Peace Negotiations and Civil Society Inclusion
Conditions under which civil society organizations become directly involved in the negotiation process to end a civil war, a case study of Sudan and Congo
Name: Nienke Vennik (6073859)
Supervisor: Abbey Steele
Second reader: dr. R.M. Sanchez Salgado
Master Thesis Political Science, International Relations
Words: 16.291
Date: 23-06-2017
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Table of Content 1. Introduction 4 2. Theoretical Framework 6 2.1 Peace Negotiations 62.2 Civil Society Organizations in the peace negotiation process 7 2.2.1 What are civil society organizations? 7
2.2.2 Different phases, different roles 8
2.2.3 Levels of inclusion 8
2.2.4 Include or Exclude? 9
2.2.5 Scenarios of inclusion and exclusion 10 2.3 Third party mediation and the role of the mediator 11
2.3.1 Types of mediators 12
3 Methodology 12
3.1 Data collection 13
3.2 Dependent and independent variables 14
4 Analysis 14
5 Comparative Case Study 17
5.1 Case selection 17
5.2 Sudan 19
5.2.1 Background and causes of war 19
5.2.2 Previous Mediation attempts 19
5.2.3 IGAD peace process 20
5.2.3.1 Timeline 20
5.2.3.2 Criticism and civil society exclusion 21
5.2.4 Other parties involved 22
5.2.4.1 Civil Society 22
5.2.4.2 International Support 22
5.2.5 Conclusion 23
5.3 Congo 24
5.3.1 Background and causes of war 24
5.3.2 Previous Mediation attempts 25
5.3.3 The Lusaka Peace Process 25
5.3.4 The Inter-Congolese Dialogue 26
5.3.5 Civil Society Involvement 27
5.3.6 Conclusion 27
5.4 Sudan and Congo compared 28
6 Conclusion 30
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AbstractThis research aims to answer the question under what conditions civil society organizations are included during the official peace negotiation process to end a civil war. This will be done by conducting a nested analysis, using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. First a qualitative analysis is conducted to see whether civil society inclusion correlates with the type of mediator that is involved during the negotiation process and then a comparative case study is conducted between Sudan and Congo to find out who decides who gets a seat at the negotiation table. Expected is that the type of mediator has the most influence on this. It is expected that when a low profile mediator is involved (a mediator from a neighboring country or regional organization) civil society organizations are more likely to be included than when a high profile mediator (like large states and international organizations) mediates between the parties. These expectations are partly confirmed by the analysis, however no strong correlation was found. To find other possible explanations a comparative case study is conducted between Sudan and Congo.
Keywords: Civil war, Peace negotiations, Civil society, Mediation, Sudan, Congo
Introduction
In the past few years we have seen international mediation efforts in civil wars in for example the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in Colombia, Afghanistan and Syria, with some efforts more successful than others. In Syria, many international efforts were made to negotiate peace, but during the first half decade, both sides were unwelcoming towards mediation as they both felt they could win (Hinnebusch and Zartman, 2016). After this, different countries like Turkey, Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Russia, but also individuals like Lakhdar Brahimi and Kofi Annan and the Arab League as a regional organization tried to mediate a peace agreement without success. During the Colombian peace talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, mediators tried to include civil society organizations with delegations for victims, women and disappeared persons. This served to strengthen the process and to generate credibility and support for the agreements reached (Sánchez-Garzoli, 2016). There are many ways to end civil wars, but in the past years, a lot of negotiating has been done. During the process, different groups can be involved and negotiations can take many shapes. Talks can be bilateral and involve just the disputants, or they can be multilateral with the addition of outside parties and organizations. Mediation is by far the most common form of third-party intervention in international conflicts (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006: 321) and international mediation as a practice in world politics has increased in the past twenty years (Lanz, 2011: 276).
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The foundation for mediation as an international practice was laid out in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular its Chapter VI regarding the pacific settlement of disputes (Lanz, 2011: 278). Article 33 states that ‘the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice’ (UN Charter art. 33). In the 1980s, approximately thirty percent of international crises received mediation. In the early and mid-1990s this number rose to fifty percent. After this it declined, but in the last years, numbers went up again. In the post-Cold War period, around thirty seven percent of the conflicts were ended after a negotiated peace settlement (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2007: 6–7). Mediation became more embedded within the foreign policies of states as well as the programs of international organizations. Bureaucratic entities dealing with conflict resolution have been created to promote mediation and mediation has become a standard international response to armed conflicts in the world. (Lanz, 2011: 278).According to Wallensteen and Svensson (2014: 317) there is a documented trend showing an increase in the number of actors involved in mediation. Regional organizations have increased their role in mediation efforts meaning a reduced role for international governmental organizations in third-party activity. This does however not mean a decrease in the actual number of mediation efforts by these actors per se, the total number of mediations just went up. Hence an increasing number of actors have been involved during the negotiation process. Next to the warring parties, also other parties may get a seat at the negotiation table. This can be for example political parties or civil society organizations. The UN guidance for effective mediation (2012: 11-12) states that a mediation process should be inclusive, meaning that the views and needs of conflict parties and other stakeholders are represented and integrated into the process and outcome of a mediation effort. But mediators may face constraints from the warring parties. According to Nilsson (2012: 244) the inclusion of civil society actors in peace accords can be of critical importance in anchoring the peace. Peace deals with involvement from civil society actors and political parties in combination are more likely to see peace prevail.
Mediation research faced a new beginning with respect to the issue of internal wars, and the efforts that have gone into such research have dramatically increased over the past few decades (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014: 317). A lot has been written on the effectiveness of mediations and the advantages and disadvantages of including different groups during the negotiation process. Also a lot of research has been conducted on the influence of civil society inclusion on the legitimacy and sustainability of peace (for example Belloni, 2001; Orjuela, 2004; Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008; Paffenholz, 2010; Nilsson, 2012), but no research has been done into the conditions in which these groups are invited. This article aims to contribute to this end: it tries to identify the factors that determine who gets involved during the negotiation process by doing a nested analysis using qualitative as well as quantitative methods. By doing an in-depth case study, I will be able to describe the conditions under which civil society organizations are included during the peace negotiation
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process. This leads to a better understanding of why in some cases civil society groups are involved and in others they are not. Who gets a seat at the table and under what conditions is not only a relevant academic question, it has also political implications. When we know under what conditions civil society organizations are included, we can influence the process of their inclusion.The main research question that this article addresses is: under what conditions are civil society organizations included during the official peace negotiation process to end a civil war? I will try to answer this question by looking at the type of mediator that is involved during the process. Does the type of mediator have an influence on the inclusion of civil society groups? The main question of this article will be answered in three steps. First some background information is provided on the main variables of this research. I will explain what I mean by civil society organizations, what I mean by the inclusion of these groups by giving an overview of the existing literature and I will explain the role of the mediator, leading to the main focus point of this research and the hypothesis that will be investigated. In the second part a qualitative analysis is conducted to see whether civil society inclusion correlates with the type of mediator that mediates between the parties and the third part of this study consists of a comparative case study. Here the conditions under which civil society organizations were included or excluded during a particular peace negotiation process are explained more in depth. By doing this in the end I hope to provide a conclusion explaining the conditions under which civil society organizations become directly involved in the negotiation process to end a civil war. This paper will end with a discussion and recommendations for future research.
Theoretical Framework
Peace NegotiationsIn the past years third parties played a major role in a large number of interstate and intrastate disputes. Empirical studies suggest that some form of non-coercive third-party intervention, without using force or threads, has taken place in nearly seventy percent of all conflicts since 1945 (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006b: 330). Mediation is one form of intervention that can be used to end a civil war. This is according to Bercovitch (1997) a coercive, violent, and, ultimately, non-binding form of intervention. According to McKeon (2005: 567) ‘traditional diplomacy and conflict resolution approaches have largely focused on a narrow definition of a peace process - namely the crucial task of bringing the political and military leaders of opposing groups into a process of dialogue and negotiation with the aim of exploring, reaching agreement on and implementing measures to end violent conflict and create the conditions for peaceful co-existence.’ Research on this topic has also focused a lot on high level peace negotiations and the roles of governing elites. In the last decades the scope has broadened to include armed non-state actors, but also other actors gained more influence during the peace negotiation process (Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008: 12) including different civil society groups. Many studies have confirmed the important role of civil society in peace processes (Belloni 2001; Orjuela 2003; Aall 2007; Paffenholz 2010), but mediators and negotiators have tended to favor the exclusion of civil society groups from peace negotiations (Barnes 2002, 2005; Bell and O’Rourke 2007; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008; Lanz 2011; Nilsson 2012).
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While there are many policy tools available for conflict prevention, management and resolution, mediation is by far the most common form of third-party intervention in international conflicts (Bercovitch and Gartner: 2006: 321). Because the inclusion of different parties is important for the legitimacy of the process and the durability of peace afterwards, but no research has been done into the conditions under which these groups are involved in the peace process, this study will contribute to a better understanding why in some cases civil society groups are involved and during other peace negotiation processes they are not. In the following paragraphs I will explain what is understand to be a civil society organization, what I understand as the inclusion of civil society groups, in what phases they are important and what might explain the differences of inclusion.Civil Society Organizations in the Peace Negotiation Process
What are Civil Society Organizations?
In the late 18th century, a notion of civil society was developed as a domain parallel to, but separate from the state, in which citizens associate according to their own interests and wishes. In the Post— Cold War period, the term civil society became broadly used (Carothers, 2001: 18). Since then, much of the literature either has stressed the qualities of the ‘‘good’’ versus the ‘‘bad’’ state or the need of a strong civil society to make democratic institutions work more efficiently (Belloni, 2008: 185). Civil society creates a space for people to promote specific issues or concerns towards the state and at the same time it balances the power of the state (Wanis St-John and Kew, 2008: 15). There is a lot of discussion on what civil society organizations are, which organizations to include, what they do and how they can be defined (Foley and Edwards, 1996: 38-39; Bell and O’Rourke, 2007: 294; Wanis st-John and Kew, 2008: 15). According to Wanis st-st-John and Kew (2008: 15) civil society can be defined as ‘the vast array of public-oriented associations that are not formal parts of the governing institutions of the state’. This can include for example non-governmental organizations, trade unions or religious institutions, but not political parties. Their purpose is to promote the interests and perspectives of a particular sector of society. For this study civil society organizations are defined in line with the above definition, and only organizations that are solely operating in and originating from the country itself will be included. International civil society organizations are not included in this study.
Because individual citizens are directly affected by conflict, they also have an interest in contributing to its resolution (McKeon, 2005: 567). Since civil society creates a space for people to promote specific issues or concerns towards the state, one way in which citizens can be heard during the peace negotiation process is through civil society organizations. In the current literature on peace negotiations, civil society plays a limited role. When civil society organizations are discussed, it is mostly about inclusion or exclusion, and not about the function or impact they can have or under which conditions they are included (Paffenholz, 2014: 71-72). To give an overview of the current literature, the different phases of a peace process and what roles civil society can play will be described. I will then describe the different degrees by which they can be included. After this, an explanation will be provided for what reasons civil society organizations can be included or excluded and different scenarios of inclusion will be outlined.
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Different phases, different roles
Nilsson (2012) and O’Flaherty (2004) distinguish different phases in the peace negotiations process. It should however be noted that a peace negotiations process is not a linear process with a clear distinction between the different phases or a clear beginning and end. The phases can take place at the same time or actors can fall back from one phase to another. During the different phases of the process, civil society organizations can play different roles. The first phase as distinguished by the two authors is the dialogue phase (Nilsson, 2012) or the in-conflict phase (O’Flaherty, 2004). During this phase civil society organizations can contribute to local ownership of the peace agreement by participating at the grassroots level (Nilsson, 2012: 247). They can advocate talks as an alternative for armed conflict and try to influence public opinion by pointing out the costs of the conflict. This can push the leadership of armed forces into negotiations (McKeon, 2005: 568).
Second phase is the negotiation phase. During this phase civil society organizations can facilitate dialogue between the parties (McKeon, 200: 569) or they can be given a direct seat at the negotiation table (McKeon, 2004: 569; Nilsson, 2012: 247). In countries with a well-developed system of multi-party politics and a vibrant political culture, it is easier to include civil society organizations. Those countries have a political tradition that helps to shape a more democratic structure of the peace process (Barnes, 2002: 8). But in countries where the elites are not democratic representatives, civil society organizations can give voice to groups in the country who are not represented by the elite and they can pressure elite negotiators to function in a more democratic way (Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008: 17). When civil society groups do not have a seat at the table, they can try to influence the parties through lobbying, rallying public opinion and by providing advice (Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008: 20). When civil society organizations are represented at the table, they can encourage the elite level mediators to join the process, mediate between the parties, or promote the interests of their sector or the interests of the broader population (Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008: 17).
The third phase of the process is the implementation phase. During this phase civil society organizations can be used as monitoring bodies or commissions (Nilsson, 2012: 247), or they can have a role as supervisor for the implementation of the agreement (O’Flaherty, 2004: 55-60). This study will only focus on the negotiation phase, because this is the phase in which civil society organizations can have most direct influence on the negotiation process. During the other phases, civil society can act on their own initiative, but during the negotiation phase other actors have an influence on their inclusion. During the negotiation phase civil society organizations can be included in different degrees.
Levels of inclusion
Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008: 18-21) argue that there are different ways in which civil society organizations participate during the negotiation phase of the peace process. The first way in which they can be included is when they are active in track two, unofficial and informal, diplomacy initiatives. Their task is to supplement track one negotiations, the official process, among the political elites by
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engaging key secondary actors to support the peace process. They can also act as temporary intermediaries, to keep lines of communication open when the warring parties are not talking in official negotiations. More directly they can be either chosen as a member of an official delegation or as separate parties to the conflict in their own right. High levels of inclusion are according to Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008:24) when civil society groups have an actual seat at the table. There are moderate levels when the groups do not have a seat at the table but clearly had influence on the parties that were at the table and with low levels of inclusion they do not have a seat at the table and they do not have influence on the parties that do.Paffenholz (2014) also identifies different models of civil society inclusion during the negotiation phase of the peace process. From the highest to the lowest degree of involvement these include direct representation, observer status, official consultative forums, consultations, inclusive post-agreement mechanisms, high-level civil society initiatives, public participation, public decision making, and mass action. Inclusion in this study is defined as high and moderate influence by the definition of Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008), when civil society organizations have a direct seat at the table or when they clearly had an influence on the parties with an observer status or in official consultative forums as defined by Paffenholz (2014).
Include or Exclude
When it comes to the inclusion or exclusion of civil society organizations in the peace negotiation process, different arguments are made. The UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004:38) recommends a ‘greater consultation with and involvement in peace processes of important voices from civil society, especially those of women, who are often neglected during negotiations’. Where research suggests that including civil society makes the process more sustainable and democratic (Belloni, 2001; Orjuela, 2003; Paffenholz, 2010), in practice mediators often exclude non-combatants from the peace negotiations so civil society organization rarely have a seat at the table (Bell and O’Rourke, 2007; Belloni, 2008; Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008; Lanz, 2011; Nilsson, 2012). Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008: 12) state that ‘in fact, numerous critical peace negotiations are structured on the explicit exclusion of these groups and other selected parties.’ Why in practice civil society organizations are often left out of the process is explained in the next paragraphs.
According to Belloni (2008: 183) a vertical dilemma between legitimacy and efficacy arises in the process of the negotiation and implementation of a peace agreement. The involvement of other groups than the warring parties improves the legitimacy of the process, but mediators might fear that involving a greater number of individuals delays the process and thus making it less efficient (Belloni, 2008: 183; Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008:12). According to the literature, the main reasons for excluding civil society from peace negotiations relate to the difficulty in reaching a peace agreement between the primary parties to the conflict (Paffenholz, 2014a: 72). Mediators focus on efficiently and successfully reaching a deal between the actors who control the means of violence and the involvement of more actors may delay the process or even irritate domestic political elites (Belloni,
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2008: 194-195). Next to this it is often difficult to convince the warring parties to agree on more parties at the negotiation table. They are often unwilling to share power with additional groups and even when they are willing to talk with them, it is difficult to decide which groups to include and which ones not (Paffenholz, 2014a: 72-73).There are also arguments to include civil society organizations in the peace negotiation process. According to Paffenholz (2014a: 73) scholars give mainly normative reasons or reasons concerned with the sustainability of peace agreements whereas mediators themselves tend to emphasize issues of effectiveness. Normative reasons to include civil society organizations in the peace process are for example given by Barnes (2002) who states that the inclusion of civil society groups is an international responsibility based on the “right to participate”. Failing to take into account the rights of ordinary citizens can be a hurdle to effectively implement the peace agreement (Belloni, 2008: 195). Civil society organizations can give a voice to those groups in the country who are not represented by the elite (Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008: 17). Consequences of war are felt by the whole population, and civilians are directly affected by violent conflict. Therefore these people should also have a right to participate in decisions about its resolution (McKeon, 2005:1; Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008: 18) through civil society organizations. Leaving civil society organizations out of the process can undermine its legitimacy and create the conditions for future constraint and complicate the implementation. Including civil society on the other hand, ensures broader local support of the peace agreement (Belloni, 2008: 195). Adding to this, peace may be negotiated from the ground up, local leaders, grassroots civil society and traditional authorities may have more influence over fighters than national or international leaders (Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008: 24).
Arguments based on the sustainability of peace agreements are for example made by Nilsson (2012) who conducted a statistical evaluation of whether and how the inclusion of civil society in peace accords affects the durability of peace. With this analysis she found that the inclusion of civil society actors in peace accords can be of critical importance in anchoring the peace, especially in non-democratic societies (Nilsson, 2012: 244). Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008) have similar findings. When the involvement of civil society is high, it is more likely to have a sustained peace.
With these arguments in mind in some cases civil society organizations are involved in the peace negotiation process, while in others they are deliberately left out (Nilsson, 2012: 244). With this, the main question of this study arises, namely what explains whether civil society organizations are included during the official peace negotiation process to end a civil war?
Scenarios of Inclusion and Exclusion in Peace Negotiations
Lanz (2011) argues that there are two questions important for the inclusion or exclusion of civil society organizations in peace negotiations. The first question is related to the second set of arguments provided in the previous paragraph, namely: does the participation of a given actor augment the chance of reaching a sustainable peace settlement? The second question is related to the normative set of arguments: is the participation of a given actor consistent with the values of international
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mediators and sponsors of peace negotiations? Whether civil society organizations are involved in the peace negotiations might come forth from an interplay between these two factors. According to Lanz (2011) actors are included when the participation of a given actor increases the chances of achieving a sustainable peace settlement and when this rationale is supported by the actor’s international reputation. The first practical requirements seem pretty straightforward, actors whose support is crucial to consolidate peace in the long run can be included, while inclusion of a lot of actors who unnecessarily complicate peace negotiations or hardliners who seek to undermine a peace process is not desirable. However how to select these groups that are crucial to consolidate peace or how to indicate groups that try to undermine a peace process is not clear.
Lanz (2011: 287) distinguishes four different scenarios for in- or exclusion. When it comes to the inclusion of civil society organizations, inclusion is the right thing to do as far as international values are concerned, but this potentially has negative consequences on the effectiveness of peace negotiations, which leaves mediators with a difficult dilemma. Lanz does however not provide a solution for this dilemma and he also does not provide a solution for how to select groups that are crucial to consolidate peace and who does this. In the next paragraphs I will look at the role the mediator might play in this.
Third party mediation and the role of the mediator
In the last twenty five years, mediation has gained prominence as a means to end armed conflict (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014: 315). However, how mediators deal with different kind of conflict situations differs. Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991: 8) define mediation as ‘a process of conflict management where the disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical violence or invoking the authority of the law’. According to Beardsley (2013: 57) ‘mediation might involve such functions as the mere hosting of talks, substantive participation in the negotiation process, shuttle diplomacy, or heavy-handed involvement in which the third party shapes the incentives of the parties to reach an agreement.’
In general, mediators do not dominate what happens in peace processes, but they do shape the process by setting the agenda, providing training to conflict parties, bringing in technical experts, and drafting peace agreements. They bring with them their own interests and values (Lanz, 2011: 280-281). Bercovitch and Gartner (2006: 228-339) suggest three mediation strategies, communication-facilitating strategies, procedural, and directive strategies. In the first strategy, the mediator has a passive role, only channeling information to the parties and facilitating cooperation. In the second strategy, the mediator also controls the process and environment of the mediation. The third strategy is the most powerful, in which the mediator affects the content and substance of the bargaining process by providing incentives for the parties to negotiate or by issuing ultimatums. The choice about what strategy to use is affected by the characteristics of the dispute, the nature of the social environment and the identity of a mediator (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006b: 331). As stated in the definition of Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille, mediation can be carried out by an individual,
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group, state or organization and they may all use different strategies. These different types of mediators will be described in the next section.Types of mediators
Mediation is practiced by numerous and diverse actors, mostly being individuals, states, regional organizations or international institutions, who all can be associated with different forms of intervention (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006b: 333). There is a trend showing an increase in the number of actors involved in mediation. Instead of international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations, regional organizations have enhanced their role as third party actors. Since 1956 there has been a decline in UN-led mediation efforts. IGOs are bodies constituted by states, and in many situations, states may prefer to act on their own, therefore the most frequent third parties have been states. The UN often comes in when other mediation efforts failed, which leads to the fact that they have to deal with the most difficult cases (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014: 318).
Bercovitch and Gartner (2006: 323) divide the actors involved in mediation into two groups, namely high profile mediators, like large states and international organizations such as the United Nations, and low profile mediators, like neighboring countries and regional organizations. The first category of mediators are deployed when the intensity of a conflict is high. They use active, intrusive resolution strategies while lower profile mediators use more passive strategies, utilizing fewer resources. High profile mediators are thus more likely to use powerful and directive strategies in conflicts with high intensity, leaving less room for other groups like civil society organizations to participate.
Goulding (2002: 87) has similar findings. According to his study national, low profile mediators make more use of public participation than international mediators. He states that ‘what seems to emerge from recent experiences of peacemaking is that there may be greater scope for public participation when the peacemaking is led by national actors rather than international organizations.’ For this, he gives three explanations. In the first place, few governments are willing to involve more actors at the table for normative reasons and because of efficiency. Second international actors may only undertake mediation when national attempts have failed, by this time society may be polarized so public participation is difficult to manage. And third, international mediators are often ill-informed about the country in which they mediate, which may obscure their perception of the advantages that civil society organizations might have on the process. The findings of Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) and Goulding (2002) lead to the following hypothesis:
H1: When mediation is conducted by low profile mediators, civil society organizations are more likely to have a seat at the negotiation table.
Methodology
To test whether or not civil society actors are more frequently at the table of the peace negotiations when the mediator is from a regional organization or a neighboring state, a combination of quantitative
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and qualitative methods are used. This section describes the methods used for empirical data collection, as well as the case selection process. I will describe the different variables and how they are operationalized and measured. To answer the central question to this thesis the analysis is split into two parts: 1) a quantitative analysis of the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset is conducted to find out in which cases civil society organizations were included; 2) a comparative case study is conducted in order to further test the model. The analysis in this thesis is done for the purpose of theory-testing and theory-building meaning that the variables from the theoretical framework will be discussed and in addition the analysis will contribute to theory-building in the study of similar topics in future research. Data collectionTo test the hypothesis posed in the theoretical framework and to test whether the findings are consistent with the theory, first a quantitative research was conducted on the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset. This dataset covers peace agreements signed between at least two opposing primary warring parties in an armed conflict between 1975 and 2011. Each agreement is categorized as comprehensive agreement which is a final product in a peace process, or as a partial agreement or a peace process agreement, in which the parties still have issues that have to be solved. For this study peace agreements were selected on the basis of three criteria: the agreement is signed after the Cold War period; the agreement is a comprehensive, full agreement, so not a partial or peace process agreement; the agreement is signed between a country and other warring parties, but only intrastate conflict, so no conflict between states. Agreements where no international mediator was involved (like Bangladesh and Ivory Coast) were left out of the analysis. After applying these criteria, a total of twenty nine agreements in the period between 1989 and 2011 remained to analyze for the quantitative research.
The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset includes a variable with the signatories and third parties to the agreement, and it also states who was the mediator during the process. To test the hypothesis when mediation is conducted by low profile mediators, civil society organizations are more likely to have a seat at the negotiation table information about the mediator and about civil society involvement was coded from the dataset. After this, an in depth case study was conducted to compare a deviant case to cases with an expected outcome, so an explanation can be found on why in some cases civil society organizations are included and in others they are not. Data for the case study can be found in UN documents and secondary literature. Because negotiations can come and go over time during a civil war, I will only look at the talks that led to the full, comprehensive peace agreement. This might have led to selection bias because it is possible that civil society organizations are only involved earlier in the process, or that negotiations which included civil society more often lead to partial peace agreements. However, this will not influence the results very much for this study because an in depth case study will be conducted to look at the results more closely. Based on this I will still be able to say something about the conditions under which civil society organizations are included during the process. Another factor that might have influenced the results is that high profile mediators might mainly get the high-intensity, long-standing conflicts. Mediation in these types of
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conflicts might be less suitable to include civil society organizations. Intensity of the conflict was therefore taken into account when selecting the cases for the comparative case study.Dependent and independent variables
As seen in the chapter above there are five types of mediators, namely individuals, states, regional organizations and international institutions. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006: 348) make a distinction between high and low profile mediators. This distinction was used for coding the mediator from the dataset. The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset provides a variable ‘Third party/parties of peace agreement’ where all third parties to the agreement are mentioned. In this variable it is also stated who mediated the agreement. The mediator was coded as (0) when the mediator was a high profile mediator, which is seen as a mediator from an international organization as the United Nations or a major power. The mediator was coded (1) when the mediator was a low profile mediator, which is seen as a regional actor, as a neighboring state or regional organization as the Arab League or ECOWAS. When during the mediation process both low and high profile mediators were involved, the mediator was coded as a high profile mediator.
After coding the mediator I looked at the actors involved during the process. Paffenholz (2014) made a distinction between different ways in which civil society organizations are included during negotiations. These included direct representation, observer status, official consultative forums, consultations, inclusive post-agreement mechanisms, high-level civil society initiatives, public participation, public decision making, and mass action. Because this study investigates high level civil society involvement, involvement was coded as (0) when civil society organizations were not involved or mentioned or when they had a low degree of involvement like consultations, inclusive post-agreement mechanisms, high-level civil society initiatives, public participation, public decision making, and mass action. Civil society involvement was coded as (1) when civil society organizations had a direct seat at the negotiation table as a member of an official delegation or as separate parties to the conflict in their own right or when official consultative forums were organized. For this I also looked at the UCDP peace agreement dataset where third parties and signatories are mentioned as separate variables. When someone from a civil society organization was mentioned as a third party or signatory, involvement was coded as (1). When the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset did not provide enough information about the involvement of civil society actors, official UN documents and the UN peace agreements database were consulted. When the variable mediator changes from high profile to low profile, it is expected that the variable civil society involvement increases with one point from low level to high level involvement.
Analysis
Not every civil war requires the same negotiation strategy and the strategy that is chosen by the mediator is conflict specific. The best solution to a civil war differs from country to country, what works in El Salvador might not work in Northern Ireland. Still some common relationships can be discerned
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between civil society involvement and the type of mediator. First I will provide some brief descriptive information. Out of the twenty nine peace agreements that were analyzed for this study, thirteen made use of a high profile mediator from the United Nations or from a major power like the United States. For sixteen of the negotiated agreements a low profile mediator was used, usually a regional organization like ECOWAS or a mediator from a neighboring country. When a high profile mediator mediated between the parties, in eight of the cases civil society did not have any influence and in five of the cases they did have influence as can be seen in the first table. When a low profile mediator was involved, in six of the cases civil society did not have any influence and in ten of the cases, they did.
In order to assess the relationship between the choice of mediator and the level of civil society involvement, a Pearson correlation coefficient was computed. There was a not significant, positive correlation between the two variables, r(29) = 0.239, p = 0.211 (Table 2). A change in mediator from high profile to low profile, correlates with the increase in civil society involvement from low involvement to high involvement. When a low profile mediator is involved, it is more likely that there is civil society involvement, but not significantly.
Four categories can be distinguished from this analysis, namely (1) a high profile mediator and low levels of civil society involvement, (2) a high profile mediator and high levels of civil society involvement, (3) a low profile mediator and low levels of civil society involvement and (4) a low profile mediator and high levels of civil society involvement (categories are shown in the table below). Categories one and four are cases that were expected when looking at the hypothesis. In eighteen of
civil society
Total
No influence High Influence
mediator High Profile
8 5 13
Low Profile 6 10 16
Total
14 15 29
mediator civil society
mediator Pearson Correlation 1 .239
Sig. (2-tailed) .211
N 29 29
civil society Pearson Correlation .239 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .211
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the cases an expected outcome is seen. Category one is compiled mostly from countries from the Balkans and from Asia and Oceania, namely Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, Tajikistan, Kosovo, Macedonia, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka. Category four, countries with a low profile mediator and high levels of involvement is almost solely compiled of African countries namely Mozambique, Mali, South Africa, Burundi, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Congo and Liberia.
Categories two and three are unexpected when looking at the hypothesis, these consist of eleven from the total of twenty nine cases. Countries with a high profile mediator, but also with high levels of civil society involvement (2) were El Salvador, Guatemala, Northern Ireland, Nepal and Indonesia, all countries from Europe, Asia and Central America. In three of these cases the United Nations was involved, a diplomat from the United States and The Crisis Management Initiative, a Finnish, non-governmental organization. No distinction can however be made with the high profile mediators from category one, the types of mediators are the same in both categories. Countries with a low profile mediator, but also with low levels of civil society involvement (3) were Rwanda, Niger, Guinea Bissau, Burundi and Sudan. Involved as mediators were representatives from neighboring countries like presidents, and regional organizations like ECOWAS and IGAD. This last category (3) is all made up from African countries. From this there can be concluded that the cases in which a low profile mediator was involved, almost solely consist of African countries, except for the Philippines. On the contrary, in the cases which are mediated by a high profile mediator, no African countries are included except from Angola. For future research it might be interesting to also take into account the country and whether it is more common in Africa to use low profile mediators instead of a mediator from the United Nations and why this is the case.
Notable is also that the United Nations were only directly involved as a mediator in five out of twenty nine cases. In other cases they did have an observer status, but they were not mediating. This was only in the cases of Angola, Croatia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nepal. In the first two, civil Low Civil Society Involvement High Civil Society Involvement
Low Profile Mediator Rwanda Liberia Niger Sudan Guinea Bissau
Burundi II
Mozambique Philippines Mali Sierra Leone South Africa Congo Burundi I
High Profile Mediator Angola Sri Lanka Bosnia Kosovo Croatia Macedonia Tajikistan
Papua New Guinea
El Salvador Northern Ireland Guatemala Indonesia Nepal
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society was not involved, whereas in the last three, civil society organizations were involved. UN involvement does not seem to explain the variance in civil society inclusion.When looking at category two and category three we see that countries with a high profile mediator but still civil society inclusion (2) have, when compared to the countries with low profile mediators and low levels of civil society inclusion (3), higher levels of democracy. On the other hand when looking at categories one and four we see that the countries from category four have relatively lower levels of democracy than the countries from category one, but still higher levels of civil society inclusion, but this gives a more varied image. Barnes (2002: 8) stated that it is easier to include civil society organizations in countries with higher levels of democracy, but this does not explain the differences in civil society inclusion in these cases. When comparing the countries with high profile mediators and high levels of civil society inclusion and high profile mediators and low level civil society involvement we also see that they both have relatively high levels of democracy. When looking at countries with low level civil society involvement they have very different levels of democracy.
On the basis of this analysis, the hypothesis as stated in the theoretical framework: when mediation is conducted by low profile mediators, civil society organizations are more likely to have a seat at the negotiation table can be partly confirmed. As seen the descriptives and as seen in the correlation test, it is more likely to have civil society inclusion when there is a low profile mediator involved, this effect was however not significant. There can be different reasons for the negative results. By only including full peace agreements, the earlier stages of the peace process were not analyzed, while this might be the time during which civil society organizations were included, while during the later stages they were not. Also ‘inclusion’ might have been measured differently in different countries, for the data only mentioned that they were included, but not in what way. It was not clear what levels of inclusion they had as stated in the distinction from Paffenholz. For this a more in-depth study would have been necessary. Lastly there might have been other factors than the mediator that might have influenced civil society inclusion. Because the results were not robust, the selected cases are used for theory building (Lieberman, 2005: 436). From the comparative case study I hope to find these different factors that also have an influence on the levels of civil society inclusion.
Comparative Case Study
Case Selection
After analyzing the dataset, cases were selected to explain the variation of civil society involvement during the peace negotiation processes with a comparison across space. A nested analyses combines the statistical analysis of a large sample of cases with the in-depth investigation of one or more of the cases contained within the large sample, aiming to improve the quality of conceptualization and measurement, analysis of rival explanations, and overall confidence in the central findings of a study (Lieberman, 2005: 436). After the statistical analysis, cases for a more in-depth study can be selected in different ways. Because in this study the statistical analysis did not
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provide robust results, I will aim for model building small-N analysis in order to develop a new model and look for other explanations.For a case study, random sampling is not a viable approach when the total number of cases to be selected is small according to Seawright and Gerring (2008: 294). For this study there will be looked at causal effects, namely how the change in an outcome (civil society involvement) results from a change in an explanatory factor (type of mediator). Therefore the cases are selected by keeping the independent variable constant, so in both cases there will be a low profile mediator. The hypothesis states that in case a low profile mediator is present, civil society organizations are more likely to be involved. According to Lieberman (2005: 445) for model building analysis, at least one case that has not been well predicted by the best-fitting statistical model should be selected. This would be a case in which a low profile mediator is present, but where there is also low level civil society involvement. An additional case that was expected following the hypothesis was selected for comparative analysis.
Goal was to select a set of cases that shared a number of basic socio-economic and other characteristics like geography, nature of the conflict, level of democracy in the country and strength of civil society in a country. As stated by Barnes (2002:8) in countries with a well-developed system of multi-party politics and a vibrant political culture, it is easier to include civil society organizations, therefor both cases that were selected do not have a well-developed system of multi-party politics. Also intensity of the conflict was taken into account. As stated earlier, level of intensity might have an influence on the mediator involved. In this case two conflicts were selected which both had high levels of intensity, so this would not influence the results.
To select an unexpected case with a low profile mediator a country from category three was selected, which included Rwanda, Niger, Guinea Bissau, Burundi and Sudan. Because a lot is written about the process in Sudan I will look more in-depth into this case to find out what the conditions and reasons were to not include civil society. The case of Sudan will be compared to a case with a low profile mediator, but in which civil society did have a direct role during the peace negotiations. A case was selected from category four which included Mozambique, Mali, South Africa, Burundi, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Congo and Liberia. To keep other conditions as constant as possible, Congo was selected. These conflicts both included ethnic tensions, socio-economic neglect and marginalization. There are some more similarities between the countries in terms of poverty levels, richness in natural resources and involvement of external actors in the conflict and the intensity of the conflict (Blaydes and De Maio, 2010: 6-8). In Congo however, more neighboring countries and other parties were involved during the conflict. With the selection of these two cases with different outcomes I hope to explain the variance in civil society involvement and the role of the mediator and to answer the main question of this thesis namely what explains whether civil society groups are included during the official peace negotiation process to end a civil war?
To compare the two cases and to answer the question stated above, each case study will start with providing some background information on the conflict and previous mediation attempts,
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then information is given about the mediator and the mediation process and lastly there will be looked at the inclusion of civil society groups and the influence of other third parties. With this I hope to provide a more in-depth answer to the question under what conditions civil society organizations are involved in the peace negotiation process.Sudan
Background and causes of war
Sudan has seen intermittent civil wars in different parts of the country since its independence in 1956. From 1955 to 1972 and from 1983 to 2005 a civil war has been raging in Sudan between the government and southern armed groups. But also other parts of the country have been engaged in a conflict with the Sudanese government or government backed militias. During the last war an estimated two million people have died and millions have been displaced from their homes (Dagne, 2005: 4). In the beginning of this second civil war, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was founded to fight for a secular but unified Sudan. Economic, resource based, ethnic, cultural, religious and international dimensions all played a role in the emergence and continuation of the conflict (El-Battahani, 2006: 10). The conflict in Sudan was rooted in the creation of the state and came forth from the colonial rule in which the Arabic and Muslim north and the Christian south were ruled as two distinct entities. The north was modernized, but the south has been neglected which led to tensions between the regions. The Islamic fundamentalist agenda of the government dominated mostly by the Muslim/Arab north, was rejected by the mostly Christian people from the south (Dagne, 2005: 5).
Previous mediation attempts
To explain the origins of the conflict and to go deeper into the causes of the conflict reaches beyond the scope of this research, but I will go deeper into the attempts for mediation and the different actors involved in the conflict. During the first phase of the civil war, between 1983 and 1989 the SPLM/A rejected formal negotiations, but dialogue took place between the SPLM/A and political and civil society groups. In 1989 two formal talks were held, from which the second one was chaired by former US president Jimmy Carter. These talks failed and in 1991 the two sides accepted new talks which were mediated by Nigerian president Ibrahim Babangida. These Abuja peace talks were also unsuccessful (El‐Affendi, 2001: 584-585) and Nigeria withdraw from the process.
After the breakdown of internal efforts at reconciliation, the failure of other initiatives by the international community, and the withdrawal of Nigeria from the peacemaking process, IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, a regional cooperation between east African countries) became engaged in the process (Young, 2005: 100). Because of the collapse of the Abuja process, a peace initiative was officially adopted at the fourth IGADD (later IGAD) summit held in 1993, were a peace committee was set up to oversee the process, made up of the heads of state of Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea and Kenya (El‐Affendi, 2001: 585).
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IGAD peace processTimeline
IGAD became involved in conflict resolution in Sudan from 1990, when the government of Sudan requested the organization to assist in the peace process with the Southern rebels. They saw IGAD as the only vehicle that could prevent external actors from infringing on its internal affairs, so it would prevent greater powers with greater leverage to intervene. IGAD therefore responded by gradually transforming itself into an organization responsible for conflict resolution in the region (Adar, 2000: 46). The involvement of IGAD was thus on the initiative of the Sudanese government.
In March 1994 peace negotiations were officially launched by IGAD a regional body not normally mandated to run a mediation process. The two parties however accepted its mediation and IGAD enjoyed the support of the international community (Ofuho, 2006: 20). IGAD formed a mediation committee consisting of two organs: a summit committee of heads of state from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda to oversee the process, and a standing committee composed of their mediators (Dagne, 2005: 7). In May 1994 IGAD mediators presented the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A a ‘Declaration of Principles’ which called for the right to self-determination for all Sudanese people and stated that the social and political system had to be secular and democratic. Peace talks were officially adjourned when the government did not accept the south’s right to self-determination (Blaydes and De Maio, 2010: 10). Also bilateral relations deteriorated between Sudan on the one hand and Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea on the other and IGAD members became unanimously hostile to Khartoum. With this, IGAD lost its ability to influence the government, while the leaders became less and less keen on pursuing a settlement that could only benefit a hostile regime. This lasted for about three years (El‐Affendi, 2001: 586-587).
Following major offensive operations in which the SPLM/A recaptured government held areas, in 1997 a few factors came together which encouraged the parties to return to the negotiating table. It became clear that neither side would gain a decisive victory, there were only few negotiators left of the Sudanese government which let to new blood and there was a lot of international pressure from African states and the US (Ofuho, 2006:10). In Nairobi new peace talks started and the government of Sudan accepted the Declaration of Principles and with that the right to self-determination of the South (Dagne, 2005: 8). Mediators however did not use the three year stalemate to think of a different strategy. The mediators relied mainly on improvisation, and were unable to structure the talks (El‐Affendi, 2001: 588) This led to the fact that in 1998 peace talks were suspended because the parties disagreed on which territories were considered part of the south and on the role of religion in politics (Dagne: 2005: 8). In 2001 and in 2002 former president Moi of Kenya made attempts to resume the negotiations and in 2002 the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A signed a Framework Agreement to end the war in southern Sudan after a five weeks talk in Machakos, Kenya. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway participated as observers in the Machakos IGAD negotiations (Dagne, 2005: 9).
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In September 2002 the SPLM/A launched an attack and the Government of Sudan walked out of the Machkos talks. Under the pressure of mediator Sumbeiywo with the assistance of neighboring countries and the US, the UK and Norway, the parties agreed to a ceasefire agreement. After the collapse of these talks in 2003, the two leaders, SPLM/A leader Garang and Vice-President Ali Osman Taha started direct negotiations, excluding all others and the IGAD process was discontinued. They made great progress, but negotiations over the last details dragged on. In 2004 a UN Security Council meeting in Nairobi gave the parties an ultimatum, and in 2005 the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed which effectively ended the 21-year old civil war (Rolandsen, 2011: 553-559). Criticism and civil society exclusionOne of the most important criticisms of the IGAD mediation was its exclusive nature (Blaydes and De Maio, 2010: 10), the process was narrowly focused, exclusionary and lacking transparency (Young, 2005: 99). The process was top down, externally guided, supply-driven, elitist and interventionist (Young, 2005: 99). Sudanese people, rival rebel movements, northern opposition groups, southern militias and the National Democratic Alliance were excluded from the talks (Blaydes and De Maio, 2010: 10). This exclusion was caused for several reasons.
Dixon and Simmons (2006: 60) state that track two processes in Sudan were difficult firstly because the warring parties were only focusing on military issues such as territory, force levels and ceasefires, and they did not necessarily saw a need for informal outside assistance or support. Secondly the atmosphere of uncertainty and mistrust that was created, encouraged secrecy in formal negotiations, this however is not specific for this peace process but applies to most conflict situations. Another factor that contributed to this exclusivity has been the nature of decision making within the SPLM/A. Garang has been its charismatic leader and he did not tolerate dissent or contradiction. He dominated the IGAD peace process, calculating that negotiations would force southern groups to focus on dealing with the north (Blaydes and De Maio, 2010: 11). According to Young (2005: 101) the exclusivity of the process is explained by a number of factors. He states that the process was too complicated to bring in other parties, the level of secrecy would not have been kept by involving other parties and the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A did not want other parties at the negotiation table, because it would have let to further division of resources and power. IGAD promised that third parties would be brought into the process after a comprehensive peace agreement was reached, but this left the Sudanese people and democratic organizations with only the possibility to endorse a done deal.
The fact that the warring parties were not willing to include others in the process appears from an interview with Sumbeiywo, Kenya’s Special Envoy to the IGAD-led Sudanese peace process and later mediator. On the question whether other parties could be included, both the government and the SPLM/A answered: “look, you are putting this problem on us and we really don’t want to appear like we’re refusing anybody. But what we will do is this: you forward whatever people apply and we will not reply” (Subeiywo, 2006: 26). So the parties that wanted to be involved, never got an answer. Sumbeiywo (2006:24) himself travelled through Sudan to meet people from civil society groups, religious groups, lawyers and judges to find out the position of these parties on issues as security,
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power sharing and wealth sharing. On the basis of these talks he wrote the Nakuru Document, but the government did not accept this document.In 2005 the comprehensive peace agreement was signed by Ali Osman Mohamed Taha for the government of Sudan and Garang for the SPLM/A. The signing of the accord was witnessed by Mwai Kibaki (President of the Republic of Kenya) Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (President of the Republic of Uganda) Ahmed Aboul Gheit (Egyptian Minister of Forein Affairs) and Alfredo Mantica (Italian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs).
Other parties involved
Civil society
During the first phase of the second civil war, civil society organizations were involved in talks with the SPLM/A. In the period between 1994 and 1997 when official talks were in deadlock, the SPLM/A tried to use the National Democratic Alliance, a Cairo-based umbrella body for most opposition groups, as an alternative forum for talks. These talks led to the he Asmara Declaration in 1995 (El‐Affendi, 2001: 587). Where the SPLM/A was in touch with these other opposition parties through the National Democratic Alliance, according to Dixon and Simmons (2006:62) the government was probably most resisting an inclusive approach. In 1999 the Relationships Foundation International, a UK-based NGO started in cooperation with the South African based Renaissance Institute an initiative to use ‘low-profile inclusive consultations both to build relationships between key players and to provide a space for them to develop constructive solutions to long-term conflict causes’ (Dixon and Simmons, 2006: 62). When in 1999 the official talks were again interrupted for almost a year, a debate on the weakness of the IGAD process led to the mediators accepting proposals from NGO’s to create more viable mechanisms and procedures. This led to the creation of a permanent secretariat and the appointment of a special envoy for the Committee Chairman. This envoy was authorized to enlist the help of experts and to allow IPF representatives (the IGAD Partners Forum, which include Western countries like the Netherlands, France, Italy, the United States and Canada) and others to attend the talks as observers after consultation with the parties.
International Support
IGAD accepted its international supporters to be observers during the negotiation process. British, Norwegian, American and Italian observers were present. They all had their own perceptions of a resolution (Sumbeiywo, 2006: 24). Especially the US reinforced the undemocratic approach initiated by the region and American interests are not necessarily consistent with the objectives of a sustainable peace and democracy (Young, 2005: 100). Haysom, who worked under Sumbeiywo on the peace process states that “the US representatives would pressure us because they too were under real pressure to deliver because of US domestic politics but we also needed them and worked with them” (Haysom, 2006: 30). In 1997 the Clinton administration imposed comprehensive sanctions on the government (Dagne, 2005:4), but the Bush administration had a more pragmatic policy towards Sudan. In November 1997, the Clinton Administration imposed comprehensive sanctions on the NIF
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government. President Bush has renewed the sanctions since he came to office in 2001 (Dagne, 2005: 4). They demonstrated a willingness to use decisive force in its foreign policy, which made its subsequent threats of drastic action towards Sudan more convincing. Members of Congress pressed to pursue a negotiated settlement, and ‘The Sudan Peace Act’ allowed further sanctions against the regime in Khartoum if it obstructed the peace process (Rolandsen, 2011: 554). The pressure from foreign partners to deliver a peace agreement fast, might have resulted for the mediators to choose not to include other groups than the main warring parties, for there is a chance that this would have slowed down the process.International supporters showed little confidence in the IGAD peace process and the IGAD Partners Forum started to increasingly intrude in the process. Regional leaders showed little capacity to produce results without help from outside and external powers kept looking over IGAD's shoulder and pushing for a more direct role, but they also did not achieve much.
Conclusion
When other initiatives to mediate between the Government of Sudan and southern armed groups failed, regional organization IGAD stepped in. IGAD enjoyed international support and they let their international partners observe during the peace talks. These international partners all had their own views on the process and increasingly exercised pressure on the mediator. The IGAD-process was top down and was defined as narrowly focused, exclusionary and lacking transparency. Several explanations for this were provided. Firstly the civil war had been raging for years and led to millions of deaths and displaced people. This made the situation very complex and created an atmosphere of
Peace process Mediator Agreement reached
Addis Ababa talks Ethiopia, 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement (March 1972)
Koka Dam talks Ethiopia, 1986
Addis Ababa talks Ethiopia, Egypt,
1989
Abuja talks Nigeria, 1992-93
Peace talks on the Sudan conflict
IGADD, 1993-1994
Peace from Within talks 1992-1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement (April 1997)
Egyptian-Lybian initiative 1999-2002
Sudan Peace Process IGAD, 1997-2005 -Machakos Protocol (July 2002)
-Framework Agreement on Security Arrangements
(September 2003)
-Agreement on Wealth-Sharing (January 2004) -Protocol on Power-Sharing (May 2004) -Three Areas Protocols (May 2004)
