COLLECTIVE ACTION VS. COLLECTIVE FISHING:
Understanding the attempted prohibition and uncontrollable growth of the
ring seine in the district of Nagapattinam and Karaikal, Tamil Nadu
Ciara Phelan
Research Project IDS - Field Work and Thesis Masters International Development Studies
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands (Student ID: 11181400) January 2017
ciara.phelan@hotmail.co.uk
Word count: 22,338
Supervised by Dr Maarten Bavinck Professor of coastal resource governance
Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
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ABSTRACT
In recent decades, the Indian government has promoted the modernisation of fisheries and the growth of the fishing community. At the same time, fishers have been collectively regulating the use of gear seen to be harmful to the resources or to the community. Collective action studies so far along the Coromandel Coast have focused on individual village structures and processes, but many of the common pool resource challenges facing fishers are larger and need to be addressed at multiple levels of governance; little is known about the processes between different villages and actors at the regional level. The focus of this thesis is on the Nagapattinam-Karaikal region of Tamil Nadu, and the current challenge of the ring seine: a net banned by the central and state government, which has caused protests and divisions in the fishing community since its introduction. Despite an agreed phase out of the net by 2016 by all 64 village councils, or panchayats, the number of ring seine units has continued to grow throughout the region. This study explores the collective action problems faced by fishers at the regional level, in trying to stop harmful fishing methods. The findings are based on a set of individual and group interviews conducted in several villages throughout the region in the summer of 2016. It is clear that many fishers believe the prohibition of the ring seine to be in the interest of trawler boat owners, not for the collective benefit of small-scale fishermen or the resources, demonstrating a power struggle within the fisheries. The
panchayats are not seen to be responsible for monitoring fishing practices, but the role of external actors in common pool resource management is unclear. In addition, the resources are open to access by ring seiners from outside of the region, so local fishers do not see the regional-level ban as a solution to the problem. The study highlights the importance of prohibiting potentially harmful fishing nets in the early stages of development in the future, rather than attempting gradual phase-outs when people have invested their money in the gear. The case of the ring seine in Nagapattinam and Karaikal has wider theoretical implications for the debate on fisheries governance, and the need for common pool resources to be managed at multiple collaborative levels – by fishers and external actors – with particular emphasis on the clear roles assigned to each.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
There are several people in Tamil Nadu that I would like to thank for their help with the completion of my research.
The first is my local supervisor, Subu, who took the time to come and welcome me into the Nagapattinam-Karaikal fishing community. I would like to thank Baskar and his family for taking me into their home, and for the great hospitality I received throughout my stay. I would like to give a special acknowledgement to Baskar himself, for his invaluable help in the field, personal insights into the research topic, and the contact details he provided for countless respondents that would otherwise have been missed. Thank you to Sekar, not only for translating throughout the data collection process, but for his companionship on long working days and daily bus journeys.
To all of the above-mentioned people, thank you for answering my endless questions about Tamil culture.
I am also extremely grateful for any friends and family members who have listened to me talk about my work in recent months, and have been a welcome distraction from it.
Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank Maarten Bavinck for the introduction to the research topic, for being a much-needed friendly face in Tamil Nadu, and for his incredible patience throughout the writing process. Without him both supporting and challenging me, I would not have completed this thesis.
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CONTENTS
ABSTRACT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS LIST OF FIGURES
1. INTRODUCTION 6
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 9
2.1 Group Behaviour 9
2.2 Individually Rational Behaviour 11
2.2.1 The Tragedy of the Commons 11
2.2.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma 12
2.2.3 The Logic of Collective Action 12 2.3 Design Principles for Managing Common Pool Resources 14
2.4 External Actors 17
2.5 Conceptual Scheme 19
3. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND 21
3.1 Tamil Nadu Fisheries 21
3.2 Nagapattinam and Karaikal 23
3.3 Ring Seine Fishery 25
4. METHODOLOGY 29
4.1 Research Questions 29
4.2 Units of Observation 29
4.3 Selection of Villages 30
4.4 Sampling 32
4.5 Methods of Data Collection 32
4.5.1 Participant Observation 32
4.5.2 Interviews 33
4.6 Data Analysis 34
4.7 Methodological Limitations 34
4.8 Ethical Considerations 35
5. THE REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE RING SEINE 37
5.1 Numbers of Ring Seine Units 37
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5.3 Group Size 40
5.4 “There is no boundary” 42
5.5 Discussion 43
6. PERCEIVED HARM: MOTIVATIONS FOR A COLLECTIVE BAN 45
6.1 Perceptions of the Ring Seine 45
6.2 The Motivation for the Ban 51
6.3 Discussion 52
7. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BAN 54
7.1 Governance Structure of the Nagapattinam-Karaikal Fishing Community 54
7.2 Meetings 55
7.3 Panchayat Rules and their Implementation 57 7.4 “Only the government can say no to this thing” 61
7.5 Discussion 63
8. CONCLUSIONS 65
8.1 Answers to Research Questions 65
8.2 Theoretical Reflections and Suggestions for Further Research 67 8.3 Recommendations for Policy and Practice 70 REFERENCES
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FIGURES
Figure 1: Location of Tamil Nadu state and Nagapattinam-Karaikal district Figure 2: Taluks of the district
Figure 3: Mapped locations of sample villages
Figure 4: Bar graph showing units of ring seine and years of use in sample villages
Table 1: Units of ring seine currently in operation in each of the sample villages Table 2: Ring seine units and population size by number of families in sample villages
Image 1: A group of ring seine fishers with their net and mechanised boat Image 2: One fibreglass boat full of oil sardine
Image 3: Fish drying in the sun
Image 4: Large number of people unloading the catch of one ring seine unit
ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations SIFFS: South Indian Federation of Fishermen Societies
CPR: Common pool resource
CMFRI: Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute Panchayat: Village council
Mathi: Oil sardine
Surukkumadi: Ring seine Rettamadi: Pair trawl
INR: Indian rupee (€1 = INR 72.57) Lakh: INR 100,000
Crore: INR 10million, or 100 lakhs i1-i38: Interviews
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1. INTRODUCTION
The blue revolution of the 1960s was promoted by the central government of India, modernising capture fisheries and introducing new technologies to increase catch levels, for the purpose of economic growth, poverty reduction and food security. In terms of increasing efficiency and production levels, the blue revolution was very successful, with the catch yield rising each year (Bavinck & Johnson, 2008). However, those now operating larger, more powerful boats and fishing gear continued to fish the same inshore waters as small-scale fishers where stocks are known to be rich, instead of advancing to deep-sea zones where the resources remain largely underexploited (Cacatian, 2010). As a result, fishers and fishery scientists both report that catches have significantly decreased in recent decades since the blue revolution, and that stocks in the inshore zone may be exploited beyond maximum level (Bavinck, 2001a). At the global level, over 75 per cent of fish stocks are estimated to be either fully exploited or overexploited; the majority of the main capture fisheries have reached their maximum potential (Mathew, 2009).
Small-scale fisheries are receiving growing recognition for their potential role in global poverty alleviation and food security (FAO, 2014) but, unfortunately, small-scale fishers are not receiving an equal share of the benefits generated within fisheries. Bavinck (2012) suggests that the distribution of economic wealth experienced through the industrialisation of Tamil Nadu fisheries is unevenly weighted in favour of those fishing at a larger scale, and that small-scale fishers suffer further from these encroachments into the coastal waters they occupy. The ecological problems associated with the depletion of natural resources are therefore accompanied by a sense of injustice among fisher populations.
A number of researchers have studied the collective action of fishers in the villages of Tamil Nadu, with regards to the members and decision-making structures of the panchayats (village councils). Particular attention has been placed on their involvement in regulating access to and usage of marine resources, to ensure sustainable and fair resource management (Bavinck, 2001b, 2014a; Bavinck & Karunaharan, 2006; Thamizoli & Prabhakar, 2009). The collective prohibition of fishing gear in the villages of Tamil Nadu is referred to as an “institutional tradition”, with a long history of self-governing (Bavinck & Karunaharan, 2006:46). However, despite this information on how fishers organise within villages, little is known about the
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structures at a regional level. The historically marginalised nature of marine fisheries has contributed to the way in which each village has strengthened its resource management structures in isolation (Bavinck, 2001b). As a result, the structures of different villages have frequently been studied in isolation from one another. Although the panchayats of Tamil Nadu are local scale organisations, the FAO (2014) argues that some of the challenges they deal with are much larger and that it is important for organisations to upscale in order to address important issues. Coming to regional agreements would make regulations more effective, replicating the results over a larger geographical area (Bavinck & Karunaharan, 2006).
This thesis is based on a study of the Nagapattinam-Karaikal region on the south-eastern coast of India, and the collective attempts of fishers and panchayats here to regulate ring seine fishing. Recently the collective action of fishers has been studied in relation to the use of fishing gear, rather than collective bans. Research shows that fishers form collective groups within their villages to operate ring seine fisheries, as a strategy to overcome difficult natural and social circumstances, largely to collectively meet their basic needs by increasing their income (Hoefsloot, 2014). However, the operation of ring seine units is a matter of concern for other fisher groups, and has been protested against. This has led to an official ban by the central government of India, the state government of Tamil Nadu, and the Tamil Nadu Fisheries Department, as the net is seen to catch an unsustainably large number of fish, a high percentage of which are juvenile as a result of its small mesh size (Mohan Joseph & Jayaprakash, 2003). Yet in spite of regulations, the ring seine is still widely used in the region. So, my main research question is:
Why is the collective action of fishers difficult to realise in prohibiting ring seine fishing in the Nagapattinam-Karaikal region?
The chapter following this presents the theories of collective action and fisheries governance that guide the study, alongside a review of the existing literature on Tamil Nadu fisheries. The chapter concludes with a set of clear conceptual choices based on the theoretical framework, and the scope of the research is shown in a conceptual diagram.
Chapter three provides some geographical context and background relevance to the study. This includes information on Tamil Nadu fisheries, the district of Nagapattinam and Karaikal, the ring seine net, and the Indian oil sardine fishery that it targets.
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Next is the methodology, which begins with a set of sub-questions aimed towards answering the main research question. I explain the sampling process for the respondents, as well as for the villages selected in the study. I also outline the main methods of data collection and data analysis used. Finally, the methodological limitations and ethical considerations of the research are highlighted.
I present my findings in three separate empirical chapters, providing answers to each sub-question and, in turn, the main research sub-question. The focus of chapter five is on the geography of ring seine use in the region and how this has spread in recent years. In chapter six I move on to discussing the perceived social and ecological impacts of the net by members of the fishing community, and how these perceptions have motivated the prohibition. Chapter seven discusses attempts at implementing regulations, both by the Nagapattinam-Karaikal community and by state actors.
The thesis concludes with a summary of the findings that answer the research questions, reflections on the theory, suggestions for areas of further research, and recommendations for policy and practice.
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Existing theories of collective action provide the framework for this research. Collective action may be defined and conceptualised in several ways, often depending on the context in which it is used. However,
“What most definitions have in common is that collective action requires the involvement
of a group of people, it requires a shared interest within the group and it involves some kind
of common action which works in pursuit of that shared interest. Although not often mentioned, this action should be voluntary, to distinguish collective action from hired or
corvee labour.” (Meinzen-Dick, Gregorio & McCarthy, 2004:4-5, emphasis in original)
With these requirements in mind, I discuss some of the different theories of collective action highlighted in the literature, with particular reference to previous research on Tamil Nadu fisheries. I also try to position the individual and group behaviour of fishers and other actors in the wider framework of fisheries governance.
2.1 Group Behaviour
A popular assumption of group behaviour is that individuals who share common interests will act together to further these interests. Just as one individual is expected to act out of self-interest, the same is expected of groups of individuals sharing the same interest. Based on this logic of group behaviour, self-interested individuals may collectively succeed in achieving their common goals (Olson, 1965). For those individuals who rely on common pool resources for their livelihoods and well-being, it is in their best interest to sustain these resources to ensure long-term benefits. Fishers are therefore expected to collectively avoid “depleting stocks of natural resources to a level which results in an effectively permanent decline in the rate at which the natural resource base yields useful products or services for livelihoods” (Scoones, 1998:7). In theory, all fishers would be individually better off if common goals were achieved.
Fishers in Tamil Nadu have a long history of self-regulation when it comes to the use of fish stocks, particularly restricting those gears seen as ecologically or socially harmful. According to Bavinck & Karunaharan (2006) the harm caused by new fishing gear is conceptualised in
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three ways along the Coromandel Coast. The first is in terms of harm to the fish stock on which the fishers’ livelihoods depend. Gear bans are motivated by the self-interest of individual fishers to protect these specific resource categories (ibid:53). The depletion of fish stocks is to be avoided at all costs, for the collective long-term benefit of the group. The second is harm to the majority of other gear users. Although new fishing technologies are often more economically efficient, the increase in yield for its users negatively affects the availability of resources for the rest of the group. The collective regulation or prohibition of such technologies is seen as a way of promoting equality and fairness among individuals and groups of fishers. If the access and opportunities available to each fisher are unequal, this can negatively impact the dynamics within the community. Accordingly, the third dimension of harm relates to the community as a social entity, and harm to the unity of its population (ibid:55).
Despite the separation of the different aspects of harm on paper, it seems very unlikely that one would occur independently from the others in reality. The authors suggest that an “intermingling” of dimensions is to be expected (Bavinck & Karunaharan, 2006:53). It is possible to imagine a knock-on effect from the depletion of resources and the social difficulties that follow, which I elaborate on in the following paragraph. It is also important to recognise the subjectivity of harm as a concept. As a result of their high levels of interaction with the natural environment, fishers frequently possess extensive knowledge of the ecosystems and available resources (Schlager, Blomquist and Tang, 1994). Gear bans motivated by harm to the fish stock, for example, are based on changes as they are experienced by fishers. So, notions of harm very much rely on perceptions rather than scientific data. Nonetheless, it is clear from the literature that there are both environmental and socioeconomic dimensions of harm involved; the prohibition and regulation of fishing gear is motivated by the principles of social justice, as much as it is by ecological sustainability (Bavinck, 1996).
In situations where the use of a particular gear causes harm to other fishers or to the community as a whole, conflict may be expected. Homer-Dixon (1999) claims that scarcity of renewable resources can contribute to violent conflict, particularly in developing countries where people are more dependent on the environment for their economic well-being. He argues that one of the key sources of scarcity is the depletion and degradation of a resource, fish in this case, where stocks are being depleted at a faster rate than they are being renewed. Implementing a ban on the use of any gear that may be considered unsustainable is presumably in the interest of all users. In contrast, the possibility also exists that a regulatory decision results in conflict.
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The assumption of regulatory decisions so far – in response to harm – has been perfect consensus among all group members, which will not always be the case (Olson, 1965). In the context of previous bans, local fishers have protested that adhering to the rules would leave them without livelihoods and sufficient food (Tietze, 2016). When there is such heavy dispute over the prohibition of a particular fishing gear, it can be difficult for local collective groups to take any further action in implementing and enforcing regulations (Bavinck, 2001b). However, if all individuals are in agreement then it is often taken for granted that they will act as a group on behalf of their shared interests.
2.2 Individually Rational Behaviour
Based on general theories of group behaviour, the prohibition of seemingly harmful gear appears to be the simple solution to shared problems and a means to achieving common objectives. Following previous studies, Bavinck (2001a) claims that such decisions are not just decided upon by the panchayat, but are legitimised in village-member gatherings. In her book “Governing the Commons…”, Elinor Ostrom (1990) discusses three popular models of collective action to explain why groups of individuals may not act to achieve their common goals.
2.2.1 The Tragedy of the Commons
Garrett Hardin (1968) argues that each rational being, such as an individual fisher, seeks to maximise his own gain. In other words, a rational fisher will try to catch as many fish as possible on a given day. The logic in doing so is that the individual fisher will receive all of the benefits from fishing without limits, whilst the negative consequences of overfishing a shared resource are shared by all. The nature of fisheries as a common pool resource, means that they are vulnerable to the impacts of overfishing (Homer-Dixon, 1999). When all rational fishers follow the same logic, the tragedy of the commons arises; “Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his… [catch] without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons” (Hardin, 1968:1,244). Ostrom (1990:3) argues that much of the world depends on natural resources which are subject to this possibility. Hardin’s (1968) model pertains to the idea that individual behaviour – specifically in dealing with common pool resources – has implications on a larger scale, just as village-level actions do for
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the region as a whole. It may be argued then that the collective action of fishers and panchayats at village level in Tamil Nadu is insufficient for achieving regional-level goals.
2.2.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The prisoner’s dilemma model is conceptualised as a two-person game, where each has the option of cooperating in a management regime or defecting. The “defect” strategy for a fisher would be to catch as much fish as he can possibly sell, and the “cooperate” strategy would be for each fisher to catch only his share of an agreed optimum total amount (Ostrom, 1990:4). If both fishers in the game decide to cooperate, they receive equally beneficial payoffs from the fishery. If both defect, they share the negative consequences of overfishing equally. However, if only one fisher cooperates, his share of the burden will increase whilst the defector receives an even higher payoff (Hardin, 1982). Fishers operating industrialised fishing methods benefit from higher yields, but the resulting losses are distributed amongst all users. The increased losses for small-scale fishers and the unequal distribution of benefits creates feelings of injustice, and causes conflict between different groups (Hoefsloot, 2014). If the dominant strategy is for both fishers in the game to defect – as there is a strong incentive to do so – the model suggests that individually rational behaviour will not lead to collectively rational outcomes (Hardin, 1982). This challenges the fundamental assumptions of group theory. Of course, in prisoner’s dilemmas the strategies are chosen independently and without communication, which is less realistic in real life settings. It is impossible or forbidden for the prisoners to communicate with one another, but the case is not the same in the fishing community where, as I have already discussed, Tamil fishers have historically come to collective agreements on the use of the resources. Bavinck and Karunaharan (2006) in particular highlight the sense of community prevailing in fishing hamlets.
2.2.3 The Logic of Collective Action
The third model presented by Ostrom (1990) to explain why individuals may have difficulty in pursuing their joint interests, is the logic of collective action. The main theoretical assumption made by Olson in this model is as follows: “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests” (1965:2). A key aspect of this model is that the behaviour of individuals is
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voluntary. The coercion dimension and the intervention of external actors are discussed later in the chapter, but I expand on the topic of group size at this point.
Olson (1965) claims that larger groups of individuals will fail to further their collective interests for three main reasons, which have been summarised by Hardin (1982) as follows. The first reason is that when the benefits are distributed among more members, each member receives a lower share. A central characteristic of common pool resources, such as that of fisheries, is the difficulty of excluding users. Therefore, since a fisher cannot easily be excluded from the benefits of the collective efforts of the group, the incentive for any individual not to contribute increases with group size. The second suggestion made by Olson (1965) is that in a larger group, the efforts of one member will not have a noticeable effect on the situation of the group as a whole, and so he can still enjoy the benefits of improvements without having contributed. The ecological and social effects of defectors in areas with larger fisher populations may go unnoticed, despite the fact that they will still benefit from the regulatory decisions made. In smaller groups where the members come into face-to-face contact regularly, individuals are more likely to be bound by shared norms and socially acceptable behaviours, and are distinguishable in their villages. Thus, they are more likely to be socially affected than those in large groups, if they fail to cooperate when making the decision on how to fish (Olson, 1965). The third reason for failure is simply that the effective organisation of a larger group generates higher transaction costs.
No matter the reasons provided, Olson (1965) concludes that large groups will always fail to act to achieve their common goals. Hardin (1982) claims that the effect of group size on collective action is the most controversial issue in the literature on collective action; both he and Ostrom (1990) argue that the probability of an individual voluntarily acting on behalf of collective interests is determined not by the number of people in the group, but by the relational size of the individual, i.e. how noticeable the individual’s actions are to the other group members, and how much they stand to benefit from the collective good.
All three models introduce the free-rider problem: the motivation for each individual to “free-ride” on the efforts of the other members without having contributed to the collective effort (Ostrom, 1990:6). Olson (1965) suggests that each rational individual would prefer that others pay the whole cost towards achieving collective benefits. He explains that with common pool
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resources, or collective goods, users cannot be excluded from the consumption of the good even though they do not assist in ensuring the good is provided.
The dominant conclusion often drawn from these models of collective action is that no rational individuals will voluntarily ensure the provision of a common pool resource, and that only government control or privatisation will provide long-term benefits to users. However, Ostrom argues that individuals have the capacity to “escape tragic outcomes” (1990:14). Based on years of research on common pool resources, she finds many communities of individuals successfully governing their resource systems. Evidence from Tamil Nadu shows that fishers have in fact been collectively regulating the use of fishery resources for a long time (Bavinck & Karunaharan, 2006). As a result of individually rational behaviour, fishing gear bans have been executed with varying degrees of success. When applied at the regional level, it is possible that fishers in some locations are altogether unaware of the decision to prohibit the use of a particular fishing gear, and so it is only banned in parts. In contrast, however, some previous measures have spread from one place to another without fishers ever gathering to make collective decisions (Bavinck, 2001a). Ostrom (1990) suggests that user groups near governance centres have less autonomy than appropriators of remote common pool resources, so in theory are more likely to comply with prohibitions.
2.3 Design Principles for Managing Common Pool Resources
Elinor Ostrom studied a large number of self-governed common pool resource settings, in an attempt to explain why some communities succeed and others fail. In disagreement with the conclusions drawn from the previous three models, she identified a set of design principles that characterise sustainable, robust, and fair common pool resource management via collective action, as an alternative to privatisation or state regulation. Ostrom described the design principles as the fundamental similarities that exist between different successfully community-governed commons (1990:90); several of the conditions are particularly relevant to this study and guide the thesis.
Firstly, emphasis is placed on clearly defined boundaries: “individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself” (Ostrom, 1990:91). As previously mentioned, rights can be difficult to assign in such open access resource settings. The fluid nature of water and the mobility of fish,
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especially where migratory species are concerned, is problematic for the definition of boundaries (Mathew, 2009). Bavinck (2001b) finds that the panchayats of the Coromandel Coast govern over clearly defined groups of people and physical territories, where the boundaries set at sea are an extension of the borders between villages on land. In another study, fishers are reported as stating that “there are no boundaries at sea” (Bavinck, 1996:478) and village panchayats in the region would not exclude other fishers from their adjacent waters as this would also lock their own fishers in. However, they do claim to maintain some control over the fishing methods used there (Bavinck, 2014a). Without closing the fish resources to outside appropriators, the regulatory efforts of local fishers may benefit those who have not contributed, reducing the benefits for locals or destroying the resource itself. For fishers to be interested in coordinating common pool resource provision among themselves, they must have the ability to exclude others from access to and appropriation of the resource (Ostrom, 1990:91). Although specifying clear boundaries and users may be the first step in organising collective action, Ostrom argues that a clearly defined number of appropriators still have the potential to destroy the resource (1990:92).
Ostrom also argues for collective-choice arrangements: “most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules” (1990:93). She suggests that institutions who make collective decisions about rules are better able to tailor the rules to local circumstances, as the resource users are directly involved. Evidence from the Coromandel Coast finds fishers rallying to have resource use regulated at different periods in time. So, as the people who know the characteristics of the resources best, based on their own perceptions of the impacts of certain fishing nets (Bavinck & Karunaharan, 2006) fishers are modifying the rules of the fishery themselves. Furthermore, Thamizoli and Prabhakar (2009) claim that the current decision making system of panchayats along the Coromandel Coast is a democratic one, much more so than earlier systems. They found in their research that decisions are arrived at due to consensus following discussions between all members and that collective-choice arrangements are facilitated particularly when banning certain types of nets. However, attendance at a meeting “implies agreement with joint decisions” made there (Bavinck, 2001b:1090) which may not necessarily be the case.
Following this, Ostrom (1990) says that in robust common pool resource institutions, monitoring and sanctioning are undertaken by the resource users rather than external authorities. She argues that “monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator
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behaviour, are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators” and “appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both” (ibid:94). It may often be assumed that resource users will not spend the time, money, or effort to monitor the performance of others and sanction rule breakers, as this generates high costs for the individual but produces goods available to everyone (ibid:94). However, Ostrom finds evidence of participants doing both. It is in the personal interest of fishers to monitor the use of resources on which their livelihoods depend, and this may also increase the confidence of a fisher that he is not the only user following the rules (Wade, 1987). For those found to be not in compliance with the rules, a system of punishment must be in place. Ostrom (1990) suggests graduated sanctions based on the frequency and severity of the rule breaking, from financial punishments (fines) to social punishments (loss of reputation, banishment). According to previous research on Tamil Nadu fisheries, most punishments within the community consist of monetary fines of varying amounts depending on the rule break. The village panchayats may exercise public shaming methods of punishment, or excommunication from the society (Bavinck, 2014a). Even small penalties can remind the defector of the importance of compliance (Ostrom, 1990:97).
The next important design principle for this study is “conflict-resolution mechanisms: appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials” (ibid:100). Ostrom (1990) argues here that individuals must have a mechanism for discussing and resolving non-compliance if they are to collectively follow rules over a long period of time. Gear bans may also be seen as a way of resolving conflict between different groups of fishers, if a net is considered to be harmful to other resource users. Conflict-resolution is one of the main responsibilities of the panchayat, and previous research demonstrates that sanctions have actually been imposed on fishers who seek the support of the police rather than panchayats to settle disputes (Bavinck et al., 2015). Furthermore, community members do not pay for this service but the panchayats work on a voluntary basis (Bavinck, 2014a). The presence of conflict-resolution mechanisms does not equal enduring common pool resource institutions, but it is unlikely that such complex systems of rules could be maintained over time without them (Ostrom, 1990:101).
Finally, Ostrom says that “appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises” for
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all of the more complex, enduring common pool resources (ibid). In cases where the common pool resource in question is part of a larger, more complex system, users are organised on different levels and in local, regional, and national contexts (Ostrom, 1990). Hardin (1982) suggests that in larger groups and systems, collective action problems might be resolved as a result of smaller, often spontaneous, subgroup interactions. Evidence from Tamil Nadu finds individual fishing villages “loosely embedded” in larger bodies at the taluk level and regional level (Bavinck et al., 2015) all of which are nested within the authority of government actors at different levels. However, there are substantial differences within the small-scale fisheries subsector in different villages – “particularly in gear types and target species” – that may need to be addressed in order for fishers to scale up their collective resource management efforts (Bavinck et al., 2015).
There are additional principles identified by Ostrom (1990), but the ones outlined in this section are relevant to the thesis and have provided theoretical guidance throughout the research.
2.4 External Actors
The theoretical framework has so far focused on the collective action of resource appropriators, but here I will discuss the role of external actors. Following on from her design principles, and the idea of multiple nested governance layers, Ostrom concluded that the community collective management of common pool resources was more likely to be sustainable “if it was nested within a broader system of polycentric governance, one that allowed for multiple mechanisms of collective decision-making and conflict resolution at multiple levels of aggregation…requiring cross-sector collaboration among multiple levels of governance units” (McGinnis, 2016:1). The term “polycentric” is said to refer to “many centres of decision making”, either functioning independently or forming an interdependent governance system (V. Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren 1961:831–32, in Ostrom, 2010:643). Ostrom states that the move away from assuming that only the government can solve common pool resource problems, whilst still recognising the important role of governments in common pool resource management is a “big step forward”; in her work on polycentric governance she says that ideally more national, regional and local officials will learn to work together, alongside nongovernmental organisations and local citizens (Ostrom, 2010:664). She also highlights the need for further research into the conditions that ensure self-organisation within multilevel, polycentric systems (ibid:642).
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Evidence from the Coromandel Coast finds that panchayats have difficulty implementing gear regulations beyond the local level, and fisher leaders frequently highlight the need for governmental support for these movements (Bavinck, 2014a). Nonetheless, in areas of limited statehood legitimate governance configurations are still present, as established in the panchayats. Government authorities are just one actor among many, applying different rules and systems, leading to parallel layers of governance (Risse, 2012) and situations of legal pluralism (Bavinck et al., 2015).
Risse says that the state should “at least possess the ability to authoritatively make, implement, and enforce central decisions for a collectivity” (2012:6). Previous research has established that the successful regulation of fisheries must originate from fishermen themselves, and that robust resource settings cannot be achieved without the active participation of fishers in governance at the local, national and regional level (Tietze, 2016). However, when state regulations are formulated the local organisations and traditional fisheries governance actors are rarely consulted.
“The exercise of applying precaution to natural resource management needs to be undertaken against a background of value judgements as to the bounds of ecological acceptability and the socio-economic costs that are justifiably incurred in securing a
sustainable level of exploitation.” (Mathew, 2009:106)
Elaborating on this idea, Mathew (2009) explains that over-precautious sustainability measures in fisheries governance may benefit ecosystems but at a cost to fishers and their local communities. On the other hand, under-precaution will be at the cost of ecosystems. Strengthening efforts towards fisheries co-governance could be beneficial for understanding the socioeconomic implications of such prohibitions.
According to Symes (2006) co-governance increases the rationality of regulatory systems. Fisheries co-governance also incorporates the diversity of fishing behaviour at the local level, and the wealth of knowledge held by fishers, in a way that top-down governance systems do not (Symes, 2006). This allows for state intervention in larger scale situations where ur panchayats struggle to implement agreements, and helps to bridge fishers and fisher organisations with other governance actors. It is important to establish the right degree of
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intervention, as too much interference can be as harmful to organisational development as too little support (FAO, 2014).
2.5 Conceptual Scheme
The diagram below demonstrates the links between the main concepts that guide this thesis, drawn from the theoretical framework in sections 2.1 to 2.4: harm, collective action, and regulation. The three concepts were fully operationalised to assist firstly with the data collection process, and secondly with answering my research questions (see appendix).
The introduction of a new fishing gear is the starting point for this research. Each net type may cause harm to the levels of fish stocks along the Coromandel Coast, on which the livelihoods of the fishers depend. There may also be issues of social justice if the catch is only reduced for fishers not operating the net, causing harm to specific groups of fishers, or to the community as a whole unit. The potential social and ecological harm caused by overfishing is represented in the left of the scheme. It is unlikely that one aspect of harm would occur independently from
FISHER PERCEPTIONS SOCIAL HARM HARM TO FISH STOCKS MOTIVATION N OSTROM’S DESIGN PRINCIPLES INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY EXTERNAL ACTORS REGULATION COLLECTIVE ACTION PROHIBITION
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the others, and so the impact arrows go in both directions between the two. The dimensions of harm are based solely on the perceptions of fishermen, as it is outside of the scope of this research to scientifically prove or disprove that any net is affecting the fish stock (and I did not set out to do this in my field work).
The collective action of fishers is motivated by the way they perceive the impacts of new gear, as represented by the first red arrow. If the fishers act collectively to prohibit or restrict the use of harmful nets, then the regulation of the common pool resource will be successful, as demonstrated in the right side of the scheme. However, if they all act in their own self-interest then it is thought that any harm to the fish stocks or to the fishing community will continue, and this is where the scheme loops back.
The grey boxes at the top of the scheme show different conditions required for successfully self-governed common pool resources, as highlighted in the literature, including the involvement of external actors. These conditions feed into the main concepts as factors which may impact on the success of collective coastal resource management by Tamil Nadu fishers.
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3. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
In this chapter I will present the geographical context of the research location and background information on the thesis topic, based on existing literature as well as conversations and observations in the field. I will first provide information on Tamil Nadu fisheries, followed by the study region of Nagapattinam and Karaikal, and specifically the practice of ring seining.
3.1 Tamil Nadu Fisheries
Tamil Nadu has a coastline that stretches 1,076 km – approximately 15 per cent of the total coastal length of India – and is one of the leading producers of marine fish, ranking fourth in the country (Cacatian, 2010). At the time of the most recent census, the total population of the state was 802,912 within 192,697 marine fisher households, and 96 per cent of these were classified as traditional fishermen families (CMFRI, 2010a:1). At this point, 66 per cent of the population was said to be living below the poverty line (ibid:2). The majority of the fishing population in Tamil Nadu belongs to the Pattinavar caste, classified as a most backward caste, and they rely almost entirely on the sea for their livelihoods (Bavinck et al., 2014:595).
Of the 46,070 crafts in the fishery, 10,692 are mechanised, 24,942 are motorized and the rest are non-motorized (CMFRI, 2010a:3). Prior to India’s independence however, these figures were vastly different. Fishers previously went to the sea in wooden catamarans, with small nets, and practiced traditional fishing methods. After gaining independence from British rule in 1947, the capture fisheries of India underwent a period of rapid industrialisation, following an initiative of the government known as “the blue revolution” (Bavinck, 2014b:37). Although trawler vessels dominated the revolution, small-scale fisheries also continued to grow with modernised equipment and new fishing techniques. The blue revolution has been framed as a development effort by the Indian government to lift the fishing population out of backwardness and poverty (Bavinck & Johnson, 2008). According to Bavinck (2014b:39), Tamil Nadu state was at the forefront of this process. On the one hand, the industrialisation of capture fisheries was a big success; India’s marine landings multiplied, and so did the value of the catches (Bavinck, 2014b:38). On the other hand, fishers along the Coromandel Coast now complain about a reduction in inshore resources. As a result, The Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act of 1983 states that trawlers must operate at least three nautical miles from the shore.
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However, members of the fishing community claim that this rule is not adhered to. Nonetheless, small-scale fishermen still account for almost half of the annual fish catch in Tamil Nadu (Bavinck, 2014b:40).
In terms of fisheries governance, the Tamil Nadu Fisheries Department is responsible for facilitating development as well as resource management. The Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act (1983) is in place for the “regulation, restriction and prohibition of fishing by fishing vessels in the sea along the whole or part of the coast line of the State”. Yet all fishing villages of Tamil Nadu also have their own traditional panchayat. Each one has authority over the fishing population and all other organisational bodies in the village. Bavinck & Karunaharan (2006:46) describe the panchayats as non-governmental bodies, “with roots in traditional caste administration”. This used to be a role passed down through generations, but each fishing village now elects their own panchayat from among the male population. An important element of the work of the panchayats is concerned with the regulation of environmentally and socially harmful fishing methods. They also represent the village in matters in the outside world with other actors, from the state for example (Bavinck et al., 2015). For this reason, fishers say that younger, better educated, panchayat members are increasingly being chosen.
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3.2 Nagapattinam and Karaikal
Figure 1: location of Tamil Nadu state and Nagapattinam-Karaikal district (Google Maps, 2016)
The study area of Nagapattinam shown in figure 1 stretches 187km of the Coromandel Coast, and accounts for 11 per cent of the fishing community of Tamil Nadu (CMFRI, 2010a). The north of Nagapattinam borders Cuddalore district, the neighbouring district to the west is Thiruvarur, the Bay of Bengal lies to the east, and south is the Palk Strait between India and Sri Lanka. Nagapattinam was the worst affected part of India in the 2004 tsunami, where over 80 villages were affected. As well as a loss of thousands of lives, there were heavy damages to fishing boats and gear (NGO Coordination and Resource Centre, 2005). As a result of post-tsunami development efforts – where fishers were given new boats for free – and the blue revolution, Nagapattinam now has more fishing crafts than anywhere else in Tamil Nadu (Hoefsloot, 2014:20).
Although Karaikal is situated along the Nagapattinam coastline (see figure two), it officially belongs to the Union Territory of Puducherry, which means that it is governed by the central government rather than that of Tamil Nadu. However, the fisheries policy of Karaikal is similar to that of the Nagapattinam district (Bavinck, Vivekanandan & Sajith, 2015) and the fishers say that they are all one community, separate only in political affairs. So, given its geographic position, this area is also included in the research. The combined fishing population of Nagapattinam and Karaikal is 95,663 (CMFRI, 2010a; 2010b).
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Figure 2: Taluks of the district (Nagapattinam District Maps, 2016)
The coast of the district is divided into six administrative taluks: Sirkali, Tharangampadi, Karaikal, Nagapattinam, Kilvelur and Vedaranyan. Each one has its own head village. These taluks then collectively consist of 64 individual fishing villages1. The sample of villages that I visited are mapped in chapter four. Nambiyar Nagar is the traditional head village of the entire Nagapattinam-Karaikal district, but is now in competition with neighbouring village Akkarai Pettai for this role. This is partly due to the large, wealthy trawler population of Akkarai Pettai (Bavinck, 2014a); they took over a harbour in a neighbouring small village and have since gained a lot of power in the region, so there is a struggle between the two village panchayats.
1 The marine fisheries census counts 57 villages in Nagapattinam (CMFRI, 2010a) and 10 in Karaikal (CMFRI,
2010b) making 67 villages in the study region altogether. However, fishers refer to the 64-village community of Nagapattinam and Karaikal, so 64 is the figure that will officially be used in this thesis.
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3.3 Ring Seine Fishery
Ring seining is very much a post-tsunami phenomenon along the Coromandel Coast. Each ring seine unit requires approximately 50 operators. One mechanised boat will go to the sea with ten to fifteen smaller fibreglass boats, as shown in images one and two. They work by moving to different areas along the coast in search of fish shoals, locally referred to as mobs of fish. Fishers previously relied on their experience of shoal behaviour, wind and current patterns, movement of sea birds, and so on to locate the target species. Now echo sound technology and global positioning systems (GPS) are increasingly used to locate and identify the shoals (Abdussamad et al., 2015).
The large net, shown occupying the mechanised boat in image one has buoys at the top to keep it afloat, and weights at the bottom to pull it down. The fibreglass boats will all separately help to position the net in a circle, creating a vertical wall surrounding the shoal of fish in the water. A mechanism on the large boat then pulls a rope threaded through the weighted end of the net, enclosing the fish inside from the bottom. The catch is distributed over the fibreglass boats and transported back to the shore or harbour (Hoefsloot, 2014:27-28). They will do this every day, leaving at approximately 4am. On a good catch day, they may return with fifteen fibreglass boats full of fish, like the one shown in image two.
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Image 1: A group of ring seine fishers with their net and mechanised boat
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Previous research in other parts of Tamil Nadu finds a system where ten to fifteen local fishermen come together to invest in a ring seine unit, and hire the rest of the labourers to work alongside them, including immigrant workers from agricultural communities. The profits are split 50:50 between the joint owners and crew members (BOBLME, 2015). In Nagapattinam however, equal shareholder groups are in place where 50 small-scale fishers jointly own the nets and boats required for ring seining. Each one is required to invest an equal amount, on average between INR 50,000 and INR 1.2 lakhs, for a total investment of INR 80 lakh to INR 1 crore (Hoefsloot, 2014:29). Any remaining amount may be taken as a loan by the group.
Image 3: Fish drying in the sun
The main species targeted by ring seiners is Indian oil sardine – a highly migratory pelagic fish – which has emerged as a major resource along the east coast over the last twenty years. Since the local consumption of oil sardine is low in Tamil Nadu, most of the catch is marketed elsewhere, predominantly in Kerala (Jayaprakasah, 2004). A small amount is kept and dried in the sun for preservation or to make fish meal for other animals, as can be seen in image three. The oil sardine fishery fluctuates widely on a seasonal, annual and decadal scale, making it difficult to manage. In addition, the small mesh size of the nets used results in high numbers of
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juvenile fish being caught, which can impact on the fishery in the following season (Mohan Joseph & Jayaprakash, 2003).
As a result of the controversy surrounding the impacts of the ring seine, panchayats have made several efforts to regulate its use along the Coromandel Coast, and fishers have engaged in protests, even going as far as burning ring seines (BOBLME, 2015). Furthermore, it has been officially illegal to operate the net in the region since the year 2000. In May 2013, a meeting was held with members from all 64 panchayats of Nagapattinam and Karaikal. A collective decision was made to ban ring seining at the regional level; as a result of the large investments made by fishers, they were given three years to phase out their operations to cover their costs. Some groups were also given permission to start up new ring seine units, providing that they ended their operations at the time of the three-year deadline, but new units continue to emerge. The ban has only been successfully maintained in certain villages and the results are compromised by the use of ring seines in adjacent villages (Bavinck, 2014a).
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4. METHODOLOGY
4.1 Research Questions
Based on the theoretical framework and the contextual information provided in the previous chapters, I aim to answer the following questions in my thesis.
Main question:
Why is the collective action of fishers difficult to realise in prohibiting ring seine fishing in the Nagapattinam-Karaikal region?
Sub-questions:
1. What is the geographical distribution of the use of the ring seine in Nagapattinam and Karaikal?
2. How have fishermen’s perceptions of the ring seine motivated the decision to prohibit the net in the region?
3. How has ring seine use been regulated by the panchayats since the decision to ban it in 2013?
4. How is the ban of the ring seine supported by the government of Tamil Nadu?
4.2 Units of Observation
The units of observation are individual members of the fishing community. This includes panchayat members, who are responsible for the self-governance of fisheries and have previously attempted to regulate the use of the ring seine. The need for a broad understanding of the ring seine situation, from different perspectives, encourages the inclusion of both ring seine fishers and other fishers when it comes to data collection. Individual women of the community are also included in this unit of observation, for their different (primarily financial) role within the fisheries. The unit of analysis is the regional fishing community of Nagapattinam and Karaikal, and the analysis of collective action in the region is based on data collected from individuals.
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4.3 Selection of Villages
It became apparent early in the field that the use and prohibition of the ring seine is a sensitive issue, and one that people are wary of discussing with strangers. Therefore, I had to choose villages to visit where I could establish local connections beforehand. I was lucky enough to be living in the family home of a panchayat member and SIFFS employee, named Baskar. He was able to provide contact details for participants in several villages, and to verify who I was, which improved access to target respondents. The villages of Akkarai Pettai, Nambiyar Nagar and Karaikal Medu were prioritised as I was initially told that they are considered to be the head villages. The rest were selected based on geographical spread (within feasible proximity to my village of residence). I did not visit any villages in the far south of the region because I was told that there is no ring seine presence here, and it would have been difficult to reach there and return in the same day. The remaining villages were Keezhakasakudimudu, Kalikuppam, Akkampettai, Kilinjal Medu, T.R. Pattinam, Tharangambadi, Samandhanpettai, Chandrapadi and Poompuhar. The locations of all of these are mapped in figure three. Several villages were selected to get a regional sense of the issue at hand, and to ensure that the participants were spread out across Nagapattinam and Karaikal. It should be made clear that the purpose of this was not to carry out a comparative study between the different villages.
31 Poompuhar Tharangambadi Chandrapadi Kalikuppam Akkampettai Keezhakasakudimudu Kilinjal Medu Karaikal Medu T.R. Pattinam Samandhanpettai Akkarai Pettai
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4.4 Sampling
In the initial stages of data collection, a purposive sampling approach was adopted. The sample of participants was selected for their relevance to the research questions (Bryman, 2012) and I obtained their contact details in advance. This technique ensured that (i) there was variety and equal representation of different members of the fishing community, and (ii) current or recent panchayat members were interviewed in all chosen villages. Most active fishermen – members of the panchayat, in particular – are busy and are unlikely to be found sitting around on the beach in the middle of the day. This approach therefore saved wasted bus journeys to other villages.
Thereafter, snowball sampling was used to reach more participants with relevant knowledge or characteristics to the research (Bryman, 2012). Some respondents provided me with the contact details of potentially useful participants known to them. Others called further respondents to ask them to join us, or to arrange further interviews later in the day. The topic of the ring seine was often a sensitive one to discuss, and some participants were suspicious of the research. Snowball sampling helped towards developing a level of trust with these participants, as they were aware that their peers had already been interviewed before referral.
4.5 Methods of Data Collection
4.5.1 Participant Observation
The first stage of my research was participant observation. I visited harbours and beaches to see the boats used for ring seining and the amount of fish caught by the net, and to observe the people involved in processing the catch. I also went to open spaces where fishers were mending their equipment, to get an idea of the size of the nets and how the mechanisms work. In these early stages when I was with the local supervisor, we began speaking to people about the ring seine as we stopped in different villages, to gain a sense of the general feelings towards the net across the district. Living with a local family helped me to establish a degree of trust within the different villages. It also allowed me to understand better the close relationships within the fishing community. Observational methods continued throughout. I kept full field notes to reflect on my observations, including my own initial interpretations and impressions, and I took photographs as supporting data where possible and necessary (Bryman, 2012).
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4.5.2 Interviews
The majority of the field work period was spent conducting semi-structured interviews with individuals or groups of participants, with the assistance of a translator. In each case, I asked a question in English and the translator asked the same question to the participant(s) in Tamil. He then translated the response from Tamil to English. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) suggest that such qualitative methods are useful for studying collective action, especially in cases like Nagapattinam fisheries, where all the manifestations and institutions of collective action are not understood. Although the interviews all followed a loose structure (see operationalisation in appendix), the questions varied depending on whether or not the participant takes part in ring seine fishing, and whether they are, or were, in the panchayat. The open nature of semi-structured interviews allowed me to ask further questions where I felt like the information being provided was of particular relevance to the research (Bryman, 2012). This process also allowed participants to elaborate on rules, norms, and attitudes that may have a strong influence on collective action but are not outlined in the design principles already discussed (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). Most of the interviews were recorded using an iPhone; for those that were not audio recorded, I took notes throughout the interview and then typed them in full the same evening.
In total, I conducted 38 interviews; 18 of the interviews were with an individual participant, and 20 were conducted in a group setting (referenced as i1-i38 in chapters five to seven). I have categorised any interview with more than one person present as a group interview. Although one participant may have answered all or the majority of the questions in some cases, it is possible for their answers to have been influenced by the presence of others. There were 71 individuals involved in the research altogether, some of whom were interviewed more than once.
During the interviews, several participants provided figures for the number of households or families in their village. However, the numbers used in the results are taken from the Marine Fisheries Census 2010 for Nagapattinam and Karaikal, as I considered this data to be more accurate and consistent throughout the region. Participants throughout the region provided information on the distribution of ring seine units, and I made a point of asking Baskar, interviewees, and community members in conversation, about their knowledge on the number of units in other villages. When visiting the mentioned villages, I then asked for the same
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information from local participants for triangulation purposes. In each case, the reported number of ring seine units in each village matched the data I collected when visiting myself; the same figures were confirmed by the people fishing in those villages.
4.6 Data Analysis
All interviews were transcribed and analysed in Atlas.ti, for organisation purposes. I assigned codes to help me identify themes and develop an argument, generally informed by the questions I am trying to answer. During the interview process, several closed questions were asked, regarding the number of ring seine units in different villages, the number of years they have been using the net, and population figures throughout the region. A quantitative strand is thus embedded in the research design, with numerical data that addresses sub-question number one (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Elements of this were analysed in SPSS.
4.7 Methodological Limitations
Two main factors made data collection more difficult than expected. The first, and perhaps most obvious, was the language barrier. Although I conducted all interviews with a translator, there were difficulties in understanding between him and myself. Some questions were lost in translation, had to be oversimplified, or skipped altogether. At other times, the translator would elaborate on the answers given based on conversations we had had previously, rather than translating what the participant said. I am aware that these realities – along with limited English vocabulary – have an impact on the strength of the data and the level of detail obtained. In addition, informal conversations frequently occurred outside of data collection procedures where interesting additional points were made. However, I cannot understand Tamil, and it was not appropriate to interrupt, so I had to rely on the translator to relay the information afterwards.
The second limitation was the political sensitivity of the ring seine situation at present. Although it is common knowledge that this net is widely used in the region, it is still legally banned and is difficult to discuss openly with some people. This was problematic at times when trying to get honest answers from the respondents. The Assistant Director of Fisheries in the south of Nagapattinam, for instance, agreed to a meeting but then would not answer any questions about the ring seine – even in a more general sense. In an interview with the panchayat members from the head village, one respondent would not answer any of the
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questions openly but would also not let the others speak. Future data collection opportunities were then limited in a key area of the region. There were a few respondents who wondered why I was asking so many questions about the ring seine and thought that I might be working for the government, but this was rare and easily overcome.
Another issue that arose was arranging an interview with an individual and repeatedly being faced with a group interview setting. I conducted the majority of interviews in respondents’ homes, panchayat offices, or community spaces. Passing friends and family members would want to know who we were and what was happening, and – after being informed about the research – many people would then join the interview part way through or stay to listen. Other individual contacts had simply invited others to join upon organising the meeting. Although this increased the number of participants, and viewpoints, the presence of one may have affected the answers of another. Furthermore, it is harder to translate the responses when several people are speaking at once, so there are more likely to be missing details from group interviews. Similar problems applied particularly when trying to include women in the study, as the translator would automatically direct questions to any man present, and – though I was looking for a different perspective – both male and female would look to the man as possibly more qualified to answer.
Despite my intentions to go to the field without any preconceptions, I do not believe that any researcher is truly objective in their study; I am aware that my world views and personal values are likely to have influenced my interpretation of the research setting (Bryman, 2012). Subjectivity limitations should also be extended to the translator, as long answers from respondents were, at times, summarised in a couple of sentences. Thus, my results depend upon which information was, or was not, considered to be important by the translator.
4.8 Ethical Considerations
When considering the ethical implications of my research, there were four main things to avoid; harm to participants, lack of informed consent, invasion of privacy, and deception (Diener & Crandall, 1978 in Bryman, 2012:135). As a result, all records have been kept confidential and will not be used outside of the purposes of this study. As much identifying information as possible has been removed when referring to participants in the thesis. Respondents were fully informed about the research before they decided whether or not to participate, and were aware
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that they could withdraw their consent or information at any time. I obtained verbal consent, rather than written, from all participants.
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5. THE REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE RING SEINE
In order to understand the challenge of ring seine regulation, it is important to examine the extent of the use of the net in the study region (sub-question one). This chapter opens with data on existing numbers of ring seine units and discusses how the net has been introduced and spread across the region over time. Following this is an attempt to understand the size of the ring seining population in relation to the overall population of the fishing villages of Nagapattinam and Karaikal. The geographic boundaries of the fishery are then discussed. I aim to illustrate the extensive distribution of the ring seine within the district, and how this is influenced by the use of the net outside of the region. I argue that a regional-level ban does not solve the ecological and social issues associated with the ring seine whilst the resources are open to access by fishers at the state level.
5.1 Numbers of Ring Seine Units
Village Units Poompuhar 25 Tharangambadi 3 Chandrapadi 11 Kalikuppam 2 Akkampettai 2 Keezhakasakudimudu 1 Kilinjal Medu 0 Karaikal Medu 1 T.R. Pattinam 2 Samandhanpettai 0 Nambiyar Nagar 9 Akkarai Pettai 0
Table 1: Units of ring seine currently in operation in each of the sample villages
Table one shows all figures collected with regards to the number of ring seine units in each of the villages where I carried out data collection. Although people may have been using the same techniques in the past to target oil sardine, the data refers specifically to the large ring seine units currently owned and operated by 50-60 individuals. Of the twelve villages listed in the table, only three are reported to have no ring seine units. As this is based on a sample only, it
