Strengthening the rule of law in Kosovo : the issue of donor coordination in international-led statebuilding

in International-led Statebuilding

Author: Marguerite L. Bos Supervisor: A. Steele Second reader: R. Sánchez Date: June, 2017

Course: Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations Word count: 20.324

Strengthening the Rule of Law in Kosovo: The Issue of Donor Coordination

in International-led Statebuilding

Marguerite L. Bos

Department of Political Science, Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Amsterdam, 1018 WV Amsterdam, The Netherlands

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I. Introduction

Upon nomination in April 2016, the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) António Guterres released a vision statement on the challenges and opportunities the UN may encounter in the near future. In the statement, Guterres emphasises the need for enhanced global coordination and partnership, stressing that:

“Global coherence demands a permanent strategic cooperation culture at all levels. The key to further enhancing UN's effectiveness is attitude: cooperation instead of duplication, sharing instead of competing, and collective responsibility instead of circumstantial individual interests. This requires leadership and more and better coordination - delivery-centred, not process oriented” (Guterres, 2016). In doing so, Guterres endorses the global debate surrounding the call for better coordination among donors in the field of international development cooperation. In 2005, the issue of so-called ‘donor coordination’ gained momentum as a result of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. One of the main pillars in the declaration is that of harmonisation. Harmonisation implies, similar to donor coordination, that donors must make an effort to coordinate better, be more transparent and be more efficient to eliminate the duplication of donor efforts (OECD, 2008: 6). In the field of political science the issue of donor coordination has also been noted, as academics started highlighting the need for better donor coordination in the practice of international-led statebuilding. International-led statebuilding continues to be a much-debated issue in the academic literature of political science. However, as of recent a more critical discourse has emerged among scholars as result of a series of failures of

ABSTRACT

In this research, the aim is to study the concept of donor coordination in an international-led statebuilding setting, by looking specifically at the international actors involved in justice sector reform in Kosovo. The research question that is central to this article is, what explains the level of donor coordination between international organisations in international-led statebuilding? Donor coordination among international actors in Kosovo’s justice sector is often lacking, and is very much reliant on informal meetings between individuals. Furthermore, the large number of donors, the pressure to fulfil their mandates, and competition and hierarchy among donors all hinder international organisations in their ability to coordinate. Moreover, on the individual level, the hidden agendas of individuals in the donor community greatly impact the level of donor coordination, whereas on the political level, the unstable political climate in Kosovo severely complicates donor coordination.

Harmonisation Aid effectiveness Justice sector reform International-led statebuilding Rule of law

international-led statebuilding missions. One of the main criticisms regarding the practice of international-led statebuilding is the lack of sufficient donor coordination among international organisations.

In this article, the aim is to build further upon the harmonisation debate and gain a more in-depth understanding of the concept of donor coordination in the context of international-led statebuilding. In doing so, the research relies on both hypothesis-testing and theory-building to identify causal mechanisms that may influence the level of donor coordination among international organisations. The research question central to this article is, what explains the level of donor coordination between international organisations in international-led statebuilding? In order to answer this question, the research focuses on the international-led statebuilding case of Kosovo. Moreover, to understand the concept of donor coordination within an international-led statebuilding setting, the research draws on extensive field research that was conducted in Kosovo. Kosovo has since the ending of the Kosovo War in 1999 been the stage for one of the largest international-led statebuilding missions in recent history. However, nearly two decades after the ending of Kosovo’s civil war, the country continues to host a multitude of international actors whom are engaged in international-led statebuilding. A large number of these international organisations focus their efforts on strengthening the rule of law in Kosovo and work alongside one another in Kosovo’s justice sector. As such, the goal of this research is to study the concept of donor coordination in international-led statebuilding, by looking specifically at the gathering of international actors in Kosovo’s justice sector.

Even though donor coordination has become an influential concept in the field of international development cooperation, its link to the context of international-led statebuilding has been noted by scholars but remains an understudied issue in political science. Furthermore, because of the critical discourse surrounding international-led statebuilding in the academic literature, more academic research needs to be done into the actual practice of international-led statebuilding. In doing so, academic research helps us frame our understanding of the challenges and opportunities in international-led statebuilding, and can as such contribute to a more successful practice in the future.

The outline of the article is as follows. First, the academic literature that is relevant to this research will be briefly discussed, in order to identify possible knowledge gaps and define useful concepts. Then, the academic literature will be used to formulate theories and hypotheses that may help answer the research question and structure the research design. Hereafter, the methods that have been used to test the acquired theories will be further outlined. In the subsequent section, the case selection of Kosovo will be justified, while also discussing the necessary background information of the case in more detail. In the following part of the article, the data that has been gathered from in-depth interviews with people working at international organisations during field research in Kosovo will be discussed. On the basis of this data, the hypotheses that were formulated to help answer the research question will be tested. In addition, two new causal mechanisms will be introduced that may improve our understanding of donor coordination in international-led statebuilding. In the final section, possible

shortcomings of the data collection will be discussed and recommendations for further academic research will be considered.

II. Literature Discussion

Introduction

In the literature discussion, the aim is to define the concepts that are central to this research on the basis of the existing academic literature. Furthermore, the literature discussion intends to give an overview of the relevant academic literature on the topic of this research, in order to develop theories that can help answer the research question. In doing so, the literature discussion also aims to identify what is missing in the academic debate and how this research could contribute to such a knowledge gap.

Defining donor coordination

In order to understand the concept of donor coordination, Penh et al. (2004: 4) argue, one must understand that it is a means to an end. The goal of donor coordination may take many forms, but the ultimate objective should always be aid effectiveness (Pehn et al., 2004: 5). Pehn et al. (2004: 5) define donor coordination as: “development partners working together to maximize aid effectiveness”. De Renzio et al. (2004: 3), on the other hand, understand donor coordination as the: “increased coordination and streamlining of the activities of different aid agencies”. Both the OECD (2003: 23) and De Renzio et al. (2004: 3) highlight the importance of information sharing among donors, the existence of common agreements for planning and the management of aid, and the simplification of procedures to facilitate donor coordination. Pehn et al. (2004: 5) make a very similar distinction and define the central characteristics of donor coordination as the occurrence of information sharing, and the existence of a division of labour and a common framework. For Pehn et al. (2004: 6), information exchange is the most basic form of donor coordination. Information exchange entails donors regularly meeting to share programmatic information, economic and political forecasting or evaluation findings. This is a common form of donor coordination, because it is relatively easy to facilitate for the donors (Pehn et al., 2004: 12). However, according to Pehn et al. (2004: 12), moving beyond information exchange is often problematic because all donors must consider their mandated priorities and strategies. Division of labour goes beyond information sharing alone, and demands a sense of shared planning and a division of tasks between donors to avoid duplication of donor efforts (Pehn et al., 2004: 6). A common framework arises when donors establish common goals and procedures to actively improve aid effectiveness (Pehn et al., 2004: 7).

In the 1980s, the issue of donor coordination first came to the attention of scholars and practioners in the field of international development cooperation. Since then, a general consensus has started to consolidate on the seriousness of the problem of donor fragmentation in aid industries

(Aldasoro et al., 2010: 920; Mawdsley et al., 2014: 27). In the late 1990s, a fundamental shift in development thinking influenced the entire field of international development cooperation. As part of this shift, donor coordination became a major theme within the academic literature on aid effectiveness (Pehn et al., 2004: 1). At first, donors appeared to use donor coordination as a means to tap into other aid sources, or to make sure that programmes of other donors would not undermine their own programmes (Pehn et al., 2004: 2). Over the last two decades, however, there has been more attention for improving aid effectiveness by creating an international framework on donor coordination (Lawson, 2013: 6). In 2003, the High Level Forum on Harmonization held in Rome was aimed at improving the overall efficiency of international development cooperation. As a result, the Declaration on Harmonization was drafted which, even though it urged donors to streamline their efforts, did not establish any formal goals or standards (Lawson, 2013: 6). In 2005, the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness was held in Paris to give a more concrete structure to the issues discussed in Rome (Lawson, 2013: 7). In the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, donor coordination became one of the main issues on the global development agenda (Lawson, 2013: 7; Bigsten & Tengstam, 2015: 75; Holvoet & Rombouts, 2008: 578). In sum, donor coordination is a concept that first emerged in the practice of international development cooperation and has gained importance over the years as result of the global debate on aid effectiveness. Moreover, donor coordination can, on the basis of definitions by Pehn et al. (2004: 5) and De Renzio et al. (2004: 3), be defined as the ‘increased coordination and streamlining of the activities of different actors to maximize aid effectiveness’.

Donor coordination in practice

While the concept of donor coordination has been defined, the question that remains is, why is it so important for donors to coordinate? First, let us assume that donor fragmentation is the opposite of donor coordination. Donor fragmentation occurs when: “a multiplicity of actors pursue their own policies and strategies and use different instruments and approaches regarding the deployment of development assistance” (OECD, 2011a: 7). Donor fragmentation is known to have a negative impact on aid effectiveness. For the recipient countries, managing the large number of different donors can be a daunting task (OECD, 2011a: 7). Furthermore, the duplication of donor efforts that may occur as a result of donor fragmentation imposes a heavy burden on the administration of these recipient countries (OECD, 2003: 14). In addition, Kimura et al. (2007: 19) find that donor fragmentation hinders economic growth in the recipient country, while Knack and Rahman (2007: 193) conclude that donor fragmentation deteriorates the bureaucratic quality of these countries. Donor fragmentation could also be problematic for the donors themselves. For instance, Halonen-Akatwijuka (2004: 32) claims that donor fragmentation imposes significant financial costs on both the recipient and the donor partner. Donor coordination, on the contrary, should lead to cost reduction because it allows donors to share and economise their resources (Bigsten & Tengstam, 2015: 76, 83). Donor coordination is also beneficial to the recipient partner, because it makes it both easier and less costly to manage the group of donors in

their country (Eyben, 2007: 641). However, in spite of all the recent attention for donor coordination, both Aldasoro et al. (2010: 933) and Nunnenkamp et al. (2013: 557) find that aid fragmentation remains an issue. In 2011, the OECD (2011b: 2) drew a similar conclusion and stated that little progress had been made with regard to donor coordination since the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

But, if donor coordination is indeed as important as the academic literature suggests, what then accounts for the persisting lack of donor coordination in international development cooperation? De Renzio et al. (2004: 14) find that organisations with high levels of decentralisation are more likely to engage in donor coordination, because they are better at cooperating and responding to local circumstances. De Renzio et al. (2004: 16, 20) also argue that flexible procedures and enthusiastic individuals within organisations are key to successful donor coordination. But, the academic literature also identifies a number of limitations of donor coordination. Nunnenkamp et al. (2013: 558) stress that competition among donors could make them reluctant to share information with one another. Furthermore, donor coordination might cause donors to lose political control or constrain them in their pursuit of commercial and political self-interest (Aldasoro et al., 2010: 922). According to Rogerson (2005: 534), political interests and strategic considerations continue to be important motivations for the provision of aid. As a consequence, donors are often pressured by their home governments to maintain a leadership position or to remain involved in all different aid sectors (De Renzio et al., 2004: 14). Moreover, Eyben (2007: 645) notes that donor coordination makes it more difficult for donors to try out different approaches, because all of them have to agree on a common strategy. Hence, donor coordination can be a time-consuming practice that due to political, strategic or even practical considerations may not be in the interest of the donor (De Renzio et al., 2004: 21). In practice, even though the academic literature has shown us that donor coordination is essential for the effective delivery of aid and could be beneficial both to the donor and the recipient, it has also demonstrated that donors may have incentives not to actively engage in donor coordination.

Conceptualising international-led statebuilding

In this research, the concept of donor coordination is being studied in an international-led statebuilding setting. But, before such a context can be further explored, it is important to conceptualise international-led statebuilding and the concept that is directly related to it, namely peacebuilding. Barnett and Zürcher (2009: 26) define peacebuilding as: “an effort to eliminate the root causes of conflict, to promote the security of the individual, societal groups, and the state, and to nurture features that create the conditions for a stable peace”. Perhaps a more influential definition of peacebuilding comes from Boutros-Ghali (1992: 4) in his Agenda for Peace, as: “an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Peacebuilding as defined here gained real momentum after the ending of the Cold War (Paris, 2010: 337; Barnett, 2006: 87; Autesserre, 2011: 1). In the beginning of the 1990s, a great sense of liberal optimism led to the belief that multilateralism and economic liberalism could be the solution to a range of global problems (Bendana,

2005: 5; Paris, 2010: 340). Bendana (2005: 5) argues that for the first time in decades, the UN was able to mediate in the internal affairs of states and adopt a leading role in the negotiation of long-standing conflicts. Paris (2010: 337) describes the emergence of a liberal peacebuilding model around this time, aimed at implementing a liberal peace based on the norms of free markets, the rule of law and democratic institutions (Barnett, 2006: 88; Suhrke, 2013: 3). In the 1990s, liberal optimism and the coincidence of a large number of intrastate conflicts caused the UN to launch a series of peacebuilding operations (Paris, 2010: 340). But, after a number of operations failed scholars began to promote a longer-lasting approach by focusing on strengthening of state institutions (Bendana, 2005: 6; Paris, 2010: 338-342). As such, statebuilding became an integral part of the peacebuilding practice.

For statebuilding, in terms of post-conflict statebuilding, a number of different definitions can be found in the academic literature. Fukuyama (2004: 17) describes statebuilding as: “the creation of new governmental institutions and the strengthening of existing ones”. For Chesterman (2004: 5) statebuilding entails: “constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security”. Barnett and Zürcher (2009: 26) define statebuilding as the process of the modern state coming into existence, based on the monopolisation of means of coercion and the establishment of a bureaucratic state apparatus. But, for one to understand the importance of statebuilding in a contemporary post-conflict setting, it helps to understand the medieval statebuilding mechanisms of modern European states. During the Middle Ages, hostile conditions among a multitude of political entities created a constant threat of war for European rulers (Ertman, 1997: 317). In order to facilitate warfare European rulers had to monopolise means of coercion to extract the necessary resources from the populations in their territories (Tilly, 1985: 183). To eliminate internal threats European rulers disarmed the populations in their territories, and created centralised state structures and institutions capable of monitoring their people (Vu, 2010: 152; Tilly, 1990: 84). Hence, as Fukuyama (2004: 29) famously stated: “institutions matter”. Paris and Sisk (2009: 1) argue that the existence of a capable, autonomous and legitimate state is crucial to establishing a stable peace in post-conflict societies. Furthermore, Barnett (2006: 88) emphasises that liberalisation prior to institutionalisation can trigger conflict, rather than securing a stable peace in societies emerging from conflict. Both Krasner (2004: 86) and Fearon and Laitin (2004: 7) add another dimension to the statebuilding debate. Both argue that statebuilding is in the shared interest of multilateral arrangements, because state failure could generate conflicts across international borders. In sum, for any state to have a chance at creating sustainable peace in a post-conflict society, the creation of capable state institutions and a strong rule of law are essential.

Security and justice sector reform

Furthermore, since the establishment of a strong rule of law in a state is such an important element of international-led statebuilding, it is also important to understand the concepts of security sector reform and, more specifically, justice sector reform. One of the more common definitions of security sector

reform comes from the OECD (2005: 20), as: “Processes and procedures dedicated to the reform of the security sector: which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework”. On the basis of this definition lies the assumption that an unstable security sector hinders a stable and sustainable peace in a country (Chappuis & Hänggi, 2013: 168). Boas and Stig (2010: 290) even argue that: “Security sector reform resembles both a first and a last step in international-led statebuilding”. Security sector reform in an post-conflict environment is often accompanied by a strong involvement of international actors, who have ambitious mandates to reform the security sector (Chappuis & Hänggi, 2013: 171, 177). Most scholars adopt a fairly broad definition of the security sector, similar to Jackson’s (2011: 1804) as: “all those organisations which have authority to use, or order the use of force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight”. Hence, a strong rule of law is an indispensable element of a well-functioning security sector in a state. According to Peake et al. (2008:7), security sector reform is necessary to ensure that security institutions are capable of providing basic security in post-conflict conditions, and to ensure that these institutions are serving the interest of the society as a whole.

Similar to donor coordination, the origins of security sector reform lie in the field of international development cooperation. Development actors began to realise that security is a prerequisite for any economic progress and human rights protection in a state (Suhrke & Borchgrevink, 2009: 219; Bouris & Reigeluth, 2012: 178; Bellamy, 2003: 102). Long-term development and democratisation in a state appeared nearly impossible without the provision of security by capable and legitimate security institutions (Bellamy, 2003: 101; Brzoska, 2006: 4). Jackson (2011: 1810) notes that security sector reform often has a liberal approach to it, and is aimed at creating a democratic peace on the basis of liberal norms. As such, the creation of strong and independent rule of law institutions, or justice sector reform, is a crucial element of security sector reform. Justice sector reform focuses specifically on strengthening the rule of law in countries emerging from conflict. According to Mobekk (2009: 281), justice sector reform is based on the assumption that a functioning judicial system is crucial for achieving political stability and security in a state. In post-conflict societies, the absence of a functioning judicial system can cause people to rely on traditional justice systems for the settling of disputes (Mobekk, 2009: 282). Such a trend can be problematic when these traditional mechanisms do not respect human rights or if the legal vacuum leads to a culture of impunity in a state (Mobekk, 2009: 282; Sedra, 2006: 100). Bouris (2012: 264) emphasises that security sector reform and justice sector reform must always go hand in hand, because improvements in one security sector often spill over to other security sectors. In short, security sector reform, and justice sector reform as an essential element of it, are important instruments to ensure a stable and functioning state apparatus in international-led statebuilding.

Combining the two: donor coordination in international-led statebuilding

Both the concepts of donor coordination and international-led statebuilding have been discussed. From here onwards the concepts are brought together, to focus on the issue of donor coordination in an international-led statebuilding setting. From the academic literature is appears that a lack of donor coordination among international actors is indeed a continuing problem in the field of international-led statebuilding (Paris, 2009: 53). According to Paris (2009: 53), international actors often fail to exchange information about their strategies and as a result duplicate the efforts of their donor counterparts. In the early 1990s, such issues of donor coordination in international-led statebuilding became painfully clear in the cases of El Salvador, Mozambique and Cambodia. In each of these international-led statebuilding operations, the UN pushed for an increase in government spending, while the IMF demanded fiscal restraint from the host governments (Paris, 2009: 55). Since then, the coordination problem in the practice of international-led statebuilding has grown extensively, as statebuilding missions became more complex and the number of actors involved increased (Paris, 2009: 55). In the 2000s, scholars started to acknowledge a lack of donor coordination as an obstacle to the success of international-led statebuilding operations (Paris, 2009: 56). Paris (2009: 58) notes that often competition among donors, their reluctance to sacrifice independence or their reluctance to turn up for the costs of donor coordination contribute to the problem of donor fragmentation. Moreover, it can also be problematic to achieve successful donor coordination when the donors have different approaches to, or philosophies about the practice of international-led statebuilding (Paris, 2009: 59). As such, Paris ((2009: 61) argues that the realm of international-led statebuilding can be characterised as a loosely structured network, because it is neither a market nor a structured hierarchy. However, rigid forms of networks are not desirable, because it is crucial that donors retain the flexibility to adapt to quickly changing local circumstances (Paris, 2009: 63). Hence, according to Paris (2009: 64), the donor coordination problem in statebuilding can best be solved by greatly improving information sharing, and modestly strengthening the hierarchy among donors.

Donor fragmentation is not only an issue in the broader context of international-led statebuilding, it is also a persisting problem within the field of security sector reform, and more specifically, justice sector reform (Vetschera & Damian, 2006: 28). Donor coordination tends to be problematic among donors in the field of security sector reform, on the one hand because there often are a lot of donors, and on the other hand because these donors deal with many different security-related issues (Chappuis & Hänggi, 2013: 180). In addition, security sector reform initiatives are often based on ad-hoc policies that lead to uncoordinated programmes and lack a coherent approach (Jackson, 2011: 1811). From the academic literature it becomes clear that a lack of donor coordination among donors engaged in security sector reform is a common problem in international-led statebuilding. Mobekk (2009: 275), focuses on the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and finds that a lack of donor coordination among international actors is one of main causes for the unsuccessful statebuilding operation. He describes the response of the international actors as fragmented and suffering from poor

donor coordination (Mobekk, 2009: 281-282). Focusing on the case of East-Timor, Hood (2006: 60) concludes that inadequate planning and coordination amongst donors contributed to the disappointing performance of the international administration. In Afghanistan, coordination among donors engaged in the justice sector has been problematic because of competing agendas and a general mistrust among the different international actors (Sedra, 2006: 106). In Palestine, Bouris (2012: 266) argues, reform of the justice sector has failed because donors did not succeed in adequately coordinating their efforts. Even the actors part of the European Union (EU) had trouble coordinating their own efforts. In spite of the EU’s intention to coordinate, the two EU missions in Palestine (Seyada and EUPOL-COPSS) never worked hand in hand and clearly had different mandates (Bouris & Reigeluth, 2012: 191). In sum, from the academic literature it has become clear that donor coordination is crucial in order to realise the potential of international-led statebuilding (Chappuis & Hänggi, 2013: 172).

International actors and the provision of public goods

By now, the concepts of donor coordination and international-led statebuilding have both been discussed. However, the role of international actors in an international-led statebuilding setting has not yet been fully explored. According to Lee et al. (2014: 636), the state is the natural candidate for the provision of collective goods and services, because it successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in a given territory. But, in countries with limited statehood the state often fails to claim such a monopoly because of its lack of authority throughout the territory (Lake & Fariss, 2014: 572). When states indeed suffer from limited statehood, the international community often takes on the role of a ‘trustee’ while governing the country for a certain amount of time (Lake & Fariss, 2014: 571). In doing so, the trustee often focuses on building an inclusive and democratic state, while taking direct responsibility for governing the country (Lake & Fariss, 2014: 571, 573). Because an international administration takes on the role of the state as a trustee, they are also capable of providing the country with public goods and services (Krasner & Risse, 2014: 550). The extent to which external actors succeed in improving state capacity and providing public goods depends on their legitimacy in the country, the complexity of their task and the institutional design of governance structures (Krasner & Risse, 2014: 555). But, because international-led statebuilding is costly for international actors, only the actors that have an interest in the failed state are willing to take on the task of serving as a trustee (Lake & Fariss, 2014: 575). According to Lake and Fariss (2014: 576), international actors can have an interest in political stability in the failed state or region. But, more often specific economic or security incentives motivate their statebuilding efforts. Thus, Lake and Fariss (2014: 576) argue that international actors in an international-led statebuilding context are self-interested actors, even when they are authorized by the international community. In conclusion, it important to note that international-led statebuilding occurs in countries of limited statehood, and that international actors are often self-interested and capable of providing public goods.

Coordinating international-led statebuilding: a classic collective action problem?

We have now learned that donor coordination is a relevant issue in the field of international-led statebuilding, and perhaps more importantly, that donors may have incentives not to actively engage in donor coordination even though it serves their common goal. If this is indeed the case, then one could wonder whether donor coordination in international-led statebuilding leads to collective action problems. Could it perhaps be that donors in international-led statebuilding have an incentive not to engage in donor coordination, knowing they could still benefit from the provided public good? Collective action theory has been a dominant paradigm in social sciences since the publication of Mancur Olson’s ‘The Logic of Collective Action’ in the 1960s (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007: 180). Olson (1965: 1) notes that the general idea exists that rational, self-interested individuals will act in support of their group interest. If the members of a group have a common interest, then each of the members is better off if he acts to achieve that common objective (Olson, 1965: 2). However, according to Olson (1965:2): “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests” because collective action problems arise. First of all, it is important to note that collective action problems arise when groups act collectively to provide a public good. Public goods are goods that are both non-rivalrous and non-excludable (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007: 180; Daniel & Arce, 2001: 114). This means that the use of a public good does not impede its use by others (non-rivalry), and that once the public good is provided no one can be excluded from enjoying the good (non-exclusion) (Daniel & Arce, 2001: 114).

However, in order to provide the public good the members in the group must make private contributions. In other words, even though the benefits of the public good are public, the costs must be borne privately (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007: 180). However, each group member has an incentive not to bear the private costs for the public good, but rather to share in the benefits of the public good when it is provided by the other members. Hence, a rational and self-interested group member shall not contribute to the common group interest, but rather freeride on the contributions of other group members (Willer, 2009: 23). In addition, Olson finds that the larger a group is, the less likely group members are to further their common interest (Olson, 1976: 36). Smaller groups are much more effective at providing public goods, because “they not only have economic incentives, but also social incentives, that lead their members to work towards the achievement of the collective good” (Olson, 1965: 53, 63). Olson identifies two reasons for this difference between small and large groups. First, in large groups each member is such a small part of the total group that his or her action barely contributes to the final outcome. Therefore, if a group member fails to contribute to the common goal, it is rarely decisive for the success of the group. Second, in a large group everyone cannot possible know everyone, so group members will not be personally affected when they fail to make a sacrifice on behalf of the group (Olson, 1965: 62). In sum, from the theory of collective action we have learned that there is a possibility that collective action problems may arise in an international-led statebuilding setting, and that these kinds of problems are easier to tackle by working in smaller groups.

Concluding remarks

In the literature discussion, the concept of donor coordination has first been defined along with a number of indicators that help us determine the level of coordination among donors. In addition, the academic literature has also provided us with a number of different mechanisms that help explain the general lack of donor coordination in both international development cooperation and international-led statebuilding. Thereafter, the concept of international-led statebuilding has been introduced on the basis of the academic literature. In doing so, the importance of statebuilding in general, and more specifically the existence of a strong rule of law within a well-functioning security sector, for achieving stable peace in a post-conflict situation has been emphasised. Finally, the literature discussion has focused on the role of international organisations in international-led statebuilding, and the collective action problems they may encounter within such a setting. In addition to introducing the concepts that are central to this research, the literature discussion was also aimed at identifying the knowledge gaps in the academic literature. From the literature discussion it has become clear that donor coordination has especially received a lot of attention in the field of international development studies. However, the concept donor coordination has also been picked up by a number of political scientists who recognise the importance of donor coordination in the context of international-led statebuilding. But, what is missing from the academic literature is research that looks specifically at the concept donor coordination in an international-led statebuilding setting. Most of the research recognises that a lack of donor coordination is an issue, but fails to explore the mechanisms that could improve our understanding of donor coordination among international statebuilders. In this research, the aim is to contribute to this gap in the literature by trying to understand donor coordination in an international-led statebuilding setting better. In the next chapter, the insights that have been gathered from the literature discussion will be translated into theories and hypotheses that can help answer the research question.

III. Theory

Introduction

In order to be able to answer the research question in this article, it is crucial to collect data on two separate questions. First, the aim of this research is to determine the actual level of donor coordination among international organisations in an international-led statebuilding context. Second, the aim is to find the causal mechanisms than can explain this level of donor coordination. Determining the level of donor coordination is an empirical question, whereas identifying the mechanisms that may explain this level of donor coordination is an explanatory question. In this chapter, the aim is to find plausible answers to both of the questions by developing theories on the basis of the literature discussion. These theories are then formulated into hypotheses that will be tested by using the data that has been collected from field research in Kosovo and the analysis of policy documents.

Collective action problems: predicting the level of donor coordination

In the literature discussion, the possibility that international-led statebuilding may cause collective actions problems has been raised. But, how can we apply this theory of collective action to the reality of led statebuilding? In their role as trustees, international organisations in an international-led statebuilding setting can collectively provide public goods. Let us assume that these international actors have a common interest in providing effective assistance with regard to the statebuilding process in a post-conflict situation. Hence, the effective provision of aid by international organisations to ensure successful statebuilding in post-conflict societies could be understood here as a public good. It is a public good in the sense that one donor enjoying the effective provision of aid does not reduce the ability of the other donors to effectively provide aid, making it non-rivalrous. In addition, anyone can enjoy the benefits of aid effectiveness once it is provided and no one can be excluded from enjoying it, making it thus non-excludable. Furthermore, let us assume that donor coordination contributes to achieving this common interest of aid effectiveness. Donor coordination therefore is the private contribution that group members must make in order to achieve the pubic good of aid effectiveness. Of course, donor coordination is only one of many mechanisms that may contribute to achieving more effective aid provision in international-led statebuilding. But, since this research focuses specifically on donor coordination, other possible mechanisms will not be taken into account at this point. It is important to note however that donor coordination is not the end in itself or a public good. But, rather the private contribution that is necessary to further the common interest of the group.

Let us now translate this theory to the international organisations that are engaged in justice sector reform in Kosovo. If it is assumed that the international organisations in Kosovo’s justice sector are rational and self-interested actors, as Lake and Fariss (2014: 576) suggested earlier, then we would expect them to encounter a collective action problem. If this is indeed the case, it is possible to make two assumptions about the level of donor coordination in Kosovo’s justice sector. On the one hand, because there is a great chance that collective action problems will arise among donors in Kosovo’s justice sector, we are likely to find that the level of donor coordination is relatively low. After all, international actors may have incentives to freeride, or to benefit from the contributions the other group members are making to the common goal of effective aid provision. On the other hand, if international actors in Kosovo’s justice sector indeed encounter collective action problems, we could also reasonably expect them to tackle such problems by coordinating in smaller groups. It is therefore likely that we find smaller groups of donors that do succeed in donor coordination, because they have managed to overcome collective action problems by reducing their group size. In sum, international-led statebuilding is likely to lead to collective action problems, because international organisations have, as rational actors, little incentive to make the private contribution of engaging in donor coordination. However, if we were to find successful donor coordination anywhere in Kosovo’s justice sector, it is most likely to be in smaller groups of donors that are better able to avoid collective action problems. By

making these two assumptions, we can better predict and ultimately understand the level of donor coordination among international organisations.

Causal mechanisms: explaining the level of donor coordination

Once the level of donor coordination among international organisations in the justice sector of Kosovo has been established, the causal mechanisms that can explain such a level of donor coordination can be identified. From the academic literature it has become clear that a number of mechanisms may influence the level of donor coordination among international organisations in an international-led statebuilding setting. These mechanism are merged here into three broader categories of causal mechanisms, of which we could reasonably expect them to have an effect on the level of donor coordination in the context of this research. The three causal mechanisms that are taken into account in this article have been derived from Paris (2009), Nunnenkamp et al. (2013), Aldasoro et al. (2010), De Renzio ( 2004) and Eyben (2007), and are: (1) transaction costs, (2) donors interests and (3) donor competition. First, the transaction costs that accompany donor coordination might have a reducing effect on the level of donor coordination among international organisations. Donor coordination demands time, effort and financial resources from the actors involved and can decrease the level of flexibility in their work. Therefore, the transaction costs might be an obstacle for donors to engage in donor coordination.

Second, donors might have different goals, philosophies, strategic considerations or approaches regarding their statebuilding efforts in Kosovo. Such interests may either stem from the organisation itself, or from strong national interests backing the international organisation. Likewise, differing interests among different donors could make donor coordination a less appealing or feasible option for them. Third, competition among the international organisations might hinder successful donor coordination. International organisations engaged in similar efforts in the justice sector in Kosovo may compete over funds, recognition, attention from the host government or a leadership position. Such competition could make donors reluctant to coordinate their efforts. Each of these causal mechanisms could explain the level of donor coordination that is found among the donors in the justice sector in Kosovo. However, this does not mean that there are no other causal mechanisms, for example random or case-specific factors, that have influenced the level of donor coordination in the case of Kosovo. Therefore, the research remains open to any of such causal mechanisms that may further our understanding of the concept of donor coordination in international-led statebuilding.

Hypotheses

From these theories and assumptions, a number of hypotheses can be formulated that will help answer the research question. First, it can be expected that the level of donor coordination decreases the higher the transaction costs for donor coordination are. The independent variable then is the level of the transaction costs for donor coordination. However, it must be noted that it is only possible to determine donors’ perception of the transaction costs, and not the actual transaction costs of donor coordination.

Second, it can be expected that the level of donor coordination decreases the more diverse the interests of the donors are. The independent variable is here the degree of similarity between donor interests. Third, it can be expected that the level of donor coordination decreases the more competition exists between the donors. The independent variable is then the level of competition between donors. These three hypotheses form the basis for the research, and will be tested in order to explain the level of donor coordination in Kosovo’s justice sector. In addition, the research remains open to other factors that could possibly explain the level of donor coordination in an international-led statebuilding setting. If any of such factors will be found, their impact on the level of donor coordination will be discussed in a sense of theory-building, rather than theory-testing.

IV. Methods

Methods

Before turning to the discussion of the data, it is important to elaborate more on the methods and constructs that have been used to conduct this research. The level of donor coordination is the central concept in this research. Donor coordination is understood as increased coordination and streamlining of the activities of different actors to maximize aid effectiveness. This definition follows from the literature discussion, and is a combination of the definitions proposed by Pehn et al. (2004: 5) and De Renzio et al. (2004: 3). The concept of donor coordination is being studied among international actors that are engaged in justice sector reform in Kosovo. Justice sector reform is defined as all processes and procedures aimed at reforming the justice sector, with the wider objective of building a stable and functioning state in Kosovo. For the justice sector a rather broad definition is being used, as all institutions – both state and non-state – that are central to the management and strengthening of the rule of law in societies. In this context, the article focuses specifically on the interaction between the international actors involved in justice sector reform in Kosovo. However, this does not mean that local institutions are not mentioned in this article, nor that they have been of no importance to the outcome of this research. But, it is important to note that local institutions have not been included in the data collection because of the limited scope of this research. International organisations are understood here as all non-local actors, either multilateral or bilateral organisations, in Kosovo’s justice sector. These actors are donors in the sense that they actively contribute to justice sector reform in Kosovo. Their contribution may take many forms, either by guiding the reform process, assisting local institutions with advice, or providing assistance on project basis.

In order to conduct the research, qualitative research methods have been used. It was decided to use a qualitative approach, because this method allows for an in-depth understanding of the specific situation in Kosovo. The purpose of this research has been to better understand and ultimately explain the interaction between international actors in an international-led statebuilding setting. In order to

obtain such insights, one must understand the dynamic between these international actors, the choices they make and the motives that drive them. Such information can best be gathered by conducting in-depth interviews with people working at international organisations in Kosovo. By conducting these interviews it becomes possible to give meaning to a concept as abstract as donor coordination, and to identify the causal mechanisms that influence international actors in their level of donor coordination. All data that has been gathered through interviews will be processed anonymously, due to sensitive nature of the information. The in-depth interviews will be complemented by information that has been gained from analysing policies and reports on this particular issue. The policy analysis makes it easier to put the information that has been obtained from the interviews in perspective. Furthermore, the policy analysis may provide additional information and can as such give a more complete picture of the concept of donor coordination within the justice sector of Kosovo. In the period from the 27th _{of April until the}

16th _{of May of 2017, eleven interviews were conducted with people working at nine different}

international organisations Kosovo. The interviews were conducted with employees of OSCE, EULEX, UNMIK, EUSR, USAID, UNDP, INL, NSCS and the Dutch Embassy in Pristina, Kosovo. Due to time constraints and the limited scope of this research, it was not possible to include all international organisations engaged in justice sector reform in Kosovo. These international organisations were selected because they are all influential actors with a long history in Kosovo’s justice sector. Therefore, this selection of international organisations is believed to be a good representation of the international community involved in justice sector reform in Kosovo. The appendix contains a list of all the people that have been interviewed for this research.

Dependent variable

In the literature discussion, the concept of donor coordination has been discussed and defined. Furthermore, a number of indicators were found in the academic literature that can help operationalise the concept of donor coordination (OECD, 2003; De Renzio et al., 2004: Pehn et al., 2004). Before anything can be said about the causal mechanisms that help explain donor coordination, the level of donor coordination among international organisations in Kosovo’s justice sector must first be determined. In total there are three indicators that are able to tell us something about the level of donor coordination among a group of donors. First, information exchange is the most basic form of donor coordination. Donors keep one another informed about their activities, but there is little effort being put into coordinating these activities. Second, a common agreement on the division of labour is a more elaborate form of donor coordination. Donors agree not to interfere in one another’s efforts and there is a clear agreement on the division of tasks among the international actors. Third, a common framework of the simplification of procedures to facilitate donor coordination is the most advanced form of donor coordination. Donors make an effort to create formal structures for donor coordination embedded within their organisations and coordinate their efforts on a regular basis. Hence, there are three levels of donor coordination that range from the most basic form of information sharing to more elaborate formal donor

coordination structures. Using these three indicators makes it possible to determine the level of donor coordination among the international actors engaged in justice sector reform in Kosovo. It is important to note, however, that it may prove difficult to determine the level of donor coordination for the entire group of international organisations engaged in Kosovo’s justice sector. It is quite possible that we find different levels of donor coordination within this group of donors. After all, in the previous chapter the assumption was made that we are likely to find smaller groups of donors who have achieved a more advanced level of donor coordination than the rest of the donor community. In short, the three levels of donor coordination mentioned here are important instruments for determining the level of donor coordination in Kosovo’s justice sector.

Independent variable

Once the level of donor coordination has been determined, the goal is to determine whether or not the causal mechanisms that were identified indeed influence the level of donor coordination, and more importantly, to what extent and how these mechanisms influence the level of donor coordination. In doing so, the research relies primarily on testing the hypothesis that followed from the academic literature. Earlier in the article, the three causal mechanism that might influence the outcome of this research have been identified. Based on the literature discussion, three hypotheses were formulated of which we expect them to have an effect on the level of donor coordination among international actors in an international-led statebuilding setting. The first causal mechanism is transaction costs. In order to measure if the transaction costs of coordinating influence the level of donor coordination, the respondents were asked if they think the time, effort or financial resources influence the level of donor coordination. The second causal mechanism is donor interests. The respondents were asked if they think that different interests, philosophies or approaches among the donors influence the level of donor coordination. The final causal mechanism is donor competition. In order to measure this mechanism, respondents were asked if there was any competition between the international actors involved in justice sector reform in Kosovo, and whether this affected the level of donor coordination between them. In addition to these three causal mechanisms, respondents were asked if they feel there are any other factors that could explain the level of donor coordination in Kosovo’s justice sector.

Limitations

It is important to note that this research is based on the perception of the respondents. It is neither feasible, nor desirable to objectively measure the effects of the abovementioned causal mechanisms. After all, the aim of this research is to better understand the interaction among international actors, by studying their behaviour in an international-led statebuilding setting. The respondents in this research are likely to have different views on the level of donor coordination and the causal mechanisms that influence it. As a consequence, it may prove difficult to make clear statements about the situation in Kosovo, or to generalise the results to other cases. Furthermore, for some of the variables in this research

the data very much relies on the memory of the respondents. Respondents may or may not have a clear memory of what the situation was like years ago and if the variables changed over time. Therefore, the data that has been gathered during this research will be carefully considered with these limitations in mind, before drawing any conclusions.

V. Case Selection

Case selection

Up until this point, the research design has focused more at the general concept of donor coordination in an international-led statebuilding setting. In this chapter, however, the case selection of Kosovo will be accounted for and the necessary background information on the international led statebuilding operation in Kosovo will be introduced. The field research in this article focuses specifically on the case of Kosovo, because it is a unique case in the record of international-led statebuilding. Ever since the end of the Kosovo War in 1999, international statebuilders have been flooding the country to assist in its statebuilding process. Nearly eighteen years later, influential international actors such as the UN, the EU and the OSCE are still present to build Kosovo’s future. Many of the international actors in Kosovo focus on similar themes or sectors. One of those sectors is the justice sector. A large number of the international organisations focus on strengthening the rule of law in Kosovo, some of them as part of their mandate and others as their core business. As such, one would expect that given the long tradition of international-led statebuilding in Kosovo and the fact that these international actors focus on similar topics, a high level of donor coordination, similar to the third level of donor coordination that was discussed in the previous chapter, should be observed. If this is not the case, and these international organisation are indeed not capable of coordinating their efforts, then one could ask if donor coordination is at all feasible in cases with less favourable circumstances. In this research, the case of Kosovo is therefore used as a ‘most-likely’ case. If we were to find high levels of donor coordination anywhere, it is most likely to be in the case of Kosovo. However, it has been decided to test if there is indeed such a high level of donor coordination in Kosovo, because the literature has provided us with reasons to believe that the level of donor coordination is not as high as one would expect in the case of Kosovo. Indeed, on the basis of the theory it has been assumed that the level of donor coordination in such an international-led statebuilding may be lacking, as a result of the collective action problems that arise among international organisations. As a consequence, it has been assumed that successful donor coordination is difficult to reach in large groups and is therefore more likely to occur in smaller groups of donors.

Furthermore, it should also be mentioned that because the statebuilding process in Kosovo has been going on for a considerable amount of time, it is much more feasible to collect data on possible changes over time in this case. Hence, if we want to know more about the level of coordination between

international organisations in an international-led statebuilding setting and look at changes over a longer period of time, Kosovo is an excellent case for field research. In the following sections a more detailed outline will be given of the relevant background information to the international-led statebuilding operation in Kosovo.

The dynamics of civil war: introducing the case of Kosovo

Before turning to the arrival of the international administration in Kosovo in 1999, it is important to give a brief overview of the events that preceded the international-led statebuilding operation. The Kosovo War – lasting from March 1998 until June 1999 – began as an armed conflict between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Serb police forces, and ended with the intervention of NATO forces which started a bombing campaign to end the hostilities in Kosovo (Webber, 2009: 448). Kosovo had long been a contested territory and at the time of the conflict over ninety percent of the Kosovar population were Kosovar Albanians calling on their right to self-determination (Papasotiriou, 2002: 40). For the Serbs, however, Kosovo also had important historical and cultural value as they felt that their land had been colonised by Albanians (Derks & Price, 2010: 3). After the Second World War, Kosovo became part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and succeeded in obtaining a certain degree of autonomy within the Yugoslav regime of Josip Broz Tito (Derks & Price, 2010: 3). But, as Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in 1989, Kosovo’s autonomous state slowly began to disintegrate and the province was placed under the direct rule of Belgrade (Papasotiriou, 2002: 42). In the following years, Serbia gradually gained more control over Kosovo and eventually replaced Kosovo’s administrative apparatus with Serbs (Papasotiriou, 2002: 42). During the 1990s, Kosovar Albanians began to demand the independence of Kosovo, as a peaceful resistance under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova emerged (Papasotiriou, 2002: 42). However, Rugova’s pacifist approach suffered a serious blow when the Dayton Agreement that ended the Bosnian War in 1995 paid insufficient attention to the deteriorating situation in Kosovo (Papasotiriou, 2002: 43). To the Kosovar Albanian population, it seemed as if as long as there was no fighting in Kosovo the issue of Kosovo would not be on the international agenda.

Hence, the militant group KLA began promoting an armed approach, but lacked the sufficient means to organise a proper guerrilla campaign against the Serbian forces (Papasotiriou, 2003: 43). In March 1997, the collapse of the neighbouring Albanian state resulted in a state of anarchy that caused a significant flow of arms into Kosovo. Because of the easy access to arms, the KLA was able to start an armed conflict in the hope that Serbia’s retaliation would cause a humanitarian crisis large enough for international forces to intervene (Papasotiriou, 2002: 45). Indeed, the Serbian army and special forces of the Serbian Interior Ministry reacted with brutal countermeasures towards the KLA, causing both the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people within Kosovo and the emergence of a huge refugee flow towards neighbouring countries (Webber, 2009: 449). In reaction to the deteriorating situation in Kosovo, NATO called for a peace conference to be held at Rambouillet in France in February 1999. But, after the failure of these peace negotiations Milosevic continued his military strategy with

supposedly two goals in mind. First, the destruction of the KLA and mass expulsion of Kosovar Albanians from Kosovo. And second, the survival of the Serb forces long enough to enforce either a possible crack in the NATO alliance or to invoke support from Russia. On March 24th _{1999, NATO}

launched Operation Allied Forces (OAF), a bombing campaign that lasted for 78 days and was organised without authorisation from the UN Security Council. OAF was aimed at ending the violence in Kosovo by sufficiently damaging the Serbian forces for them to accept the terms of the Rambouillet Agreement (Webber, 2009: 448). However, at the end of the bombing campaign conditions were worse than ever, and a refugee crisis was well underway after hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians had been expelled from Kosovo by Milosevic. In June 1999, Milosevic finally surrendered to the international community and the Kosovo War came to an official end.

Civil wars that end in negotiated settlements, as was the case in Kosovo, are less likely to be followed by a stable peace than are civil wars that end in decisive military victories (Fortna, 2004: 273). Furthermore, according to Sisk (2009: 201), civil wars also considerably weaken both the basic state capacities and the political system in a state, in addition to severely crippling civil society. The state often loses its legitimacy after a civil war because people no longer trust the state and do not regard the state as an impartial force (Blattman & Miguel, 2010: 43; Barnett, 2006: 92). Hence, countries emerging from civil wars are often in desperate need of statebuilding in order for them to have a chance at securing a stable peace. In June 1999, immediately following NATO’s bombing campaign, the United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 1244 therefore authorised the deployment of a UN-led civilian mission (UNMIK) and a NATO-led military mission (KFOR) in Kosovo (Bernabéu, 2007: 73). In doing so, the international administration was meant to: “provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo” (UNSC, 1999: 3). As such, the Special Representative of the Secretary General became the legal head of Kosovo, while powers were gradually transferred to the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (Derks & Price, 2010: 4; Mulaj, 2010: 245). The civilian mission, UNMIK, was divided into four pillars that were each headed by an international organisation: (1) ‘Law Enforcement and Justice by the UN, (2) ‘Civil Administration’ by the UN, (3) ‘Democratization and Institution Building’ by the OSCE and (4) ‘Economic Reconstruction’ by the EU. In sum, the Kosovo war that lasted from 1998 to 1999 lead to a grave humanitarian and political crisis in the region and caused the international community to launch one of the largest international-led statebuilding operations in recent history.

VI. Results

Introduction

In this chapter, the data that has been gathered through interviews and policy analysis will be discussed and interpreted in order to answer the research question. Before turning to the concept of donor coordination, the context within which donor coordination has been studied, namely the reform of Kosovo’s justice sector, will be further elaborated on. Thereafter, the level of donor coordination as the dependent variable in this research will be considered. Then the chapter focuses on the main purpose of this research, which is testing if the hypothesis can indeed explain this level of donor coordination. First, the three mechanisms that emerged from the academic literature and were translated into hypotheses will be discussed. Then we will discuss two other mechanisms that did not appear in the academic literature, but may provide new insight into our understanding of donor coordination in international-led statebuilding.

Kosovo’s justice sector and the arrival of the international administration

Reforming Kosovo’s justice sector: starting from scratch?

In 1999, UNMIK was appointed the daunting task of establishing a multi-ethnic, independent and impartial judicial system in Kosovo to ensure and maintain peace in the post-conflict situation (Marshall & Inglis, 2003: 109). However, the international community was immediately faced with three major challenges; the continuing security vacuum, the choice of the applicable law, and the appointment of judicial staff (Chesterman, 2001: 4). Kosovo was in a legal vacuum after all Serbian authorities had fled the country prior to the international community’s arrival (Chesterman, 2001: 4). According to many scholars and practioners in the field, the justice system had completely collapsed and all institutions had to be built from scratch (Lemay-Herbert, 2012: 195; Strohmeyer, 2001: 48; Marshall & Inglis, 2003: 123; Hehir, 2009: 138). However, one of the respondents – a local judge – mentioned: “I cannot say we started from scratch. Because when you go back before 1989, you see that Kosovo had a very strong justice sector. Much stronger than today”. In June 1999, shortly after their arrival, UNMIK decided that the law that was in force prior to NATO’s intervention would be the law applicable in Kosovo. But, this decision was met with a lot of resistance by the Kosovar Albanian judiciary, who refused to apply the Serbian laws in Kosovo because they considered it the law from a repressive regime (Chesterman, 2001: 5; Marshall & Inglis, 2003: 101). As a result, in December of that year UNMIK decided to reinstate the laws that were applicable in 1989 (Marshall & Inglis, 2003: 101).

However, administering the justice system in Kosovo proved to be an extremely difficult task for the international administration, partly due to the problematic security situation on the ground (Chesterman, 2001: 6). The judicial vacuum and the breakdown of institutions led to a significant rise in organised crime, which even resulted in attempts to kill the remaining Serbs and collaborators in the

country (Marshall & Inglis, 2003: 101; Narten, 2008: 378). In addition, the appointment of judicial staff also proved to be problematic. One of the respondents stated: “The president of Supreme Court literally went house by house, apartment by apartment to find colleagues, because nothing was working”. Another respondent described the appointment process as a: “layer of ridiculousness”, because UNMIK saw no need in vetting the appointed judges. As a result, many former Yugoslav judges who had not worked since 1989 and had lost most of their skills were appointed. One of the respondents, a judge at the time, mentioned that the situation changed drastically after Kosovo came under Serbian rule in 1989. The respondent described how over 400 Kosovar judges were dismissed and had to reapply in order to get their jobs back. “We knew that we would not at all be considered for judges, because it was only a way to do the cleaning in the courts”, this respondent stated. As a consequence, most Kosovar Albanian judges and prosecutors were not able to maintain their legal skills or education in the period from 1989 to 1999 (Marshall & Inglis, 2003: 123).

Because of these obstacles, it has often been argued that the reform process of the justice system in Kosovo started off at the wrong foot. One of the respondents stated: “It was really UNMIK’s show back then, and they were a disaster”. From 2001 onwards, the international community placed the justice system under the Constitutional Framework for Self-Government in Kosovo, and gradually started transferring powers to the Provision Institutes of Self-Government. In 2006, the Ministry of Justice, the Kosovo Judicial Council and Kosovo Prosecutorial Council were created, albeit the latter two not in their current forms. The Ministry of Justice was tasked with the drafting of legislation, whereas the Kosovo Judicial Council and the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council had to manage everything related to the judiciary. In 2008, Kosovo declared independence and formally invited the EU into the country to establish the new rule of law mission EULEX (Derks & Price, 2010: 4). At first, the intention was that the international community would come to a consensus that would allow Kosovo to become independent while being monitored by the EU (ICG, 2010: 2). However, because Russia blocked any UN Security Council action, the UN and the EU were unable to reach a consensus on the issue. As a result, EULEX was subordinated to the UNMIK legal framework established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, and had to be neutral regarding the status of Kosovo (ICG, 2010: 3; Koeth, 2010: 236). In short, justice sector reform has always been on the agenda of the international community in Kosovo, but they were confronted with a series of setbacks in the early stages of the reform process. The current state of Kosovo’s justice sector

Eighteen years have passed since the ending of Kosovo’s civil war, and the international administration is still present to strengthen the country’s justice sector. However, most of the respondents acknowledged that Kosovo’s justice sector continues to face a host of serious challenges (OSCE, 2012: 5). According to one of the respondents, Kosovo’s justice sector remains very unstable because the laws change every couple of years. “Whoever is coming brings a new method, which is not helping. I think it is too expensive and there is no time to see how it is implemented”, the respondent argued. Several