Carving Agency out of Ice: Regional Agency in Russia's Arctic Development

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MA Russian and Eurasian Studies Thesis

CARVING AGENCY OUT OF ICE:

REGIONAL AGENCY IN RUSSIA’S ARCTIC DEVELOPMENT

30 June 2020

By Liam van Son Supervised by Dr Max Bader Word count: 21,958 (excl. endnotes)

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Abstract

Key Words: Russian Arctic Development, Transport Infrastructure, Federalism.

This thesis seeks to analyse the institutional framework guiding Russia’s growing interest in Arctic development. In particular, the research aimed to answer the question: How much agency do the constituent entities of the Russian Federation have in the socio-economic development of the Arctic? The focus of the research is on transport infrastructure, the reason being that Arctic development hinges on the creation of an effective transport system so that other, more lucrative economic interests can be accessed and exploited. The research engaged with the legislative and strategic documents of both the federal authorities and the regions through a doctrinal analysis of policy mechanisms.

The thesis contends that regions do have significant agency in the development of transport infrastructure, in so far as said transport infrastructure forms a part of the Support Zone mechanism. In doing so, the thesis shows that the Arctic regions enjoy the independence necessary to identify areas of economic interest in their regions, formulate a cluster of development projects, implement a corresponding program, and monitor the program’s progress. Additionally, the thesis was able to identify the limits of regional agency, which exist depending on the importance of a given socio-economic development project to the federal authorities. We see this determinant in practice in the hierarchical distinction between the Northern Sea Route and the land-based transport systems (including river and air transport). Due to the geopolitical potential of the Northern Sea Route, it occupies a place of supreme importance in Arctic development, and is therefore governed by the Centre. In contrast, land-based transport systems are principally of national, and economic importance, and thus their development is delegated to the regions.

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List of Abbreviations

Art. Article

AZRF Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union GRP Gross Regional Product

LNG Liquefied Natural Gas

OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development NSR Northern Sea Route

RSP Regional State Program

USGS United States Geological Survey YNAO Yamal Nenets Autonomous Okrug

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Note on citations

The following thesis makes use of the author-date variation in the Chicago-style of source citations. However, limitations to the Chicago-style exist in the citation of policy documents, owing to the fact that differentiation between documents becomes difficult if the author does not vary. For this reason, the core policy documents that make up the primary sources of the research will be cited by their short title, followed by the date of enactment, and, if relevant, the specific article or section of the document – only the Strategy document of the Murmansk Oblast (Murmansk Strategy 2013) has page numbers, the rest of the primary sources do not.

The use of short titles is done with a view to clarifying the exact originating policy document from which a claim is made. For example, instead of citing (Putin 2013; Putin 2014), the citation will read (Federal Strategy 2013; Federal Law 2014) in order to more accurately indicate the source. Of course, the citations of the respective documents, including the authors, will be listed when they are first introduced in Chapter 2, titled Documents, method, cases, so that the reader has less trouble finding the relevant document in the bibliography. To reiterate, the use of short title citations in this thesis only applies to the main primary sources listed in said chapter. All other citations follow the normal, author-date format.

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Acknowledgments

Big thanks to the family, without whom I would have had to write the thesis anyway...

Big thanks to Dr Max Bader for his supervision, and for agreeing to the monthly deadlines that helped me immeasurably.

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Introduction

Russia’s recent Arctic pivot signals the emergence of a new ground for global economic competition, particularly as globalization and climate change offer new possibilities for resource exploitation (Stephen 2018; Staalesen 2019a; Astrasheuskaya and Foy 2019). Moscow’s strategic shift is evidenced by renewed military and economic projects designed to reap benefit from their territorial primacy in the Arctic. In fact, the Russian Arctic increasingly constitutes a strategic node in Russian policy making, due to the territory’s immense resource wealth and access to the Arctic ocean. This importance has been stressed since President Medvedev, under whose Presidency the Arctic was dubbed Russia’s “resource base,” and by President Putin, whose current administration is set to unfold the new Strategy for Arctic development until 2035 at some point this year (Medvedev 2008).

The Arctic is thus viewed in “potentialities,” establishing itself as a rare area for “proactive” approaches in Russian domestic and foreign policy (Laruelle 2014: xxii-xxiii). That said, the growing significance of the Arctic does not give rise to its easy exploitation. On the contrary, the Arctic remains as inhospitable a place as ever. Arctic development contends with severe climate and spatial factors that make government investment a costly endeavour. Limitations of this kind necessitate that socio-economic development plans for the Arctic are both desirable and executed efficiently. Considering that Arctic development is undoubtedly desirable for its resource wealth, it remains to be seen how the efficiency of its execution is planned for, and managed.

An integral aspect of said management is the role of the various regions situated in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (Henceforth, AZRF). Throughout Russia’s history, Arctic policy has been a centralized affair, amounting to a chronic mismanagement of resources, problematic policies towards native communities, and catastrophic environmental

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degradation from industrial waste (Hill and Gaddy 2003; Orttung and Reisser 2014; Laruelle 2014). It is within the context of a highly centralized state that efficient public policy becomes a matter of sincere concern. As such, the following thesis aims to explore the institutional mechanisms in place for the development and implementation of Arctic policy. Specifically, the research focusses on the devolvement of agency to the regions, so that they may participate in what is, essentially, their own development.

In light of Russia’s centralized policy making mechanisms, this thesis asks the following question: How much agency do the constituent entities of the Russian Federation have in the socio-economic development of the Arctic? With a focus on transport infrastructure, the thesis contends that regions do have significant agency in the planning and implementation of development. However, through the focus on transport infrastructure, the research reveals that limits to regional agency exist. Regions are the dominant actors in the development of transport infrastructure, in so far as said infrastructure forms a part of the Support Zone mechanism. Transport infrastructure related to the development of the Northern Sea Route is a matter elevated to Central control due to the route’s geopolitical importance to the Centre.

Structured as follows, the thesis first outlines the relevant body of literature on the Russian Arctic, taking care to construct its importance to the federal authorities (hereafter the Centre). Second, the work establishes the method of research and introduces three regional cases – Murmansk Oblast, Yamal Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) – and the documents under investigation. Third, the work engages in a doctrinal analysis of the previously introduced strategic documents, done with a view to identifying the exact areas of regional agency, and establishing how that agency fits into Russia’s federal system. The thesis concludes with a comment on the implications of these institutional changes for Russian federalism and for Arctic development.

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1. Situating the Russian Arctic in literature

The following review highlights important bodies of literature that will support further research into the question: How much agency do the constituent entities of the Russian Federation have in the socio-economic development of the Arctic? First, the work reviews the place of the Arctic in Russia’s political priorities, identifying conceptual features that are embedded in, and circumscribe, the policy orientations of Russian leaders. These are primarily Symbolic and Economic constructions of importance based on spatial-climate dimensions, history, and material wealth. A conclusion that we draw from the literature is that this importance results in the Centre’s propensity to use exploitative models for development. In turn, these models create untenable economic conditions for self-sustaining growth. Second, we review how the centralizing tendencies of Russian federalism have created and sustained institutional barriers to further Arctic development. Combining the value of the AZRF with a general view of the institutional context reveals the overarching limitations of Arctic development – importantly, as they appear in the Centre’s renewed drive to conquer its own hinterland. Within this context, we can begin to trace the significance of, and need for, devolved agency.

1.1 The Arctic Leviathan

Since Putin’s ascension to the Presidency, scholarship notes an increase in the prominence of the Arctic to the Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy considerations, particularly as Russia deals with the loss of its Great Power status (Baev 2012; Baev 2015). When looking into the subnational strategies of economic development, the question arises over the mechanisms in place to govern what is essentially one of the most strategic macro-regions of the Russian Federation. It is within the context of symbolism and economic power that the importance of

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the Arctic Zone, or rather, how that importance is manifest, influences the modes of decision-making, and the priorities of decision makers.

1.1.1 A Symbolic Far North

Scholarship agrees that the Arctic occupies an important place in Russian political discourse and identity. It is a source of prestige and awe, forming an enormous, wild territory with seemingly limitless resources and an unforgiving climate (Tynkkynen 2018: 1: Laruelle 2014; Medvedev 2018; Romashkina et al 2017). Accordingly, a general agreement exists in the literature that the Arctic has symbolic value to the Kremlin. This symbolic power features in the Centre’s configuration of domestic and foreign policy priorities.

Several scholars, notably Marlene Laruelle, Andrei Tsygankov, Sergei Medvedev, Fiona Hill, and Clifford Gaddy, link the significance of the Russian Arctic to a nexus of identity and power. The nexus in question constructs the Arctic as a symbolic pillar of the Kremlin’s power. Notions of Arctic power, cultivated by the Soviets, have been revived and perpetuated by Putin’s successive administrations after languishing in the Yeltsin era. In fact, some scholars argue that its symbolism supersedes material-strategic considerations, in light of its importance to Russia’s projection of power. The thinking goes that, territoriality plays such a major role in the construction of the political community so as to become the key marker of power and sovereignty (Medvedev 2018: 208; Laruelle 2014; Hill and Gaddy 2003).

The spatial aspect of Russia’s constructed socio-political identity has long been an undercurrent of Russian policy making, as it serves to reflect the Kremlin’s power (Laruelle 2014; Medvedev 2018). This is because Russian political discourse tends to derive its intrinsic sense of uniqueness, and exceptionalism from geographic immensity. The same can arguably be said of the Arctic. According to Laruelle (2014), the size and resource wealth of the Arctic

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traditionally affirmed Russia’s superpower status, and accorded previous regimes near-complete autarky (Laruelle 2014: 24). Beginning in the 1920’s, the Soviet Union took an active role in Arctic development, through which most of the current infrastructure was established (Zenzinov 1944: 68). Prior forays into the Arctic were few and far between, leaving much to be discovered and exploited by the Soviet government. Referring in 1944 to Soviet development of the Arctic, Zenzinov noted that, “the whole atmosphere of this work is so unusual, picturesque and exciting, that it undoubtedly stimulates imagination at the expense of respect for facts” (Zenzinov 1944: 68). Indeed, exploration and exploitation projects in the Far North were sources of Soviet pride, and offered the state domestic and international legitimacy through their publicized achievements over the expansive and inhospitable territory (Laruelle 2014).

When discussing the Far North, Soviet press actively blurred the distinction between information and propaganda in the years of High Stalinism. Stalin viewed Russia’s Far North as a tabula rasa upon which the state could project the industrious values of Stalin’s brand of socialism (Laruelle 2012: 567). Northern exploits were publicized in newspapers, books, and radio broadcasts, highlighting the spatial elements of their technological feats as evidence of Soviet greatness (Laruelle 2012: 567). These feats, including the traversing expeditions across the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in record time, and the development of transarctic aviation – at which the USSR was the frontrunner – were exceptional not only due to the harshness of the physical climate of the northern regions, but also because of the scale of the distance. Russia’s Far North became an essential myth – the “Red Arctic” – and its ‘mastery’ by the Soviets was likened, not unfairly, to mythical conquest (Laruelle 2014: 27; Laruelle 2012: 567).

The collapse of the Soviet Union wreaked disaster to Russia’s self-image as a Great Power. To Laruelle (2012), this is precisely because of the association of Russia’s status with its unique geographic context (Laruelle 2012: 558). Indeed, Putin asserted as much in a speech

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at the reopening of the Russian Geographical Society in 2009 when he stated that, “When we say great, a great country, a great state—certainly, size matters.... When there is no size, there is no influence, no meaning” (Laruelle 2012: 557). Similarly, Andrei Tsygankov (2003) underscores the importance of spatial elements in contemporary Russia’s political discourse, noting the many manifestations of spatial uniqueness that underpin various ‘Eurasianist’ schools of thought (Tsygankov 2003: 106). Tsygankov regards the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a cultural trauma that brought Russia’s political, geopolitical, and economic future into contestation (Tsygankov 2003: 102). Though no regions of the Far North were ceded to any newly independent states, the Kremlin’s capacity to provide it public goods and ensure its economic growth was nullified in the 1990s and early 2000s (Hill and Gaddy 2003). The corresponding decay left behind an Arctic region aptly described “a giant frozen monument” (Medvedev 2018: 209). The space was, for all intents and purposes, ‘lost’. It is only in the Putin era, with a consolidated state and characteristic reassertion of Russia’s Great Power status, that a symbolic drive has once again been stirred to carry out the costly development of the North (Medvedev 2018).

Medvedev approaches Russia’s intentions and actions towards the Arctic from a Wendtian understanding of identity, wherein “identities are relatively stable, role-specific understandings about self that are acquired by participating in collective reasoning about certain objects” (Medvedev 2018: 207). Medvedev argues that the mutually constitutive roles that Russia shared with the West elevated the territorial and symbolic grandeur of the Arctic, which had presupposed its military and economic strength. This, he suggests, meant that the symbolic importance of the Artic “has far prevailed over its practical nature: in fact, Russia took pride in possessing one immense emptiness” (Medvedev 2018: 208). As the constitutive role gradually shifted away from confrontation with the West, the Arctic myth needed less cultivation. The economic development of the Arctic was downscaled because the immediate

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emphasis on manifest destiny lost its ring in the prevailing Arctic winds. Through this understanding, he claims that the Kremlin’s growing interest in the Arctic is partly shaped and advanced by the national memories and myths of the Far North’s development during parts of the Soviet era (Medvedev 2018: 207). And this resurgence is driven by Russia’s struggle to define its identity since the 1990s.

Putin’s emphasis on geopolitical and domestic power projection has once again elevated the symbolic value of the Arctic – signified by regular displays of “increased military activity, [and] megalomaniac economic plans” (Medvedev 2018: 207). Pavel Baev (2015) and Medvedev (2018) both argue that the driving force for this revitalized interest is that the Kremlin increasingly sees international politics through the lens of major competition for resources (Medvedev 2018: 211; Baev 2015). Notwithstanding a genuine intention to cooperate with other Arctic powers, as attested by a strong track record of Arctic cooperation (Baev and Trenin 2010; Buchanan 2019), the Kremlin is increasingly assertive regarding its prerogatives over the Arctic’s economic resources. Exploitation of these resources not only provides symbolic clout, but that symbolic clout now seems more entwined with the notion of economic indispensability (Laruelle 2014: 135).

1.1.2 An Economic ‘Far North’

Without variance, available literature on the Russian Arctic posits that the Far North is the lynchpin of Russia’s primary-resource wealth, and, therefore, its economy. Resources from the Far North first gained importance during the Soviet drive to modernize, and industrialize the economy throughout the twentieth century, establishing a trend that today’s Russian Federation adheres to.

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From an emphasis on mining and timber, economic priorities in the Arctic regions shifted to energy production in the 1960s and 1970s, and so it has remained (Orttung and Reisser 2014: 197). Particularly throughout Putin’s first two terms in office, high oil prices paved the way for Russia’s economic success (Shiraev 2013). The stabilization of the rouble, and yearly growth rates above 4.7 per cent between 2000 and 2008 owed much to the country’s hydrocarbon sectors (World Bank 2020; Shiraev 2013: 225-226). Today, the state’s dependence on hydrocarbons is marked. According to Andrey Movchan (2015), a non-resident expert linked to Carnegie Moscow, approximately 67 to 70 percent of Russia’s GDP depends directly or indirectly on oil (Movchan 2015). Movchan asserts that non-oil elements of the GDP are financed by diverse revenue sources, including a myriad tax categories, which are, in fact, attributable to the hydrocarbon sector. A more recent article in the Moscow Times affirms a lower figure of 60 percent, based not only on oil, but on other hydrocarbons and natural resources. Said primary resources, which are dominated by hydrocarbons, accounted for approximately 55.2 trillion roubles ($844.58 billion) in 2017 (The Moscow Times 2019). Tatiana Mitrova (2019) notes that, despite conflicting interests in Russia’s overall Energy Strategy – between diversification, or a greater emphasis on hydrocarbons – hydrocarbon revenues comprised 39 percent of the federal budget revenues as recently as 2017 (Mitrova 2019: 3).

Moscow’s economic dependency on hydrocarbons is one of the primary drivers of its development of the Far North. The Kremlin views the Far North foremost as an economic asset to be secured and exploited. Former President Medvedev evidenced this when he described the Arctic regions of Russia as a resource base, thus signalling the strategic importance of the area for its extractive potential (Medvedev 2008; Laruelle 2014: xxii). President Medvedev’s label is apt by all measures, considering that the country produces approximately 75 percent of its oil, 95 percent of its natural gas, and much of its metals and minerals in the Far North (Laruelle

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2014: 135). To add, an oft evoked report by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) in 2008 estimates that the Arctic shelf holds approximately 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered gas resources, and 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil (USGS 2008). A considerable amount of the alleged resources falls in territory that Russia contends is theirs (Orttung and Reisser 2014: 198). If claimed, the alleged resources available to Russia would double Saudi Arabia’s 2010 reserves (Trenin and Baev 2010: 5). This type of potential would naturally inspire the Centre to concentrate their efforts in the further development and exploitation of the Far North.

It is no surprise that since 2008, Russia has made concerted efforts to make use of the resources of the Far North, including the revitalization of the NSR as the main transport artery to serve the otherwise dislocated regions. Their stated intentions were first formalized in 2008 with the ‘Foundations of Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond’, and in the subsequent ‘Strategy for the development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and national security for the period until 2020,’ enacted in 2013 (Medvedev 2008; Federal Strategy 2013; Egorov 2013). The Far North’s centrality to Russia’s successive Energy Strategies is also noted by Tatiana Mitrova and Vitaly Yermakov. This is especially the case as an expected reduction in oil production from 2025 onwards – due to the declining productivity and quality of Soviet era ‘brownfields’ – is hoped to be offset by the development of the gas industry, notably with the liquefied natural gas (LNG) project on the Yamal peninsula (Mitrova 2019: 9; Mitrova and Yermakov 2019: 11).

The state places strategic emphasis on renewing gas infrastructure, particularly in the Yamal Nenets Autonomous Okrug (YNAO). This includes a new generation of high-pressure domestic and export trunk pipelines linking the established gas transit systems to the new sites on the peninsula, as well as the construction of a new LNG terminal in Sabetta (Mitrova and Yermakov 2019: 11-12; Mitrova 2019: 9). The latter receives special attention from the state

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in the form of a reduced profit tax, total exemption from the mineral extraction tax for the first twelve years of operations, and the state financing of 75 percent of the Sabetta Port’s construction, which was completed in 2016 and is now fully operational (Mitrova 2019: 9). The discovery of energy resources in Yakutia have also received attention, but to a lesser extent as in the YNAO. One assumes that Yakutia has not the necessary supporting infrastructure for such projects to be exploited in the near-term.

1.2 Barriers to Arctic Development

Despite the literature’s unanimous assertions of the Far North’s significance to Russian strategy and national identity, this significance exists in a constant paradox (Pilyasov 2016: 228). Laruelle (2014) notes that the sheer remoteness and spatial grandeur of the Far North have been conceptualized as a burden as well as a blessing – chiefly, in the state’s responsibility to shoulder the costs and challenges inherent to governing a vast, inhospitable territory (Laruelle 2014: 24). The paradox that this entails continues to be a defining feature of Arctic policy; the rewards are worth the costs, but the costs are so acute as to necessitate great effort on part of the Centre. Arctic development thus tends to be a centralized affair, committed to under the auspices of government intervention (Hill and Gaddy 2003: 80; Laruelle 2014: 35; Galimullin and Matveenko 2019: 9). However, scholars such as Pavel Baev, Fiona Hill, Clifford Gaddy, and David Orttung and Colin Reisser, question the government’s capacity to make use of Arctic resources. Serious difficulties in accessing economic resources and maintaining dynamic socio-economic conditions in the Arctic are exacerbated by both environmental-spatial barriers and institutional barriers. In other words, the extreme climate of the AZRF and the centralized, exploitative models of public policy give way to chronic mismanagement.

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Some scholars note that environmental factors alone are so severe, that it is only natural that the Kremlin would fall short of engineering effective socioeconomic development in the Far North. Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy (2003) note the enormous burden on the state that existed through subsidizing military and economic activity – read life – in the overly industrialized Arctic throughout the Soviet and post-Soviet era. The cost of living in the Far North is four times higher than elsewhere in the Federation due to the extreme weather conditions (Hill and Gaddy 2003: 2). Orttung and Reisser (2014) echo this concern, positing that climate, in addition to top-down policy mechanisms, hampers the sustainable socio-economic growth of the Far North. According to Orttung and Reisser, these costs are aggravated by the need to subsidize populations separated by “vast distances between settlements, [where] transport networks must contend with permafrost, seasonally frozen rivers, and extreme temperature ranges, among other obstacles, to ensure stable economic and social supply routes” (Orttung and Reisser 2014: 204). These obstacles to mobility are at the root of challenges to (self-) sustainable socio-economic, and urban development. In essence, environmental factors are so insurmountable to private market actors that they necessitate a high degree of state intervention.

Hill and Gaddy’s proposed metric, ‘temperature per capita,’ is helpful to pinpointing the ‘cost of the cold’. Their work designed a measurement that weights temperatures against population sizes of specific geographic units, thus allowing for comparative studies between them (Hill and Gaddy 2003: 35-42). The principle behind the metric is that extremely cold areas with large populations cost more to the state, due to the elevated costs of providing public goods. They argue that the industrialization of the Far North during the Soviet era constituted nothing more than a gross misallocation of resources on an unprecedented scale, which would require a continual, costly provision of subsidies. The costs make little economic sense, and

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would not have been incurred lest a centrally-planned government, like that of the Bolsheviks, would “[choose] to defy the forces of both nature and the market” (Hill and Gaddy 2003: 3).

Another view that complicates Russian Arctic aspirations is the exceptionally high rate of change in environmental factors owing to climate change (Pilyasov 2016: 228; Pilyasov et al 2015: 11). Daria Gritsenko and Elena Efimova (2018), Orttung and Reisser (2014), A. Pilyasov (2016), Pilyasov et al (2015), and Kathrin Stephen (2018) discuss climate aspects of the AZRF’s developments and barriers to its realization. The authors are relatively unanimous in arguing that one of the main determinants for economic policy in the AZRF is climate change. With the warming of the climate, resources that were hitherto inaccessible, are increasingly within reach of exploitation (Stephen 2018: 223-226; Orttung and Reisser 2014; Gritsenko and Efimova 2018; Pilyasov 2016: 227; Pilyasov et al 2015: 13). Namely, hydrocarbon deposits, other extractable resources, and the development of the NSR as a viable commercial maritime route now receive considerable attention from policy-makers at the federal and regional levels.

However, the authors make a point of quelling any exaggerated optimism. Climate change in the Arctic regions is equally a cause of concern as it is an opportunity. A phenomenon called ‘Arctic Amplification’ ensures that climate change occurs twice as fast in the Arctic regions as anywhere else (Stephen 2018: 223-226; Orttung and Reisser 2014; Gritsenko and Efimova 2018; Pilyasov 2016; Pilyasov et al 2015). Arctic Amplification presents challenges to urban development and infrastructure projects, as the degradation of permafrost (a prominent geological feature across the AZRF’s regions) diminishes soil load bearing capacity. The risk of said degradation is that reduced permafrost will undermine or damage industrial infrastructure, especially land-based transport infrastructure, as well as oil and gas transit systems, with a potentially detrimental impact on the environment and public safety (Orttung and Reisser 2014: 199). Thus, while the premise of renewed global interest in the Arctic due

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to climate change is often entertained by policy makers, scholars note that this phenomenon will present new challenges to Russia’s ailing Arctic infrastructure.

Fixed assets of transport infrastructure – such as roads, airports, and seaports – have been a source of concern. Writing in 2002, Allen Lynch noted that Russia’s economic growth was, and would continue to be, severely stricken by capital depreciation, especially regarding costly rail and road networks that are expensive to maintain and impossible to go without (Lynch 2002). Over a decade later, an OECD working paper reported a similar concern that infrastructural renewal remained an Achilles heel of the Russian state (Kolik et al 2015). Despite this, optimism is far-reaching with regard to the NSR, owing to climate change. Successful navigation of the route significantly cuts down the distance and time of European-Asian trade, making the route a potential game-changer in global commerce (Buixadé Farré et al. 2014; Russian International Affairs Council 2015). Nonetheless, this optimism tends to exceed what can be realistically expected (Buixadé Farré et al. 2014). Though summers now leave the NSR mostly, if not entirely, ice-free, winters will still be particularly challenging for navigation for some time to come (Buixadé Farré et al. 2014; Humpert 2018). In addition to this, the current infrastructure lacks the capacity for increased use. Ports along the Arctic coast are decaying, and supporting infrastructure, such as communication technology, or Search and Rescue capacities, cannot cover the vast expanses efficiently (Buixadé Farré et al. 2014).

Another barrier noted in the literature looks to the locus of economic benefit and decision-making power between the federal Centre and Arctic regions. Gennadiy Detter (2017) and Orttung and Reisser (2014) evaluate the disparate effects of the state’s prioritization of national economic development over the development of the ‘periphery’. According to Orttung and Reisser, the central government has always been the main player concerning Arctic policy, with little or no effective devolvement of power. As such, centrally directed programs have been the driving force of economic development (Orttung and Reisser 2014: 199). These

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programs have, without historical exception, been implemented with a view to extracting wealth from far-flung regions for the Centre’s economic gain. Referencing the importance of the AZRF to the Russian state, addressed in the previous section, the guiding principle of the Arctic’s development has been to implement large projects conducive to the state’s necessary involvement. Detter, Orttung and Reisser hypothesize that such an inherently haphazard approach leads to “contradictory goals, methods and ways for achieving them” (Detter 2017: 97). The result is widespread preferential treatment to profit-prone, energy-rich areas at the expense of energy poor areas, creating a fragmented territory – a de facto archipelago of “wealthy islands” (Laruelle 2014: 48; Detter 2017; Orttung and Reisser 2014: 200).

Thus, exploitative economic development has always been prioritized over sustainable development (Orttung and Reiss 2014; Detter 2017). Together, environmental-spatial limitations and institutional practices create untenable economic conditions where self-sustaining growth is unlikely. Without the genuine improvement of policy-making mechanisms, renewed efforts to develop the Arctic may be as wasteful as they have been in the recent past. The key to understanding the policy-making mechanism, and how to spot institutional change, lies in an understanding of Russia’s brand of federalism.

1.3 Development in the context of Federalism

Russia’s plans for the AZRF prioritize the development and integration of physical infrastructure, as well as of the existing legal and institutional frameworks (Maximova 2018; Galimullin and Matveenko 2019; Romashkina et al 2017). These are recognized goals of the Kremlin, as described by the literature on Arctic Development. The goals to integrate the spatial and institutional features of the AZRF emerged from issues over policy jurisdictions, intra- and inter-agency competition, and a lack of a macro region-specific legal framework, all

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of which served to confuse and impede policy implementation (Sergunin and Konyshev 2019). Correspondingly, the Federal government has worked toward streamlining policy implementation by submitting a number of strategic documents since 2008 that delineate objects of state policy, determine specific interests, and delegate tasks to federal agencies, subnational government units, and non-governmental actors (Galimullin and Matveenko 2019: 5-6; Sergunin and Konyshev 2019). These documents have reshaped the legal and institutional mechanisms for decision-making most notably by establishing a macro-region of the AZRF in 2014 – the first time in Russian history – in addition to establishing an inter-agency coordinating body, the State Commission, in 2015. Considering the Arctic’s growing importance for Russia’s resource security, it is no surprise that in the last decade, the Kremlin has sought to reform the institutional/legal mechanisms concerning matters of Arctic development.

Issues of Arctic development thus constitute organizational challenges that are amplified by the distinct political, spatial, and economic challenges unique to the Russian state. For this reason, the research seeks to approach the topic of development from the vantage point of Federalism as a theoretical framework, in order to understand how regional agency functions. Federalism takes many forms in practice and in theory. As a concept, it encompasses as its most basic traits the self-governance of two or more communities that share a political space (Watts 1996: 7; Karmis and Norman 2016: 3). Within that political space, the self-governing entities share a set of institutions that binds them to one another and outlines the organization of governing duties, specifically where they do, or do not, overlap. In addition to this, the constituent bodies of a federation agree to be subjugated by a central government, and subjected to a “supreme written constitution [that is] not unilaterally amendable” by the constituent bodies (Watts 1996: 7). In other words, that shared political space is also characterized by multiple (vertical) levels of government each operating with some delineated

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organizational autonomy (Halberstam & Reimann 2014: 4). To summarize, Ronald Watts offers the following useful definition of a federation:

“Compound polities, combining strong constituent units and a strong general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the people through a constitution, each empowered to deal directly with the citizens in the exercise of its legislative, administrative and taxing powers, and each directly elected by the citizens” (Watts 1996: 8).

Within the boundaries placed by the above definition – and, perhaps, in spite of them – federalism is manifest in a variety of forms. The study of federalism concerns itself with the diversity of federal arrangements with which a state operates, and with how said arrangement impacts the functions of statehood. According to Karmis and Norman (2016), all federal systems are defined by their stance on: the division of power within a federation; the representation of constituent governments in Central Institutions; the degree of integration enjoyed by market and legal systems; and, processes of legislative amendments and provisions for secession (Karmis and Norman 2016: 14-15). Stances on these aspects of federal organization differ based on normative concerns that are unique to the country in question. These normative concerns embody an array of characteristics including a country’s recent history, its domestic and internal pressures, and its institutional make up. For example, it is imperative to ask why a country federalizes in order to understand the resulting division of power. By the same logic, it is equally important to know of the historical context to be able to map out the pathways of federalization.

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In response to the normative prompt, popular reasoning in favour of such an organization reflects some of the main concerns that befell Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In principle, any form of Federalism is seen as an attractive alternative to the possible secession of polities that seek greater autonomy (Karmis and Norman 2016: 4). Threats of this kind are exacerbated by the increasingly complex and interconnected world, where forces linked to globalization place pressures on unitary states. These pressures tend to be insurmountable to states that govern over political spaces with multiple identity communities, as was the case in post-Soviet Russia (Gel’man 2009; Sakwa 2002; Teague 2002).

The birth of the Russian Federation did not occur in a vacuum. In many ways, the legacy of the centralized state of the Soviet Union served to limit the choices available to political actors during the 1990s, effectively hamstringing the transition to liberal democracy. According to Michael Burgess, the state emerged from the embers of the Soviet Union in “the most difficult and unpromising of circumstances” (Burgess 2009: 25). The Soviet government presided over an enormous territory that spanned numerous regions and republics brought together under the banner of communism. In name and by way of legislation, the Soviet Union constituted an “integral, federal, multinational state formed on the principle of socialist federalism” with which association was voluntary (Kux 1990: 1; Burgess 2009: 27; Soviet Union 1977).

Despite the suggestion of a legal-rational devolvement of power, the Soviet Union was anything but a federal state. The delineation of the republics’ respective sovereignty, not to mention that of the regions within the Russian republic, was “largely formal” (Kux 1990: 2). In fact, the effort to label the organization of the Soviet Union as a federal political body reveals an incentive that mirrors considerations that took place in the early 1990s. Claims to power made in the regions and republics threatened to unravel the Russian Federation, as they did

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following the Soviet seizure of power. Federalization was thus the expedient solution “to be given form but not substance” (Burgess 2009: 27). As such, Soviet federalism paid lip service to nationalist claims in order to appease the national groups, binding them to the Union. In reality, the right to practice sovereignty over one’s political jurisdiction depended on the delegation of specific responsibilities to be carried out on behalf of the central government (Kux 1990: 1-2). An example underlining the Centre’s preeminent power notes that republics, though formally sovereign, had to seek Moscow’s permission to build new roads or select school textbooks (Kux 1990: 1). In Burgess’s words, the Soviet Union was a “federal façade” (Burgess 2009: 25).

The legacy of the centralized mechanisms of governance ensured that subsequent efforts to devolve power had no institutional precedent to follow. Not only were government institutions outside of the CPSU not bestowed with decision-making faculties, but sub-national administrative bodies shared little or no horizontal institutions between them (Hill and Gaddy 2003: 111). In other words, relations between the regions were virtually non-existent, they had no history of self-management, and without the economic guarantees of their vertical relations with a hyper-centralized government, regions were completely isolated. In addition, the social and economic diversity among the regions makes Russia’s political landscape a complex, heterogeneous space that requires context-specific support from the Centre (Hill and Gaddy 2003: 134).

As a result, Yeltsin’s decision to devolve power throughout the country was poorly managed (Gel’man 2009; Teague 2002). Vladimir Gel’man refers to federal reforms as “the swing of the pendulum” that severely destabilized the country (Gel’man 2009: 2). Russia had become politically, economically, and legally fragmented, holding on only through the Federal government’s opaque disbursement of funds to the regions. The problems that this created led to an untenable situation of weak governance and confused domestic policies. In particular, the

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development of a methodology for strategic planning in a market economy was hampered by the absence of a unified regulatory framework (Myasnikova et al 2019: 447). Between 1990 and 2005, Russia’s regions and cities were able to draft their own strategic documents without oversight or coordination from the Centre (Myasnikova et al 2019: 447). Consequently, strategic planning was uncontrolled and inefficient, especially in the Arctic regions, where the previously mentioned spatial-environmental barriers compounded the decline of Arctic economies.

One of the main corollaries of this legal, political, and economic fragmentation was the prolonged decline of the AZRF’s fixed assets. The volatile legal and political context tended to undermine the government’s ability to fulfil the basic tasks of governance, such as generating and distributing tax revenue, and investing in public goods of all kind (Lynch 2002: 38). A knock-on effect was that high levels of political uncertainty rendered private investment completely unattractive during the 1990s and 2000s, leading to further degradation of Russia’s industrial, transport, and energy infrastructure (Lynch 2002: 38). Lynch calculates that Russia’s overall rate of renewal of fixed assets fell to 1.0 percent in 1998, when it had been 6.9 percent in 1990 (Lynch 2002: 33). Some of the consequences of this decline were evidenced in January 2001, when Arctic cities and communities experienced daily 15-hour power cuts amidst temperatures as low as -20ºC (Lynch 2002: 36). The chronic failure of public administration, accelerated by capital flight and an entrenched elite corruption, created the conditions for Putin’s recentralization.

It was only natural that the pendulum would eventually swing back in the direction of greater central control through the reformation of institutional and legislative decision-making mechanisms. Measures like the creations of a new layer of presidential envoys to oversee Russia’s regions, the elimination of gubernatorial elections, and the introduction of Presidential powers to dismiss regional governors in the mid 2000s all worked to realize a form of ‘new

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centralism’ (Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004: 139-140; Gel’man 2009). Putin’s centralization was successful in re-establishing the Centre’s control of the regions, though the consequences have not necessarily been positive (Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004; Gel’man 2009). Gel’man laments that the Centre had succeeded in minimizing the autonomy of the regions, and therefore in limiting the destructive intra-elite competition for regional resources, but in doing so had created an inefficient asymmetry in Centre-Region relations (Gel’man 2009: 18). Functionally, the dynamic of centralism means that the Centre cannot accurately assess the effectiveness of regional administration because regional authorities are no longer answerable to the electorate. In essence, this gives rise to a systematic distortion of information between the federal authorities and regions, because it serves the latter’s interests to not implicate oneself in administrative shortcomings (Gel’man 2009:18-19).

Furthermore, recentralization between 2005 and 2014 skewed the socio-economic development of the regions – especially in the Arctic, where emphasis tended to be placed on lucrative extractive industries. As jurisdiction over Arctic affairs was centralized, bureaucratic processes were inefficiently shared between different federal administrative entities. Laruelle (2014) and Sergunin and Konyshev (2019) suggest that this trend made management unimaginative and ineffective. Laruelle notes that other priorities tended to supersede Arctic considerations (Laruelle 2014: 4). Sergunin and Konyshev, on the other hand, argue that inter-agency competition tended to thwart meaningful strategic planning with regard to the Arctic’s socio-economic development (Sergunin and Konyshev 2019).

Another key factor contributing to the skewed development of the Arctic is that major decision-making of Arctic policy occurs at the highest level of the Centre’s executive bodies (Sergunin and Konyshev 2019; Laruelle 2014; Maximova 2018; Galimullin and Matveenko 2019; Myasnikova et al 2019). The presidential administration, the Security Council of the Russian Federation, and the President himself decide the strategic priorities, which focus on

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the development of the Arctic ‘resource-base’. Accordingly, local needs are difficult to communicate to the relevant decision-makers, and thus, large industrial projects are prioritized over those that address social, indigenous, and environmental issues (Maximova 2018; Laruelle 2014). This lack of local consultation was partly addressed in 2014 with the creation of further institutional mechanisms to be described in later chapters, notably with the creation of the Federal Law 172-FZ (Myasnikova et al 2019). Even so, the ‘top-down’ strategic planning mechanism is deeply entrenched in the system of Arctic public policy (Sergunin and Konyshev 2019; Laruelle 2014; Maximova 2018; Galimullin and Matveenko 2019; Myasnikova et al 2019). Any introduction of devolved power, or regional agency, would at once be a remarkable, promising, and, yet, incongruous development in the context of Russian federalism.

That said, the Russian government has put a genuine effort into developing the Arctic. The problem is that, as is the case with so many other centralized states that tend towards degrees of authoritarianism, they are trying to solve many complex issues from afar without relinquishing federal powers. The resulting risk is that, in its genuine effort to improve the socio-economic state of the Arctic macro-region, the Centre uses ineffective and unmalleable tools. This is why the subject of federal devolvement of power is so important, because the alternative is a half-successful display of intent by a lumbering leviathan. In lieu of the emphasis that the Centre now puts on Arctic development, it is vital that the improvement of administrative mechanisms is realized. Hence, the identification of areas of regional agency may reveal that improvement of this kind is underway.

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2.1 Evaluating the Documents

To recount, the intention of the study is to determine how much agency constituent entities of the Russian Federation have in the socio-economic development of the Arctic. In particular, the research focusses on the development of transport infrastructure for several reasons. First and foremost, the main barriers to the AZRF’s development – sustainable or otherwise – are its remoteness and size, both of which necessitate a strong transport network for any hope of revitalizing economic activity. As a general rule, the further east one goes, the more remote areas of socio-economic interest become. Second, economists tend to agree that transport is a “backbone industry” (Kolik et al 2015: 5) whose improvement drives economic productivity through greater participation in global production and supply chains. According to Kolik et al (2015), a 10 percent improvement in Russia’s transport sector efficiency could amount to a 0.8 percent increase in its GDP (Kolik et al 2015: 17-19). Third, the project-model of the AZRF’s socio-economic development is geared towards establishing the necessary infrastructure in order to expand the lucrative, extractive industries of the Russian Far North. The quality of transport infrastructure is one of the most inconsistent between areas of interest. Russia’s federal Centre and the regional executive bodies are aware and veritably concerned with the three reasons, and thus place an emphasis on transport in their respective development approaches.

The question of agency at the subnational level was approached through a doctrinal analysis of relevant legislative frameworks and policy documents at both the state and regional levels. These documents expound the formal framework of responsibilities of the various levels of public administration. In doing so, the documents reveal the areas of agency of the regional

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executive bodies, the determinants that render their agency, and the mechanisms that they have at their disposal for public administration. Aside from federal documents, the research chose three regions in order to ensure that similar agency extends to all: Murmansk Oblast; the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug; and, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). The assumption behind the choice of case studies is that regional agency may rest on the importance of a region to the Centre’s socio-economic priorities. For example, the relative resource wealth of a region may entail greater dependence on the Centre, where less ‘wealthy’ regions are left to their own devices. Taking this into account, the chosen cases differ in industry, wealth, and transport levels, and represent a broad geographical range (from west to east) of the Arctic macro-region.

2.2 Federal Documents

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At the federal level, the study identifies three documents that are most important in this thesis’ pursuit of determining regional agency. Their importance stems from the legal-normative and strategic frameworks that they set for the implementation of Arctic development. From the stages of planning and application to monitoring and coordination, these documents describe the base mechanisms that must be adhered to by all participants of Arctic development. Combined, the documents present a fairly cohesive set of mechanisms to specify how actors, like the regional authorities, may participate in creating and executing the plans within their territorial and administrative jurisdictions.

An evaluation of these documents shows that regional agency is mandated, but the extent of their respective independence varies by project – in this case, between types of transport infrastructure development projects (State Program 2017: I (5)). The significant determinant of regional agency is, therefore, the project-type, and not the resource potential of the region. The projects that are considered areas of national security are consequently far more centralized processes. As the evaluation section will discuss, the development of transport infrastructure falls on this fault line. That is to say that, some elements of transport development are well within the jurisdiction of the regional authorities, where other elements are not. The major difference is manifest in the development of Support Zones and the development of the NSR. Both form integral subprograms of the State Program, and both are either wholly, or largely, concerned with the creation of an integrated transport system to the benefit of the Arctic’s economy (State Program 2017). As such, the contribution of the regions to these two thrusts of transport development differs considerably.

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2.3 Regional Documents

To evaluate the mechanisms given to the public authorities of these regions, we must first establish their general socio-economic characteristics and introduce the relevant documents for inspection. Each of the following regions have similar documents that form the basis of their governance. These are, briefly, the regional Laws on Strategic Planning; Procedures for the Development, Implementation and Evaluation of the Effectiveness of State Programs; State Programs on the Development of the Transport System; and, the Strategy of Socio-Economic Development. The regions all share documents in more or less the same standardized form as listed above. These documents give a fairly complete understanding of the goals, strategies, and policy-making mechanisms enlisted in pursuit of the respective region’s socio-economic development.

The legal framework for policy making is established by the Laws, which delineate the responsibilities of regional state actors, and the process of policy planning and implementation at the regional level. Said legislative framework is vital to the study of the regional executive’s specific powers with regards to national and regional policy making. The Procedure documents supplement the legislative frameworks, providing additional information on the mechanisms of policy-making specific to the regional State Programs. In turn, the State Programs outline the specific plans and priorities conceptualized with a view to developing transport infrastructure in the region. As will be discussed later on, Yakutia has a second State Program of relevance, in addition to the State Program for transport development – it is the State Program Development of the Arctic Zone. The fact that only part of Yakutia’s territory is situated in the AZRF necessitates a specific document to coordinate development plans for their Arctic zone. Lastly, the Strategies of socio-economic development give an overview of

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the regions’ socio-economic development goals, and how those goals hinge on the creation and modernization of transport infrastructure.

Beginning with Murmansk Oblast, then the YNAO, and finally Yakutia, the following subsections will present their relevant policy and legislative documents, and aim to discuss the main socio-economic challenges identified in them. The intention is to form a basic understanding of the socio-economic strengths and weaknesses of the respective regions, taking care to note the qualitative state of their respective transport complexes.

2.4 Murmansk Oblast

2.4.1 Murmansk’s Documents, and their short titles

Short Title Document Murmansk Law

2014

Murmansk Regional Duma. 2014. Law of Murmansk Oblast on Strategic Planning in the Murmansk Oblast (as Amended on October 14, 2019).

Murmansk Procedure 2013

Government of Murmansk Oblast. 2013a. On Approval of the Procedure for the Development, Implementation and Evaluation of the Effectiveness of State Programs of the Murmansk Region.

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Murmansk Program 2013

Government of Murmansk Oblast. 2013b. State Program of the Murmansk Oblast on the ‘Development of the Transport System’ (as Amended on April 20, 2020), (Murmansk Program 2013).

Murmansk Strategy 2013

Government of Murmansk Oblast. 2013c. On the Strategy of Socio-Economic Development of Murmansk Region until 2020 and until 2025, ).

2.4.2 Socio-economic Profile of Murmansk

Murmansk Oblast is located on the Kola Peninsula in the North-West of European Russia, bordering Finland to its west. The region has long been an important industrial and maritime hub of successive Russian states. In 1938, the Murmansk Oblast was officially formed as a constituent entity of the Russian SFSR, having previously been a sparsely settled area that was home to the indigenous Saami people and a few seafaring Pomor communities (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 6). The development of mineral resources, discovered in abundance on the peninsula, and the construction of a maritime industry led to the region’s rapid economic growth in the 20th_century.

Of the three regions under discussion, it is the smallest in landmass with an area of approximately 144.9 thousand km2, and has the highest population density of around 5.4 people per km2 (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 3). As of 2013, the population stands at around 780.4 thousand people (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 3). Around 92.7 percent of the population resides in urban areas, making Murmansk Oblast one of the most urbanized regions of Russia, and the most urbanized in the AZRF (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 3). The region’s contribution to the Russian economy is significant, although it has been based on unsustainable, “raw material export-oriented development models,” and economic monospecialization in the subregions of

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Murmansk (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 43). That said, of the Arctic territories, the economy of Murmansk is most diversified and modernized. The spread of the region’s GRP in 2017 confirms this: Agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing and fish farming constitute 13.0 percent of the GRP; mining operations contribute 13.4 percent; and, transportation and storage make up 11.3 percent (Federal Service of Government Statistics 2018: 232).

Among the extractive industries, apatite, nickel, cobalt, copper, and iron ore are the main mineral exports (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 4). Alongside these industries, the region is well known for its maritime and naval power. The Murmansk sea port, located on the north side of the peninsula on the Barents Sea, is the only deep-water port on the Arctic coast of European Russia that remains ice-free year-round (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 4). The Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet is based in Murmansk Oblast due to its ideal location at the European mouth of the North-Eastern shipping corridor. Over the course of the 20th century, the growth of the Murmansk shipyard helped to expand the industrial power of the region and raise its geopolitical importance as a transport hub and base of Arctic exploration (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 4). Murmansk also has a fairly developed railway network that connects to networks in other regions (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 22). This railway network supports passengers and cargo, and links the Murmansk sea port to the interior national railway network (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 26).

Despite the relative economic strength of the region and an established transport infrastructure, aspects of this economic base are still recovering from a sharp decline following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 7). Though the GRP remained relatively stable due to the strength of extractive industries, infrastructural and demographic problems constitute significant barriers to the region’s plans to modernize. In particular, the political problems resulting from regime change in the 1990s caused a systemic collapse of subsidies, wages and investment in the shipbuilding, defence, and fishing industries

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(Murmansk Strategy 2013: 10). The decline of these industries also exacerbated the monospecialization of the economy by subregion, meaning that local economies are not dynamic. A corollary of this collapse of the benefit system, known as the Northern benefits (severnye l’goty), and the decline of the aforementioned industries was that living in the extreme climate of the Far North became undesirable (Laruelle 2014: 28; Hill and Gaddy 2003: 121). In consequence, a downward slide in population size from 1.18 million to 789.4 thousand people between 1990 and 2013 – the steepest decline occurring between 1990 and 2000 – constituted a significant outflow of working-age individuals from the region (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 14-15).

The problems of a reduced budget, a declining population, and the restructuring of political institutions at the national and subnational levels during the 1990s ultimately meant that the upkeep and modernization of key infrastructure was neglected (Romashkina et al 2017: 28). As such, the 1990s and 2000s saw a gradual and widespread degradation of fixed assets, especially in transport, and industrial infrastructure (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 13). The lack of private and public investment in fixed assets of all transport types and systems ensured that renewal occurred at a slow pace, though this has been corrected somewhat since the introduction of the socio-economic strategy in 2013. In 2005, for example, the proportion of the regional state budget invested in fixed capital in Murmansk was approximately 16.8 percent, whereas in 2015 it was 40.1 percent (Federal Service of Government Statistics 2018: 236). The increase in that same proportion from 19.1 percent in 2012 – before the Murmansk Strategy was enacted – to 40.1 percent just three years later in 2015, exhibits that the modernization of Murmansk’s physical infrastructure is a priority (Federal Service of Government Statistics 2018: 236).

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2.4.3 Murmansk’s Transport Complex

Indeed, improving the state of the transport network in Murmansk Oblast forms a key part of the proposed “Kola Support Zone,” (Maximova 2018: 3-4; Murmansk Strategy 2013: 12, 44). The Kola Support Zone is the proposed economic cluster, which, among other priorities, includes the continued investment in mining industries, the exploration of hydrocarbon deposits on the adjacent Arctic continental shelf, heavy investment into establishing Murmansk sea port as the central logistics hub for the NSR, as well as continued investment in the Navy’s Northern Fleet (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 26-27; Maximova 2018: 3-4). The Murmansk Strategy asserts that the project-based modernization will both allow a greater coordination between public and private actors, thus improving the investment climate, and create the hard-economic base with which the regional government can invest in social development and quality of life. This cluster policy essentially creates the economic and institutional conditions for the economy to become more self-reliant, dynamic, and sustainable.

According to the ‘Murmansk Strategy,’ the regional government recognizes the need to drive the Kola Support Zone’s modernization through investment in port facilities, and railways. This intent is evinced in the “production, transport and logistics” cluster type, which deals with projects related to these specific challenges (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 34). The Murmansk Strategy indicates that the main goal is to establish the port as the logistical centre of the Russian Arctic and the NSR (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 34). As it stands, approximately 60.7 million tons of cargo, or 65.5 percent, passed through Murmansk in 2018, out of the 92.7 million tons handled over all Russia’s Arctic sea ports (Humpert 2019). Murmansk is also the home of Russia’s fleet of nuclear icebreakers, which are compelled by the Rules of Navigation of the NSR to escort foreign vessels in their passage of the NSR (Russian International Affairs Council 2015). Another advantage, in addition to the year-round functionality of the sea port, is its land connection to other regions via the Oktyabrskaya Railway, among other rail lines

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(Murmansk Strategy 2013: 22). The ideal location and physical advantages of the port, combined with an existing – albeit, aged – network of transport infrastructure, means that Murmansk Oblast holds a superior position to competing Russian and Norwegian alternatives in Archangelsk and Kirkenes respectively (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 26).

However, in its current state, the network of transport infrastructure is inadequate for the proposed plans to develop the region. Lack of investment has ensured that fixed assets are obsolete, and that the current capacity does not match the ambitious plans of both the federal Centre and the Regional Government. The sea port’s supporting facilities are especially suspect. According to the Murmansk Strategy, the insufficient cargo capacity of the Oktyabrskaya Railway hinders the increasing cargo turnover of the port. Issues of limited rear-end capacity are not helped by physically obsolete transhipment equipment (Murmansk Strategy 2013: 12). In fact, the collapse of a vital railway bridge over the Kola river on June 3, 2020 is the most recent example to have exposed this chronic infrastructural under-preparedness (Staalesen 2020a). The collapse of the bridge, which was renovated as recently as 2014, has temporarily halted all railway transportation to the peninsula until a bypass route can be established. The regional government has rightly prioritized investment in these fixed assets, understanding that the development of logistical and extractive industries necessitates reliable transport infrastructure.

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2.5 Yamal Nenets Autonomous Okrug

2.5.1 YNAO’s Documents, and their short titles

Figure: ‘Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug’ 2020 ; Google 2020abc

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2.5.2 Socio-economic Profile of the YNAO

The YNAO is located in the extreme Far North of the Western Siberian Plain, near to the geographical centre of Russia’s Arctic coastline. Its shores look out over the Kara Sea, and its two peninsulas, Yamal and Gyda, sandwich the Obskaya Bay, which forms the mouth of the Ob river network (Federation Council 2020). Half of the region, including the gas-rich Yamal peninsula, lies in the Arctic Circle, thus complicating the socio-economic activities of its population. Indeed, the extreme climactic conditions of the region make for a number of difficulties in the state’s provision of public goods to the population, with much of the social infrastructure distributed heterogeneously across the YNAO (YNAO Strategy 2011: I (1.1)). In terms of land mass, the region is one of Russia’s largest subjects, occupying 769.3 thousand km2. With a population of approximately 541.5 thousand people, the population density is significantly lower than that of Murmansk – around 0.7 per km2 (Federal Service of Government Statistics 2018: 555). The Autonomous Okrug is home to more than 100 nationalities, chief among which are Russians (60 percent), Ukrainians (9 percent), and the Nenets (5.7 percent) – the native ethnic group of the region, many of whom are nomadic (YNAO Strategy 2011: I (1.1)).

Historically, the YNAO has a long history of prosperous, small-scale communities trading traditional goods like fur, fish, and reindeer products along the Ob, Irtysh, Tobol, and Tura rivers. In the Soviet period, the region was not immediately transformed until the geostrategic role of the NSR was recognized, leading to massive railway and seaport construction projects. Gradually, the region was industrialized, and it was in the 1960s that oil and gas fields began to be developed on a large scale, after a major gas discovery in 1962 (Detter 2017: 95). Since then, the YNAO has been one of Russia’s leading hydrocarbon-producing regions, with 78 percent of Russia’s gas deposits, and 18 percent of their oil reserves