The state of CSR communication of Dutch banks since the 2007 economic crisis: A qualitative study on discourse development in annual CSR-reports (2005-2014)
Jason Rouse, BSc Hons Communication Science Student number: 11304383 Master track: Corporate Communication
Graduate School of Communication, University of Amsterdam (UvA) First supervisor: dr. P. (Piet) Verhoeven
Second supervisor: Committee 'Thesis Quality Master' Due date: February 1, 2019
2 This thesis was written to obtain the degree Master of Science (MSc) in Communication.
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Abstract
The economic crisis of 2007 is taken as a starting point to study the development of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) communication of Dutch banks over a longer period of time. A central thesis is that banks’ profit-drive was at the expense of customers and wider society, thereby importantly contributing to the onset of the crisis. This study aims to square this thesis with CSR communication of banks, which in its nature oftentimes is associated with the exact opposite. CSR was conceptualized as discourse to this end. CSR reports were the
studied materials. A longitudinal qualitative content analysis (i.e. discourse analysis) was conducted over 2005-2014. An important result was that dissimilarity between banks dominates throughout the entire sampled time period: all banks seem to favor a different discourse in their reporting. Another interesting result is that there are a few clear legacies of the crisis: a shift from product to client centricity; increased focus on transparency, clarity, and simplicity of products and services; and smaller banks that are no longer too big to fail. These findings were related to discourse using an existing framework (i.e. Stohl, Stohl, & Townsley, 2007; Stohl, Etter, Banhart, & Woo, 2017). The main limitation is that the study generated too much data, leaving much to be undiscussed. Future research is served with adopting a more narrow scope.
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Introduction
The espoused role of banks in society, being protectors of citizens’ deposits and issuers of loans, did not align with their actual role in society in 2007 (Beattie, 2018). Banks arguably were narcissistic and profit-driven at the expense of customers and wider society (Wesseling, 2015). This discrepancy between the espoused role of banks in society and their actual role, contributed to a global economic crisis causing tremendous damage throughout societies; either directly (e.g. via preventable home foreclosures), or indirectly (e.g. via higher unemployment rates; NOS, 2017a). The focus often is on US society, even though other societies had similar problems. In the Dutch context DSB-bank went bust, ABN-AMRO and SNS Reaal needed to be nationalized, and multiple other banks needed state aid (Bluekens, 2016).
The crisis resulting from this aforementioned discrepancy, has for many researchers justified scrutiny of banks in terms of how they place themselves in society (Lentner, Szegedi, & Tibor, 2015). Qualitative research dealing with this exact issue, features interviews with corporate communication professionals of Dutch banks, one of whom discloses that the sector has slowly started to realize: “that this [discrepancy] is a lasting issue […] which you don’t resolve just like that,” thereby implicating a need for change on part of the banks (Rietman, 2010, p. 42). At the same time, however, the same professionals admitted to not having changed their banks’ policies, even though the crisis at that time had already brought about much of the aforementioned tremendous damage (Rietman, 2010).
The theoretical concept that can be applied to scrutinize banks in terms of how their espoused role and actual role (mis)align, is Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). CSR is a concept that is used in scientific literature in divergent ways, exhibiting: “considerable heterogeneity in its core assumptions, approaches and goals” (Crane & Glozer, 2016, p. 1223). Influential conceptualizations are that of Carrol (2015, p. 90) that breaks up CSR in “economic, legal, ethical and discretionary expectations […] that society has at a given point in time”. As well as the conceptualization of Elkington (1998) whom departed from an accounting tradition and argued for a triple bottom line. He argued concerns for Profit to be supplemented with concerns for People and Planet.
CSR could also be conceptualized as being discourse. “Discourse refers to culturally standardized interpretive frames historically rooted in systems of power/knowledge,” (Jian, Schmisseur, & Fairhurst, 2008, p. 305). Discourse in this conceptualization can be observed through communication, thus in “texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception,” (Jian et al., 2008; Tang Gallagher, & Bie, 2015, p. 215). It is here argued that the earlier discussed definitions unmeritorious privilege organizational interests (Edwards,
5 2012). The approach of CSR as discourse, however, allows for a more meta-perspective, revealing “shifts that have been made as scholars and practitioners attempt to make sense of” corporations’ roles and responsibilities in society over time (Stohl, Stohl, & Townsley, 2007, p. 32).
Banks can use multiple communication channels to organize their CSR
communication. The most important arguably being the corporate website and the CSR-report (De Boer, 2013; Vilar & Simao, 2015; Kilic, 2016; Meeusen, 2010; Branco & Rodrigues, 2006). The former lending itself particularly for CSR communication for its
“cost-effectiveness, flexibility, timeliness and up-to-datedness, versatility, speed, detailed [and] almost unlimited capacity, and global reach,” (Vilar & Simao, 2015, p. 298). The latter being important for its legitimacy and annual dissemination.
The CSR-report is an offspring of the better known financial report. The annual financial report provides an account of the financial actions of an organization. The CSR-report, which first surfaced in the 1990’s, added a social component to organizations’ reporting (Meeusen, 2010). The CSR-report has been an important form of communication for previous studies. Foremost for its annual nature which allows the tracking of changes over time. Furthermore, it can be argued that the close proximity of the CSR-report to the audited financial report, gives it a credibility that other CSR-communication does not possess (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006, p. 236).
Given that the literature has shown that it is relevant and interesting to see how banks developed their CSR-communication in the years following the crisis, coupled with the insight that CSR-reports seem fit to track communication over time; the following research question is proposed:
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Theoretical framework
DiscoursesDiscourse, as earlier defined, refers to “culturally standardized interpretative frames,” (Jian, et al., 2008, p. 305). The merits of conceptualizing CSR as discourse was explained earlier: discourse is some sort of a meta-perspective, revealing shifts of sensemaking by scholars and practitioners, of corporations’ roles and responsibilities in society over time (Stohl et al., 2007). A framework exists that captures these interpretive frames and shifts of sensemaking, namely the framework of Stohl, et al. (2007) and Stohl, Etter, Banghart, & Woo (2017). The purpose that this framework could serve, is that it becomes clearer how the abstract notion of divergent discourse can translate to divergent practical CSR communication.
The framework consists of the identification of three discourses addressing CSR. The authors called these generations of discourse as they argue that these perspectives emerged at different times throughout modern history (Stohl et al., 2007). The three generations of discourse are used as if they are different ways of making a case for CSR. In this vein, the respective discourses are: the business case, the social contract case, and the civil society case (Stohl et al., 2017).
Central to the business case of CSR, the first generation of discourse, is that a corporation is socially responsible if it makes profits (in a way that is consistent with local laws; Stohl et al., 2007; Stohl et al., 2017). This discourse arguably is a response to a lack of property rights (i.e. right to have a corporation of your own, something nobody else can interfere with; see Donaldson & Preston, 1995). It is important to imagine that businesses throughout a long time of history could be thought of as vulnerable. A lack of (enforced) property rights left businesses open to be to pillaged and plundered either by other individuals/businesses or by an overreaching government (e.g. via seizure of funds or property; Meyer & Church, n.d.). From this perspective it is possibly best understood why making this case (read also: using this discourse in communication as a corporation), is particularly concerned with the internals of a corporation, and not so much with the environment (if not dictated by law).
Central to the social contract case of CSR, the second generation of discourse, is that a corporation is socially responsible if it takes properly care of workers and its families. This ‘properly taking care’ must be seen as encompassing a living wage for workers and providing good working conditions. Another important way this can be propagated, is via voluntary corporate philanthropy. This discourse is arguably a response to the exploitation of factory workers in Western European capitalist democracies early 20th century (Stohl et al., 2007; Stohl et al., 2017). One could argue that this perspective in particular took flight in the
7 Netherlands after World War II; a period in which the social security net for workers grew considerably (Bovens, ‘t Hart, & Van Twist, 2012). From this perspective it is possibly best understood why making this case is particularly concerned with being more responsible in various obvious/explicit social contracts the organization has with various actors (e.g. customers, employees and their respective families).
Central to the civil society case of CSR, the third generation of discourse, is that a corporation is socially responsible if it expands the notion of ‘properly taking care’ to wider society. Thus, those who are not necessarily directly tied to the company as customers, employees (and their families), and stockholders. This ‘properly taking care for’, however, materializes differently if applied in its best form. Within this discourse it is obtained via a process of dialogue with wider society (Stohl et al., 2007; Stohl et al., 2017). This discourse arguably mirrors Habermasian discourse ethics. In the sense that CSR is enacted through sincerity (rather than sarcasm), and dialogue with wider society (rather than limiting it to certain actors; see Meisenbach, 2006). From this perspective it is possibly best understood why making this case oftentimes deals with collective/societal issues, in addition to the issues brought up in the other two discourses.
Between discourse and text
It was explained in the introduction that a discourse refers to interpretative frames that can be observed through texts. More precisely, one can draw discourse (a latent interpretative frame) from looking at manifest texts. It is interesting to explorer which perspectives exist in the literature on how to do just that.
One perspective is provided by a study that investigates CSR reports of British banks. Coupland (2006) opted for the use of grounded theory and relied on reading and re-reading of texts in order to capture a discourse through text. An interesting suggestion from this study was that techniques of media analysis can be adapted at times (Coupland, 2006).
Another perspective can be drawn from media analysis. Bell (1998) proposes a more directed technique of drawing discourse from text. His approach may be best characterized as a fracturing technique. Fracturing is the notion of rearranging your data in a way that
facilitates comparison, thereby obviating more broader themes and issues (such as discourse; Maxwell, 2013, p. 107). As the author approaches it: “Only after we are clear what the story says,” (i.e. put it into a comparable schema), “will we be in a position to see what it does not say” and thus observe discourse (Bell, 1998, p. 66). In summary, both perspectives discussed underline an understanding that texts are dissimilar to discourses. The perspectives
8 Between text and practices
The current text has thus far focused to a large extent on texts and what can be drawn from texts in the context of CSR. At this point, it may be good to contrast this with practices. After all: studying what banks say that they do, is something different than studying what banks actually do. And both have merit.
Some scholars that study texts (over practices) depart from the starting point that language is performative rather than functional (Christensen & Cornelissen, 2011). This means that language enables the existence of practices rather than reflecting them. In other words, language precedes practices instead of the other way round. A CSR-report is prime exemplar for these scholars (e.g. Coupland, 2006; Meeusen, 2010; Tang, Gallagher, & Bie, 2015). A CSR-report among other describes vision. It has been argued that this aspirational quality “may instigate reality rather than describe it” even if the communicator “deliberately [paints] an inaccurate picture of corporate behaviors and impacts” (Crane & Glozer, 2016, p. 1235). This, perhaps optimistic, view thus ascribes a performative property to CSR
communication to the extent that even insincere communication inadvertently can “generate pressure to create the reality,” that a corporation is reluctant to embrace (Crane & Glozer, 2016, p. 1235).
Similarly there are authors that approach the contrast between text and practices with a more functional perspective. Devin (2016), for instance, adopts such a functional perspective. She argues that the focus should not only be on what corporations say in their CSR
communication, but also on what they are not saying. What is not said, could be highly important and central to the CSR of a corporation. Devin (2016) in this way inadvertently exposes that the performative perspective somewhat quickly assumes that all that is important will be addressed in CSR communication.
The above insights are relevant in that they better situate the research question as proposed in the introduction. It shows that the research question is built on the assumption that language is performative. Furthermore, it shows that the research question is built on the assumption that most important CSR-related issues are indeed addressed in CSR-reports (thereby satisfying the issue brought up by Devin, 2016).
Phases of the crisis
Bluekens (2016) provided a comprehensive reflection on the economic crisis of 2007 and its development in subsequent years. In general, it could be argued that the crisis had a pretty erratic course. Bouts of optimism of economic recovery were exchanged with
disappointing economic results and vice versa. Similarly, however, it could be argued that the crisis did have phases of some sort. It is here proposed that there are three phases of the crisis.
9 First there is the period running up to the crisis, defined as 2005 and 2006. In 2007 the
financial crisis hit, followed by the banking crisis in 2008. It is here argued that the main crisis ended around 2012, as it is argued that the banking sector at this point had recovered sufficiently. The period 2013-2014 is then defined as the period after the crisis (Bluekens, 2016). This leads to the following sub question:
Question 1.1: Are there notable differences in discourse use before (i.e. 2005-2006), during (i.e. 2007-2012) and after the crisis (i.e. 2013-2014)?
Differences within the sector
An important facet of studying CSR communication in banks arguably is deciding whether differences between individual banks are relevant, or that only an assessment of the sector in its entirety is interesting. It seems most common to take differences between individual banks into account. This latter line of research has concluded (domestically and abroad) that CSR communication by individual banks might by different based on differences in core values, tradition, or amount of public scrutiny (Branco & Rodriguez, 2006; Coupland, 2006; Kilic, 2016; Rietman, 2010). It is expected that the relevance of studying individual banks, will carry over to the Dutch context. Particularly given the fact that Dutch banks also use their CSR reports to profile themselves as having a unique relationship to CSR compared to other Dutch banks (e.g. Rabobank, 2005). That is why it is here also explored whether there are notable differences between banks. This leads to the following sub question:
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Methods
The study applied a qualitative research strategy. A longitudinal study was chosen as the research design. Content analysis (i.e. discourse analysis) was the employed method. Content analysis fitted this study because banks have been consistently publishing yearly CSR-reports (either because of legal requirements or because of consistent institutional pressures).
Additionally, there is a favorable global trend of more and more CSR-reporting (Matten, & Moon, 2008).
Selection of research units
All retail banks are relevant to this study as the crisis was a system-wide failure (Bluekens, 2016). A census of retail banks was therefore conducted made up out of ING, ABN-AMRO, and Rabobank. These banks make up 84% of the retail market (Banken.nl, 2018). It was opted not to include other banks as this would be very time consuming while simultaneously adding only slightly to the total picture of CSR in the banking sector as Dutch citizens experience it.
Another selection that had to be made, was the content material to be included. In general, this is pretty simple; the CSR-reports of the sampled banks for the sampled time-frame. There is however some unavailable data due to the nationalization of ABN-AMRO over 2008-2011, and because some reports of Rabobank could not be located. The data in total comprised of 23 CSR-reports which amounted to 1700+ pages text. An oversight is presented in table 1:
Table 1
Oversight of the available content material for analysis
Year ING ABN-AMRO Rabobank
2005 ✓ ✓ ✓ 2006 ✓* ✓ ✓ 2007 ✓* ✓ ✓ 2008 ✓ Nationalized** ✓ 2009 ✓ Nationalized Missing*** 2010 ✓ Nationalized Missing 2011 ✓ ✓ Missing 2012 ✓ ✓ ✓ 2013 ✓ ✓ ✓
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Year ING ABN-AMRO Rabobank
2014 Integrated**** ✓ ✓
Note: *ING made two smaller CSR reports for different stakeholder groups, both were studied
and treated as if they were one CSR-report.
**ABN-AMRO was nationalized for the period reflected above. In that period ABN-AMRO seemingly did not (have to) produce CSR-reports.
***Researcher was unable to locate CSR-report.
**** ING integrated the CSR report with the annual financial report. It was opted not to study a separately available annex due to time restrictions and validity concerns.
Sample characteristics
All sampled banks are of Dutch origin. ING and ABN-AMRO were both globally operating banks, respectively employing 116.600 and 97.523 people in 2005. Both banks shrunk in size due to digitization, divestments, and the consequences of the crisis. In 2013 the banks respectively employed 63.805 and 22.829 and operated in a more select number of countries. Rabobank grew from 45.480 employees in 2005 to 56.870 in 2013, despite also dealing with the issues of digitization and the consequences of the crisis. Rabobank branched out around the globe during the sampled time period, after having almost solely focused on the Dutch market in 2005. The merits of this short oversight is that it objectively captures a part of the shifts that happened in the banking landscape during the studied time period. ING, ABN-AMRO and Rabobank published their first CSR-report respectively in 1995, 2003, and 2001. This is reported because it shows the familiarity that banks could have had with the medium of a CSR report. ABN-AMRO, in particular, had difficulties writing a clear understandable CSR-report in the first two year of sampling. This is likely due to the novelty of a CSR report for the organization (as their reporting started as late as 2003). The reports were clear starting 2011, it seemed only then that ABN-AMRO had mastered the format.
Also interesting to address, is what a CSR report looked like in the current sample. There were multiple approaches, but generally, it included a leadership statement (1). This was an introductory word usually authored by the chairman of the executive board or a similar prominent leader. Moreover, it included a vision (2; a long term outlook) and a strategy (3; proposed actions for the coming years). Also generally included was progress reporting (4): an account of the way that previous strategy was executed over the reported year. An explanation of the relevant organizational governance and compliance systems (5) was generally also part of a CSR report. As well as a chapter on how the current policies and practices of offering services and selling products intersects with CSR (6). In addition there
12 generally was an account of what kind of employer the bank wants to be (7), and an account of community involvement (8).
ING was the most innovative with the format. The report over time had the form of a magazine for employees and citizens. As well as a technical report lending itself for
researching purposes. Both in addition to the more ‘traditional’ form. At times two reports were published (as reported on in the methods section). ING’s CSR reports also became longer over the years (from 40 pages in 2005 to 109 pages in 2013). ABN-AMRO’s CSR reports became shorter over the years (from 112 pages in 2005 down to 66 pages in 2014). Rabobank’s report also became shorter over the years (from 110 pages in 2005 down to 63 pages in 2014).
Operationalization
Bell (1998) came up with a method to draw the discourse structure from news stories. His approach departed from the idea of rearranging the data thereby obviating discourse. In Bell’s (1998) theory this is done by rearranging 18 aspects of a text. In a nutshell, the aspects address manifest aspects such as the what, who, where, and when of a text. In addition, there are more latent aspects addressing things as confusion as experienced by the reader. Please see appendix 1 for Bell’s own explanation of all 18 aspects. The aspects are from now on called constructs. The totality of the 18 aspects reported on is called a filled-out schema from now on. The idea for this study is to come up with one schema for every CSR-report. This, in turn, would allow comparison across banks and over time.
The present study does not cover news stories such as Bell (1998), instead it covers CSR reports. This meant that the theory had to be adapted. This was done in two ways. Firstly, some terminology was changed (e.g. the lead in news articles corresponds with a leadership statement that is present in most CSR-reports). Secondly, the method was made more fit to handle large quantities of data (as 1700+ pages are the current sample). The latter was established via conducting a pre-test.
The pre-test consisted of a sampling of three CSR-reports. The aim was to see how Bell’s (1998) method could be made fit for the present study. To that end, the method was first closely studied. Secondly, the areas were identified where the method might not be fit. Bell (1998) proposed an 18-step plan to discourse analysis, eight of which were identified as possibly needing adjustments. Thirdly, alternative ‘steps’ were thought out in collaboration with an experienced researcher. The adaptations mostly consisted out of alternative units of measurement (e.g. not analyzing per sentence, but per chapter). Two alternatives were mostly considered and then tested for fit. Criteria that needed to be met, were: timeliness (ease to register), and internal validity (success at measuring construct; Bryman, 2012).
13 The pre-test illuminated that the schema had to be adapted in multiple ways. The primary finding was that the proposed level of measurement oftentimes was too small. Furthermore, it turned out that some of the constructs weren’t particularly at play.
In the end, ten constructs were used for the present study. The first six are more or less manifest characteristics. The title (1) was written down in the schema. The leadership
statement (2) was analyzed too. The leadership statement was an introductory word to the report usually authored by the chairman of the executive board or a similar prominent leader. Events (3) was a construct too. This was the broadest construct in the study, it encompassed what the text actually was about, think among other thing of vision and undertaken activities. Actors (4) was a construct as well, and it captured all the stakeholders that were mentioned in the text. Places (5) as in countries mentioned also formed their own construct. Time and background (6) also formed a construct. It was a similar broad concept as events, but this construct was primarily used if documents outside the CSR-report were referenced, or when CSR-policy before 2005 the initial sampling moment was referenced.
The latter four constructs were latent and based on the previous manifest constructs. Consistency between the title, leadership statement and main body text (7) was a construct in the schema. The construct was based on what was filled-out for variables 1-5. Cohesion (8) was a construct meant to uncover what the central features of a text were: what were the writers trying to convey to the reader? The construct was based on what was filled-out for variables 1-5. Confusion (9) was a construct meant to be able to write down what came across as contradictory, ambiguous, or otherwise confusing to the reader/ researcher. The construct was based on what was filled-out for variables 1-8. Discourse (10) was the final construct that was part of the schema. It was meant to make an assessment of discourse. The construct was based on what was filled-out for variables 1-9 and it was based on the framework of Stohl et al., (2007; 2017). This construct explored to what extent the theory of Stohl et al. (2007; 2017) fit the data: was the business case (or the other two cases) of CSR a good way to capture what was going on in a CSR report, or was there something else going on in the data that wasn’t explained with the theory. Appendix 2 was tentatively used to recognize the discourse in addition to the text of the theoretical framework explaining the three discourses. An oversight of all constructs used in the present study can be found in table 2. A specific account of how the 18 constructs of Bell (1998) were adapted in the current ten constructs using the pre-test, can be found in appendix 3.
Table 2
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Constructs Explanation Method of registration
1. Title Title of the report as presented on the title page
Copy
2. Leadership statement
Introductory segment of the report, authored, delivered by leadership
List (creation of which is supported with ATLAS.ti) 3. Events Events that take place, ranging
from descriptions of vision to specific undertaken activities. Answers: what is this (selection of) text about?
List/Summary per chapter (creation of which is supported with ATLAS.ti)
4. Actors Stakeholders that are mentioned: internal and external
List per chapter (creation of which is supported with ATLAS.ti) 5. Places Physical locations that are
addressed in the text
List per chapter (creation of which is supported with ATLAS.ti) 6. Time & background Use of time expressions to
structure the story, such as recounting past issues or future challenges
List per chapter (creation of which is supported with ATLAS.ti) 7. Consistency (title,
leadership
statement, and rest of CSR-report)
An account of the extent to which the three textual facets (mis)align/ are consistent with each other
Summary (based on constructs 1-5)
8. Cohesion (amongst chapters)
What does the content of the chapters tell about the grand focus of the CSR-report?
Summary (based on constructs 1-5)
9. Confusion Are there still ambiguities, gaps or confusions? Explain.
Summary (based on constructs 1-8) 10. Discourse Comparison of the findings up
until now with the CSR
Summary based on results of constructs
1-15 discourses of Stohl et al. (2007) to
see to what extent they fit
9, and compared to appendix 2
Analysis plan
A first aspect of the plan of analysis is that every CSR report has a filled out schema. The filling-out was done as described in the operationalization. Here however, time is taken to describe a bit more accurately what was actually done. Please also refer to table 2 in which the method of registration is summarized. Please also refer to appendix 4 which is an example of an filled-out schema. The title (1) was copied. Focal points of the leadership statement (2) were filled out with each point having an own bullet. Events (3), actors (4), places (5), time and background (6) were filled-out per chapter after completing reading the chapter in question. Bullet points were used to organize this data within a chapter. The remaining four constructs: consistency (7), cohesion (8), confusion (9), and discourse (10) were all filled out after reading an entire CSR-report. The constructs were filled out based on what was filled-out for the earlier constructs, exactly as described in the operationalization. Additionally, there was a designated space per chapter for note-keeping that could be used whenever necessary. Notes usually concerned trains of thought addressing the contents of the just read chapter, or implications for the results. More generally put, though, note-keeping facilitated critical thinking for the researcher.
ATLAS.ti was used for constructs 2-6. It proved to be very difficult to validly and reliably recount the contents of a chapter after fully reading it. That is why it was opted to use ATLAS.ti. A list of ten nodes was made in ATLAS.ti, the nodes were the ten constructs in table 2. These constructs were coded for whilst reading a chapter. ATLAS.ti, was used to go back after reading a chapter, so that the schema for that chapter could be filled-out much more validly and reliably. An additional benefit was that it made the study more replicable.
Replicability, validity, and reliability, all being key values in the empirical research tradition (Bryman, 2012).
Now that it is addressed how 23 CSR-reports are turned into 23 schema’s, the
attention will shift to how the schema’s have helped answering the sub questions and the main research question. The starting point was looking at the four latent constructs (i.e.
consistency, cohesion, confusion, and discourse). These were compared among banks and over time for similarities and differences (Maxwell, 2013). But other aspects could also be compared across banks and over years: the notes, the names of the chapter, the number of pages a chapter addressing a certain theme gets over the years and across banks. This all revealed a story with which the way the sub questions could be answered. It was time and
16 time again reflected upon whether these more abstract findings largely based on constructs 7-10 held up when looking at constructs 1-6 and when looking at the actual report again.
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Results
The filled-out schemas that were meant as an input for the results section led to a 39.000+ word document. It is likely needless to say that a stringent selection was necessary to come to a handy result section. This meant focusing on the most important and interesting issues, and in that process reluctantly disregarding other interesting or remarkable findings. The data revealed that there were two interesting ‘types’ of results. The first type was the journey of individual banks, it answers: what changed year by year for a particular bank. The second type of interesting results, dealt with more cross-cutting issues and themes. One could think here of the legacy of the crisis or the fit of the data in general with the discourses of Stohl et al. (2007; 2017). It was opted, because of this observation, to divide the results section in two parts.
Part 1 is meant to give vertical perspective on the data. What is meant by that is that part 1 focuses on the ‘story’ of the individual bank from 2005-2014 based on the data. Part 2 is meant to give a horizontal perspective. What is meant by that is that this part addresses more cross-cutting issues and themes. Please also take a look at table 1 in the methods section to further understand what is meant with vertical and horizontal. Both parts are finished up with a sub conclusion. The sub conclusion is used to make sure that the outcomes are clearly and explicitly related to the concept of ‘discourse’ which is central in the main research question.
PART 1: A vertical perspective, the individual stories of the three banks The data revealed that all banks in 2005 communicated about CSR differently. Forward to 2015 and dissimilarity still dominates. This was the main reason to introduce a vertical
perspective, that is: take time out to tell the individual stories of the three banks since so much of the interesting findings were specific to only one of the banks. Part of telling this story is done through table 3. Table 3 was based on what was filled out on the schema under the constructs consistency, cohesion, confusion, and discourse. Or in other words: the latent constructs of this study. The notes that were made while filling out the schema’s, were also used in drawing up table 3. The table should be able to give the reader an idea of the story of the individual banks as they develop their reporting over the years. So the primary objective is not a comparison among banks, rather it is meant to give the reader a feel of the most central elements in the development of reporting of individual banks over the years. In addition to that a more, directed discussion of the data will follow next in text. Each bank gets its own section.
Table 3
Highlights of comparison to other banks and years
ING ABN-AMRO Rabobank
2005 • "Be a winning company that creates sustainable profitable growth" (all years)
• Manage relationship w/ clients differently as a means to sustainability
• Proactive dialogue: for identity and reputation management • Simplicity and transparency of financial services are of
importance (all years)
• Text is very unclear: it is a hard read (2005-2006)
• Social trend analysis is used extensively for setting a policy agenda
2006 • "Corporate responsibility is first and foremost about business" • Aspiring a communicative turn: listening, two-way communication, dialogue
• Introduction of rigid framework of stakeholder consultation presently in use
2007 • Achieving CO2 neutrality for own operations • No particular addition or change to previous year
• Catching wind of a trend: "customers are highly critical of financial products whose terms they believe lack transparency" • List of issues/topics provided that are deemed important to a
certain stakeholder group
• Defending oneself on many issues: fully emerged in the issue arena
• "Treating customers fairly" is said to be of importance • Training is important to instill CSR in employees (2007-2013) 2008 • Arguing to be "taking responsibility in turbulent times" while
deflecting culpability in any part for onset of economic crisis
- • Achieving CO2 neutrality for own operations
• Extensive elaboration on social trends and consequential key themes
2009 • Separate banking operations from investment management (2009-2013)
- -
2010 • Argued "shift from product centricity to customer centricity throughout culture [....]and operation
- -
• Trying to find "the business case for sustainability” 2011 • Most important challenge is to “better demonstrate that we
provide real value that benefits our customers and society"
• Terminology changed from ‘clients’ to ‘customers’: arguably to achieve enhanced relatability for non-entrepreneurial customers
-
• A more technical report hard to understand for layman, in contrast to previous reports
• Seeing bank in terms of role in society • All chapters start w/ 'better' (e.g. better business; 2011-2012).
Arguably to exemplify that ING needs to be better
• A proactive form of stakeholder management is practiced
2012 • Trying to be more apt at responding to societal changes and changing expectations from society
• Terminology changed back: from
‘customers’ back to ‘clients’ • New focus: treating customer fairly • Personalization of the report (increasing use
of 'I' and 'we'). Arguably to enhance relatability
• Organization in reputational crisis
• Trying to (re-)sell the merit of the cooperative structure to Dutch citizens
2013 • "Simpler, stronger, sustainable" is tagline of title • Improved (depiction of) awareness of stakeholders
• Continuation of issues in 2012 • They present "The business case for stakeholder engagement" • First mention that client centricity and
profitability sometimes conflict w/ each other
2014 - • Really extensive list of stakeholder dialogue
conducted over the previous year
• Seeing the light at the end of the tunnel (in terms of dealing w/ issues of the previous two years)
ING
ING’s take on sustainability is really consistent over the years. As they iterate in the very first sentence of the CSR report of 2006: "Corporate responsibility is first and foremost about business," that is, making profit (ING, 2006, p. 1). Their self-admitted ultimate goal in 2006 is to: “be a winning company that creates sustainable profitable growth” (ING, 2006, p. 21). This latter quote is deemed fairly applicable for the whole sampled time period.
While profit was arguably the main concern for ING, it wasn’t their only concern. ING stood out in their take on sustainability in relation to customers, in that they were the only bank to broadly mention the importance of simplicity and transparency of products and services before the crisis hit. Furthermore, they had a clear community involvement objective. Their focus was on helping solve the global problem of lack of childhood education in
emerging countries. ING to this end donated to UNICEF each year to send children to school for one year. Another interesting aspect, particularly in earlier ING CSR-reports, is that suppliers are seen as customers. Accordingly, ING tries to act on issues that are important for suppliers, such as prompt payment, prices and fair treatment (ING, 2007).
One of the most reliable aspects of CSR reports that could be tracked for changes over time for ING were its business principles. Business principles “set out the behaviours
[they] expect from everyone at ING [as well as] certain responsibilities [employees] have towards key stakeholders. Table 4 provides an overview of the business principles over the years.
Three principles from table 4 in particular are exemplary in light of the rest of ING CSR-reports. The first business principle that can be used as an example of broader reporting, is: “We aim for an above-average return”. The aim for profit represented in the business principle is present throughout all ING CSR-reports. The CSR-reports of 2005-2006 highlights something additional to just profit, that is: be a profitable but more so than other banks. This view was more centrally present in 2005-2006, and less so in following reports. The view seemed not to be abandoned, but it was given less prominence. The second business principle that can be used as an example of broader reporting, is: “We manage our impact on the environment”. Managing the impact on the environment is something that was not prominent in the first CSR reports, that is, concerns such as climate change, and limiting resource use in ING’s own operations. This however did become important in later CSR-reports (i.e. from 2007 on). That the environment became a business principle as late as 2007, seems to add to the credibility of the idea that this was a new idea in the organization
emerging in .2007 The third business principle that can be used as an example of broader reporting, is: “We treat customers fairly”. Customer needs were discussed earlier by ING in terms of simplicity of services, but the moral concept of ‘fairness’ was new in 2007 and
20 carried over in all subsequent CSR-reports. That this concept of ‘fairness’ became a business principle as late as 2007, seems to add to the credibility of the idea that this was a new idea in the organization emerging in 2007. Another interesting remark about the CSR-reporting is that ING in its implementation of CSR in the organization relied a lot on training and the notion that ‘culture is key’ throughout the studied period.
This entire elaboration on ING was based on what was filled out on the schema under the constructs consistency, cohesion, confusion, and discourse for each year. In addition the notes were utilized. Once the story was outlined, it was checked with the constructs
‘leadership statement’, ‘events’, ‘actors’, ‘places’, ‘time & background’, whether the story held up. The ‘story’ was also checked against the actual CSR-report that was studied to ensure that the story held up.
Table 4
Overview of ING business principles over the years
2005, 2006 2007, 2008 2009-2013
We are committed to our integrity.
We aim for an above-average return.* We are open and clear. We promote sustainable development
and respect human rights. We respect each other. We are involved in the communities we operate in.
We lend and invest responsibly
We manage our impact on the environment
We engage our employees in sustainability
We treat our customers fairly
We offer our customers responsible products
We play on active role in the communities where we do business
We act with integrity We are open and clear We respect each other We are socially and environmentally responsible
* Exemplary principles bold faced ABN-AMRO
ABN-AMRO’s take on sustainability shows a clear development over time. In 2005-2007 it is about delineating its role. The starting point for the bank is that the complexity of sustainability in banks is that of two worlds merging: ‘business arena’ and ‘traditional sustainability audiences’ (ABN-AMRO, 2005). This unfolds itself by the bank repeatedly insisting that it wants to engage with NGO’s and other ‘traditional sustainability audiences’,
21 provided that it is understood “that there are boundaries to the role that we [ABN-AMRO] can or even want to play.” (ABN-AMRO, 2006, p. 9) They continue by laying out that they take in considerations concerns of people and planet in addition to profit, but that “we [ABN-AMRO] are also clear about the fundamental reason for our existence: ABN AMRO is a profit-driven business.” (ABN-AMRO, 2006, p. 9).
Another aspect prominently present in this 2005-2007 era is a focus on the
relationships that ABN-AMRO has with clients. ABN-AMRO sees this as the primary way through which sustainability is achieved, as it is through investment and lending decisions that the bank indirectly affects the most change in society (ABN-AMRO, 2006).
The reporting in the 2011-2014 era is markedly different. First, extra emphasis is now put on the role that the bank has in society. Each chapter in 2011 for instance features a role description (e.g. as a citizen of the world; as a business facilitator). Second, the relevance of a clear range of products described in plain language is now for the first time a prominent feature of the reports. Third, is the practice of a “systematic form of proactive stakeholder management” (ABN-AMRO, 2011, p. 28). Basically this comprises of actively approaching stakeholders in the context of CSR, instead of letting them come to you. Examples given are for instance contacting people early when it seems they have difficulty to pay their mortgage to see how the situation can be bettered. It also comprises of proactively contacting wealthy private customers, to engage them on whether they would want to have their money invested more sustainably (ABN-AMRO, 2011). To exemplify, in 2013 230,000 clients were
proactively contacted and 31,000 proactively called (ABN-AMRO, 2013).
A constant over time is that ABN-AMRO has a broad Furthermore, they are constantly focused on the issues surrounding climate change (so starting 2005). Their focus could be observed through the way they repeatedly focused on the risks that it posed to the world and ABN-AMRO itself. Additionally, they are the first bank in 2005 to be as focused in reducing the negative effects from their own operations (i.e. environmental footprint) as in energy, mobility, paper, waste and water.
Unmentioned interesting aspects of ABN-AMRO’s CSR reporting are the considerations of dilemma’s in the 2005 and 2006 reports. It illustrates, they argue, “the absence of a simple of a simple right or wrong[. Highlighting that] we are often faced with divergent views and issues involving many stakeholders, interests and cross-border elements” (ABN-AMRO, 2006, p. 32). Other banks also did this to an extent, though not as
comprehensive and convincing as ABN-AMRO did. ABN-AMRO continued the tradition, but outsourced the chapter to a separate document in 2006. Another interesting remark is that ABN-AMRO’s implementation of CSR in the organization relied a lot on writing policy and
22 expecting compliance. It is argued that only in 2013-2014 reports addressed culture to an extent. Lastly, business principles did not have a similar prominent role as was the case with ING, that is why it will not be reported on.
This entire elaboration on ABN-AMRO was based on what was filled out on the schema under the constructs consistency, cohesion, confusion, and discourse for each year. In addition the notes were utilized. Once the story was outlined, it was checked with the
constructs ‘leadership statement’, ‘events’, ‘actors’, ‘places’, ‘time & background’, whether the story held up. The ‘story’ was also checked against the actual CSR-report that was studied to ensure that the story held up.
Rabobank
Rabobank’s take on sustainability remains similar in its core over time. Basically, two aspects stood out. First, there is a rigid framework to organize proactive dialogue with
stakeholders to allow identity and reputation management. Second, social trend analysis is repeatedly (and extensively) used to guide sustainability efforts. These two aspects will be elaborated upon below.
The rigid framework to organize proactive dialogue with stakeholders is applied once every three years throughout the sampled time period. It could be explained as a rule based process to come to a sophisticated understanding of the way stakeholders view Rabobank. That is: as a brand, its CSR policies, and its vision for the future. An important part also seems to be to get a grip on the stakeholders’ perception of the social issues Rabobank is likely to face in the future. This all translates into rules for selecting a wide-range of stakeholders, principles for dialogue, and a proposition of dialogue methods (e.g.
consultation, bi-laterals) among other rules. It is important to state that the process of dialogue at times also ended up in Rabobank keeping its initial position, sometimes while referencing that it opted to not go beyond applicable laws.
Social trend analysis is also a central part of Rabobank’s CSR reporting. Most paragraphs in all CSR reports started with an analysis of society after which policy was laid out. Trends formed the basis of reporting, or at least it did rhetorically. A text excerpt that show this, is for example: “The demand for food ingredients, foodstuffs, and food production will continue to grow on a global scale in the coming years. […] These issues require a balanced approach to economic, social and ecological interests.” (Rabobank, 2005, p. 20). This social trend analysis was more structurally addressed as well. Rabobank, for example, identified twelve social trends and fifteen key themes that are relevant (i.e. material issues) for the organization in their 2011 report.
23 A somewhat separate issue that deserves attention at this point is the organizational structure of Rabobank. Rabobank is a cooperative. This basically means that Rabobank has a central servicing organization, but in addition to that there are local Rabobanks that each hold their own banking licenses. For sustainability this meant a few things. First, it was more difficult to implement sustainability objectives thought up in the central servicing
organization as banks can only be nudged but not forced. Second, Rabobank was committed to distribute a share of the profit for community development: this is called cooperative dividend. Other banks, maybe less structurally, also did allocate funds to community involvement.
The previously discussed aspects were present throughout the full sampled period. In contrast to this is the issue of lack of trust. This issue emerged as early as the report of 2007, but became front and central in 2012. This was central to the content of Rabobank’s CSR-reporting, but it will be elaborated upon later on in the heading: ‘Onset of the crisis: different parts of CSR-reports’.
This entire elaboration on ABN-AMRO was based on what was filled out on the schema under the constructs consistency, cohesion, confusion, and discourse for each year. In addition the notes were utilized. Once the story was outlined, it was checked with the
constructs ‘leadership statement’, ‘events’, ‘actors’, ‘places’, ‘time & background’, whether the story held up. The ‘story’ was also checked against the actual CSR-report that was studied to ensure that the story held up.
Making up the balance: What does all of this say about discourse?
ING’s focus on business and profit is arguably the most important feature throughout its CSR reporting. This is a clear use of the business case for CSR. The business case as it pertains is a bit watered down starting 2007 (the moment the crisis hits) in that having more profit than competitors is no longer as prominently communicated. In addition ING
undertakes philanthropic activities, a clear use of the social contract case for CSR.
Furthermore, ING also undertakes efforts that benefit everyone in society equally, for instance its effort on climate change. This arguably signifies third generation discourse: civil society case. Lastly, the focus on transparency and simplicity pf products and services could also be classified as CSR. It arguably falls under the business case to the extent that business
objectives are cited, and under the social contract case to the extent that customers as stakeholders are cited. Focusing on the last, it seems however that the discourse theory provides little guidance or has only a moderate fit with the data.
ABN-AMRO’s focus on managing relationships with clients is a clear use of the social contract case for CSR in 2005-2007. During this period there are also clear facets of the
24 business case visible (e.g. when they emphasize that profit is their reason for existence), and the civil society case (its addressing of climate change and other global issues). This shifts to a stronger focus on dialogue with customers from 2011 on, a clear stronger use of the social contract case for CSR. Similarly, there is a shift in the use of business case. The business case is arguably used considerably less from 2011 on. The use of the civil society case remains similar.
Rabobank’s focus on dialogue present throughout the entire sampled time period is a clear use of the civil society case. During this period there are also clear facets of the business case visible (as they sometimes take the stance of adapting only if laws change), and the social contract case (its community involvement with cooperative dividend). Changing over time is an extra use of the social contract case, in that there are extensive worries about the lack of trust with stakeholders.
In light of sub question 1.2, there seem to be notable differences between banks. In light of sub question 1.1, a bit more of data analysis is required to answer that.
PART 2: A horizontal perspective, cross-cutting issues and themes
This part of the results section is not organized around the individual banks, rather it is issue based. This set up was chosen as it will aid a deeper understanding of cross-cutting issues and themes.
Onset of the crisis: different parts of CSR-reports
Up until now, little attention has been paid to how the crisis was visible in CSR-reports. Partly, it can be deduced implicitly if one sees the above described developments in conjunction with year counts provided. For the majority, however, it is discussed here. In the following text it is attempted to view ‘the crisis hitting’ from multiple perspectives, as the data implicated that there was no one best way to accurately capture this theme.
A first perspective is the crisis hitting looking at the title pages. ING used the words ‘growth’ in 2005 and 2006. The title of the report changed in 2007 when the crisis hit. It became: ING in society. This remained the case until 2012, with the exception of 2008. That report was named: Corporate Responsibility Report 2008: Taking responsibility in turbulent times. One could conclude in hindsight, that the crisis affected the CSR reporting on title pages starting reports over 2007. The 2008 report also featured crisis-related imagery: an orange hand print (company color) starkly contrasted on a blue background. This arguably symbolized that ING had ‘skin in the game’, the game being the onset of the crisis . ABN-AMRO’s title page also showed a clear change in 2007. The report had lost the clear picture from previous years, and was in white tones, arguably reflecting a sober approach. Rabobank
25 seemed to implicitly address the crisis in its title in 2007 with the subtitle being ‘A sustainable position in the market’ and in 2008 ‘Responsible banking for a sustainable future’. Both taglines arguably symbolized the importance of banking in such a way that the state shouldn’t have to step in as unfortunately was the case for ING and ABN-AMRO. In contrast: earlier or later years that did not have a tagline. Additionally, Rabobank featured in their 2008 report a photo from the inside of a car looking out to the side-window to other cars on the highway. The picture shows the side mirror looking back at past traffic as well as a boy in the next car slightly ahead of the car from which the picture is taken. The photo arguably highlighting past and future. Based on this elaboration, it becomes clear that the crisis hit in 2007 and 2008.
A second perspective is the crisis hitting looking at the leadership statement. What was notable in ING’s reporting was that there was no picture of the leader in the leadership statement in 2008, while this was the case in 2005-2007 and 2009-2013. There also was a leadership change in 2008 compared to 2005-2007. This was observable because leadership statements are usually signed with name and signature at the bottom. Rabobank’s reporting revealed something similar: in 2007 there was no picture with the leadership statement, while this was the case most other studied CSR reports: all except reporting of 2012 and 2014. Additionally, one of the two leaders in 2008 was different compared to 2005-2007. For ABN-AMRO there was no leadership statement in 2007 at all, while this was the case in all other studied years. Furthermore, ABN-AMRO reported that its leadership had changed in 2007. What all of this arguably shows, is that it was clear to leaders that ‘something’ was going on, that something being the crisis. Omitting a picture of the leader arguably also shows that leaders wanted to somewhat distance themselves from the ‘events’ unfolding, meaning the crisis wreaking havoc. The leadership change around 2007 in all sampled banks, furthermore, points to a break with a previous period, that is the period before crisis. All in all, this means that the crisis started around 2007-2008 if one looks at leadership statements.
A third perspective is the crisis hitting looking at the main body of text. ING presents the most interesting case in this regard. In 2010, somewhere tucked away in a corner in a chapter about the future of ING, the following sentence can be found: “[…]ING will focus on creating more agile and customer-centric businesses and repaying the Dutch State.” (ING, 2010, p. 9). Interestingly enough, there seems to be no mention of the Dutch state lending money to ING: either in this report, or earlier reports. So this lone sentence, which isn’t elaborated upon else in the 75+ page report, created a lot of confusion. Confusion, being one of the constructs of the schema’s. It is only in the 2011 ING report that it is explained that ING received a 10 billion euro loan from the Dutch state in October 2008 to make sure that
26 the bank would survive the crisis. Note that this is three reports later than the earliest moment it could have been reported on in the CSR-report. This means, all in all, that the crisis only was addressed comprehensively in 2011 if studying the main body of text . One very important remark to be made, is: ING did mention lack of trust due to the crisis earlier and proposed solutions to counter this loss of trust. It is here however argued that this is far less of a central issue than the 10 billion euro loan. After all, without the loan there might not even have been an ING bank at all after 2008. Taking the main body of text, the crisis thus came to light for the reader in 2011.
The same perspective, that is looking at the main body of text, can also be applied to Rabobank. Rabobank did not receive state support, so their reporting on the crisis had a different focal point. For them it was about sharp declining customer trust. This came to the forefront in the 2012 report, where they presented that their own early survey research under corporate customers had revealed that the likelihood of recommendation went down with 24% year-to-year (Rabobank, 2012, p. 20). A similar sampling of corporate customers in the 2013 report revealed this figure to go down by another 27% over 2013 (Rabobank, 2012, p. 36). This last decline was also under the influence of the ‘Libor interest rate scandal’ becoming public in November 2013, according to Rabobank’s 2013 CSR-report. The issue at play according to Rabobank in 2012-2013, seems to be: how could trust could dwindle even though Rabobank was a cooperative bank. In 2014, this shifts to the narrative: how can we make sure that we adhere to the cooperative principles to ensure more costumer trust. Both issues are called under one name here: the Rabobank identity crisis. This arguably was the clearest indication that the economic crisis hit Rabobank and it hit first in 2012.
To clarify, one way that the above described identity crisis was observed in text was when a 2013 chapter for the first time was named ‘cooperative and sustainability’. The chapter clarified the link between a cooperative organizational structure and sustainability. In other words: Rabobank tried to exemplify how their organizational structure was more aligned with long term sustainability instead of the abrupt disruption of a crisis. Another way that it was apparent in text was in its 2014 chapter about strategy. The report read: “The cooperative identity needs to be strengthened in order to maintain our distinctive
profile.”(Rabobank, 2014, p. 9). The distinctive profile referred to the CSR that could be achieved if the cooperative structure was adequately lived up to. In other words: this sentence reflects that identity work that needs to be done to reap the full benefits of being a cooperative organization.
27 Lastly, ABN-AMRO present possibly the clearest indication, going by the main body text, of when the crisis hit. It stopped publishing CSR reports altogether over 2008-2011 reflecting that the crisis hit and had its consequences.
To summarize, in hindsight it proved to be pretty consequential whether one is studying the title page, leadership statement, or the main body of text to find out as a reader when the crisis hit. The title page and leadership statement suggest a particular focus on the crisis around 2007-2008. While the main body of text addresses the crisis most
comprehensively around 2011-2012. Legacy of the crisis
The previous section laid out how the crisis first hit when looking at different parts of CSR-reports. This section shifts focus to the legacy of the crisis. Or in other words: what has changed in the focus of reporting since the crisis. All in all, three themes emerged from the studied texts. They will be addressed next.
First, all banks argue that they made a “shift from product centricity to client centricity” (ING, 2011, p. 39). This terminology was used by ING in 2011 but covers all banks. What it means is that selling as many products to a customer is no longer the primary objective of the salesperson, rather it is giving the customer what is best for them. It might be useful to put this in context of the crisis: many people were sold financial product they in the end couldn’t afford. Think for instance of a too high mortgage. This shift arguably plays into this state of affairs. To clarify how this was observed in the reports of the other two banks: Rabobank named one of its 2012 chapters ‘treating customers fairly’, and also used the language of client centricity. ABN-AMRO called a chapter in 2013 ‘enhancing client centricity’. Both banks built similar arguments as did ING.
Second, transparency, clarity, and simplicity of products and services was a clear legacy of the crisis. What this meant was that customers should be able to understand the financial products and services they use or buy. Rabobank’s reporting forms a clear example of this being a legacy of the crisis. In 2007 the bank reported that: “the sector was once more reminded of the fact that customers are highly critical of financial products whose terms they believe lack transparency.” (Rabobank, 2007, p. 8, emphasis added). This quote arguably illustrates that it is a needy consumer that requests transparency, clarity, and simplicity of products and services. While in 2012 they identify four themes of responsible and sustainable banking, one of them being: “transparency: offering fair, straight-forward products, and clearly communicating the related costs, returns and potential risks” (Rabobank, 2012, p. 22). This latter quote arguably showing that the merits of transparency, clarity and simplicity is no longer debated, but rather an integral part of CSR. ABN-AMRO showed a similar increased
28 focus on this issue, noting in its 2011 report that it wants to offer a: “clear range of products described in plain language” (ABN-AMRO, 2011, p. 8). One of ING’s golden rules in 2012, is: “We explain the risks, returns and costs of our products and services. Transparency and easy-to-understand language are crucial to our business.” (ING, 20112, p. 29) This ING quote arguably reflects a similar orientation on transparency, clarity and simplicity. ABN-AMRO wrote in similar vein: “One of the lessons that emerged from the financial crisis is that clients need to fully understand the financial products they purchase […] We have therefore
simplified our product range and rewritten our product descriptions and conditions in clearly understandable language” (ABN-AMRO, 2012, p. 7).
Third, smaller banks. This might be the most lamented legacy of crisis from the perspective of banks. ING and ABN-AMRO went from being ‘universal banks’ to being banks with a more specific focus. This terminology was used by ING in 2011. This specific legacy was the result of government interference for both banks. ING laid out that separation of its Investment Management activities from its banking activities was a condition of the EU for allowing a bail out by the Dutch state. For ABN-AMRO something similar happened, though little is known about that because most of it played out when ABN-AMRO wasn’t reporting (i.e. 2008-2011). It is clear that smaller banks is a legacy of the crisis when considering these events and the drop in employee numbers as reported on in the methods section.
Third generation discourse: A more refined understanding
The theory of discourse applied in this study was of help in interpreting the data. The data, however, also allows a refinement of the theory in some areas. Third generation discourse, the civil society case, is such an area. This section serves to argue that there are two main
‘subtypes’ of third generation discourse, that is: environmental and communicative. A considerable amount of content deemed civil society discourse addressed the environment (e.g. climate change). Efforts by banks on fighting climate change, arguably fall under third generation discourse mainly because the effects of combating it affect everyone in society similarly. Banks use the concept of ‘sustainability’ often in this vein. Sustainability as used here is a sub concept of CSR. Its focus being to make sure that practices of today don’t undermine a tomorrow, to put it briefly. Sustainability is used on the title page of ING reports starting 2011, all ABN-AMRO reports, and all Rabobank reports except its 2014 one.
Another considerable amount of content that was related to civil society discourse, was related for its reference to a specific form of communication. Two-way communication, listening, and dialogue were all pointers for civil society to be distilled. This joined (the spirit)
29 of Habermasian dialogue and departed from a one-way form of communication more
concerned with the internals of a corporation to be associated with the business case for CSR. Similarities across the board
The greatest similarity across banks was its treatment of employees. All tried to be an employer of choice, made commitments, and presented their progress. All three banks had to fire a considerable amount of people and tried to do so with efforts guiding them to new work. In this respect the social contract case for discourse applied across years and across banks as it pertains to employees.
Another similarity was in the field of organizational governance and compliance systems. A central aspect of the CSR communication for every bank was reporting on the policies for declining or accepting customers on the basis of CSR. ING called this
Environmental and Social Risk policy and ABN-AMRO named it an Ethical Social and Environmental risk management policy. Rabobank adopted similar policies under different names. To clarify what his policies entail: one could imagine that these kinds of policies deal with the question whether or under which circumstances it would be possible to loan money benefitting controversial governments or companies involved in nuclear energy, weapons, animal testing, the sex industry, etc..
Making up the balance: What does all of this say about discourse?
There are notable differences in discourse use before, during and after the crisis, thereby addressing sub question 1.1. At the same time, it can be said that those different parts of the crisis aren’t as clear-cut as previously defined. Looking at different parts offing CSR-reports, shows a different time when the crisis came to the forefront. A more accurate account at this point in this results section might be: there are notable differences before the onset of the crisis and thereafter. There notably is a shift from product centricity to client centricity. Product centricity arguably being an example of the business case for CSR, while client centricity is a good example of the social contract case. Another change is a focus on transparency, clarity, and simplicity of products and services. This change, benefitting customers, is also a shift to the social contract case of CSR. The shift to smaller banks as dictated by the EU and Dutch state is a clear legacy of the crisis. It shows that the business case, with a focus on profit did not prevail after the crisis. Rather, a general societal interest prevails: an example of third generation of discourse, the civil society case.
The data also reveals something about the fit of the discourse theory. Particularly the third generation of discourse could be refined based on the sample of this study: there turned out to be environmental and communicative facets of the civil society case of discourse in CSR reporting of Dutch banks.
30
Discussion
The economic crisis of 2007 was taken as a starting point to study the development of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) communication of Dutch banks over a longer period of time. Central to the approach was conceptualizing CSR as discourse. The merits, of which, were that discourse is some sort of a meta-perspective, revealing shifts of sensemaking by scholars and practitioners, of corporations’ roles and responsibilities in society over time (Stohl et al., 2007). Three discourses for CSR were conceptualized using an existing
framework, notably: the business case, social contract case, and the civil society case (Stohl, et al., 2007; 2017). The main research question inquired about the way that discourse developed in CSR-reports of Dutch retail banks over 2005-2014. A discourse analysis was conducted for the three largest banks making up 84% of the retail market: ING, ABN-AMRO, Rabobank (Banken.nl, 2018).
The study revealed that there are notable differences between banks (thereby
answering sub question 1.2). ING arguably uses the business case discourse most throughout its CSR reports in addition to the other two discourses to lesser extent. ABN-AMRO, on the other hand, had a stronger focus on the second generation of discourse (social contract case) in 2005-2007 before the crisis. The other two discourses were present, but to a lesser extent. From 2011 on, however, they started to focus more on dialogue, which shifted the balance to more civil society case for CSR. ABN-AMRO, was also the lone bank where from 2011 on the first discourse vanished for a considerable amount. Rabobank used all three discourses over the entire sampled time period, but the civil society case was the most prominently used discourse due to Rabobank’s proactive and rigidly organized approach to dialogue with stakeholders.
Answering sub question 1.1 proved to be more complicated. The data revealed that the crisis as found in the CSR-reports did not entirely match the conceptualization on forehand in the theoretical framework. In hindsight, it seems that the main problem was that there was no clear theory explaining the course of economic crises in general or the 2007 economic crisis in particular: Is a crisis one moment in time, after which the recovery starts? Or is it a period of time, after which the recovery starts? Or is a crisis actually multiple moments of crisis spread over a longer period of time. For the present study, it seems that particularly the last model seemed to have a good fit with the data. It explains how the crisis became visible in the title pages as early as 2007, but that a comprehensive analysis in the main body of text could emerge as late as 2012. The model of multiples crises would probably recognize a financial crisis in 2007 in the US, prompting a response in symbolism in leadership statements and title pages. That the main body of text only addresses crisis in 2012, is than attributed to an
