of subjectivity, mostly based on each appointee’s affiliation to either Russian or Ukrainian ethnic group. As a consequence, when political power is divided along ethnic lines, for example with the President and the ruling class coming from the Russian minority and just some of the elected local councils, especially from regions inhabited by a large number of Ukrainians, led by Ukrainians, some ethnic groups are more favoured than others, due to the membership of the ruling class to one group or another. In this case too, leadership style was part of the problem.

Secondly, ethnic conflict further weakened Ukraine’s institutions. As long as the country is divided along ethnic lines, Ukraine’s institutions will remain weak. All the presidential elections that were held since the country gained its independence, especially the ones from 2004 (2005) and 2010, have proved this. The results of the elections were tight, as long as the general tendency of the population was to vote for the candidate who is part of their own group. Ukrainians voted for candidates who were ethnic Ukrainian and Russians voted

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ethnic Russian candidates. It is clear that this tendency that tips the scales in favour of one group or the other, creates an institutional instability and harms the Ukrainian political life. The inability to control the population and the failure to meet its demands are features of weak institutions. In this way, violence is more likely to occur, because ethnic groups usually live together, geographically separated from other groups, in small but concentrated areas where they share the same language, customs and are bonded by the same deep ties with ethnic kin. This way of living facilitates mobilization when these groups are aggrieved. In addition to this, ethnic identity is a more serious issue than any other type of identity, which makes it less elastic. In order for any bargaining to culminate in a sustainable agreement, however, credible commitments are necessary, but bargaining before an imminent conflict (and during it) is more difficult than in its closing stages. Having said this, ethnic identities being at stake, the ethnic groups have more reasons, opportunities and incentives to start mobilizing and fight than non-ethnic groups (Denny & Walter 2014, p. 200).

Part of the weak institutions – ethnic conflict problem is the leadership style of Yanukovych. In general, when talking about regimes, these sort of debates fall under institutional issues, but in this context, institutions in Ukraine were also affected by the

leadership style of Yanukovych in particular. This authoritarian regime weakens further

Ukraine’s institutions and, in the same time, exacerbates already existing ethnic grievances and deepens them further, leading to additional tensions among the two main ethnic groups: the Ukrainians and the Russians. The latent ethnic conflict that exists in Ukraine for decades between Ukrainians and Russians was aggravated by Yanukovych’s discriminatory style of ruling the country. Ukrainians’ protests and manifestations emerged against the ruling class, where they demanded a change at governmental level or at least a political change towards West. Thus, clashes between Ukrainians and Russians emerged. Outside involvement exacerbates the domestic tensions caused by these ethnic grievances and leadership style and it is also a significant factor that weakens Ukraine’s institutions. So, the entire causal mechanism is explained as following: weak institutions lead to ethnic conflict, but in the same time, they are a result of the continuous ethnic conflict within Ukraine, especially since 1991. Outside involvement weakened Ukraine’s institutions and exacerbated the ethnic conflict. Eventually, all these led to the civil war.

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17 2.2. Dependent variable

The dependent variable of this paper concerns the Ukrainian civil war. According to Kalyvas and Kenny (Kalyvas & Kenny 2010), a civil war can be seen as a “revolution, political violence, ethnic conflict, and terrorism” (Kalyvas & Kenny 2010, p. 2). The key elements of a civil war stated by Kalyvas et al. are “(1) the goal of armed entities in civil war is power; (2) the entities that participate in a civil war must be organized; (3) the means by which these goal are accomplished is violence; (4) the context in which a civil war takes place is the sovereign nation state; and (5) it is implicit in the definition that one of the participants is the government” (Kalyvas & Kenny 2010, p. 2). The best working definition of a civil war is given by Kalyvas who defines it “as armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign unit between organized entities subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities” (Kalyvas & Kenny 2010, p. 2). The last part of Kalyvas’ definition is delicate in the Ukrainian case, because the Russian fighters from Crimea and Donbas do not really match this criteria. If these fighters are Russians, and not Ukrainian citizens, they were not “subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities”. Another definition of civil war states that a civil war has 25 battle casualties per year or 1000 deaths in a single year (Gleditsch, Wallansteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg & Strand 2002). If we are to take Ukraine and put this theory into practice, it is more than obvious that the conflict matches the entire criteria mentioned above, with the one amendment on Russian fighters.

It seems clear that the Euromaidan demonstrations can be seen as a revolution, where political violence played an important role. This led to terrible fights between Yanukovych’s forces and demonstrators who were asking for a closer European integration and, later, the president’s resignation. On the 18th_{of February the conflict escalated into bloody street fights.}

The events in Kiev, and then Crimea, sealed the onset of the Ukrainian civil war. The fight in Crimea appeared to be a revolution against the newly appointed pro-European government in Kiev and in the same time an ethnic conflict, where the Russian ethnic majority from this region whished separation from Ukraine and unity with Russia. Moreover, both the government from Kiev and rebels that are fighting in Eastern Ukraine want power. On one side, the government wants to re-impose control over that region, while on the other side, the rebels want to gain dominance and control too. Besides, both sides are organized entities and in order to achieve their goals, they fight, which means that their goals are achieved through violence. Additionally, the conflict takes place in a sovereign state. The last point where the Ukrainian civil war

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matches the criteria is that one of the combatants is the government from Kiev (Oliphant 2014). Going back to Gleditsch et al.’s definition relating to battle casualties, Ukraine again meets the criterion. 6 months after the conflict in Ukraine turned deadly (in July 2014), the death toll was already exceeding the 1000 deaths limit at 1500 (Katchanovski 2014). In March 2015, the United Nations Office for the High Commissioner (OHCHR) released a statement confirming that the death toll reached 6000 casualties (UN News Centre 2015). To conclude, according to the theory that defines civil wars, it is clear that Ukraine meets the criteria, and the on-going conflict within its boundaries is a civil war.

2.3. Independent variables

The first independent variable is ethnicity. This section intends to show how ethnicity led to ethnic grievances. What is ethnicity and how do we know to differentiate different ethnic groups? According to Horowitz (1985), and many political scientists follow this definition, ethnicity is “an umbrella concept that easily embraces groups differentiated by colour, language, and religion; it covers “tribes”, “races”, “nationalities” and “castes” (Horowitz 1985, p. 53). In general, it is easy to identify ethnic groups when you see them, but to scientifically define what an ethnic group is becomes problematic, because two concepts are opposed (Basedau 2011, p. 5). Fearon and Laitin (Fearon & Laitin 2000) argue that according to “an essentialist or primordialist notion of ethnicity, ethnic groups identities are stable over time and result from differences in shared identity markers such as clan, community, faith (religion), language, regional provenance, race, sect or tribe, and complexion or other physical appearance” (Fearon & Laitin 2000, p. 849). These different identity markers are sometimes present, but very often they are not, so there is no fixed set or number of such “objective” differences (Basedau 2011, p. 5). For instance, in the case of Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi had the same language, religion and regional settlement. The only difference was each group’s historical evolution which made Tutsi to be perceived as superior than Hutu. A significant fact to be mentioned is that when the massacres began, the only way to differentiate a Tutsi from Hutu was to check their ethnic affiliation which was shown on the identity card of each individual (Basedau 2011, p. 5).

Laitin and Fearon but also Horowitz claim that, contrary to essentialist’s notion, constructivists argue that “ethnic identity can change over time and, at the end of the day, it is the result of self-ascription and / or ascription by others” (Fearon & Laitin 2000, pp. 851-853). Basedau argues that ethnicity is socially constructed, and “it does not seem plausible that ethnic

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identity changes on a daily or arbitrary basis and is completely independent from “objective” identity markers, though their number and importance may differ from case to case” (Basedau 2011, p. 5). Hence, based on Horowitz and Kasfir (1976) notions, Basedau states that ethnicity should be defined in a combined concept, but in a more constructivist way than a primordialist one: “ethnicity and ethnic identity derive from the notion of a common ancestry and are associated with a variable set of objective identity markers such as language, religion, and physical appearance. However, though relatively stable over time, ethnic identity finally results from self- and outside ascription and may be principally subject to change” (Basedau 2011, p. 5).

Often, ethnicity contributes a great deal to the onset of a civil war. Fearon and Laitin argue that, once with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ethnicity became a predominant frame for interpreting civil wars (Fearon & Laitin 2001, p. 4). Moreover, Collier and Hoeffler claim that ethnicity can be also a cause for political allegiance (Collier & Hoeffler 2004, p. 571). According to Index Mundi, Ukraine’s largest ethnic minority group is Russian (approximately 17.3% of the total 44 million people). This percentage is mostly concentrated in the Southern and Eastern part of Ukraine, where the Russian population represents the majority, especially in Crimea. Once upon the ruling of the Soviet leader, Ukraine was contained, but the ethnic conflict mainly started once the country gained its independence in 1991. Ukraine is a country with substantial ethnic diversity and has political, cultural and social influences from all its neighbouring countries. Actually it is a “state of regions” (Sasse 2001, p. 69). Geographically, Ukraine is part of Central Europe. Western countries, such as Poland and Hungary, but also other European powers, shared historical links with Ukraine. Ethnically speaking, Ukraine can be seen as an Eastern Europe entity with Russian populations, as mentioned above. Moreover, Crimea was part of the Russian Republic in the Soviet Union until 1954 when it was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR. Prior to this, Crimea was integrated in the former Russian Empire, from 1791 until 1917 (Sasse 2001, p. 69). For these reasons, Ukraine has multiple cultural and ethnic perspectives. I argue that these automatically generate a large number of controversial social issues in specific areas, such as territory, language or history.

Hypothesis 1: The large ethnic cleavages between the Russian and Ukrainian

populations facilitated the development of weak institutions, which increased the probability of civil war.

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The second independent variable is the level of institutional development. Ukraine has weak institutions and Yanukovych’s regime type was a significant factor that weakened them. Being an anocracy, it may explain why civil war was even possible in Ukraine from the beginning. This mainly looks at the Ukrainian institutions. As mentioned throughout the literature review chapter, weak institutions in general, and regime type or regime instability in particular, may be responsible for the onset of civil wars. A number or recent studies, such as Kramer et al. (Kramer, Nurick, Wilson & Alterman 2011), Kuzio (2011) and Menon and Motyl (Menon & Motyl 2011), claim that Ukraine under Yanukovych’s regime went back from the post-Orange Revolution democracy towards an autocracy. Moreover, they argue that in the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine, when the predominant population, which massively voted for Yanukovych, is Russian speaking, political values may even be seen as authoritarian. These hybrid semi-democratic/semi-authoritarian regimes allow the possibility for other parties to act on the political scene and they also offer an environment for competitive elections, albeit just partially. A regime of this type combines these democratic characteristics, but still centres on an authoritarian leader and a party of power. Georgia and Russia, with Mikheil Saakashvili and Vladimir Putin, is a good illustration. In countries like these, parties - besides being popular along their voters - seek to strengthen their power through other ways; for example, when considerable parts of mass media is controlled by the government. According to Hegre et al., semi-democracies or anocracies are more prone to experience civil wars than democracies and authoritarian states (Hegre 2001, p. 33). They claim that “semi-democracies are partly open yet somewhat repressive, a combination that invites protest, rebellion, and other forms of civil violence. Repression leads to grievances that induce groups to take action, and openness allows for them to organize and engage in activities against the regime” (Hegre 2001, p. 33). Ukraine’s recent history is a combination of democratic and partly democratic regimes. In 2004, the population massively protested due to the results of the presidential election. The “Orange Revolution” made Ukraine the most democratic former Soviet republic, with the exception of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. But from 2010 and during the entire reign of Yanukovych, Ukraine went back to a less democratic regime. Freedom House classifies Ukraine as “partly free,” the Internet partly free and the press not free (Freedom House). Thus, according to Hegre et al.’s definition, Ukraine is an anocracy.

Following the authoritarian leadership role in the civil wars literature, the importance of ethnic sectarianism, minority-led rule and nationalism are found to be more significant in the context of a civil war. The literature on authoritarian leadership applies to the current case study.

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It is clear that the authoritarian leadership of Yanukovych weakened Ukraine’s institutions and intensified the already present ethnic tensions within Ukraine. For the majority of Ukrainians, it was totally unacceptable that a minority-led government would decide, contrary to the general public will, to move closer to Russia and distant itself from the European Union. Moreover, this discontent is the main factor that led the Ukrainian majority to revolt, through the Euromaidan demonstrations against Yanukovych and his way of ruling the country. Following this logic, it would be likely that authoritarian leadership and its direct impact on society increased the chances of the outbreak of the civil war. These clashes facilitated the ethnic conflict that led to the Ukrainian civil war.

Hypothesis 2: Weak institutions exacerbated the country’s internal ethnic divisions,

which subsequently made civil war more likely.

Involvement by external powers is the third independent variable. In the Ukrainian case, third-party interventions heavily relied on the existing grievances and this relationship will be further developed below. This independent variable is based on two core concepts, Russification and Westernization, which are of great significance for the current case study. Russification can be defined as a form of cultural assimilation by the Russian Federation of different non-Russian territories or communities. This can be done by a self-integration process or simply by force. In the Ukrainian case, this phenomenon is more related to Russia’s desires to keep Ukraine closer, by maintaining a strict control over the Ukrainian government, or by annexing its territory step-by-step, as has already happened with Crimea. Of course, a total annexation of Ukraine is almost impossible, even if Putin wants to re-build, territorially speaking, the former Soviet Russia. Westernization is the same phenomenon, but focuses on the Western world and the integration process in its main bodies, such as NATO or the E.U. According to Asmus (2008), what brought these two phenomena to compete so strongly with each other may be the fact that Moscow perceived the result of the Orange Revolution as a threat to its security. This unfavourable result for Russia had to be dealt with in such a way so that Moscow would benefit from the result. Moreover, Asmus asks what may have been the reasons of this ideological conflict, especially what drives so hard to fulfil its expansionist policies. One of the causes may be the lack of imagination in the U.S. and the European Union with a resulting in a further drifting of Russia in an anti-Western direction. Moreover, another potential explanation is that the West was incapable of understanding Russian internal dynamics. Furthermore, he is asking if the actual expansionist policies of NATO and the E.U. may have driven Russia to react so (Amus 2008, p. 100). These two significant concepts can be

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perceived as a head-on collision. It seems that this “collision” leaves nothing good behind in the context of Ukraine, but more tensions and even a further exacerbation of the conflict.

Hypothesis 3: Outside involvement weakened Ukraine’s institutions, contributing to

the onset of the civil war, by putting pressure on the country to draw it in a specific direction, towards the West or the East.

Ukraine is geographically situated at the border between Russia and the West. Thus, influences from both sides are strong and compete with each other. A possible way to Westernize Ukraine was the signature of the European Union future integration agreement, but Yanukovych refused to do this. As a result, Ukraine went on a further Russification path. The annexation of Crimea meant a deepening of this phenomenon, while the West tried to counter-attack with promises to the newly elected President Poroshenko that Ukraine would be seen as the most reliable non-NATO member. Putin decided to collaborate with the ethnic Russian majority in Crimea which ended with the Crimean annexation and its complete detachment from Ukraine. Following the Russification path, other eastern Ukrainian cities such as Donetsk or Lugansk, wish to have the same fate as Crimea. This made the West to worry and they took opposite positions in order to respond Russia’s actions. The NATO summit in Wales is a powerful response to Russia’s expansionist policies. Moreover, NATO repositioned some of its forces in Europe in case Russia decides to make a military move. All of these diplomatic actions mean that the international community is aware of what risks may bring a potential escalation of the conflict into a military one. This brings hope that leaders involved in this conflict may act rationally and think twice before any decision to be taken.

Hypothesis 4: Third party interventions made civil war more likely in Ukraine by

exacerbating the population’s grievances against other ethnic groups and the regime.

In order to bring all the three factors examined together, a fifth hypothesis is needed. Outside involvement may cause in general the onset of a civil war in multi-ethnic countries. Still, other countries, including many in the post-Soviet sphere, and Ukraine itself for almost two decades and a half after its independence, have survived ethnically charged tensions over elections or anti-regime mobilizations without escalating to civil war. In conclusion, it is possible that the lack of outside involvement in the internal affairs of another country may not lead to the onset of a civil war. Accordingly, the hypothesis is formulated as following:

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Hypothesis 5: Without third party intervention, conflicts instigated by ethnic cleavages

and regime type would not have escalated to civil war.

Chapter 3: Research design

In this paper, ethnicity, weak institutions and outside involvement are the independent variables and the Ukrainian civil war is the dependent variable. In particular, the main aims of this research are to demonstrate what influences ethnicity brings to the domestic conflict from the post-2010 elections and how the ethnic conflict weakened the Ukrainian institutions. Moreover, by examining the post-2010 elections regime type of Yanukovych, the purpose of this thesis is to explore how the existing turmoil within the country was affected by its leadership and how outside involvement affected the inner tensions within Ukraine. Here, the argument explores if the involvement of outside powers further exacerbated the ethnic conflict and additionally weakened Ukraine’s institutions. The study takes a qualitative research approach and attempts to build upon existing information and data available in relation to ethnicity, institutions and third party interventions in civil wars. The paper will provide an in-depth description of the links between the independent variables and the dependent one. Examining the effects of the minority rule after the 2010 presidential elections, the authoritarian leadership during this time and its consequences for the general Ukrainian population, it can be determine how the existing domestic conflict within Ukraine was affected. By examining outside involvement, especially of Russia in Crimea and its subsequent military incursions in the Eastern part of Ukraine, this case study will contribute to the existing literature on third party interventions and civil wars. The argument in this instance is that the Ukrainian civil war represents a shift in the manner in which conflict is fought. Within the Ukrainian conflict new methods of warfare were note and, thus, the conflict became a “hybrid” or “ambiguous” type of warfare (Apps 2014). The main idea behind this new type of conflict is that external parties involved in the conflict use subversion, agitation, propaganda and political demonstration to fulfil their agendas.

A potential concern within this study is external validity. The outcome intended to be explained (the dependent variable) is the influence on the Ukrainian civil war. The factors (independent variables) that influence the civil war are ethnicity and state’s institutions. Outside involvement is used as another independent variable that should have serious consequences on the Ukrainian civil war, which will reduce the external validity of this study. In order to conduct an in-depth empirical investigation, the case study design appears to be the most feasible option.

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Thus, as methodology, the Ukrainian civil war is used as a single case study. Ukraine is of contemporary relevance, and thus the policy implication from thorough analysis may be of obvious importance. Moreover, Ukraine is a conflict that merits attention, because it is important to uncover information about the conflict. Likewise, even though the literature on civil wars is substantial and comprehensive, it is still important to rigorously evaluate it against new upcoming cases in order to avoid dogmatic thinking. Therefore, it makes good sense to look at the Ukrainian case, because it might uncover weaknesses or areas of improvement in current theories, or, at the very least, enrich the empirical pool. Ethnicity, weak institutions and outside involvement will be the observations of the chosen case study. All these observations will be further developed and their variables and characteristics will be analysed in accordance with the purpose of this thesis.

Ethnicity was chosen to be examined because is one of the most frequent causes mentioned in the current literature that can lead to civil war onsets. Ukraine is clearly a country with huge ethnic diversity, mainly dominated by the Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups. Two thirds of the state’s population belong to the Ukrainian ethnicity who speak Ukrainian and mainly inhabit the Western part of the country. The last third, who mainly resides in the far Eastern parts of Ukraine, such as the Donbas region, Crimea and Odessa and its surroundings, is split as following: around half of it is Russian and speaks the Russian language, while the other half is made of Ukrainians who speak Russian. At the time of elections, ethnicity also played a huge role among the candidates and among the votes they got from the population. In the last two elections, from 2004 (and the re-run from 2005) and 2010, the country was basically split in two relatively equal parts. The West massively voted with the more pro-European candidates, Yushchenko in 2004 (2005) and Tymoshenko in 2010, while the East offered its vote to the pro-Russian candidate, Yanukovych in both elections (Fischer 2013).

The level of institutional development is another observation of this single case study. It automatically involves public discontent to be brought into the discussion in the context of the Ukrainian case. On top of that, it is a significant cause that led to the outbreak of the civil war, because at their roots, the Euromaidan demonstrations were mainly driven by the Ukrainians’ concerns and dissatisfactions towards Yanukovych and his government. Once with the election of Yanukovych in 2010, the majority of the population was displeased, as long as he comes from the minority ethnic Russian group. Even if, at the beginning, the President pledged to equally support all ethnic groups, immediately after his election he went to Moscow in an official visit. His instauration of a minority-led ruling class over Ukraine did nothing else

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other than to further deepen the existing ethnic domestic conflict within the country. Outside involvement, especially from NATO and Russia, and all the clashes between these two distinct ideologies, may have exacerbated the inner tensions.

As previously stated, a good part of the study and the majority of the analysis will focus on the above-mentioned independent variables. In order to analyse the intensity of these independent variables on the dependent one and to answer the research question of this thesis, data before the moment of the 2010 presidential elections and the 2014 crisis will be evaluated. In order to understand the present and what caused the tensions that led to the outbreak of the civil war and the issues that arose since that moment, this data is of absolute necessity. Historical, political and ethnic background of Ukraine will be assessed. In the next sections, the observations of this single case study will be evaluated.

Chapter 4: Empirical chapter

In this section, the empirics will be discussed. At first, a general background of the ethnic and institutional situation of Ukraine will be exposed. Moreover, outside involvement in Ukraine will be further examined with a special attention on how this factor influenced the social and political life in this country. Then, the next three sections will examine the arguments of this paper. The first analysis will examine whether the ethnic conflict within Ukraine was responsible for weakening the Ukrainian institutions. The focus of the second analysis will be on whether external involvement is responsible for a further weakening of the Ukrainian institutions. Besides that, this section tests the hypothesis according to which the Ukrainian weak institutions exacerbated the country’s ethnic divisions, leading in this way to the onset of a civil war. Finally, the last section concerns the argument that outside involvement deepened the existing conflict within Ukraine.

4.1. Background – ethnicity, institutions and outside involvement

4.1.1. Ethnicity

Once upon the ruling of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was contained, but the ethnic conflict mainly started once this country gained its independence in 1991. Ukraine is a country with a huge ethnic diversity and it has political, cultural and social influences from all its neighbouring

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countries. Actually it is a “state of regions” (Sasse 2001, p. 69). Geographically, Ukraine is part of the Central Europe states. Western countries, such as Poland and Hungary, but also other European powers shared historical links with Ukraine. Ethnically speaking, Ukraine can be seen as an Eastern Europe unit with Russian populations, as it was mentioned above. Due to the Black Sea vicinity, Ukraine, together with Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia and Russia is part of the 6 Black Sea nation-states. Together, these countries participate in mutual defence and cultural activities. Moreover, Crimea was part of the Russian Republic in the Soviet Union until 1954 when it was transferred to the Ukrainian SSR. Prior to this, Crimea was integrated to the former Russian Empire, from 1791 until 1917 (Sasse 2001, p. 69). For these reasons, Ukraine has multiple cultural and ethnic perspectives. The argument is that these automatically generate a large number of key issues in specific areas, such as territory, language or history.

Ukraine is a multi-ethnic country. From its total population of almost 44 million people, 77.8% are Ukrainians (34 million), 17.3% Ukrainians (7.5 million) and the rest are Hungarians, Moldovans, Romanians, Tatars, Bulgarians, Jewish and other (Index Mundi). Linguistically, Ukraine is divided too. The Ukrainian language is spoken by almost 67% of its population, while the Russian language is spoken by 24% (Index Mundi), although the Russian language was introduced as the second official language following to the 1994 referendum. The majority of the ethnic Ukrainian population lives in the Western part of the country, while the ethnic Russian population lives in the Eastern part and predominantly in Crimea (BBC News, 2014). A similar pattern could be seen at every presidential election, especially at the ones from 2005 and 2010. The Russian candidate was massively voted in the East and the Ukrainian candidate, a more pro-European one, was voted in the West (BBC News 2014). Since its independence, Ukraine was ruled by four Presidents, one of whom was only an interim President during the crisis moment of February – June 2014. In June 2014, Petro Poroshenko was elected as the fifth President of the Republic. Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych were the main characters during the biggest two crisis of the post-Cold War Ukraine. In the presidential elections from 2004, they competed against each other, but in the end Yanukovych won. Demonstrations emerged due to a massive electoral fraud and the elections were held again in February 2005, where Yushchenko won. The election of Yushchenko meant a new start for Ukraine, a new path towards democracy, Western values and a distancing from Russia. These protests and manifestations that eventually led to the re-run of the elections were called “the Orange Revolution”. In 2010, new presidential elections were held and Yanukovych won. His election was seen as a step back from democracy and the Ukrainian population dreams for

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joining Western structures were shattered. From this moment, especially the crisis years of 2013 and 2014, Ukraine was ruled by an authoritarian leader. The refusal to sign the Vilnius agreement which meant an association agreement between the E.U. and Ukraine and the signing of the $25 billion agreement with Russia, led to massive demonstrations in Kiev. People were demanding a political change, the resignation of the government and Yanukovych. Thus, the Euromaidan began and Yanukovych chose to supress the demonstrations with fire. More than 50 people died (Gatehouse 2015), and eventually, when the conflict escalated even more, the President fled the country. This exposure of the Ukrainian ethnic situation was necessary in order to understand the significance of the past for the present, how split the country is and what the level of tensions between the two ethnic Ukrainian and Russian groups is nowadays. Following the social and political events between December 2013 and February 2014, this rupture among the Ukrainian population is one of the main factors that significantly increased the onset of the civil war.

4.1.2. Institutions

Ukraine had suffered modifications throughout the years after gaining its independence and the country was re-organized: politically, administratively, territorially and institutionally. So, due to all these issues, (the country was basically formed from at least 4 major regions as mentioned above), in 1994, the newly elected government established a Council of Regions. Sasse argues that the Council relied on federalist principles in order to select and choose leaders for different regions. Therefore, these leaders were appointed by the president of Ukraine, the mayors of Kiev and Sevastopol and the Deputy Prime Minister of Crimea (Sasse 2001, p. 77). This voting system based only on the 4 major regions’ leaders was clearly unbalanced, as long as half of the votes (2 out of 4) were coming from the Crimean region. All these reforms did not strengthen Ukraine’s institutions as a whole, but instead they split the power, equally, between more institutional bodies, which led to political instability throughout the years that were to come.

Besides these institutional changes, the year of 1994 witnessed other key events. One of these was a successful referendum that made the Russian language the second official one throughout Ukraine and “the official language of administration in Crimea” (Sasse 2001, p. 85). The year of 1997 witnessed another significant moment in Ukraine that clearly shaped the future of this country towards a pro-Russian attitude and a further weakening of Ukraine’s institutions’ autonomy. The “Big Treaty” was signed between these two countries which prolonged the right

The battle for Ukraine : ethnic conflict, weak institutions and outside involvement : what are the factors that instigated the current civil war in Ukraine?

MSc Political Science – Selective Master’s Programme International Relations