THE ETHICS OF A MEAT TAX
A RESEARCH PROJECT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE STUDENT: PATRICK GRADY
SUPERVISOR: DR. R. J. PISTORIUS SECOND READER: DR. B. NETELENBOS
WORD COUNT: 22,280 JUNE 2020
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 2 KEY TERMS 3 1. INTRODUCTION 5 1.1. CONTEXT 5
1.2. MOTIVATION FOR RESEARCH 10
2. RESEARCH DESIGN 12
2.1. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SUB-QUESTIONS 12
2.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 15
2.3. METHODOLOGY 17
3. A MEAT TAX AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT 20
3.1. ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 21
3.2. POLICY OPTIONS IN INSTANCES OF MARKET FAILURE 24
3.3. MODELLING A MEAT TAX:POSSIBILITIES FOR MITIGATING GHGEMISSIONS 29
4. THE ETHICS OF A MEAT TAX PART I: A 'SIN' TAX? 38
4.1. PRINCIPLES OF NORMATIVE ECONOMICS 39
4.2. THE CURRENCY OF SIN TAXES:FOUR CLAIMS RELEVANT TO A MEAT TAX 46
4.3. TAXING MEAT:ASIN TAX ERROR 54
5. THE ETHICS OF A MEAT TAX PART II: JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COERCIVE
CLIMATE POLICY 56 5.1. THE LIBERAL RESPONSE 59 5.2. THE UTILITARIAN RESPONSE 65 5.3. THE MACHIAVELLIAN RESPONSE 69 6. CONCLUSION 73 6.1. SUMMARY 73 6.2. LIMITATIONS 75 APPENDIX 77 BIBLIOGRAPHY 79
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Acknowledgements
I would like to say a special thank you to my supervisor, Dr. Robin Pistorius, for his support throughout; providing me with the confidence and clarity to execute this research. Even in these disturbing and disruptive times of a global pandemic, Robin remained forthright and committed. It was a pleasure to work under his guidance.
I would also like to thank Dr. Benno Netelenbos for taking the time to read and assess this thesis as a second reader.
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Key Terms
Anthropogenic climate change. The change in climate resulting from human activity. Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2-eq). A metric used to compare emissions from
different greenhouse gases according to their potential to contribute to global warming.
Climate Emergency. A situation in which immediate action is needed to reduce or stop
climate change and prevent serious and permanent damage to the environment – Oxford Word of the Year, 2019.
Climate extreme. Extreme weather (e.g. extreme heat, drought, intense precipitation) or
extreme weather events (e.g. cyclones, wildfires, floods) that are attributable to the changing climate.
Emissions-efficiency. A measure of a practice's productivity compared to its total
emissions of greenhouse gases, often synonymous with 'carbon-efficiency'. 'Emissions-intensive' is used to describe a practice or lifestyle with low emissions-efficiency.
Greenhouse gases (GHG). The gases that absorb and emit heat from the atmosphere.
The primary gases are water vapor [H2O], carbon dioxide [CO2], methane [CH4] and
nitrous oxide [N2O]. Unless otherwise stated, GHG hereafter refers to the global total. Plant-based (P-B) analogy. A plant-based meat substitute that approximates aesthetic
qualities or chemical characterises, e.g. veggie burgers.
Pre-industrial levels. The global average temperature between 1850-1900, as per the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2019, 56),
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A second ‘Warning to Humanity’, co-signed by over 15,000 independent scientists from 184 countries (The Alliance of World Scientists, 2017):
Soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out. We must recognise, in our day-to-day lives and in our governing
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1. Introduction
1.1. Context
1.1.1. Global warming and climate extremes
According to the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), global mean temperature is approximately 1.0°C warmer than pre-industrial levels (2019, 5). Each successive decade since the 1980s was warmer than any preceding pre-industrial levels, the last decade was warmer than any other, and the past five years were the warmest years on record. As a result of the climate changing, temperatures – both hot and cold – have become more extreme, and weather patterns less predictable; oceans are heating and acidifying, cryosphere ice is melting, and sea levels are rising (6-17).
In 2015, under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNCCC), 196 state parties together adopted the Paris Agreement; in doing so, agreeing on the goal of halting global warming to “well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” and to pursue “efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C” (Paris Agreement, 2015).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warn that, should the rise in temperature reach 2°C, some planetary impacts may last millennia; other impacts will be entirely irreversible, such as the degradation of ecosystems, the total (>99%) decline of coral reefs, species extinctions and the melting of the entire Greenland ice sheet (5-8).
Yet, even if the rise is limited to 1.5°C – predicted to be realised between 2030 and 2052 (IPCC, 2018, 4) – ecosystems will transform, many species will lose over half of their range (6% of insects, 8% of plants and 4% of vertebrates), coral reefs will have mostly declined (70-90%) and sea levels will continue to rise beyond the year 2100.
A changing climate leads to a higher frequency of climate extremes. Last year saw a number of such events (WMO, 2019, 18-26): (i) heat waves – for instance, two significant heat waves across Europe (in France the national temperature record was beaten by 1.9°C); (ii) cold waves – such as in North America, wherein regions both sides of the United States-Canada border experienced temperatures more than 15°C below
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normal; (iii) heavy rainfall and flooding – by example, the all-India summer monsoon experienced rainfall 10% above the average for the last 50 years (and endured until the latest date on record); (iv) tropical cyclones and severe storms – with the number of cyclones in the North Atlantic well above average and Cyclone Idai was one of the strongest cyclones ever to make landfall in Africa; (v) droughts – such as Australia recording its driest ever spring and areas near the Laos-China border experiencing less than 50% of usual rainfall; and (vi) wildfires – particularly in Australia, which experienced an exceptional, prolonged and severe wildfire season with some areas affected for the second time in four years, prior to which wildfires had been historically rare.
The WMO reported in late 2019 that the world remains on course to exceed the Paris Agreement’s thresholds of either 1.5°C or 2°C (27).
1.1.2. The anthropogenic influence
A review of nearly 12,000 papers published in scientific journals between 1991-2011 establishes a 97.2% consensus that human activity is the cause of global warming and finds that those papers in disagreement constitute a vanishingly low proportion of published research (Cook, 2013). This anthropogenic influence is most often associated with the combustion of fossil fuels – principally; coal, oil and natural gas – in order to generate energy. This combustion combines carbon from these fuels with oxygen from the air and, as a result, releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.
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The central component of global warming is the ‘greenhouse gas effect’. Whereby, “a layer of greenhouse gases – primarily water vapor [H2O] and including much smaller
amount of carbon dioxide [CO2], methane [CH4] and nitrous oxide [N2O]– acts as a
thermal blanket for the Earth” (NASA, 2020). Too few of these gases and the planet cools (even dangerously so); too many, however, and the planet warms. The concentrations of these latter three gases have risen, respectively, 147%, 259% and 123% beyond pre-industrial levels (WMO, 2019, 7).
It should be noted: only the lower layer of the atmosphere warms from the greenhouse gas effect; the upper layer of the atmosphere is cooling. This fact serves to dismiss the relevance of solar changes to global warming and, instead, stress the significance of the greenhouse effect (indeed, climate models cannot reproduce the observed temperature trend over the last century without including greenhouse gases [NASA, 2020]).
According to the IPCC, in order to limit global warming to a rise of 1.5°C, or to only experience a ‘limited overshoot’ of that target, CO2 emissions need to reach net zero
by around 2050; as well as there being “deep reductions” in non-CO2 emissions (2018,
12). The latest UN ‘Emissions Gap’ report estimates that, to achieve this mitigation, total CO2-eq emissions need to half by 2030 (UNEP, 2019, 10).
1.1.3. The relationship between the production of meat and greenhouse gas emissions
The search for viable ways to mitigate climate change brings forth the discovery of proximate and relevant sources of GHG emissions. Increasing attention is paid to the role of meat production. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), total GHG emissions from livestock supply chains constitute 7.1 gigatons CO2-eq, 14.5 percent of total GHG emissions (2013, 15). That is more than the world’s
transport – all cars, motorbikes, trains, aircraft, ships and boats – combined (IPCC, 2014, 603-607).
Over 45% of the sector’s emissions result from supplying feed to livestock; a further 40 % results from the excretion of feed from livestock – a process called ‘enteric fermentation’ – which releases CH4 (FAO, 2013, 14-17). Emissions from this process,
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alone, total 2.7 gigatonnes CO2-eq – or 144 million tonnes of oil equivalent (about the
annual energy use of South Africa [40]).
The emissions involved in the production of meat is significantly greater than other food types of food (Figure 2); especially so, when considered as a source of protein. Beef raised directly (as opposed to beef attained from the dairy herd) is the least emissions-efficient food type. Per 100g of protein, the production of beef produces an average of 123 times the GHG emissions of tofu, 35 times that of pulses (beans and lentils) and 25 times that of plant-based (P-B) 'beef' analogies (such as The Beyond Burger). The production of nuts is, on average, net-negative per 100g protein (due to the carbon sequestration of planting nut trees on cropland or pasture [Poole & Nemecek, 2018, 4]).
Subsequently, governments have been urged to target emissions from this sector in order to reduce their country's contribution: the FAO report the “substantial mitigation effect” of dietary changes (2013, 45) and advise that “the livestock sector should be part of any solution to climate change” (82); the Alliance of World Scientists state that “farming ruminants for meat consumption” is an ‘especially troubling’ practice and advise governments to “promote dietary shifts towards mostly plant-based foods” in order to mitigate emissions (2017, 1028); the IPCC recommend reducing meat and dairy consumption to reduce total emissions (2018, 376) and note it to be “surprising” that politicians have paid little attention to such consumption in their mitigation strategies (492), a year later concluding there to be "significant potential mitigation" should plant-based diets be adopted (2019, 499); and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 2019b) stated in the latest Emissions Gap Report that “dietary shifts to more sustainable, plant-based diets” is one of the major sectoral transformations required to mitigate the impact of climate change (2019, 29).
9 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Ro ot V eg et ab le s Po ta to es On io ns & L ee ks Br as si ca s Ot he r Ve ge ta bl es Ca ss av a Ci tr us F ru it Ap pl es Nu ts Ba na na s Ot he r F ru it Be rr ie s & G ra pe s To m ato es Wh ea t & R ye Ma iz e Oa tm ea l Ri ce So ym ilk Pe as Ot he r P ul se s Pe an ut s To fu Mi lk Ch ee se Eg gs Po ul tr y Pi g Fi sh Cr us ta ce an s Be ef ( da ir y he rd ) La m b & M utto n Be ef ( be ef h er d) P-B 'b ee f' La b-gr ow n be ef
GHG Emissions (kg CO-eq) for Different Food Types
per kg produce per 100g protein
Da ir y Legumes Grains Meat Fruit
Vegetables MeatAlt.
Figure 2: Global mean emissions for different food types: estimates from Poore & Nemecek (2018); estimates for alternative (Alt.) meats from CCC (2020)
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1.2. Motivation for Research
This research is motivated by its socio-political relevance as well as an observed conceptual deficiency within political theory. It is relevant in a number of ways. First, as noted (sub-section 1.1.3.), there is broadening scientific consensus that meat production is a significant cause of GHG emissions and yet no government policy acknowledges this. As will be indicated in sub-section 3.1.1., there is a growing appetite for a meat tax in Europe; an ethical discussion thereof, is a timely contribution.
Second, concerns noted here are predicted to become more pertinent in the forthcoming decades. The world’s population is expected to grow to 9.7 billion by 2050 and to 11.2 billion by 2100 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2019). The increased populations of developing countries – the population of the African continent, for instance, is predicted to quadruple in this time – is expected to drive demand for meat (DCE, 2016, 59-66). According to the FAO, the global demand for meat will double by 2050 (Fao.org, 2020). If meat is proven to be a significant and relevant cause of GHG emissions, policies to discourage its production become markedly more relevant.
Third, parallel attention is discouraging the production of meat for non-environmental reasons. In the UK, by example, the number of vegans – those that choose not to eat meat (or dairy) – increased from 150,000 in 2006, to 600,000 in 2018 but little over 30% of those that ate less meat cited environmental reasons (BBC News, 2020b). Most people cited animal welfare reasons for giving up meat; other reasons included health, taste, concerns over antibiotics and weight management. Similarly, there are a number of non-GHG environmental concerns associated with the production of meat: soil desiccation, water pollution and antibiotics resistance; most notably, the use of land as 83% of total farmland is used to produce meat; constituting only 18% of total calories consumed (Poore & Nemecek, 2018). This context is relevant because it makes it more likely that policy to reduce meat production will plausibly gather the broader support, and political capital, required to be implemented.
Finally, this research is deserving of conceptual space within the field of political theory. That global warming is a pressing concern, described as "the moral challenge of our generation" by then-Secretary-General of the UN Ban Ki-Moon (UNICEF, 2009),
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and that the production of meat plays a substantial role in climate change motivates moral analysis. Should the production of meat become a target for mitigation, and should taxation be an 'effective' tool, the question remains whether a tax is justified. As Chapter 4 indicates, ethical frameworks of taxation are not appropriate for justifying a meat tax. Chapter 5 finds that many wider theories of political justice are limited in their application to a specific tax as a tool for climate policy. To find more productive claims, these fields ought to be further explored; the considerations put forward here provide insight when justifying a meat tax; insight that is applicable to justifying climate policy, more broadly.
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2. Research Design
2.1. Research Question and Sub-Questions
This research seeks to answer the following question:
‘Is a ‘meat tax’ a justified tool with which to curb greenhouse gas emissions?’
'Justified' is synonymous, here, with 'ethically justified' or 'morally justified'. To answer this question, the production of meat is first framed as an appropriate subject of policy aimed at mitigating GHG emissions. Then, a variety of policy options are considered, and their relative merits weighed. The most appropriate policy is proposed – taxation – and its likely effects analysed. Finally, the implementation of the policy is interrogated ethically. These three steps are categorised into sub-questions below.
2.1.1. Sub-question 1: What are the significant and relevant considerations regarding the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions?
The role of meat production in contributing to GHG emissions must first be justified as significant and relevant. ‘Significant’, here, infers the size of its contribution is such that reducing its production would play a large, causal, role in reducing total GHG emissions (or, a high degree of causality). Recreational fires or barbeques, for instance, directly, and necessarily, combust CO2 into the atmosphere; yet, their overall contribution to total
GHG emissions is negligible; therefore, such activities are insignificant considerations. 'Relevant', here, concerns contributions to GHG emissions that can be plausibly mitigated in terms of possibility and feasibility (or, a high plausibility of mitigation). The production of electricity, for instance, contributes a significant portion of total GHG emissions (estimated as 25% [IPCC, 2014, 9]). Nevertheless, given how difficult it would be to mitigate the production of electricity – owing to its monopoly over society’s power, the dispersion of its consumption and the political unviability of regulation – it is not a relevant subject for government intervention.
The role of meat production is significant, according to the concerns cited in Chapter 1. Meat production produces a large, and growing, proportion of GHG emissions. The most appropriate indicators are (a) livestock production constitutes 14.5% of GHG
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emissions (FAO, 2013, 15) and (b) demand for meat expected to double by 2050 (FAO, 2020). The remainder of sub-question 1 – that is, the question of relevance – will be answered in Section 3.3., when considering the likely effects of the tax.
2.1.2. Sub-question 2: Which tools are legitimate and available to governments? Having framed the production of meat as a significant consideration for governments attempting to mitigating GHG emissions, this sub-question seeks the conditions in which governments legitimately intervene into markets and which tool, in this instance, is most appropriate.
The emitting of GHGs, this research finds (Section 3.1.), represents market failure; 'legitimate coercion' then involves policy instruments that address this failure (Woodside, 1986); specifically, regulation, information campaigns and economic instruments (Connelly et al, 2012, 178-201).
By asking which tools are available, the sub-question explores the number of options available – according to the capacity of governments – and then compares their suitability for curbing the consumption of meat (Section 3.2), finding taxation the most appropriate. This task is descriptive, seeking the application of policies in practice, rather than theory; to do otherwise, would be 'seriously misleading' (Connelly et al, 2012, 200). The shift in focus, from the production of meat to the consumption, is clarified (sub-section 3.3.2.).
The policy options available will depend on the capacity of a government and so may vary greatly according to the type of government (a liberal democracy may capably impose only scarce regulation; an authoritarian regime is far more capable). For the sake of scope and clarity, ‘government’ is used loosely to imagine a theoretical, functioning and representative democracy for which such a tax is a possibility that a responsive public will scrutinise.
2.1.3. Sub-question 3: What are the moral implications of implementation? Implementing a meat tax carries considerable moral baggage. However urgent intervention may be, in order to prevent foreseeable damage from climate change, any tax constitutes an intervention into the lives and liberties of citizens. Hence, questions arise: Who is the tax targeting? Why tax this? What are the unintended effects (do they
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matter)? Moreover, government policy may misfire or produce otherwise undesirable effects. These are proper subjects for normative assessment. This ethical assessment is divided into two parts.
First, in Chapter 4, this research investigates the moral implications from the perspective of normative economics, using the metrics of equity and fairness. The chapter addresses four claims that a meat tax could be justified as a 'sin tax' and the implications thereof. The chapter closes by presenting moral hurdles that this framework uncovers.
Second, in Chapter 5, perspectives from political philosophy attempt to overcome these hurdles and justify a meat tax according to principles of liberty, utility and necessity. The implications of each of these responses are considered comparatively and the limitations of each are signalled.
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2.2. Theoretical Framework
This research takes the perspective of political theory to analyse the moral implications of implementing a meat tax. The two relevant dimensions for this approach are normative economics and political philosophy. Normative economics was initially deployed because it provides precise evaluative tools with to assess schemes of taxation and translate the distribution of tax burdens into ethical values. This approach, however, was unable to make sense of the intergenerational goal of a meat tax (sub-section 4.3.1.).
Political philosophy was then deployed to make more coherent appeals to intergenerational justice; a requirement of climate policy. The accompanying concepts for both dimensions are outlined below.
2.2.1. Normative economics
As will be noted in Section 4.1, normative economics signifies a contrast from positive economic concepts deployed in Chapter 3; namely, market failure, free ridership, price elasticity, negative externalities and public goods. Normative economics instead uses concepts that furnish value-lidden claims.
The core concepts within this dimension are equity and fairness. The literature is best divided into that which addresses specific-good taxes, including the ethics of so-called ‘sin taxes’ (McLachlan, 2002; Lorenzi, 2004; Green 2010; Bird, 2015; Bate et al, 2020), or that which addresses the use of taxes as a means by states, more generally (Bird-Pollan, 2020; Frecknall-Hughes, 2020; Lindsay, 2018; Green, 1983).
The former group assert the rightness of taxation as depending on what is the subject of taxation, and which members are proper subjects for receipt. The latter group generally considers taxes as “the price we pay for a civilized society” (Bird-Pollan, 2020, 145), and is concerned primarily about the effect of a tax, and the distribution of burdens. Quite aside from these two groups, McLachlan (2002) argues that a tax can be justified on its effectiveness, even if inequitable and unfair.
2.2.2. Political philosophy
Three fields within the dimension of political philosophy are drawn from to motivate government intervention – specifically, taxation – in order to curb GHG emissions.
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First, liberalism. The core concept within this field is liberty. Strong liberals consider taxes an erosion of liberty, even constituting a ‘theft’ from the state (Nozick, 1974). Other liberals deploy the harm principle as a means to justify a degree of governments intervention (Mills, 1859); yet others use a modified version of this principle to motivate climate policy (Wallack, 2014; Cripps, 2011). It has also been argued that the principle of state neutrality, within the framework of liberalism, prevents meaningful intervention on climate change (Fragnière, 2014). Within this framework, a minimal concept of rights has been offered, to bypass the neutrality objection (Caney, 2010).
Utilitarianism is presented as a theoretical backbone for the kind of cost-benefit-analysis claims that attempt to justify action on climate change. Bentham's account of utilitarianism, and the greatest happiness principle (1789), is the foundation for these claims. Grasso (2004; 2013) appeals to the impersonal component of utilitarianism to suggest it is best placed to justifying climate intervention. When applying utilitarianism to a tax, however, criticisms made of cost-benefit-analysis remain a concern (Shue, 1993; Page, 1999).
The field of political morality provides a Machiavellian perspective on climate action; namely, that action is justified even if it were the wrong thing to do. This perspective focuses on the additional duties that a politician incumbers; that they ought to "learn to be able not to be good, and to use this and not use it according to necessity" (Machievelli, 1532/1998, 61). Drawing on larger literature within the field of political morality (Walzer, 1975; 2004; Wolgast, 1991), and that on dirty hands scenarios (de Wijze, 2007), this claim to necessity attempts to make sense of both the libertarian and the utilitarian positions. Its reliance on representative institutions to acquire responsibility, however, seems undermined by the reality of institutional inadequacy (Gardiner, 2006).
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2.3. Methodology
2.3.1. Structure
Chapter 1 of this research has introduced the context of climate change and its consequences, the function of the GHG effect, and indicated the significant role of meat production (Section 1.1.).
This chapter (2) presents the research question (Section 1.1.), and sub-questions, for this research, as well as the theoretical framework (Section 1.2.) and methodology (Section 1.3.).
Chapter 3 models a meat tax as a policy proposal. First, in Section 3.1., the problem of mitigating GHG emissions is framed as an economic problem; in Section 3.2., the policy options available for government use are considered and taxation is motivated as most preferable; in Section 3.3., the design of the tax, and the likely effects of its use, are considered.
Chapter 4 presents the first set of moral justifications for a tax on meat. First, the principles of normative economics – equity and fairness – are outlined (Section 4.1.). Then, four claims that a meat tax could be justified as a kind of sin tax are considered (Section 4.2.) Finally, the sin tax framework is evaluated, and relevant findings are laid out (Section 4.3.).
Chapter 5 presents alternative justifications for a meat tax, drawing from the findings of the prior chapter. First, a response is offered from the liberal tradition (Section 5.1.), then the utilitarian tradition (Section 5.2.) and, finally, from the field of political morality (Section 5.3.). The chapter concludes with a summary of the relative merits of each response.
Chapter 6 concludes the findings. First, the research is summarised (Section 6.1.) and then the limitations are considered critically, and further research is recommended (Section 6.2.).
2.3.2. Deployment of theory
In Chapter 3, Section 3.1. analyses frame the problem of GHG emissions from meat production as one of market failure and so deploys economic theory to motivate
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government intervention into the market as legitimate. Using concepts such as market failure, public goods, externalities, free ridership. When considering the effects of the tax (Section 3.3.), further concepts of social costs and elasticity of demand are integrated.
Chapter 4 deploys principles of normative economics to assess the claims that a meat tax should be framed as a sin tax and justified on this basis. The relevant concepts are equity and fairness.
Chapter 5 presents three theories from the field of political philosophy to respond to the challenge of justifying tax. The relevant concepts are liberty, utility, necessity and intergenerational justice.
2.3.3. Use of empirical data
This research uses empirical data to contextualise the problem of climate change and make relevant the role of the production of meat in contributing GHG emissions. This data has been sourced primarily from United Nations (UN) agencies – FAO (2006; 2013; 2015; 2020), WMO (2019), UNEP (2019a; 2019b), IPCC (2014, 2018, 2019) – with additional input from other government agencies (Danish Council of Ethics [DCE], 2016; NASA, 2020; UK Committee on Climate Change [CCC], 2020) and one independent international assembly (The Alliance of World Scientists [AWS], 2014; 2017).
In Chapter 3, Section 3.1., estimates of the external costs of meat are presented in order to frame the market as failed. As well as the UN sources above, these estimates include other research including a charity (Compassion in World Farming [CIWF], 2016), an environmental research consultancy (CE Delft, 2020), and research from the University of Oxford's Future of Food initiative (Springmann et al, 2017).
When assessing the policy options available, in Section 3.2, further insights will be drawn from various policy papers (Chatham House, 2015; Farm Animal Investment Risk and Return [FAIRR], 2017; Behaviour Insights Team [BIT], 2020).
When modelling the tax (Section 3.3), this paper will draw on research that has attempted to model similar taxes (Gallet, 2010; Andreyeva et al, 2010; Edjabou & Smed, 2013; Springmann et al, 2017; Agricultural Economics, 2018; CE Delft, 2020). These case studies concentrate on EU countries [3] or the EU at large [2]; one models the US
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market and another, the effect world-wide. The availability of the data constrains this scope.
After this point, the research is more normative. Empirical data will be further littered in Chapters 4 and 5 to either justify normative moves or to present ongoing claims; for instance, in Chapter 4, health claims draw on data from empirical sources (Ng et al, 2014; Rouhani et al, 2014; WHO, 2015); in Chapter 5, for instance, exerts from a supreme court hearing (ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007, 2020) are used to present ongoing justifications from a rights-based perspective.
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3. A Meat Tax as a Policy Instrument
IntroductionClimate taxes on food have not yet been levied in any country (UNEP, 2019a, 433; Moberg et al, 2019, 1717); in fact, there are no known regulatory measures that target climate-damaging foods (DCE, 2016, 7). Despite this, the notion of taxing meat has been proposed in a variety of forms: a ‘sustainability charge’ (CE Delft, 2020); an ‘emissions-per-portion tax’ (BIT, 2020); a ‘ruminant meat tax’ (DCE, 2016); a livestock tax (AWS, 2014); a ‘greenhouse gas tax’ (Wirsenius et al, 2010); a tax on harm (Singer 2009).
In Europe, the appetite for a meat tax is growing: in 2016, the Swedish Green party tabled an unsuccessful motion for a climate tax on food, introduced first as a tax on beef (FAIRR, 2017, 24-25); in 2017, Denmark's The Alternative party proposed a Danish meat tax in order to curb environmentally damaging food consumption (Alternativets skatteudspil, 2017), which was rejected in parliament; in 2019, politicians from the Green and Social Democrats (SPD) party in Germany proposed a tax hike on animal products to curb global warming (BBC News, 2019); in 2020, the Dutch Finance minister Hoekstra sent a proposal to the Dutch House of Representatives, advising a 'fair price for meat', an increase set to be implemented in 2023 (TAPP, 2020); in 2020, the European Commission announce its Farm to Fork Strategy, one of two elements of the European Union's Green Deal, which would allow member states to use more targeted taxes which should "ensure the price of different foods reflects their real costs in terms of use of finite natural resources, pollution, GHG emissions and other environmental externalities" (European Commission, 2020).
This chapter seeks to answer the second sub-question: whether government intervening into the meat market is a legitimate response to the problem of GHG emissions (Section 3.1); and, which tools are best place to serve this purpose (Section 3.2). The remainder of the first sub-question (the question of relevant considerations for the mitigation of GHG emissions) is answered in Section 3.3.
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3.1. Economic Rationale for Government Intervention
Following up on a landmark study of ten years prior (Stern, 2006), former chief economist at the World Bank Nicholas Stern re-affirmed climate change to be the "the greatest market failure the world has seen" (Stern, 6, 2015).
This research considers intervention into the market legitimate under the conditions of market failure (Woodside, 1986); the tools that are available for government use – in answer to sub-question 2 – are those appropriate to dealing with this failure.
This section presents two market failures concerning the emissions of GHGs: first, the under provision of public goods (climate stability is a public good underprovided by the market); second, negative externalities leaking from the meat market.
3.1.1. Private actors and public goods
Food choices, as a target of government policy, has “tended to ‘fly under the radar’ of the political system” and much of the responsibility is left to private actors; that is, consumers (DCE, 2016, 59). This has facilitated a movement, often termed ‘green consumerism’ (Connelly et al, 105), in which, consumers are increasingly able and willing to choose, though with some opportunity cost, perceived ‘greener’ food options – these may be marked as ‘organic’, ‘free range’ or ‘sustainable’.
Yet, despite promising cultural trends, particularly over the last 10 years (BIT, 2020, 16), too few consumers choose 'greener' food options and are often unaware of them (CCC, 2020, 14-15). This is partly because global supply chains are incomprehensible, the links between meat production and climate change are “numerous and conceptually challenging” (Chatham House, 2015, 12), and consumers do not have available information connecting an end product to the amount of energy that was required to make it (DCE, 2016, 8-15).
Consumption patterns are difficult to change, and voluntary actions, alone, fail to make a substantive difference toward reducing total emissions (Moberg et al, 2019, 1715). Given the urgency of mitigation required, green consumerism cannot be relied upon to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As Connelly et al summarise, “it is no more than a first step and if seen as more, as a panacea, there is a real danger of
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complacency… sustainability requires a reconsideration of the role of private companies and the market” (2012, 107).
Most fundamentally, the problem of unsustainable consumption is economic: public actors (governments) have failed to a provide a public good (a stable climate). Environmental goods are typically categorised as public goods insofar as they are non-excludable and non-rivalrous. That is to say, one’s use of it cannot deprive another’s opportunity to use it (non-excludable) and the good can be used simultaneously with other users (non-rivalrous). Examples include clean air, footpaths and national parks.
These goods are typically provided by public actors because they otherwise suffer from the ‘free rider problem’; wherein, the owner of the good cannot correctly charge those that use it (how does one charge for clean air?). It is not in the interests of private individuals to provide public goods for which they cannot charge.
‘Climate stability’ has been framed as a “quintessential global pure public good” with “no market nor price, and that does not offer proper incentives against overexploitation” (Grasso, 2004, 7-8). Private actors can use it without being charged (non-excludability) and simultaneously so (it is non-rivalrous). The use of carbon-heavy resources and, in turn, the emitting of greenhouse gas emissions is using the stability of the climate to further short-term goals. As a consequence of a vast number of actors doing so, resources are depleting at the expense of future generation's ability to use them. There is an in principle economic authorisation for government intervention; namely, the market has failed to provide a socially desirable supply of a public good (climate stability).
Under conditions of market failure, it is legitimate for governments to intervene into the market; that public actors are usually held responsible for providing public goods imposes a prima facie rationale for intervention (Frecknall-Hudges, 2020, 23).
3.1.2. Negative externalities and the ‘real’ cost of meat
There is a further economic problem: the market for meat produces immense ‘negative externalities’; an uncompensated burden borne by third parties as a consequence of the economic transactions of others. Negative externalities are economically inefficient
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because of these uncompensated burdens and the perpetrators have little incentive to reduce their externalities, as they are borne by society.
Farming animals for meat entails numerous negative externalities: on the production side; water depletion and pollution (FAO, 2006, 125-167), habitat destruction (187-195), loss of biodiversity (209-213), deforestation (FAO, 2013, 8) excess nitrogen (CIWF, 2016, 4-5), soil degradation (5), air pollution (7-8), poor animal welfare (8-9), and on the consumption side; antimicrobial resistance (7), foodborne diseases (8), obesity (Rouhani et al, 2014; Ng et al, 2014), type-2 diabetes (Arnett et al, 2009), coronary heart disease and stroke (Springmann et al, 2017) and certain cancers (WHO, 2015).
One estimate of these costs, which omits the costs of GHG emissions and consumption side externalities puts the EU bill at €168.69 billion (CIWF, 2016); a 'substantial underestimate' in light of the omissions. CE Delft (2020 incorporate a number of the environmental externalities – including GHG emissions – of meat consumption into an External Costs Charge, reckoning the 'social costs' of beef, pork and chicken to be, respectively, €4.77/kg, €3.61/kg and €1.73/kg. Another study finds costs of meat consumption alone will amount to $600 billion in climate damages and $1 trillion in healthcare costs by 2050 (Springmann et al, 2017).
Consumers and producers of meat pay no price for these additional social costs and so the price of meat fails to reflect its ‘real’ cost. A report by the FAO notes the “worrying disconnect between the retail price of food and the true cost of its production” which allows some foods to “appear to be cheaper than more sustainably produced alternatives” (2015, 5). In this way, the price of many environmentally damaging foods is only ‘artificially cheap’ (Connelly et al, 2012, 184) and the price ought to be ‘revised’ in order to “take into count the real costs which consumption patterns impose on our environment” (AWS, 2017, 3).
A further economic rationale for intervention, then, is the meat market has failed by producing immense negative externalities and distorting the price of meat. Intervention is legitimised in order to return the market to its genuine equilibrium; a legitimate response to the problem of GHG emissions.
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3.2. Policy Options in Instances of Market Failure
This section explores the policy options available to governments, in the instance of market failure, and seeks the most appropriate.
A government’s policy arsenal can be categorised in a variety of ways. For instance, the tools available could be divided into ‘inform and power’, ‘guide and influence’ and tools that ‘incentivise, discourage or restrict’ (Chatham House, 2015, 10). Similarly, the options available could be defined as: ‘command and control’ instruments, information provisions and price-based approaches (Edjabou & Smed, 2013, 85).
For this research, the policy arsenal is divided into two: (i) tools that directly affect choice (choice instruments); and (ii) tools that directly affect cost and price (economic instruments). Each group is considered in turn.
3.2.1. Choice instruments
Positive information campaigns, or ‘suasion', can address non-financial barriers to behavioural change (Woodside, 1986, 786-787). Part of the market failure in this case derives from private actors attaining imperfect information in the market; specifically, the consequences of their food choices. Surveys suggest two-thirds of consumers want to consume more sustainably (BIT, 2020, 23) and so information campaigns may better guide their choices.
According to a report from Chatham House, there exists a considerable ‘awareness gap’ linking livestock, diet and climate change (2015, 20-23): across a survey of populations from twelve countries, one in four respondents stated that meat and dairy makes “little or no contribution to climate change” and the livestock sector was identified as markedly less causal than other sectors (23).
Consumers are generally not aware of the environmental impacts of food choices and, even when intending to consumer more sustainably, consumers mistakenly equate ‘local’, ‘seasonal’ or ‘organic’ as greener options, and use heuristics such as 'food miles' to guide choices (BIT, 2020, 30-32; 62). Total emissions per food group is a more reliable indicator insofar as it takes into account factors such as transport mileage and the energy required to farm outside of a food’s ‘natural’ season. Indeed, even long-distance foods only expend 11% of their total carbon footprint on transport (62), and organic foods are
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generally less sustainable than their alternatives (Bogueva & Phau, 2015, 271; DCE, 2016, 63-64).
Government could fill this ‘awareness gap’ by launching information campaigns – signifying emissions per food group – and promoting climate-specific nutritional education in schools. With this information, consumers may be encouraged to choose less emissions-intensive foods, such as meat, in their diet.
A problem germane to all tools that attempt to influence consumer choices is industry actors use information campaigns in precisely the opposite way (BIT, 2020, 22). The meat industry lobby is well-funded and profoundly affects the food sector; in the US alone, sales of meat total $125-$200 billion per year and the market is dominated by only a handful of corporations (BIT, 2020, 37). Industry actors have pushed meat consumption habits onto – particularly young – consumers by heavily financed advertising campaigns (Bogueva,& Phau, 2015, 268-270) In 2006, for instance, a campaign by the UK’s Agricultural and Horticultural Development Board’s Pork Division led to an increase of pork consumption by 21,900% in six years (BIT, 2020, 52).
These industry efforts condemn any government strategy to being expensive at best, or futile at worst. Significant capital would be required to compete with industry advertising and enable long term public awareness (Chatham House, 2015, 12-13). Moreover, there is yet no evidence that informational dietary interventions have significantly changed behaviour in the past (BIT, 2020, 30).
A more direct way to influence consumer’s choices is to regulate those available. Regulations allow governments to pursue nonmarket goals and is seen generally as a soft alternative to public ownership (Woodside, 1986, 783), and yet sterner than information provision tools. As BIT finds, “diet interventions that seek to alter the ‘external setting’ or choice environment tend to be more effective than those that target our ‘internal motivations’” (2020, 39).
One suggestion, in this case, could be to legislate mandatory ‘meat free’ days in public institutions (DCE, 2016, 74), as is the case in Portugal (CCC, 2020, 117) and in Germany's environmental agency (FAIRR, 2017, 25); the ‘Good Food Cities’ is an example of a city-to-city initiative, where 14 Mayors from some of the most populous
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cities of the C40 Climate Cities Leadership Group committed to considerably cutting their meat consumption in public institutions (Greenpeace International, 2019).
Another option is to enforce carbon labelling schemes on all food packaging; one study suggests a black-yellow-green traffic light system (for above-, near- and below-average emissions) could be effective (Vanclay et al, 2011). A stricter option is to regulate the advertising of meat, by including a climate warning with emissions-intensive products or to regulate TV advertising time slots in order to limit the exposure to children (as is already the case with gambling and alcohol).
One objection to such regulation, is pragmatic; it will likely be unpopular amongst consumers and could be viewed as a disproportionate attack on the industry. Regulation is difficult to implement for this reason. This is exacerbated by the deeply rooted cultural practices – whether or not re-enforced by marketing (Bogueva & Phau, 2015) – that accompany both producing and consuming meat (Edjabou & Smed, 2013, 85). Softer regulation may be palatable, but at the cost of being less effective.
Choice instruments are problematic for government use in the case of meat consumption. Regulation is likely to be met with significant opposition (from both consumers and producers) and industry actors are well-positioned to provide counter forces to efforts to educate consumers. These instruments are not optimal for curbing the consumption, and production, of meat.
3.2.2. Economic instruments
Alternatively, economic instruments directly influence the price, and cost, of meat. Price is the most compelling determinant of food choice (Clonon et al, 2016, 9) and a systematic review of 38 studies finds that price signals (taxes and subsidies) are consistently effective at changing consumption patterns (CCC, 2020, 119). In the case of food choices, "the financial incentive that ought to be in place to pursue climate-minded acts simply is non-existent" (DCE, 2016, 8).
One option is to subsidise meat alternatives or less emissions-intensive protein foods. As a report by Chatham House finds, consumers are often priced out of buying alternatives for meat and there is a lack of affordable alternatives; fundamental changes to consumer’s ‘choice architecture’ are needed to rebalance these relative costs (2015,
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37-49). Subsidies may encourage producers of less emissions-intensive foods to produce better quality, or cheaper, alternatives and shift demand away from meat.
Conversely, governments could increase the cost of meat production by lifting the immense subsidies that animal agriculture receives; the total within OECD ‘club of rich countries’ is $52 billion (BIT, 2020, 37), which is higher than the GDP of three of the club’s members (Iceland, $25.9 billion; Estonia, $30,7 billion; Latvia, $34.4 [World Bank, 2020]).
Providing more subsidies, in this context, is expensive; yet, removing existing subsidies may be excessively disruptive to the livelihoods of farmers who have come to depend on them. An intermediate suggestion of ‘conversion subsidies’ (DCE, 2016, 74) may be the most appropriate option, in which the subsidies become contingent upon farming more sustainably in the short term, before phasing out totally in the longer term.
Taxation is the policy tool best placed to mitigate the market failures discussed. It is the ‘most appropriate’ given the failure of the market (Edjabou & Smed, 2013, 85) and also the most ‘cost effective’ (Wirsenius et al, 2010, 160). Taxation can work to internalise the environmental costs of meat production. Consumers will likely have to pay a higher price for meat and so less will be bought, to the detriment of producers of meat. It is better in practice to tax consumers rather than producers. Charging producers directly, a ‘slaughter tax’ (CE Delft, 11-12), would be a “complex administrative challenge” (19) and costly (Wirsenius et al, 2010, 162; Edjabou & Smed, 2013; Springmann et al, 2017, 69) because corrections would have to be made to ensure that domestic and imported products are equally affected (CE Delft, 2016; Moberg et al, 2019, 1716). Although taxing producers is simpler in some respects, since there are fewer payers, a tax on consumption has the comparative advantage of capturing the full – ‘cradle-to-gate’ – supply chain (Moberg et al, 2019, 1717).
In addition to internalising some of the negative externalities, taxation also aids the provision of public goods. Taxes, of any ilk, offer the significant advantage of both incentivising behaviour and raising revenue – elsewhere referred to as the ‘double dividend’ (Connelly et al, 2012, 186). In principle, the revenue from taxation could be fund previously considered policies options, such as informational campaigns, in a complementary manner. For Woodside, taxes ought to be spent in a way that makes clear
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the tax has been doubly effective in this way, otherwise citizens have trouble ‘making the fiscal connection’ between the hike in price and the benefits accrued for government (1986, 784).
Taxing the additional environmental burden of goods also signals they are not free, and "consumption entails a cost” (Connelly et al, 2012, 183). The signalling effect of taxes has two notable advantages: on the one hand, taxes signal the “real price of production” (DCE, 2016, 58) and change the perception of meat as a relatively cheap, ‘essential’ staple food (CCC, 2020, 119); on the other hand, it eludes to the fact that “moral responsibility to reduce greenhouse gas emissions should be shouldered by the consumers in solidarity” and not merely assigned as the fault of producers (DCE, 2016, 72). For this reason, education of the true cost of meat consumption would work well in tandem with taxation policy (Poore & Nemecek, 2018, 5). Although greater awareness of externalities is unlikely to prompt action alone, it can bolster public support for such fiscal policies (Chatham House, 2015, 36).
To summarise, taxation is the best policy tool available. Economic instruments, generally speaking, are preferable to choice instruments because of their superior potential to change consumer behaviour. Taxation is more suitable than using subsidies because of the political viability of the double dividend and the accompanied signalling effect.
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3.3. Modelling a Meat Tax: Possibilities for Mitigating GHG Emissions
This section explores the question of whether the consumption of meat is a relevant consideration for the mitigation of GHG emissions; in so doing, complete the first two sub-questions of this research. 'Relevant', as per sub-section 2.1.1., by measure of plausibility of mitigation; in other words, a consideration is relevant if it would likely work. As well as this, insights attained from this analysis will motivate normative moves made in Chapters 4 and 5.
First, seven model scenarios are presented in order to decipher the likely effect a meat tax would have on GHG emissions (sub-section 3.3.1.). The appropriate shape of the tax is considered (3.3.2.) and the relevance of future demand for meat is noted (3.3.3.). Finally, the limitations of these assumptions, as well as the wider application of the tax, are considered (3.3.4.).
3.3.1. The economic effects of taxing meat: seven scenarios
Before discussing normative justifications that attempt to justify a meat tax, it is important to understand what the likely effects of the tax will be. Some later claims rely on assumptions about the likely effects of implementation; other claims are undermined by such effects.
No meat tax yet exists. Table 1 present seven scenarios which have attempted to model the implementation of climate taxes on food.Each scenario differs in metric, scale or context and together they serve to analyse what can be said about the likely economic effects of implementation. Summaries of each can be found in the Appendix.
30 Table 1: scenarios
1 Prices for scenarios 2, 3, 5 & 6 are converted to euros (€) for comparative sake (Xe.com, 2020) 2 Respectively, €4.77 per kg beef / veal; €3.61 per kg pork; €1.73 per kg chicken
3 Using total EU emissions figures from European Environment Agency (2017)
4 Data on total agriculture emissions from United States Environmental Protection Agency (2020) 5 150 regions
6 62 types, intended to cover the majority of food consumption 7 Exempts poultry, fish, milk, eggs, vegetables and fruit
8 Food-related GHG emissions derived from the average Norwegian diet
# Author(s) Model
region
Target & price1
Effect on food related GHG emissions in region 1 CE Delft (2020) European Union Differentiated 'social cost' taxes on meat2 -27.3% 3 2 University of Nebraska (2019) United States €0.46 per kg CO2-eq on livestock and grain -1.6%4
3 Springmann et al. (2017) World-wide5 CO€0.46 per kg
2-eq on all
types of food6 -9.3%
4 García-Muros et al. (2017) Spain
€0.25-€0.50 per kg CO2-eq on 14 food stuffs -3.8%-7.6% 5 Abadie et al. (2016) Norway Differentiated taxes on 'nearly all food categories'7 -10% 6 Edjabou and Smed (2013) Denmark €0.47-€0.93 per kg CO2-eq on 23 food types -10.4%-19.4%8
7 Wirsenius et al. (2011) European Union
€0.60 per kg CO2-eq on
animal products
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There are limitations to the conclusions that can be drawn from these models and their wider application. Each assumes different prices for the tax, different targets for the tax, and, as noted (sub-section 2.2.3.), most concern only European markets.
At minimum, these models reveal that climate taxes on food effectively reduce GHG emissions, and this is likely the case whether meat is taxed specifically (scenarios 1, 2 & 7) or food is taxed generally (scenarios 3, 4, 5 & 6). In the latter case, meat is nevertheless taxed the highest owing to its low emissions-efficiency. Though an increase government revenue can be expected in every case, only scenario 1 makes this calculation explicit (€32.2 billion after 10 years).
In some cases, the reduction in emissions is substantial: in scenario 1, for instance, over 27.3% of agricultural emissions in the EU could be prevented through a meat tax; scenario 3 finds that a worldwide tax on all food types would mitigate 9.3% of agricultural emissions, about half of what is needed to keep global temperature rise to below 2°C (Springmann et al, 2017, 69). The most modest decrease is that of scenario 2 concerning the United States, a decrease of 1.6% following a tax on meat and grain; however, even in this case, this is equivalent to taking 2.2 million cars off of roads in the US.
In addition to the shape of the tax, potential accounts of the differences in emissions reductions may be the resistance of demand to changes in price (such as those noted in sub section 3.3.2.), differences in regional productivity (as discussed in Section 3.3) or existing subsidies.
On the basis of these scenarios, the future chapters work under the assumption that a meat tax will be effective in reducing agricultural GHG emissions in the region of the tax.
3.3.2. A note on the price elasticity of meat
It matters, both politically and ethically, how elastic a good is when considering taxing it. That is, how sensitive its demand is to a change in price. An elasticity of 1 mean that an increase in the price of a good leads to a directly proportionate decrease in demand for the good: a rise of 10% in price, by example, would lead to a 10% fall in demand. A good is price elastic if its elasticity is greater than 1; a good is inelastic if its elasticity is less than 1.
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The more inelastic a good is, the greater the burden on consumers (as they shoulder the cost) and the higher the emphasis is on revenue raising (because consumers are less likely to change their behaviour in response to a change in price). The more elastic a good is, the greater the burden on producers, as consumers choose alternative products to the producer's detriment.
Two meta-analyses reveal the price elasticity of meat. The first, a review of 160 studies finds the price elasticity of meat to be in the 0.7-0.8 range (Andreyeva, 2010). This makes meat relatively slightly price inelastic; though, as the authors notes, it is among the most elastic food types.
The second, a larger review of 419 studies finds the median elasticity to be 0.77 but that it varies greatly and according to the available substitutes (Gallet, 2010). Beef and lamb are significantly more price-elastic than poultry and all meats tend to be more price elastic when substitutes are available (267).
The price elasticity of meat is likely to be much more elastic in future, and therefore produce a greater shift in demand, as the industry for meat alternatives – lab-grown and P-B analogies – grows. A greater availably of alternatives will make it easier for consumers to adapt their demand; according to the CCC, “the market for plant-based proteins could grow more than ten-fold, from 1% of the global meat market to 10% (totally $140 billion) within the decade” (2020, 116).
Future price elasticities are relevant to the overall claim of this chapter – that meat consumption is a relevant consideration for curbing GHG emissions – because it implies that the scenarios above (sub-section 3.3.1.) likely underestimate the effect of a tax on meat. A tax on meat becomes more plausible as the availability of substitutes increases.
3.3.3. Differentiated versus non-differentiated taxation
So far, this research has considered a 'meat tax', generally. Yet, a tax on food consumption could instead be differentiated – more precisely – according to the emissions of individual or groups of different food types. In principle, this more accurately achieves ‘emissions justice’ by targeting consumption proportionately. A number of possibilities are worth noting.
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The most ambitious would be to implement differentiated taxes for every food type (as with scenarios 3, 4 and 6 [Table 1]). Just as beef would be taxed more than poultry, tomatoes would be taxed more than potatoes (Figure 2). Though this ‘incremental tax’ would be the most ‘optimal’ tax, the DCE conclude, it would be extremely difficult to administer because of the local variations within each food type; simply, “not realistic in the short term” (DCE, 2016, 71). Such a differentiated tax has also been dismissed on the ground that “the cost of calculating and verifying the climate impact of all individual products would be unreasonably high” (Moberg et al, 2019, 1717)
In addition to the costs involved, a differentiated tax poses a different problem: it encourages consumers to simply substitute one meat for another, cheaper, meat. This may be costly to consumer’s health (Nordgren, 2012) as well as potentially exacerbating animal welfare concerns (insofar as intensively farmed animals are less costly).
Alternatively, one food group could be differentially taxed (meat), whilst another is exempt altogether (as with scenarios 1, 2, 5 and 7). CE Delft's model incorporates this ‘substitution effect’ into their three different charges for beef, pig and poultry (2016); though, there are countless other meats that would have to be taken into account.
Conversely, consumers may instead substitute meat for dairy which itself can be emissions-intensive; cheese is a greater emitter, per 100g of protein, than eggs, fish, pork and poultry (Figure 2). To capture significant portions of total meat emissions, as well as those from dairy production, a species-specific tax could be proposed. Indeed, a tax on cattle (meat and dairy) produce, alone, would cover 10% of GHG emissions (DCE, 2016, 56) and 65% of total livestock emissions (FAO, 2013, 15-16).
The difference between cattle and other meats should not, however, distract from the difference between meat and non-meat (though cheese remains an outlier). Moreover, should dairy be included in the tax, the administration costs would rise sharply and – insofar as dairy cows are eventually slaughtered for meat – dairy farmers are already affected by a meat tax (Lykkeskov and Gjerris, 2017, 188; CE Delft, 2020, 22). As well as this, dairy consumption has – unlike meat – remained stable for the past-half century, making it a less urgent concern (Chatham House, 2015, 7).
34 Figure 3: IPCC, 2019, 487
Figure 3 illustrates the GHG mitigation potential of a change in diet as compared to the ‘business as usual’ scenario; that is, if global diets remain unchanged. It shows significant mitigation effects of even moderated meat intake; transitions to Flexitarian diets, for instance, would result in a saving of approximately 5 gigatonnes CO2-eq emissions. It
might be inferred that transitions to ‘less meat’ may prove more productive than, say, targeting specific meats or species, or otherwise including dairy into regulations.
As Moberg et al argue, a broad, aggregated (non-differentiated) tax is likely necessary; it will not be perfectly cost-efficient but rather the “result of political negotiations and administrative simplicity” (2019, 1717). In the short term, at least, the most available option to government is a blanket meat tax. Correspondingly, Bird notes the complications with previous attempts to differentiate tax for alcohol (2015, 12-13) and argued a uniform tax is usually best in practice (18-27).
The best form of the tax is a non-differentiated tax on meat, hereafter 'meat tax'. The subsequent chapters will work under this definition.
3.3.4. Limitations of implementing a meat tax and potential undesirable effects An increase in the price of meat will likely incentivise farmers to farm more efficiently in order to lower costs of production. Livestock farms in Latin America and the
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Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa have the most potential to farm more productively (FAO, 2013, 25). The effort to lower costs may encourage agricultural innovation – for instance, in methods, feeds and technology – which the FOA point to as tantamount when working towards a sustainable future (83-91). Ideally, these innovations reduce the emissions intensity within animal agriculture.
For many farms, however, there is limited scope for improving efficiency and a significant portion of emissions – particularly, that of CH4 from enteric fermentation –
can be only partially avoided (40). As a report by Wirsenius et al find, many emissions in the sector are inherent to it or cannot be attributable to a single source (2010, 163).
Instead, particularly in the short term, the tax may encourage producers to farm more intensively and thereby leave consumers with cheaper, lower quality meat (Chatham House, 2015, 15); the ‘organic’ market sector will likely be disproportionately affected (DCE, 2016, 76-77).
The tax will likely be regressive, disproportionately affecting lower-income households for whom meat consumptions constitutes a greater percentage of spending power (CE Delft, 2020; Garcia et al, 2017); a Danish proposal of a 'ruminant meat tax' was highly controversial in Denmark, owing in part to its regressive nature (Lykkeskov and Gjerris, 2017, 187-188). More generally, the tax could also be interpreted as an attack on meat’s cultural role in society (BIT, 2020, 21). These undesirable effects may limit the plausibility of the proposal.
Concurrent policy initiatives may lift some of these burdens, particularly those on consumers. For instance, a number of policy reports suggest directly ring-fencing some of the revenue gains to alleviate the regressive effect on poorer consumers (CE Delft, 2020, 30-32; Chatham House, 2015).
By example, CE Delft’s model purposely increments a tax over nine years in order to give consumers time to adjust; also suggesting that some of the revenue should be used to directly compensate lower-income households (2020, 12-38). This incrementation will also help producers adjust. Others have argued that any such revenue should be earmarked specifically for climate initiatives or restorations of inefficient farms (DCE, 2016, 72) (CE, Delft, 2020, 33-34)
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Furthermore, governments often overestimate the negative reaction of the public, whom generally trust them to take the lead on public policy providing they are well-informed; therefore, political resistance is likely to be short-lived (Chatham House, 2015, 40-41). Particularly so, if the purpose of the tax is properly communicated (BIT, 2020, 24-25).
There are, however, a number of hurdles when considering a meat tax in the global context. For instance, there is potential conflicts and legal constrains with regard to EU (DCE, 2016, 69-70) and WTO (CE Delft, 2020, 18) trade rules that may prevent a tax from being implemented by any one nation.
There is also the problem of tax competition across borders (Lindsay, 2018, 23): in which, the 'first mover' on any tax will face comparative disadvantages, hurting domestic producers; some countries might choose to become 'meat tax havens', and undermine the efforts of other countries. A supranational fiscal authority might be required to enforce climate policy such as taxation (Grasso, 2004, 9-10).
Furthermore, blobal implementation may disproportionately affect lower income countries in which hundreds of millions of ‘smallholders’ depend on livestock for their “daily income, food and survival” (FAO, 2013, 1-2). The farming intensities in poor- and middle-income countries are far lower than the rest of the world (FAO, 2016, 25) and these countries would be most disrupted by the price increases (Nordgren, 2012, 576-577; Springmann et al, 2017, 71-73).
On the other hand, countries in the tropics and Southern Hemisphere subtropics – an area which covers many of the poor- and middle-income countries – are projected to experience the most severe climate extremes (WMO, 2019), as well as the largest negative impacts on economic growth (IPCC, 2018, 9), because of climate change and so will gain the most from efforts to mitigate the effects thereof. Perhaps, as Alby et al (2008, 11-23) argue, climate taxes should vary globally to account for different capacities to adapt, factoring in culpability for past emissions.
More research is needed with as regards the political economy of how a meat tax could be established globally. As a pragmatic first step, as the DCE recommend, capable national governments should first take the lead (2016, 72-73).
37 Chapter 3 conclusion
To summarise, this chapter has answered sub-question 2 of this research, by finding tax to be a legitimate tool for governments to use in the instance of market failure and noting the comparative advantages of taxation over other policies available to governments. Furthermore, in finding it to be plausible effective, though not without limitations (sub-section 3.3.3.), the first sub-question is also answered; and so, the preceding chapters have completed the first two sub-questions of this research.
To respond to whether a meat tax can be justified, however, the implications of implementation ought to be considered. As Bird-Pollan puts it (2020, 162): "Economics must be used to determine how best to achieve a particular end, but the determination of the end itself is a fundamental philosophical question that must be answered by the society in question”.
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4. The Ethics of a Meat Tax Part I: A 'Sin' Tax?
IntroductionSo far, this research has positioned the production of meat as a relevant and significant cause of GHG emissions (Chapter 1) and then argued that taxation is a mitigation tool both legitimate and available for government use (Chapter 3). The next two chapters address the third, and final, sub-question of this research: what are the moral implications of implementation? The focus shifts from what is expedient by some economic measure (e.g. efficiency, efficacy) or plausible by some political measure (e.g. viability, feasibility), to what is just, by ethical measures of equity, fairness, liberty, utility or necessity. The question of how a meat tax could be implemented becomes the moral question of, should it?
The last chapter noted the likely effects of implementation: reduced consumption, increased government revenue, regressive effects, comparative future benefits. These findings aid the framing of subsequent moral discourse and help furnish normative moves made hereafter. By example, the likely regressive nature of a meat tax (sub-section 3.3.4.) is immediately relevant to claims that attempt to justify taxing meat as fair (sub-section 4.2.1.).
This chapters introduces a framework with which similar excise duties are justified; namely, as a sin tax. The aim here is not to evaluate the justness of sin taxes, generally, but rather the availability of the sin tax framework as a means with which to justify a meat tax. The merits and limitations of the framework are considered. Four claims have been levied in favour: sin taxes (i) stifle excessive consumption; (ii) recover costs of consumption; (iii) discourage immoral consumption; and (iv) fund moral venture.
If these claims can be made appropriate for a tax on meat, then the implementation of a meat tax will be morally justified, as a kind of sin tax. First, this chapter clarifies the principles of normative economics that together serve as an ethical metric for taxation. Sin taxes are defined and parallel claims for a meat tax are introduced. The bulk of the chapter then addresses four claims of sin taxes, and simultaneously asks whether they are suitable for justifying a tax on meat.
